# Jaffna Monitor > Jaffna Monitor is an independent, bilingual magazine delivering fearless reporting and in-depth stories on Jaffna news, Tamil politics, culture and diaspora life. Public Ghost content for AI and LLM tooling. This file includes a bounded export of public pages first, then recent public posts. Append `.md` to any post or page URL to get the content in Markdown (for example, `/example-post.md`). ## Pages ### About Jaffna Monitor URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/about/ Last updated: 2025-10-11T09:13:44.000Z **Jaffna Monitor (JM)** is an independent, community-driven magazine for Sri Lankans everywhere—both on the island and across the global Sri Lankan diaspora. We publish public-interest journalism, analysis, interviews, culture, and history. Though it originates from Sri Lanka, *Jaffna Monitor* is read by a diverse audience around the world who seek authentic perspectives and independent voices from the island. Our mantra: **Unafraid & Unbowed.** Our promise: **fair, factual, people-centred reporting** that amplifies voices from every corner of Sri Lanka and its worldwide communities. - **Who we serve:** Sri Lankans and friends of Sri Lanka—at home and abroad. - **What we cover:** governance and justice, economy and livelihoods, culture and arts, education and youth, environment and development, sport, diaspora life, memory/history, and important global affairs — in short, *almost everything that shapes Sri Lankan life and thought, at home and abroad.* **How we publish:** At present, *Jaffna Monitor* is released as a monthly e-magazine alongside our website. All stories featured in the magazine appear on the website as well — some even before the magazine’s release. We also plan to launch a daily news website soon to provide continuous updates and deeper engagement with our readers. **Languages:** Our primary publishing language is English, with plans to include select content in Tamil and Sinhala in the future, wherever relevant. --- ## **Guiding Principles of *Jaffna Monitor*** **1\. Interviews Without Boundaries** - *Jaffna Monitor* does not restrict whom we interview. Whether controversial or celebrated, we believe every story deserves to be told. Interviews are published faithfully, without distortion, and allow interviewees to speak in their own words. Each interview carries the disclaimer: *“The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of Jaffna Monitor.”* **2\. An Open Platform for Writers** - Jaffna Monitor welcomes contributions from all who wish to write, provided they uphold the basic principles of free expression. Submissions are published under *Guest Columns* or *Opinions*. *Editorials*, *Monitor Memos*, and articles are authored by our correspondents or reporters. - All *Guest Columns* and interviews are clearly identified as the views of their respective authors, not those of Jaffna Monitor. Each carries the note: *“The views expressed here are personal and do not reflect those of the Jaffna Monitor.”* - We do not publish material that glorifies death, promotes or justifies violence, or incites its use. Writers are invited to submit their articles to [**editor@jaffnamonitor.com**](mailto:editor@jaffnamonitor.com). **3\. Counter-Voices** - We encourage debate. If readers disagree with a published interview or article, we are committed to publishing counter-arguments in the same spirit of open dialogue. - We strongly encourage and welcome counter-voices. Readers may contact us at **editor@jaffnamonitor.com**. **4\. Editing and Accuracy** - Submissions may be edited for clarity, grammar, and scope. Factual errors will be corrected, but the arguments will remain unchanged. Responsibility for opinion pieces rests solely with their respective authors. - **6\. Editorial Responsibility** - The editorial team assumes direct responsibility only for *Editorials*, *Monitor Memos*, and articles written by our reporters and special correspondents. - All other contributions represent the views of the individual authors. However, Jaffna Monitor accepts responsibility for the editorial decision to publish such material, within the framework of our mission, ethical standards, and the law. This ensures that while individual voices remain independent, Jaffna Monitor remains accountable for the platform it provides. --- ## **Guidelines for Letters to the Editor** We welcome letters to the editor as part of our commitment to fostering open, informed, and respectful public dialogue. To ensure fairness and clarity, please follow the guidelines below: **1\. Word Count** - Letters should be **between 300 and 500 words**. - Shorter letters are more likely to be published in full; longer submissions may be edited for length and clarity. **2\. Relevance and Timeliness** - Letters must respond to a recent article, editorial, or a pressing public issue. - Submissions that are time-sensitive are more likely to be considered. **3\. Clarity and Focus** - Please address **only one main issue or argument** per letter. - Use clear, concise language that can be understood by a broad readership. **4\. Civility and Respect** - Critique ideas, arguments, or policies—not individuals. - Submissions containing abusive, defamatory, or discriminatory language will not be published. **5\. Accuracy and Responsibility** - Authors are responsible for ensuring factual accuracy. - Cite reliable sources where appropriate. Letters containing misinformation will be rejected. **6\. Authorship** - All letters must include the writer’s **full name, city of residence, and valid contact information** (phone or email). - Only the writer’s name and location will be published; contact details are for verification only. **7\. Originality** - Letters must be **original and exclusive** to this publication. - Content previously published elsewhere will not be considered. **8\. Editorial Rights** - The editorial team reserves the right to edit all submissions for grammar, clarity, style, and length, while preserving the writer’s core meaning. Letters and articles are selected based on their relevance to *Jaffna Monitor*’s editorial scope and public interest value. - Publication is not guaranteed, and decisions of the editorial team are final. ### Guidelines for Letters to the Editor URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/guidelines-for-letters-to-the-editor/ Last updated: 2025-10-11T09:14:26.000Z We welcome letters to the editor as part of our commitment to fostering open, informed, and respectful public dialogue. To ensure fairness and clarity, please follow the guidelines below: **1\. Word Count** - Letters should be **between 300 and 500 words**. - Shorter letters are more likely to be published in full; longer submissions may be edited for length and clarity. **2\. Relevance and Timeliness** - Letters must respond to a recent article, editorial, or a pressing public issue. - Submissions that are time-sensitive are more likely to be considered. **3\. Clarity and Focus** - Please address **only one main issue or argument** per letter. - Use clear, concise language that can be understood by a broad readership. **4\. Civility and Respect** - Critique ideas, arguments, or policies—not individuals. - Submissions containing abusive, defamatory, or discriminatory language will not be published. **5\. Accuracy and Responsibility** - Authors are responsible for ensuring factual accuracy. - Cite reliable sources where appropriate. Letters containing misinformation will be rejected. **6\. Authorship** - All letters must include the writer’s **full name, city of residence, and valid contact information** (phone or email). - Only the writer’s name and location will be published; contact details are for verification only. **7\. Originality** - Letters must be **original and exclusive** to this publication. - Content previously published elsewhere will not be considered. **8\. Editorial Rights** - The editorial team reserves the right to edit all submissions for grammar, clarity, style, and length, while preserving the writer’s core meaning. Letters and articles are selected based on their relevance to *Jaffna Monitor*’s editorial scope and public interest value. - Publication is not guaranteed, and decisions of the editorial team are final. ### Jaffna Monitor Previous Issues URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-monitor-previous-issues/ Last updated: 2026-08-30T15:39:30.000Z Explore our past editions to revisit key stories and perspectives from Jaffna Monitor. Click on any previous issue below to read the full publication. --- [July 2026 - Jaffna MonitorEruope’s Ambassadors on the North’s Unfinished Business![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-6ab2834c-3808-44f0-a54d-c30b13c2519f.png)Jaffna MonitorOur Reporter Jul 31, 2026 — 1 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/JM_JULY-1-487c0ba9-52ab-48de-895a-ebe126e3fcc3.jpg)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/july-2026/) [June 2026 - Jaffna Monitor“Land was the one issue raised everywhere I went.” - Australian High Commissioner.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-9e3cd497-d1eb-4ddc-a09e-76f3e05be522.png)Jaffna MonitorOur Reporter Jul 7, 2026 — 1 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/JM_JUNE-1-1-d6e9371c-edf3-44a1-b5c4-de60a353be37.jpg)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/june-2026/) [May 2026 - Jaffna MonitorHow a political novice devoured goliaths in Tamil Nadu![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-d3ac86b8-c2a4-415b-9aec-107217475381.png)Jaffna MonitorM.R. Narayan Swamy Jun 6, 2026 — 5 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/JM-MAY-Cover-29df1c4d-fc96-415c-b80d-74318c563066.jpg)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/may-2026/) [April 2026 - Jaffna MonitorThe Business of Hope: How IMHO Helped Rebuild Lives in Sri Lanka.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-34.png)Jaffna MonitorAruliniyan Mahalingam May 2, 2026 — 8 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/JM_APRIL_2015-1.jpg)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/april-2026/) [March 2026 - Jaffna MonitorInvited. Then Turned Away: The 11-hour wait that preceded IRIS DENA’s sinking.![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Jaffna MonitorDr. Alireza Delkhosh Mar 31, 2026 — 4 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/JM_March-15-Cover.jpg)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/march-2026/) [February 2026 - Jaffna Monitor“Had Prabhakaran accepted the international rescue plan, thousands - including himself - would have survived” - Erik Solheim![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-33.png)Jaffna MonitorOur Reporter Feb 28, 2026 — 2 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/Cover-Page-JM_FEBRUARY_15-1.png)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/february-2026/) [January 2026 - Jaffna Monitor“Grasp Every Opportunity, Don’t Be Afraid” — Sir Nishan Canagarajah![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-32.png)Jaffna MonitorOur Reporter Jan 31, 2026 — 2 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/PHOTO-2026-01-16-08-49-11-1.jpg)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/january-2026/) [December 2025 - Jaffna MonitorFirst Sri Lankan Tamil Knight in 50 Years.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-22.png)Jaffna MonitorAruliniyan Mahalingam Jan 7, 2026 — 18 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/Jaffna-Monitor-December-2025-1.png)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/december-2025/) [November 2025 - Jaffna MonitorBE IT LTTE, HAMAS, OR ISIS - YOU CAN’T CREATE A COUNTRY THROUGH TERROR.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-25.png)Jaffna MonitorEḻuttukkiṉiyavaṉ Nov 18, 2025 — 7 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/Cover-Page-JM_NOVEMBER_15-3.jpg)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/november-2025/) [October 2025 - Jaffna MonitorNo minority politician can solve ethnic issues without the trust of the majority.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-26.png)Jaffna MonitorEḻuttukkiṉiyavaṉ Oct 27, 2025 — 20 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/Frame-8-2.png)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/october-2025/) [September 2025 - Jaffna MonitorJVP still denies the Tamil ethnic question.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-27.png)Jaffna MonitorEḻuttukkiṉiyavaṉ Sep 17, 2025 — 6 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/sept2025-1-4.png)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/september-2025/) [August 2025 - Jaffna MonitorIf Sri Lankan Tamils truly want to shape their destiny, they must first become financially and institutionally self-reliant.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-28.png)Jaffna MonitorJaffna Monitor Aug 16, 2025 — 4 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/august-2025-4.png)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/august-2025/) [July 2025 - Jaffna MonitorTwo centuries, zero extremists: How Bohras became Sri Lanka’s model muslims.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-29.png)Jaffna MonitorKaniyan Pungundran Jul 14, 2025 — 13 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/July2025-1-2.png)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/july-2025/) [June 2025 - Jaffna MonitorHow noolaham.org gave the Jaffna library arsonists a digital middle finger.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/Jaffna-Icon-1-1-30.png)Jaffna MonitorKaniyan Pungundran Jun 16, 2025 — 14 min read![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/June2025-2.png)](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tag/june-2025/) --- Discover earlier issues in our E-Book collection — [click to browse](https://jaffnamonitor.app/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com). ## Posts ### ‘India Will Always Stand Firmly With Sri Lanka,’ Rajnath Singh Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/india-will-always-stand-firmly-with-sri-lanka-rajnath-singh-says/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T17:24:55.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India will stand by Sri Lanka whenever it faces a crisis, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said Tuesday as he began a three-day visit focused on expanding defence and security ties. “India will always stand firmly with Sri Lanka whenever the island nation faces a crisis,” Mr. Singh told members of the Indian community in Colombo, according to India’s Ministry of Defence. Mr. Singh is scheduled to meet President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who also holds the defence portfolio, on Wednesday at the Presidential Secretariat. The countries are expected to sign three agreements covering military education, cadet exchanges and maintenance of Sri Lankan air-defence guns. The agreements would follow a five-year defence cooperation memorandum signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in April 2025. Mr. Singh’s visit is the first by an Indian defence minister to Sri Lanka since 1988, when K.C. Pant travelled to the island during the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. India and Sri Lanka have expanded military training, maritime surveillance and other security cooperation in recent years. The relationship has gained strategic importance for New Delhi as China has strengthened its economic and maritime presence across the Indian Ocean, including in Sri Lanka. Addressing the Indian community, Mr. Singh also highlighted India’s economic growth and defence industry. He said the economy had grown to about $4 trillion, citing increases in manufacturing, exports, infrastructure investment and digital services. He said annual defence exports had risen from about 6 billion rupees roughly 12 years ago to around 390 billion rupees, as India seeks to reduce its dependence on imported military equipment. Mr. Singh credited Mr. Modi’s government with raising India’s international standing and said the country was increasingly being heard in global affairs. He described the Indian community in Sri Lanka as an important link between the countries, whose ties extend to trade, development assistance and cultural relations. Among those attending were Sri Lankan cabinet minister Saroja Savithri Paulraj, Western Province Governor Hanif Yusoof, Deputy Minister Sundaralingam Pradeep and India’s high commissioner to Sri Lanka, Santosh Jha. Sri Lanka lies just off India’s southern coast and near major Indian Ocean shipping routes. Successive governments in Colombo have sought to maintain close relations with India while cultivating extensive economic ties with China. India provided billions of dollars in credit lines and other assistance during Sri Lanka’s economic collapse in 2022 and has continued to support infrastructure and development projects on the island. Mr. Singh’s visit continues through Thursday. ### India’s Defence Minister Arrives in Sri Lanka, First Such Visit in 38 Years URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indias-defence-minister-arrives-in-sri-lanka-first-such-visit-in-38-years/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T16:10:01.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, arrived in Sri Lanka on Tuesday for a three-day visit, the first by an Indian defence minister since 1988, as the two countries prepare to sign three military agreements and New Delhi presses a security relationship it now describes as central to its position in the Indian Ocean. Mr. Singh is scheduled to meet President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who also holds the defence portfolio, on Wednesday morning at the Presidential Secretariat. The three agreements to be signed there cover military education, cadet exchanges and the maintenance of Sri Lankan air-defence guns. The visit comes seventeen months after India and Sri Lanka signed a five-year defence cooperation memorandum during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Colombo in April 2025, and nine months after India committed $450 million to rebuilding infrastructure destroyed by Cyclone Ditwah. Mr. Singh landed at Bandaranaike International Airport on Tuesday afternoon, leading a delegation of senior officials from India’s defence and external affairs ministries. He was received by Sri Lanka’s deputy defence minister, Maj. Gen. Aruna Jayasekara, who is retired from the military, and by India’s high commissioner in Colombo, Santosh Jha. Before leaving New Delhi, Mr. Singh described Sri Lanka as one of India’s most important partners under its “Neighbourhood First” policy and its MAHASAGAR regional framework, and said he looked forward to a productive engagement with the Sri Lankan leadership. The last Indian defence minister to visit was K.C. Pant, who travelled to Colombo in 1988 while serving in Rajiv Gandhi’s cabinet, at a point when Indian troops were deployed on the island under the Indo-Lanka Accord, and relations between the two governments were at their most strained. Mr. Singh himself was scheduled to visit in September 2023, during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s presidency, but the trip was deferred by New Delhi without explanation. ## Three Agreements Sri Lanka’s foreign minister, Vijitha Herath, who is also the cabinet spokesman, set out the contents of the three agreements at the government’s weekly post-cabinet briefing on Tuesday. The first establishes cooperation between the National Cadet Corps of India and its Sri Lankan counterpart, providing for exchanges, training and joint programs. The second links the two countries’ national defence colleges, allowing exchanges of instructors and course participants. The third covers the maintenance, free of charge, of anti-aircraft guns that India supplied to Sri Lanka in earlier years. Indian defence reporting in the days before the visit had described the third agreement differently, as a prospective supply of new Indian air-defence guns to Sri Lanka, which India manufactures in short- and medium-range variants. Mr. Herath’s account describes servicing of equipment already in Sri Lankan hands. Neither government had reconciled the two descriptions by Tuesday evening. Mr. Herath said the visit should not be read solely through a defence lens, and that its purpose extended beyond military cooperation to the broader bilateral relationship. That framing reflects a persistent domestic sensitivity. The opposition has accused Mr. Dissanayake’s National People’s Power government of entering a secret defence pact with India during Mr. Modi’s 2025 visit and has demanded the memorandum’s release. Mr. Dissanayake has rejected the charge, saying the agreements are open to both sides and that ensuring Sri Lanka’s own security is written into the text. He has said the memorandum would be presented to Parliament. The political charge attaches to the party as much as the pact. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, the N.P.P.'s parent party, led an armed insurrection between 1987 and 1990 in opposition to Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. ## A Wider Relationship The April 2025 memorandum functions as an umbrella agreement, institutionalising joint exercises, training, naval port calls and equipment cooperation, and providing a framework under which India can supply military hardware. Mr. Singh is expected to review its implementation during his talks. At the time of signing, Mr. Dissanayake publicly reaffirmed that Sri Lankan territory would not be used in ways that undermined India’s security. India’s role in Sri Lanka expanded significantly during the country’s economic collapse in 2022, when New Delhi extended billions of dollars in credit lines as the country ran short of fuel, medicine and food. It grew again after Cyclone Ditwah struck in late 2025\. India’s response, conducted under the name Operation Sagar Bandhu, delivered relief supplies and Indian Army engineering teams, which have been rebuilding road connectivity across seven provinces using prefabricated Bailey bridges. The $450 million package announced in Colombo in December 2025 by India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, combines a $350 million concessional line of credit with $100 million in grants, with $30 million allocated specifically to bridge connectivity. Mr. Singh is scheduled to review that work and to remotely inaugurate three rebuilt bridges, two in Kurunegala District and one in Batticaloa. ## The Program Mr. Singh met members of the Indian community in Colombo on Tuesday evening at India House. On Wednesday, after the signing at the Presidential Secretariat, his program includes the Indian Peace Keeping Force memorial at Battaramulla, the Ministry of Defence, Parliament and Gangaramaya Temple, according to police traffic arrangements and Sri Lankan press reports. He is scheduled to meet Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, Defence Secretary Sampath Thuyacontha and the commanders of the three armed services. A reception aboard an Indian Navy vessel is planned for Wednesday evening. On Thursday he travels to Nuwara Eliya to visit the Seetha Amman Temple before departing. ### Sri Lanka’s Main Tamil Party Says Government Has Failed to Deliver on War Accountability URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-main-tamil-party-says-government-has-failed-to-deliver-on-war-accountability/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T11:23:56.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s largest Tamil political party said Tuesday that the government had failed to take meaningful action on wartime accountability, enforced disappearances, or the return of military-held land, nearly two years after coming to power promising reform. The Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, or ITAK, issued the statement as Sri Lanka’s human rights record came under renewed scrutiny at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. The party said it welcomed a written update by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, particularly its concern over the lack of progress on accountability for abuses committed during the country’s civil war. The statement, signed by ITAK’s general secretary, M.A. Sumanthiran, cited the continued military occupation of civilian land, enforced disappearances, political prisoners and the Chemmani mass grave near Jaffna among issues it said remained unresolved. It also pointed to the long-delayed provincial council elections. ITAK acknowledged the government’s efforts to combat bribery, corruption and drug-related crime but said there had been no comparable progress on issues affecting Tamils. “We are deeply disappointed by the lack of any meaningful steps taken by the government on matters affecting the Tamil people, the party said. ITAK also called on President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government to fulfil its election promises, particularly its pledge to introduce a new constitution addressing what the party described as the “historic aspirations” of the Tamil people. Mr. Dissanayake’s National People’s Power made unprecedented electoral gains in the Tamil-majority north after taking power in 2024, winning parliamentary seats in areas long dominated by Tamil nationalist parties. The result gave the new government political ground in a region where successive administrations in Colombo had struggled to build support. The U.N. assessment, however, presented a more mixed picture than ITAK’s statement. Covering developments from October 2025 through July 2026, it noted arrests and investigations connected to political killings, enforced disappearances and the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. It also cited the attorney general’s decision to indict Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, a former Eastern Province chief minister widely known as Pillayan, over the 2006 abduction and killing of a university vice chancellor. But the U.N. found that prosecutions for crimes committed during the civil war remained stalled. It also raised concerns about the continued use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and about surveillance and questioning of activists and journalists, including over their contacts with U.N. bodies in Geneva. Mr. Türk said the government had an opportunity to break with decades of impunity but warned that “more needs to be done to end the long legacy of impunity.” The renewed scrutiny comes as excavations at Chemmani have again placed questions of accountability and the disappeared at the center of public attention in the north. Human remains were uncovered there during construction work in February 2025, prompting a court-supervised excavation. Investigators have since recovered 583 sets of human remains during 110 days of excavation across three phases. The remains include those of adults and children, while personal belongings recovered from the site have included items associated with children. The identities of the dead have yet to be established, and no one has been charged in connection with the burial site. The question of political devolution also remains unresolved. Sri Lanka’s provincial councils, established under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1987, have been without elected representatives since 2018 as successive governments postponed elections. Sri Lanka’s civil war ended in May 2009 with the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In the 17 years since, successive governments have pledged varying measures of reconciliation, accountability and constitutional reform. For families searching for relatives who disappeared during the conflict and its aftermath, those promises have yet to produce the answers they have sought. ### Sri Lanka Cannot Outrun Its Human Rights Past, Tamil MP Warns Government URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-cannot-outrun-its-human-rights-past-tamil-mp-warns-government/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T05:36:11.000Z **By Asela Kuruluwansha** **KANDY, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s new political leadership cannot distance itself from the country’s unresolved human rights record simply because the abuses occurred under previous governments, Tamil lawmaker Shanakiyan Rasamanickam said, warning that international scrutiny would persist until the underlying issues were addressed. Changes in the presidency, Cabinet or governing party do not erase the state’s responsibility to confront past violations or act on international human rights recommendations, Mr. Rasamanickam said. “The government should not think that it can avoid the issue without addressing human rights concerns,” he told reporters after a seminar organised by the Open Parliament Caucus at the Golden Crown Hotel in Kandy. His remarks come as Sri Lanka once again faces scrutiny in Geneva over accountability for past human rights violations, including those associated with the country’s long civil war. Mr. Rasamanickam acknowledged that many of the violations at the centre of that scrutiny predated the current government. But, he said, responsibility for addressing them now rests with those in power. “The past violations of human rights did not occur under this government,” he said. “But the present government must understand that unless firm decisions are taken regarding those past violations, the international human rights body will continue to raise these issues.” He also rejected the idea that international scrutiny of Sri Lanka’s human rights record was primarily a Tamil concern. “It is not something confined to one ethnic community or one group of people,” he said, arguing that the questions raised internationally concern human rights across the country. Mr. Rasamanickam also spoke about the erosion of public confidence in Parliament, particularly among younger Sri Lankans, tracing much of that disillusionment to the mass protest movement that erupted during the country’s economic and political crisis. “During that period, people said they did not want any of the 225 members of Parliament,” he said. “Confidence in the parliamentary system had particularly deteriorated among young people.” As a co-chair of the Open Parliament Caucus, Mr. Rasamanickam said he was working to narrow that divide. The caucus has held discussions with young people in Gampaha, Batticaloa and Kandy and plans similar meetings in other districts. But public forums alone would not be enough, he said. The caucus also hopes to bring youth groups into parliamentary select committees and consultative committees, giving them a more direct role in the legislative process. Separately, Mr. Rasamanickam rejected suggestions that the arrest of Namal Rajapaksa, a lawmaker and national organiser of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, amounted to political persecution. “The arrest of Namal Rajapaksa cannot be described as political persecution,” he said. ### The Long Warning: Inside the Intelligence Trail That Preceded Easter Bombings URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/the-long-warning-inside-the-intelligence-trail-that-preceded-easter-bombings/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T05:15:43.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** **JAFFNA —** On the evening of April 20, 2019, a man at his home in Puthukudiyiruppu took a WhatsApp call from an Indian police officer. The call came sometime between 5:15 and 5:45 p.m. The officer asked him an odd question: where were Sri Lanka's major churches? The man named the ones that came to mind. The Madhu shrine. St. Anthony's at Kochchikade in Colombo. The Tewatta church at Ragama. Then the officer told him that Zahran Hashim's group was preparing to strike Catholic churches the following morning, and that he should alert people in the government quickly. The call was not the beginning of anything. It was the most consequential item in a traffic that had been moving across the Palk Strait for close to eighteen months, along a route that ran from a young man in Coimbatore who had once tried to reach the Islamic State, through the intelligence wing of the Tamil Nadu Police, through a former LTTE commander who had spent years in the Sea Tigers, and into the hands of a low-ranking Sri Lankan military intelligence operative in Vavuniya. Sri Lanka has spent seven years arguing inside a seventeen-day window. India's warning to the State Intelligence Service arrived on April 4, 2019, followed by further information on April 18 and 19; on the evening of the 20th and again at first light on the 21st, the head of the SIS passed his own warnings to the inspector general of police and the defence secretary. Two of the country's most senior security officials have since been sentenced to death for failing to act on that intelligence. This account, based on months of reporting in the north and on interviews with people familiar with the operation on both sides of the water, describes the eighteen months that preceded it. ### PART ONE: THE MAN INSIDE **Abu Hind** In 2017, the Islamic State's declaration of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria was still pulling in young men across South Asia who had encountered it entirely online. One of them was a Muslim youth from Coimbatore, in Tamil Nadu. His radicalization did not come through a recruiter. There was no local handler and no cell. "He was essentially alone," one source familiar with the investigation told the *Jaffna Monitor*. "He learned about ISIS by reading and watching material." He had become fascinated by the group's emergence and gradually convinced himself that joining it was a religious obligation. The young man travelled to Turkey intending to cross into Syria. He was intercepted at the border and sent back. By then he had drawn the attention of an intelligence apparatus much closer to home. Tamil Nadu's security establishment, including the Q Branch, was monitoring possible links between Muslims in the state and ISIS networks abroad, and officers took him into custody for questioning when he landed in Chennai. Overseeing the state's internal-security intelligence apparatus was C. Easwaramoorthy, a senior Indian Police Service officer who had taken charge as inspector general of police for Intelligence (Internal Security) after his promotion in December 2016, with Q Branch matters under his supervision. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-1-14.jpg) C. Easwaramoorthy Questioning produced something the officers had not expected. Part of the ideological material that had shaped the young man could be traced to Zahran Hashim, the Sri Lankan preacher then building a radical following. Zahran's base was in the east, but his reach already extended well beyond it — to Mawanella, Maruthamunai in Ampara, Panadura, Matale, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa and other parts of the country. At the same time, Zahran's own network was trying to make contact with the Islamic State and its structures abroad. According to sources familiar with the group, those attempts had repeatedly failed. The Q Branch saw an opening. Rather than treat the young man as a failed traveller, officers devised a plan to turn him and insert him into Zahran's network. The preacher whose material had helped radicalize him would become his target. The Q Branch prepared him to present himself as a man with connections to the Islamic State, an intermediary who could help Zahran’s group establish contact with the movement. To Zahran and his circle he became known as Abu Hind. They believed him. The name itself carried a claim. *Abu Hind* means “Father of India” in Arabic, and the Islamic State often used such *abu* titles for men of significance. To Zahran’s circle, the name suggested its bearer was a person of standing in India. ## **Why the cover held** By 2017, Sri Lanka had produced a cluster of radical preachers with formal religious education, whose credentials gave their message an authority that an online propagandist could not match. Zahran and Naufer Moulavi were among them. So was Rasheed Mohammed Ibraheem Moulavi, the younger brother of the man who led the Sri Lanka Jamaat-e-Islami for twenty-four years, handing over the organisation only weeks before the Easter attacks. What the country had not produced was any structure connected to the Islamic State itself. Neither had Tamil Nadu, where investigators had encountered individual young men consuming ISIS propaganda but no comparable network of clerics openly aligned with the group. There was no Tamil-speaking ISIS apparatus anywhere within Zahran's reach. That absence worked in two directions. It was why the group needed an intermediary in the first place. It was also why, when one turned up, there was no one to vouch for him and no one to expose him. Nor did the form of the approach raise suspicion: the Islamic State was by then running much of its overseas activity through remote handlers who dealt with local cells over encrypted messaging and were never seen, so a voice on a telephone was exactly what such a contact looked like. Abu Hind did not have to manufacture the substance of his cover either. Before his recruitment he had immersed himself in ISIS propaganda thoroughly enough to convince himself to leave India for Syria, and the knowledge that had made him a security concern became his principal asset. "He already had all of this material in his head," one source familiar with the operation said. "That was why he had wanted to go to Syria in the first place." Q Branch officers trained him in the mechanics of the persona — how to communicate with Zahran's circle, how to handle questions, how to conduct himself without exposing the operation behind him. The ideology required no instruction. One more thing helped. Zahran's circle was not, in this period, a clandestine network in any serious sense. A Muslim who watched the radical circles around him told the *Jaffna Monitor* that as early as 2016, Zahran and people associated with him would discuss matters he considered sensitive in relatively open online groups. "Zahran's group was not like the LTTE," he said. "There wasn't that level of secrecy." ## **What Zahran believed** Evidence later given before Sri Lanka's Presidential Commission of Inquiry indicates how completely the deception worked. The commission's final report records testimony that Zahran believed Abu Hind was the Islamic State's regional representative, and found that Abu Hind was in contact with Zahran and his brother Rilwan and had communicated with Naufer Moulavi. Zahran's wife, Abdul Cader Fathima Hadiya, testified before the commission on Oct. 20, 2020\. Her evidence indicated that a man identifying himself as Abu Hind, based in India, began communicating with Zahran around the end of 2017 and remained in frequent contact through 2019\. According to accounts of her testimony later cited in Parliament, whenever Abu Hind called, Zahran would ask her to leave the room. ## **Across the water** The contact began online and may not have stayed there. According to credible sources who spoke with the *Jaffna Monitor*, Abu Hind may subsequently have met Zahran and members of his group in person, after Zahran travelled clandestinely to India by boat. The sources said a Muslim politician helped arrange the journey. The occasion was Zahran's younger brother, Mohamed Rilwan, who was being treated in India. Rilwan had been badly injured at Palamunai, near Kattankudy, on Aug. 27, 2018, while making or testing a device. The blast damaged his hands and eyes, leaving him with missing fingers and impaired vision. Publicly available records establish that he was first treated at the National Hospital in Colombo under a false name. Sources told the *Jaffna Monitor* that his treatment did not end there, that he was subsequently taken to India, and that Zahran travelled by boat in connection with it. ## **The clock accelerates** What changed everything for Zahran was a chain of four incidents, each of which brought investigators closer to him. The first was the killing of the two constables at Vavunathivu on Nov. 30, 2018\. At the time it was read as a possible LTTE revival, and the investigation went in that direction. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-2-13.jpg) Police constables Dinesh Ganesh and Niroshan Indika Prasanna, who were killed by members of Zahran Hashim’s group at Vavunathivu on Nov. 30, 2018. The second came a month later. In late December, several young men on motorcycles damaged Buddha statues in and around Mawanella, hacking at their faces and hands with sharp tools. The Parliamentary Select Committee later identified those responsible as members of Zahran's group, and investigators established that Zahran himself had spent months living in Mawanella during 2018. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-3-11.jpg) One of the Buddha statues damaged in Mawanella in December 2018. Two of the alleged ringleaders, the brothers Mohamed Sadiq Abdul Haq and Mohamed Shahid Abdul Haq, evaded arrest. They were sons of Rasheed Mohammed Ibraheem Moulavi, the Jamaat-e-Islami leader's brother. The two remained at large until they were picked up a week after the bombings. The interrogation of those detained for the vandalism led investigators west, to the coast. On Jan. 16, 2019, the CID raided a coconut estate at Lacktowatta, in Wanathawilluwa, Puttalam district, and recovered explosives, chemicals, detonators and ISIS-related material. Four men were arrested and detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The estate had served as a safe house and a training ground. An internal SIS memorandum in March would record that the Abdul Haq brothers had been hiding there from late December into early January, manufacturing explosives. Wanathawilluwa was the point at which suspicions about the group were backed by concrete evidence. The state moved, on paper. On Jan. 26 the CID began tracking Zahran's movements. On Jan. 31 the SIS gave the CID a list of 129 individuals it assessed as influenced by ISIS ideology, with Zahran among them. On Feb. 2, the SIS director discussed the Wanathawilluwa recovery and its connection to Zahran at a National Security Council meeting. Zahran went into hiding. The fourth incident was a shooting. On March 9, 2019, gunmen shot Mohamed Thasleem, a coordinating secretary to Minister Kabir Hashim, in Danagama, Mawanella. Thasleem had quietly assisted the CID investigation into the Dec. 26 Buddha statue attacks, helping lead investigators to Wanathawilluwa and the group’s largest arms cache. He survived. The gunmen used service revolvers taken from the two constables killed at Vavunathivu. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-4-10.jpg) Fathima visits her husband, Mohamed Thasleem, in the hospital after he was shot in March 2019. Then the investigators reached Zahran's household. The Terrorism Investigation Division went to a house associated with him at Kekunugolla, in the Kurunegala area, according to sources familiar with the investigation, and questioned his wife. Zahran became convinced that his arrest was only a matter of time, and that carried a particular meaning for him. His interpretation of Islam, the sources said, held that surrendering to, or being captured by, forces he regarded as *kafir* (unbelievers ) was unacceptable. Faced with an arrest he believed was coming, he decided he should die carrying out an attack instead. Until then, the group had been working toward the Kandy Esala Perahera, one of the country's largest Buddhist festivals, which falls in July and August. The festival was still months away. Zahran no longer believed he could wait that long. The decision to abandon the timetable appears to have been taken in March. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/WhatsApp-Image-2026-09-07-at-20.16.10.jpeg) Naufer Moulavi Naufer Moulavi disagreed with the acceleration. According to sources who spoke with the *Jaffna Monitor*, he argued that the group should not abandon its plan because Zahran feared arrest. The dispute was never about whether killing innocent people was wrong. Neither man objected to that. It was about where and when. The disagreement hardened into a rupture, and Naufer and several of those aligned with him parted ways with Zahran in the weeks before Easter. The preparations moved fast after that. On April 16, five days before Easter Sunday, Zahran's group carried out a test explosion at Kattankudy, detonating a device on a motorcycle at Palamunai. The Attorney General would later treat it as a distinct offence in the indictments. It was the second explosion at Palamunai in eight months; the first, on Aug. 27, 2018, had been an accident, and had cost Rilwan his fingers and much of his sight. The split damaged the Indian operation at the worst possible moment. By then Abu Hind had spent well over a year building relationships across the broader network, winning the trust of Zahran and of the men around him while reporting what he learned to the Q Branch. When Naufer's faction broke away, several of those contacts went with it. Some of the people through whom Abu Hind had understood what was happening inside the organization were no longer part of the group preparing the attack. His window narrowed precisely as the circle behind it became most dangerous. He retained contact with Zahran's side and continued to receive information from within the network, according to the sources, but the access was no longer what it had been. ## PART TWO: THE CHANNEL ## **The man in Puthukudiyiruppu** The intelligence Abu Hind provided did not remain in Tamil Nadu. According to sources familiar with the operation, the Q Branch had an unusual channel for passing information to Sri Lanka's security establishment. At the centre of it was a former LTTE member widely known in the Vanni as "Thampi Anna." His name is Thiyagarasa Arutchelvam (தியாகராசா அருட்செல்வம்), born in 1967 at Vettilaikkerni in the Jaffna district. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-5-10.jpg) Thiyagarasa Arutchelvam, widely known as “Thampi Anna.” Arutchelvam joined the LTTE in 1985, according to former members of the organization who spoke with the *Jaffna Monitor*. He served with the Sea Tigers until 1995, rising to a reasonably senior position and operating mainly in the Mannar region; in 1992 and 1993 he ran the organization's training camp at Polikandy. From 1995 to 2001 he worked in the finance wing, which sent him on clandestine boat trips to India to arrange supplies and manage financial dealings. From May 2004 until about July 2008, he was based in Mannar, responsible for bringing supplies from India by sea. Around August 2008, the LTTE sent him to India to handle procurement in Tamil Nadu. He carried weapons with him, including a pistol, and the Q Branch arrested him on Aug. 23, 2008\. According to sources familiar with the case, the firearm was kept out of the file, and he was charged with lesser offences. He was produced before an Indian court, charged in six cases, and acquitted on Nov. 2, 2011. Those sources said he avoided serious prosecution by reaching an understanding with the Q Branch and agreeing to work for it. He remained in India until January 2016\. During that period, as he sought clearance to return home, his relationship with Easwaramoorthy took shape. It continued after his return; whenever he later travelled to India, the two would meet. Sources who spoke to the *Jaffna Monitor* said the Q Branch came to regard him as a reliable source. When he came back from India, he went to a plot at Puthukudiyiruppu that the LTTE had allocated to him and his wife during the war. His wife, Thevika, had been a fighter herself. Former cadres identified her nom de guerre as Thanushiya (தனுஷியா) and said she served in the Malathi Regiment, the LTTE's women's formation. The couple have three children, a daughter born in 1998 and sons born in 2001 and 2003. The family card listed his occupation as labourer. People who knew him said otherwise — the household appeared comparatively well off, and on the same land he put up a large modern house for a brother living abroad. Within the grounds he also built a small shrine to Sai Baba, acted as poojari himself, and drew a steady crowd from the neighbourhood to poojas every Thursday. ## **Saman** After returning to Sri Lanka, Thampi Anna established a relationship with Military Intelligence in Vavuniya. His handler was not a senior officer. The *Jaffna Monitor* is withholding his identity and will call him Saman. Saman was a lower-ranking officer who had spent years working in the region and was known by different names to different people, which is unremarkable in intelligence work. Former cadres who encountered him in custody said he generally dealt with them without hostility, which appears to have helped him maintain contacts among former fighters. Thampi Anna became one of those contacts. How the relationship began is unclear. The *Jaffna Monitor* has not established whether the Q Branch instructed Thampi Anna to cultivate Sri Lankan Military Intelligence or whether he made the connection himself after returning home. What is clear from the accounts of people familiar with him is that he kept his Q Branch relationship while reporting to Vavuniya at the same time. He had become an informant operating between two intelligence systems. He was also acquiring a third contact. The *Jaffna Monitor* has been told that he developed a relationship within the State Intelligence Service during this period, and sources have described how it began. When Thampi Anna went to the Sri Lankan mission in India to obtain travel documents, carrying a clearance from the Q Branch and returning home legally for the first time since his arrest, a man acted as his translator. He knew him only as Mohamed. Years later, the same man met him again in Mannar, this time as an officer of the State Intelligence Service, and the relationship continued for at least a year after the Easter attacks. When Mohamed told him that Suresh Sallay, by then head of the SIS, wanted to meet him, Thampi Anna gave him the cold shoulder. The meeting is understood never to have taken place. The arrangement acquired a different significance in late 2017 and early 2018, when the Q Branch had Abu Hind inside Zahran's network. According to sources familiar with the Indian operation, the Q Branch passed material to Thampi Anna, who passed it to Saman in Vavuniya. Saman reported to his immediate superior, and from there it moved up the Military Intelligence hierarchy. Sources familiar with the arrangement said this was deliberate. The Q Branch was using Thampi Anna to move information about Zahran into the Sri Lankan system. Everything that follows in this account passed through that one man. ## PART THREE: AMBITIONS ## **The party that would not have him** While he was moving intelligence between two services, Thampi Anna was also trying to enter mainstream politics, pursuing several routes at once. According to sources familiar with his activities at the time, his first serious attempt was the *Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi*. They told the *Jaffna Monitor* that he approached several senior figures in the party to secure a place for himself. A news report published on Nov. 27, 2017, the birthday of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, said that Thiyagarasa Arutchelvam had joined ITAK, obtaining his membership through the TNA's Mannar district lawmaker, Charles Nirmalanathan. Arutchelvam said he hoped to contest the forthcoming local government elections as an ITAK candidate. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-6-9.jpg) Thiyagarasa Arutchelvam, widely known as “Thampi Anna,” receives his ITAK membership from lawmaker Charles Nirmalanathan in 2017. Sources who spoke to the *Jaffna Monitor* described a much older association between Nirmalanathan and Thampi Anna, dating to the latter's years in the LTTE. Those sources further claimed that Nirmalanathan helped him build a house at Puthukudiyiruppu. The *Jaffna Monitor* has not independently verified that claim. He joined the party but was never absorbed into it. ITAK sources said the leadership remained wary, taking what one described as a "let us watch him" approach. In his dealings with the party, he presented himself as a man with considerable influence among former LTTE cadres who had been through government rehabilitation, telling several figures that he could mobilise them and deliver their votes, according to people familiar with those conversations. ## **The monks** He was working the other direction at the same time. Sources familiar with his political activities said he was trying to reach Namal Rajapaksa, and explored several channels to do it. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-7-7.png) Buddist monks attends a reconciliation-themed Thai Pongal event organised by Thampi Anna in Puthukudiyiruppu in January 2019. One of his principal contacts was Ven. Pahiyangala Ananda Sagara Thero, a Buddhist monk who later became associated with the Ape Jana Bala Party and contested the 2020 parliamentary election from the Gampaha district on its ticket, alongside several other prominent monks. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-8-7.jpg) Thampi Anna with Athuraliye Rathana Thero at his home in Puthukudiyiruppu. The association appears to have developed while Thampi Anna was still publicly aligned with ITAK. In January 2019, he organised a reconciliation-themed Thai Pongal event at Puthukudiyiruppu, which Ananda Sagara Thero and several other monks attended. His contacts extended further into the Sinhala clergy. On a separate occasion, Athuraliye Rathana Thero, a firebrand Sinhala nationalist monk, visited him at his home there. He also established an organisation of his own, the North-East Social Reconciliation Organisation (வடக்கு கிழக்கு சமூக நல்லிணக்க அமைப்பு). A person involved with it told the *Jaffna Monitor* that he had been determined to have an organisation under his own name and made several attempts to register one before succeeding under the Companies Act. It ran a handful of small-scale community initiatives in the north, including in Jaffna, on drug abuse and violence. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-9-5.jpg) The letterhead of Thampi Anna’s organisation, the North-East Social Reconciliation Organisation. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-10-5.jpg) The logo of Thampi Anna’s North-East Social Reconciliation Organisation. "Thampi Anna, in fact, wanted to become an influential figure in Tamil politics," said a person who knew him. "He wanted to be someone whom people needed." ## **"A good taskmaster, but not a task maker"** People who dealt with him described a persuasive talker who knew how to approach people and win them over. One person who helped him make contacts within ITAK said his political instincts did not match the image of a shrewd operator he tried to project. "He was a good taskmaster, but not a task maker," this person said, explaining that Thampi Anna was highly effective when given a specific assignment and would pursue it diligently, but was less adept at independent judgment or political leadership. Several people who interacted with him came away with the same impression that he was not acting entirely on his own. His approaches struck them as unusually calculated, and some concluded he was being guided. ## **Campaigning for Sumanthiran** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-11-4.jpg) Thampi Anna, third from left, with M.A. Sumanthiran, second from left, at a meeting. The calculations changed in 2020\. Days before that year's parliamentary election, Thampi Anna publicly backed the Tamil National Alliance and one of its most prominent candidates, M.A. Sumanthiran, who had no difficulty publicising the association. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-12-3.jpg) M.A. Sumanthiran’s Facebook post announcing the North-East Social Reconciliation Organisation’s support for the Tamil National Alliance during the 2020 parliamentary election campaign. On July 27, 2020, Thampi Anna and representatives of his organisation met Sumanthiran, then the TNA spokesman and a candidate in the Jaffna electoral district, at the alliance's office in Point Pedro and pledged their support. Sumanthiran announced it on Facebook the following day, noting that the organisation had also issued a leaflet calling on Tamils to unite and to declare Tamil nationalism their breath. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-13-2.jpg) Thampi Anna and members of his organisation with M.A. Sumanthiran and other ITAK leaders The leaflet went considerably further than the announcement. It invoked the LTTE's armed struggle and Prabhakaran directly, urging Tamils to support an alliance it described as embraced by the Tamil national leader. Tamil nationalism had survived the destruction of the preceding decades, it argued, because of the immeasurable price paid for liberation and the strength of mind gained through the armed struggle. It cast the TNA as a formation that had emerged, according to the needs of the time, from Prabhakaran's political and intelligence strategy. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/the-long-warning-inside-the-in-dd2380-14-1-1.jpg) A leaflet issued by Thampi Anna’s North-East Social Reconciliation Organisation during the 2020 parliamentary election campaign. It accused the Sri Lankan state of turning to Tamil political actors to accomplish politically what it had failed to achieve militarily, and attacked the TNA's Tamil rivals across the field, from those advocating an alternative leadership and development-oriented politics with national parties to groups advocating self-determination and independent candidates. Sumanthiran won a seat from the Jaffna district. The *Jaffna Monitor* could not determine how significant Thampi Anna's campaigning was to that result. A man who was at that moment carrying Indian intelligence into the Sri Lankan military system was campaigning on a leaflet that praised the intelligence strategy of Prabhakaran. ## PART FOUR: WHAT THE CHANNEL CARRIED ## **Sermons** The first material to reach Puthukudiyiruppu concerned a Muslim group in Batticaloa whose leader was delivering anti-Buddhist sermons on Facebook. Easwaramoorthy sent Thampi Anna links to the sermons, according to sources familiar with the channel. Thampi Anna listened to them, made notes on their contents and passed what he had to Saman, doing this on two or three occasions. Easwaramoorthy continued monitoring the group and contacted him periodically with further information about it and its intentions; each time, the material went to Vavuniya. It grew more serious over time. ## **The document** During one of Thampi Anna's visits to India, according to credible sources who spoke with the *Jaffna Monitor*, Easwaramoorthy handed him a Tamil-language document connected to a Tawheed Jamaat organisation. It contained material on explosives and illustrations relating to suicide jackets. Thampi Anna carried it back across the Palk Strait and gave Saman a copy. He gave a second copy to Ananda Sagara Thero, hoping the monk's political connections would carry the information to then-President Maithripala Sirisena. ## **'Major destruction'** About six months before Easter Sunday, the warnings became explicit. Easwaramoorthy told Thampi Anna that a Muslim group was preparing to cause major destruction in Sri Lanka, according to sources familiar with the exchange. That went to Saman immediately. Further information about Zahran's movements followed, including reports that he had travelled to India and elsewhere. It went the same way. ## **The Vavunathivu killings** Four constables had been posted to a special search operation at the Vavunathivu checkpoint, on the road out of Batticaloa, on the afternoon of Nov. 29, 2018\. One left early for an alms-giving. Another left at 1 a.m., in the rain. That left two men at an isolated post about a kilometre from an air force detachment and three kilometres from an STF camp. Their bodies were found at about 6 a.m. Constables Dinesh Ganesh, from the east, and Niroshan Indika Prasanna, from Galle, had been shot and their bodies mutilated. Their service revolvers were gone. Suspicion fell on former LTTE cadres within days, with a motive attached. In the last week of November, police had blocked a Maaveerar Naal commemoration for the LTTE's dead. The theory that took hold was retaliation. The Directorate of Military Intelligence submitted four reports on Dec. 5, Dec. 8, Dec. 14 and Jan. 3, making the case that former LTTE men had killed the constables in revenge for the blocked memorial, and naming the men it said were responsible. They were innocent. Rasanayagam Saravanandan, 48, a former Charles Anthony Brigade cadre from Vattakachchi in Kilinochchi, was taken into custody within days. Kadiramathambi Irajakumaran, known as Kannan, 40, a former LTTE intelligence member from Karaiyakanthivu near Batticaloa, was arrested soon after. Both were held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The case against them did not hold together on its own. Shani Abeysekara, who had previously headed the CID, later alleged in a fundamental rights petition that the DMI and SIS had conspired to steer the investigation toward former Tamil militants and away from Islamist extremists, and that a motorcycle jacket produced as evidence against an ex-cadre had been planted. According to his account, the tip-off about the jacket came from the SIS chief, and when CID officers arrived at the place where it was supposedly found, SIS operatives were already there. The truth came out only after Easter Sunday. A detained member of Zahran's network admitted that the group had killed the two constables, and by late April three men were in CID custody for it. The stolen revolvers were the same weapons used against Mohamed Thasleem in March. The channel had been saying so from the start. According to sources familiar with it, Easwaramoorthy contacted Thampi Anna shortly after the two constables were killed and told him Zahran's group had carried out the attack. Thampi Anna passed it to Saman. Sri Lankan intelligence continued pursuing the LTTE theory regardless, and Saman repeatedly asked Thampi Anna to investigate along those lines. He refused. From his own years inside the organisation, he told his handler the killings did not resemble an LTTE operation. To him, they looked like the work of Muslim extremists, and he kept insisting that Zahran's group had done it. The location of the stolen weapons came later, and by then it hardly mattered. On April 26, 2019, five days after the bombings, Easwaramoorthy told Thampi Anna that the constables' revolvers had been found at Sainthamaruthu — at the house where Zahran's brother and the last of the group had gathered and where they blew themselves up that night. ## **The test** The motorcycle explosion at Palamunai on April 16 came down the same channel. Easwaramoorthy telephoned from India to say Zahran's group had carried it out, according to sources familiar with the traffic, and the information went to Saman. ## **April 20** Thampi Anna was at home on the evening of April 20 when his WhatsApp rang. Easwaramoorthy asked him where Sri Lanka's major churches were. Thampi Anna named the ones that came to mind: the Madhu shrine in Mannar, St. Anthony's at Kochchikade, the Tewatta church at Ragama. Then came the warning. Zahran's group was preparing to cause major destruction at Catholic churches the following day, Easwaramoorthy told him, and he should alert people in the government quickly. Thampi Anna called Saman immediately. By then the operative knew who Easwaramoorthy was and understood where the information originated. "Sir, Zahran's group is ready," he told him, according to sources familiar with the call. "The Indian intelligence officer who gives me information has asked that the government be alerted." The next morning, Thampi Anna was at the fish market in Puthukudiyiruppu when his phone rang. A bomb had gone off at Kochchikade, a friend told him. The caller, himself a former LTTE fighter, instinctively, and wrongly, assumed the movement was responsible. “What the hell have they done?” he asked. ## PART FIVE: WHAT HAPPENED TO IT Much of what the Q Branch sent across the Palk Strait in 2017 and 2018 would have looked, at the time, like fragments of a developing extremist network. When the intelligence began pointing to a possible suicide attack, the Q Branch escalated the warning to India’s external intelligence establishment rather than relying solely on its informal channel into Sri Lanka. On April 4, the warning arrived in Colombo through official channels, as a WhatsApp message to Nilantha Jayawardena, the director of the State Intelligence Service. Zahran Hashim and his associates were preparing a suicide attack on important churches. They had carried out reconnaissance of the Indian High Commission, which was itself a target. Six men were named, Zahran and his brother Rilwan among them. The message was confirmed in writing at nine the following morning, and a second Indian source sent the same substance three hours later. Seventeen days remained. On April 7 a top-secret letter reached Sisira Mendis, the Chief of National Intelligence. It set out the same warning and added the methods the group might use: a suicide attack, an armed attack, a knife attack, an attack with a truck. On April 8 the defence secretary was told, and advised that the police be informed. On April 9 the security chiefs met. That same day Jayawardena sent the inspector general of police a report identifying four of the six men India had named. The test explosion at Palamunai a week later turned the intelligence specific. The reports that followed traced the motorcycle's chassis number back to Zahran's people, tracked the suspects' movements, logged their calls to numbers abroad, and described how relatives had been selling land to raise money. One noted that some of the men were carrying automatic weapons. Another recorded that officers at the Kattankudy police station had been in contact with a wanted suspect, Mohamed Shareef Adam Lebbe, known as Gafoor Mama, and had not arrested him. Then, on April 20, the Indian counterpart messaged Jayawardena again. He wanted feedback on what he had sent at the start of the month. He added that the attack was expected "at any time on or before 21.04.2019," and that a dry run had already been carried out at Kattankudy. That was the same evening a former Sea Tiger in Puthukudiyiruppu took a call from an Indian police officer and relayed the warning to his handler in Vavuniya. The last message came at 8.27 the next morning. It said the attackers would probably move within hours. The first bomb went off eighteen minutes later. ***To be continued.*** ### ‘Tell Me What I Have Done Wrong’: Shavendra Silva Defends 2009 as Families of the Disappeared Wait for Answers URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/tell-me-what-i-have-done-wrong-shavendra-silva-defends-2009-as-families-of-the-disappeared-wait-for-answers/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T05:11:28.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** On the morning of May 18, 2009, Sellamma walked her two sons and her son-in-law across the Vattuvakal bridge and handed them to Sri Lankan soldiers. She had been assured that men who surrendered would be rehabilitated and returned, her family has said. She spent the next 17 years on roadside protests asking where they were, and died in May without an answer. Gen. Shavendra Silva commanded the division that held the ground on the far side of that bridge. In an extensive interview with the Indian YouTube channel IMPACT Stories, which drew coverage in Colombo this week, he offered the treatment of captured fighters as proof that his troops had run no policy of killing prisoners. “Our aim and our biggest achievement was to capture a person alive,” General Silva said. It is his most detailed public account since he retired as chief of defense staff at the end of 2024\. He acknowledged that civilians were killed, said the government’s wartime promise of “zero casualties” was never achievable, and challenged the governments that sanctioned him to say what, precisely, they believe he did. “I’m not a war criminal,” he said. “I fought for my country.” His 58th Division advanced from Mannar up the western Vanni into the coastal pocket where the war ended. He said commanders used aerial surveillance to separate fighters from civilians and changed plans when the two were too close, and that the division fired its multiple-barrel rocket launchers fewer than five times in the entire campaign. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, he said, held civilians by force, sited artillery at hospitals and inside government-declared no-fire zones, and shot at those who tried to flee. “There would have been deaths of civilians,” he said. “Inevitable. But those are not intentional.” Much of what he says about the LTTE is well documented. U.N. investigations found that it forcibly recruited children, prevented civilians from leaving, and fired on some who tried to escape. The question that remains is what the Sri Lankan military did during the final offensive. Between May 17 and 19, 2009, several hundred LTTE members, civilian administrators and their relatives crossed at Vattuvakal into army-held ground. Among them was the Rev. Francis Joseph, a Jaffna priest and former principal of St. Patrick’s College, who wrote out a list of those surrendering for the military. Witnesses saw them loaded onto buses. The International Truth and Justice Project, working with the Human Rights Data Analysis Group, counted about 503 people who disappeared around the bridge, including at least 29 children; Human Rights Watch documented the same pattern in 2011\. Eyewitnesses interviewed by the ITJP place General Silva at the bridge on May 18. Before the Vavuniya High Court, the army has maintained that those who surrendered did so to the Rehabilitation Commission rather than to the military. The surrender lists have never been released. Families in Mullaitivu and Vavuniya have protested by the roadside continuously since 2017, and several of the original protesters have died waiting. Among those who tried to surrender were several senior LTTE figures: Balasingham Nadesan, the head of its political wing and formerly its police chief; Seevaratnam Puleedevan, who ran its Peace Secretariat; Ramesh, also known as Ilango, the LTTE’s police chief; and Jawan, who headed its radio service, Pulikalin Kural. Nadesan and Puleedevan negotiated their surrender in the final hours through intermediaries in Colombo and abroad. They and several others were later found dead. Former LTTE members and civilians interviewed separately by the *Jaffna Monitor* said these men had also committed war crimes against their own people, including forcing civilians to join the LTTE during the final months of the war. But that did not change their rights when they surrendered. Under the laws of war, fighters who surrender or clearly show that they want to surrender cannot be killed. In December 2009, Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the army commander during the offensive, told The Sunday Leader that Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had instructed the commander of the 58th Division not to take them alive. General Silva denied it then and denies it now. In 2011, an officer who had served in the division told Channel 4 News that the orders to kill those who surrendered came from the defense secretary and from General Silva. Human Rights Watch documented at least 30 artillery and air attacks on hospitals in the war zone from December 2008\. Shelling of the hospital at Mullivaikkal on May 2, 2009, inside the government’s own no-fire zone, killed 68 people. By May 14, the last makeshift hospital, housed in a school, had stopped functioning, and patients who could not be moved were left behind. The 2015 report of the U.N. human rights office recorded entire families killed in the bunkers where they sheltered, and found that civilians queuing for food were shelled at times and places the government knew in advance. One of the men who helped create the first no-fire zone says the shelling of it was deliberate, and that General Silva admitted as much to his face. The man, a Tamil former United Nations staff member who worked in the war zone and now lives abroad, told Jaffna Monitor in a series of interviews in 2024 that he drafted a one-page proposal in late 2008 for a protected area for displaced civilians and sent it to the U.N. coordinator for Sri Lanka. After the government declared the zone in January 2009, families moved in and put up tarpaulin shelters, many without digging bunkers, because they believed the declaration meant they would not be shelled. The army had been given the GPS coordinates of the U.N. humanitarian hub at Suthanthirapuram junction. About a week later, he said, shelling began shortly after 2 a.m. and resumed the following day. He estimated that more than 500 people were killed in roughly 48 hours, among them civilians waiting in line for food, a pattern U.N. investigators would later document independently. After crossing into government-held territory, he said, he came face to face with General Silva and asked him why the no-fire zone had been shelled. The general denied it, he said, then fell silent for a long moment before acknowledging it, telling him there had been no other way to move the population out of LTTE-held ground. Jaffna Monitor could not independently verify the exchange. General Silva has consistently denied that his forces attacked civilians deliberately. He also disputes the arithmetic of the dead. He said the U.N. office in Colombo counted 7,000 killed, and that they were fighters in civilian clothes. That figure is an unpublished internal tally of 7,721 compiled up to May 13, six days before the fighting stopped. The 2011 panel appointed by the U.N. secretary-general concluded that as many as 40,000 civilians may have died, most from government shelling. A later internal U.N. review found that nearly all civilian casualties its staff recorded had reportedly been caused by government fire, that two-thirds of the killing was occurring inside the declared safe zones, and that more than 70,000 people were unaccounted for. To make his case, General Silva described an encirclement operation and the body of a senior enemy commander found in civilian clothes with a weapon. “One could say a civilian was killed,” he said. “No. He was the LTTE northern commander.” He was describing Aanandapuram, where in April 2009 the LTTE’s northern commander, Theepan, was killed along with much of the movement’s senior military leadership. General Silva also dismissed Channel 4’s documentaries on the final stages of the war as fabricated, saying Tamil speech in them had been mistranslated. The execution videos at the center of that reporting were examined by forensic pathologists, firearms specialists and video analysts commissioned by two U.N. special rapporteurs. Philip Alston reported that they found nothing indicating the footage was faked, and his successor, Christof Heyns, told the Human Rights Council that what it showed had happened. The United States barred General Silva and his immediate family from entry in February 2020, citing credible information of his involvement, through command responsibility, in extrajudicial killings by the 58th Division. Britain imposed a travel ban and asset freeze in March 2025, naming him, along with two other former commanders and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, the former LTTE eastern commander turned paramilitary leader known as Karuna Amman, on grounds of extrajudicial killings, torture and sexual violence. Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry has called the allegations unverified and unproven. General Silva said his daughters were 12 and 7 in 2009 and had nothing to do with his decisions. He said he can no longer use his credit card abroad, and that a payment his bank sent to a foreign hospital under his military insurance was frozen. “I have been asking, tell me what I have done wrong,” he said. Asked about Tamils, he allowed that they had grievances and had not been treated fairly. “We can’t say they were treated 100 percent” well, he said, before rejecting the resort to arms. “There are ways and means.” Seventeen years on, no senior Sri Lankan officer has been tried over the final offensive. Human Rights Watch reported on Sept. 1 that prosecutions remain stalled and that victims’ families face intimidation in the north and east; the U.N. high commissioner’s report two days later found no accountability for crimes committed by any party. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government has not accepted the evidence-gathering mechanism created for these events. At Vattuvakal and along the roadsides of Mullaitivu and Vavuniya, the families are still waiting. ### British MP Launches Campaign for Direct London-Jaffna Flights URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/british-mp-launches-campaign-for-direct-london-jaffna-flights/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T05:04:03.000Z **LONDON —** British Labour lawmaker Gareth Thomas has launched a campaign for direct flights between London and Jaffna, calling on the British and Sri Lankan governments, airlines and airport operators to explore establishing a route aimed largely at serving Britain’s substantial Tamil diaspora. Mr. Thomas, the member of Parliament for Harrow West, has launched a petition titled “Bring Direct Flights to Jaffna,” arguing that the absence of a direct connection places an unnecessary burden on British Tamils travelling to visit family in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. “British Tamils have strong family, cultural and community ties to Northern Sri Lanka,” the campaign says. “For many families in Harrow and across the UK, travelling to Jaffna means visiting relatives, attending weddings and funerals, taking part in religious festivals, and maintaining family connections across generations.” There are currently no direct flights between London and Jaffna International Airport. The campaign notes that passengers can fly nonstop from London to Colombo but must then travel roughly 400 kilometers to Jaffna, a journey it says can take six to seven hours by road or rail. That additional journey can be particularly difficult for elderly passengers, families travelling with young children and people returning for weddings, funerals and other important family occasions, according to the petition. Mr. Thomas’s campaign argues that a direct service would do more than shorten travel times. It says such a connection could help families maintain ties across generations, make travel easier for elderly relatives and strengthen cultural and religious links between Britain’s Tamil communities and Northern Sri Lanka. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/british-mp-launches-campaign-f-f497af-1-1.jpg) The petition also presents the proposed route as an economic opportunity for the north, arguing that direct international access could support tourism, investment and economic development in a region that remains less internationally connected than Colombo. “We are calling on the UK Government, Sri Lankan authorities, airlines and London airports to work together to explore and support a viable direct flight service between London and Jaffna,” the petition says. The campaign does not identify an airline that has agreed to operate the route or set out a timetable for beginning flights. Its immediate objective is instead to build public support and persuade governments, airlines and airport authorities to examine whether a London-Jaffna service would be commercially and operationally viable. Any such service would also depend on Jaffna International Airport being able to accommodate the aircraft and operational requirements of a long-haul route between Sri Lanka and Britain — and, ultimately, on the NPP government’s willingness to develop the airport for such operations. Many Tamils have accused the government of showing insufficient commitment to developing the north’s two principal international gateways, Jaffna International Airport at Palaly and Kankesanthurai harbour, despite their potential to strengthen the region’s links with India and the wider world. Mr. Thomas represents Harrow West, an area of Greater London with a significant Tamil community. His campaign material encourages supporters to sign the petition online and through QR codes being distributed locally. The campaign is being promoted by Harrow Labour, according to material accompanying the petition. **The petition can be signed on Mr. Thomas’s official website:** [PETITION: Bring Direct Flights to Jaffna - Gareth Thomas MPHelp Connect British Tamils with Family in Northern Sri Lanka We are calling for a direct flight service between London and Jaffna International Airport. British Tamils have strong family, cultural and community ties to Northern Sri Lanka. For many families in Harrow and across the UK, travelling to Jaffna means visiting relatives, attending weddings and funerals, taking part in religious festivals, and maintaining family connections across generations. There are currently no direct flights between London and Jaffna. Passengers can…![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/icon/android-icon-192x192-1c96ac06-4b05-41c6-979d-b44824776fd2.png)Gareth Thomas MP![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/thumbnail/Flights-Jaffna-1200x630-c-center-ba0adffe-f41b-4e04-97c3-2b837869cb4b.jpg)](https://gareththomas.org.uk/petition-bring-direct-flights-to-jaffna/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com) ### Tamil Society Cannot Confront Its Past Until It Acknowledges Its Own Victims URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-society-cannot-confront-its-past-until-it-acknowledges-its-own-victims/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T17:25:24.000Z **By: Jeevan Thiyagaraja** The recent public statement by PLOTE leader [Dharmalingam Siddharthan ](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/telo-killed-my-father-siddharthan-confronts-the-bloody-past-behind-todays-tamil-alliances/)perfectly illustrates the central tragedy of the Tamil militant struggle in Sri Lanka: the transition from armed groups that eliminated their own people. Speaking at a memorial for his father, V. Dharmalingam, a former Member of Parliament, Siddharthan publicly accused the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)—a group that now sits in the same political alliance as his own—of carrying out the assassination 41 years ago. "There is no confusion whatsoever," he said. "Those responsible for his death were members of the TELO. Everyone knows that." His family, he noted, had known the identity of the killers within half an hour of the abduction. To understand how we arrived at this moral precipice, we must tear away the veil of romanticism that often shrouds the early days of the militancy. This culture of lethal impunity did not begin with the double murder of Dharmalingam and M. Alalasundaram in 1985\. It began exactly a decade earlier, on July 27, 1975, with the assassination of Jaffna’s Mayor, Alfred Duraiappah, by a young Velupillai Prabhakaran. That single bullet was a historical rupture. It was the moment the Tamil militant movement decided that the gun trumped the ballot. More dangerously, it established a horrific precedent: a Tamil could be executed by other Tamils for "treason" without any due process, without a trial, and without public recourse. By the time the fratricide of 1980 to 1983 erupted in Jaffna, the rules of engagement had fundamentally degraded. As multiple militant groups—TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF, EROS, and the LTTE proliferated, they turned on each other. We must be honest about this: the early killings were rarely about deep, noble ideological divides between Marxism and Tamil nationalism. They were driven by personality clashes, ego, and brutal turf wars. They fought for hegemony over Jaffna’s streets, control over extortion rackets, and dominance over the limited funds flowing from the diaspora. To eliminate rivals, groups like the LTTE set up courts, trying fellow Tamils for "treason" and executing them to project an image of revolutionary justice. Under the universal conventions of International Humanitarian Law, specifically Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, these courts were not merely revolutionary theater. They were egregious war crimes. The conventions universally prohibit the passing of sentences and executions without a regularly constituted court, a law that bound the militant groups just as strictly as it bound the state. During the 1980s and 90s, Jaffna operated on a terrifying system of "open secrets." Everyone knew who was killing whom. Everyone knew which group ran which extortion racket or executed which rival. But out of profound fear, or a misplaced sense of protecting the "movement," these truths were buried. Avoiding the question of "who killed whom, when, and where" became a survival mechanism, but it also birthed a culture of absolute impunity. The cost of this silence was the total destruction of Tamil civil society. By killing moderate politicians like Dharmalingam and Alalasundaram, and earlier figures like Duraiappah, the militants systematically destroyed the Tamil political middle ground. They eradicated the voices that advocated for negotiation, leaving only the language of violence as the sole medium of political expression. But the victims were not just parliamentarians. The list of the dead is long, filled with the names of ordinary Tamil youths who were attracted by the rhetoric of liberation, only to be executed by a rival faction over a dispute about extortion money or a leader’s bruised ego. For the mothers and fathers of these nameless youths, the agony was twofold: not only did they lose their children, but they were forced into a suffocating silence, unable to publicly mourn or demand justice lest they invite the wrath of the very groups claiming to protect them. A movement that is willing to slaughter its own members over personality clashes will inevitably turn its weapons on the civilian population. The fratricide of the early 1980s was the direct training ground for the authoritarianism that later consumed the North. The tragedy of this era is perhaps best encapsulated by the imagery of the recent memorials. Dharmalingam and Alalasundaram were abducted on the exact same night, by the exact same group of men, and killed within hours of each other. Yet, 41 years later, they were commemorated at separate ceremonies. There is no unified collective memory. When a society is grappling with a legacy of internecine killings, disappearances, and unmarked graves, the international community universally demands a framework known as the "Right to Truth," enshrined in the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. Under universal conventions, an enforced disappearance is not a closed chapter of history; it is a continuous, ongoing crime committed every single day that a family is denied answers. This framework demands uncovering the fate of the disappeared, because families have an absolute, non-negotiable right to know what happened to their loved ones; locating unmarked graves through forensic investigation; naming the individuals and organizational structures responsible; and providing guarantees of non-recurrence and meaningful reparations. On what basis can we avoid the question of who killed whom, when, and where? There is no valid basis. This silence is not just a political failure; it is a profound spiritual betrayal. Jaffna is a deeply devout society, yet the actions of the militants in the 1980s violated the most fundamental tenets of every faith practiced on that soil. In Hinduism, to murder a man and leave him in an unmarked grave is to condemn his soul to earthly limbo, denying him the sacred Antyesti rites required for liberation. In Christianity, human life is inviolable, made in the image of God, and the body demands dignified burial; political convenience can never wash away the sin of murder without genuine repentance. Islam equally demands Haqq—the absolute truth—and warns of severe accountability for the shedding of innocent blood. Whether judged by the Hindu imperative of Satya (truth), the Christian demand for confession, the Islamic obligation of justice, or the universal statutes of International Criminal Law, which classify the systematic murder of a political group as a crime against humanity, the verdict is the same. By keeping these 'open secrets,' the militant leaders did not just break secular laws; they positioned themselves in defiance of both the divine and the international order. Until the names of the early victims are spoken aloud, and until the unmarked graves of Jaffna are acknowledged, Tamils will remain haunted by the ghosts of its own making. ### AKD Vows to Press Ahead With Judicial Amendment URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/akd-vows-to-press-ahead-with-judicial-amendment/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T17:25:27.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** President Anura Kumara Dissanayake said on Sunday that his government would not withdraw a proposed constitutional amendment extending the retirement ages of Sri Lanka's senior judges, and that he intended to move it through Parliament as soon as the Supreme Court delivers its determination on a record number of legal challenges. Speaking at a public rally in Bulathsinhala, in the Kalutara district south of Colombo, Mr. Dissanayake presented the proposed 22nd Amendment as part of a broader effort to clear a backlog in the courts and prosecute corruption cases, brushing aside opposition from the country's largest lawyers' body, opposition parties and dozens of professional associations. "We will not reverse any decision we make," Mr. Dissanayake said. He added that he expected the court's determination shortly, and that once it arrived, the government would table it in Parliament and pass the amendment quickly. The amendment would raise the mandatory retirement age of Supreme Court judges to 67 from 65, and of Court of Appeal judges to 65 from 63\. It would also increase the number of judges the Court of Appeal may seat, and would set a separate limit for the chief justice, who would leave office on reaching 67 or completing six years in the post, whichever came first. A companion bill amending the Judicature Act would raise the retirement age for High Court, District Court and Magistrates' Court judges to 62. Because the changes would apply to judges already on the bench, the legislation would extend the working lives of the same judges asked to rule on whether it is constitutional. Critics in the legal profession say that altering the tenure of sitting judges raises a different question from setting terms for future appointees. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has led the opposition, joined by about 40 professional bodies and trade unions, and opposition politicians, lawyers, trade unionists and activists demonstrated in Colombo last week. The Supreme Court concluded hearings on Sept. 2 on 67 petitions concerning the amendment, filed both against and in support of it, after two days of proceedings that ran until 5:30 p.m. on the second day. The court said its determination on the constitutionality of the bill would be communicated confidentially to the speaker of Parliament, and gave the parties until 3 p.m. the following day to file written submissions. Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena presided over the five-member bench, sitting with Justices Achala Wengappuli, Arjuna Obeyesekere, Sampath Abeykoon and Gihan Kulatunga. The four judges immediately below the chief justice in seniority were not named to the panel. At the outset, M.A. Sumanthiran, a president's counsel appearing for the Bar Association, asked that the case be heard by a full bench of all sitting Supreme Court judges, arguing that legislation capable of extending the judges' own tenure raised a conflict of interest. Several other senior lawyers for petitioners supported the request. The court refused, after Solicitor General Viraj Dayaratne, appearing for the Attorney General, argued that Article 132(3) of the Constitution leaves the size and composition of a bench to the chief justice. On the merits, Mr. Sumanthiran argued that the amendment engaged Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, which concern the sovereignty of the people and the exercise of judicial power, and therefore required approval at a national referendum. Other petitioners argued along similar lines that changing the retirement age of sitting judges bears on judicial independence. Mr. Dayaratne told the court that the changes were intended to expand the courts and improve their efficiency, that judicial independence would not be affected, and that the petitioners had failed to establish any violation of Articles 3 and 4. The hearing ended in a dispute over procedure. After the Solicitor General finished his oral submissions, the petitioners' lawyers asked to reply orally. The court declined and directed that any further argument be made in writing. In a motion filed afterward, the petitioners said the refusal had cost them the chance to answer the state's case directly and to address questions the judges had put to the solicitor general, and told the court they would file no written submissions at all. They also noted that the government had produced no policy document underlying the bill. The Bar Association separately informed the court that it would not file written arguments, citing the denial of a right of reply. Steven Thiru, president of the Commonwealth Lawyers Association, who observed the proceedings in court, said the refusal of an oral reply in a case of this importance was unusual and that counsel for the petitioners should have been allowed to respond. He also questioned the decision not to convene a larger bench and the absence of the most senior judges from the panel. A day after the hearing ended, Mr. Sumanthiran posted two maxims of natural justice on his Facebook page without further comment: *nemo judex in causa sua*, no one should be a judge in his own cause, and *audi alteram partem*, hear the other side. Mr. Dissanayake, whose National People's Power government holds a large parliamentary majority, framed the resistance as part of a wider reaction to his anti-corruption campaign. He said the government had recruited additional personnel to the judicial service, accelerated reports from the Government Analyst's Department, and established more High Courts to address cases that in some instances had gone unresolved for 15 to 20 years. His remarks came two days after the arrest of Namal Rajapaksa, the national organizer of the opposition Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna and a son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Mr. Rajapaksa was questioned by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption over the purchase of Airbus aircraft for SriLankan Airlines and remanded until Sept. 18\. His party and the United National Party called the arrest politically motivated and said it was timed to disrupt a rally planned for Anuradhapura on Sept. 12\. The party has said the rally will go ahead. Mr. Dissanayake rejected the accusation that the arrests amounted to political retaliation, saying the volume of cases reflected years of accumulated investigations. "If there had been no backlog of cases, there would not be this many arrests," he said. He also said that people who had benefited from what he called a "black state" were becoming frightened, and that they were approaching foreign embassies and writing to organizations abroad. "We need to punish these corrupt people," he said. "That is how we must break this black state." The government says the changes will improve efficiency and reduce delays in the courts. Critics have asked why extending the tenure of judges now sitting is necessary to achieve that, and have said the administration is pushing through a consequential change without adequate consultation. ### Aid, poverty and the illusion of better health URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/aid-poverty-and-the-illusion-of-better-health/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T19:06:13.000Z **By Mahesh Nirmalan, MD, FRCA, PhD, FFICM, and Jared Mecha, MD, MPH** **Mahesh Nirmalan is Professor of Medical Education and Associate Vice President at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom. Jared Mecha is a Lecturer, Consultant Physician and Global Health Specialist at the University of Nairobi, Kenya.** International development agencies, philanthropy, and health research funding agencies largely approach health outcomes in less developed countries (LDCs) as a problem to be solved within isolated silos. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for health has traditionally prioritised and invested in child health programs (including vaccination), family planning and reproductive health, nutrition, control of communicable diseases, and healthcare infrastructure. Similarly, health research, funded through government agencies or charities, has often focused on linear hypothesis-driven interventions expected to produce measurable outputs. Though these initiatives are well-intentioned, their ability to produce sustainable, positive changes to health systems have often been disappointing. The reason is simple – health outcomes are not produced primarily within healthcare systems but rather in complex, multi-layered, and interconnected political and socioeconomic structures. In such systems, improvements in population health metrics are the by-product of a broad base of social and economic development and institutional quality, catalysed by transparent, people-centred governance frameworks. ### ### **The Preston Curve and the Development of Health** The Preston Curve, first described by Samuel Preston in 1975, demonstrated this relationship between national income and life expectancy. By plotting risk of dying against per-capita income in multiple countries Preston demonstrated one of the most robust observations in development economics. ![Figure 1: Preston curve showing the inverse relationship between risk of dying and economic output.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/aid-poverty-and-the-illusion-o-bhS-j0-kix7yw2f3xf8l5o.png) Figure 1: Preston curve showing the inverse relationship between risk of dying and economic output. The central message is that countries moving from extreme poverty to middle-income status experience dramatic reductions in death rates. This observation is attributable to better nutrition, housing, clean water & sanitation, general educational attainment, transport infrastructure, and access to basic public services that accompany economic development. As income rises further, however, additional increases in wealth produce smaller gains in longevity. Despite this diminishing returns in the higher-income countries, the relationship between economic growth and community health holds true across all health systems. ![Figure 2: The direct relationship between wellbeing and economic output.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/aid-poverty-and-the-illusion-o-bhS-j0-kixagct1qnm2k9s.png) Figure 2: The direct relationship between wellbeing and economic output. Preston also demonstrated that countries today achieve higher life expectancy at equivalent income levels than several decades ago. This is likely to be the result of mass communication, which has enabled improved health literacy and knowledge of healthier lifestyles now than was possible in the past. The implication is profound. Population health is shaped primarily by three interconnected domains: Economic growth Governance and institutional integrity Technological and ‘medical’ interventions Agencies distributing developmental funding, however, pay disproportionate focus on the third domain because medical interventions are easier to define, fund, and measure. The first two domains on the other hand are usually ‘messy’, politically sensitive, and difficult to evaluate through conventional metrics. Yet when economic systems fail or state institutions weaken, health outcomes deteriorate regardless of medical advances. Therefore, as aid budgets shrink globally, donors (and recipients) face an important choice. Should the diminishing funds continue to support projects focused directly on narrow health outcomes, or should they view health outcomes as a ‘*dependent variable*’ and preferentially support economic development, trade, institutional strengthening, and nation-building? The experiences of Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Kenya since the end of colonial rule provide valuable insights in shaping this debate. ### **Sri Lanka: From Universal access to ‘enforced entrapment’** Sri Lanka has long been celebrated as a success story in global public health with life expectancy approaching 78 years despite modest income levels. Many observers attributed this achievement to the country's free healthcare system. However, healthcare was only one component of a broader developmental story in the 2-3 decades that followed independence in 1948\. Successive governments invested heavily in universal education, female empowerment, public health legislation, sanitation, rural infrastructure, and social welfare. These investments created the social and economic foundations upon which an effective health system could operate synergistically. The health sector succeeded because wider society succeeded. However, in the subsequent 3 to 4 decades, that immediate post-independence foundation has progressively weakened. The legacy of a prolonged civil war, rooted in a flawed nation-building project – with ethno-nationalistic leanings, diverted resources from development to security priorities. Growing debt and economic mismanagement in this context culminated in a severe economic crisis in 2022\. As public finances deteriorated and inflation soared, the health sector became increasingly underfunded and critical infrastructure became difficult to maintain.Health records – essential for clinical audits and quality improvement – were reduced to small ‘exercise books’ purchased and owned by patients. The situation was further aggravated by mass emigration of healthcare workers, further weakening the capacity for meaningful care in public hospitals. ![Figure 3: The booming private health care sector is a regular feature in all parts of Sri Lanka.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/aid-poverty-and-the-illusion-o-bhS-j0-kixck5q64jlcnkl.jpg) Figure 3: The booming private health care sector is a regular feature in all parts of Sri Lanka. The consequences of this transformation for ordinary citizens have been profound. Patients who once relied entirely on free public healthcare (delivered to a standard sustainable by the local economy) increasingly found themselves forced into the private sector as public facilities could not meet their expectations. This shift, unfortunately, was not a matter of choice, even for families with modest means. Modern healthcare technologies, surgery, intensive care, cancer care, and other advanced therapeutics could only be accessed in the private sector “to save his/her life” at costs far beyond many families’ means. The recent case history of a patient - admitted to a private hospital in Colombo, with ascending paralysis due to *Guillain-Barré* syndrome and requiring intravenous immunoglobulins and prolonged ventilation and then having a bill close to LKR 5.5 million before being transferred to the National Hospital in Colombo encapsulates the dilemma of many middle-class families with no access to insurance schemes. This family, for example, exhausted its entire life savings as a result of this life-changing and financially catastrophic encounter with private health care in Colombo. Similar dramas are being enacted up and down the country on a daily basis, and the crucial point is that opting out of such care is NOT an option due to socio-cultural imperatives. It is a cruel form of *‘enforced entrapment*’ indeed. Sri Lanka's experience demonstrates an important lesson. The country's earlier population health gains were not created solely through health services. Likewise, its recent deterioration has not been caused solely by failures within health care. Both success and failure closely followed broader economic and institutional realities, reinforcing the message implicit in the Preston curves. ### The Replicated Pattern: Structural Failure in Kenya and Uganda Similar challenges in health care closely linked to socio-political upheavals in the country are evident in many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda in particular presents a different but equally revealing example. Decades of conflict, political instability, and reliance on donor-funded programmes have left deep structural weaknesses within public institutions. One striking illustration emerged in Northern Uganda following the conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government. The war left many people with major limb loss and permanent disabilities. Rather than developing sustainable – even if suboptimal – public rehabilitation services, much of the response was outsourced to NGOs (such as AVSI International) and short-term donor-funded research projects. Although these initiatives delivered valuable short-term support, perhaps to higher standards, they did not create enduring health systems capacity for sustainable rehabilitation of victims. Rehabilitation services in the Acholi sub-region remained dependent entirely on external actors. As a result, when priorities shifted, or projects ended, vulnerable populations were left without essential, reliable long-term support. One child victim – now a married woman with two children, who lost her leg to a land mine, reflected in 2019 (13 years after the war with the LRA formally ended) *“If AVSI goes I have to kill myself*”. The net result of this well-intentioned NGO-led program in the region was therefore a significant disconnect between humanitarian intervention and sustainable institution-building. ![Figure 4: HIV prevention/treatment programs were outsourced to external agencies such as USAID in many African countries such as Uganda and Kenya. (Source: Wikimedia Commons).](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/aid-poverty-and-the-illusion-o-bhS-j0-kixd28sjy9ibmfo.jpg) Figure 4: HIV prevention/treatment programs were outsourced to external agencies such as USAID in many African countries such as Uganda and Kenya. (Source: Wikimedia Commons). Kenya demonstrates many of the same pressures. Although the country has experienced notable economic growth and technological modernisation, major challenges remain within public healthcare. Persistent personnel shortages, industrial disputes, supply-chain disruptions, and equipment failures continue to affect service delivery. Consequently, private providers occupy an increasingly dominant position within the healthcare landscape.While various reforms seek to improve insurance coverage, out-of-pocket payments - secured through the sale of houses, land or livestock, remain substantial with family illness becoming one of the most effective routes into poverty. As in Uganda, in Kenya too the provision of many vital services was outsourced to international donors. Programs aimed at prevention and treatment of HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria were entirely in the hands of organisations such as USAID and the Global Fund. The dependency was such that, according to an informed Kenyan academic, “*the national and many county governments did not have a budget allocation for these essential programs*”. The rapid withdrawal of USAID-funded programs in Kenya, almost over a single weekend, has created a huge gap in service provision accompanied by unimaginable human tragedy. Reflecting on these different but inter-connected case histories across Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Kenya, the common denominator was not primarily healthcare policy. The glaring deficits in health care in all three countries were undoubtedly a manifestation of the strength or weakness of the wider economic and institutional environment in which healthcare operated. This is what the Preston curves teach us. ### **Why Donor Agencies Get It Wrong: The Illusion of Technical Fixes** Many international development organisations continue to organise their activities through strict administrative silos. Health specialists focus on health; education specialists on education; infrastructure experts on infrastructure; and governance teams on governance. This compartmentalised architecture can create a dangerous intellectual trap. Health professionals understandably view suffering through a medical lens and therefore propose medical solutions - more clinics, more medicines, more training programmes, more disease-specific interventions, and more research. Such outputs are attractive because they can be counted or listed. Donors can report the number of vaccines administered, clinics built, workers trained, or papers published. Yet these metrics often bear only a weak relationship to durable improvements in population health. A modern clinic funded through a donor grant may look impressive in the departmental annual report. However, if surrounding roads remain broken, electricity unreliable, local employment hard to find, and governance corrupt, the facility - however impressive it looked in the project report and the associated posts in social media, become rapidly ineffective. Similar examples can be found across many low-income countries where donor-supported infrastructure exists but broader systems necessary for sustainability do not. Vertical health programmes also struggle to address macroeconomic realities. Vaccination campaigns and training workshops cannot compensate for food inflation or healthcare workers emigrating. Similarly, disease-specific interventions or research cannot stabilise a national currency or repair dysfunctional institutions. The same fragmentation often exists within donor countries. The United Kingdom's Overseas Development Assistance system illustrates this challenge. Funding is distributed across multiple departments and agencies including the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Department of Health and Social Care, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, and research bodies such as UKRI. These organisations frequently pursue separate priorities, procurement systems, accountability frameworks, and performance indicators.As a result, a research innovation funded by UKRI or Welcome Trust may have no clear pathway into wider development policy or infrastructure investment. Health projects, scientific research, and governance programmes often proceed in parallel rather than as components of an integrated state-building strategy. The consequence is a pattern of fragmented interventions rather than transformative change. ### **Political Institutions and Fiscal Protection Matter More Than Medical Hardware** The most important determinant of national health is the quality of a country's institutions. Competent governments create security, maintain infrastructure, support education, regulate markets, collect taxation, and deliver public services. These functions create the conditions necessary for economic growth which in turn generates the financial capability to finance healthcare systems that are sustainable by the local economy. When governments cannot retain healthcare workers, regulate private healthcare markets, or maintain basic public infrastructure, externally funded programmes merely amount to *‘pacifying the donors’ conscience*’ rather than achieve real change. Countries with capable institutions on the other hand frequently improve population health rapidly even when foreign assistance is modest. The major health transformations seen across South and East Asia during the twentieth century - China, Vietnam and India included, were driven primarily by economic development, educational expansion, and calibrated/proportional state interventions rather than donor-funded isolated medical interventions. In Vietnam for example a basic war-recovering health system has transformed into a 4-tiered universal health care model backed by >90% health insurance coverage within the past 5 decades. Such transformations in health care are only possible if the local economy drives aspirations for better health care. ### ### **What Should Development Assistance Support Instead?** Recognising the broader determinants of health does not require abandoning traditional health programmes. Rather, it requires placing health within a wider developmental framework as implied by Preston. Development assistance should therefore place greater emphasis on public infrastructure & productivity**;** education & human capital development; macroeconomic resilience & regulatory capacity**;** agricultural productivity, waste management and food security etc*.*. When these basic foundations are in place improvement in health usually follows, supported and resourced in a more sustainable manner by national budgets. The goal however is not to abruptly abandon healthcare support (as done by USAID in Kenya) but to recognise healthcare's place within a much larger ecosystem. ### Conclusion: Health and Wellbeing are Consequences of Development The enduring lesson of the Preston Curve is that health is not an isolated bubble. Life expectancy, mortality, wellbeing, and vulnerability are shaped by economic growth, educational attainment, infrastructure, governance, and institutional strength. Sri Lanka's recent experience illustrates how outstanding achievements in health care can be undone by economic collapse that follows corruption concealed by sectarian rhetorics. Uganda and Kenya demonstrate the risks of excessive dependence on externally funded programmes and the failure to strengthen sustainable indigenous public systems concurrently. Collectively, these examples show that when state capacity diminishes, citizens are increasingly exposed to predatory commercial healthcare markets and financial ruin for families. For too long, development agencies and donor governments have treated health primarily as a technical challenge requiring technical solutions. Whether through vertical disease-control programmes or fragmented aid, this approach has often overestimated what health interventions can achieve in isolation. As aid budgets are slashed, donor (and recipient) governments have important choices to make. The realisation that health grows most effectively in societies that are productive, stable, and resilient is an important facet in informing this choice. The ultimate task of development policy is therefore not merely to subsidise medicine or build new health centres, but to help build societies where better health is an outcome of better governance and a stable economy. ***The opinions expressed in this article are that of the authors alone and not the views of the Universities of Manchester and/or Nairobi on the subject.*** ### Rajnath Singh Heads to Sri Lanka Tuesday as India Deepens Defence Ties URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T15:19:33.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, will arrive in Sri Lanka on Tuesday for a three-day official visit, leading a high-level delegation for talks aimed at strengthening the two countries’ defence and maritime partnership. The visit, from Sept. 8 to 10, will be a rare one at the ministerial level: Mr. Singh is set to become the first Indian defence minister to visit Sri Lanka in nearly four decades. The last such visit was by K.C. Pant, who served as defence minister under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in 1988. Mr. Singh had been scheduled to visit Sri Lanka once before, in September 2023, but the trip was called off on the eve of his departure. India’s Ministry of Defence said at the time that the visit had been deferred because of “unavoidable circumstances” and that Mr. Singh remained committed to strengthening bilateral cooperation. Three years later, the rescheduled engagement comes as India and Sri Lanka continue to expand a defence relationship that encompasses military training, maritime security, capacity building and exchanges between their armed forces. Mr. Singh will hold consultations with Sri Lanka’s leadership on a range of issues and meet members of the Indian community in Colombo, the Indian government said Sunday. He will be accompanied by senior officials from India’s ministries of defence and external affairs. The government did not immediately provide a detailed itinerary or identify the Sri Lankan leaders Mr. Singh would meet. India played a central role in supporting Sri Lanka during its economic collapse in 2022, extending about $4 billion in credit lines and other assistance as severe shortages of foreign currency left the island struggling to pay for fuel, food, medicines and other essential imports. India was also among the first countries to provide assistance to Sri Lanka following Cyclone Ditwah in 2025, an intervention New Delhi has cited as an example of its role as a first responder in the region. The Indian government said Mr. Singh’s visit would further strengthen the countries’ “traditionally strong and friendly bilateral relations,” particularly their maritime and defence partnership. Mr. Singh’s visit will conclude Thursday ### Thirty Years On, Krishanthi’s Memorial Becomes a Campaign for Mass-Grave Investigations URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/thirty-years-on-krishanthis-memorial-becomes-a-campaign-for-mass-grave-investigations/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T05:07:40.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Groups organising a memorial for Krishanthi Kumaraswamy on Monday, 30 years after the schoolgirl was raped and murdered by soldiers at an army checkpoint outside Jaffna, said the event will also launch a campaign to identify suspected mass graves across the Northern and Eastern Provinces and to press the courts for their excavation. The organising committee announced the plans at a news conference. The main event begins at 3:30 p.m. on Monday, Sept. 7, and will open with a floral tribute to Krishanthi, followed by speeches by politicians, researchers and activists, and theatrical performances. Organisations working on disappearances and human rights will be formally invited to join the initiative in the coming days, the committee said. It aims to set up a common coordinating mechanism within 45 days and, through that body, to agree a shared policy and set of procedures for identifying suspected burial sites and seeking court authorisation to excavate them. Krishanthi, an 18-year-old student at Chundikuli Girls’ High School, was cycling home from her final Advanced Level examination on Sept. 7, 1996, when she was stopped at the Kaithady army checkpoint on the Jaffna-Kandy road. Her mother, Rassammah, her 16-year-old brother, Pranavan, and a family friend, Kirupakaran, went looking for her and were also killed. All four bodies were later recovered from shallow graves in the Chemmani area. Six soldiers were sentenced to death over the killings in 1998 and three others were given 20-year terms. It remains the only publicly known case in which Sri Lankan soldiers have been convicted of raping a Tamil civilian during the war. No officer above the rank of those directly involved was investigated. The case acquired its wider significance in July 1998, when Lance Corporal Somaratne Rajapakse, facing the death sentence, told the court he knew of mass graves in the Jaffna Peninsula holding the bodies of people who had disappeared in earlier years. He put the number at 300 to 400\. Fifteen sets of remains were exhumed at Chemmani in 1999\. The investigation then stalled. The anniversary falls at a point when Chemmani is again under judicial scrutiny. Human remains surfaced at the Chemmani-Sindhubathi cremation ground in February 2025 during trenching work by the Nallur Pradeshiya Sabha, and the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court ordered an excavation that began that May. The third phase ended on Aug. 19, bringing the total recovered over 110 days of digging to 583 sets of human remains, among them 51 clusters of bodies buried together. The site is now the largest mass grave recorded in the North-East, surpassing Mannar Sathosa. Little has been established about who the dead were or when they were buried. Archaeological, forensic and carbon-14 testing is still pending. Professor Raj Somadeva, the archaeologist supervising the dig, is due to report on Sept. 30 on the likely period of the artefacts recovered, including material from 14 test pits opened outside the main burial area. An administrative meeting on Oct. 14 is expected to decide how the investigation proceeds, and the judicial medical officer is expected to seek approval for a further 28 days of excavation, which would then require the Ministry of Justice to release funding. The Criminal Investigation Department told the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court in July that it had not yet established whether a crime had taken place at the site. ### People’s Struggle Alliance Says Sri Lanka’s 22nd Amendment Is Designed to Benefit Individuals URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/peoples-struggle-alliance-says-sri-lankas-22nd-amendment-is-designed-to-benefit-individuals/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T05:07:41.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The People’s Struggle Alliance has accused the government of introducing Sri Lanka’s proposed 22nd Amendment to the Constitution to benefit particular individuals and groups, saying the measure offers no meaningful benefit to the country or its people. Nuwan Bopage, a lawyer and national executive committee member of the alliance, made the accusation at a news conference at the group’s office in Nugegoda on Friday. “The 22nd Amendment is being brought for the benefit of individuals and a particular group,” Mr. Bopage said. “It will bring no benefit to the country or its people.” The proposed amendment would raise the retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67 and Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65. Mr. Bopage alleged that the measure had been introduced primarily to extend the tenure of judges currently serving on the country’s highest courts. He also accused the government, which has emphasized participatory democracy, of pushing ahead with the amendment without a meaningful public debate. He said more than 50 petitions had been filed in the Supreme Court challenging the bill and argued that the breadth of the opposition reflected wider concerns about the proposal. According to Mr. Bopage, political parties, mass movements and university academics were among those who went before the court in opposition to the amendment. He claimed that the government, by contrast, had to rely on people close to it, including Janaka Adhikari and Lakshman Nipuna Arachchi, to intervene in support of the measure. Mr. Bopage also criticized the composition of the Supreme Court bench hearing the constitutional challenges. Lawyers opposing the amendment had asked for the petitions to be considered by the full Supreme Court rather than a five-judge bench. That request was rejected. Mr. Bopage argued that the case should have been considered by all 13 Supreme Court judges or that the proposed constitutional changes should ultimately be put before voters in a referendum. He accused lawyers representing the government and the attorney general of strongly resisting those alternatives. He also raised questions about potential conflicts of interest, arguing that judges who could personally be affected by the proposed increase in the retirement age should not take part in determining its constitutionality. Mr. Bopage accused the government of seeking to avoid a referendum because it feared the amendment would be defeated by voters. Once the Supreme Court’s determination is sent to the speaker of Parliament, he said, the government could use its 159-seat parliamentary majority to push the amendment through the legislature. The governing National People’s Power coalition won 159 of Parliament’s 225 seats in the 2024 general election, giving it more than the two-thirds majority generally required for constitutional amendments. Whether the proposal would also require approval at a referendum depends on the constitutional provisions involved and the Supreme Court’s determination. Mr. Bopage also questioned the independence and legal competence of some government lawmakers, accusing them of being willing to vote according to instructions from the political leadership rather than independently scrutinizing the legislation. “They will close their eyes, raise their hands and pass it,” he said. “This is not democracy of the people.” He called on Sri Lankans to oppose the amendment publicly, arguing that political power ultimately rests with citizens rather than the institutions of government. “The people stand above the legislature, the executive and the judiciary,” Mr. Bopage said. He urged the public to “take to the streets” to defeat what he described as an antidemocratic constitutional amendment intended to serve individual interests. ### ‘Astrology Ritual’ Turns Into Blackmail for Sri Lankan Tamil Canadian Woman in Chennai URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/astrology-ritual-turns-into-blackmail-for-sri-lankan-tamil-canadian-woman-in-chennai/ Last updated: 2026-09-05T02:49:33.000Z CHENNAI, India — Police in Chennai have arrested a fortune teller accused of persuading a Canadian woman of Sri Lankan Tamil origin to appear naked during video calls as part of an astrological ritual, secretly recording the calls and later using the footage to extort money and demand sex from her, police said. The suspect, Isakki Muthu, 45, was arrested in Courtallam in Tamil Nadu’s Tenkasi district after officers traced his cellphone. Police seized his phone and are investigating whether other women may have been targeted in a similar manner. The woman, 37, had traveled to Tamil Nadu several months ago and was staying in Chennai. Police said she met Mr. Muthu while visiting Besant Nagar beach, where he worked as a *kili josiyar*, or parrot astrologer, a traditional form of fortune-telling in which a trained parrot selects cards that are then interpreted for customers. During their conversation, Mr. Muthu referred to details of the woman’s personal life, including her divorce and her mother’s cancer. His apparent knowledge of those circumstances surprised her and helped him gain her trust, police said. He allegedly told her that her horoscope showed an unfavorable planetary alignment and that she was suffering from the influence of Saturn. He warned that she could develop cancer like her mother unless she underwent a special ritual, for which he initially sought about 20,000 Indian rupees. Police said Mr. Muthu later instructed the woman to stand naked in her room at midnight during a video call, telling her that he would conduct a *yagam*, or fire ritual, at a temple to remove the astrological affliction. Believing him, the woman followed his instructions. Police said she was made to take part in such video calls more than five times. Mr. Muthu then allegedly told her that he had secretly recorded the calls and threatened to publish the footage online unless she paid him as much as 500,000 rupees. Fearing that the videos would be released, the woman paid him about 70,000 rupees, police said. The alleged blackmail later escalated. Police said Mr. Muthu used the recordings to demand sex from the woman, prompting her to file a complaint with the Mambalam All Women Police Station in Chennai. Investigators traced the cellphone number he had used to contact the woman and examined the number linked to the Google Pay account through which she had transferred money. A police source familiar with the investigation told Jaffna Monitor that members of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora visiting Tamil Nadu are frequently targeted by scammers who perceive people living in countries such as Canada, Britain and Australia as wealthy. The source said that perception can make diaspora visitors attractive targets for fraud and urged Sri Lankan Tamils traveling in Tamil Nadu to be cautious when approached by people seeking money for astrology, religious rituals or other purported remedies. Police identified Mr. Muthu as a resident of Bala Marthandapuram, near Kadayanallur in Tenkasi district. He had worked as a religious medium at a Karuppasamy temple in his village as well as a parrot astrologer. A special police team tracked his cellphone signal to Courtallam and arrested him on Thursday. He was taken to Chennai, where investigators seized his phone. Police are examining the device to determine whether Mr. Muthu recorded other women or used similar rituals to extort money from them. ### IMF Team to Visit Sri Lanka for Seventh Review of Economic Program URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/imf-team-to-visit-sri-lanka-for-seventh-review-of-economic-program/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T13:12:55.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** An International Monetary Fund team will visit Sri Lanka this month to conduct the seventh review of the country’s economic program and assess its broader economic outlook, the Fund said. The team, led by Evan Papageorgiou, the IMF’s mission chief for Sri Lanka, will be in the country from Sept. 10 to 23 for discussions with government officials on the Seventh Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the Extended Fund Facility and the 2026 Article IV Consultation. The mission will assess Sri Lanka’s progress in implementing economic reforms under the IMF-backed program, as well as recent macroeconomic developments. The Fund said the team would communicate its findings at the conclusion of the visit. The review comes as Sri Lanka continues an economic restructuring program undertaken after the country’s financial collapse in 2022, when severe shortages of foreign currency left the government struggling to pay for essential imports and ultimately led it to default on its foreign debt. The IMF approved a four-year Extended Fund Facility for Sri Lanka in March 2023 worth about $3 billion. In May, its executive board completed the combined fifth and sixth reviews of the program. The September mission follows a visit by Mr. Papageorgiou and his team from June 24 to 30, when IMF officials reviewed economic developments and discussed the government’s progress in implementing reforms. At the end of that visit, the Fund said Sri Lanka’s economic recovery had faced renewed pressure from the Middle East conflict, including higher energy prices, rising inflation, slower growth in tourist arrivals and weaker accumulation of foreign reserves. The IMF also said that maintaining the pace of reforms was critical to preserving fiscal and external stability, and that Sri Lanka’s performance under the program would be formally assessed during the Seventh Review. ### U.S. Maritime Chiefs to Visit Sri Lanka as Colombo’s Shipping Role Grows URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-s-maritime-chiefs-to-visit-sri-lanka-as-colombos-shipping-role-grows/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T12:34:34.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Two senior United States maritime regulators will visit Sri Lanka next week for talks on shipping, trade and investment, the U.S. Embassy in Colombo said Friday. Laura DiBella, chairwoman of the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission, and Commissioner Robert J. Harvey are scheduled to be in the country from Sept. 6 to 10. The visit will include meetings with senior Sri Lankan government officials and leaders of the country’s maritime industry, with discussions expected to focus on trade, investment and the shipping networks connecting the United States with markets across the Indo-Pacific. Ms. DiBella will also address the eighth Colombo International Maritime and Logistics Conference, while Mr. Harvey will participate in a panel discussion. The visit comes as Sri Lanka seeks to strengthen Colombo’s position as a regional maritime and logistics center. Sitting close to the main east-west shipping route across the Indian Ocean, Colombo serves less as a final destination for cargo than as a transfer point for containers moving between larger international markets. More than 80 percent of containers handled in Colombo are transshipment cargo destined for other countries, according to the U.S. Embassy. Eric Meyer, the U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka, said that figure illustrated the island’s importance to international shipping. “Over 80 percent of the containers moving through Colombo continue on to destinations around the world,” Mr. Meyer said, calling it “a remarkable illustration of Sri Lanka’s role at the heart of Indian Ocean shipping.” He said the visit offered an opportunity to deepen American cooperation with Sri Lanka’s maritime sector and argued that secure and efficient shipping would benefit businesses and consumers in both countries. The Federal Maritime Commission is an independent U.S. government agency that regulates America’s international ocean transportation system. Established in 1961, it oversees aspects of the relationship between ocean carriers, ports and other maritime businesses, with a mandate that includes protecting American exporters, importers and consumers from unfair or deceptive shipping practices. Ms. DiBella, a Florida business and economic-development official with experience managing ports, joined the commission in January after being nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate. Mr. Trump designated her chairwoman later that month. Before joining the commission, Ms. DiBella served as Florida’s secretary of commerce and as president and chief executive of Enterprise Florida. Her maritime career included serving as port director of the Port of Fernandina and later as executive director of the Florida Harbor Pilots Association. Mr. Harvey, also from Florida, joined the commission in June after his nomination by Mr. Trump and confirmation by the Senate. A lawyer and U.S. Navy veteran, Mr. Harvey previously held senior positions in Florida economic-development organizations and served in the Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps. His maritime interests include freedom of navigation, the right of innocent passage, and emerging technologies involving navigation, cybersecurity, and secure maritime communications. Their visit places Colombo within a broader American focus on the security and resilience of Indo-Pacific maritime trade. Sri Lanka’s location near the sea lanes linking East Asia, the Middle East and Europe has long given its ports an importance extending well beyond the size of the country’s domestic market. ### Namal Rajapaksa Arrested in SriLankan Airlines Airbus Bribery Investigation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/namal-rajapaksa-arrested-in-srilankan-airlines-airbus-bribery-investigation/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T03:33:54.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Namal Rajapaksa, a lawmaker and the eldest son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, was arrested Friday after being questioned for more than five hours over an alleged bribery case linked to SriLankan Airlines’ purchase of Airbus aircraft. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, or CIABOC, arrested Mr. Rajapaksa after he appeared at its Colombo office on Friday morning in response to a summons. Mr. Rajapaksa, 40, is the national organizer of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, or SLPP, and one of the most prominent members of the Rajapaksa political family. CIABOC said the investigation concerns an alleged bribe connected to the purchase of wide-body aircraft for SriLankan Airlines during the administration of Mr. Rajapaksa’s father. According to the commission, investigators are examining payments totaling €1,454,651.24 and $800,000, which were worth about 100 million Sri Lankan rupees at the time. At current exchange rates, the same amounts would be worth about Rs. 817 million. Investigators allege that the money was paid by a Sri Lankan businessman on several occasions in 2013 and 2014 in connection with the aircraft transaction. CIABOC said the money was deposited into an account held by Biz Solutions Inc. at Standard Chartered Bank in Singapore and was later transferred to an account at OCBC Bank in Singapore belonging to Sabre Vision Holdings Ltd., a company belonging to the same Sri Lankan businessman. Investigators have been examining the movement of money through the Singapore accounts and whether some of it ultimately reached Mr. Rajapaksa. Two payments of $400,000 each were transferred from the Biz Solutions account to Sabre Vision Holdings in November and December 2013, according to information that emerged during earlier investigations into the transaction. Businessman Nimal Perera was identified by investigators as the beneficial owner of Sabre Vision. A businessman questioned in the investigation has told investigators that he facilitated transactions involving money connected to the Airbus deal and that money was handed to Mr. Rajapaksa, according to people familiar with the investigation. Mr. Rajapaksa has previously denied wrongdoing and rejected allegations that he received illicit money connected to the aircraft deal. CIABOC said Friday that the decision to arrest him was based on evidence gathered during the investigation, including statements from the businessman, information obtained from Airbus officials in France, and electronic and other evidence relating to the transactions. Mr. Rajapaksa had been ordered to appear before the commission at 9 a.m. Friday. He was questioned for more than five hours before being arrested in the afternoon. A CIABOC official said he would be produced before a magistrate. The precise charges he will face were not immediately clear. His arrest came three days after Mr. Rajapaksa publicly predicted that he could be jailed before an opposition rally planned for Sept. 12 in Anuradhapura. Speaking to reporters on Sept. 1, Mr. Rajapaksa accused the government of trying to suppress the opposition and said it might put him behind bars if it believed a large crowd would attend the SLPP rally. “If the government realises that a large crowd will come to Anuradhapura on the 12th, they may even put Namal Rajapaksa behind bars before then,” he said. The government rejected the allegation. Health and Mass Media Minister Nalinda Jayatissa said this week that law-enforcement agencies were acting on evidence and court proceedings, not according to the dates of political rallies. He said investigators would make arrests if they uncovered evidence of wrongdoing. ## The Airbus Investigation The investigation stems from SriLankan Airlines’ decision in 2013 to acquire 10 Airbus aircraft and lease four others as part of a major fleet renewal program. The scale of the alleged corruption surrounding the transaction became public in 2020, when a British court approved a deferred prosecution agreement between Airbus and Britain’s Serious Fraud Office as part of a wider international investigation into corruption at the European aircraft manufacturer. The British court found that Airbus employees had offered as much as $16.84 million to an intermediary to influence SriLankan Airlines’ purchase of 10 aircraft and lease of four others. Of that amount, $2 million was ultimately paid. The intermediary was later identified in Sri Lankan investigations as Biz Solutions Inc., a company established by Priyanka Neomali Wijenayake, the wife of Kapila Chandrasena, who was chief executive of SriLankan Airlines when the aircraft deal was negotiated. The British proceedings found that Airbus employees had concealed the intermediary’s connection to a SriLankan Airlines executive and provided misleading information when questions were raised about the arrangement. Mr. Chandrasena and Ms. Wijenayake were arrested in Sri Lanka in 2020 after details of the payments emerged from the international Airbus investigation. CIABOC revived the investigation in recent years and arrested Mr. Chandrasena again in March. The commission alleged that he and his wife had established the company in Brunei, opened its bank account in Singapore and received about €1.45 million connected to the aircraft deal. Mr. Chandrasena has also disputed the investigation. Earlier this year, his lawyers submitted an affidavit alleging that CIABOC investigators had pressured and intimidated him to make statements implicating Mahinda Rajapaksa, Namal Rajapaksa and others. He alleged that references to members of the Rajapaksa family were not made voluntarily. Mahinda Rajapaksa was questioned by the commission for nearly two hours in May over the Airbus transaction. The Criminal Investigation Department also questioned Namal Rajapaksa over the case in February 2025. Mr. Chandrasena was later found dead, hanging at the home of his brother-in-law, former Sri Lankan cricket captain Aravinda de Silva. The circumstances surrounding his death have raised questions as the Airbus investigation has continued. Friday’s arrest is the first time Namal Rajapaksa has been taken into custody in connection with the Airbus investigation. The case is one of several major corruption investigations revived since President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and his National People’s Power government came to power after campaigning on a pledge to prosecute corruption and recover stolen public assets. The underlying Airbus bribery scheme has already been established through proceedings overseas. Airbus reached settlements with authorities in Britain, France and the United States in 2020 after admitting misconduct involving aircraft sales in several countries. ### A Boy Died Minutes After Eating a Fallen Fruit. The Explanation Is a Medical Mystery URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-boy-died-minutes-after-eating-a-fallen-fruit-the-explanation-is-a-medical-mystery/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T04:38:41.000Z **BATTICALOA, Sri Lanka —** An 11-year-old boy collapsed and died in eastern Sri Lanka on Thursday evening, minutes after eating a fruit he had picked up from the ground outside his home, the police said, prompting an investigation into a theory that medical evidence does not readily support: that the fruit had been contaminated with snake venom. The boy, R. Sanjeev, lived on Hospital Road in Palaiyadivattai, a village in Batticaloa District, and was a sixth grader at Navagiri Vidyalayam in 37th Village. He had picked up a Java plum, known as naval, that had fallen from a tree in front of the house, according to a preliminary account gathered by the Vellaveli police. He collapsed a short time later. He was taken to Kaluwanchikudy Base Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Officers have raised the possibility that the fruit came into contact with venom from a snake on the ground. That explanation has not been medically established, and it runs against most of what is known about how venom harms people. ## Can Swallowed Venom Kill? Snake venom is dangerous chiefly because a bite drives it beneath the skin, where the toxins enter the lymphatic system and the bloodstream. Depending on the species, it can paralyze the muscles that control breathing, prevent blood from clotting, destroy muscle tissue, and damage the kidneys. Swallowing venom is a different matter. Venoms are made largely of proteins and peptides, the same class of molecules the digestive system exists to break down. Medical literature holds that venom does not cross intact skin or mucous membranes and does not ordinarily cause envenoming (poisoning by venom) when it is swallowed. A standard clinical reference on hazardous animals notes that no case of human envenoming from ingested snake venom has been reported. The presence of venom on a fallen fruit would not, on its own, establish that venom killed the child. Clinicians allow for a narrower possibility: that venom reached damaged tissue, through a cut in the mouth or a broken mucous membrane, rather than passing through an intact digestive tract. Even that would remain speculation. Investigators would first have to show that venom was present at all, that the boy had not been bitten without anyone noticing, and that no other medical or toxicological event caused his collapse. ## What to Know About Snakebite The case is not evidence that fruit becomes lethal merely because a snake has touched it. Fruit picked up from the ground should nonetheless be washed thoroughly. Fallen fruit can carry soil, animal waste, microorganisms, or pesticide residue, and fruit that is damaged or decomposing should be thrown away. More importantly, a sudden collapse after eating is a medical emergency, whatever its cause. Loss of consciousness, difficulty breathing, severe vomiting, unusual weakness, bleeding, or rapid swelling all call for immediate hospital treatment. If a snakebite is suspected, the World Health Organization advises keeping the person as still as possible and moving them to a health facility without delay. Tourniquets, cutting the wound, attempting to suck out venom and traditional remedies should all be avoided. Sri Lankan national guidance says the same, and warns specifically against those home treatments, which can worsen the injury. Until the autopsy is complete, what killed an apparently healthy 11-year-old minutes after he ate a piece of fallen fruit remains unknown. ### U.N. Says Sri Lanka Risks Losing Its Chance to Break With a Past of Impunity URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-n-says-sri-lanka-risks-losing-its-chance-to-break-with-a-past-of-impunity/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T16:37:18.000Z **GENEVA —** Nearly two years after Sri Lankans elected a government that promised to dismantle the machinery of impunity, the United Nations human rights office said Thursday that the opening for change was closing. In a report to the Human Rights Council, the office credited the government with moving against corruption and reopening several political killings and disappearances. But it found that Colombo has gone on detaining people under the counterterrorism law it pledged to abolish, has made almost no progress on wartime crimes by either side, and has not stopped the intelligence services from watching and threatening victims, activists and journalists in the north and east. “This Government still has an opportunity to turn the tide,” the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, said in a statement accompanying the report, which covers October 2025 through July 2026 and goes before the Council when it convenes here on Sept. 7. The National People’s Power government of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake took office in late 2024 promising a new constitution, repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, an independent public prosecutor and the release of political prisoners. None of it has been legislated. What the report describes is a state that has changed its political language without changing many of its habits. The country’s Human Rights Commission recorded 602 cases of torture and ill-treatment in 2025 and another 138 by April this year, along with 18 deaths in custody last year and three more by April. Of the 1,125 complaints of arbitrary arrest and detention it received in 2025, the police took no action in 530. Among the dead was a 40-year-old man held at Welikada Prison in Colombo on a minor drug charge, who died on May 3 after what the report describes as a severe beating following a suspected escape attempt. Three prison officers were arrested. Another inmate had died days earlier. In July, violence inside Negombo Prison killed at least 32 people, 22 of them detainees and 10 prison officers, in a system the U.N. says is strained by inadequate resources and by overcrowding that owes much to the jailing of people for offenses as minor as drug use. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, the law that has shaped the Tamil experience of the Sri Lankan state for two generations, remains in force. The Human Rights Commission was notified of 46 detentions under it in 2025 and 12 more by March. A replacement drafted in December, the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, drew a detailed rebuke from the U.N. office in February, which warned that it would reproduce and in places widen the powers it was meant to retire: broad criminal definitions, sweeping executive authority, arbitrary detention and thin protection against torture and enforced disappearance. The Cabinet approved publishing a bill in the gazette on Aug. 17\. As of the end of that month, no text had been made public. Surveillance remains common in the north and east. The U.N. office said it received 16 complaints from people who said they had been watched, questioned or threatened by military and civilian intelligence officers, including from the Criminal Investigation Department and the Terrorism Investigation Division. Officers asked about their organizations, funding, protests and commemorations, as well as trips to Geneva and contact with U.N. human rights bodies. Some activists also reported death threats, visits to their homes and warnings that they could be disappeared or face false charges. In January, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances was told that authorities had threatened a person who had provided information to the committee four months earlier. The report singles out the killing of Albino Arul Pius, a 17-year-old shot in the head by police at Allaipiddy in Jaffna on Feb. 10 after officers said the vehicle he was travelling in had not stopped at a checkpoint. The police initially described the dead youth as an adult. He died at Jaffna Teaching Hospital. His family has since reported being watched and threatened, and has asked for an independent investigation. Land remains unresolved. The government released almost 1,000 acres held by the military in the north and east in 2025, while communities went on demanding thousands more in Vasavilan and Valikamam in Jaffna and Keppapilavu in Mullaitivu. Religious sites have become flashpoints of their own: a shrine built on private land at Thaiyiddy in Jaffna, still disputed after years, and a proposal to install an Air Force radar inside the Thirukoneswaram temple precinct in Trincomalee. At Chemmani-Sithuppaththi, on the edge of Jaffna town, excavators had recovered remains corresponding to more than 477 people, among them children, by late July. Later counts run higher. The U.N. welcomed the resumption of the dig and the magistrate’s decision to let diplomats observe it, then made the point the families have been making for months: that exhumation without impartial criminal investigation, including into command responsibility, produces bones and not answers. It urged the government to seek international forensic assistance. Enforced disappearance, the report says, remains a defining feature of Sri Lanka’s impunity. The Office on Missing Persons has still established the fate of no one. Parents and spouses are dying without learning anything. A few emblematic cases have moved. Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the former Eastern Province chief minister known as Pillayan, was indicted in August over the 2006 disappearance of Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, the vice chancellor of Eastern University. In March, the Court of Appeal set aside the 2016 acquittals in the killing of the Tamil parliamentarian Nadarajah Raviraj and ordered a retrial. August also brought the 20th anniversary of the execution of 17 Action Contre la Faim aid workers at Muttur, on which the report records no new step of any kind. The government has made more progress in the investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. Former State Intelligence Service director Suresh Sallay was arrested in February. On June 3, a Colombo magistrate imposed a travel ban on former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and two Army intelligence officers. On July 31, a special trial-at-bar found former police chief Pujith Jayasundara and former defense secretary Hemasiri Fernando guilty on several charges and sentenced them to death. The U.N. noted these developments but raised concerns about the death sentences, the lack of effective legal representation for 22 defendants after their lawyers withdrew, restrictions on family members and the lack of public access to the proceedings. There has been little progress on crimes committed during the war. The report says there has been no accountability for serious violations committed by any side, and that meaningful security sector reform has yet to take place. Colombo’s posture toward Geneva has not softened. It continues to reject the Council resolutions that underpin the U.N.'s Sri Lanka accountability project, whose repository now holds more than 123,000 items from over 500 witnesses and sources, and has declined to engage with it. In May it rejected outright a U.N. brief on conflict-related sexual violence built on consultations with 27 survivors, and has not taken up an offer to discuss the findings. Mr. Türk’s recommendations run from the achievable to the unlikely: a moratorium on the terrorism law pending repeal, the release of long-held detainees, the return of occupied land, support for memorialisation, a stronger Office on Missing Persons, the removal from office of anyone credibly accused of serious violations, and a special judicial mechanism with an independent counsel. To member states he suggested prosecutions under universal jurisdiction and targeted sanctions. Behind all of it is a clock. On Jan. 16, Sandya Ekneligoda, who has spent 16 years looking for her husband, the cartoonist Prageeth Ekneligoda, answered her telephone to a man identifying himself as a retired brigadier who told her she would be killed. A second such call came on April 13, days after she wrote to President Dissanayake objecting to the promotion of a military intelligence officer accused in her husband’s case. ### London Businessman Gives Rs. 5 Million to Expand Fertility Care at Kilinochchi Hospital URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/london-businessman-gives-rs-5-million-to-expand-fertility-care-at-kilinochchi-hospital/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T17:01:47.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka —** A London-based businessman has donated 5 million Sri Lankan rupees to help expand fertility treatment services at Kilinochchi General Hospital, providing support for a specialized area of care at one of the Northern Province’s main public hospitals. The donation, from Thangarajah Kalamohan, was formally presented at the hospital on Thursday as part of a project undertaken by Kili Makkal, Tamil for “Kilinochchi People”, an organization founded by members of the Kilinochchi community. The money will go toward expanding the hospital’s assisted fertility treatment center, according to organizers of the initiative. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/london-businessman-gives-rs-5-0cd7ca-1.jpg) The hospital’s director, Dr. M. Thayalini, led the presentation, and Professor Sivalingarajah Raguraman, the specialist overseeing the project, coordinated it. Mr. Kalamohan joined the event from London. Krishnapillai Vijayarajah, a founder of Kili Makkal; Abinaya Vijayarajah, a medical student in London; and Krishnapillai Vickinarajah, the organization’s Sri Lanka coordinator, took part in presenting the cheque. Professor S. Kumaran and K. Vijayasekaran, president of the Kilinochchi Hospital Patients’ Welfare Association, also attended, along with hospital officials, staff members and representatives of *Kili Makkal.* ### Sri Lanka and India Move Closer to Agreement on Kankesanthurai Port URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-and-india-move-closer-to-agreement-on-kankesanthurai-port/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T16:37:20.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka and India moved closer on Thursday to finalizing an agreement to redevelop the Kankesanthurai port in the island’s north, with officials from the two countries saying they had made progress on outstanding issues that have delayed the Indian-funded project. The talks were held at the Ministry of Energy, Ports and Civil Aviation in Colombo and led by the minister, Anura Karunathilaka. India was represented by a delegation that included Maitrey Kulkarni, the deputy high commissioner. Sri Lanka’s deputy minister of ports and civil aviation, Janitha Ruwan Kodithuwakku; the ministry secretary, W.W.S. Mangala; the chairman of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority; and officials from the Foreign Affairs Ministry also attended. The government said the two sides had discussed outstanding issues in the proposed agreements and reached understandings on several matters. The Indian delegation agreed to report the outcome of the talks to New Delhi and seek an early decision, the government said. The two countries expect to sign the agreements in the near future. The negotiations are the latest attempt to advance the redevelopment of Kankesanthurai, commonly known as KKS, a strategically located harbor at the northern edge of the Jaffna Peninsula, a short sea crossing from Tamil Nadu. India has committed $61.5 million in grant assistance to rehabilitate and modernize the harbor. The project received another push last month during a visit to Colombo by India’s foreign secretary, Vikram Misri, when the two governments called for an agreement on the project to be concluded as early as possible. Much of the technical groundwork has already been completed. Mr. Kodithuwakku said last month that feasibility studies and designs had been finished and that construction was awaiting completion of the agreement with India. “We have to sign the MOU, receive the grant, and start the work,” he told The Sunday Morning. Mr. Kodithuwakku said the remaining negotiations included how the grant would be used, the ownership of the project and the structure of the partnership. The prolonged negotiations have delayed a project that both governments see as part of a broader effort to improve links between northern Sri Lanka and southern India. Kankesanthurai already serves as the Sri Lankan terminal for a passenger ferry to Nagapattinam in Tamil Nadu. The service was inaugurated in October 2023, restoring a direct passenger sea link between the two countries after decades without one. The crossing is about 110 kilometers. The proposed redevelopment would significantly expand the port’s capabilities. According to the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, the plans include rehabilitating existing breakwaters, piers and roads, carrying out dredging and wreck removal, and constructing a new pier and warehouse. The authority says dredging of the turning basin to a depth of eight meters has already been completed. The government said on Thursday that the redevelopment was intended to increase both passenger and cargo traffic between India and Sri Lanka. A joint monitoring committee and a technical committee have also been proposed to oversee the project. Indian involvement in the rehabilitation of Kankesanthurai dates to the years immediately after Sri Lanka’s civil war. India and Sri Lanka began working on the rehabilitation of the harbor more than a decade ago, with Indian assistance used for work including wreck removal and dredging. The current plan is intended to transform the harbor more substantially and increase its ability to handle commercial traffic. The port is one element of an expanding network of connections between northern Sri Lanka and southern India. The Northern Province emerged from nearly three decades of civil war with damaged infrastructure and an economy poorly connected to regional markets. Its proximity to southern India has long made direct maritime trade an attractive prospect, particularly for businesses that now depend heavily on ports and logistics networks in other parts of Sri Lanka. A modern commercial port at Kankesanthurai could shorten that route and give businesses in the north more direct access to Indian markets. The Sri Lankan government said the project was expected to strengthen maritime connections with India, improve infrastructure in the Northern Province and increase economic activity in the region. ### ‘TELO Killed My Father’: Siddharthan Confronts the Bloody Past Behind Today’s Tamil Alliances URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/telo-killed-my-father-siddharthan-confronts-the-bloody-past-behind-todays-tamil-alliances/ Last updated: 2026-09-06T16:37:21.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Dharmalingam Siddharthan, the leader of the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), has publicly accused TELO, a fellow Tamil political group, of killing his father 41 years ago, saying there was no uncertainty over who was responsible. “There is no confusion whatsoever,” Mr. Siddharthan said Wednesday at a memorial for his father, V. Dharmalingam, a former member of Parliament. “Those responsible for his death were members of the TELO. Everyone knows that.” His family, he said, learned within half an hour of the killing that TELO was responsible. The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, or TELO, was one of several armed Tamil groups active during the 1980s. Like Mr. Siddharthan’s PLOTE, it later entered electoral politics. The two groups would eventually find themselves in the same political alliance. Mr. Siddharthan addressed that history directly. “Many people ask me, ‘How can you have an alliance with the TELO, which killed your father?’” he said. “On this matter, the Tamil Arasu Kachchi is my guide. They formed an alliance with the Liberation Tigers, who killed Annan Amirthalingam.” A. Amirthalingam, one of the leading Tamil politicians of his generation, was shot dead at his Colombo residence in July 1989 by members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. “The Liberation Tigers did not contest the elections themselves,” Mr. Siddharthan continued. “The TNA contested on their behalf.” The Tamil National Alliance, or TNA, was formed in 2001 and went on to dominate Tamil parliamentary politics for much of the next two decades. PLOTE and TELO were both, at different periods, part of the alliance. Both are now members of the Democratic Tamil National Alliance, or DTNA. “Everyone has made mistakes,” Mr. Siddharthan said. “Everyone has, in one way or another, been complicit in wrongdoing. Therefore, we must put those mistakes behind us and unite.” PLOTE, which Mr. Siddharthan has led for decades, has itself faced allegations of killings, abductions and other abuses during Sri Lanka’s conflict. Vetriselvan, a former PLOTE member who served as the organization’s coordinator in New Delhi, has accused Mr. Siddharthan and the late PLOTE military commander Manickam Dasan of involvement in a plot to kill a former PLOTE member known as Robin in Switzerland. According to Vetriselvan, Robin had threatened to disclose information about the 1989 assassination of PLOTE founder Uma Maheswaran. Robin and his pregnant wife, Vathsala, were later killed. PLOTE was also accused of internal killings during the early years of the Tamil militancy. In later years, the group faced allegations of killings, abductions and other serious abuses against civilians in Vavuniya, where it exercised considerable influence while operating alongside Sri Lankan government forces. The killing of Mr. Siddharthan’s father was part of a double assassination that has remained one of the stark episodes of internecine violence in Tamil politics. On the night of Sept. 2, 1985, M. Alalasundaram, a lawyer and former member of Parliament for Kopay, was abducted at gunpoint from his home in Kalliyankadu, Nallur. His abductors then drove to Uduvil, where Mr. Dharmalingam, a former member of Parliament for Uduvil and Manipay, was attending a wedding, and abducted him as well. Their bodies were found the following day separately. Mr. Alalasundaram was discovered in scrubland near his home with gunshot wounds to his chest and arm. Mr. Dharmalingam was found at a cemetery in Thavady with a gunshot wound to his forehead. Forty-one years later, the two men were commemorated separately. Mr. Dharmalingam was remembered Wednesday morning at his memorial in Thavady, where his son made his accusation against TELO. Mr. Alalasundaram was honored at a separate ceremony at Sangiliyan Hall in Nallur, organized by the Nallur branch of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi and led by the party’s president, C.V.K. Sivagnanam. Jaffna Mayor Mathivathani Vivekanandarajah, Deputy Mayor E. Thayalan, local council members, party members and relatives attended. The two men were abducted on the same night, by the same group of men, and killed within hours of each other. Forty-one years later they were remembered apart. ### M.K. Sivajilingam Moved to Intensive Care in Colombo URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/m-k-sivajilingam-moved-to-intensive-care-in-colombo/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T03:19:28.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** M.K. Sivajilingam, a veteran Tamil nationalist politician and former member of Parliament who underwent a kidney transplant in June, has been moved to the intensive care unit of a private hospital in Colombo, according to people familiar with his condition. Mr. Sivajilingam, who currently serves as chairman of the Valvettithurai Urban Council, had remained in Colombo for continuing treatment after undergoing the transplant. He was admitted to the hospital again last week and was transferred to intensive care on Wednesday for further treatment. Details about his present condition were not immediately available. Mr. Sivajilingam’s health problems had drawn considerable public attention earlier this year after he disclosed that he was suffering from kidney failure and appealed for financial assistance to cover the cost of a transplant and related treatment. The appeal prompted donations from individuals and Tamil organizations in Sri Lanka and abroad. His circumstances also attracted attention because Mr. Sivajilingam, despite decades in politics, including two terms in Parliament and service in the Northern Provincial Council, said he owned no house, land, or vehicle. A longtime member of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation, or TELO, Mr. Sivajilingam has been one of the most outspoken figures in Tamil nationalist politics, particularly on issues of wartime remembrance and the political legacy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. He represented the Tamil National Alliance in Parliament after being elected in 2001 and 2004 and later served as a member of the Northern Provincial Council. He has repeatedly attracted scrutiny from authorities over his public commemorations of LTTE leader Prabhakaran and other wartime remembrance activities. Mr. Sivajilingam is from Valvettithurai, the northern coastal town that was also Prabhakaran’s hometown. ### A Small School in Mallakam Produces Sri Lanka’s Tamil-Medium Topper URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-small-school-in-mallakam-produces-sri-lankas-tamil-medium-topper/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T12:13:03.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A 10-year-old student from a small primary school in Mallakam has secured the highest Tamil-medium score in Sri Lanka’s 2026 Grade 5 Scholarship Examination. Surendar Sabin, a student at Dr. Thangamma Appakutty Junior School, scored 188 marks, the highest result among students who sat the examination in the Tamil medium. The result has brought national attention to a modest school in Mallakam, a town about 10 miles north of Jaffna. Dr. Thangamma Appakutty Junior School, which falls under the Valikamam Education Zone, is far removed in size and profile from the prominent schools that often dominate Sri Lanka’s national examination results. Nearly 290,000 children sat the scholarship examination across Sri Lanka this year. The examination was held on Aug. 9 at 2,723 centers, with 294,132 students registered and 289,867 sitting the test. Sabin’s 188 was the highest Tamil-medium score nationally. The highest Sinhala-medium score was 193, obtained by a student from Kurunegala District. Sabin is from Mallakam. His father works as a Sports Officer in the Kilinochchi District. The Grade 5 Scholarship Examination, taken by children at about the age of 10, is one of Sri Lanka’s most closely watched school examinations. Its results are used to award scholarships to students from lower-income families and can also open a path to admission to some of the country’s better-resourced schools. The examination has also been the subject of years of debate, with educators and parents questioning the pressure placed on children at such a young age and successive governments considering changes to the system. It will not disappear immediately. The government has said the examination will continue through 2029, while its future beyond that is expected to be reviewed. The result may also renew interest in Jaffna’s smaller village schools. Many parents have long preferred to send their children to the region’s better-known schools, while smaller neighborhood schools have struggled to attract pupils. Sabin’s success may challenge that perception, showing that one of the country’s best results can come from a small school in Mallakam. ### Bimal Does It Again: New Development Remark Revives KKS, Palaly Questions URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/bimal-does-it-again-new-development-remark-revives-kks-palaly-questions/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T14:04:08.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Transport Minister Bimal Rathnayake said Wednesday that Sri Lanka would not pursue development projects that failed to benefit ordinary people, remarks likely to renew scrutiny of the government’s approach to two Indian-backed gateways in the Tamil-majority north: Jaffna International Airport at Palaly and Kankesanthurai Port. “Economic development projects must be connected to the everyday lives of the people,” Mr. Rathnayake said. “We will not pursue development projects that do not benefit the people.” He made the remarks at a ceremony in Colombo where Japan handed over seven low-floor buses for Sri Lanka’s public transport system. Mr. Rathnayake did not mention Palaly or Kankesanthurai on Wednesday. But his comments closely echoed an argument he made in Jaffna last week when questioned about why development of the airport and port had not advanced despite Indian financial assistance. “As a government, we are concerned about development,” he said then. “But it is the government that will decide what development should be undertaken and where.” Mr. Rathnayake cited Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport as a warning against poorly planned infrastructure that leaves the state carrying losses. “Our government will not undertake development that results in such losses,” he said. “Regardless of who provides the funding for development, the final decision will be taken by the government.” The comparison has drawn criticism in the north. Unlike Mattala, which was built from scratch for about $248 million around passenger projections that never materialized, Palaly and Kankesanthurai are longstanding gateways with established links to southern India. Palaly dates to the Second World War and already handles scheduled flights between Jaffna and Chennai. Kankesanthurai has operated as a commercial port since 1950, lies about 56 nautical miles from India and already supports a passenger connection with Nagapattinam. Their development could allow more passengers and goods to reach northern Sri Lanka directly from India instead of passing through Colombo, reducing travel time and transportation costs and potentially weakening the north’s economic dependence on the capital. The financing of Kankesanthurai also complicates concerns about the financial burden on Sri Lanka. India initially offered a $45.27 million line of credit, but after costs increased, New Delhi agreed in 2024 to convert the project into a grant of roughly $65 million. Mr. Rathnayake said last week that Indian assistance for Palaly would not cover the entire proposed development and that Sri Lanka would have to find or borrow the balance. Critics have accused Mr. Rathnayake, who is also the governing National People’s Power’s chief coordinator for the Northern Province, of obstructing the two projects. A Jaffna-based economist previously told Jaffna Monitor that developing them would give the north direct economic links with India instead of requiring commerce to pass through Colombo. Mr. Rathnayake has rejected development driven simply by the availability of foreign financing, arguing that the government must determine whether projects make economic sense. But he has not publicly presented an economic assessment showing that Palaly or Kankesanthurai would impose losses comparable to Mattala, nor has the government announced a timetable for their full development. Wednesday’s remarks sharpen that unanswered question: if development must demonstrably benefit ordinary people, on what basis do two existing gateways connecting northern Sri Lanka with a major market just across the Palk Strait fail that test? ### U.S. Reveals Wider Role Behind Colombo’s 463-Kilogram Meth Seizure URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-s-reveals-wider-role-behind-colombos-463-kilogram-meth-seizure/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T01:44:47.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The seizure of 463 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine at the Port of Colombo this week grew out of a weeks-long international intelligence operation involving American, Pakistani and Sri Lankan authorities, according to new details released Wednesday by the United States Embassy, offering a fuller account of an interdiction initially described largely through the actions of Sri Lankan investigators. The Embassy said the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s New Delhi Country Office and Sri Lanka’s Police Narcotics Bureau conducted a “joint operation” against a Pakistan-based trafficking network attempting to move methamphetamine through Sri Lanka to international markets. More significantly, it said intelligence on suspicious maritime containers moving from Pakistan to Colombo was developed between Aug. 14 and Aug. 29 by the DEA’s Foreign Counterparts Unit and the Special Investigations Cell of Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force. The disclosure shows that the intelligence trail began well before Sri Lankan officers opened the container at Colombo port on Monday, Aug. 31, and that authorities outside Sri Lanka had been tracking suspicious cargo movements before the seizure. Sri Lanka Police had already acknowledged an American role, saying information received by Senior Deputy Inspector General Ranmal Kodituwakku had originated with the DEA. But the police account focused largely on what happened after the intelligence reached Sri Lanka. Investigators from the Central Crime Investigation Bureau obtained a court order and, working with the Police Narcotics Bureau and Sri Lanka Customs, inspected suspicious containers at the port. They found the methamphetamine tightly packed and concealed among a shipment of towels. The American statement goes further. It describes the case not simply as a Sri Lankan operation triggered by foreign intelligence, but as a joint U.S.-Sri Lankan counternarcotics operation built on intelligence developed over more than two weeks, with Pakistan’s principal anti-drug agency also involved. The Embassy did not explain why it released the more detailed account two days after the seizure, and there is no evidence of a dispute between Washington and Colombo over credit for the operation. But the statement puts the international role firmly on the public record. Hours after it was released, Deputy Inspector General Ashoka Dharmasena also described the operation to reporters as a joint effort that followed a tip-off. The chronology raises further questions. Police say the container arrived in Colombo from Pakistan on June 27 and was being held for re-export to Morocco. The intelligence period identified by the U.S. Embassy, Aug. 14 to Aug. 29, began roughly seven weeks after the container reached Colombo. Investigators obtained a court order and opened the container on Monday afternoon. Sri Lankan estimates of the street value have ranged from more than 8 billion rupees to more than 15 billion rupees. Drug valuations can vary considerably depending on the assumptions used to calculate street prices. A 44-year-old businessman from Dematagoda, whose company police say was involved in bringing the container into Sri Lanka, was arrested. A police source familiar with the investigation identified him to Jaffna Monitor as Arumugam Sasinthiran, 44, of Dematagoda. Police said he was involved in the onion and potato trade. Further questioning led investigators to three Pakistani nationals, aged 33, 36 and 51, who were also taken into custody. Police sources say investigators are examining whether the shipment was organised by a Sri Lankan trafficker known by the alias Parevi Suda, who is believed to have moved from Dubai to Pakistan, along with two other Sri Lankan suspects. One important question remains unresolved: Where were the drugs ultimately headed? The U.S. Embassy said the Pakistan-based network was attempting to smuggle methamphetamine “through Sri Lanka to international markets,” casting Colombo as a transit point. Sri Lankan investigators, however, suspect the paperwork listing Morocco as the container’s onward destination may have been a cover and are examining whether the drugs were actually intended for distribution in Sri Lanka. Mr. Dharmasena said intensified interdiction of maritime smuggling routes had pushed traffickers toward commercial container shipments. He said an anti-narcotics campaign begun in October had resulted in the seizure of nearly 14 tonnes of illegal drugs, including methamphetamine, heroin and cocaine. Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala told Parliament this week that much of the illegal narcotics entering Sri Lanka originated in Afghanistan and Pakistan and reached the island by sea. He estimated that Sri Lanka had about 400,000 drug users. Crystal methamphetamine, commonly known in Sri Lanka as “Ice,” has become an increasingly significant part of the country’s illegal drug trade. Police recorded 68,132 arrests involving the drug in 2024, a 161 percent increase from the previous year, and reported seizures of more than 1,360 kilograms. Wednesday’s statement also placed the operation within a longer history of American assistance to Sri Lankan law enforcement. The Embassy said the cooperation built on training and technical assistance provided by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to Sri Lanka Police and Customs. The Embassy also said such operations target transnational criminal organisations that fund terrorism. It did not accuse those arrested in the Colombo case of financing terrorism or identify any terrorist organisation connected to the seized shipment. ### Thanthai Chelva Monument Smashed in Jaffna URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/thanthai-chelva-monument-smashed-in-jaffna/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T14:04:11.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A monument honoring S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the founder of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi and one of the most consequential figures in Sri Lankan Tamil politics, has been damaged at his family’s ancestral burial ground in Tellippalai, in what people familiar with the site said appeared to be a case of theft rather than a politically motivated attack. The monument stands in the Church of South India cemetery along the Vallai-Araly Road, within the Tellippalai Police Division, where members of Chelvanayakam’s family are buried. Chelvanayakam, widely known as Thanthai Chelva, or Father Chelva, is not buried at the Tellippalai cemetery. His grave is at the Thanthai Chelva memorial site in Jaffna town, facing the Jaffna Fort esplanade. The structure in Tellippalai was erected to commemorate Chelvanayakam at his family’s ancestral burial ground and was decorated with coloured lights. The lights were removed, apparently by thieves, and the upper portion of the monument was damaged in the process. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/09/thanthai-chelva-monument-smash-e027dd-1-1.jpg) **The Thanthai Chelva monument in Tellippalai, Jaffna, after it was damaged by unidentified people.* Initial reports described the episode as the destruction of a memorial by unidentified people. But people familiar with the site said the available circumstances suggested that the perpetrators were after the decorative lighting and associated fittings, rather than seeking to desecrate a monument to the Tamil political leader. There was no immediate evidence of a political or ethnic motive, and the identity of those responsible was not known. Residents and neighbours have brought the damage to the attention of the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha and called for those responsible to be identified and for the monument to be repaired. Tellippalai has deep connections to Chelvanayakam and his family. Although he was born in Malaya, now Malaysia, in 1898, his mother returned to Tellippalai with her children when Chelvanayakam was young, and he was educated at Union College there before continuing his studies in Jaffna and Colombo. His ties to Tellippalai deepened through marriage: in 1927, he married Emily Grace Barr-Kumarakulasinghe, who came from a prominent Tellippalai family. Chelvanayakam died in 1977\. A lawyer and longtime parliamentarian, he founded the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, commonly known as the Federal Party, and became the leading advocate of federalism and nonviolent political action for Tamil rights in post-independence Sri Lanka. ### Sri Lanka Is Reopening Its Worst Cases but Not Finishing Them, Human Rights Watch Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-is-reopening-its-worst-cases-but-not-finishing-them-human-rights-watch-says/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T14:04:11.000Z JAFFNA — Almost two years after Anura Kumara Dissanayake won the presidency on a promise to reopen Sri Lanka’s most notorious killings and disappearances, Human Rights Watch has found that his government has pushed a handful of those cases further than any administration before it, and has largely left the rest of the country’s apparatus of impunity untouched. The report, “Not Genuine with Justice,” comes days before the United Nations high commissioner for human rights updates the Human Rights Council in Geneva. Its title belongs to a woman whose relative is thought to lie in the mass grave at Chemmani, on the edge of Jaffna town. “There will be no justice for victims in Chemmani,” she told researchers. “The delays show the government is not genuine with justice.” Human Rights Watch does not claim that nothing has changed since November 2024\. Its argument is that nothing has been made irreversible, and that this country has watched credible investigations collapse before—every time a government changed, or a suspect turned out to be someone who mattered. ## The cases that moved The furthest movement has come in the Easter Sunday case. In February, the Criminal Investigation Department arrested Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the retired officer Gotabaya Rajapaksa installed at the head of the State Intelligence Service, on charges of conspiracy and of aiding and abetting the 2019 bombings that killed 269 people. Sallay denies the allegations. He is held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and is challenging his detention in the Court of Appeal. On June 3, the Fort Magistrate’s Court barred Rajapaksa himself from leaving the country, along with Col. Mohamed Ansar and a former intelligence officer, Premananda Udalagama. It was the first time the Sri Lankan state formally tied the former president to the attacks. He has gone to the Court of Appeal to prevent his arrest, and the petition is pending. On July 31, a Special High Court convicted the former inspector general of police, Pujith Jayasundara, and the former defence secretary, Hemasiri Fernando, of murder and attempted murder in a split decision, for failing to act on intelligence that could have stopped the bombings. Human Rights Watch records the conviction and the gap beside it: several others whom the Supreme Court held liable in 2023 have never been charged with anything. Father Cyril Gamini, among the most persistent Catholic voices on the case, credits the current investigations, and notes that the previous ones stopped when Gotabaya Rajapaksa became president. The Navy 11 case has moved too. Between August 2008 and February 2009, eleven men, most of them young, disappeared in Colombo. Their families were asked for ransom, and some paid up to a million rupees. Several of the men got word out on borrowed handsets: they were held first at the Parakrama naval base in Colombo, then at the Gun Site, underground cells inside the Trincomalee Naval Command. The last call came in May 2009. Fourteen suspects were indicted in 2019, including former navy commander Wasantha Karannagoda, whose own order in an unrelated matter had accidentally exposed the case a decade earlier. The attorney general withdrew the indictment against him in 2021\. By then he had been made Admiral of the Fleet, the navy’s highest rank. Washington sanctioned him in 2023, London in 2025. On June 10, the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court ordered that a second former navy commander, Adm. Ravindra Wijegunaratne, be named a suspect. A week later, the Trincomalee magistrate went to the Gun Site and inspected it. The next hearing is on December 9. Jennifer Jamaldeen Weerasinghe has spent more than a decade in courtrooms looking for her son Dilan, one of the eleven. The mothers have been threatened and watched throughout, she said, and they keep going because the pressure is the only thing that works. The Prageeth Ekneligoda case has inched. Nine army officers were indicted in 2019 over the cartoonist’s abduction and an alleged conspiracy to murder him, and two trials are now running: one for an earlier abduction in 2009, one for the disappearance itself. Both have been slowed by changes of judge, adjournments, witnesses who revised their statements and repeated allegations of intimidation. The main suspect was detained last year over accusations that he threatened witnesses on 19 separate occasions. The government brought back Shani Abeysekara, the CID director the Gotabaya administration demoted, arrested and retired; he is now a witness. In January it halted the promotion of an accused officer to colonel after protests by Sandya Ekneligoda and human rights groups. Sixteen years on, there is no verdict and no answer about where Ekneligoda is. His wife’s fear is not that the case will be lost but that it will run out of time. “My firm belief is that the case must be heard and completed soon because I don’t know what will happen if the political context changes,” she said. ## The cases that did not Against that, Human Rights Watch reports no movement whatever in two cases in the East. On the evening of January 2, 2006, five Tamil students were shot dead on the Trincomalee beachfront and two more survived with severe injuries. A 2015 investigation by the UN human rights office found reasonable grounds to believe that security personnel, including men from the police Special Task Force, carried out the killings. Thirteen suspects were arrested in 2013 and bailed three months later. In 2019, the Trincomalee chief magistrate dismissed every charge for want of evidence, having declined to hear eight of the 36 witnesses. Two of the eight were the survivors. Dr. Kasippillai Manoharan, whose son Ragihar was among the dead, testified that government forces were responsible and then left the country with his family after months of death threats. So did the other families, and both survivors. He died last year, still pursuing the case. Balachandran, an auto-rickshaw driver who came forward with information linking the security forces to the shooting, was taken from his home by men in a white van in August 2006 and killed. Subramaniyam Sugirdharajan, the journalist who covered the case, was shot by unidentified gunmen. Seven months after the beachfront killings, 17 Sri Lankan staff of the Paris-based agency Action Contre la Faim were executed at close range inside their compound in Muttur. Sixteen were Tamil, one was Muslim, and each was wearing a shirt that identified them as an aid worker. The government blamed the Tigers. Field research by University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), and later an ACF investigation and a UN inquiry, pointed instead to the security forces and to a cover-up in which evidence was never collected, was tampered with, or was simply left out of the police file. Twenty years on, no one has been charged. Two more cases have complete investigation files and nothing else. Lasantha Wickrematunge, editor of The Sunday Leader and among the sharpest critics of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, was killed on January 8, 2009, by masked men on motorcycles who forced his car off the road at Mount Lavinia. His notebook and telephone were recovered from the scene and then disappeared; two senior officers later testified that the inspector general of police, Jayantha Wickramaratne, had ordered them destroyed. When detectives followed the trail into military intelligence in 2010, the police chief took the case off the CID and handed it to the Terrorist Investigation Division. The investigation was returned to the CID after 2015 and pursued military intelligence again. In November 2019, weeks after Gotabaya Rajapaksa took office, the officer leading it, Nishantha Silva, fled the country. Keith Noyahr, deputy editor of The Nation, was abducted in a white van on May 22, 2008, taken to a house, blindfolded, stripped and beaten, and dumped in Dehiwala the next morning. Call logs later produced in court traced what happened after his editor and his chairman telephoned the Rajapaksa brothers for help that night: Gotabaya Rajapaksa, then defence secretary, called the inspector general of police and the intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendawitharana; Hendawitharana called the director of military intelligence, Brig. Amal Karunasekara; Karunasekara called Maj. Prabath Bulathwatta, who commanded the military intelligence unit at Tripoli Camp. Noyahr told police that during the beating one of his captors took a call and answered “Okay sir, okay sir,” and that the beating then stopped. Nine suspects were arrested in 2017; Karunasekara in 2018\. The case stalled once Gotabaya Rajapaksa became president; that February he promoted Bulathwatta to lieutenant colonel. The attorney general began preparing indictments against 12 former soldiers over the Noyahr abduction in May 2025\. That August, the public security minister told Parliament that both investigations were finished and the files had gone to the attorney general. A year later, in neither case has an indictment been filed. ## What has not been legislated The National People’s Power went to the country in 2024 promising to finish the investigations into political killings and the abduction of journalists, to deliver justice for disappearances in every part of the island including the North and East, and to create an independent prosecutor’s office that would answer to no minister. It then took a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The Prevention of Terrorism Act has not been repealed and is still being used to arrest and detain. Since the report went to press, the government has moved: Cabinet gave in-principle approval on August 10 to a replacement drafted by a technical expert committee, and on August 17 approved its publication in the gazette ahead of presentation to Parliament. The bill has not been tabled. Its text has not been released, and the Cabinet decision gives it a different name from the draft the public was consulted on in December. That draft, which is still the only version anyone outside government has seen, defined terrorism broadly enough to reach political activism and carried wide powers of arrest, search and proscription. Human Rights Watch said in January that it fell short of the benchmarks set by the UN counterterrorism expert and of the commitments Sri Lanka gave the European Union to keep GSP+. The independent prosecutor’s office promised in the manifesto does not exist. An expert committee was appointed in June to design one. Enforced disappearance became a crime in Sri Lanka only in 2018, and no case has yet reached court under that law. It is still not a crime against humanity here, and domestic law still contains no provision for command responsibility, the doctrine under which an officer answers for crimes he failed to prevent or punish. Without it, the men who gave orders stay out of reach, and the prosecutions that do proceed reach only the men who carried them out. ## Chemmani The grave at Chemmani entered the public record in 1998, when a soldier convicted in the rape and murder of the schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy told a court that hundreds of bodies had been buried there during the military’s occupation of the peninsula. Nothing followed for 27 years. In 2025, construction workers struck human remains, and digging resumed under the supervision of the Jaffna magistrate. The report’s summary puts the remains recovered by mid-August at more than 580, which makes Chemmani the largest mass grave in the country; its own chapter on the site gives more than 530 for the same month. Out of the soil have come children’s footwear, school bags, a doll, a baby’s milk bottle and coins. Almost nothing has been done to work out who the dead were or how they died. The investigators do not have the forensic capacity, and the justice minister, Harshana Nanayakkara, has said DNA analysis will have to go to laboratories abroad. The Code of Criminal Procedure gives a magistrate power to investigate a death but says nothing at all about mass graves; a draft procedure prepared by the College of Forensic Pathologists in 2024 has not been adopted. A committee of the Human Rights Commission named military personnel who were in the Jaffna area during the disappearances of the 1990s. The state has not acted on it. Families protested at the site in June and again in July, the second time while ambassadors of European Union member states were visiting, and asked for an international investigation. What lies beneath Chemmani has never been counted nationally. Estimates of enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka since the 1980s range from 60,000 to 100,000\. The missing include Tamils who disappeared during the civil war and Sinhalese suspected of left-wing sympathies during the southern insurrection that the state crushed between 1987 and 1989. The party that led that insurrection, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is now the principal constituent of the governing National People’s Power. Its own dead from those years lie in graves nobody has opened either. Human Rights Watch is explicit that the state was not the only offender. Government forces were responsible for arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, rape, enforced disappearance and indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam carried out suicide bombings and targeted killings of civilians, tortured, took children as soldiers, evicted communities and used civilians as shields. ## Geneva To Colombo, the report recommends an independent prosecutor’s office with investigators of its own, genuine witness protection, forensic and DNA capacity for the graves, enforced disappearance recognised as a crime against humanity, command responsibility written into law, repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and prosecutions built on evidence that earlier commissions already gathered and no one used. It also asks the government to work with the Sri Lanka Accountability Project, the UN evidence-preservation mandate the Council renewed last October for two more years, and to revive the special court with international judges, prosecutors and investigators that Sri Lanka itself agreed to in 2015 and never built. The government has rejected that approach. Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath told Parliament in October that these questions had been internationalised through politicisation and would be settled by domestic institutions. In Jaffna, that argument is a hard sell. “It is like asking the owner of a chicken shop to investigate the killing of the chickens,” one activist told the Monitor. “You can probably guess what the investigation will find.” To foreign governments, Human Rights Watch recommends targeted sanctions on individuals credibly implicated in serious abuses, prosecutions under universal jurisdiction where the evidence allows, help with forensics and evidence preservation, and continued linkage between Sri Lanka’s human rights commitments and trade preferences such as the European Union’s GSP+. Volker Türk, the high commissioner, went to Chemmani in June last year and met a family searching there for someone they had lost. He told the Council in September that Sri Lanka had a historic opportunity to break its cycles of violence and impunity. He reports again this month. At the edge of the pits, one relative of a disappeared man told the researchers what he thought that opportunity was worth so far. “Excavations alone will not provide justice.” ### Read the Full Report (PDF) [srilanka0926websrilanka0926web.pdf1 MBdownload-circle](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/content/files/2026/09/srilanka0926web.pdf "Download") ***“Not Genuine with Justice” was researched and written by Bhavani Fonseka, a Human Rights Watch consultant, and edited by Meenakshi Ganguly, the organisation’s deputy Asia director.*** ### New Chinese Ambassador Pledges Stronger Sri Lanka Ties, More Investment URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/new-chinese-ambassador-pledges-stronger-sri-lanka-ties-more-investment/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T01:48:57.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** China’s new ambassador to Sri Lanka has pledged to deepen relations between the two countries and encourage greater Chinese investment, saying he had felt “no sense of being a foreigner” since arriving on the island, according to an account of his meeting with a senior leader of Sri Lanka’s governing political movement. Ambassador Wei Huaxiang made the remarks during a meeting with Tilvin Silva, general secretary of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or J.V.P., at the party’s headquarters in Colombo earlier this week. According to the J.V.P.’s account of the meeting, Mr. Wei, who presented his credentials on Aug. 25, said he received a warm welcome from Sri Lankans and hoped to further strengthen the longstanding relationship between Beijing and Colombo during his tenure. The meeting comes as Sri Lanka and China approach two significant anniversaries in their relationship. Next year will mark 70 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries and 75 years since the signing of the 1952 Rubber-Rice Pact, an agreement that became an early foundation of their post-independence ties. Mr. Wei and Mr. Silva discussed the Sri Lankan government’s anti-corruption efforts and its “Praja Shakthi” program aimed at reducing poverty, according to the account. They also exchanged views on whether aspects of China’s experience in poverty alleviation could be applied in Sri Lanka. The ambassador was quoted as saying that China’s engagement with other countries was based on respect for their sovereignty and the pursuit of mutual development. He also expressed an intention to encourage more Chinese investment in Sri Lanka. Mr. Wei also spoke about his own background, saying China’s development under the Communist Party had enabled people from difficult rural circumstances, including himself, to rise to senior positions such as that of a diplomat, according to the account. Both sides agreed on the importance of further strengthening relations between Sri Lanka and China. The meeting was also attended by Mei Jing, a counselor in the political section of the Chinese Embassy; Xin Ligong of the embassy’s political section; Jin Enze, a third secretary at the embassy; and attorney Kalpana Madhubhashini of the J.V.P.’s international relations division. ### Rs. 15 Billion ‘Ice’ Haul at Colombo Port Exposes Pakistan-Linked Drug Route URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/rs-15-billion-ice-haul-at-colombo-port-exposes-pakistan-linked-drug-route/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T12:19:17.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lankan authorities have seized nearly half a ton of crystal methamphetamine concealed in a shipping container at the Port of Colombo and arrested several people, including three Pakistani nationals, in one of the country’s largest recent narcotics seizures. Police sources say Pakistan-linked drug trafficking has become a growing concern in Sri Lanka, with the number of major narcotics cases involving Pakistani nationals and networks rising sharply in recent years. The drugs, commonly known in Sri Lanka as “Ice,” were discovered on Monday, Aug. 31, hidden among towels inside a container that had arrived from Pakistan and was being held at the Colombo port under arrangements for re-export, according to police and local reports. Sri Lanka Police said Tuesday that 463 kilograms of methamphetamine had been recovered. Estimates of its street value range from more than 8 billion Sri Lankan rupees to more than 15 billion rupees. The operation began after Senior Deputy Inspector General Ranmal Kodituwakku received intelligence about a suspicious container at the port. An official police statement said the information had come from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. Investigators from the Central Crime Investigation Bureau obtained a court order and, working with the Police Narcotics Bureau and Sri Lanka Customs, opened the container Monday afternoon. Inside, officers found tightly packed quantities of methamphetamine carefully concealed among a shipment of towels, according to police. A 44-year-old businessman from Dematagoda, who police said was responsible for bringing the container into Sri Lanka, was arrested. Further questioning led investigators to three Pakistani nationals, aged 33, 36 and 51, who were also taken into custody. A police source familiar with the investigation identified the arrested businessman to Jaffna Monitor as Arumugam Sasinthiran, 44, of Dematagoda. Police said the suspects and the seized drugs had been transferred to the Police Narcotics Bureau for further investigation. The arrests have focused attention on a trafficking route that has long concerned Sri Lankan narcotics investigators. Sri Lanka’s position along major Indian Ocean shipping lanes has made the island both a destination and a potential transit point for narcotics moving across South Asia and onward to other regions. Pakistan has repeatedly surfaced in investigations involving international drug consignments reaching Sri Lanka, particularly narcotics originating from or moving through the broader Southwest Asian trafficking network. Police sources say the problem has become more acute as crystal methamphetamine has expanded rapidly in Sri Lanka’s illicit drug market. While heroin once dominated many major narcotics investigations, “Ice” has become an increasingly significant part of the trade. Official figures underline the scale of that shift. Police recorded 68,132 arrests involving crystal methamphetamine in 2024, a 161 percent increase from the previous year. Authorities seized more than 1,360 kilograms of the drug that year. The wider narcotics problem has also intensified. Sri Lankan police said they seized more than 23,692 kilograms of narcotics of various kinds in 2025, more than twice the quantity recorded in 2024\. The figures include cannabis as well as heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine and other drugs. Police sources said Pakistan-linked international networks have become a particular concern because of the frequency with which Pakistani nationals, shipments originating in Pakistan or intermediaries operating between Pakistan, Dubai and Sri Lanka have surfaced in major investigations. The container was brought from Pakistan to Colombo for re-export to Morocco. Police, however, suspect the re-export arrangement was a cover and that the methamphetamine was intended for distribution in Sri Lanka. Investigators are also examining the suspected involvement of Sri Lankan traffickers operating from abroad and their connections with foreign suppliers. The seizure comes as Sri Lankan authorities face an increasingly complex narcotics trade that stretches well beyond street-level dealing, encompassing maritime smuggling, commercial shipping containers, international financiers and trafficking figures operating from overseas. The seizure has also raised concerns that international drug networks are exploiting Colombo’s position as a major regional transshipment hub to move large quantities of narcotics through legitimate commercial shipping routes. Police said further investigations were underway to identify others involved in the network and determine whether the seized drugs were intended for the Sri Lankan market. ### Sri Lanka Supreme Court Rejects Full-Bench Request in Challenge to Judges’ Retirement-Age Amendment URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-supreme-court-rejects-full-bench-request-in-challenge-to-judges-retirement-age-amendment/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T13:26:47.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court on Tuesday [rejected](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-top-judges-weigh-an-amendment-that-could-extend-their-own-tenure/) a request for all of its judges to hear challenges to a proposed constitutional amendment that would extend the retirement ages of judges, deciding that the proceedings would continue before a five-member bench headed by the chief justice. The ruling disposed of an unusual preliminary dispute in a closely watched constitutional case: who should sit in judgment on legislation that, if enacted, could extend the tenure of members of the court considering it. President’s Counsel M.A. Sumanthiran made the application for a fuller bench when the petitions were taken up Tuesday before Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena and four other Supreme Court judges. The request was supported by several other President’s Counsel appearing for petitioners, including Saliya Pieris, Ali Sabry, Geoffrey Alagaratnam, Eraj de Silva, Srinath Perera, Anura Meddegoda and Maithri Gunaratne. After considering the submissions, Chief Justice Surasena announced that the request had been rejected and that the petitions would proceed before the five judges already nominated to hear them. Solicitor General Viraj Dayaratne, appearing for the attorney general, opposed the application and relied on Article 132(3) of the Constitution, which provides for the Chief Justice, in specified circumstances, to direct that an appeal, proceeding or matter be heard by a bench comprising five or more Supreme Court judges. The bench consists of Chief Justice Surasena and Justices Achala Wengappuli, Arjuna Obeyesekere, Sampath Abeykoon and Gihan Kulatunga. The four judges immediately below the chief justice in seniority were not included on the panel, with more junior judges nominated instead. The composition of the bench has attracted particular attention because the proposed 22nd Amendment would alter Article 107(5) of the Constitution to raise the mandatory retirement age of Supreme Court judges to 67 from 65 and that of Court of Appeal judges to 65 from 63. The bill would also introduce a separate limit for the tenure of the chief justice: retirement would occur upon reaching 67 or completing six years from the date of appointment as chief justice, whichever came first. Harshana Nanayakkara, the minister of justice and national integration, presented the constitutional amendment Bill to Parliament on Aug. 18 after it was published in the government Gazette on Aug. 7\. A related Bill proposes amendments to the Judicature Act. Sixty-seven petitions have been filed in relation to the 22nd Amendment Bill, while another five petitions challenge the Judicature Bill. The challenges to the constitutional amendment raise fundamental questions about judicial independence and the constitutional consequences of Parliament changing the tenure of judges who were appointed under an existing retirement-age regime. Petitioners have argued, among other grounds, that extending the tenure of sitting judges would affect the independence of the judiciary and, through it, the sovereignty of the people protected by Article 3 of the Constitution. Under Sri Lanka’s constitutional framework, Article 3 declares that sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable, while Article 4 provides for the manner in which that sovereignty is exercised, including through the judicial power of the people. Because the measure before the court is a Bill expressly seeking to amend the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s pre-enactment jurisdiction is circumscribed by Article 120\. The central legal question is whether any provision of the proposed amendment requires approval by the people at a referendum under Article 83, in addition to the special parliamentary majority required for a constitutional amendment. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka, one of the petitioners, had sought a full bench, citing the exceptional circumstances created by judges being called upon to consider legislation capable of affecting judicial tenure. Last week, the association also filed a motion asking the chief justice to consider recusing himself and requested that, if he did so, a bench comprising all the remaining Supreme Court judges be constituted to hear the challenges. Chief Justice Surasena instead nominated the five-member bench on Monday. Tuesday’s ruling concerned only that preliminary question of bench composition. It did not determine the substantive constitutional objections to the proposed 22nd Amendment. The five judges will now proceed to hear submissions on the Bill and determine whether its provisions trigger the referendum requirement under the Constitution. The proceedings have drawn an unusually large number of lawyers. More than 100 lawyers were expected to record appearances in connection with the Bar Association’s petition alone, according to people familiar with preparations for the case, including lawyers associated with regional bar associations seeking to place their opposition to the proposed amendment on the record. The Supreme Court’s scrutiny takes place under Sri Lanka’s system of pre-enactment judicial review, under which a Bill may be challenged within the constitutionally prescribed period after it is placed on Parliament’s Order Paper. Once the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction has been invoked, parliamentary proceedings on the Bill are suspended until the court makes its determination or the constitutional period expires. The court is required to communicate its determination to the president and the speaker of Parliament within three weeks of the reference or petition. The eventual determination will establish what constitutional procedure Parliament must follow if the government wishes to enact the proposed amendment, including whether approval by voters at a nationwide referendum is required. ### Sri Lanka’s Top Judges Weigh an Amendment That Could Extend Their Own Tenure URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-top-judges-weigh-an-amendment-that-could-extend-their-own-tenure/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T13:01:35.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka was to begin hearing challenges on Tuesday to a constitutional amendment that would extend the working lives of the judges deciding the case. Before any argument on the amendment itself, the court faced a preliminary question about its own composition: whether five judges are enough. Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena announced the five-member bench on Monday and will preside over it. Sitting with him are Justices Achala Wengappuli, Arjuna Obeyesekere, Sampath Abeykoon and Gihan Kulatunga. The four judges immediately below the Chief Justice in seniority were passed over in favor of more junior colleagues. The 22nd Amendment would raise the retirement age of Supreme Court judges to 67 from 65 and of Court of Appeal judges to 65 from 63, and would increase the number of judges the Court of Appeal may seat. Harshana Nanayakkara, the Minister of Justice and National Integration, presented the bill to Parliament on Aug. 18, alongside a related bill amending the Judicature Act. It was gazetted on Aug. 7 amid objections from the legal profession. Petitioners contend that allowing Parliament to alter the tenure of sitting judges would erode judicial independence and set a precedent for political authorities to adjust judicial terms after appointments are made. Many argue that the bill offends Article 3 of the Constitution, which vests sovereignty in the people, and that it can therefore be enacted only with a two-thirds parliamentary majority and approval at a referendum. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka, one of the petitioners, had asked that the challenges be heard by the full court, pointing to the unusual position of judges ruling on legislation that could benefit them. Last week the association also filed a motion asking the chief justice to consider recusing himself, and said that if he did so, he should constitute a bench of all the remaining judges. He named the five-member panel instead. M.A. Sumanthiran, the president’s counsel expected to lead the association’s team, will renew the request in open court, according to people familiar with the preparations, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the case publicly. He is also expected to argue that the request itself should be decided by all the judges of the court — a position that, if accepted, would take the question out of the hands of the five appointed to answer it. The court could therefore have to rule on its own composition before hearing a word about the amendment. The hearing is also expected to draw an unusually large turnout of counsel. More than 100 lawyers may record appearances for the Bar Association’s petition alone, the same people said, among them lawyers for regional bar associations who intend to place their opposition on the record. With dozens of petitions and separate teams behind many of them, lawyers involved in the case said the recording of appearances could consume much of the day. The Supreme Court must communicate its determination to the Speaker of Parliament within three weeks. The government has said it will abide by the ruling, which will determine whether the proposed amendment can proceed through Parliament in its present form or whether changes will be required before lawmakers can take it further. ### Hinduism's Temples of Sri Lanka and India: One Living Tradition, Built to Reach Everyone URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/hinduisms-temples-of-sri-lanka-and-india-one-living-tradition-built-to-reach-everyone/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T02:13:48.000Z ***By Jeevan Thiagarajah*** A temple is never really finished. It is destroyed, it is rebuilt, and somewhere in that cycle it becomes sacred all over again — not despite the disruption, but partly because of it. That is the argument at the heart of a new book, Sacred Shrines of Sri Lanka: A Profile of Major Hindu Temples. It is also the argument behind the ecosystem now being built around it — a Kindle edition, a website, a Facebook page, and Kovil, a mobile app — so that the same material can reach a person however they happen to arrive: as a first-time visitor curious what a puja involves, or as a devotee who has performed one every week for forty years. Temples do not become famous on their own. What makes this more than a book with a companion app is that each format serves a different depth of engagement, and one of them — the app — serves it instantly. A reader can spend an evening with the printed chapter on Thiruketheeswaram; a devotee standing at the temple gate can open Kovil and have the same temple's founding legend, its festival dates, and the exact pujas being performed that day pulled up in seconds. Nothing is lost in that shortcut — it is the same 46-source scholarship underneath — only the time it takes to reach it changes. And because the same search sits behind every entry, it levels a field that has traditionally depended on who you were born to: a newcomer with no family lineage to draw on gets the same instant access to learn, to search, and to begin practising as someone raised inside the tradition from birth. The book documents 114 temples across Sri Lanka, spannin six deity traditions — 21 for Shiva, 22 for Parvati and Shakthi, 13 for Vinayakar, 23 for Murugan, 4 for Vishnu, and 6 for Anjaneyar — plus two special multi-temple island chapters covering Neduntheevu (17 temples) and Pungudutheevu (8 temples), a thematic chapter on Kataragama, and a closing essay on the symbiotic evolution of Hinduism and Buddhist temple traditions across India and Sri Lanka. Scores of counterpart shrines across South India are linked throughout, tracing the two traditions' shared roots. Priests, or Kurukkals, continue to perform Agamic rites rooted in the Saiva Agama tradition — Abishekam, Alankaram, Naivedyam, Arathi — accompanied by mantras, mudras, and the Nadaswaram and Thavil. Since the end of the civil war in 2009, these same temples have become something more than places of ritual: spaces of healing, and a locus of identity for a generation navigating migration and modernity at once. The book itself is a collaboration between the Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre in Colombo and Sri Lanka's Department of Hindu Religious and Cultural Affairs, with funding from the India–Sri Lanka Foundation, and draws on foundational work by S. Arumugam and Professor S. Pathmanathan, among others. Its preface puts the intent plainly: *"May this book serve as an offering — to the deities who inhabit these sacred shrines, to the ancestors who preserved them through turmoil, and to the generations yet to come who will continue to worship, study, and care for these extraordinary embodiments of Sri Lanka's spiritual heritage."* ## **Why people come to the temple — and why one format was never going to be enough** Devotion rarely arrives out of nowhere. Most people are drawn in by something specific: an illness in the family, a wedding being planned, an exam on the horizon, a job that isn't going well. Each need has traditionally pointed toward a particular deity — Ganesha for new beginnings, Saraswati for exams, Lakshmi for prosperity — with the choice often guided by astrology, by a person's birth nakshatra, their ruling planet, or the day of the week tied to their situation. Others come to it more slowly. Children who grow up watching a grandparent perform puja eventually start asking why — wanting to understand a practice they've only ever seen repeated. And for many, it is the sheer spectacle that hooks them first: the kavadi processions, the fire-walking, the temple chariots at festivals like Nallur or Kataragama, which pull people in emotionally long before any explanation is needed. For the diaspora, the pull is different again. Tamil and Sinhalese-Hindu-adjacent communities abroad — in London, in Toronto — often turn toward temple life out of a sense of disconnection, trying to reclaim something their parents practised but never fully explained. They notice, too, that rituals abroad don't quite match the ones back home, and want to know what was simplified and what survived intact. Interfaith households add another layer: explaining one's own practice to a partner or in-laws is, for many, the first time they've had to articulate it at all. And then there is a more academic curiosity — the kind drawn to Kataragama, a shrine worshipped across Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim communities alike, or to the gap between myth and ritual: people encounter the story of Murugan's spear or Ganesha's elephant head first, and are pulled toward the living practice only afterward. No single format serves all of these people equally well. A grandparent's answer to a curious grandchild doesn't need an app. A diaspora parent trying to explain, mid-conversation, why Tuesday belongs to Murugan does. The ecosystem exists because the range of people walking into this material is that wide. ## **Idols with histories — destroyed, and standing again** What the book insists on, chapter after chapter, is that Sri Lanka's Hindu temples are not static monuments. They are institutions that have been knocked down — by war, by colonial-era iconoclasm, by displacement — and then rebuilt, largely by the same communities that lost them, using the same devotion that built them the first time. **Thiruketheeswaram**, one of Sri Lanka's most revered Shiva temples and among the 21 Shaivite shrines covered in the book's opening chapters, carries exactly this arc: a site of ancient sanctity repeatedly disrupted and repeatedly restored by the people who considered it theirs to protect. It was razed once and rebuilt later. A benefactor purchased the land at an auction by the British. Scores of people digging there found the temple's original remnants. It was rebuilt with the original lingam and has become one of the most significant and iconic Sivan temples by devotion and belief. **Kathirgamam**, covered not as a single temple entry but as its own thematic chapter — a social-anthropological essay on a shrine shared across three faiths — became famous in much the same way: not simply by surviving, but by being continuously re-consecrated by the crowds who kept returning to it, generation after generation. Here too it is said Kathirgamam is Lord Murugan's sixth home with links to Boghar associated with the five homes in India. The sixth being located deep in the South of the country is itself unique. It continues to see steady, unceasing crowds of devotees. A related history belongs to the complex of Hindu temples in Dondra, at the southern tip of the country, now home to a famous temple for Lord Vishnu. ## **Five doors into the same tradition: book, Kindle, web, Facebook, app** The book's companion platform, Kovil, is where the ecosystem becomes something a devotee can practically use. Alongside the book, a Kindle edition, a website, and a Facebook page carrying daily panchanga updates are all part of the same effort to put the material wherever a person is already looking. But it is the app that is built for the moment someone needs one specific fact, right now. Kovil is built around eight sections: a day-by-day sacred Calendar for 2026–27 with festival, tithi, nakshatra and kalyanam filters and .ics export; a fast Search layer across two years of events; a Temple Directory of more than 134 temples across Sri Lanka and India, filterable by country, province, and deity tradition, with "Twin Shrine" badges linking each idol to the counterpart source temple in India it traces back to; an Itinerary Builder for cross-border pilgrimage planning; a tradition-first Deities & India Shrines gallery; a searchable Pujas reference explaining what each ritual involves and requires; a Resources hub built on a 46-source scholarly bibliography; and an About section documenting the project's origins. By September, this stops being a description and becomes something you can watch happen. Open the Calendar and Ganesh Chaturthi is tagged to Ganesha, Navaratri to Devi — each with its own puja items and the temples observing it, not a generic month view. Search the Temple Directory for Nallur Kandaswamy in Jaffna and its own festival dates surface with it, down to the day the chariot processions peak — along with a Twin Shrine badge pointing to the temple in India its idol is linked back to. The Itinerary Builder times a cross-border trip against those same dates rather than an arbitrary week. The Pujas reference attaches the day's specific rite to what it actually requires, item by item. Even the Deities & India Shrines gallery and the Resources bibliography hold this down to the shrine and the citation, not just the tradition. Every section, in other words, resolves to a day, a deity, and a place — not a category. Tithi and nakshatra tracking work the same way, day by day rather than only on named festivals: open September 1 and the Daily Panchanga shows Chaturthi tithi in the waning fortnight, Ardra nakshatra under Rudra, and a Tuesday ruled by Mangala — a day the tradition ties to Murugan and Hanuman. What makes this relevant to a devotee, rather than merely comprehensive, is how these layers converge instead of standing alone, and how quickly. A given day carries three separate deity associations at once — the weekday's presiding deity, the tithi's, and the nakshatra's — so a Tuesday points to Murugan and Hanuman independently of whatever tithi or nakshatra also falls that day. The Temple Directory narrows the same way by place: country, then province, then deity tradition, so a devotee planning a visit can go straight to, say, Shiva temples in a single province rather than scroll the full 114\. Auspiciousness itself isn't a single flag either — every tithi carries its own purpose: Ekadasi for a Vishnu fast, Ashtami as a day to hold off on new ventures, Amavasya for ancestral rites, Pournami sacred across traditions. For some entries the app narrows further still, to the hour: Pradosham's window for abhishekam is given as 4:30 to 6 PM, not simply auspicious for the day. The information resolves, for a specific devotee on a specific day, to which deity, which temple, and increasingly which hour — pulled out of two years of data in the time it takes to open the app. ## **A template from Tamil Nadu: touring temple towns, not single temples** Kovil's Itinerary Builder currently sequences a trip stop by stop. But the Tamil Nadu temple trail suggests a richer model — one Sri Lanka's own temple towns could follow, using tools Kovil already has. A seven-day route through Tamil Nadu doesn't treat each town as a single flagship stop; it treats each as a cluster of four or more shrines, and the cluster is the point: | **Town** | **Flagship** | **Also in the cluster** | | ----------- | ---------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Kanchipuram | Kailasanathar Temple | Ekambareswarar Temple; Varadaraja Perumal Temple; Kamakshi Amman Temple | | Thanjavur | Brihadeeswarar Temple | Airavatesvara Temple, Darasuram; Gangaikonda Cholapuram; Thanjavur Palace & Art Gallery | | Madurai | Meenakshi Amman Temple | Thirumalai Nayakkar Mahal; Koodal Azhagar Temple; Pazhamudircholai | | Rameswaram | Ramanathaswamy Temple | Kothandaramaswamy Temple; Five-Faced Hanuman Temple; Agnitheertham | In Kanchipuram, the "City of a Thousand Temples," the route runs from the 8th-century Kailasanathar Temple — the oldest Pallava-sandstone shrine in the city — to Ekambareswarar, one of the five Pancha Bhoota Sthalams, where a 59-metre gopuram rises over a mango tree said to be 3,500 years old; to Varadaraja Perumal, a Vishnu shrine with a hundred-pillared hall and a stone chain carved from a single block; and finally to Kamakshi Amman, one of the Shakti Peethas. Thanjavur repeats the pattern at grander scale. Brihadeeswarar, completed by Raja Raja Chola I around 1010 CE, carries a 66-metre vimana capped by an 80-tonne granite block whose hoisting method engineers still debate — but it is only the anchor. Nearby stand Airavatesvara at Darasuram, whose steps are carved to sound like musical notes when struck, and Gangaikonda Cholapuram, the third of the Great Living Chola Temples, raised by Rajendra Chola I. The Thanjavur Palace and Art Gallery, with its collection of Chola bronzes, rounds out the cluster. Madurai centres on the Meenakshi Amman Temple, with its fourteen painted gopurams and a Hall of a Thousand Pillars in which no two pillars are alike — alongside the Thirumalai Nayakkar Mahal next door, the quieter Koodal Azhagar Vishnu shrine, and Pazhamudircholai in the hills, one of Murugan's six sacred abodes. Rameswaram closes the route. The Ramanathaswamy Temple holds the longest pillared corridor in India — over a thousand metres and more than 1,200 columns — and is one of the twelve Jyotirlingas. The town also holds the Kothandaramaswamy Temple, the only structure to survive the 1964 cyclone that erased the nearby town of Dhanushkodi, the Five-Faced Hanuman Temple, and Agnitheertham, the sacred bathing shore. A detour to Chidambaram adds the Nataraja Temple, unusual for enshrining not an idol but akasha — the element of space itself. Nothing about this model needs inventing for Sri Lanka. The Temple Directory already holds this material town by town; the Itinerary Builder can sequence clustered depth rather than a single flagship stop; Twin Shrines can surface a Sri Lankan cluster to an Indian devotee planning the same trip in reverse; the Sacred Calendar can time the visit against festival dates; and the Pujas guide can tell the traveller what to bring. The promise, town by town, is every trip these features can already generate. ## **A small team behind a large undertaking, and an ecosystem still growing** What began as a survey of 69 temples has already grown into more than 114 individual shrines once multi-temple clusters are counted, and an expanded survey now underway is looking at what may eventually be well over 1,000 Hindu temples across the island. A video reel per temple, a wider Facebook presence for daily panchanga updates, a dedicated address at [temples.lk](http://temples.lk/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com), a Kindle edition of the book, and a concept-stage feature matching a devotee's nakshatra and tithi to a recommended deity or ritual are all on the roadmap — each one another door into the same material. The intent, in short, is to put the whole of this living tradition — its calendar, its temples, its rituals — into a form a devotee can carry in one hand, and reach in a moment. For all its scope, the project runs on the equivalent of two and a half people — a 1 + 1 + 0.5 arrangement — supported by sponsors. This article's writer works from the back end. The scholarship and the hand of co-editor Ankuran Dutta are evident throughout — from the book's original form as a 69-temple survey, through the preface, to the curating of its final composition. *The world of Hinduism, quite literally, in your palm.* ### Court Stops Archaeology Department Work at Kanniya URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/court-stops-archaeology-department-work-at-kanniya/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T13:26:50.000Z **TRINCOMALEE, Sri Lanka —** A court in eastern Sri Lanka has ordered the Department of Archaeology to halt construction at a disputed religious site near the Kanniya hot springs, where a Hindu temple once stood and where officials say the remains of an ancient Buddhist stupa lie beneath the ground. The Trincomalee High Court issued the interim order on Monday, directing that the site be maintained in its present condition and that no further construction take place until the case returns to court on Sept. 22. The site in question is at Kanniya, near Trincomalee, where a temple dedicated to Pillaiyar, the Hindu deity also known as Ganesha, had previously stood. According to the case laid out in court, the Department of Archaeology began construction-related work at the site on July 22\. The temple property’s owner challenged the work, arguing that it violated an agreement reached before the same court in 2019. At Monday’s hearing, government counsel Sanjeevan asked for time to obtain information from the Department of Archaeology about precisely what was being built and to submit a written report setting out the department’s position. The court granted the request but ordered that, in the meantime, the site remain exactly as it stood and that no construction work be undertaken. The dispute stretches back several years. The temple’s owner, identified in the proceedings as Kokilaramani, had sought to demolish the existing structure and build a new one. The Department of Archaeology objected, saying archaeological remains - - including those of an ancient Buddhist stupa - -existed beneath or around the site. The matter reached the Trincomalee High Court, where the parties reached a settlement in 2019. Under that arrangement, according to the account laid out by lawyers for the landowner, the Pillaiyar temple was to be relocated to another suitable site provided with government approval, while the Department of Archaeology would be permitted only to preserve and protect the archaeological remains at the original location, including the structure identified as an ancient stupa. Arrangements have since been made to build the new temple at the alternative site. But the landowner’s side returned to court after learning that the department was undertaking new work at the original site, arguing that the activity went beyond preservation and amounted to reconstruction. A motion was filed on the owner’s behalf bringing the matter back before the court. M.A. Sumanthiran, a President’s Counsel who appeared for the petitioner, said outside the courthouse that the central question was whether the Department of Archaeology was preserving what existed at the site or attempting to rebuild the stupa — a distinction he said was central to the terms of the 2019 settlement. “The agreement very specifically says preservation and protection only,” Mr. Sumanthiran told reporters after the hearing. He said that when the landowner learned several months ago that steps were being taken to reconstruct the stupa, Prasanthini Uthayakumar, acting on the owner’s behalf, brought the matter to the court’s attention through a motion. The Department of Archaeology and the local government agent were subsequently summoned. Mr. Sumanthiran said the government lawyer appearing Monday told the court he needed time to obtain a written report from the department on what work was actually being carried out. The petitioner’s lawyers agreed that time could be granted, he said, but asked that all work at the site be suspended in the meantime — a request the court granted, ordering that the status quo hold until Sept. 22, when the state is expected to explain its position. Mr. Sumanthiran also pointed to Section 20 of Sri Lanka’s Antiquities Ordinance, which he said allows a landowner and the director general of archaeology to reach a binding agreement over how an archaeological find on private land is treated. He argued that the 2019 settlement recorded before the High Court was such an agreement, and that it limited the department’s role at Kanniya strictly to preserving what was already there. The Department of Archaeology has not yet placed its full account of the work before the court; its written position is expected when the case resumes on Sept. 22. The dispute is the latest instance of a recurring friction point in Sri Lanka’s north and east, where archaeological conservation work has periodically drawn accusations that it is being used to expand Buddhist religious sites in areas with Hindu and Tamil populations. ### NPP Councillor Resigns a Day After Arrest Over Jaffna Home Attack URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/npp-councillor-resigns-a-day-after-arrest-over-jaffna-home-attack/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T13:01:46.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A local councillor from Sri Lanka’s governing National People’s Power has resigned a day [after his arrest ](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/npp-councillor-arrested-after-alleged-attack-on-retired-officials-jaffna-home-freed-on-police-bail-hours-later/)over an alleged late-night attack on the home of a retired government official in northern Jaffna. Santhirakumar Kanesaruban, a member of the Vadamaradchi South West Pradeshiya Sabha, formally notified election and local government authorities of his resignation on Monday, according to a letter announcing his decision. The letter was addressed to the returning officer in Jaffna and copied to the secretary of the Vadamaradchi South West Pradeshiya Sabha, formally communicating his decision to relinquish his seat. Kanesaruban did not give a detailed public explanation for his resignation in the material immediately available. His departure comes after Nelliady police arrested him at about 12:45 a.m. on Sunday, Aug. 30, following an emergency call from the occupants of a house belonging to a retired government official. Kanesaruban and several associates are accused of arriving at the property while intoxicated, entering the premises without permission, throwing stones, damaging property, including CCTV cameras, and threatening those inside. CCTV footage reviewed by *Jaffna Monitor* appeared to show Kanesaruban attacking a security camera during the episode. Police released him on bail at about 7 a.m., roughly six hours after his arrest, on the condition that he appear in court on Sept. 1, a police officer told *Jaffna Monitor* on Sunday. The officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, questioned the decision to grant police bail given the allegations and claimed that political pressure had played a role. Kanesaruban rose politically as the NPP expanded into Tamil-majority areas where the JVP had traditionally been weak. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP swept to power promising a break with Sri Lanka’s entrenched political culture, portraying themselves as an alternative to parties that, they argued, had long protected politically connected local figures from accountability. Kanesaruban’s case attracted particular attention in Vadamaradchi because several residents told *Jaffna Monitor* that concerns about his conduct had existed well before Sunday’s episode. Residents described him as a confrontational local figure and questioned the level of scrutiny applied when the NPP rapidly expanded its organization in the north. One local commentator alleged that Kanesaruban had previously intimidated police officers by telephone and had been involved in disruptions at District Coordinating Committee meetings. Earlier this year, Kanesaruban also drew criticism after publishing an AI-generated image depicting President Dissanayake holding a *vel*, the sacred spear associated with the Hindu deity Lord Murugan, accompanied by the declaration that the president was “equal to Lord Murugan.” The image angered some Tamils who considered it an inappropriate use of a revered Hindu figure for political glorification. His resignation also raises a broader question for the NPP in the north: whether the party can hold its own local representatives to the same standards of conduct and accountability it promised voters. ### Mother of Two Electrocuted at Jaffna Government Office After Being Called to Work on Sunday URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/mother-of-two-electrocuted-at-jaffna-government-office-after-being-called-to-work-on-sunday/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T04:51:32.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A 37-year-old government employee and mother of two was electrocuted Sunday evening at the Uduvil Divisional Secretariat after staff members were instructed to report to the office on what would ordinarily have been a day off to prepare for a government productivity assessment scheduled for Monday. The death of Nishanthan Sinthupiriya, a development officer attached to the Indigenous Medicine sector, has prompted questions about why employees were called in on a Sunday, who authorized the instruction, and whether adequate electrical safety precautions had been taken at the government premises. Ms. Sinthupiriya was watering a herbal garden on the Divisional Secretariat grounds when she apparently came into contact with an electrical current in or near the wet area, according to preliminary accounts of the incident. She suffered a severe electric shock and collapsed. She was taken to Tellippalai Base Hospital, where she was pronounced dead. Her body remained at the hospital pending further proceedings. Police have begun an investigation into the circumstances of her death. Ms. Sinthupiriya had been at the office as employees prepared the premises for a visit by a productivity assessment team expected on Monday, according to people familiar with the preparations. A WhatsApp message seen and verified by *Jaffna Monitor* shows that a person identified in the group as “Field CC,” believed to refer to the Field Coordinating Officer, instructed all officers of Field Branch 1 to report to the Uduvil Divisional Secretariat at 2 p.m. Sunday “without fail.” The message said the officers were being called because the productivity assessment team was scheduled to visit the following day. The instruction places new focus on the circumstances that brought Ms. Sinthupiriya to the office on the day she died. Questions also remain about the electrical installation near the herbal garden. It was not immediately known when the wiring or electrical equipment in the area had last been inspected, whether a fault had previously been reported, or precisely how electrical current came into contact with the area where Ms. Sinthupiriya was watering plants. Those questions could become central to determining whether her death was an unforeseeable workplace accident or whether failures in maintenance, electrical safety or workplace supervision contributed to it. An officer familiar with local government administration told *Jaffna Monitor* that employees at other divisional secretariats have also sometimes been called to work on Sundays and public holidays to clean, organize or prepare government offices for inspections and official events. The Uduvil office is formally known as the Valikamam South Divisional Secretariat and operates within the Jaffna District administration. The immediate investigation is expected to establish the source of the electrical current that killed Ms. Sinthupiriya and whether the installation complied with required safety standards. But the circumstances surrounding her presence at the office raise a separate administrative question: who decided that government employees should report for work on Sunday to prepare for Monday’s assessment, and under whose authority? Ms. Sinthupiriya, a mother of two, went to her government office on what would ordinarily have been a day off. She never returned home. ### Families of Sri Lanka’s Disappeared March in Jaffna, Still Asking: Where Are They? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/families-of-sri-lankas-disappeared-march-in-jaffna-still-asking-where-are-they/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T04:06:31.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** They came carrying photographs of sons, husbands and other relatives who disappeared years ago, some dressed in black, some holding burning torches, many still asking the question that has defined years of protests across Sri Lanka’s north and east: Where are they? Relatives of the forcibly disappeared marched through Jaffna on Sunday as part of a gathering that brought United Nations officials, international diplomats and human rights advocates together with families who say successive Sri Lankan governments have failed to tell them what happened to their loved ones. The march began around 9:15 a.m. near the memorial to those killed during the 1974 World Tamil Research Conference in Jaffna and moved along Hospital Road to the Thanthai Chelva Auditorium, where an international conference titled “The Long Journey for Justice” was held. At the front of the procession was a vehicle made to resemble the “white vans” that became synonymous with abductions in Sri Lanka. Photographs of missing people covered its sides. A mother whose relative had disappeared lit a ceremonial flame before the march began. Along the route, families held portraits of the missing above their heads. Some cried as they walked. “Where are our disappeared relatives?” marchers chanted. “Where are those we handed over to the military?” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/families-of-sri-lanka-s-disapp-9d06e3-1.jpg) Mothers in Jaffna hold photographs of their missing sons and daughters during a march marking the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Others rejected the Office on Missing Persons and the Office for Reparations, saying they wanted answers rather than compensation. “We will neither forget nor forgive,” they chanted. There were also calls for an international investigation and for international scrutiny of the mass grave being excavated at Chemmani in Jaffna. The event was organized by the Association of Relatives of the Enforced Disappeared of the North and East to mark the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, observed each year on Aug. 30. Among those attending were Ana Lorena Delgadillo Pérez, a member of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Smriti Singh, Amnesty International’s South Asia regional director; international diplomats; lawmakers Sivagnanam Shritharan, Thurairajah Raviharan and Gnanamuttu Sirinesan; and civil society figures including Velan Swamigal, Ruki Fernando and Thyagi Ruwanpathirana. But much of the day was about the families — and the diminishing time many of them have left to get an answer. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/789539148_1404184191856816_1072945921491947588_n.jpg) A number of the mothers who began campaigning for their missing children have died during the years of protest. Those who remain have continued to demonstrate, carrying the same photographs and returning to the same question. Yogeswari, a mother from Chunnakam whose son disappeared in 2006, told *Jaffna Monitor* that nearly 20 years had passed, but she was still waiting for him. “For almost 20 years, there has not been a single day when I have stopped waiting for my son,” she said. “I have not had a peaceful night’s sleep in all these years. Whenever I hear someone coming to my house, for a moment I think it might be him. I still look toward the door hoping to see my son standing there.” “People tell us to move on, but how can a mother move on when she does not know whether her child is alive or dead?” she said. “If they tell me what happened to him, at least I will know. But this waiting, every day, without an answer — this is a living death.” ### ‘No Victim Should Have to Die Without an Answer’ Speaking inside the Thanthai Chelva Auditorium, Ms. Delgadillo Pérez said it was unacceptable for state authorities to deny enforced disappearances when credible and reliable evidence existed. She said the excavation of mass graves must not end with the recovery of human remains. The sites must be properly investigated and the evidence used to establish what happened and, where possible, who was responsible. “The ongoing excavations of mass graves must be followed by proper investigations,” she said. “The victims must receive the justice they are entitled to.” The U.N. Working Group was established in 1980 and has transmitted information concerning 66,626 cases to about 115 countries, Ms. Delgadillo Pérez said. Sri Lanka alone has generated more than 12,000 complaints to the Working Group over the years, she said, though there is still no comprehensive official count of the disappeared. The cases span different chapters of Sri Lanka’s violent recent history. Many complaints received by the Working Group concern disappearances during the state’s suppression of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or J.V.P., insurrection in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Others arose from the long war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Ms. Delgadillo Pérez said civil society activists, journalists, political critics and members of ethnic and religious minorities had been among those subjected to disappearance. For the families, she said, the consequences do not end with the disappearance itself. Many of those who vanished were men who supported their households, leaving families to cope with both the uncertainty over their fate and the loss of an income. And as the years pass, some parents are dying without ever learning what happened. “Many mothers who struggled for justice for a long time have died without receiving answers,” Ms. Delgadillo Pérez said. “In the future, no victim should have to die without receiving an answer.” She said the Working Group was prepared to provide technical assistance for investigations and urged the families to keep making themselves heard. “The voices of these mothers must continue to be heard by the international community,” she said. ### A Gap Between Words and Action Ms. Singh, Amnesty International’s South Asia regional director, turned her attention more directly to the Sri Lankan government. “The government speaks about reconciliation,” she said. “But there is a gap between the government’s intentions and its actions.” She said the current administration had both an opportunity and an obligation to take a different approach from its predecessors. Ms. Singh recalled attending the Mullivaikkal commemoration for the first time in 2023 and being struck by how long families had been asking the same basic questions. “Where are our loved ones?” she said. “Who is responsible?” No government had adequately answered them, she said, calling that failure evidence of a deeper problem of accountability in Sri Lanka. Finding out what happened to the disappeared and determining responsibility for their disappearance could not be separated, she said. Families were entitled to both truth and justice. “Accountability for Chemmani must not end merely with the excavation of the mass grave,” she said. She called for domestic criminal investigations and judicial proceedings to move forward alongside international scrutiny. She also said participants in a recent protest by families of the disappeared in Jaffna had faced repression. “The international community must continue to exert pressure until justice and accountability are ensured,” she said. ### A Question That Outlives Those Asking It ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/families-of-sri-lanka-s-disapp-9d06e3-2.jpg) Sandya Ekneligoda, wife of disappeared journalist and cartoonist Prageeth Ekneligoda, joins mothers carrying **theechatti*, traditional clay pots holding fire, during a commemoration in Kilinochchi for the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Kanagaranjani Yogarasa, president of the Association of Relatives of the Enforced Disappeared of the North and East, said Sunday’s gathering was not simply another conference. Its purpose, she said, was to make the international community hear families whose voices had gone unanswered for years. Some of the mothers who began the search are no longer alive. But the question they asked has survived them. **What happened to our loved ones?** The gathering also included the launch of a book documenting the families’ long campaign for truth and justice and an exhibition of material relating to enforced disappearances. Jaffna was not the only place where families gathered on Sunday. In Kilinochchi, a separate commemoration was held with the participation of Sandya Ekneligoda, the wife of Prageeth Ekneligoda, the journalist and cartoonist who disappeared in 2010. Mothers there carried *theechatti*, traditional clay pots holding fire, as part of a ritual invocation to the gods during the commemoration. Back in Jaffna, the march eventually ended, and the torches were put out. Families left the auditorium carrying home the photographs of their loved ones, along with the weight of their memories, years of unanswered questions and a deep sense of betrayal by a government they had hoped would be different. But the question they had carried for years remained. Where are they? ### NPP ‘Thug’ Councillor Arrested at 12:45, Freed at 7 URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/npp-councillor-arrested-after-alleged-attack-on-retired-officials-jaffna-home-freed-on-police-bail-hours-later/ Last updated: 2026-08-30T08:29:46.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A local councillor from Sri Lanka’s governing National People’s Power was arrested early Sunday after allegedly entering the home of a retired government official in Nelliady with a group of associates while intoxicated, damaging property and threatening those inside. Roughly six hours later, he was released on police bail, prompting allegations that political pressure helped secure his release. Santhirakumar Kanesaruban, an NPP member of the Vadamaradchi South West Pradeshiya Sabha, was arrested by Nelliady police at about 12:45 a.m. on Aug. 30 after the occupants called Sri Lanka’s 119 police emergency service, according to people familiar with the incident. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/npp-councillor-arrested-after-7ef672-1-3.jpg) A cropped image from CCTV footage appears to show NPP councillor Santhirakumar Kanesaruban attacking a security camera during the alleged incident in Nelliady. Kanesaruban and several associates are accused of arriving at the property while intoxicated, entering the premises without permission and damaging property, including CCTV cameras. They are also accused of threatening the occupants. Police responding to the emergency call arrested Kanesaruban. But by about 7 a.m., he had been released on police bail. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/npp-councillor-arrested-after-7ef672-2-3.jpg) NPP councillor Santhirakumar Kanesaruban, center, with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, right, and senior NPP leader Bimal Rathnayake, left. A police officer who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor* on condition of anonymity said Kanesaruban was released on the condition that he appear in court on Sept. 1. The officer questioned how police bail had been granted given the allegations of unlawful entry, threats and property damage, and alleged that political pressure had played a role in the decision. The arrest has drawn particular attention in Vadamaradchi because residents say Sunday’s episode did not come out of nowhere. They say concerns about Kanesaruban’s conduct had been raised before, without meaningful intervention from the party that ultimately put him in elected office. Several residents who spoke with *Jaffna Monitor* described Kanesaruban as a local troublemaker with a reputation for intimidation and confrontational behaviour. ## From Local ‘Rough’ to Governing-Party Councillor ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/npp-councillor-arrested-after-7ef672-3-3.jpg) NPP councillor Santhirakumar Kanesaruban with Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya. People familiar with local politics in Vadamaradchi told *Jaffna Monitor* that Kanesaruban was a newcomer to the JVP who gravitated toward the NPP as its electoral prospects improved. Before that, he was known locally as a “rough,” one resident said. “The NPP and its parent party, the JVP, have historically been weak in Tamil-majority areas,” the resident said. “In the north, they needed people, so they accepted almost anyone who came their way — a thief, a local rough, you name it. They accumulated all sorts of people without even an iota of background checking.” The JVP spent decades with little electoral or organisational presence in much of the Tamil-majority north. As the NPP suddenly emerged as a serious national electoral force, it also needed candidates, organisers and people capable of building a political operation in areas where the party had little established machinery. Critics in Jaffna say that rush came at a price: people who appeared when the NPP’s political fortunes were rising were welcomed without enough scrutiny of who they were or how they behaved. Several local sources told *Jaffna Monitor* that party leaders had been warned about the behaviour of some of these recruits but failed to intervene decisively. Kanesaruban, they say, was not a problem the party discovered on Sunday morning. One local commentator said there had been several earlier opportunities for the NPP to rein him in. The commentator alleged that Kanesaruban had previously telephoned and intimidated Nelliady police officers. If the allegation was known to the party, the commentator said, that should have been enough to trigger disciplinary action. The commentator also pointed to Kanesaruban’s conduct at District Coordinating Committee meetings, where he was accused of contributing to disruptions, and to an earlier controversy in which he used an altered image of Lord Murugan to glorify President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. “If action had been taken when these things happened, they would not now have had to go to the police station to secure bail after CCTV cameras were smashed with stones,” the commentator said. ## An Earlier Controversy Over Lord Murugan ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/npp-councillor-arrested-after-7ef672-4.jpg) Kanesaruban had already drawn widespread attention earlier this year after posting an AI-generated image depicting President Dissanayake holding a *vel*, the sacred spear associated with the Hindu deity Lord Murugan. He accompanied the image with the Tamil declaration, “AKD முருகனுக்கு நிகரானவர்” — “AKD is equal to Lord Murugan.” The post provoked anger among some Tamils in Jaffna, who regarded the comparison as an inappropriate use of a revered Hindu deity for political glorification. At the time, the episode could be dismissed as crude political flattery from an overenthusiastic local supporter. Sunday’s arrest makes the questions surrounding Kanesaruban considerably more serious. ## A Test of the NPP’s Own Promise President Dissanayake and the JVP built much of their appeal by attacking precisely this kind of political culture. For decades, they argued, Sri Lanka’s established parties had created networks of local political power in which councillors, organisers and loyalists could throw their weight around, interfere with officials and expect their political connections to protect them when trouble reached the police station. The NPP promised to end that. In Jaffna, critics say, it is now in danger of reproducing the very system it condemned. ### ‘They Deserve Answers’: U.N. Envoy Presses Sri Lanka on the Disappeared URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/this-is-not-the-grief-of-one-community-u-n-envoy-urges-answers-on-sri-lankas-disappeared/ Last updated: 2026-08-30T15:29:37.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The United Nations’ top official in Sri Lanka called on the government on Sunday to strengthen investigations into enforced disappearances, conduct independent forensic examinations of mass graves, and ensure that families searching for missing relatives can participate meaningfully in the process. Marc-André Franche, the United Nations resident coordinator in Sri Lanka, made the appeal in [a video statement](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXJ2C%5FQv6Zk&ref=jaffnamonitor.com) marking the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, observed each year on Aug. 30. “Across Sri Lanka, tens of thousands of families are still waiting to learn the fate of loved ones who disappeared,” Mr. Franche said, referring to the insurrection years in the south, the conflict in the north and east, young people taken from their homes, and soldiers whose families never learned how or where they lost their lives. "This is not the grief of one community," he said. "All communities carry this deep loss. They deserve answers. They deserve closure. They deserve justice." Sri Lanka has one of the world's most extensive and unresolved legacies of enforced disappearance. Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, estimate that 60,000 to 100,000 people have disappeared nationwide since the 1980s — a toll spanning the government's suppression of the JVP insurrection in the south and the nearly three-decade civil war against the LTTE that ended in 2009. Four commissions of inquiry established in the 1990s examined tens of thousands of complaints and established more than 20,000 cases of disappearance. Rights groups have long maintained that the true toll could be considerably higher, with disappearances continuing during later phases of the conflict, particularly in the north and east. The government’s principal institution for tracing the missing, the Office on Missing Persons, has produced limited results. In findings published last year, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances said the Sri Lankan government had reported that the OMP had traced just 23 disappeared people out of 16,966 cases received by the office. Mr. Franche acknowledged some progress, including Sri Lanka's ratification in 2016 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the creation of the Office on Missing Persons and the Office for Reparations. He also welcomed recent steps to strengthen the panels that review complaints filed with the missing-persons office, but said the institutions needed far more resources, capacity and independence to do their jobs. Much of his statement addressed the mass graves that have drawn renewed national attention this year. At Chemmani, exhumations had produced 582 sets of remains as of Aug. 20, including those of infants and young children. Sites have also drawn scrutiny this year at Kurukkalmadam and Kokkuthoduvai in the east, part of a pattern U.N. human-rights experts say now totals more than 20 confirmed or suspected mass graves uncovered nationwide since 1989. "The ongoing excavations at mass grave sites are a stark reminder of the scale of past violations," Mr. Franche said. Answers, he said, would come only through "rigorous independent forensic examination and identification, conducted transparently and in line with international standards." He said families should receive regular updates, participate meaningfully in the process, and have access to reparations. "Families need to be full partners of the state in this process," he said. "Mourning and the peaceful search for truth must never be treated as a threat." "Addressing enforced disappearances is not only a human rights obligation," he said. "It is a foundation for the rule of law, public trust, good governance and development." The United Nations, he said, would continue supporting Sri Lanka's efforts to secure victims' rights to truth, justice and reparations, and to guarantee such violations would not recur. "Today and every day," Mr. Franche said, "the United Nations stands in solidarity with every family still searching." ### Sri Lanka’s Disappeared: Where Do We Go From Here? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-disappeared-where-do-we-go-from-here/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T13:58:52.000Z **By: Sunanda Deshapriya** 30 August is the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Across the world, tens of thousands of families continue to search for answers about loved ones who vanished during wars, dictatorships, political repression, and armed conflicts. For many, justice remains elusive. Sri Lanka is one of the countries where enforced disappearances remain a deeply painful and unresolved issue. For decades, Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim families have experienced disappearances in different historical contexts. Since the mid-1980s, I have witnessed and actively participated in both local and international efforts to seek truth, accountability, and justice for the disappeared in Sri Lanka. Since May 2009, while living in exile in Geneva, Switzerland, I have continued to support and advocate for international initiatives aimed at securing justice for wartime human rights violations in my country. Over the years, the international human rights community has produced hundreds of reports documenting these violations. Numerous UN Human Rights Council resolutions have been adopted, and many comprehensive studies and recommendations on post-war accountability and transitional justice have been published, debated, and archived. Despite this extensive body of work, meaningful justice for victims and their families remains elusive. Sixteen years on, we are still at square one. Mothers and fathers of the disappeared are still on the streets, in the North as well as in the South. Numbers are dwindling. Same slogans, same faces and same response from the state. Sometimes brutal repression, sometimes cold indifference. In early post-war years, progressive Sinhalese and justice-seeking Tamil diaspora worked together at the Human Rights Council, in Geneva. Today there is no unity. Diaspora groups opposed the September 2015 consensus resolution on establishing transitional justice mechanisms. I stood by the resolution. The 2015 change of government presented the most promising opportunity for constitutional reform, reconciliation, and transitional justice in Sri Lanka, generating significant domestic and international optimism. However, political resistance, personality clashes and infights, institutional weaknesses, and the absence of sustained public support caused these efforts to stall, allowing a historic opportunity for accountability to slip away. At the same time, the ruling NPP/JVP has generally approached the national question through a class-based framework, emphasizing socioeconomic reform as the solution to ethnic grievances. This perspective overlooks the distinct political, historical, and identity-based dimensions of the Sri Lankan Tamil question, which require direct engagement with issues such as power-sharing, minority rights, recognition, and accountability. Expecting justice for the disappeared from a ruling party that has shown no willingness to investigate the killing of its own founding leader, Rohana Wijeweera, after his arrest on 13 November 1989, and that has elevated alleged perpetrators to positions of power, is akin to waiting for Godot. At present, the strongest Tamil voices, both within Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, call for an international mechanism, whereas there is little discernible support among Sinhalese constituencies for international involvement. Appeals to Tamil Nadu and India for support in securing an international investigation have largely fallen on deaf ears. Even recent political changes in Tamil Nadu have made little difference. Resolutions passed by the UNHRC became diluted over time, and there is now no such enthusiasm among Council members as there was between 2012 and 2016\. The Sri Lankan state learned to live with the resolutions to the extent that it no longer asks for a division when yet another hackneyed resolution comes up. On the last two occasions, the NPP government, led by President Dissanayake, simply made a statement opposing the resolutions and allowed them to pass unopposed. The OHCHR Sri Lanka Accountability Project (OSLAP), established by the UN Human Rights Council, has been in operation for five years and has collected a substantial body of evidence relating to alleged human rights violations in Sri Lanka. However, no convictions resulting from the use of this evidence under universal jurisdiction have been publicly reported. The Office on Missing Persons (OMP), established in line with Sri Lanka's commitments under the 2015 UNHRC resolution, has largely faded from public relevance. Under the leadership of Saliya Pieris, PC, a respected lawyer and human rights defender, the institution did some commendable work in its early years. Today, however, it is often viewed as little more than a nameboard institution. The same critique is frequently directed at the Office for Reparations, whose first Chairperson was Dhara Wijayatilake, Attorney-at-Law and a distinguished former senior public servant. Unlike countries such as South Africa and Argentina, where transitional justice processes emerged from profound political transformations, Sri Lanka has experienced no comparable change in the character of the state. At the same time, there is no shared understanding of justice across Sri Lanka's communities. For many Tamils, accountability for wartime abuses remains central to reconciliation, while Muslims continue to face grievances relating to discrimination and displacement. In contrast, many Sinhalese view the military primarily as the force that defeated terrorism and safeguarded the state. These competing narratives have made it difficult to build consensus around a common approach to justice and reconciliation. No paradigm shift in any of these factors is on the horizon. Within Sri Lanka, there is no significant civil or state initiative towards establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that could pave the way for a realistic and tangible accountability and reconciliation process. When it comes to wartime accountability issues, the government and opposition are on the same page. The international human rights landscape has changed dramatically. There is no longer a unipolar West advocating rights-based accountability. The multipolar world we are witnessing today places greater weight on state sovereignty than on international pressure. In the era of post-Gaza genocide, advocacy for human rights has become another term for selective hypocrisy. The 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council will once again consider the OHCHR's written update on Sri Lanka. As an individual who submitted a report on Sri Lanka's human rights situation to the Council's first session in June 2006, I continue to follow these proceedings with keen interest. Most probably, a new resolution along the lines of Resolution 57/1, *Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka*, will be adopted without a vote. But will it make any real difference? I am not convinced that it will. This brings us to the million-rupee accountability question: Where do we go from here? After nearly two decades of resolutions, reports, commitments and monitoring mechanisms, the fundamental challenge remains unchanged. How can meaningful accountability, reconciliation and institutional reform be achieved when international concern has not translated into substantial domestic action? Are there any low-hanging fruits that can be pursued while keeping the larger issues on the agenda? Could the day-to-day lives of the families of the disappeared be improved through an accelerated programme? Is a collective apology from Sri Lanka’s political leadership possible? Can there be an investigation leading to a consensus on the number of missing and dead due to political violence since the 1971 insurrection, including those affected by ethnic riots? How do we create a common narrative on justice for the disappeared? This leaves me with a troubling question: if even such steps remain beyond reach, where can victims of enforced disappearances realistically look for justice? ### Iranian Tankers Gather Near Sri Lanka, Where U.S. Sank an Iranian Warship in March URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/iranian-tankers-gather-near-sri-lanka-where-u-s-sank-an-iranian-warship-in-march/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T15:44:10.000Z **COLOMBO —** Nearly 20 Iranian oil tankers, all of them empty, have gathered in waters near Sri Lanka, unable to sail home because an American naval blockade has closed Iran's ports. Their presence has brought the war between Washington and Tehran close to Sri Lanka and to one of the world's busiest shipping lanes for the second time this year. Sri Lanka's Foreign Ministry said on Saturday that it was tracking the vessels but bore no responsibility for them and was providing them nothing. Thushara Rodrigo, the ministry's director general of public diplomacy, said the ships were away from Sri Lankan territory and that Colombo therefore had no binding obligation toward them. Where exactly they are sitting is disputed. [TankerTrackers.com](http://tankertrackers.com/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com), a maritime intelligence service, places the fleet inside Sri Lanka's exclusive economic zone, with roughly 13 confirmed Iranian-flagged vessels, several belonging to the state-owned National Iranian Tanker Company, alongside ships linked to Iran's sanctions-evading shadow fleet. The Foreign Ministry says they are anchored beyond the zone's outer boundary. Neither has published coordinates. The count has also moved. Days earlier, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath told Agence France-Presse that authorities were monitoring 11 tankers under American sanctions. The distinction the ministry is drawing carries legal weight. Sri Lanka's territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles from the coast and falls under full sovereignty. The exclusive economic zone reaches 200 nautical miles but confers only resource rights; foreign vessels retain broad rights of navigation there. Samir Madani, a co-founder of [TankerTrackers.com](http://tankertrackers.com/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com), told the Financial Times that the vessels' draft levels showed they were riding empty, which suggests they are waiting for an opening to return to Iran and load. That, he said, leaves them exposed to attack, consistent with earlier American strikes on tankers making for Iranian export terminals. Washington imposed the blockade on April 13, after talks in Islamabad failed to produce a settlement. A 14-point memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 lifted it and reopened the Strait of Hormuz, but the agreement broke down within weeks, and the blockade was reinstated in mid-July. On August 19, President Trump announced a further expansion of sanctions, which Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described as an economic D-Day. Data from the analytics firm Kpler shows Iranian crude loadings have fallen to almost nothing since mid-July. Sri Lanka has already absorbed one consequence of this war. Before dawn on March 4, the American attack submarine U.S.S. Charlotte sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena with an MK-48 torpedo in international waters off Galle, on the southern coast — the first sinking of an enemy warship by a U.S. submarine torpedo since the Second World War. Of about 180 people aboard, the Sri Lankan navy rescued 32 and recovered 87 bodies. Eighty-four sets of remains were repatriated to Iran on March 13; the survivors stayed in Sri Lanka. Accounts of the strike's distance from shore have ranged from about 20 to 40 nautical miles, but all place it outside the territorial sea. A day after the sinking, Colombo permitted a second Iranian warship, the IRIS Bushehr, and its crew of 219 into Sri Lankan waters and gave it safe harbour. The law that made the Dena a lawful target also explains the tankers' positioning. Belligerents may not attack vessels inside the territorial sea of a neutral state, which gives ships hugging that boundary a measure of protection they lose the moment they cross out of it. The fleet has not held still. United Against Nuclear Iran, an advocacy group that tracks sanctioned shipping, reported that most Iran-flagged tankers left the Galle anchorage from August 23 and began loitering elsewhere near the island, which it attributed to enforcement pressure following publicity about their presence. Opposition politicians have pressed the government in Parliament over Iranian vessels near Colombo before. Cabinet spokesman Nalinda Jayatissa said in March that ministers knew considerably more than they had disclosed and promised a full report once the matter was resolved. No such report has been presented. ### ITAK Will Skip Disappearance Commemorations, Citing Exclusion URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/itak-will-skip-disappearance-commemorations-citing-exclusion/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T13:58:54.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), the largest political party representing Sri Lankan Tamils, said it will stay away from Sunday’s commemorations for the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, arguing that competing events had been organized without consulting or inviting the party — even as families of the missing prepare for a large march and international conference in Jaffna. The decision lays bare divisions over how one of the most enduring grievances of Sri Lanka's civil war should be marked, at a moment when relatives of the disappeared are trying to renew international attention on their decades-long search for answers. In a statement signed by C.V.K. Sivagnanam, the party's president, and M.A. Sumanthiran, its general secretary, ITAK said several organizations had arranged separate events for Aug. 30 without consulting the party or inviting it to take part. “Those who have been forcibly disappeared in our country have still not received any form of justice,” the party said. “The government, which bears responsibility in this regard, and the international community must act swiftly.” The proliferation of separate events, the party said, had led it to withdraw from all of them. “None of these events was organized in consultation with our party, and we have not been invited to any of them,” the statement said. “Therefore, it has been decided that we will not participate in any event organized by any organization.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/WhatsApp-Image-2026-08-29-at-20.46.54.jpeg) ITAK said individual members remained free to attend in a personal capacity, while also calling for an end to divisions and competing approaches surrounding the issue of enforced disappearances. The decision comes as groups representing families of the forcibly disappeared across Sri Lanka's north and east prepare for one of the largest commemorations Jaffna has seen in years. The Association of Relatives of the Enforced Disappeared in the North and East is organizing a march beginning at about 9 a.m. near Veerasingam Hall, at the memorial for those killed during the 1974 World Tamil Research Conference. Marchers are expected to proceed through Jaffna to the Thanthai Chelva Auditorium for a daylong conference titled “The Long Journey for Justice.” Organizers have called on university students, young people, religious leaders, civil society groups, political representatives and members of the public to join. The Jaffna University Students' Union has announced its support and urged the wider Tamil community to participate. Representatives of the United Nations and Amnesty International are also expected to attend the conference, organizers said, though their identities have not been publicly disclosed. The competing commemorations follow a government-backed event held five days earlier, on Tuesday, Aug. 25, at the Jaffna District Secretariat by the Office on Missing Persons, or O.M.P. That gathering was attended by Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara, Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar, Northern Province Governor Nagalingam Vedanayagan and government lawmakers. The O.M.P. said hundreds of families of missing people from districts including Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Vavuniya and Mannar had been invited. But the event also exposed the deep distrust that persists between government institutions and many families of the disappeared. Relatives protesting outside the District Secretariat rejected compensation payments and death certificates, arguing that neither could substitute for establishing what happened to family members who disappeared or, in some cases, whom they say were surrendered to government forces during the final stages of the war in 2009. A confrontation followed when police stopped protesters from displaying a banner and physically removed several women from the area. The O.M.P. later disputed the characterization that families seeking justice had been driven away, saying those removed belonged to a politically motivated group attempting to disrupt the event. The competing commemorations come as enforced disappearances have again moved to the center of public attention in northern Sri Lanka, driven in large part by the continuing excavation of the Chemmani mass grave in Jaffna. ### Mano Ganesan Urges Direct Global Links for Jaffna, Accusing Bimal Rathnayake of Standing in the Way URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/mano-ganesan-urges-direct-global-links-for-jaffna-accusing-bimal-rathnayake-of-standing-in-the-way/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T13:58:56.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Northern Sri Lanka should be transformed into an economic center with direct links to international trade and investment rather than remain dependent on Colombo, Mano Ganesan, the leader of the Tamil Progressive Alliance, said, accusing Transport Minister Bimal Rathnayake of standing in the way of two Indian-backed infrastructure projects that could help make that possible. Mr. Ganesan, a member of Parliament, said the development of Jaffna International Airport at Palaly and Kankesanthurai Port represented two of the most important strategic opportunities for the economy of the north. With India prepared to provide financial assistance, he said, the government should move ahead with the projects rather than delay their expansion. He accused Mr. Rathnayake, who is also the governing National People’s Power’s chief coordinator for the Northern Province, of maintaining a political outlook that would keep the north economically reliant on Colombo. Although Mr. Rathnayake portrays himself as an opponent of racism, Mr. Ganesan said, his approach reflected a deeply rooted belief that the north should remain dependent on the capital. He called the position “blatant political double standards.” Mr. Ganesan’s criticism followed remarks by Mr. Rathnayake at a recent news conference in Jaffna, where the minister said Sri Lanka would decide what development should take place, and when, regardless of who provided the financing. “As a government, we are concerned about development,” Mr. Rathnayake said. “But it is the government that will decide what development should be undertaken and where.” Mr. Rathnayake cited Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport in southern Sri Lanka as a warning against infrastructure projects that impose substantial costs on the state without generating sufficient economic returns. Mr. Ganesan rejected the comparison as misguided, arguing that Palaly and Kankesanthurai were fundamentally different from Mattala Airport and Hambantota Port, two ambitious southern infrastructure projects whose economic performance has long been criticized. Both northern facilities, he noted, existed decades before Mattala and the modern Hambantota port were built. Mattala was constructed from scratch at a cost of about $248 million during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa, whose home district is Hambantota. The airport was built around passenger demand that failed to materialize. Sri Lanka’s auditor general found that, despite projections of one million passengers a year, Mattala handled only 321,577 passengers over six years and had accumulated net losses of 39.4 billion rupees, or about $131 million, by the end of 2024. Palaly is a different proposition. The airfield dates to the Second World War and already serves an established regional market. Commercial flights between Jaffna and Chennai began in 2019, although service was interrupted during the coronavirus pandemic. Kankesanthurai also predates the modern Hambantota project. The northern port has operated commercially since 1950 and lies roughly 56 nautical miles from India. A passenger ferry connects the region with Nagapattinam in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Supporters of the projects argue that geography gives both facilities an economic rationale distinct from their southern counterparts. Much of the merchandise reaching northern Sri Lanka from India now enters through Colombo before traveling hundreds of kilometers north by road. A fully functioning commercial port at Kankesanthurai could allow suitable cargo from southern India to enter the north directly, potentially reducing freight costs, fuel consumption, handling and travel times for businesses and consumers. An expanded Jaffna airport could provide a similar advantage for passenger traffic. More direct international connections would allow tourists, business travelers and members of the large Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora to reach the north without first flying into Colombo and then making a journey of several hours overland. Mr. Ganesan said those geographic advantages should be used to make northern Sri Lanka a regional economic gateway rather than leave it overwhelmingly dependent on infrastructure centered around Colombo. The financing arrangements for the two projects differ. At his Jaffna news conference, Mr. Rathnayake said India had provided some financing for the airport but that the amount was insufficient to complete the proposed development, leaving Sri Lanka to find or borrow the balance. For Kankesanthurai, India initially agreed to finance the final stages of the port’s rehabilitation through a $45.27 million line of credit under an agreement signed in 2018\. After revised estimates increased the projected cost and the project stalled, India agreed in 2024 to convert its assistance into a grant of about $65 million. The proposed work includes rehabilitation of the breakwater and existing pier, construction of a new pier for commercial cargo and other port infrastructure. Indian officials have described the assistance as an effort to develop Kankesanthurai into a fully functioning commercial port. Indian sources familiar with the project told *Jaffna Monitor* that New Delhi remained willing to consider reasonable cost increases resulting from delays and revised estimates. Mr. Ganesan said the availability of Indian assistance made further delays difficult to justify. For northern businesses, the case for the projects is also rooted in proximity. Jaffna is far closer to southern India than to Colombo, yet much of the north’s international movement of goods and people continues to depend on infrastructure in and around the Sri Lankan capital. Mr. Ganesan said stronger air and maritime connections could also make the north more accessible to Tamils living abroad and create opportunities for tourism, investment and commerce that do not first have to pass through Colombo. “The development of the north is the development of Sri Lanka as a whole,” he said. ### A Jaffna Family Built a Life in Australia. Now All Four Are Missing in Nepal URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-jaffna-family-built-a-life-in-australia-now-all-four-are-missing-in-nepal/ Last updated: 2026-08-30T03:15:15.000Z JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — A Sri Lankan Tamil couple who migrated from Jaffna to Australia and their two young sons have gone missing in flood-stricken Nepal, leaving relatives in Sri Lanka and Australia anxiously awaiting news of their whereabouts. Chandrasekaran Muralitharan, 47, a native of Kopay in Jaffna, his wife, Shylaja Muralitharan, 42, and their sons, Ashwin, 14, and Aarush, 11, disappeared while travelling in Nepal. All four hold Australian passports. Mr. Muralitharan and his wife are first-generation Sri Lankan Tamil migrants to Australia, while their children are part of the second generation of the Australian Tamil diaspora. The family, who live in northwestern Sydney, were travelling with Himalayan Glacier Adventures as part of a pilgrimage group. Fifteen Australians travelling with the company were among those reported missing after the floods. According to an appeal circulated by relatives, the Muralitharans were last known to be at Hotel Kailash on the Pasang Lhamu Highway in Thuman, Nepal, close to the border with Tibet. The family was last heard from on the morning of Aug. 26\. Shylaja’s sister, Vaishnavi, said the family had been preparing to eat breakfast before going to the border to clear immigration. Attempts to reach them afterward were unsuccessful. Their disappearance has prompted relatives and friends to appeal for information as rescue teams struggle to reach areas where roads, bridges, electricity and communications were destroyed. News that an entire family with roots in Kopay is among the missing has also travelled quickly through Jaffna and the Tamil community in Australia. As of Saturday, 41 Australians remained unaccounted for. The floods struck the mountainous Nepal-Tibet border region on Wednesday after a massive section of glacier, rock and ice collapsed high in the Himalayas, sending a surge of water and debris through river valleys below. The torrent destroyed roads, bridges and settlements and travelled far downstream through Nepal. By Saturday, the death toll had risen above 600 across the affected region, with thousands still reported missing as rescue operations continued. Scientists are still examining the precise chain of events that caused the disaster. ### As ITAK Rivals Fight for Influence, Former LTTE Fighters Become the New Battleground URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/as-itak-rivals-fight-for-influence-former-ltte-fighters-become-the-new-battleground/ Last updated: 2026-08-30T05:14:36.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka —** For more than 17 years since Sri Lanka’s civil war ended, many former Tamil Tiger fighters have lived on the margins, poor and jobless and carrying the injuries of the battlefield. Now, as a struggle for influence intensifies inside the country’s main Tamil political party, they are suddenly being courted. M.A. Sumanthiran and S. Sritharan, longtime rivals inside the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, or ITAK, are holding separate meetings in Kilinochchi with former members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, turning a community still living with the war’s consequences into the newest arena of their contest for control of the party. The former fighters can see it happening. “We know we are being used by both camps of the ITAK,” Senan, a former LTTE cadre, told *Jaffna Monitor*. “They did not pay attention to our problems before. Now they are coming to us because of their political rivalry.” Several other former cadres said the same: that the politicians now seeking them out had shown little interest in their hardships during the years in between. The courtship began with Mr. Sumanthiran, the party’s acting general secretary and a former member of Parliament, who had already met former cadres in Kilinochchi a few times. At the most recent gathering, he was joined by Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, ITAK’s lawmaker for the Batticaloa district. The meeting was arranged by a former fighter from the LTTE’s Charles Antony Brigade who has since become an environmental activist. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/as-itak-rivals-fight-for-influ-43c516-1-1.jpg) The ground was pointed. Kilinochchi has for years been the stronghold of Mr. Sritharan, one of Mr. Sumanthiran’s principal rivals inside the party. His camp is now preparing a gathering of its own, and building it to be bigger. Former cadres from across the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been invited to a meeting on Sept. 6 at K.K. Lodge in Kilinochchi, convened under the banner of a former combatants’ welfare association, according to people involved in the arrangements. Those people said the organizers include Venthan, a member of the Karachchi Pradeshiya Sabha, a local council, and a close political associate of Mr. Sritharan; and Tamilselvan, an organizer for the lawmaker in Vinayagapuram. Members of Mr. Sritharan’s camp told *Jaffna Monitor* that the event was a direct response to Mr. Sumanthiran’s meetings, and that they expected to assemble a larger crowd than he had drawn. Ex-combatants have struggled to find steady work and rebuild livelihoods after leaving government rehabilitation programs. Some live in severe poverty. Others carry shrapnel and permanent disabilities and need continuing medical care. The years they spent fighting cost many of them schooling, professional qualifications and the work experience that civilian employment demands. Mr. Sritharan, first elected to Parliament in 2010, has built one of the strongest personal bases in the party and has repeatedly survived electoral challenges. He has generally positioned himself closer to Tamil nationalist sentiment and to the legacy of the armed struggle. Mr. Sumanthiran, a constitutional lawyer who entered Parliament the same year, has represented a markedly different strand, emphasizing constitutional negotiation with Colombo and advocacy abroad. His positions on the LTTE and the armed struggle have repeatedly made him a target of nationalist critics. Mr. Sumanthiran lost the contest for the ITAK presidency and then lost his parliamentary seat in the 2024 general election. Mr. Sritharan retained his seat and remains the party’s sole parliamentarian elected from the Jaffna district. After his electoral defeat, Mr. Sumanthiran began taking an increasingly Tamil nationalist line, political observers who spoke with *Jaffna Monitor* said. They described the shift less as an ideological transformation than as an exercise in political survival. Against that record, Mr. Sumanthiran’s repeated appearances alongside former cadres amount to a sustained move into both his rival’s territory and a constituency with which Mr. Sritharan has long identified himself. But the contest over who can gather more former fighters obscures a more basic question: what either camp intends to do for them. Neither side has publicly set out a comprehensive, long-term program arising from these meetings to address employment, poverty, medical treatment, disability or economic reintegration. For Rasu, a former LTTE cadre, that absence is the whole point. Former fighters, he said, have had 17 years to learn the difference between being remembered as political symbols and being helped as people. “Where were these guys all these years?” he told *Jaffna Monitor*. “The war did not end yesterday. It ended 17 years ago. We struggled then, and we are still struggling today. Where were they all this time?” ### North-East Landowners Unite Over Military and State-Held Land URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/north-east-landowners-unite-over-military-and-state-held-land/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T04:48:53.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Landowners and community representatives from seven districts across Sri Lanka’s north and east met in Jaffna on Friday to form a common front seeking the return of land they say has been taken over by the military and government agencies, arguing that successive governments have failed to resolve disputes that have persisted for years after the civil war. The meeting brought together representatives from all five districts of the Northern Province and from Batticaloa and Trincomalee in the Eastern Province. Organizers said the participants intended to work through a common platform, described as a “United Organization,” rather than pursue land disputes separately at the district level. Many of those represented at the meeting say they have been unable to return to ancestral homes or agricultural land because of military security zones or claims and restrictions imposed by the Forest and Archaeology Departments. Representatives said that land traditionally used for homes and farming remained inaccessible despite the passage of many years since the war ended in 2009, and that efforts to secure a lasting settlement had produced little progress. “Governments have changed, but the situation has not,” representatives said at the meeting. They accused the current government of continuing the approach of previous administrations on land disputes, despite having criticized those governments before coming to power. Organizers said the new grouping would seek to treat the disputes as a broader land-rights issue affecting communities across the north and east, rather than as a series of isolated local cases. They said the group planned to pursue a coordinated strategy that would include negotiations with the government, legal action and efforts to bring unresolved land disputes to the attention of the international community. ### Sri Lanka Ranks Near Bottom in Global Minimum-Wage Comparison, but Data Are From 2024 URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-ranks-near-bottom-in-global-minimum-wage-comparison-but-data-are-from-2024/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T12:40:28.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka has been placed 120th out of 130 countries in a global comparison of minimum wages, near the bottom of a ranking that has drawn attention in the country but is based on wage data from two years ago. The comparison, published on Aug. 26 by Visual Capitalist using 2024 data from the International Labour Organization, puts Sri Lanka’s monthly minimum wage at $200 after adjusting for purchasing power. That does not mean Sri Lankan workers were paid $200 a month. The figure is expressed in purchasing power parity-adjusted U.S. dollars, which takes account of differences in local prices to give a better indication of what a minimum wage can buy within each country. Even after that adjustment, Sri Lanka ranked close to the bottom. Switzerland topped the table at $3,804 a month, followed by Germany at $2,928, Britain at $2,902 and the Netherlands at $2,876\. South Korea, at $2,362, had the highest figure in Asia and ranked 11th, while Japan was 16th at $1,839. The United States ranked 25th at $1,257, based on the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. Ten countries were below Sri Lanka: Niger, Bhutan, Haiti, Guinea, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia. Some reports in Sri Lanka have described the country as having the lowest minimum wage in South Asia. The Visual Capitalist table does not support that claim. Bhutan, a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, ranked 122nd, two places below Sri Lanka, with a PPP-adjusted minimum wage of $180\. Afghanistan was 88th at $393 and the Maldives 67th at $587. Among Sri Lanka’s other South Asian neighbors, Pakistan recorded $570, Nepal $490 and Bangladesh $379\. India ranked 111th at $233. There is also an important qualification to Sri Lanka’s position in the table: the underlying figures are from 2024, before two increases in the country’s statutory minimum wage. Sri Lanka’s national minimum monthly wage had stood at 12,500 rupees since 2021, a period that included the country’s severe economic crisis and a surge in inflation. Legislation passed in September 2024 raised the statutory monthly minimum to 17,500 rupees and the daily minimum to 700 rupees. Workers were also entitled to budgetary relief allowances totaling 3,500 rupees, bringing the effective monthly floor to 21,000 rupees. The minimum wage has since risen further. Legislation enacted in 2025 increased the monthly minimum to 27,000 rupees from April 1, 2025, and to 30,000 rupees from Jan. 1, 2026\. The daily minimum is now 1,200 rupees. The latest increase means Sri Lanka’s current statutory wage floor is substantially higher than the one reflected in the 2024 international comparison. It does not, however, establish where Sri Lanka would rank today. Other countries have also changed their minimum wages since 2024, while inflation and purchasing-power estimates have changed. A current ranking would require updated figures for all 130 countries. Rising prices could also erode some of the gains Sri Lankan workers received from the higher wage floor. Year-on-year inflation measured by the National Consumer Price Index reached 7.2 percent in July, after a period of low inflation and falling prices. Visual Capitalist also cautions that minimum-wage systems differ substantially between countries. Switzerland, for example, has no single nationwide minimum wage. Canada’s figure represents the median of provincial rates, while the United States figure uses the federal minimum even though many states require higher wages. Several European countries where wages are largely determined through collective bargaining were listed as having no comparable data. The purchasing-power figures also do not account for taxes or benefits and can conceal differences in living costs within individual countries. The comparison therefore does not show that Sri Lanka currently ranks 120th in the world. It shows where the country stood in a standardized comparison using 2024 wage data. Sri Lanka’s minimum wage has risen substantially since then. Whether those increases have been enough to lift the country significantly in an updated global ranking will not be known until comparable data for other countries become available. ### Sri Lanka, Japan Begin Work on Export-Oriented Industrial Corridor URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-japan-begin-work-on-export-oriented-industrial-corridor/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T10:59:07.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka and Japan have begun work on plans for an export-oriented industrial corridor, setting up a joint working group to identify priorities and a timetable for the project. The first meeting of the Sri Lanka-Japan Joint Working Group on Export-Oriented Industrial Corridor Development was held at the Japanese Embassy in Colombo on Aug. 25. The group was established following an agreement reached at an intergovernmental economic policy dialogue in February, where the two countries agreed on a conceptual road map for developing the corridor. At the first meeting, officials discussed the business environment needed to put the plan into effect, areas that should receive priority and a possible timeline for implementation. The Japanese side included representatives from the Embassy of Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan External Trade Organization, or JETRO, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA, and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Sri Lankan officials included representatives from the Ministry of Trade, Commerce, Food Security and Co-operative Development and other government agencies. Earlier the same day, the fifth meeting of the Japan-Sri Lanka Committee on Business Environment was held at the Board of Investment. Japanese companies operating in Sri Lanka joined officials from both countries to discuss problems faced by investors and possible measures to improve the country's business environment. Representatives from the Japanese Embassy, JETRO, JICA and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry attended, along with officials from the Board of Investment and other Sri Lankan agencies. The discussions focused on concerns raised by Japanese businesses already operating in Sri Lanka and ways to encourage further Japanese investment. The two meetings come as Sri Lanka seeks to attract more foreign investment and expand exports as part of its economic recovery. ### Bimal Says Government Has Final Say on Jaffna Airport and KKS. Critics Call It Racism URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/bimal-says-government-has-final-say-on-jaffna-airport-and-kks-critics-call-it-racism/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T17:42:26.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka will decide when and how to develop Jaffna International Airport and Kankesanthurai Port even if India provides financial assistance for the projects, Transport Minister Bimal Rathnayake, a politician increasingly accused by Tamil critics of being hostile to the development of the north, said in Jaffna. Mr. Rathnayake, the minister of transport and highways and the governing National People’s Power’s chief coordinator for the Northern Province, has been accused by critics of being one of the principal figures obstructing the development of Palaly Airport and Kankesanthurai Port. He made the remarks at a recent news conference in Jaffna, after being asked why the two projects had not advanced despite the availability of Indian funding. India has provided some money for the airport, Mr. Rathnayake said, but not enough to complete the proposed work, and Sri Lanka would have to borrow the balance. India, by contrast, has said it will bear the full cost of the proposed development of Kankesanthurai harbor. “As a government, we are concerned about development,” Mr. Rathnayake said. “But it is the government that will decide what development should be undertaken and where.” The news conference was held at the National People’s Power office in Jaffna. Ramalingam Chandrasekar, the minister of fisheries, aquatic and ocean resources, and Karunainathan Ilankumaran, a member of Parliament, also attended. Mr. Rathnayake pointed to Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport in southern Sri Lanka as a warning against large infrastructure projects undertaken without adequate planning, saying previous governments had left the state carrying substantial losses there. The comparison is difficult to sustain on either historical or economic grounds. Mattala was built from scratch at a cost of about $248 million, around projected demand that never materialized. The airport, constructed in Hambantota, the home district and political stronghold of then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and later named after him, was controversial from its inception. Critics portrayed it less as an answer to genuine aviation demand than as a prestige project intended to satisfy Mr. Rajapaksa’s political ambitions and his government’s determination to transform his home region into a new economic hub. They questioned both its remote location and the economic assumptions used to justify such a large investment. Those concerns proved difficult to dismiss: Sri Lanka’s auditor general found that, against an expectation of one million passengers a year, the airport handled only 321,577 passengers over six years and had accumulated net losses of 39.4 billion rupees by the end of 2024. Palaly is a different proposition. The Palaly airfield dates to the Second World War, decades before Mattala was built and well before Katunayake began operating as Sri Lanka’s principal international civilian airport. India first helped rehabilitate its infrastructure under an agreement dating to 2005, and it already serves a clearly defined regional market, with scheduled Jaffna-Chennai flights operating since 2019, apart from a pandemic interruption. The same distinction applies to Kankesanthurai and Hambantota. Hambantota was conceived as a new, large-scale international maritime hub, financed substantially through Chinese loans and ultimately placed under a 99-year concession after struggling commercially. Kankesanthurai has operated as a commercial port since 1950, lies 56 nautical miles from India’s coast and already anchors a functioning passenger link with Nagapattinam. Palaly and Kankesanthurai, in other words, are not speculative attempts to manufacture demand in new locations. They are existing northern gateways being upgraded around established geographic links with southern India, and treating them as northern equivalents of Mattala and Hambantota conflates projects with markedly different histories, scales, financing structures and economic purposes. The case for developing them rests on geography. Goods originating in India now enter through Colombo and travel hundreds of kilometers north by road along the A9 before reaching Jaffna and the surrounding districts — a penalty paid in freight costs, fuel, travel time and handling. A fully functioning Kankesanthurai port would allow suitable cargo from southern India to enter the north directly, savings that would reach not only consumers but northern farmers, fishermen and businesses importing machinery and raw materials. Palaly offers the same advantage for passenger traffic. Expanded direct connections with Indian cities would allow tourists, business travelers and members of the large Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora to reach the north without first flying into Colombo and making a six- to eight-hour journey by road. Together, the two gateways could reduce the north’s economic dependence on Colombo and make Jaffna a regional destination in its own right rather than the end of a long domestic journey. And that, according to one Jaffna-based economist, is precisely what makes the projects politically uncomfortable for some in Colombo. “The prospect of reducing the north’s economic dependence on Colombo is exactly the problem for people with a racist mindset like Bimal Rathnayake,” the economist said, requesting anonymity because of the sensitivity of the criticism. “A developed KKS and Palaly would give the north direct economic links with India instead of requiring everything to pass through Colombo.” The history of the Kankesanthurai project also complicates Mr. Rathnayake’s argument about the need for further borrowing. India initially agreed to finance the final stages of the port’s rehabilitation through a $45.27 million line of credit, under an agreement signed in January 2018\. When revised estimates pushed the cost beyond that financing, and the project stalled, New Delhi did not ask Colombo to take on a larger loan. It agreed in 2024 to convert the project into a grant of about $65 million — covering rehabilitation of the breakwater and existing pier, construction of a new pier for commercial cargo, and the installation of port infrastructure. Indian officials have repeatedly presented the work as grant-funded assistance intended to turn Kankesanthurai into a fully functioning commercial port. Indian sources familiar with the project told Jaffna Monitor that New Delhi also remains prepared to accommodate reasonable cost increases arising from delays and revised estimates, meaning that, in their view, cost escalation alone should not prevent the project from proceeding. Mr. Rathnayake previously oversaw ports and civil aviation before being removed from that portfolio and given other responsibilities. Members of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, the party at the core of the governing coalition, told Jaffna Monitor that the change was linked to what they called his inherently anti-Tamil positions and his resistance to the development of Palaly and Kankesanthurai. One party member, who said he knew the minister well, went further, describing his outlook as “inherently anti-Tamil and anti-India” and arguing that this, rather than economic considerations, was driving his approach to development projects in the north. Losing the portfolio, his critics say, has done nothing to change it. “Our government will not undertake development that results in such losses,” Mr. Rathnayake said. “Regardless of who provides the funding for development, the final decision will be taken by the government.” He gave no timetable for further development of either the airport or the port. In Jaffna, that assertion has prompted a more uncomfortable question. “If the government is so insistent that it alone decides how development money is spent,” said Vivekanathan, a Jaffna resident, “why does it keep going to India for help whenever it faces financial difficulties?” ### Australian Senator Urges Government to Press Sri Lanka Over Chemmani Mass Grave URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/australian-senator-urges-government-to-press-sri-lanka-over-chemmani-mass-grave/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T14:33:31.000Z **CANBERRA, Australia —**An Australian senator has urged his government to raise the Chemmani mass grave with Sri Lanka in bilateral talks and at the United Nations Human Rights Council, calling for independent forensic scrutiny of the site and protection of the evidence recovered from it. David Shoebridge, a Greens senator for New South Wales, told the Australian Senate that Canberra should act on its stated commitments to accountability in Sri Lanka. "This means supporting the preservation of the whole site," he said, along with an independently verifiable chain of custody for remains and other evidence, and work with the Sri Lankan government to ensure the investigation is capable of producing accountability. The appeal comes at a pause in the excavation. The third phase of digging at Chemmani ended on Aug. 19 after 56 court-authorised days, bringing the total to 583 sets of human remains recovered over 110 days across three phases. That makes Chemmani the largest mass grave uncovered in Sri Lanka, surpassing the Mannar Sathosa site. Investigators have found infants and young children buried alongside adults, in clusters and stacked one above another, together with clothing, feeding bottles, toys and beads. None of that establishes who the dead were, when they died, or how they came to be buried there. Archaeological, forensic and carbon-14 examinations remain pending, and identification has not begun. Whether a fourth phase proceeds rests with the Jaffna Magistrate's Court, which is due to take up reports on the excavation on Oct. 14. In his remarks, Mr. Shoebridge cited a figure of 544 sets of remains identified at the time, some of which, he said, were believed from their size to be infants and very young children. He said Human Rights Watch had documented around 20 mass grave sites across Sri Lanka, none of which had been successfully investigated to completion. Chemmani has been on the public record since 1998, when a soldier convicted in the abduction, rape and murder of the Jaffna schoolgirl Krishanthy Kumaraswamy alleged that hundreds of people who disappeared after the military recaptured the peninsula had been buried at the site. Amnesty International called for an independent excavation that year, with international assistance. The 30th anniversary of Krishanthy's killing falls on Sept. 7. Volker Türk, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, visited Chemmani and called for robust investigation by independent forensic experts. Mr. Shoebridge noted that Australia told the Human Rights Council in September 2025 that it remained committed to supporting reconciliation, accountability and transitional justice in Sri Lanka. "Now we need to follow through," he said. He acknowledged what he called first steps by the Sri Lankan government, but said Chemmani should stay on the agenda both bilaterally and at the Human Rights Council. He said he joined the Tamil community in Australia in making that call. The Tamil Refugee Council, an Australia-based advocacy group representing and campaigning for Tamil refugees and asylum seekers, said in response to Mr. Shoebridge’s speech that Sri Lanka had repeatedly failed to complete credible investigations into its mass graves and that Tamil families could not be expected to trust domestic mechanisms. "The families and the community fundamentally deserve answers," Mr. Shoebridge said. ### Former Sri Lankan Parliamentary Leaders Reject Audit Findings on Fuel Use URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-sri-lankan-parliamentary-leaders-reject-audit-findings-on-fuel-use/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T03:03:58.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s former Speaker and deputy speaker have rejected the findings of a special government audit that raised questions about millions of rupees spent on fuel and the use of multiple vehicles during their time in office. Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena, the former Speaker, and Ajith Rajapakse, the former deputy speaker, said they had committed no wrongdoing and called for a formal investigation, saying they were prepared to answer questions about the expenditure. Their denials followed the release of a special audit examining financial management during the Eighth and Ninth Parliaments, covering September 2015 to November 2024\. The report scrutinized fuel allocations, vehicle privileges and other expenditure involving the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and other senior parliamentary officials. Among its findings, the audit said there had been no effective ceiling on fuel provided to the speaker’s office. It recorded average monthly fuel consumption of 3,994 liters in 2023 and 6,122 liters in 2024, with annual fuel expenditure reaching about 19.4 million rupees in 2023 and 26 million rupees in 2024. The audit also questioned benefits provided to the deputy speaker. It found that 21,299 liters of fuel, valued at about 8.55 million rupees, had been provided for a private vehicle used by the deputy speaker during 2023 and 2024, in addition to three official vehicles assigned to the office. It also reported that fuel consumption by the official vehicles exceeded applicable limits by 6,980 liters in 2023 and 1,515 liters in 2024. Mr. Abeywardena disputed how the figures were presented. He said the fuel consumption attributed to him represented the combined use of several vehicles assigned to the Speaker rather than the consumption of a single vehicle. He said he had been provided with five vehicles as well as a bulletproof security vehicle, which consumed substantially more fuel than an ordinary vehicle. The audit, he argued, should have presented each vehicle's consumption separately rather than combining the figures, which he said created a misleading impression of the amount of fuel he personally used. Mr. Abeywardena also said that a police security vehicle traveling with him obtained its fuel through Parliament and that this consumption had been included in the overall figures. “All of that was handled by the drivers,” he told, adding that he had not personally signed fuel orders except on one or two occasions in Matara. He said approvals were ordinarily handled by parliamentary officials. He said questions about his fuel use had first been raised roughly a year and a half ago but that no investigation or legal proceedings had followed. The controversy dates at least to February and March 2025, when Bimal Rathnayake, the leader of the House, publicly questioned the fuel expenditure of former parliamentary officials. He later asked the Speaker to examine whether action could be taken against Mr. Abeywardena, Mr. Rajapakse and former Deputy Chairman of Committees Angajan Ramanathan. Mr. Rajapakse also rejected the latest audit findings, saying that expenditure during his tenure had been incurred in accordance with the law and administered through parliamentary officials. “Nothing was done outside the law,” he told, arguing that Parliament’s own officials were responsible for administering vehicle and fuel arrangements. Mr. Rajapakse said he believed the publication of the figures was part of an effort to create a damaging public narrative about him and the former Speaker. The audit’s findings extend beyond the two former officials. It also questioned unrestricted fuel and vehicle benefits provided to other senior parliamentary officeholders and officials, including the Deputy Chairman of Committees and the Secretary-General of Parliament. The Auditor General recommended stronger controls over such benefits and changes to the legal and administrative framework governing Parliament’s finances. The dispute now centers on whether the spending was covered by the benefits available to the two offices or whether Parliament failed to properly control the use of public money. Both men say they want a formal investigation to determine what happened. ### Jaffna’s Beloved ‘Kala Miss,’ Who Devoted Her Life to Chemistry, Dies at 59 URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffnas-beloved-kala-miss-who-devoted-her-life-to-chemistry-dies-at-59/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T04:16:32.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —**Kala Namasivayam, a chemistry teacher whose resonant voice and patient instruction guided generations of students in northern Sri Lanka through one of the school system’s most demanding subjects, chemistry, died on Thursday. She was 59. The cause was cancer, according to doctors who treated her. Ms. Namasivayam taught at Kokuvil Hindu College and at Jaffna Hindu Ladies' College, two of the district's prominent schools, and for years ran private chemistry classes that drew students well beyond her own classrooms. To nearly all of them she was known simply as Kala Miss. Her reputation rested on two things: a voice that reached the back of any room and held it, and a method that took the mystery out of a subject that defeats many students. Chemistry, in Sri Lanka's advanced-level examinations, functions as a gate — it decides who enters the medical and engineering faculties and who does not. Ms. Namasivayam's students arrived knowing that, and left saying she had made the subject seem plain. She never married. Former students, describing a life given over almost entirely to teaching, used an affectionate phrase: she was married to chemistry. Word of her death drew tributes from across Jaffna's educational community, where a teacher of long standing can leave an imprint on several generations of the same family. Former pupils described someone who took a personal interest in their progress and remained unassuming despite the standing she had earned. "She was a humble soul and a lovely person," one former student said. Among those who studied under her was Vithoosan Sahathevan, now a neurologist practicing in Sri Lanka. Writing on Facebook after her death, he said he remained grateful for her guidance and her blessings. "At least now you can give rest to your voice," he wrote. In the end, what they remembered was not only the chemistry. ### Sri Lanka Braces for Food Supply Disruptions as El Niño May Curb Indian Exports URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-braces-for-food-supply-disruptions-as-el-nino-may-curb-indian-exports/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T13:51:49.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka is drawing up contingency plans to guard against disruptions to essential food imports from India, as the anticipated return of El Niño raises fears that adverse weather could damage Indian agricultural output and prompt New Delhi to restrict exports, a government minister said. R.M. Jayawardena, the deputy minister of trade, commerce and food security, said officials were examining how the country should respond if India- -one of its most important sources of food imports- -moves to limit or suspend exports of key commodities. "We are considering what measures should be taken if El Niño affects India's agriculture and production and creates difficulties for us in obtaining goods," Mr. Jayawardena said. The matter was discussed at a recent meeting chaired by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Mr. Jayawardena said. No final decisions were reached, but officials are continuing to weigh measures to protect domestic supplies, he added. The government is also moving to bolster domestic production. As part of its preparations, Sri Lanka plans to begin cultivation for the coming Maha paddy season about a month earlier than usual, an effort to reduce the risk of shortages in the domestic rice market. Sri Lanka relies on India for a wide range of food imports, and disruptions there can quickly reverberate across the Palk Strait. That dependence was laid bare during Sri Lanka's economic crisis, when a foreign-currency shortage severely constrained imports and helped drive food prices sharply higher. India, for its part, has repeatedly turned to export controls when domestic food supplies or prices have come under pressure — measures that can ripple well beyond its borders given its scale as an agricultural producer and exporter. The renewed concern centers on El Niño, a recurring climate pattern marked by unusually warm waters in the central and eastern tropical Pacific. Its effects vary by region, but it can disrupt rainfall patterns and agricultural production across parts of Asia. Mr. Jayawardena said forecasts had put the probability of El Niño developing between June and August at 80 percent, rising to 90 percent between September and December. For Sri Lanka, the risk is not simply that El Niño could hurt its own harvests. A significant disruption to Indian agriculture could expose the country to a second source of pressure: reduced availability, or outright restrictions, in the very market it depends on to fill gaps in domestic supply. By weighing contingency measures before any restrictions materialize, the government is signaling an intent to avoid being caught unprepared should regional food supplies tighten. Officials have not yet detailed what those measures might involve — whether larger buffer stocks, a broader range of suppliers, or a temporary increase in imports from other countries. Mr. Jayawardena said discussions were continuing. ### Jaffna’s Lavin’s Restaurant Fined Nearly Rs. 1 Million Over Rs. 200 Bottle of Water URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffnas-lavins-restaurant-fined-nearly-rs-1-million-over-rs-200-bottle-of-water/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T13:06:45.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A restaurant in Jaffna that had previously drawn attention for its pricing has been fined 950,000 rupees after selling a one-liter bottle of drinking water for 200 rupees, well above the government-set maximum retail price of 120 rupees, Sri Lanka’s Consumer Affairs Authority said. The Jaffna Magistrate’s Court imposed the fine on Lavin’s Vegetarian Family Restaurant on Aug. 25, following legal action brought by investigators from the Consumer Affairs Authority’s Jaffna district office. According to the authority, investigators conducting an inspection found that the restaurant had sold a 1,000-milliliter bottle of drinking water to a customer for 200 rupees, despite the stipulated maximum retail price of 120 rupees. The 80-rupee difference meant the restaurant charged about 67 percent more than the legal maximum. The restaurant had already attracted criticism over its pricing. Last year, a group of Sinhala tourists publicly complained that the restaurant had charged them 100 rupees each for a single glass of hot water. The Consumer Affairs Authority said it initiated legal proceedings after its investigators detected the sale above the stipulated price. When the case was taken up before the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court on Aug. 25, the restaurant was fined 950,000 rupees. The size of the penalty was striking compared with the amount involved in the transaction: an 80-rupee overcharge on a bottle of water resulted in a fine approaching one million rupees. The authority said such enforcement actions were intended to curb trading practices that harm consumers, including selling goods above stipulated maximum retail prices, while helping ensure a fair marketplace for businesses that comply with the law. The Consumer Affairs Authority also urged customers to check printed prices and applicable maximum retail prices before making purchases and to obtain and retain receipts. Such documentation, it said, can serve as important evidence when filing a complaint or during an investigation. Consumers who encounter goods being sold above stipulated prices or other suspected violations of consumer protection laws can report them to the Consumer Affairs Authority through its 1977 hotline during office hours. ### Sri Lanka Wants Arjuna Mahendran Back. But It Has Yet to Satisfy Singapore’s Extradition Law. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-wants-arjuna-mahendran-back-but-it-has-yet-to-satisfy-singapores-extradition-law/ Last updated: 2026-08-29T14:33:35.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka is examining alternative legal avenues to bring Arjuna Mahendran, the former Central Bank governor at the center of the country's long-running Treasury bond scandal, back from Singapore to face criminal proceedings, the public security minister said, acknowledging that earlier efforts to secure his return had run into legal obstacles. Ananda Wijepala, the minister of public security and parliamentary affairs, said in an interview with a private television channel that Mr. Mahendran's status as a Singaporean citizen had complicated efforts to arrest and return him. He added, without elaborating, that Mr. Mahendran had also changed his name since settling in Singapore. "There are legal complications in bringing former Central Bank Governor Arjuna Mahendran back to the country because he is a Singaporean citizen," Mr. Wijepala said. "He is currently not a Sri Lankan citizen. Therefore, under Singaporean law, there are legal complications in arresting a citizen of that country and bringing him back here." Mr. Wijepala said the government was giving "special attention to alternative legal avenues," but did not explain what those options were. The minister's account, however, describes only part of a more complicated legal picture. Singaporean citizenship alone does not appear to bar extradition outright. Singapore is among the Commonwealth countries that Sri Lanka's own extradition law treats as eligible for such requests, but any request must still satisfy Singapore's Extradition Act — establishing that the conduct alleged amounts to an extraditable offense and supplying evidence sufficient for Singaporean authorities to determine whether the legal conditions for surrender have been met. That test has already proved difficult to meet. Sri Lanka submitted an extensive extradition request to Singapore in 2019, with supporting documentation reported at the time to run to about 21,000 pages, including warrants issued by Sri Lankan courts and material relating to the criminal case against Mr. Mahendran. Singapore did not act on it. Singaporean authorities later indicated that the material did not satisfy the requirements of their Extradition Act. An Interpol notice or a Sri Lankan arrest warrant does not, by itself, compel Singapore to hand someone over. Sri Lanka must persuade Singaporean authorities, through the legal process available there, that the requirements for extradition have been fulfilled — and the government has not said publicly what deficiency in the earlier request it now hopes to overcome, or what alternative mechanism it is considering. ## **Who Is Arjuna Mahendran?** Lakshman Arjuna Mahendran is a Sri Lankan-born, Oxford-educated economist who became a Singaporean citizen before he was appointed the Central Bank of Sri Lanka's 13th governor in January 2015, shortly after President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe took office. He was not new to the institution. Mr. Mahendran joined the Central Bank as a staff officer in 1983 and later worked in its Economic Research Department. After leaving in 1995, he built an international banking career, holding senior posts at Credit Suisse Private Bank, Emirates NBD and HSBC Private Bank, and later served as chairman of Sri Lanka's Board of Investment. His appointment as governor was controversial from the outset, in part because he did not hold Sri Lankan citizenship. He left the post in June 2016, by which point his tenure had become closely associated with one of the biggest financial scandals in Sri Lanka’s recent history. ## **What Was the Bond Scandal?** Governments borrow by selling Treasury bonds, and the interest rate they pay matters enormously: even a small increase can add substantial costs when billions of rupees are at stake. The controversy erupted over a Treasury bond auction on Feb. 27, 2015, barely a month into Mr. Mahendran's tenure. The Central Bank had advertised Rs. 1 billion in 30-year bonds but ultimately accepted bids worth Rs. 10 billion, 10 times the amount offered, at yields that drew immediate scrutiny. The chief beneficiary was Perpetual Treasuries Ltd., a primary dealer linked to Arjun Aloysius, Mr. Mahendran's son-in-law, raising immediate questions about conflicts of interest. The controversy spread to other bond transactions in 2015 and 2016 and eventually prompted parliamentary inquiries, forensic audits and a presidential commission of inquiry, which found that Perpetual Treasuries had made improper profits and identified conduct by Mr. Mahendran and others warranting further legal action. He has not been convicted of any of the allegations against him and has denied wrongdoing; the criminal case remains before the courts. ## **How Much Did Sri Lanka Lose?** Different investigations examined different transactions, making a single figure for the total loss elusive. But the presidential commission, whose findings President Sirisena announced in January 2018, calculated that Perpetual Treasuries reaped an undue profit of Rs. 11.145 billion from secondary-market bond transactions — of which more than Rs. 8.5 billion came from the Employees' Provident Fund and other state institutions. The Employees' Provident Fund holds the retirement savings of millions of Sri Lankan private-sector workers, accumulated through decades of employee contributions. The commission's findings meant that public institutions, including a fund built from ordinary workers' savings, had suffered heavy losses while a dealer connected to the governor's own family reaped extraordinary profits. When Mr. Mahendran was indicted in June 2019 before the Permanent High Court-at-Bar, prosecutors separately charged him with causing the state losses of more than $11 million, a narrower figure tied to the specific counts in that indictment rather than the commission's broader estimate. There may also have been a wider economic cost: elevated government bond yields can push up borrowing costs across an economy, with taxpayers ultimately covering the difference. But untangling that effect from the many other forces buffeting Sri Lankan interest rates at the time is difficult, and it would be an overstatement to trace the country's 2022 economic collapse, driven by years of fiscal imbalances, heavy debt, and depleted foreign reserves, to the bond affair alone. What the scandal damaged most clearly was public trust. The idea that a dealer connected by family ties to the central bank's own governor had profited from transactions the bank oversaw became a defining controversy for the government then in power. ## **Why Can't Sri Lanka Simply Arrest Him?** A Sri Lankan warrant has no force inside Singapore. Once a wanted person is in another sovereign country, Sri Lanka must work through that country's legal system, and extradition is the formal channel for doing so. Singapore's Extradition Act allows for judicial scrutiny: a Singapore magistrate may need to be satisfied that a prima facie case exists — one that would justify a trial had the alleged conduct occurred in Singapore itself. That is a considerably higher bar than simply informing Singapore that a Sri Lankan court has issued a warrant, and it helps explain why the sheer volume of Sri Lanka's earlier submission — about 21,000 pages — did not, by itself, secure Mr. Mahendran's extradition. Mr. Wijepala's emphasis on citizenship, in other words, describes only part of the obstacle. The deeper question is whether Sri Lanka can build a case that meets Singapore's legal requirements — something it has not yet managed to do. ## **A Case That Has Outlasted Governments** The scandal has now followed Sri Lanka through several administrations and years of unmet promises. Mr. Mahendran was indicted in 2019 along with other defendants, and Sri Lankan authorities have sought international assistance in locating and returning him ever since; court proceedings have continued in his absence. Mr. Wijepala placed the effort within a broader government campaign, targeting suspects he said were concentrated especially in narcotics trafficking and organized crime, to repatriate fugitives from overseas. Sri Lankan authorities, he said, have obtained 236 Interpol Red Notices in such cases, 110 of them since the current government took office, and have identified the locations of 39 wanted individuals. Sixty-six suspects have already been returned to the country, he said, while investigations into 97 others continue, and one more suspect was expected to be brought back within “another day or two.” The minister went further, suggesting that testimony gathered from suspects already returned was unsettling some politicians. "Following this, we can observe that some politicians become agitated," he said, adding that opposition figures had grown unusually vocal after being questioned by the Criminal Investigation Department over allegations involving corruption and killings. "Following the investigations, they know very well what could happen next," he said. He also said investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings were being accelerated, including scrutiny of whether officials who had received advance intelligence had failed to act for political reasons. ### Meta Is Making Its Apps Safer for American Teens. What About Sri Lanka? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/meta-is-making-its-apps-safer-for-american-teens-what-about-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T06:08:20.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** **JAFFNA —** Opening a phone for a quick look at Instagram and surfacing forty minutes later is such a common failure of self-discipline that most people have stopped calling it one. American authorities spent years arguing it was never a failure of discipline at all. In a case brought by 47 states, the District of Columbia and several U.S. territories, they accused Meta of building features whose purpose was to keep young users watching, scrolling and coming back. On Wednesday, Meta Platforms - - the parent company of Facebook and Instagram- - settled. It agreed to pay up to $17.1 billion over the next decade and to rebuild, feature by feature, the way teenagers experience its two biggest apps. A separate $1 billion agreement with Texas the same day brought Meta’s combined settlements with the states to more than $18 billion, a sum matched in American consumer litigation only by the tobacco settlements of the 1990s. The states filed the agreement in federal court in Oakland on Wednesday morning, and Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers approved it, cutting short a trial that had opened on 18 August. Mark Zuckerberg, who had been expected to testify again, will not have to. The four states leading that trial had been seeking roughly $200 billion. Meta’s shares closed up about 1 percent. Roughly $12 billion of the money is guaranteed. The remaining $5 billion falls due only if Snap, TikTok and YouTube also settle with the states and accept comparable penalties and product changes — a clause Meta’s lawyers said they negotiated deliberately, to set an industry standard rather than be singled out. Meta’s chief legal officer, C.J. Mahoney, used a blog post to implore the company’s rivals to join, arguing that teenagers move too fluidly across dozens of apps for one firm’s rules to accomplish much alone. It is, whatever else it is, the first time a social media company has put billions of dollars behind the proposition that its competitors should be bound too. The changes themselves may matter more than the money. Teen accounts on Instagram and Facebook will carry a combined two-hour daily limit, which parents can switch off, interrupted by mandatory prompts after fifteen minutes of continuous use and again at sixty and ninety. Feeds shut off between midnight and 6 a.m. Push notifications go quiet from 10 p.m. to 7 a.m., and again on school days between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. — the latter running only from 15 August to 15 June, which is to say the American school year. Meta will hide the running tally of likes on a minor’s posts by default, restrict cosmetic-surgery and extreme makeup filters, let teenagers switch off autoplay, and strengthen both age verification and parental controls, alongside new safeguards around bullying, eating disorders, and content related to suicide and self-harm. The obligations run five years, or ten at a tighter one-hour cap if Snap, TikTok and YouTube sign on. Teenagers will be *offered* a non-personalised feed, one that does not use Meta’s recommendation system to select what they see. They are not given it. Meta must periodically remind them the option exists, and parents may lock it on. Otherwise the recommendation engine runs as before. The agreement does not require Meta to abandon personalised recommendations or targeted advertising at all. Washington, D.C. Attorney General Brian Schwalb was blunter than the filings about why the states sued, accusing Meta of having exploited children for profit while telling the public its products were safe. Meta denies wrongdoing and says the agreement builds on protections it had already begun putting in place. Not everyone signed. Florida and New Mexico stayed out, alongside Texas, which cut its own deal. Florida’s attorney general, James Uthmeier, called the payouts “peanuts” and said he would see Meta at trial. New Mexico had already won: a jury there ordered Meta to pay $375 million in March for consumer-protection violations, and a further order this month has pushed the state’s total toward $1 billion. A day after that March verdict, a California jury found Meta and YouTube negligent in the design of their platforms and ordered them to pay $6 million between them. Meta still faces bellwether personal-injury trials in California state court beginning in October and a long tail of school-district lawsuits. It expects to book roughly $10 billion in legal costs this quarter alone. ## THE SAME APPS, A DIFFERENT COUNTRY Sri Lanka collected none of that money, and no Sri Lankan regulator has attempted anything resembling the multistate effort that produced it. The products are identical. Facebook still commands an 81 percent usage share among the country’s internet users, according to the Digital Outlook Sri Lanka 2026 report, with YouTube close behind at 72 percent. TikTok has climbed to 48 percent, up six points in a year, even as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram all lost ground — Sri Lankan attention drifting toward short-form video exactly as it has everywhere else. The 2024 Global School-based Student Health Survey, run jointly by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education with WHO support, found that 28.4 percent of Sri Lankan students aged 13 to 17 spend three or more hours a day on their phones for social media, messaging or browsing. Among 16- and 17-year-olds, the figure is 40.6 percent. Only about three in four said their parents set any rules for that use at all. Set those results beside the last comparable survey, taken in 2016, and the direction is unmistakable. Loneliness among adolescents more than doubled, from 9 to 22.4 percent. The share of students unable to sleep because of worry nearly tripled, to 11.9 percent. Depressive symptoms stood at 18 percent overall and 26.3 percent among the oldest students surveyed. Those who reported seriously considering suicide rose from 9.4 to 15.4 percent; those who reported an attempt, from 6.8 to 9.1 percent. ## WHAT JAFFNA ALREADY KNOWS On the evening of Aug. 11, Governor N. Vethanayahan called senior health and education officials, medical specialists and the head of the University of Jaffna’s sociology department to the Governor’s Secretariat. He ordered that coordinated prevention efforts be restored without delay. The immediate concern was 80 deaths recorded in Jaffna District over the previous three months. Specialists at the meeting put the district’s rate at about 30 per 100,000, roughly twice the national figure, and said the increase was particularly concerning among young people and women. The official account of the meeting did not use the word suicide, referring instead to deaths resulting from “impulsive decisions.” Nobody at the meeting blamed a telephone, and there is no basis for doing so. Jaffna carries the consequences of war, unresolved disappearances, household debt, alcohol dependence and other social pressures. Young people across Sri Lanka have also lived through a pandemic and an economic collapse, while those in the North and East have grown up with the consequences of a war fought by the generation before them. Academic pressure, family difficulties and exposure to violence add to that burden. There is no single explanation for the distress. But research increasingly suggests that heavy internet and social media use belongs in the discussion. A 2025 study of 1,045 students in seven Gampaha District schools found that 24.11 percent had clinically significant depressive symptoms and 60.10 percent reported psychological distress. A separate 2026 study of school-going adolescents in the Western Province, published in *JMIR Formative Research*, found that 12.6 percent of current internet users met the criteria for internet addiction. The findings are not confined to schoolchildren. At Eastern University’s Faculty of Health-Care Sciences, researchers found that 52 percent of undergraduates surveyed showed some degree of social media addiction, although most cases were mild and rates were higher among female students. The broader mental-health picture is troubling as well. In January, Dr. Dhammika Alahapperuma, director of the National Institute of Mental Health, said nearly 39 percent of Sri Lankans between the ages of 10 and 24 experience some form of mental stress. None of these figures proves that social media is causing Sri Lanka’s mental-health problems. They do show why the way young people use their phones — and the way the apps on those phones are designed to keep them there — can no longer be treated as a separate question. ## WHAT THE BRAIN IS ACTUALLY DOING In 2016, researchers at UCLA scanned teenagers’ brains while showing them photographs on a simulated version of Instagram, secretly varying how many likes each photograph appeared to have. Images displayed with more likes lit up the nucleus accumbens, a hub of the brain’s reward circuitry, more strongly than the same images displayed with few. The teenagers were significantly more likely to like a popular photograph themselves — even one posted by a stranger, even one showing risky behaviour such as drinking or smoking. A longer study, led by researchers at the University of North Carolina and published in *JAMA Pediatrics* in 2023, followed 169 sixth- and seventh-graders for three years. Those who checked Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat most habitually developed a measurably different sensitivity to social reward and punishment than those who checked least. Children who grow up checking social media constantly, the study’s senior author, Eva Telzer, said at publication, become hypersensitive to feedback from their peers. Part of what makes the checking hard to stop is that it pays off unpredictably. A notification may carry a message, a compliment, something worth seeing — or nothing at all. Psychologists have known since the middle of the last century that rewards delivered on an unpredictable schedule produce far more persistent behaviour than rewards delivered reliably. Adolescents appear especially susceptible. The parts of the brain that respond to reward mature earlier than those governing judgment and impulse control. Infinite scrolling compounds the problem by removing the natural stopping point. A newspaper runs out of pages. A television programme ends. A feed does neither. Late-night use raises a separate concern. Screen light and stimulating content make sleep harder to come by, and insufficient sleep in adolescence has been linked to problems with mood, attention and anxiety. In 2023, the U.S. Surgeon General issued a formal advisory warning that social media poses a profound risk of harm to the mental health of children and adolescents. That advisory was careful about what the evidence can support, and so are most researchers. No one has established that social media causes mental illness in every child who uses it heavily. A teenager who is already lonely, anxious, or depressed may simply spend more time online. The platforms also deliver real goods: friendship, information, support not available elsewhere. Meta made these arguments in court. But the states were pressing a different question — not what social media does to a child, but what the product was built to do. Infinite scrolling is not illegal. Neither is a notification arriving at 1 a.m., or an algorithm serving up more of whatever keeps a teenager watching. The states’ case was that these features were engineered, together and deliberately, to hold young people’s attention, and that Meta knew enough about the consequences to be liable under consumer-protection law. Rather than test that argument in front of an Oakland jury, Meta settled. ## TWO BILLS, AND A LAW Sri Lankan law has almost nothing to say about any of this — and two quite different debates have been running together in Colombo all year. The Online Safety Act, No. 9 of 2024, gives a state commission broad powers over online statements deemed false, prohibited or otherwise harmful. It was promoted partly as a shield for women and children. Rights groups, including the Global Network Initiative, argued that what it actually delivers is an instrument that can be turned on journalists and critics. On June 26, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who opposed the law from the opposition benches, told Parliament that his government would not enforce it in its current form and had secured cabinet approval to draft a replacement. Whatever replaces it, the Online Safety Act was never designed to answer the question at the centre of the American case: whether the design of a platform can itself harm a child. The proposals that do address children’s use came later. In January, Women and Child Affairs Minister Saroja Savithri Paulraj said the government was weighing a ban on social media for children under 12, on the recommendation of child psychiatrists. By May, officials were also considering a complete ban on screen use for children under five. In June, Opposition MP Faiszer Musthapha tabled a private member’s bill setting the minimum age for a social media account at 16\. It would also permit restrictions on how long children may use social media and at what hours, enforced by an authorised commissioner under the National Child Protection Authority. Enforcement is the hard part. Nothing in either proposal explains what stops a 14-year-old from entering a false date of birth and registering as an adult. Reports on Ms. Paulraj’s proposal said the government planned consultations with telecommunications companies and other parties, but described no method of verifying age. Researchers at LIRNEasia have made the same point more sharply: Sri Lanka risks importing the headline feature of Australia’s approach, the age limit, without the machinery underneath it, meaning workable age verification, a properly funded regulator and a compliance timetable. Australia’s own experience is instructive. Even after the restrictions took effect, younger teenagers went on finding their way onto the platforms they had been barred from, often by lying about their age. ## DOES SRI LANKA NEED ITS OWN CASE? A comparable lawsuit would be difficult to mount here. The American cases were driven by state attorneys general with subpoena power over Meta’s internal records and the resources to spend years fighting one of the largest companies on earth. Sri Lanka has consumer-protection law, including the Consumer Affairs Authority Act, but a far thinner regulatory apparatus behind it. No Sri Lankan regulator has attempted a case against a technology company on anything approaching this scale. Other jurisdictions have skipped litigation and written rules instead. Australia has restricted social media use by children. Britain is weighing similar measures for under-16s. The European Commission has investigated TikTok over features that encourage prolonged use, including infinite scrolling and autoplay, and is considering broader consumer-protection rules covering such practices. The methods differ, but the object of scrutiny is the same: not only what appears on a platform, but how the platform is built to keep people on it. Sri Lanka has concentrated almost entirely on content, through instruments like the Online Safety Act. The evidence elsewhere suggests design deserves at least equal attention. Meta is also trying to get other major platforms to accept similar restrictions. Under the settlement, another $5 billion depends on companies including Snap, TikTok and YouTube agreeing to comparable changes. If that happens, some of the protections introduced for American teenagers could eventually reach users elsewhere, including Sri Lanka. That could happen before Colombo passes its own legislation. The important question for Sri Lanka, then, is which protections will be introduced globally and which will remain limited to American users. ## **WHY SHOULD SRI LANKAN TEENS GET LESS?** The GSHS report found that Sri Lankan teenagers were lonelier and having more trouble sleeping than eight years earlier. But the report was not about phones. Screen time received little attention in a document that examined many other problems facing young people. That itself raises a question: has Sri Lanka paid enough attention to the role phones and social media may play in the mental health of its young people? Meta’s settlement does not prove that social media causes mental illness. The science remains unsettled, and there are many other factors involved. But the $18 billion settlement shows that the way these platforms are designed is now being taken seriously by regulators in the United States. Sri Lankan teenagers use the same platforms as teenagers in the United States. If Meta accepts that certain changes can make its products safer for American teenagers, Sri Lanka has a simple question to ask: Why should its children receive anything less? ### Justice Minister Says the PTA Is Going. Critics Fear It Is Old Toddy in a New Glass URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/justice-minister-says-the-pta-is-going-critics-fear-it-is-old-toddy-in-a-new-glass/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T06:08:22.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Harshana Nanayakkara, Sri Lanka’s justice minister, said the government would repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act by the end of this year, calling the 47-year-old law incompatible with fundamental human rights. But the government is not abandoning special counterterrorism legislation. It plans to replace the law with the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, or PSTA, an effort that has already faced opposition from rights groups and civil society organizations that say an earlier draft retained many of the sweeping powers they hoped would disappear with the PTA. “The Prevention of Terrorism Act, which was introduced in 1979 as a temporary measure, remains in force to this day,” Mr. Nanayakkara told reporters. He said the law had contributed to some of the country’s historical conflicts and that its shortcomings on human rights had repeatedly been raised at home and abroad. The government, he said, remained committed to the promise it made upon taking office to repeal the law. An earlier draft of the PSTA was released for public consultation late last year. It quickly became clear that changing the law would be more contentious than changing its name. Critics and legal scholars have raised concerns about the breadth of the proposed definition of terrorism and several powers in the draft. These include provisions allowing arrests by members of the armed forces and Coast Guard, presidential powers relating to organizations and curfews, and the authority to declare certain locations prohibited places. Amnesty International also raised concerns about the draft and called for any replacement for the PTA to comply with Sri Lanka’s international human-rights obligations. More than 100 civil society organizations, activists, academics and trade unionists were considerably less restrained. In a joint statement, they called the proposal “PTA+,” arguing that the new legislation risked expanding some of the very powers the government had promised to dismantle. The government says the bill now being advanced has gone through further drafting. According to the cabinet, a technical expert committee prepared the preliminary legislation and ministers gave policy approval on Aug. 10 to proceed with the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act. The Legal Draftsman then prepared the bill and obtained the attorney general’s clearance. The cabinet subsequently approved its publication in the Government Gazette and its presentation to Parliament. Mr. Nanayakkara said the new law was being designed with national and public security in mind. He called for cooperation in enacting it, pointing not only to international terrorism but also to crimes associated with narcotics and underworld groups. That is likely to add to the debate over what Sri Lanka’s new terrorism law is intended to cover. Drug trafficking and organized crime are serious offenses, but they are ordinarily dealt with under criminal law. Bringing them within the rationale for counterterrorism legislation could widen the reach of a law that the government says is meant to remedy the excesses of its predecessor. The PTA has outlived the circumstances in which it was introduced. Enacted in 1979 as a temporary measure and later made permanent, it became one of the most powerful instruments of Sri Lanka’s security establishment during decades of insurrection and civil war. The PTA has left a particularly deep imprint on Tamil communities, where it has long been associated with arrests, prolonged detention and suspects spending years entangled in the legal system without the protections available in ordinary criminal proceedings. Its use has extended beyond the period of the war, drawing repeated criticism from domestic and international human rights organizations. The debate over the PSTA therefore comes down to more than whether it is an improvement on the law enacted in 1979\. What matters is how much of the PTA’s extraordinary power remains. The government says contentious provisions, including the definition of terrorism, have been reconsidered during the drafting process. The version ultimately gazetted will show how far it has responded to the criticism generated by the earlier proposal. Much will turn on details that can appear technical but have consequences for anyone caught under the law: what conduct can be called terrorism, who can make an arrest, how long a suspect can be held, when a court must intervene, what role the military can play and whether political activity, protest, journalism and other legitimate expression are clearly protected. There is also an uncomfortable contradiction for the government. If, as Mr. Nanayakkara now says, the PTA itself violates fundamental human rights, replacing it with another extraordinary security law requires more than demonstrating that the new statute is an improvement. It requires explaining why the powers that remain are necessary, how they are constrained and why they cannot be exercised under Sri Lanka’s ordinary criminal law. In Jaffna, there is a familiar expression for changing the presentation without changing much of what is inside: old toddy in a new glass. The government still has a chance to prove that the PSTA is more than a change of glassware. When the bill reaches Parliament, the real test will not be whether the letters PTA have disappeared from the statute book. It will be how much of the old toddy remains. ### British Police Search for Sri Lankan Tamil Man in Swindon URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/british-police-search-for-sri-lankan-tamil-man-in-swindon/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T16:54:11.000Z **SWINDON, England —** British police are searching for a 24-year-old Sri Lankan Tamil man who is wanted by authorities and is known to frequent the Swindon area. Swindon Police identified the man as Sinthujan Balendran and appealed to the public for information that could help officers locate him. “We would like to hear from anyone with information about Sinthujan Balendran, 24, who is currently wanted by police,” the police said in a public notice. “Sinthujan is known to frequent the Swindon area.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/british-police-search-for-sri-4344dc-1-1.jpg) Police sources said Mr Balendran is wanted in connection with an alleged financial fraud and has failed to appear in court. Police asked anyone who knows Mr. Balendran’s whereabouts, or has information that could help locate him, to call 101, quoting crime reference number 54260096783. Information can also be provided anonymously to Crimestoppers on 0800 555 111, police said. ### After a Monologue, N.P.P. Ministers Leave Jaffna Briefing, Frustrating Journalists URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/after-a-monologue-n-p-p-ministers-leave-jaffna-briefing-frustrating-journalists/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T14:30:08.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Two Sri Lankan cabinet ministers invited journalists to a news conference in Jaffna on Wednesday, delivered lengthy remarks and then left after taking only a few questions, angering reporters who said some of them had traveled considerable distances expecting an opportunity to question the officials. Bimal Rathnayake, the minister of transport and highways, and Ramalingam Chandrasekar, the minister of fisheries, aquatic and ocean resources, held the briefing at the National People’s Power’s Jaffna district office in Ariyalai. Karunainathan Ilankumaran, a member of Parliament, also attended. Mr. Rathnayake began with a roughly 20-minute statement in Sinhala. Mr. Chandrasekar then translated his remarks into Tamil, taking up more of the time set aside for the event. The ministers answered only a few questions before saying they had another engagement and leaving. Their departure angered several journalists in attendance, some of whom had traveled considerable distances to attend what had been announced as a news conference. Reporters said they had expected a meaningful opportunity to question the ministers, rather than primarily listen to prepared remarks. Several journalists argued that if the purpose of the event was simply to communicate the government’s position without allowing sufficient time for questions, the ministers could have issued a news release instead of asking reporters to travel to Ariyalai for a press conference. The episode also revived complaints among journalists about the N.P.P.’s relationship with the news media since coming to power. Before forming the government, party representatives frequently held news conferences and took questions from reporters. Journalists at Wednesday’s briefing said such opportunities had become considerably less frequent since the party took office. ### A Busy Crossing, No Gate — and Another Death in Kilinochchi URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-busy-crossing-no-gate-and-another-death-in-kilinochchi/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T13:23:23.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka —**A 17-year-old woman was killed, and two others were seriously injured on Wednesday when a passenger train struck their car at a busy, unguarded railway crossing near the University of Jaffna’s Kilinochchi campus. The collision occurred at the Ariviyal Nagar crossing, on the access road to the university campus, when the Yal Devi Express, traveling north from Colombo toward Jaffna, struck the car at about 11:30 a.m., Sri Lanka Railways said. The victim was identified as Dineshkumar Akyasa, 17, of Selva Nagar, Kilinochchi. She died at the scene. The car’s two other occupants were rescued with serious injuries and taken to a hospital for treatment. Police in Kilinochchi are investigating the crash. The crossing has no gate and no railway employee stationed to control road traffic, despite the growth of the university campus and the resulting rise in vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Sri Lanka Railways said the crossing was equipped with warning signal lights and that they were functioning at the time of the collision, but residents in Kilinochchi disputed that account, saying the warning system was not functioning properly. The absence of a gate or crossing keeper has become a particular concern as the area around the crossing, known as Ariviyal Nagar, has developed around the campus, transforming what was once a lightly traveled road into a key route for students, university employees, residents and other motorists. Wednesday’s death was not the first serious collision in the area. A few people have been killed in railway-crossing accidents in Kilinochchi this year alone, according to Jaffna Monitor’s Kilinochchi correspondent. In February 2023, a bus belonging to the Sri Lanka Transport Board and a car collided with a train nearby, leaving three people hospitalized. In April 2015, four people were killed and two injured when a vehicle collided with a train in the Mankulam-Ariviyal Nagar area, according to police reports from the time. Those accidents point to a longstanding safety problem along the railway corridor through Kilinochchi. In 2019, six soldiers were killed when their truck collided with an express train at an unprotected crossing in the district. An investigation afterward found that the crossing’s warning signal had been malfunctioning for months despite complaints, and that the crash was the third accident at that crossing in four months. Sri Lanka Railways has installed gates and stationed attendants at some crossings in and around Kilinochchi, including those closer to the town and its railway station. But the Ariviyal Nagar crossing, despite the growth of the university area and the volume of traffic it now carries, remains without a gate or a person stationed to stop vehicles when trains approach. Railway-crossing deaths are a broader national problem in Sri Lanka. The railway recorded 94 collisions between vehicles and trains at level crossings in 2022, resulting in 18 deaths and 45 injuries, according to figures published by the Ministry of Transport. The railway’s 2023 administrative report recorded 17 deaths and 49 injuries from crossing collisions that year. Wednesday’s accident leaves a more immediate question for Sri Lanka Railways and the Ministry of Transport: after repeated serious accidents in Kilinochchi and the transformation of Ariviyal Nagar into a busy university district, why does this crossing still lack a gate or a permanent crossing keeper? As of Wednesday evening, neither the railway department nor the ministry had announced any new safety measures for the crossing. ### A Promise to Find the Disappeared Meets Distrust in Jaffna URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-promise-to-find-the-disappeared-meets-distrust-in-jaffna/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T05:34:36.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s justice minister pledged Tuesday that the government would pursue the truth about the fate of people who disappeared during decades of conflict and political violence, telling a government-organized commemoration here that answers for the families of the missing were a matter of right, not politics. “A family’s right to know what happened to its loved one is not a political demand,” said Harshana Nanayakkara, the minister of justice and national integration, at the event, held at the Jaffna District Secretariat ahead of the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. “It is a fundamental human right. It is a matter of justice.” But the government’s message of reconciliation collided with a different reality just outside the building. A group of relatives of the disappeared gathered to protest the commemoration itself, and police pulled several of the women away from the site, even as ministers inside spoke of justice for the missing. Families of the disappeared, particularly in the predominantly Tamil north and east, have spent years demanding to know what happened to relatives who vanished during and after the civil war. Many have refused compensation, death certificates and other forms of government assistance, arguing that such measures cannot substitute for establishing the fate of their relatives or holding those responsible to account. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/a-promise-to-find-the-disappea-f03dea-1.jpg) Inside the commemoration, Mr. Nanayakkara acknowledged the history of unanswered questions. Before attending the event, he said, he had visited the homes of three families whose relatives had disappeared. An enforced disappearance, he said, does not leave only one person’s fate unknown — it condemns an entire family to prolonged uncertainty. “A mother waits for an answer about her child,” he said. “A wife waits for an answer about her husband. A child waits for an answer about his or her father or mother.” However many years pass, he said, the question remains the same: “What really happened?” Mr. Nanayakkara sought to frame enforced disappearances as a national problem rather than one confined to Sri Lanka’s Tamil population, noting that people from different ethnic and political backgrounds had disappeared during different periods of the country’s history. A just resolution, he said, was “the responsibility of Sri Lankan society as a whole.” Sri Lanka has experienced large-scale disappearances during several periods of violence, including southern insurrections in the late 1980s and the 26-year civil war between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In the north and east, the fate of those who vanished during the war and its aftermath remains among the country’s most contentious unresolved issues. Mr. Nanayakkara said the government would apply the law regardless of a person’s official position, political connections or influence if evidence implicated them. “No one is above the law,” he said. “No matter how powerful a person may be, no matter how high an office that person holds, and regardless of that person’s political connections, everyone is equal before the law.” The government’s promises are likely to be measured against the record of the Office on Missing Persons, the body that organized Tuesday’s event. Created to trace missing people and clarify their fate, the office has long faced skepticism from families, particularly in the north and east, for whom years of commissions, investigations and government pledges have yet to yield the answers they seek. Mr. Nanayakkara said the current government had moved to strengthen the office, including filling vacancies on its governing board, adding representation from families of the missing, restarting stalled investigations and hiring 69 new employees. According to figures he presented, the office had identified 16,966 complaints as suitable for investigation as of July 31\. About 11,000 of those cases had been delayed for lack of funding, he said; the government allocated 375 million rupees in 2025 and formed 25 investigative teams to accelerate the work. By the end of July, preliminary investigations into 3,000 of the outstanding cases had been completed, he said; the government aims to finish preliminary investigations into all complaints by the end of 2027. Mahesh Katulanda, the office’s chairman, offered a broader measure of progress, saying more than 9,000 investigations had been completed nationwide out of roughly 19,000 complaints. In Jaffna District alone, he said, investigations had concluded in 1,940 of about 2,300 registered cases. Mr. Nanayakkara said 1,594 cases examined in preliminary inquiries had been referred for further investigation. Authorities have also issued 2,719 Certificates of Absence, which allow families to resolve certain legal and administrative matters without formally declaring a missing relative dead, and 409 death certificates, he said. The government has established what he called final information regarding 31 missing people, details that were shared privately with their families rather than disclosed publicly. Another 5,427 people have been referred to the Office for Reparations for assistance. That combination of investigation and material assistance is a source of unease for many families, who fear that compensation or administrative relief could become a substitute for truth and accountability. Nagalingam Vethanayahan, the governor of the Northern Province, addressed the concern directly, saying the search for justice and the provision of livelihood assistance should proceed together — and that relief should “never be used to bring the struggle for justice to an end.” “The income earner of a family may have disappeared,” Mr. Vethanayahan said. “Therefore, alongside investigations to establish the truth, assistance should also be provided to rebuild the economic and social lives of those families. These two things are not contradictory.” He said truth, justice, relief, dignity and guarantees of non-recurrence were inseparable, adding that the government “will never withdraw from its responsibility to seek the truth.” The government is considering a broader assistance package that would include psychosocial support, housing and welfare aid, educational opportunities, vocational training and help with self-employment. Mr. Nanayakkara cautioned that such measures should not be mistaken for an endpoint. “These are only milestones on the journey ahead,” he said. “We still have an enormous responsibility before us. We will not abandon that responsibility.” The gathering also became a venue for the government to address its handling of mass graves, an issue that has taken on renewed urgency with the continuing excavation at Chemmani, on the outskirts of Jaffna. Mr. Nanayakkara said 57 million rupees had been provided so far for the excavation and related legal proceedings, and he promised further funding for later stages. “The search for truth must not stop because of financial constraints,” he said. “It is the responsibility of the state to preserve evidence, establish the truth and ensure justice for those who lost their lives.” Investigations into mass graves, he said, should be evidence-based and conducted to scientific and forensic standards, including DNA testing where necessary. Mr. Vethanayahan echoed that view, saying evidence recovered from mass graves in the Northern and Eastern Provinces needed to be properly documented, professionally examined and subjected to judicial process. “These are not matters that should be used for political gain,” Mr. Nanayakkara said. “These are matters concerning human lives.” Ramalingam Chandrasekar, the minister for fisheries, resettlement and community development, said the suffering endured by Tamil families in the north and east should be understood as part of the country’s shared grief, and that both compassion and justice were needed to heal those wounds. The commemoration drew government officials, members of Parliament and relatives of the missing, alongside medical and social-service programs organized in conjunction with the event. Mr. Nanayakkara acknowledged that no government could undo the past or, in many cases, bring back those who had vanished. But he said the state could still deliver what families have demanded for years. “We can establish the truth,” he said. “We can investigate. We can enforce the law. We can ensure justice.” He added: “This issue cannot be resolved in a single day. But that does not mean we can stop.” ### ‘A New Chapter in Our Bilateral Relations’: Vietnam Envoy Hails Growing Sri Lanka Ties URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-new-chapter-in-our-bilateral-relations-vietnam-envoy-hails-growing-sri-lanka-ties/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T11:35:52.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Vietnam and Sri Lanka are entering a broader phase of diplomatic and economic cooperation, Vietnam’s ambassador said at a National Day reception in Colombo, pointing to upgraded political ties and newly established direct flights as signs of growing engagement between the two countries. Ambassador Trinh Thi Tam, speaking at a reception on Monday marking the 81st National Day of Vietnam, said relations had been elevated to a Comprehensive Partnership following a recent exchange of high-level visits. The reception was attended by Sri Lankan government officials, political representatives and members of the diplomatic corps. “Our two countries share a long history of friendship of more than 55 years, based on mutual respect, trust and understanding,” Ms. Trinh said. She described To Lam's visit to Sri Lanka this year as a major milestone in the relationship. The visit followed President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s state visit to Vietnam in May 2025. The two governments agreed during Mr. To Lam’s visit to upgrade their relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership, a move intended to widen cooperation beyond traditional diplomatic ties. Ms. Trinh said the visit had given new impetus to cooperation in trade, investment, tourism, defense, security and justice. One of the most visible developments has been the introduction of direct air links between the two countries. Vietnam Airlines and VietJet Air began operating direct services on Aug. 16, according to the ambassador. Together, the airlines are operating six flights a week between Ho Chi Minh City and Colombo. Ms. Trinh said the new connection would make travel easier and create greater opportunities for business, tourism and exchanges between people in the two countries. The expansion of ties comes as Vietnam seeks to project itself as one of Asia’s rapidly developing economies and a more active diplomatic player. Ms. Trinh said Vietnam’s economy grew by 8.02 percent in 2025, with gross domestic product reaching nearly $514 billion. She said the country now has 17 free-trade agreements with major partners, presenting those developments as part of a transformation that began with the Doi Moi, or economic renovation, program introduced in 1986. Vietnam has also expanded its diplomatic reach, maintaining relations with 194 countries and participating in organizations including the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Colombo Plan, Ms. Trinh said. “For us, development and diplomacy go together,” she said, adding that a stronger Vietnam would be better positioned to contribute to “peace, stability, cooperation and prosperity in the region and beyond.” Vietnam declared independence on Sept. 2, 1945, when Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the establishment of an independent Vietnamese state. Ms. Trinh used Monday’s commemoration to reflect on the wars and difficult reconstruction that followed and on the economic changes of the past four decades. She also thanked the Sri Lankan government, its ministries and agencies and the country’s business community for helping implement commitments reached by the two countries’ leaders. The ambassador singled out the relatively small Vietnamese community in Sri Lanka, describing its members as an important link between the countries through their work, studies and businesses. She said she hoped the community would continue contributing to the expanding relationship as the two governments seek to turn their newly declared Comprehensive Partnership into greater practical cooperation. ### The Tamil Mothers Are Still Grieving. Is Anura Listening? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-tamil-mothers-are-still-grieving-is-anura-listening/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T03:40:09.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Jeyavanitha Kasipillai was crouched in the crowded camp for war-hit civilians at Omanthai when some Sri Lankan soldiers showed up and rudely snatched away her eldest daughter, Jeromi. Jeyavanitha still remembers screaming her head off as she desperately tried to ward off the armed intruders to save and retain the 16-year-old girl, who too was shouting and wailing. One of the heartless soldiers told the distraught mother in half Sinhala, half Tamil: “We believe your daughter was with the Tigers. We need to question her. We will send her back after that.” The soldiers were intimidating. They were the law. This was in the immediate aftermath of the long war that militarily routed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), forcing tens of thousands of battered Tamil civilians to make it to the camp at Omanthai in the northern district of Vavuniya. When the tragedy unfolded, no one – just no one –came to her help. It was an unequal contest between a frightened Tamil woman and a power-drunk Sri Lankan state. Among those who witnessed the horror were her husband and her four other terrified and younger children – three boys and a girl. Speaking from Vavuniya, Jeyavanitha, now 56, insists that her daughter had nothing to do with the LTTE and that she had just given her OL school exam when the war crashed to an end. “She always lived with me.” Then, a bizarre – and frightening – thing happened. Years later, a group photograph of President Maithripala Sirisena was splashed in newspapers. Jeyavanitha could not believe her eyes when she saw her own Jeromi in the frame. Partly thrilled and partly anxious, the mother rushed to Colombo with some friends and confronted the president. His office promised to investigate. An officer told her: “Your daughter will be back with you in two days.” Nothing, however, happened. Jeromi never returned. (The girl in the frame turned out to be someone else.) Today, Jeyavanitha, unlike most Tamil women who too lost their spouses or siblings or children during the war against the Tigers, still lives in the hope that somehow, some day Jeromi will reunite with her. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/170518bcsrilanka-main2-editorial.srilanka_main2.jpg) Jeyavanitha On the day she spoke to Jaffna Monitor, she said: “Sir, today is the 3,468th day since I lost my daughter. I have cried and cried. My husband passed away in grief five months ago.” Heartbroken mothers like Jeyavanitha will gather in Jaffna on August 30 to discuss their collective suffering and to appeal to the international community for justice which eludes them despite years of shouting and screaming on the streets. Human rights groups believe the number of forcibly disappeared people across ethnicities in Sri Lanka is a staggering 60,000 to 100,000 – the second highest globally after Iraq. While Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, have also been blamed for many disappearances, the principal perpetrator in Sri Lanka has been the Sinhalese-dominated state. Most of these crimes took place between 1983 and 2009, the years in which the Tamil insurgency began in earnest and ultimately ended in a bloodbath. The meeting will coincide with the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. One of the key organisers of the event is Jenita, 47, whose husband, Sivanandan, vanished without a trace after being abducted by men linked to the security forces from Vavuniya in 2008. Her husband, then 30, owned and drove a bus. After the abduction, Jenita received a note purportedly written by him along with a ransom demand for Rs 50 lakhs – if she wanted to see him again alive. For good measure, she was informed that her husband was linked to the Tigers – a charge she refutes. Jenita was certain that the signature on the note sent to her was Sivanandan’s. But the note had not been written by him. When he was taken away, their first son was aged 8 and the younger was just two-and-a-half years old. Raising Rs 50 lakhs was beyond Jenita’s wildest dreams. With not many to assist her, she somehow collected Rs 5 ½ lakhs and had the money delivered to the criminals. But Sivanandan was not freed. There was no further word from the kidnappers. The money was gone too. “Even today I live in sorrow,” Jenita told Jaffna Monitor, her voice cracking. “The people who took away my husband cheated me. No one wants to listen to our plight. We will never get justice in this land.” Like most women in her category, Jenita has lost all hope that any government in Colombo will treat Tamils with a sense of equality and justice. At one point, she called on Sirisena, who was then president. “But speaking to him was like blowing a conch in the ears of a deaf person.” She added: “On August 30 we will tell the world that the Sri Lankan government cannot be trusted. That is why we are approaching the international community. We want a change. We have no trust in Colombo.” Tamils across the board feel that while the military could have fought the LTTE, it was sheer evil to have suspected almost everyone in the Tamil community, without realising that ordinary Tamils were the biggest victims of the war – from all sides. A Colombo-based lawyer who did not want to be named said: “Tamils were treated like insects. Anyone could be made to disappear. No one was punished, no one was prosecuted. And they say Sri Lanka is a democracy. I have a question: In what way was the government different from the LTTE?” The punishing campaign against Tamil civilians – all of them classified as suspects – reached its peak when the war ended, and thousands surrendered to the military. While an estimated 12,000 LTTE fighters and sympathisers who gave themselves up are alive today, hundreds of others vanished after surrendering. Take the case of Leeladevi Anandanataraja, who was an officer in the Sri Lankan labour department when she and three other lady colleagues were arrested illegally during an official visit to Colombo in 1993. The reason? They were Tamils; what were they doing in Colombo? One police officer brusquely asked Leeladevi if any of her five children were in the LTTE. “Not so far,” I told them. “But after this brazen injustice to me, maybe one of them will join the Tigers.” That is exactly what happened. Shocked by her mother’s ordeal and insult, her eldest son, Anuraj, who had been studying to be an engineer, joined the LTTE. Called Mayuran in the Tiger ranks, he held a key position in the LTTE communication wing until 2009 when he flung his uniform and weapon and mingled with the mass of civilians fleeing the battlefield. He managed to reach Omanthai — once a no man’s land between Sri Lanka and the de facto Tamil Eelam — with a Tamil family. There, an informer told the military who Anuraj was. He was promptly taken away by the military – and has never been seen again. “I have been looking for him ever since,” a distraught Leeladevi, 73, said over telephone from the northern town of Kilinochchi where she lives with her husband, four years her senior. “For many years I prayed and hoped that he must be in detention somewhere,” she said. “But I admit I have more or less lost all hope of seeing him in flesh and blood.” It is the same unfortunate conclusion that large numbers of distressed women have reached in Sri Lanka’s north and east, the former war theatre. And almost everyone is now blaming President Anura Dissanayake, who heads a coalition government led by his Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The women say that during his 2024 election campaign in Tamil areas, Dissanayake repeatedly promised them justice, saying he understood their suffering because JVP members, too, had been forcibly disappeared by the military over the years. So, large numbers of Tamils believed that he will do something others had not done until then – and voted for him. Now, the women say, he has simply turned his face away. “We have no more faith in this government,” says Leeladevi. “Seeing our sorrow, a true leader should have spoken to us. He doesn’t have time to meet us.” She added: “We realise that no government in this country will help the Tamils.” Jeyavanitha echoes her. “We voted for the JVP in full confidence that this man (Dissanayake) will be different. But he has forgotten us after taking our votes.” Many Tamil women have refused to accept the death certificates and financial compensation the government is offering. They say they either want their missing family members back or justice – not money. Human rights lawyer Bhavan Fonseka admits that there has been very little movement by the government in terms of fixing accountability over the mass of enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka. “People want to know what happened (to their loved ones),” she said from Colombo. “They promised in their election manifesto to set up prosecutors. But you don’t see even that promise being fulfilled. “Chemmani is another issue,” Fonseka said, referring to the discovery of more than 500 sets of human remains buried in Jaffna. “There doesn’t seem to be a clear path. The government has to act... Some cases are dragging on for too long.” ### New U.S. Ambassador Arrives in Colombo, Ending a Seven-Month Vacancy URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/new-u-s-ambassador-arrives-in-colombo-ending-a-seven-month-vacancy/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T12:18:39.000Z COLOMBO, Sri Lanka — Eric Meyer, a career diplomat who until recently helped shape American policy across South and Central Asia from Washington, arrived in Sri Lanka over the weekend to take up his post as ambassador, ending a seven-month stretch in which the American mission here was run by an acting chief. Mr. Meyer landed in Colombo on the evening of Aug. 22, the United States Embassy said Monday. His arrival follows confirmation by the Senate in May and a swearing-in ceremony this month in Washington. It also coincides with a broader changeover among senior American diplomats in Colombo. People familiar with the transition told the Jaffna Monitor that a new group of American officers, including a new deputy chief of mission, was taking up assignments at the embassy around the same time. The Jaffna Monitor could not independently confirm the identity of the incoming deputy, and the embassy's announcement of Mr. Meyer's arrival did not name the other officers joining him. The personnel changes come as Washington has grown more visibly engaged with Sri Lanka on maritime security, trade and investment, and the strategic contest for influence in the Indian Ocean. In a statement after landing, Mr. Meyer put economic and security cooperation at the center of his agenda. "It is an honor to represent the United States in Sri Lanka," he said, adding that he hoped to build on ties between the two countries in ways that would benefit American businesses and "shared security interests" while delivering "greater prosperity" for both nations. **From Washington Policy to Colombo** The appointment is notable in part because of the role Mr. Meyer just left. From January to August 2025, he was the senior bureau official overseeing the State Department's Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, a portfolio spanning India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka — giving him an unusually direct hand in the policy questions he now must carry out in the field. Before that, he served as chargé d'affaires at the United States mission in Norway, overseeing the embassy in Oslo as well as the American Presence Post in Tromsø, the country's only diplomatic post in the Arctic. Earlier postings included deputy chief of mission and chargé d'affaires in North Macedonia; consul general in Almaty, Kazakhstan; senior roles at the embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia; and assignments in Finland, Argentina and Egypt. In Washington, he has also served as chief of staff and senior adviser in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. **A Confirmation Delayed** President Trump first nominated Mr. Meyer for the Sri Lanka post on July 9, 2025\. The nomination was still pending when the first session of the 119th Congress ended, and it was returned to the White House on Jan. 3 under a Senate rule that clears out unresolved nominations at the close of a session — a procedural lapse, not a rejection. Mr. Trump resubmitted it on Jan. 13. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee advanced the nomination, and the full Senate confirmed Mr. Meyer on May 18, as part of a larger batch of nominations, by a vote of 46 to 43\. He was sworn in at the State Department in Washington this month before leaving for Colombo. Mr. Meyer succeeds Julie Chung, who departed Sri Lanka in January after nearly four years as ambassador. In the interim, the embassy was led by Jayne Howell, the deputy chief of mission, who served as chargé d'affaires. Ms. Howell had arrived as deputy chief of mission in 2025; on July 23, Sri Lanka's Ministry of Defence said she had made a farewell call on Deputy Defence Minister Aruna Jayasekara, a signal that her assignment was ending. **A More Active American Presence** Mr. Meyer takes over at a consequential moment for Sri Lanka's foreign relations, as the island seeks to balance ties with the United States, India, China and other powers competing for influence across the Indian Ocean. American engagement has been especially visible on security. Under Ms. Chung, the two countries expanded joint military and disaster-response exercises, and Washington transferred maritime surveillance and patrol assets to Sri Lanka — cooperation that has continued this year, alongside visits by senior American officials and congressional delegations focused on ports, maritime security and regional stability. In June, S. Paul Kapur, the State Department's assistant secretary for South and Central Asian affairs, toured the Port of Colombo with the embassy's chargé d'affaires and its regional Indo-Pacific strategy coordinator. Taken together, a new ambassador with deep South Asia experience, a wholesale turnover of senior embassy staff and a steady stream of high-level visits do not by themselves signal a shift in American policy. But they leave a strengthened diplomatic team in Colombo at a moment when Sri Lanka's position astride some of the world's busiest shipping lanes has made the island more important to competing regional strategies. Mr. Meyer signaled before leaving Washington that his priorities would extend beyond security. On Aug. 20, two days before arriving, he met with Madhuka Wickramarachchi, Sri Lanka's chargé d'affaires in Washington, for talks covering political and economic relations, defense and security cooperation, and education. For Mr. Meyer, the Colombo posting marks a shift from helping write American policy toward South Asia in Washington to carrying it out in one of the region's most strategically situated countries. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Mr. Meyer holds a political science degree from the University of California, Berkeley, and an M.B.A. from Georgetown University. Before joining the State Department, he worked in corporate sales and government relations in the airline industry. He speaks Danish, French, Russian and Spanish. ### ‘People Are Running Out of Patience’: Tamil Parties Join 10th-Week Palaly Land Protest URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/people-are-running-out-of-patience-tamil-parties-join-10th-week-palaly-land-protest/ Last updated: 2026-08-24T03:33:37.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Displaced residents of Palaly in Sri Lanka’s northern Jaffna Peninsula protested for a 10th consecutive week on Sunday, demanding the return of ancestral and privately owned land that remains under the control of the security forces, as representatives of nearly all major Tamil political parties joined the demonstration. The weekly protest at Palaly Junction is part of a broader campaign for the release of civilian land in Valikamam North, where demonstrations have also been taking place in Myliddy and Vasavilan. Residents have been gathering every Sunday, pressing the government to allow families displaced from the area to return to their homes and properties. Representatives of almost all Tamil political parties, with the exception of the governing National People’s Power, took part in Sunday’s protest. Among those present were M.A. Sumanthiran, general secretary of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, and Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, the party’s parliamentary group leader. Mr. Rasamanickam warned that frustration with the government was growing as similar campaigns over military-held civilian land emerged elsewhere in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. “People are running out of patience with the government,” Mr. Rasamanickam said during his visit to the protests at Palaly Junction and Vasavilan. “These protests are no longer isolated incidents.” He said demonstrations demanding the release of civilian land were now taking place across the North and East and that residents could not be expected to wait indefinitely for their properties to be returned. At Palaly Junction, protesters raised slogans calling on the government of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to return their land. “We want our land” and “Return our ancestral lands to us,” they chanted. The protesters also called on Mr. Dissanayake to translate his recent statements on land releases into action. Mr. Rasamanickam challenged the continued use of national security considerations to retain civilian property nearly 17 years after the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war. “National security cannot become a permanent justification for denying people access to their own property,” he said. He argued that if the government accepted that areas designated as High Security Zones during the war did not necessarily need to retain that status today, the same reasoning should apply to civilian land that remains occupied. Mr. Rasamanickam said the dispute extended beyond ownership of individual plots, pointing to continued restrictions involving St. Sebastian’s Church, Myliddy Roman Catholic School and Vasavilan Sri Velupillai Vidyalayam. “These are people’s homes, schools, places of worship and communities,” he said. “Their lives have been disrupted for decades.” He called on the government to establish a time-bound program to identify all remaining civilian land held by the military, explain why individual parcels continued to be retained and set deadlines for returning land to its owners. “Selective releases are not enough,” he said. The weekly demonstrations have also led to legal action against some participants. Palaly police and an assistant superintendent of police have filed a case in the Mallakam Magistrate’s Court against five people, accusing them of obstructing public transportation during an earlier land-release protest. Those facing proceedings include Anusiya Jeyakanth, a member of the Velanai Pradeshiya Sabha, and Venthan, identified as the leader of the Democratic Party. Police have also recorded a statement from one person in connection with the case, according to reports. At the previous week’s demonstration, residents dressed in black and carried black flags as they marched from the site where St. Sebastian’s Church once stood to Palaly Junction. They gathered near a security checkpoint and called for their ancestral lands to be released. Mr. Rasamanickam said he would continue to raise the issue in Parliament, warning that the government should take seriously the frustration reflected in the growing number of land protests. The residents, meanwhile, said the weekly demonstrations would continue until their lands were returned and they were able to resume their lives there. ### A Tuk-Tuk Policy Worthy of Tughlaq? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-tuk-tuk-policy-worthy-of-tughlaq/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T03:09:52.000Z **COLOMBO** — Sri Lanka is considering barring anyone under the age of 40 from entering the three-wheeler passenger transport trade, a deputy minister said Sunday, reviving a proposal that a previous government abandoned as unlawful and unfair. Nalin Hewage, the deputy minister of vocational education, said the measure was intended to stop school-leavers from going directly into tuk-tuk driving and push them toward further study and skills training. “We expect to increase the age for entering the three-wheeler profession to 40 years,” Mr. Hewage said. “Young people should not be able to leave school and immediately take a three-wheeler onto the road. That is why we are making changes to education.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/1745744717-nALIN-1.jpg) Nalin Hewage The current minimum age is 18\. A Class B1 licence, covering motor tricycles including hire three-wheelers, is available at that age from the Department of Motor Traffic. Raising the bar to 40 would put a lawful occupation out of reach for the first 22 years of adult life. Mr. Hewage, a National People’s Power member for Galle, did not say whether the restriction would apply only to new entrants or also to drivers already under 40, what legislation would be required, which ministry would bring it, or why the government had settled on 40\. He holds no transport portfolio. Licensing of hire three-wheelers rests with the Department of Motor Traffic under the Motor Traffic Act, with policy oversight from the Ministry of Transport and the National Transport Commission, and hire registration handled provincially. ## Tried once, and rejected The proposal is not new. In May 2017, the Ministry of Transport announced it would issue three-wheeler licences only to applicants over 35, acting on a recommendation from Dr. Sisira Kodagoda, then chairman of the National Council for Road Safety, who cited accident rates involving three-wheelers. It reached Cabinet as a paper from the transport minister, Nimal Siripala de Silva, proposing that passenger three-wheeler drivers be aged between 35 and 70\. The attack came from inside the government. Mangala Samaraweera, then finance minister, called it unfair and feudalistic. Others argued that an age bar on a lawful occupation was contrary to the law of the country. President Maithripala Sirisena rejected the paper. Nine years on, the same instrument is back, set five years higher, with a different reason attached. In 2017 it was road safety. Now it is vocational training. ## What the trade actually is More than a million three-wheelers are registered in Sri Lanka. They reach places buses do not, serve villages far from railway lines, and stay on the road long after other services stop. In much of the country, there is no practical alternative. They are also the employer of last resort. The trade needs no degree, no interview, no employer and no connections. It absorbed garment workers after factory closures, hotel staff after the 2019 Easter attacks, and a large share of the newly destitute after the 2022 collapse. Figures cited by the National Human Resources Development Council, drawn from 2016 data, put roughly 800,000 vehicles in active passenger use, about 9.2 percent of the working population, supporting some 2.8 million people across an estimated 760,000 households. ## The premise does not hold The stated diagnosis is that too many school-leavers are choosing the tuk-tuk over training. Tested against the labour force data, it fails. The Institute of Policy Studies, examining Labour Force Survey rounds, found the largest share of three-wheeler drivers in the 30-to-40 age band, participation rising after 35, and the youth share of the driver population falling between 2013 and 2016. Unemployment figures make the argument harder still. Department of Census and Statistics data for the first quarter of 2026 puts unemployment at 16.1 percent among those aged 15 to 24 and 11.8 percent among those aged 25 to 29, against a national rate of 3.7 percent. It was highest of all, at 6.5 percent, among people holding G.C.E. Advanced Level qualifications or above, and worse for educated women than educated men. That points to a different problem from the one the minister describes. Sri Lanka is not short of educated young people. It is short of work for them. A young man with three A-Level passes and no offer does not need to be stopped from driving. ## What the ban would do A minimum age of 40 removes one occupation from the choices available to every citizen aged 18 to 39\. It creates no substitute. Shut the trade to everyone under 40 and the labour market loses the thing it falls back on when something else collapses. The 22-year-old blocked from driving is unlikely to enroll in vocational training instead. He is more likely to look for work abroad, particularly in the Gulf. Enforcement would be another matter. A three-wheeler can be registered to a father, an uncle or a wife while the younger man drives it. That pushes drivers outside the formal system, complicates licensing, insurance and accident liability, and hands police and other officials wider discretion over who gets stopped. There would also be two classes of driver. If those already working under 40 are allowed to continue, and new entrants are not, the first group holds an advantage for no reason other than timing. Fares would eventually rise. Fewer people entering means fewer vehicles for hire, and the cost falls on passengers with the fewest alternatives: rural households, the elderly, and small businesses that depend on cheap last-mile transport. ## The constitutional question Article 14(1)(g) of the Constitution gives every citizen the freedom to engage in a lawful occupation, profession, trade or business. Driving a three-wheeler for hire is lawful work. Article 12(1) guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection of the law. Neither right is absolute. Article 15 permits restrictions in certain circumstances, including in the interests of the national economy, and allows the state to set qualifications and licensing requirements for particular occupations. There is nothing unusual about requiring a driver to hold a proper licence or meet safety standards. An age of 40 is different in kind. A licence can be obtained, training completed, a medical examination passed. A man of 25 can do nothing to satisfy an age requirement except wait fifteen years. The government would also have to show how the restriction serves the national economy, when its effect is to stop people who cannot find other work from earning. Age is not among the grounds listed in Article 12(2), race, religion, language, caste, sex and others, but the broader equality guarantee in Article 12(1) would still apply, and it turns on whether there is a reasonable basis for the distinction. If the aim is to encourage vocational training, the government would have to explain what a 39-year-old lacks that he acquires on his fortieth birthday. There is a further point. Any restriction must be prescribed by law. A deputy minister’s statement changes nobody’s rights and stops nobody from driving. What matters is what the government actually puts before Parliament, and how. Sri Lanka is also party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, whose Article 6 recognises the right to earn a living through work freely chosen or accepted. ## Why people reached for Tughlaq Within hours, Muhammad bin Tughlaq was being invoked online. The 14th-century Delhi sultan was not a fool. He was highly educated, with interests ranging from philosophy to medicine and mathematics. But he is remembered for decisions that went badly wrong. He shifted his capital from Delhi to Daulatabad, forcing people to make the long journey south, and later reversed the decision. He introduced a token currency in base metal; counterfeiting became rampant, and the experiment collapsed. That reputation is why Cho Ramaswamy named his Tamil weekly *Thuglak* in 1970\. The comparison is not really about stupidity. It is about governments making grand decisions without thinking enough about the people who have to live with them. A policy can sound perfectly sensible in a government office. It can look very different to a man who has a three-wheeler loan to pay on the fifteenth. ### Sri Lanka's Disappeared URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-disappeared/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T06:03:18.000Z **By: Sidhartha Thamby** ## **Part I: The Phenomenon of Disappearances** ### **What Counts as a Disappearance** The legal meaning of "enforced disappearance" is narrower than everyday usage. The main treaty — the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance — applies only when the state is involved: an arrest, detention, or kidnapping by state agents or with state approval. Disappearances by non-state groups like the LTTE or JVP fall outside this legal definition, though the treaty still requires the state to investigate them, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions allows such acts to be prosecuted as war crimes regardless. A disappearance rarely happens as a single isolated act: war provides cover for making someone vanish, impunity lets security forces act unchecked, and emergency law lets secret detention slide into disappearance, since most constitutions allow habeas corpus to be suspended during a declared emergency. International law still draws a line even then — under the ICCPR, the right to life, freedom from torture, and recognition as a person before the law can never be suspended, so enforced disappearance stays illegal even during a state of emergency. ## **How Big Is the Problem** Sri Lanka's disappearances span 1971 to 2009, though most documented casework concentrates from 1980 onward — no comparable commission of inquiry was ever set up for the earlier 1971 JVP insurrection, so that period is far less thoroughly investigated than 1987–89 in the available sources. There is no single agreed total — different organisations counted different things at different times, over different mandates, and the numbers don't match. The spread below reflects different time periods, different geographic coverage, and different thresholds for what counts as a documented case, not one figure simply being wrong. ***National mechanisms on disappearances — figures at a glance*** | **Mechanism** | **Period** | **Scope** | **Complaints Received** | **Cases Established / Key Finding** | | ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | 1991 Presidential Commission (Premadasa) | From Jan 1991 | Only new disappearances after the Commission's creation | \~15,000 reports reached the UN Working Group by 1991; 4,932 transmitted to government | Excluded 1988–90 (JVP uprising's deadliest years) entirely; no overall total given for the period it did cover | | Three Zonal Commissions (Kumaratunga) | Jan 1995 – Sep 1997 | Province-by-province: Central/NW/NC/Uva; Northern/Eastern; Western/Southern/Sabaragamuwa; disappearances from Jan 1988 | 27,526 | 16,800 established as enforced disappearances (one estimate: \~16,500); perpetrators identified in 1,681 cases | | All-Island Commission (follow-up) | 1998 – 2000/2001 | Complaints the Zonal Commissions couldn't complete | 10,135–10,136 forwarded | 4,473 additional cases established; 16,305 further complaints ruled outside mandate and referred to the Human Rights Commission | | UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances | Since 1980 | National, cumulative | — | 12,000+ cases recorded; \~6,000 unresolved | | OHCHR investigation | Jan 1983 – May 2009 | National | — | 13,378 cases documented | | ICRC tracing requests | Since 1990 | National, family-initiated | 16,000+ | \~5,200 from families of missing military/police personnel | | Paranagama Commission (PCICMP) | Aug 2013 – 2016 | North & East, 10 June 1990 – 19 May 2009 | 21,000+ (June 2015) → 23,000+ (18,000+ civilian, 5,000+ security forces) → 24,000+ (2016) | Public hearings reached evidence stage for \~2,700 complaints by mid-2015; final report never made public | | Office for National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) | Since 1994, cumulative | National | 65,000+ | Broadest umbrella count of any body | | Red Cross (2003 snapshot) | To 2003 | National | 20,000 | 9,000 resolved; 11,000 under investigation | | EVE 2011 household census | Survey: Jun–Aug 2011; covers 2005–2009 | Five Northern Province districts only; self-reported, no independent check | — | 4,156 "untraceable" persons recorded (63% from 2009 alone); 22,329 total deaths 2005–2009; \~8,000 deaths in the first five months of 2009 | None of these counts, on their own, amounts to legally proven truth, which requires a judicial process — and Sri Lanka's own domestic mechanisms have been widely reported, including by the UN's human rights office, as failing to deliver that process. Fewer than 500 indictments have followed more than 20,000 documented cases, roughly a 1.8–2.5% rate. The Zonal and All-Island Commissions ran province-by-province from 1994 to 2001 rather than as a single national inquiry. Within its area, the North East Zonal Commission's final report attributed roughly 90% of enforced disappearances to the Sri Lankan military and police, and roughly 10% to paramilitary groups, including the LTTE. In the south, the Western/Southern/Sabaragamuwa and Central/North Western/North Central/Uva Provinces Commissions investigated disappearances linked to the JVP's second uprising (1987–89), treating them as a separate track from the ethnic-conflict disappearances of Tamils in Colombo; among the perpetrators they identified were 27 Members of Parliament, 14 provincial council members, 20 police superintendents, and 12 army captains. One of these commissions found that criminal investigations at the time were often distorted "to conceal more than to reveal" — and even where someone was identified, it rarely led to an actual charge. Patterns differed by region. In Tamil-speaking areas, young men were taken during military "clearing" operations, checkpoints, or round-ups and never seen again; others vanished from displaced-persons camps after surrendering or screening late in the war, and paramilitary groups, often state-backed, added a third pattern in the east. Journalists, aid workers, and civil society figures disappeared after criticising the government or the LTTE. In the south, security forces instead targeted people branded as JVP sympathisers, whose names were passed by local officials to police and the armed forces "for elimination," per the zonal commissions' findings. Sources vary sharply in how deeply they investigated, rather than simply recording a complaint. A complaint made to a Commission of Inquiry means someone reported an allegation — it does not by itself mean the Commission checked what happened. The Human Rights Task Force (HRTF), led by Justice J.F.A. Soza, is the strongest source: its reports involved named-case investigation, on-site inquiry, and identification of specific units and officers. University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR(J)) sits close behind, documenting abuses from 1988 until it largely stopped publishing by 2010\. The Paranagama Commission, by contrast — formally the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Complaints of Abductions and Disappearances (2013–2016) — mostly took in complaints without investigating them: its own Second Mandate report describes the First Mandate's investigative work as still ongoing (figures above). Sri Lanka's 2011 household census, EVE 2011, ranks lowest of all: "untraceable" was just one checkbox on a self-reported form, with no attempt to say who was responsible, and it does not differentiate civilians from combatants or assign responsibility to either the LTTE or government forces. One case illustrates how this documentation gap plays out. On 5 September 1990, soldiers surrounded the Eastern University refugee camp at Vantharumoolai, near Batticaloa; masked informants pointed people out, and 158 people were tied up and bused away after being told they'd be released after questioning. None were ever seen again and no bodies were found. The HRTF inquiry named four officers based on witness interviews, but no one was ever prosecuted — one of the largest single mass-disappearance events of the conflict, and a template for how documentation, naming, and impunity have coexisted throughout this history. ## **The Human Cost** The case for reform rests on real, measurable harm, not just legal principle. The key concept is ambiguous loss, coined by psychologist Pauline Boss: loss with no official confirmation of life or death, and so no closure — the most stressful kind of loss, since there's no proof it's really over. Ordinary bereavement brings legal and social clarity — a death certificate, mourning, burial — none of which ambiguous loss offers. Families of the disappeared often suffer chronic depression, anxiety, complicated grief, and sometimes PTSD, since standard PTSD models don't fully capture this mix of hope, despair, and prolonged uncertainty. Even those who return aren't spared: captivity and torture leave survivors struggling with trust and hypervigilance, and reappearing itself can bring unwanted suspicion and stigma. Women bear the heaviest and most lasting burden: a disappeared male relative is often the family's main earner, and women usually lead the search for truth — exposing them to abuse, extortion, and manipulation. Many legal systems require formally declaring a disappeared person dead before relatives can access bank accounts or property, which many women resist; in some cultures, wives of the disappeared are considered neither "wife" nor "widow" — the "half-widow" limbo documented in Kashmir and present in Sri Lanka too. At the community level, unresolved disappearances pass trauma down through generations and deepen mistrust in state institutions. ## **The Risk of Revenge and New Violence** Being a victim of crime raises the risk of later committing violence, sometimes driven by revenge — itself harmful to a victim's mental health. In New York, 42% of homicides in 2012 were revenge-motivated, and an estimated 61% of US school shootings are thought to be as well. This isn't a feeling that fades quickly: a follow-up study of Kosovo Albanians found feelings of revenge were no lower a full year after the trauma than right after it, when nothing had been resolved. Johan Galtung's structural violence framework casts violence as a triangle of direct, structural, and cultural forms, where unaddressed structural and cultural violence — such as built-in impunity — tends to erupt into new direct violence. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom found a similar feedback loop in civil wars: conflict creates grievance, grievance creates more conflict, and nearly half of all civil wars restart an earlier one, with risk highest in the first post-conflict decade. This cycle isn't fixed. Sikkink and Kim's cross-national study of the "justice cascade" found that countries pursuing human rights prosecutions later show lower repression than similar countries that don't, especially when paired with a truth commission — a probable risk shaped by institutional choices, not a fixed fate. The chain runs like this: a disappearance creates ambiguous loss that's never grieved. No accountability means injustice builds instead of easing. Injustice plus no legal remedy means revenge sticks around instead of fading. At scale, this creates a pool of grievance armed groups can recruit from, or that can spark fresh violence on its own. And because no investigation means no deterrence, the same conditions repeat — producing new disappearances even in supposedly "post-conflict" periods. ## **What Sri Lanka's Own Systems Have Done** Sri Lanka has tried several mechanisms to give families practical relief without full accountability. Getting a death certificate meant formally declaring you believed your relative was dead — closing off the possibility they were still alive in detention; roughly 15,000 were issued under this route between 1995 and 1999\. The 2016 Certificate of Absence fixed that problem, giving access to bank accounts, property, and pensions without requiring that declaration — introduced against the backdrop of ONUR's cumulative count above, the largest of any single national tally. Compensation payments had reached 16,324 families by 2002\. The 1990s commissions made roughly 26 recommendations covering truth, justice, reparations, and prevention — but only certificates and modest compensation were ever delivered. Later frameworks said certificates would follow "necessary investigations," but that investigative machinery remained the weakest link: administrative paperwork stood in for real judicial accountability, and indictments never followed. Commemoration itself has been uneven. This isn't only a Tamil civilian story: when LTTE forces overran an army camp at Mullaitivu on 18 July 1996, an estimated 1,300–1,500 soldiers were lost, most listed as missing in action, and 207 who were later taken prisoner were killed in captivity. Yet Sri Lanka's military has no formal "missing" category in public commemoration — the National War Memorial's 28,619 names group all fallen soldiers together, and the Army has tended to reclassify long-missing soldiers as presumed killed, even as the Office on Missing Persons keeps a separate missing-in-action list for the Navy. A family's right to know shouldn't depend on which side their relative fought for; in 2026, Tamil and Muslim war-hero families were invited to the national commemoration for the first time in its 17-year history — a welcome step, though only partly acted on. Several groups are often lumped in with "the disappeared" even though they don't technically fit the definition — for example, roughly 200 children from the north never accounted for after the LTTE claimed to release its underage recruits in 2007\. The overall principle: "disappeared" is a narrow term for cases where fate and whereabouts were actively hidden and never resolved, not a catch-all for any unaddressed conflict loss. Eligibility should rest on the loss itself and the lack of an answer, not on which side caused it. ## **Part II: A Path to State Recognition** ### **Time Is Running Out** The people who can identify the missing are elderly. Urgent needs include collecting DNA from ageing relatives, providing trauma-informed healthcare for older survivors, and delivering closure while they are still alive. Enforced disappearance is treated as an ongoing crime, meaning the statute of limitations doesn't start until the person's fate is disclosed — so even ageing perpetrators can still be reached, through command-responsibility rules, reduced sentences in exchange for disclosure, and by recording testimony now, before it is lost. This supports a dedicated intake track, running alongside the main justice process, for perpetrator, witness, and informant testimony — modelled on South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where disclosure ran as its own stream. This protects survivors and witnesses while still incentivising disclosure, an incentive Sri Lanka's OMP Act already half-builds through a clause that stops OMP findings from directly triggering legal liability. ## **A Four-Stage Plan** What a state owes survivors is a chain of obligations, each depending on the one before it, matching four recognised pillars of transitional justice. **Stage 1 — The right to know.** Testimony is collected in a form investigators can use, and search and investigation run alongside this, funded and active whether or not prosecution follows — modelled on the International Commission on Missing Persons' DNA-led search programmes. **Stage 2 — The right to justice.** This starts with state recognition: an interim legal status granted on the strength of the complaint alone, as in Argentina's system and Sri Lanka's own Certificate of Absence. This gives a case legal standing and opens the door to reparations. Accountability follows — prosecution where courts can reach the people responsible, and truth commissions where they can't — drawing on the Velásquez Rodríguez case, which shifted the burden of proof onto the state. **Stage 3 — The right to reparation.** Legal status and practical relief come first: inheritance, custody, pensions, and bank access, released without a death declaration. Reparations and identity restoration follow, including for children who were taken and raised elsewhere. Memorials and healing complete this stage — ideally a living institution families keep returning to, not a monument they walk past once. **Stage 4 — Guarantees of non-recurrence.** This means real institutional reform: vetting, oversight, and structural change. Unresolved loss is a documented driver of future violence — both the JVP and the LTTE recruited from communities shaped by exactly this kind of grievance. It doesn't have to go that way: Argentina's Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo channelled similar grief into decades of nonviolent advocacy, closely tracking whether truth, accountability, and reparation were actually delivered, not just promised. Two obligations cut across all four stages: the search continues indefinitely, and psychosocial support runs the whole way through, rather than arriving only after everything else. ## **How This Should Be Built and Run** Right now, each stage is its own separate institution, with no single body responsible for a case across all four. A dedicated authority — an expanded Office on Missing Persons or a new body — should own the relationship with families throughout, carrying a sunset clause rather than assuming indefinite existence, following Colombia's Unidad para las Víctimas, whose fixed ten-year term Congress has actively chosen to renew rather than let lapse. Comparative practice also supports positive discrimination: extra education, healthcare, housing, and livelihood support for registered families, based strictly on documented loss and available equally to families of state security forces, LTTE combatants, and civilians — not restricted by ethnicity, as Rwanda's comparable FARG fund is. Finally, the plan needs to fit the people it serves: home visits and simpler renewal for ageing survivors; power-of-attorney provisions so an adult child can pursue a case; intake in Sinhala, Tamil, and English on equal terms regardless of which side a relative fought for; and diplomatic missions abroad as intake points for a diaspora holding much of the remaining testimony and DNA. ### Disappeared Families Say Current Government Will Never Deliver Justice URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/disappeared-families-say-current-government-will-never-deliver-justice/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T01:52:45.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The leader of an association representing families of people who disappeared during and after Sri Lanka’s civil war accused the government on Saturday of trying to steer relatives toward accepting death certificates and compensation instead of establishing what happened to their missing family members. Yogarasa Kanagaranjini, president of the Association of Relatives of the Forcibly Disappeared in the North and East, said the government was using the Office on Missing Persons, or O.M.P., to summon relatives and offer them financial assistance. “The government is working vigorously to provide death certificates and compensation,” Ms. Kanagaranjini said at a news conference at the Jaffna Press Club. Ms. Kanagaranjini said families had rejected such offers at a recent O.M.P. meeting in Kopay, outside Jaffna. “We do not want compensation. We do not want death certificates. We want our children,” she quoted mothers who attended the meeting as saying. The Office on Missing Persons was established by the Sri Lankan government to trace people who disappeared during periods of conflict and political violence. But the institution has long faced distrust among some families in the predominantly Tamil north and east, many of whom have demanded international involvement in investigations into disappearances. Ms. Kanagaranjini accused the current government of failing to address those demands despite seeking the support of affected communities during elections. She said families should not expect the government to deliver the justice they were seeking and argued that an international process was necessary. “This struggle for truth and justice is a genuine struggle directed toward the international community,” she said. “It is a long journey.” The families are preparing to hold an international conference on Aug. 30 at the Thanthai Chelva Auditorium in Jaffna, coinciding with the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Ms. Kanagaranjini said foreign diplomats and others involved in human rights issues were being invited to the gathering, where relatives would describe their experiences and press their demand for international justice. She also accused the government of opening O.M.P. offices in some districts and intensifying its engagement with relatives in the period leading up to the conference, characterizing those efforts as an attempt to weaken the families’ campaign. Families of the disappeared have maintained protests and campaigns for years across Sri Lanka’s north and east, seeking information about relatives who vanished during the civil war and its aftermath. Among the cases they have repeatedly raised are those of people they say surrendered or were handed over to the security forces during the final stages of the war in 2009 and were never seen again. Ms. Kanagaranjini described the final phase of the war as involving “genocide,” a characterization made by some Tamil groups and activists but disputed by successive Sri Lankan governments. “What happened to those who were handed over must be revealed,” she said. “That is the justice we must receive.” ### One Nation, One People — But on Whose Terms? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/one-nation-one-people-but-on-whose-terms/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T12:18:58.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** One day in 1997, Sri Lanka’s air force chief, Oliver Ranasinghe, learnt from a “little bird” that the Defence Secretary had gone to the UK with his son to buy two C-130 aircraft. The C-130 was ideally suited for Sri Lanka. It can carry heavy loads and even operate out of unprepared airfields. But there were problems with these two aircraft. Both had been parked on a tarmac in the UK for 13 long years in extreme weather, without being flown or even the engines being run. Worse, they were 34 years old. So, Air Chief Marshal Ranasinghe alerted President Chandrika Kumaratunga that someone was planning to take a decision that would not benefit Sri Lanka. “Madam, we decommissioned our Avro aircraft after 22 years in service, and now we are buying 34-year-old aircraft! I am sure somebody will have to answer for it one day.” Until Ranasinghe retired in March 1998, the subject of the two C-130 never came up. But they were purchased after he left the air force! The letter of credit was opened actually for three aircraft, but only two reached Sri Lanka for the same price. The third was given up so that the other two could be made serviceable – for 700,000 pounds each! Ranasinghe, who served in the air force for 30 years beginning in 1968, has peppered his book with stories of rampant corruption in the armed forces even as the country fought a long and costly war against the Tamil Tigers. The book gives a good idea why it became so difficult for Colombo to overcome its adversary. The other reason why this book should be read is to understand the narrow Sinhalese mindset that continues to derail Sri Lanka. Ranasinghe’s understanding is that the Sri Lankan Tamil youths were “misled” and nurtured with foreign funding and sponsored by India. He says: “Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government created the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) problem for us; they trained the LTTE in India.” There are sweeping statements which can come only from one who doesn’t understand what ignited the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka. There are many aspects of India’s Sri Lanka policy which can be faulted, at least in retrospect. But India did not give birth to the LTTE and did not “mislead” Tamil youths. Right or wrong, Tamil militancy was home-grown. There was no LTTE when anti-Tamil violence gripped Sri Lanka in 1956 and 1958; the LTTE was a crawling baby even in 1977 when Tamils again came under attack. Prabhakaran was a largely unknown entity when Sinhalese vandals destroyed the Jaffna Tamil library with 97,000 books and priceless palm leaf manuscripts. There was no India in the picture when hundreds of Tamils were slaughtered and thousands left homeless in the Sinhalese orgy that followed the killing of 13 soldiers by the LTTE in 1983. Linguistic domination, discrimination in education, political marginalisation, and equating Sinhalese (Buddhists) with the idea of Sri Lanka gave birth to Tamil militancy. Even with all these, there may have been no insurgency but for the 1983 horror in Colombo and elsewhere. It is childish to say that Tamil youths were “misled” or that Indira Gandhi “created” the LTTE. Unlike many Sinhalese (retired military personnel included) who today admit to some of the historical wrongs committed since independence in 1948, Ranasinghe comes across as a political novice, negating the roots of Tamil grievances. He speaks about the death of around 30,000 security personnel in the war but makes no mention of the tens of thousands of Tamils who too perished. And we are talking about Tamil civilians (Sri Lankans after all), not combatants. How can any country be emotionally united when people at the leadership level have such a jaundiced outlook? Ranasinghe also makes a fanciful claim that he was happy that President Ranasinghe Premadasa told the Indian military deployed in Sri Lanka under a bilateral pact to quit. According to the author, the Sri Lankan military was not happy with the Indian Army because “all signs showed that they wanted to be in Sri Lanka forever”. This is ridiculous, to say the least. I reiterate that there is nothing wrong with taking a critical look at India’s past vis-à-vis Sri Lanka. I have often wondered what exactly India achieved by air-dropping food in Jaffna in June 1987, beyond hurting the sentiments of a majority of Sri Lankans. Even then, Indian External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, who later became prime minister, wanted the 1987 pact to be signed between the LTTE and Colombo, rather than between India and Sri Lanka. But to say that the Indian military wanted to make Sri Lanka their new home is preposterous. Blame it on poor intelligence or naivete, the Indian military brass landed in Jaffna thinking they needed to oversee a surrender of weapons by Tamil militants and then go home. Many officers brought with them clothes to last just a few days. But LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran had other ideas. The rest, as we know, is history. Ranasinghe displays more of a narrow worldview when he argues that devolution of power “will separate us ethnically and lead to possible separatism”. Did Prabhakaran embark on militancy because of devolution or was devolution under the 1987 India-Sri Lanka pact conceived of as an alternative to separatism? The former air force chief tries to frighten Sri Lankans by referring to the 75 million Tamils in India, separated by a narrow strip of sea from Jaffna, insinuating a possible major Tamil invasion from India. This is another popular Sinhalese nationalist myth. Tamil Nadu may have exploded in the aftermath of the 1983 bloodbath, but the sympathy for Tamil militants in Sri Lanka evaporated a long time back, barring among pockets of Dravidian political players. This is why those who speak most vocally about Prabhakaran today struggle to get a decent number of votes in elections in the state. Ranasinghe feels unveiling provincial councils in the nine provinces amounts to “breaking this country into nine states”. Oh, really? Did Sri Lanka splinter when the provincial councils existed? “Just imagine the scenario when they get police powers and land powers! They (Tamils) will want to be kings, and the country will disintegrate sooner than later.” Wow! I do wonder what will happen if the Northern Provincial Council were to control the local police force? Jaffna will break free of Sri Lanka?! And get immediate recognition from the UN?! Perhaps people like Ranasinghe do not realise the enormous damage they are doing to Sri Lanka with such outlandish theories. Sri Lanka can never break as long as its people and communities have healthy respect for one another. It is no point paying lip service to national unity when a dominant ethnic group continues to suspect the loyalty of the minority. Mistakes and blunders happen in every society and country. But one cannot permanently live in the past. In any case, majoritarian nationalism can never lead to “One Nation, One People”. **Title:** *To Survive as One Nation, One People* **Author:** Air Chief Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe **Publisher:** Self-published, Rajagiriya, Sri Lanka **Pages:** vii + 316 **Price:** LKR 3,750 (*To Survive as One Nation, One People* is available at [www.vijithayapa.com](http://www.vijithayapa.com/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)) ### U.N., Amnesty Representatives Expected at Jaffna Conference on Sri Lanka’s Disappeared URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-n-amnesty-representatives-expected-at-jaffna-conference-on-sri-lankas-disappeared/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T11:11:44.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Representatives of the United Nations and Amnesty International are expected to attend a conference in Jaffna on Aug. 30, as families of the forcibly disappeared renew their longstanding demands for truth, justice and accountability. The conference, titled “The Long Journey for Justice,” is being organised by relatives of the forcibly disappeared to coincide with the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, observed annually on Aug. 30. It will be held at the Thanthai Chelva Auditorium in Jaffna and is expected to bring together relatives of the disappeared, political representatives, human rights and civil society activists, religious leaders and members of the public. Organisers said representatives of the United Nations and Amnesty International were also expected to participate. The identities and positions of the representatives were not immediately available. Families of the disappeared in Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces have for years marked Aug. 30 with demonstrations and marches, demanding answers about the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones and calling for truth, justice and accountability. Many of the families, particularly mothers and wives of the missing, have sustained public campaigns for years, seeking information about what happened to their relatives and accountability for those responsible. In a separate event on Aug. 30, the Association of Relatives of the Enforced Disappeared of the North and East plans to hold a demonstration in Kilinochchi from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. The gathering will take place in front of a temple along the A9 highway, where relatives are expected to carry pots of burning camphor in remembrance of their missing loved ones and to draw attention to their continuing search for answers. Organisers also plan to release a book documenting the families’ long-running campaign for justice. Enforced disappearances remain one of the most contentious unresolved legacies of Sri Lanka’s decades of conflict. Families in the North and East have repeatedly sought information about relatives who remain missing, while pressing successive governments for credible investigations and answers about their fate. ### We Can No Longer Afford to Hate Each Other URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/we-can-no-longer-afford-to-hate-each-other/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T05:34:43.000Z In one small town, in one month, two Tamil-speaking minority communities, both of which have endured discrimination, insecurity and the pressures of majoritarian politics, managed to hurt each other twice. We can no longer afford this. When nine young Muslim women were prevented from beginning work at Kalmunai North Base Hospital this month because of a dispute over their headscarves, the Ministry of Health responded in what has become an increasingly familiar NPP fashion: it managed the immediate problem without resolving the underlying one. It did not investigate whether the order was lawful. It did not test the decision against any circular governing religious attire in the public service. Instead, it transferred the nine women to Ashraff Memorial Hospital, a few minutes down the road. The state looked at a dispute between a Tamil administrator and Muslim employees inside a public institution and chose the most expedient way out: move the Muslim women to a hospital identified with the Muslim community. Nothing was resolved. No principle established, no question of rights answered, no precedent clarified for the next Tamil administrator, the next Muslim employee or the next public institution confronted with the same dispute. Azath Salley, the former governor, stated the obvious in an open letter to the health minister: transferring the workers does not solve the problem, it merely moves it from one institution to another. He is right, and it is worse than that. It sets a precedent — that when two Tamil-speaking communities come into conflict, the answer is not to establish what is right, but to separate them. We already know where that road ends, because we built it ourselves. ## **What actually happened** The nine women, newly appointed health assistants, most of them entering government service for the first time, were told on Aug. 10 to remove their hijabs before beginning their shifts at Kalmunai North Base Hospital. Their lawyer filed five complaints with the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka on Aug. 13, while preparations began for a fundamental-rights petition to the Supreme Court. The hospital's position is that this is simply a matter of uniform policy: the same rules apply to everyone, regardless of ethnicity, religion, caste or language. The deputy health minister has broadly echoed that framing, noting that among the nearly 300 professions in the health sector, some have prescribed uniforms while others do not. The foreign minister, after meeting Muslim civil-society representatives, offered a rather different interpretation: that there is no legal barrier preventing health workers from dressing in a manner that preserves their religious identity within the existing legal framework. Two ministers of the same government, two readings of the same dispute. There is a fair argument on the hospital’s side. Hospitals need clear rules about clothing, particularly when staff are working close to patients. But other countries have dealt with this without asking Muslim women to give up the headscarf. In Britain, Canada and Gulf countries, hospitals use fitted headscarves that are treated as part of the uniform and washed accordingly. Kalmunai could have found a similar solution. Instead, the women were transferred. Hardly a month earlier, another story unfolded in the same town. During this year's Kataragama Pada Yatra, a stray dog attached itself to the pilgrims walking south to Kataragama and would not leave. They named him Subramani and fed him biscuits, rice and milk. Videos of the animal padding alongside the procession for hundreds of kilometres moved a great many people. In Kalmunai, a young Muslim man was filmed kicking the dog. He was widely condemned, including by Muslim religious leaders. He was arrested, apologised and was released on bail. That should have been the end of it, and in a healthier country it would have been. Instead, the argument spilled onto social media, where abuse came from both sides. Then it took a far more serious turn. Anojan, a Sri Lankan Tamil migrant worker from Kalmunai, was convicted by the Criminal Court in Al-Ahsa in Saudi Arabia over a comment deemed insulting to the Prophet. According to a Foreign Ministry consular letter dated July 31, and to accounts relayed by his family, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, calculated from the date of his initial detention, fined three million riyals and ordered to forfeit the device used. The government has since sought a royal pardon. Muslims were reportedly among those who brought his comments to the attention of the Saudi authorities. Muslims have also been among the loudest in appealing for mercy. The man who kicked Subramani was arrested and released on bail. Anojan faces five years away from his family and a fine of a magnitude he could scarcely hope to pay. And Subramani, the stray that somehow became the spiritual centre of this entire quarrel, has simply walked on. That is what communal hatred does. It rarely lands on the people who trade in it. ## **Who benefited** Who gained when some 75,000 Muslims were driven from the North by the LTTE leadership in October 1990, in an operation that emptied the province of its entire Muslim population in a matter of days? Certainly not the Tamils. Who gained on the night of Aug. 3, 1990, when LTTE cadres opened fire on worshippers at evening prayer inside the Meera Jumma Mosque in Kattankudy and the Hussainiyya Mosque in Manchanthoduwai, killing more than 140 men and boys? Certainly not the Tamils. We lost natural allies. We handed the world acts of injustice committed in the name of the Tamil struggle, including an expulsion that bore all the marks of ethnic cleansing. In claiming to fight injustice, we inflicted grave injustices on another minority. And who gained on Aug. 12, 1990, when Muslim home guards, armed, paid and organised by the Sri Lankan state, forced their way into the Sinthayaathirai Pillaiyar Kovil and the Ramakrishna Mission Tamil Vidyalayam at Veeramunai, where Tamil families from the surrounding villages had taken shelter, and killed fifty-five of them, women and children among them? More than two hundred people were killed or disappeared in Veeramunai and the villages around it that season, and more than two thousand homes were destroyed, as University Teachers for Human Rights and NESOHR documented at the time. Who gained when Tamil families were forcibly driven from villages they regarded as their ancestral homes, and those places became predominantly or exclusively Muslim, leaving behind disputes over land, memory and demography that persist to this day? Certainly not the Muslims. Ordinary Muslims gained no more from atrocities committed in their name than ordinary Tamils gained from the expulsion of Muslims from the North. ## **The arithmetic** The 2024 census puts Sri Lankan Tamils at 12.3 percent of this country, Malaiyaga Tamils at 2.8 percent, and Moors at 10.5 percent. Together, that is 25.6 percent. One in four people on this island belongs to a Tamil-speaking community. The figure is not permanent, and that is part of the point. The Malaiyaga share has fallen from 4.1 percent in 2012, through emigration and through changes in how people declare themselves. A bloc that is not used tends, over time, to stop being a bloc. A quarter of a country is not a minority anybody can afford to overlook. It is a bloc that has to be counted before a constitution is drafted, a budget priced, or a decision taken about which language a government form is printed in. That quarter has been available to us, on paper, at every election since independence. Apart from a few brief and grudging arrangements, we have almost never collected it. Instead, the energy went sideways. Tamil politicians too often treated Muslim aspirations as an obstruction to be managed rather than a legitimate political claim to be reckoned with. Muslim politicians, in turn, often discovered that more could be extracted from Colombo by maintaining a visible distance from Tamil demands than by standing alongside them. And the men with guns on both sides settled the argument in the way men with guns settle arguments. None of that changed the arithmetic. It only ensured nobody in Colombo ever had to confront it. Every Kalmunai quarrel performs the same operation. It takes one bloc and converts it into two clients. Seventy years of separate maximalism have delivered neither Tamil Eelam nor secure Muslim autonomy. What they have delivered instead is the Prevention of Terrorism Act — used against Tamil youth in the Vanni and against Muslim traders in Kattankudy with precisely equal enthusiasm. ## **Others have done this, and faster than we are** France and Germany fought three wars in seventy-five years and killed one another in numbers we cannot conceive of. Eighteen years after the last of those wars ended, Adenauer and de Gaulle signed the Élysée Treaty. It committed the two states to teach each other's language, and it created a Franco-German Youth Office which has since put more than ten million young people through some 400,000 exchange programmes. In the years immediately after 1945, French opinion of Germany was close to irrecoverable; polling from the period found trust in the German neighbour confined to a small minority. By 2012, the Pew Research Center found that 84 percent of the French viewed Germany favourably and 80 percent of Germans viewed France favourably. And in 2003, at a joint youth parliament in Berlin, five hundred French and German schoolchildren proposed that the two countries write a single history textbook together. Their heads of government agreed on the spot. Histoire/Geschichte has been in classrooms since 2006, telling both nations the same story about what they did to each other. Rwanda is closer to our case than Europe is. Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language, practise the same religion, share the same customs, live in the same villages and marry into one another's families. The distinctions between them were older than colonialism, but it was colonial rule that hardened them into something close to race, wrote them onto identity cards and made them a basis for governing. After 1994, twelve thousand community courts heard close to two million cases. But note the flaw, because it is the one we would repeat: the gacaca courts were forbidden from examining crimes committed by the victorious side, and so to a great many Hutu they looked like victors' justice rather than justice. Any Tamil–Muslim truth process that opens the Kattankudy file without opening the Veeramunai file on the same morning will be read, correctly, as a weapon. And then there is Northern Ireland, which is the warning. Twenty-eight years after the Good Friday Agreement, Catholics and Protestants, same island, same language, indistinguishable on the street, still live in parallel, still school their children separately, still divided by peace walls. Many of those walls are still standing, and some of them went up after the agreement rather than before it. Belfast at least had the honesty to build walls. In Kalmunai we built duplicate institutions. Two divisional secretariats for one town, the Tamil one created in 1989 and still, thirty-seven years later, without the land and financial powers a Cabinet promised it in 1993, despite three hundred official letters. Two base hospitals. Two of everything, in a municipality you can cross in fifteen minutes. ## **What must happen** Goodwill will not repair this. Five things can be done within a year. **One**. The Ministry of Public Administration should issue a single, unambiguous national circular governing religious head coverings in the public service. It should do so within weeks, not months. The state has attempted this ground once before and made a mess of it: Public Administration Circular 13/2019, issued in the anxious weeks after the Easter attacks, prescribed the saree and osari for female public servants, was found by the Human Rights Commission to be arbitrary and in violation of the Constitution, and was suspended within days. A Muslim woman entering government service should not have to discover her rights according to the interpretation of whichever administrator happens to be sitting behind the desk. **Two.** Rescind the transfers. The nine women should be allowed to return to Kalmunai North Base Hospital. Whatever policy ultimately emerges, the precedent that intercommunal friction can be resolved by sorting public servants along communal lines must not be allowed to remain in a Sri Lankan personnel file. **Three.** Resolve the Kalmunai administrative question. The government should finally settle the decades-old dispute over the Kalmunai Tamil Divisional Secretariat, including the land and financial powers at the heart of the controversy. A grievance left unresolved for more than three decades does not become less dangerous with age; it becomes easier for politicians on both sides to exploit. **Four.** Begin a joint history project, drawing on the Franco-German experience. Tamil and Muslim historians should sit at the same table and produce a shared account of the years in which our communities turned against one another. Put both communities' calendars of grief into the same volume: the expulsions, massacres, disappearances, displacement and dispossession. Publish it in Tamil. Put it in the hands of students across the North and East. It would cost comparatively little, and may prove more durable than a hundred reconciliation conferences. **Five.** Tamil political parties and Northern local authorities should issue an institutional statement of regret for the expulsion of Northern Muslims, accompanied by a transparent public accounting of resettlement, restitution and unresolved property claims. Anton Balasingham offered an apology to the Muslim people at Kilinochchi in 2002, after talks with the SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem, and the movement described the expulsion as a political blunder. In 2015, M.A. Sumanthiran proposed that the Northern Provincial Council pass a resolution of regret. It was never done. Nearly a quarter-century has passed since Kilinochchi. Many of the people who made that history are dead or dispersed. There is no point waiting for somebody from the past to return and apologise on our behalf. The obligation has fallen to the living — which is to say, to us. I write this first to my own community, because that is where my obligation begins. But the arithmetic belongs to both of us. One in four people on this island speaks Tamil, and nothing has ever obliged us to arrive in Colombo as two supplicants rather than one bloc. We chose that, and we have gone on paying for the choice — in the North, in Veeramunai, and this month in a hospital in Kalmunai. ### 157 Treated for Eye Injuries After Jaffna Temple Festival; Police Seize High-Powered Lamps URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/157-treated-for-eye-injuries-after-jaffna-temple-festival-police-seize-high-powered-lamps/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T03:44:22.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** At least 157 people, including 55 children, have been treated at Jaffna Teaching Hospital after developing painful eye problems following a Hindu temple festival, prompting police to seize high-powered lamps used at the event as investigators seek to determine whether the lighting caused the injuries. The patients had attended a festival at a Murugan temple in the Piranpatru area of Jaffna, where powerful electric lamps had been installed around the temple grounds. Dr. T. Sathyamoorthy, director of Jaffna Teaching Hospital, said those seeking treatment included 58 men, 44 women and 55 children. They reported symptoms including eye pain, irritation and difficulty opening their eyes. The Jaffna District Secretary and the Sandilipay Divisional Secretary have advised anyone who visited the temple on Thursday to go to Jaffna Teaching Hospital for an eye examination. Police have seized several high-powered, Chinese-made lamps that had been installed at the temple and sent them for technical examination. Authorities are examining their electrical specifications, intensity and intended use, as well as whether the lamps were approved for use around the public or subject to any restrictions. Photographs of the seized equipment show large glass lamps containing internal arc-tube assemblies resembling high-intensity discharge, or HID, lamps. Such lamps include metal-halide and mercury-vapour types, although the precise type, wattage and specifications of those seized cannot be determined from photographs alone. Police have not yet established that the lamps caused the injuries. But doctors say the nature of the symptoms has raised the possibility of photokeratitis, an acute injury to the surface of the eye caused by excessive exposure to ultraviolet radiation. A senior eye doctor in Jaffna said the symptoms being reported, severe pain, irritation, watering, sensitivity to light and difficulty opening the eyes, were consistent with such an injury, though examination of the patients and technical testing of the lamps would be required to establish the cause. Photokeratitis is sometimes described as a sunburn of the eye. Ultraviolet radiation damages the epithelial cells covering the cornea, the transparent outer surface at the front of the eye. As the damaged cells deteriorate and shed, the densely packed nerve endings in the cornea become irritated, producing sometimes intense pain, tearing, a gritty sensation and sensitivity to light. One characteristic of ultraviolet injury is that the damage may not be immediately apparent. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/157-treated-for-eye-injuries-a-93ed4b-1.jpg) People can be exposed without feeling significant pain at the time, with symptoms developing several hours later. That delay means someone could leave the temple apparently unaffected and wake during the night or the following morning with severe pain and difficulty opening their eyes. Some high-intensity discharge lamps can generate ultraviolet radiation as part of the electrical discharge that produces their light. Depending on their design, protective outer glass, filters or appropriate fixtures prevent potentially harmful ultraviolet radiation from reaching people nearby. That makes the technical examination of the seized lamps central to the investigation. Investigators will need to determine not only their visible brightness but also the wavelengths and intensity of radiation they produced, whether they emitted ultraviolet radiation at potentially hazardous levels and whether any protective component required for their safe operation was absent, damaged or improperly used. They are also examining whether the lamps were designed for the manner in which they were used at the festival and whether they were suitable for installation in an area where large numbers of people, including children, could remain nearby for extended periods. In most uncomplicated cases, photokeratitis is temporary. The surface of the cornea regenerates rapidly and symptoms typically improve as it heals. But an ophthalmic examination is important to determine the extent of an injury and exclude other causes or damage to deeper structures of the eye. Authorities have not released the results of the technical examination, and it remains unclear what type of lamps were installed, how powerful they were, how long they were operated or how close festival-goers were to them. Until those questions are answered, there is no definitive evidence that ultraviolet radiation from the lamps caused the injuries. ### Facing a Fight for His Seat, Archchuna Turns to Muslim Rights URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/facing-a-fight-for-his-seat-archchuna-turns-to-muslim-rights/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T01:37:58.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A Tamil member of Sri Lanka’s Parliament accused the director of a government hospital in the country’s east on Wednesday of discriminating against Muslim employee. The lawmaker, Ramanathan Archchuna, an independent representing Jaffna District, said nine Muslim women employed as health assistants had been prevented from working at Kalmunai North Base Hospital because of a dispute over their attire and were subsequently transferred to the nearby Ashraff Memorial Hospital. Assurances from Muslim lawmakers and government officials that the matter had been settled were misleading, he said. “The problem has still not been resolved to this day,” Mr. Archchuna told Parliament during debate on a bill to dissolve the Shrama Vasana Fund, a state labor welfare body. In the Eastern Province, Tamils and Muslims live in close proximity, and long-running disputes over land, local administration and political representation have periodically hardened into communal friction. Mr. Archchuna accused the hospital’s director, Dr. Sugunan, of being “a very serious racist” and of engaging in politics. He said the doctor had once been aligned with Karuna, the nom de guerre of Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, a former senior Tamil Tiger commander in the Eastern Province, and later with former President Ranil Wickremesinghe. Medical professionals familiar with both men said their differences predate Mr. Archchuna’s entry into electoral politics and described a longstanding personal dispute between the two doctors, adding another layer to the lawmaker’s public accusations. Mr. Archchuna cast his intervention as an obligation to speak up when he believed Muslims were being mistreated by members of his own community. “If one ethnic group suppresses another, racism cannot be eradicated from this country unless someone from the group doing the suppressing speaks against it,” he said. “I am happy that during my final week in Parliament, I am speaking on behalf of a brother community.” He also attacked President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government as “spineless” over Muslim representation, noting the absence of a Muslim member in the cabinet and, he said, on a committee overseeing electoral delimitation. Mr. Archchuna invoked the late M.H.M. Ashraff, one of the most influential Muslim politicians of Sri Lanka’s post-independence era, saying Mr. Ashraff had defended the rights of Tamil women during the presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. “If stones are thrown at your community by people from my community, our hearts will bear those stones,” he said, before urging Muslim lawmakers to confront anti-Tamil rhetoric within their own community. ## A Contested Seat Mr. Archchuna’s references to his “final week” come as his eligibility to remain in Parliament is being challenged before the Court of Appeal. The petition was filed by Oshala Herath, chairman of the Abhinawa Niwahal Peramuna, a small political party, who contends that Mr. Archchuna was still a government medical officer when he filed nomination papers for the November 2024 general election and was therefore disqualified from contesting. Mr. Archchuna, a physician, has disputed the claim. The Attorney General’s Department has told the court that he remained interdicted from government medical service. Arguments are scheduled for Aug. 31. He has raised the prospect of his departure before. In July, he told Parliament that he was spending his “last days” in the legislature and expected to remain for only about two more weeks, citing the same case. He has not resigned, and the court has not ordered his removal. ## Wartime History Mr. Archchuna’s remarks on Wednesday ranged well beyond the hospital dispute. He pledged that if he were to take control of the Northern Provincial Council, his first development priority would be *Bommaiveli* and *Kakkaitheevu*, two areas of Jaffna associated with the resettlement of Muslims who were expelled from the north by the Tamil Tigers in 1990\. He described sanitary conditions there as severely deteriorated and criticized what he portrayed as episodic charity financed by the Tamil diaspora in place of sustained public investment. “I say this as a Tamil: when I take charge of the Northern Provincial Council, the first areas I will develop will be Bommaiveli and Kakkaitheevu,” he said. He added that he intended to introduce a special parliamentary motion concerning Muslims, describing the community as being as close to him as “flesh and blood.” He then entered the contested history of Tamil-Muslim violence during the civil war. Referring to killings of Muslims in the east, Mr. Archchuna asserted that members of Tamil militant organizations, including the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students, had carried out some attacks for which blame ultimately fell on Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE itself, however, has been widely held responsible for some of the war’s most notorious massacres of Muslim civilians, including the 1990 attacks in Kattankudy and Eravur. Muslim armed groups and individuals aligned with state security forces were also implicated in killings and abuses against Tamil civilians during the conflict, part of a cycle of violence that left lasting divisions between the two minority communities. Mr. Archchuna said that killings committed by “a few Muslims” had contributed to the estrangement between Tamils and Muslims that persists today. Mr. Archchuna closed with further criticism of Muslim lawmakers aligned with the government, saying they aired their concerns privately to opposition politicians but would not do so publicly. “It is only when they come and talk to us in the parliamentary canteen that we understand,” he said. “It is based on what they tell me that I am speaking here.” ### Three Years On, Rajnath Singh’s Sri Lanka Visit Takes on New Significance URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/from-a-deferred-visit-to-a-defence-pact-rajnath-singh-prepares-to-return/ Last updated: 2026-08-22T04:29:29.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, is preparing to visit Sri Lanka, three years after a planned trip was abruptly deferred, as the two neighbors move to deepen a security partnership that was formalized last year with their first broad agreement on defence cooperation. The itinerary has not been finalized, and New Delhi has not announced dates for the visit. Mr. Singh is expected to hold talks in Colombo, with a possible stop in Trincomalee. Preparations are already under way. On Aug. 14, India’s high commissioner in Colombo, Santosh Jha, accompanied by the mission’s defence adviser and deputy defence adviser, met Sri Lanka’s defence secretary, Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha, to discuss arrangements for the visit. The trip would be the most senior Indian defence visit to the island since the two governments concluded a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in April 2025. The agreement, which runs for five years, formalized a military relationship that had already grown substantially through training, joint exercises, maritime cooperation and exchanges between the armed forces. Mr. Thuyacontha said after the agreement was concluded that India trains about 750 Sri Lankan military personnel each year. Mr. Singh had been scheduled to make a two-day visit to Sri Lanka on Sept. 2 and 3, 2023\. India announced the trip on Sept. 1 but said later that day that it had been deferred because of “unavoidable circumstances.” No further explanation was given. The postponement came during a period of heightened sensitivity over visits by Chinese research vessels to Sri Lanka, an issue that had become a recurring concern for India because of the island’s proximity to its southern coast. Sri Lanka subsequently imposed a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels entering its waters for research purposes. The restriction took effect in January 2024 and expired at the end of that year. Trincomalee, on Sri Lanka’s eastern coast, has meanwhile become an increasingly important part of economic and strategic cooperation between Colombo and New Delhi. During Mr. Modi’s visit last year, India, Sri Lanka and the United Arab Emirates concluded a separate agreement to develop Trincomalee as an energy hub. The proposed development includes a multiproduct pipeline, bunkering facilities, further development of the Second World War-era oil tank farm and the possibility of a refinery. Sri Lanka has also given India an explicit assurance on its security concerns. Standing alongside Mr. Modi in Colombo in April 2025, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake said his government would not permit Sri Lankan territory to be used “in any manner inimical to the security of India” or to regional stability. Mr. Modi, for his part, has described the security interests of the two countries as interconnected, and the defence agreement was presented by both governments as a way of giving greater structure to an already extensive relationship. The planned visit also comes as India remains an important economic partner for Sri Lanka during its recovery from the financial collapse of 2022. Earlier this month, during a visit to Colombo by India’s foreign secretary, Vikram Misri, the two countries exchanged agreements for $350 million in Indian rupee-denominated lines of credit. The financing forms part of a $450 million reconstruction package extended by India. Mr. Singh’s visit would therefore take place against a broader expansion of ties encompassing defence, energy, infrastructure and economic assistance. Neither government has announced when the visit will take place. But three years after Mr. Singh’s previous trip was deferred on the day it was announced, preparations for his return are again under way. ### Government Refuses to Return Kilinochchi Press Club Site, Citing Security URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/government-refuses-to-return-kilinochchi-press-club-site-citing-security/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T11:47:40.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka's Defence Ministry has refused to return a state-owned property in Kilinochchi that housed a press club before the end of the civil war and has been under military control since, telling journalists only that security concerns made its release impossible. The decision was conveyed in an Aug. 12 letter from the Presidential Secretariat to the Kilinochchi Media Forum, nearly three months after the organisation appealed directly to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The property consists of about a quarter-acre of land and an office building near *Kaakka Kadai* Junction on the A9 highway, the main road linking Jaffna to the south. "Accordingly, I kindly inform you that the Ministry of Defence has reported that due to security reasons it is not possible to release the said land and building," wrote W.M.S.P. Weerasinghe, a senior assistant secretary to the president. The letter, filed under number PS/DA/SAD/MOD/03/01 (Vol. XI), went no further. It did not identify the security concern, describe how the military is using the property, or indicate whether the decision could be reviewed. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/government-refuses-to-return-k-93a1fb-1-2.jpg) ****The Aug. 12 letter from the Presidential Secretariat informing the Kilinochchi Media Forum that the Defence Ministry had declined to release the former Press Club site, citing security concerns.** Land on one side of the former Press Club has been released to Kilinochchi Maha Vidyalayam, and land on the other side to the Yogar Swami institution, according to people familiar with the arrangements. Neither institution held title to the state land it had been using. The Media Forum cited both releases in its appeal, telling the president that every property around its former premises had been returned while the Press Club alone remained shut out. The Forum's claim rests on use rather than ownership. Although its correspondence describes the site as "our land," the plot is state property and the journalists hold no title deed. The site was made available to them while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam controlled the district and ran a de facto administration across much of the Vanni, with Kilinochchi as its principal centre, according to journalists familiar with its history. The Press Club operated there until 2008\. Government forces retook Kilinochchi in January 2009, and the property has been in military hands ever since. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/government-refuses-to-return-k-93a1fb-2-1.jpg) ****The May 25 letter from the Kilinochchi Media Forum to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake requesting the release of the former Press Club site from military control.** In its May 25 letter, the Media Forum said all of the Press Club's activities had once been run from the building. It said it had reorganised its administrative structure after residents began returning to the district in December 2009 and had continued to function as a journalists' organisation, and that repeated written appeals to successive governments had produced nothing. One Kilinochchi journalist familiar with the dispute said journalists believe the military is reluctant to see the Press Club reopen at the site because it would draw attention to other land it holds nearby. "If we come back and start using this land, they are afraid they may have to release the other lands they are holding around it without any clear reason," the journalist said. Cases of this kind reflect an arrangement that existed under LTTE rule, when schools, religious bodies and community organisations were allotted state land for their use without acquiring legal title. Most of those occupants have since been allowed to resume their earlier use of the land despite holding no deeds. The Forum told Mr. Dissanayake that journalists' associations elsewhere in the Northern Province operate from their own land and offices, and that the Kilinochchi organisation is the only one without a proper workspace. Copies of the appeal went to Health and Mass Media Minister Nalinda Jayatissa; Northern Province Governor Nagalingam Vethanayahan; Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar, who co-chairs the Kilinochchi District Coordinating Committee; the lawmakers Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, Sivagnanam Shritharan and Thurairasa Ravikaran; and senior district and divisional officials. Seventeen years after the war ended, the military’s continued occupation of land remains a persistent source of friction in the north. Successive governments have released some areas, but significant tracts remain under military control, often with little public explanation of why they are still required so long after the defeat of the LTTE. In Kilinochchi, the release of the adjoining properties has sharpened that question: What continuing security need requires the military to retain the former Press Club site when the land on either side has been returned to civilian use? ### Chemmani Excavation Stops Today With 582 Sets of Human Remains Identified URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/chemmani-excavation-stops-today-with-582-sets-of-human-remains-identified/ Last updated: 2026-08-19T03:14:56.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Excavations at the Chemmani mass grave end on Wednesday with 582 sets of human remains identified, among them those of children, and no decision on whether digging will resume before a court date in October. Wednesday is the 56th and final day authorised by the court for the third phase of the excavation, and the 110th day of digging at the site on the outskirts of Jaffna since work began in May last year. Whether a fourth phase goes ahead rests on a hearing set for Oct. 14, when the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court is due to take up reports on the excavation, including findings from a ground-penetrating radar survey and an account of the evidence recovered so far. Ten more sets of remains, one of them a child’s, were identified on Tuesday, taking the total to 582\. Eight sets were exhumed during the day, bringing the number fully recovered to 573 and leaving nine identified sets still in the ground as the phase closes. Investigators also recovered three further items of evidentiary value on Tuesday: an amulet of the kind traditionally tied around the waist, coins, and fragments of iron objects. That takes the number of items recovered from the site to 169. Remains have continued to emerge at a steady rate through the final week of the authorised period, with no sign in the recent days’ work that the site is exhausted. Test pits dug at random points around the excavation to establish whether burials extend beyond the area under investigation have themselves yielded remains, including a headless skeleton with its hands bound across its chest. Chemmani is now the largest mass grave uncovered in Sri Lanka, having surpassed the Mannar Sathosa site. Investigators have found infants and young children buried alongside adults, in clusters and stacked one above another, together with clothing, feeding bottles, toys and beads. The identification of the dead has not begun. The remains establish neither who the dead were, nor when they died, nor how they came to be buried at the site. Those questions require forensic work that has yet to start. The site has been associated with disappearances in Jaffna since 1998, when Somaratne Rajapakse, a soldier convicted in the rape and murder of the schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, alleged that hundreds of bodies of disappeared Tamils lay buried at Chemmani. An internationally observed excavation the following year recovered 15 bodies, two of them identified as men who disappeared in 1996. The current investigation began after construction work near a Hindu cremation ground uncovered skeletal remains in February 2025\. The Jaffna Magistrate’s Court ordered a forensic excavation, which started in May 2025 and ran for 54 days across two phases before funding was exhausted in September. Work resumed in April this year, after the government allocated 21 million rupees for a third phase. Relatives of the disappeared have pressed for international involvement in the investigation. When ambassadors from the European Union, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands visited the site in July, families staged a protest and handed over a memorandum calling for an international inquiry. Their fear is that Chemmani will end where Mannar did: excavations near the Sacred Heart Church in 2018 recovered 346 skeletons, 29 of them children, and produced no identifications and no prosecutions. The close of the third phase leaves the dig idle for almost two months while the court considers whether it continues. ### Will the Rains Fail in Jaffna? Two Forecasts Point in Opposite Directions URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/will-the-rains-fail-in-jaffna-two-forecasts-point-in-opposite-directions/ Last updated: 2026-08-23T11:47:42.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Shortly before midnight on Tuesday, one of the most widely followed voices on weather in northern Sri Lanka posted an alert in Tamil that spread quickly across the peninsula. Prof. N. Piratheeparajah, a professor of geography at the University of Jaffna and dean of its Faculty of Arts, wrote that a closely watched Indian Ocean climate index had fallen unexpectedly, that a powerful El Niño was responsible, and that the rains the North depends on in October and November could now fall well below expectations. “This is completely contrary to the earlier forecasts,” he wrote. He asked residents to stop wasting water and to treat the groundwater and surface water now in hand as the only supply they could count on. His assessments normally travel faster in the North than any government bulletin, and they are trusted accordingly. On the central question of whether October and November will be dry, however, his reading differs from both the outlook of Sri Lanka’s Department of Meteorology and the published research on how El Niño affects this island. ## The index The Indian Ocean Dipole measures the difference in sea surface temperature anomalies between two boxes in the tropical Indian Ocean: a western box off East Africa, running 50°E to 70°E and 10°S to 10°N, and an eastern box off Sumatra and Java, running 90°E to 110°E and 10°S to the equator. The measure is called the Dipole Mode Index. A warm west and a cool east give a positive value, which pushes convection westward and draws moisture toward South Asia. The reverse gives a negative value. Professor Piratheeparajah reported the index falling from +0.64 to +0.18\. Those figures are close to the published record, though the fall was less abrupt than he described. The Australian Bureau of Meteorology, whose weekly values most forecasters in the region watch, recorded +0.63 °C for the week ending 2 August and +0.41 °C for the week ending 9 August, so a reading near +0.18 in the following week would represent a decline spread over at least a fortnight. The thresholds matter more than the drop. Australian climatologists treat sustained values above +0.4 °C as typical of a positive dipole and values below −0.4 °C as typical of a negative one, and by that standard the index has been in or near neutral territory all month. On 9 August the Bureau still described the dipole as neutral, noting that the index had merely reached +0.4 °C for a third consecutive week and that sustained values above the threshold are required before an event is considered established. Its models continue to expect a positive dipole to develop during the southern hemisphere spring. The higher figure the professor cited, in other words, was never an established event that has since been lost. Weekly values move by several tenths of a degree as a matter of routine, which is why forecasting agencies wait for a run of readings. ## The mechanism Professor Piratheeparajah attributed the fall to El Niño, arguing that an El Niño of sufficient strength can suppress or shrink the dipole. That El Niño is underway is not in dispute. NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center has an El Niño Advisory in effect and says the event is strengthening, with better than a 90 percent chance of a very strong event through the northern hemisphere autumn and winter of 2026-27\. The Oceanic Niño Index for May to July stood at about +1.4 °C. El Niño is a Pacific phenomenon, however, and does not operate in the Indian Ocean. It reaches this region indirectly, through changes to the Walker circulation and the winds those changes produce. The published literature runs the other way on the direction of that effect. During El Niño, convection over the Maritime Continent weakens, which induces easterly wind anomalies along the equatorial Indian Ocean and southeasterly anomalies along the Sumatra-Java coast. Those winds drive upwelling that cools the eastern pole while warm water accumulates in the west, producing a positive dipole. Annamalai and colleagues set out the mechanism in 2003 and Shinoda and colleagues in 2004; Cai and colleagues showed in 2011 that positive dipole events often occur alongside El Niño, while negative ones tend to accompany La Niña. Forecast models for this season have been projecting that same pairing. One recent finding gives the professor’s observation partial cover. Research published last year in Communications Earth and Environment found that dipole events developing alongside El Niño often stall, producing a double peak rather than a steady build, because the northward migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone allows El Niño-driven circulation to cause upwelling in the western Indian Ocean. The paper places that interruption in May and June, however, and describes a pause in development rather than a lasting suppression. ## The record The professor’s second claim is that a weak or negative dipole combined with a strong El Niño would leave October and November “very, very low” in rainfall. A positive dipole does tend to enhance rainfall over Sri Lanka from October to December, and the Department of Meteorology has said as much in its seasonal guidance, so a dipole that fails to develop removes a source of extra rain. The El Niño half of the claim is harder to sustain. The relationship between El Niño and rainfall here is seasonal, and in the months at issue it runs positive. Lareef Zubair and Chester Ropelewski showed in 2006 that while the link between El Niño and India’s southwest monsoon has weakened over the decades, the link with the northeast monsoon over Sri Lanka and southern India from October to December has not. Zubair and colleagues later found that El Niño typically brings wetter conditions from October to December and drier conditions from January to March and July to August, with the October-to-December signal among the more predictable. A 2019 paper in the Journal of Climate traced the route: reduced convection over the Maritime Continent forces anomalous anticyclonic flow over the Bay of Bengal, which strengthens northeast monsoon rainfall over Sri Lanka and southeastern peninsular India, weakly in October and strongly in November. Sri Lanka’s forecasters read the evidence the same way. Four days before the professor’s post, the director general of meteorology, Ajith Wijemannage, told News 1st that rainfall in October and November is likely to exceed long-term seasonal averages, that those rains may run into December and early January, and that the greatest effect is expected in the Northern, Eastern and North Central Provinces as the northeast monsoon becomes active. He described a strengthened northeast monsoon as one of the main consequences of this El Niño, and put the probability that the 2026-27 event exceeds anything in the past 75 years at 69 percent. His department is not forecasting an easy year. It expects extremes at both ends, drought and flood in sequence rather than a single settled pattern. Its October and November projection, though, is the reverse of the professor’s. ## Why the warning still holds The appeal to conserve water stands regardless. The Department of Meteorology expects rainfall to stay below normal in the Northern, North Central and Eastern Provinces and parts of Uva over the coming weeks, with little significant rain in most regions in early September and an increase only later in the month. Demand across the North is peaking at the same time, with school holidays, high temperatures and the season of major temple festivals. Reservoirs are already falling. Whatever October brings, the weeks before it are dry ones, and the water in the ground and in the tanks is the water available. The professor is also right about timing. He said conditions would have to be watched until the middle of September before a firm judgment could be made about October and November, and he declined to call a failed monsoon now. Mid-September is roughly when the dipole’s seasonal development becomes legible, and when the difference between a positive event and a neutral one stops being noise. One part of his original post has been lost in the retelling. The severe water crisis he warned of was directed at areas that received little or no rain during the southwest monsoon, the dry zone that sits in the rain shadow while the island’s southwest is watered. That is the North and East. Much of the country banks its rain in the middle of the year; the North waits for the end of it. ### Ranil Warns Sri Lanka Could Face Bankruptcy Again After 2028 URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/ranil-wickremesinghe-warns-sri-lanka-could-face-bankruptcy-again-after-2028/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T15:53:08.000Z **COLOMBO —** Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe warned on Tuesday that Sri Lanka faces a second bankruptcy when heavy debt repayments resume after 2028, and said the government was spending its remaining preparation time on the Constitution and the judiciary instead of on rebuilding foreign-exchange reserves. He spoke at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall at the launch of *Yuddha Dekakata Ura Dee*, or *Shouldering Two Wars*, by Ranjith Siyambalapitiya, whom Mr. Wickremesinghe appointed state minister of finance during the crisis. Former President Maithripala Sirisena attended. The remarks landed on the day the proposed 22nd Amendment to the Constitution was placed before Parliament. The bill would raise the retirement age of Supreme Court judges to 67 and Court of Appeal judges to 65, and fix the Chief Justice's term at six years. Gazetted on Aug. 7, it has drawn objections from the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, the Chief Prelates and opposition parties. Its tabling opens a two-week window for challenge in the Supreme Court. "The country's main problem is how to repay the debt," Mr. Wickremesinghe said. "Not amending the Constitution, and not changing the terms of office of judges. If we cannot repay, the country will go bankrupt again." By his account, reserves stand at about $6 billion, the Central Bank expects $8 billion by December, and $15 billion will be needed by 2028 to meet repayments. "So we still have to find another six billion dollars," he said. His own figures imply a shortfall of seven. The underlying numbers are close to his description. Gross official reserves, including the swap facility with the People's Bank of China, stood at $6.59 billion at the end of July, up $133 million on the month after the Central Bank resumed heavy dollar purchases. Governor Nandalal Weerasinghe has said the target is to hold more than $8 billion by year-end, while cautioning that the net international reserve target is a much lower number once short-term liabilities are stripped out. The $15 billion is not his own benchmark. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake told Parliament in December 2024 that his government aimed to reach $15.1 billion by 2028. Much of his speech was a defence of his own record. He said the collapse was not sudden but the product of tax cuts and a revenue base that had been hollowed out, compounded by the lapse of an earlier IMF arrangement that left Colombo without access to the Fund's advice. He put Indian assistance under Prime Minister Narendra Modi at $4 billion, which independent accounts support, and credited it with securing essential imports. Several of his other claims are inexact. He said Bangladesh's then prime minister provided $100 million. The Bangladesh Bank swap facility totalled $200 million, was agreed in May 2021, and was disbursed in three tranches during that year, before he returned to office. He said $50 million in fertilizer was obtained after he raised the matter with Samantha Power, then the USAID administrator. Power announced $40 million for fertilizer and $20 million in humanitarian aid during her September 2022 visit, following concerns raised by Agriculture Minister Mahinda Amaraweera. He put IMF support at $2.3 billion. Disbursements reached $2.4 billion only in May 2026, well after he left office; the total during his presidency was roughly $1 billion. His claim to have strengthened the rupee to 290 to the dollar describes his tenure. The currency now trades near 332, having lost 7.8 percent this year. Reserves crossed $7 billion in February for the first time in more than five years, then fell in four of the next five months as fuel costs climbed and debt payments came due. The current account, in surplus a year ago, ran a deficit of $245 million in the first half as the merchandise trade gap widened to $5.5 billion from $3.3 billion. The IMF completed the combined fifth and sixth reviews on May 27, releasing $695 million, but cut its 2026 growth forecast to 3 percent, citing the Middle East war and the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. Sri Lanka is also well behind the reserve path drawn up when Mr. Wickremesinghe entered the programme. The original framework projected $8.5 billion by the end of 2025 and roughly $11 billion by the end of 2026\. The actual end-2025 figure was $6.8 billion. Restructuring reduced and postponed payments rather than cancelling them. Bilateral creditors deferred obligations into a window running from 2028 to 2043\. The 48-month IMF arrangement expires in March 2027, and Mr. Wickremesinghe asked what replaces it, a question the government has not answered publicly. "There are two wars in this book," he said. "Now what has to be written about is the third war. Those two wars may be over, but another is coming. If we do not escape it, great danger is waiting for us." ### Sri Lanka Can Tame Inflation if Oil Holds Near $80, Central Bank Chief Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-can-tame-inflation-if-oil-holds-near-80-central-bank-chief-says/ Last updated: 2026-08-19T02:41:09.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka can return inflation to its 5 percent target if global oil prices hold near $80 a barrel, the country's central bank governor said, while warning that a fresh energy shock would strain a recovery that remains vulnerable to forces beyond the island's control. Nandalal Weerasinghe, governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, spoke in an interview with Bloomberg Television in Sydney, where he is leading an investor roadshow intended to draw foreign money into Sri Lanka's stock market. "If oil prices remain around that level, we can manage the situation," Mr. Weerasinghe said. Further surprises in international energy markets, he added, would be harder to absorb. The Central Bank's forecasts assume oil at roughly $80 a barrel through the rest of this year and into next. Sri Lanka imports nearly all of its petroleum, leaving it directly exposed to price swings it cannot influence. Inflation was running at about 2 percent as recently as March. It reached 7.3 percent in July, the fastest pace in three years, after global energy costs climbed and domestic fuel prices followed. Mr. Weerasinghe said he expected those pressures to ease gradually as the Central Bank's tightening worked through the economy. In May, the bank raised its policy rate by a full percentage point, to 8.75 percent, its first increase in more than three years and a move markets had not expected. Mr. Weerasinghe has called the decision pre-emptive, intended to keep inflation expectations anchored as fuel costs fed into transport, electricity and other prices. The effects are already visible, he said, in slower credit growth and a steadier rupee. Curbs on vehicle imports and lending, among them loan-to-value limits, have also eased pressure from imports. Tighter conditions will not derail the recovery, he said, though growth is likely to moderate in the second half of the year. Sri Lanka's economy expanded by about 5 percent in both 2024 and 2025, after the contraction that followed the 2022 crisis. The Central Bank expects growth of 4 to 5 percent in 2026\. The International Monetary Fund is more cautious, forecasting 3 percent on higher energy costs and other external risks. The gap between the two projections turns largely on oil. Rising prices raise consumer costs and at the same time enlarge the fuel bill Sri Lanka must settle in foreign currency, weighing on the trade balance, the exchange rate and reserves. The I.M.F. warned in May that costlier oil could lift inflation and weaken the current account, and that geopolitical tensions had tilted the risks to the downside. Mr. Weerasinghe presented the country's recent performance as a reason to invest now. "This is the time," he told Bloomberg's *The Asia Trade*. He is in Australia for Invest Sri Lanka, a series of capital-market forums in Sydney and Melbourne organised by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka, the Colombo Stock Exchange and the stockbroking industry. The Sydney forum was held on Aug. 17. Sri Lanka has been rebuilding under an I.M.F. programme agreed after it defaulted on its foreign debt in 2022, when depleted reserves left the country unable to pay for fuel, medicine and other essential imports. The fund's executive board completed the combined fifth and sixth reviews of the Extended Fund Facility in May, releasing about $695 million. It praised the authorities' implementation of reforms while warning that the Middle East energy shock had significantly worsened the outlook. Mr. Weerasinghe said the next review was expected in November or December, and that he was confident Sri Lanka would meet its commitments. ### Sri Lanka Braces for a Powerful El Niño as Reservoirs Run Low URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-braces-for-a-powerful-el-nino-as-reservoirs-run-low/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T11:19:54.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka's weather authority says an unusually powerful El Niño is likely to develop by the end of the year, arriving just as reservoirs across the country are running low. The Department of Meteorology now puts the probability of a "very strong" El Niño at about 90 percent, said Ajith Wijemanna, the department's director general. He said there was roughly a 70 percent chance the event would exceed the intensity of any El Niño recorded since 1950. The forecast tracks closely with recent international assessments. The U.S. Climate Prediction Center said last week that the probability of a very strong El Niño had also passed 90 percent, and put the odds of a historically exceptional event at about 69 percent. The World Meteorological Organization warned in late July that the phenomenon was strengthening steadily and would likely shape global temperature and rainfall patterns through the rest of the year. El Niño is a recurring climate pattern marked by unusually warm water in the central and eastern Pacific. It forms thousands of kilometres from Sri Lanka but can still shift atmospheric circulation enough to disrupt rainfall across much of the world. Its local effects are harder to predict than its global strength suggests. Meteorologists caution that a record-strength El Niño will not necessarily bring record drought or rainfall to Sri Lanka specifically. The department has studied roughly 75 years of historical data and found that rainfall in El Niño years can vary widely from typical monthly patterns, and it has urged the public and government agencies to rely on its seasonal forecasts rather than assume a fixed relationship between El Niño and local weather. The forecast arrives as the country's reservoirs are already stressed. Water stored in the 74 major reservoirs run by the Irrigation Department has dropped to about 37 percent of capacity amid the dry spell, irrigation officials said. H.N.P.S.D. Herath, the director of irrigation, said current reserves should still be enough to finish the remaining Yala season cultivation and carry the country through to the rains expected in November and December. He asked the public to use water carefully in the meantime. Rice cultivation is especially exposed to a prolonged dry spell, since large areas depend on reservoirs replenished by the seasonal monsoons. A sustained shortfall could force officials to weigh competing demands for irrigation, drinking water and other uses. Drinking-water supplies have not been affected so far. Chandana Bandara, chairman of the National Water Supply and Drainage Board, said treatment plants nationwide were running at full capacity despite dry conditions in several districts. "There is no problem with the water supply," he said, adding that distribution had not been cut even though some reservoirs had fallen below 56 percent. Even so, the strengthening El Niño adds uncertainty to the months ahead. The World Meteorological Organization has told governments that a powerful event raises the risk of extreme heat and significant swings in rainfall, and has urged early preparation across agriculture, water management and other climate-sensitive sectors. ### New E.U. Packaging Rules Now Apply to Sri Lankan Exports URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/new-e-u-packaging-rules-now-apply-to-sri-lankan-exports/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T11:00:52.000Z **COLOMBO —** European rules governing packaging began to apply on 12 August, and they cover imports. Sri Lankan exporters of tea, spices, seafood and processed food must now be able to show that the pouches, cartons and wrappers they ship to Europe meet binding requirements on recyclability, recycled content, labelling and chemical safety. The Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation entered into force in February 2025 after years of negotiation in Brussels. It draws no distinction between packaging produced inside the European Union and packaging that arrives with imported goods. The rules reach beyond exporters. Local packaging manufacturers, printers, laminators and certification bodies form part of the same compliance chain, and European buyers are expected to begin asking them for documentation. Two provisions are likely to cause the most difficulty here. The first is a ban on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, known as PFAS, in food-contact packaging. The chemicals are widely used to make paper and board resistant to grease and moisture. The ban applies from this month. The second is a requirement that tea bags and certain other packaging formats be industrially compostable from February 2028\. Tea remains among Sri Lanka's largest export earners, and the deadline leaves producers roughly eighteen months to identify alternative materials, test them and requalify with buyers. The regulation is built around five requirements: recyclability, recycled content, reuse, harmonised labelling and waste prevention. It also carries Extended Producer Responsibility obligations and traceability rules, which oblige companies to keep records showing where packaging materials came from and what they contain. ## **An untested readiness** How prepared local industry is remains unclear. A two-day seminar in Colombo on 13 and 14 July drew more than 100 people from exporting companies, packaging manufacturers, government institutions, trade associations and certification bodies. Several participants said they had not previously worked through the regulation in detail. “As the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation begins to apply, early preparation will be essential to help businesses adapt smoothly, preserve access to the E.U. market, and strengthen their position in an increasingly sustainability-driven global economy,” said Johann Hesse, head of cooperation at the Delegation of the European Union to Sri Lanka. The seminar was organised under the CIRCULAR project, a European Union-funded programme implemented jointly by Expertise France, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the German development agency GIZ. Mahmoud Gaballah, who manages the project at Expertise France, said sustainable packaging had become a commercial requirement rather than an environmental preference. Sessions covered the implementation timeline, packaging redesign, material selection, supplier checks, certification and the technical files that European authorities and buyers may ask to see. Participants were asked to map their own product lines against the requirements. Companies that do not adapt face higher compliance costs, delays at the point of entry, and the loss of contracts to exporters in countries that started earlier. Nishan Perera, president of the Sri Lanka Institute of Packaging, said the technical detail had been hard for local industry to interpret on its own. “For Sri Lanka's export-driven food and packaging sectors, understanding these complex E.U. regulations is very important,” he said. He added that the seminar had helped the sector begin drawing up a roadmap. Participants left with a list of tasks: audit existing packaging, talk to suppliers, build documentation, and budget for new investment. What that investment will cost, and how far down the supply chain the cost will travel, was not addressed. The CIRCULAR project works on reducing food loss and waste and cutting single-use plastic. It falls under European development cooperation with Sri Lanka set out in the Multiannual Indicative Programme, which covers green economic recovery, governance and the rule of law. ### Sri Lanka Moves to Oust Chennai Envoy After Government Loses Confidence in Him, Sources Say URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-moves-to-oust-chennai-envoy-after-government-loses-confidence-in-him-sources-say/ Last updated: 2026-08-20T05:04:44.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka’s government has decided to replace Dr. Ganesanathan Geathiswaran, the country’s Deputy High Commissioner for Southern India in Chennai, after losing confidence in his conduct in one of Sri Lanka’s most sensitive diplomatic postings, senior government and Foreign Ministry sources told *Jaffna Monitor*. Dr. Ganesanathan Geathiswaran, a political appointee who is not a career diplomat, is expected to be removed once Colombo identifies a successor, sources said. A government minister separately confirmed to Jaffna Monitor that the administration was searching for a replacement. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to discuss diplomatic appointments before a formal announcement. Officials said the government had concluded that Ketheeswaran failed to grasp the political gravity of the Chennai assignment, cultivated relationships that raised questions about the boundary between diplomacy and private business interests, and repeatedly pursued personal visibility they considered inappropriate for the head of the mission. “He did not understand the gravity of the posting,” one government source familiar with the discussions told Jaffna Monitor. The move follows the public controversy that engulfed Ketheeswaran in Puducherry in April, but officials said the loss of confidence was broader. ## Photographs and Film Stars Officials pointed to his frequent appearances and photographs with film stars, celebrities and other prominent personalities in South India. They said his conduct at times resembled that of a “fanboy” rather than a diplomat representing his country. Taken together, government sources said, the appearances created an impression in Colombo that the Deputy High Commissioner was more interested in cultivating his own profile than in exercising the discretion expected of Sri Lanka’s senior representative in southern India. ## Questions Over Business Relationships Senior government sources alleged that Geathiswaran developed close relationships with businessmen in Tamil Nadu and facilitated visits by some of them to Sri Lanka, including introductions and meetings with government figures. Sources said the scale and character of those relationships led officials to question whether the activity amounted to conventional economic diplomacy. One official said the impression inside the government was that Geathiswaran was building “his own business empire” around relationships made possible by his diplomatic position. Jaffna Monitor has not independently established that Geathiswaran personally profited from any business relationship or held a financial interest in companies connected to people he dealt with. The allegations are awkward for the National People’s Power administration, which came to power promising a break with corruption and political patronage. Officials said the government regards even the perception that a diplomat is using public office to build a commercial network as incompatible with the standards it claims to have brought to government. ## A Political Appointment Ketheeswaran is not an officer of the career Sri Lanka Foreign Service and had no conventional diplomatic career before being sent to Chennai. Government and Foreign Ministry sources said his appointment rested on his political connections to the new administration and his association with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The precise role that relationship played in securing the posting has not been publicly explained. Officials said the selection caused unease from the beginning among professional diplomats who questioned why a political appointee without substantial diplomatic experience had been placed in Chennai. Sri Lankan governments have for decades been accused of treating ambassadorships and other diplomatic appointments as rewards for political loyalists, relatives and associates. The NPP was among the fiercest critics of that practice before taking office. ## The Puducherry Controversy In April, Geathiswaran attended a gathering with fishermen in Puducherry, where prominent political figures were present during an Indian election period. Among them were Jose Charles Martin, leader of the Latchiya Jananayaga Katchi, and V.P. Ramalingam, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s Puducherry president and a candidate in the Raj Bhavan constituency. Pawan Khera, a senior spokesman for India’s opposition Congress party, accused the Sri Lankan diplomat of participating in a politically linked event and called it a “gross violation” of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Geathiswaran rejected the accusation. “I’m not here to do politics,” he told The Hindu at the time, saying he had gone as part of his regular engagement with fishing communities and that the meeting had taken place openly. Indian authorities subsequently registered a case against Ramalingam and Martin following a complaint by the Returning Officer, who said the event could be construed as an attempt to influence voters and sought an investigation. ## One of Colombo’s Most Difficult Missions Tamil Nadu is home to more than 80 million people and has deep historical, cultural and political connections with Sri Lankan Tamils. Developments in Sri Lanka’s North and East routinely enter Tamil Nadu politics. The mission deals simultaneously with New Delhi, the Tamil Nadu government, competing political parties, fishing communities, refugees, investors and civil society. The fishermen dispute alone has repeatedly produced tensions between the two countries, and questions involving the treatment of Tamils, wartime accountability and refugees can become politically volatile within hours. Foreign Ministry sources raised the same concern when Jaffna Monitor first reported on the Puducherry controversy in April. ## Searching for a Successor Officials said Colombo has begun considering potential replacements and that Ketheeswaran’s departure is expected once a suitable candidate is found. He remains Deputy High Commissioner. The government has made no public announcement of his removal, and the Foreign Ministry has not publicly detailed any disciplinary findings against him. ### Editor’s Note Following publication of this article, Thushara Rodrigo, Director General of Public Diplomacy and spokesperson for Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contacted *Jaffna Monitor* to deny that the government had decided to replace Dr. Ganesanathan Geathiswaran as Sri Lanka’s Deputy High Commissioner in Chennai. Rodrigo said there was “no such development whatsoever” regarding Geathiswaran’s removal or the search for a successor. He said the information contained in the report was incorrect and could mislead the public. The article was reported by two *Jaffna Monitor* journalists and published under the collective byline “Our Reporter.” Following the ministry’s response, the journalists reviewed their reporting and reconfirmed the information with their sources. They continue to stand by the central finding of the report and remain confident in the reliability of the government and Foreign Ministry sources on which it was based. ### India’s Defence Minister Heads to Sri Lanka for High-Level Security Talks URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indias-defence-minister-heads-to-sri-lanka-for-high-level-security-talks/ Last updated: 2026-08-19T07:06:17.000Z **COLOMBO —** India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, is expected to visit Sri Lanka next week for talks with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in what would be the most senior Indian defence visit to the island since the two countries signed their first formal defence cooperation agreement last year. Mr. Singh is also expected to meet Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha, the secretary to Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defence, according to people familiar with preparations for the visit. Mr. Dissanayake, who is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, holds the defence portfolio. The talks are expected to focus on putting the defence agreement into practice and expanding cooperation in military training, joint exercises and capacity-building, as well as addressing maritime and regional security concerns, the people said. The Indian government has not yet announced dates or a programme for the visit. The trip comes as New Delhi and Colombo seek to place a longstanding military relationship on a more formal footing, at a time when security in the Indian Ocean has assumed greater strategic importance for both countries. The two governments signed an umbrella agreement on defence cooperation during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in April 2025\. Indian officials said at the time that the agreement was intended to give greater structure to cooperation that already existed, rather than establish a new security relationship. The agreement covers high-level military exchanges, joint exercises, capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, increased visits by naval vessels and the exploration of cooperation between the two countries’ defence industries. Much of that cooperation is already under way. The two armies conduct the bilateral Mitra Shakti exercise, while their navies hold SLINEX. India has also trained Sri Lankan military personnel for years. According to the Indian High Commission in Colombo, Mitra Shakti was most recently held in India in November 2025 and SLINEX in Colombo in August 2025\. The two countries’ defence secretaries also meet through an annual Defence Dialogue. Sri Lanka’s position immediately south of India and astride some of the Indian Ocean’s busiest shipping routes has made maritime security an increasingly important part of the relationship. A Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, built with $6 million in Indian grant assistance, was commissioned in 2024\. India also deployed a Dornier maritime surveillance aircraft to Sri Lanka from August 2022 until August 2025, strengthening the island’s capacity to monitor its surrounding waters. The closer defence relationship has developed alongside a broader effort by India to safeguard its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, where China has expanded its economic and maritime presence. Sri Lanka, which has extensive economic ties with China while sharing deep geographical, economic and security links with India, has long sought to balance relations with the two Asian powers. Security was a prominent theme when Mr. Dissanayake travelled to India in December 2024, his first overseas visit after becoming president. During the visit, he assured India that Sri Lankan territory would not be permitted to be used in a manner detrimental to India’s security. Mr. Modi visited Colombo four months later, when the two countries signed the defence cooperation agreement. Indian officials subsequently described the security understanding reached during Mr. Dissanayake’s New Delhi visit as part of the groundwork for the agreement. Mr. Singh’s expected visit would give the two governments their first high-level opportunity since then to assess how that framework is being translated into practical defence cooperation, while discussing the wider security environment in the Indian Ocean. ### Tamil Lawmaker Questioned by Police Over Remarks on Federalism and Land URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-lawmaker-questioned-by-police-over-remarks-on-federalism-and-land/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T15:15:37.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lankan police questioned a senior Tamil lawmaker for about four hours over public remarks on power-sharing, federalism and land, in an inquiry examining whether his statements amounted to promoting separatism or stirring hostility between ethnic communities. R. Shanakiyan, the parliamentary group leader of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, known as ITAK, was summoned after a complaint over comments he made to reporters following a meeting between the party’s lawmakers and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The complaint was filed by Namal Kumara, the director of an organization called the Anti-Corruption Force. It said Mr. Shanakiyan had spoken about power-sharing, about the possibility that Tamils would demand a federal system, and about land rights in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and alleged that those remarks promoted separatism and could incite antagonism between communities. Investigators pressed Mr. Shanakiyan on each of those points, according to sources familiar with the questioning. They asked whether demands for greater power-sharing could pave the way for separation, whether his references to federalism could encourage separatism or ethnic conflict, and why he had raised land issues in the North and East. Mr. Shanakiyan rejected that interpretation of his remarks, the sources said. He told investigators that Tamil political representatives were entitled to seek greater devolution of power to the provincial councils and, if they considered devolution insufficient, to campaign peacefully for a federal system of government. In support of that position, Mr. Shanakiyan cited a 2017 Supreme Court judgment that rejected an attempt to equate ITAK’s advocacy of federalism with support for a separate state. The court drew a distinction between federalism and secession and found that the party’s objectives did not amount to advocacy for the establishment of a separate state, which is prohibited under Article 157A of the Constitution. Mr. Shanakiyan provided investigators with details of the judgment, according to the sources. On land, Mr. Shanakiyan told investigators that ITAK represents voters in the North and East and therefore has both a political responsibility and a democratic right to speak about privately owned land in those provinces, as well as areas Tamils regard as their traditional homeland, the sources said. He also sought to make clear that he was asserting a right arising from political representation rather than an exclusively ethnic claim over the issue. If ITAK were to contest elections elsewhere in Sri Lanka in the future, he told investigators, he would claim the same right to speak publicly about land issues affecting people in those areas, according to the sources. Devolution, federalism and land have been central to Tamil political demands in Sri Lanka for decades, and successive attempts at constitutional reform have foundered on them. The inquiry places those arguments, long conducted in Parliament and before the courts, in front of criminal investigators. ITAK has remained politically independent of the government while maintaining working contacts with Mr. Dissanayake, who has presented his administration as an attempt to move the country away from politics organized around ethnicity. The party’s lawmakers met the president at the Presidential Secretariat in December 2024\. The complaint that triggered the inquiry came from a private organization, and there is no indication that the government initiated it. Police recorded Mr. Shanakiyan’s statement and concluded the first round of questioning. It was not immediately clear whether he would be summoned again or whether investigators intended to take further action. ### Kanjipani Imran Has Not Been Arrested, Sri Lanka's Deputy Defence Minister Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/kanjipani-imran-has-not-been-arrested-sri-lankas-deputy-defence-minister-says-2/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T11:46:56.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka's deputy defence minister denied Monday that fugitive underworld figure Kanjipani Imran, wanted in connection with international drug trafficking, had been arrested in Italy, saying police were still trying to catch him. Several local outlets reported earlier in the day that Imran, whose full name is Mohamed Nazeem Mohamed Imran, had been taken into custody there. Deputy Defence Minister Aruna Jayasekara said the reports were false and appeared to stem from confusion over remarks he had made a day earlier. "There is no truth to reports being published quoting me as saying that Kanjipani Imran has been arrested," Jayasekara said Monday evening. "However, measures are being taken to arrest the individual concerned." Imran has been on the run since December 2022, when a Colombo magistrate granted him bail in a string of criminal cases. He had been arrested once before, in April 2019, after Dubai authorities deported him to Sri Lanka. Investigators said he had entered Dubai in March 2015 on a forged passport and obtained a residence visa there in January 2016\. Police went on to investigate him in 27 separate incidents, including cases of murder and attempted murder, while the Criminal Investigation Department opened a separate inquiry into the forged passport. After his release on bail, police say, Imran fled Sri Lanka by boat to India, then moved through Europe on a succession of different passports before going into hiding. Police have stepped up the search for him in recent months, appealing to the public and to Sri Lankans living overseas for information and seeking cooperation from foreign law enforcement agencies. The false reports of his capture surfaced as Sri Lankan authorities pursue a broader crackdown on organized crime networks and large-scale narcotics trafficking. ### Sri Lankan Police Seek Temple Priest Accused of Pawning Gold to Fund Gambling URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-police-seek-temple-priest-accused-of-pawning-gold-to-fund-gambling/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T02:34:12.000Z **COLOMBO —** A Sri Lankan court has ordered the arrest of the chief priest of a Hindu temple in central Colombo after police said he repeatedly removed gold jewellery from the temple’s safe, pawned it and used the proceeds for gambling before redeeming and returning the valuables. The Fort Magistrate’s Court also imposed a travel ban on the priest, identified as Satheeskumar Gurukkal, 34, who served as the chief priest of the Sri Sivasubramaniyar Temple in Slave Island and has since gone into hiding, according to police. The allegations were presented before Fort Magistrate Basan Amarasekara when the case was taken up on Sunday. Police told the court that the temple administration had filed a complaint after discovering that jewellery was missing from a safe during the temple’s annual festival on July 29. Investigators subsequently found evidence indicating that the chief priest, who had access to the key to the safe, had pawned temple jewellery at three pawnshops in the Kotahena area, police told the court. Police said the transactions had raised about 26.7 million Sri Lankan rupees, and alleged that the priest used the money for gambling. Pawn receipts linked to the transactions were recovered during the investigation, according to the police account presented in court. The temple administration has since recovered the pawned jewellery. But investigators told the court that the July discovery appeared to be the culmination of a much longer pattern. The priest had worked at the temple for about a decade and, since 2024, had allegedly removed jewellery from the safe, pawned it, gambled with the proceeds and later redeemed the jewellery and returned it before its absence was detected, police said. Investigators believe he carried out the cycle about 90 times, according to the police account. Police asked the magistrate for permission to obtain data connected to the suspect’s mobile phone as part of their efforts to locate him and continue the investigation. After considering the submissions, the magistrate ordered police to arrest the priest and produce him before court, while also barring him from leaving the country. Slave Island Police are continuing the investigation. ### Japan Gives Sri Lanka Rs. 591 Million to Educate Future Government Leaders URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/japan-gives-sri-lanka-rs-591-million-to-educate-future-government-leaders/ Last updated: 2026-08-17T14:28:25.000Z **COLOMBO —** Japan has provided Sri Lanka with a grant of 282 million yen, about 591 million Sri Lankan rupees, to fund postgraduate study in Japan for 15 Sri Lankan public-sector officials, the Japanese Embassy in Colombo said Monday. The funding, provided under Japan’s Human Resource Development Scholarship program, known as JDS, will enable the officials to pursue two-year master’s degree programs at Japanese universities beginning in 2027. The scholarship program aims to develop a new generation of public administrators by providing promising government officials with advanced academic training in areas considered important to Sri Lanka’s economic and institutional development. The selected officials will undertake studies in fields including public policy, international relations, international development, macroeconomics, public finance and investment management, as well as industrial development policy and investment promotion, according to the embassy. Akio Isomata, Japan’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, and Harshana Suriyapperuma, secretary to the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, signed and exchanged notes formalising the grant in Colombo on Monday. Japan has supported the JDS program in Sri Lanka since 2010\. According to the embassy, 254 Sri Lankan public-sector officials have received support through the initiative since its introduction. The program is designed not only to strengthen the professional skills of individual officials but also to improve the capacity of Sri Lanka’s public institutions by allowing officials to bring knowledge and expertise acquired in Japan back into government service. Tokyo also sees the scholarship recipients as potential long-term links between the two countries. The embassy said participants were expected to use the academic, professional and personal networks developed during their time in Japan to strengthen ties between Sri Lanka and Japan. The latest grant comes as Japan continues its development engagement with Sri Lanka following the country’s severe economic crisis, with assistance spanning economic recovery, infrastructure, governance and human-resource development. The Japanese Embassy said Monday’s agreement renewed Tokyo’s commitment to supporting human-resource development in Sri Lanka and expressed hope that the program would further strengthen relations between the two countries. ### Pillayan Among Four Indicted in Killing of Eastern University Vice-Chancellor URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/pillayan-among-four-indicted-in-killing-of-eastern-university-vice-chancellor/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T11:41:24.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka’s attorney general has indicted former Eastern Province Chief Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan and three other men in the abduction and killing of an Eastern University vice-chancellor who disappeared in Colombo nearly two decades ago, bringing one of the country’s most prominent wartime disappearance cases before a criminal court. The indictments were filed in the Polonnaruwa High Court over the abduction and killing of Prof. Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, who was vice-chancellor of Eastern University when he disappeared on Dec. 15, 2006. Mr. Chandrakanthan, widely known as Pillayan, leads the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, or TMVP, a political party that emerged from a breakaway faction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam after its eastern commander, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, better known as Karuna Amman, split from the LTTE in 2004. Mr. Chandrakanthan has denied wrongdoing. The charges against him and the other defendants have yet to be tested at trial. Prof. Raveendranath, an agricultural scientist and one of the founding academics of Eastern University, was last seen after attending the annual sessions of the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science in Colombo. His driver had been asked to return for him after the meeting, but Prof. Raveendranath never reappeared. His body has never been recovered. His disappearance followed months of threats and intimidation at Eastern University. In September 2006, armed men abducted Bala Sugumar, dean of the university’s Faculty of Arts, and demanded Prof. Raveendranath’s resignation as a condition for his release, according to reports at the time. Prof. Raveendranath submitted his resignation, but the University Grants Commission did not accept it, and he continued carrying out his duties from Colombo. The threats against Prof. Raveendranath came amid a deeper rupture within the Tamil community in the East following Karuna’s split from the LTTE, an episode that sharply aggravated tensions between Tamils from the north and east. Karuna, the LTTE’s powerful eastern commander, broke with the organisation in March 2004 after accusing its northern-dominated leadership of discriminating against eastern cadres. In the weeks that followed, people of Jaffna origin living in the Batticaloa region came under pressure to leave. Contemporary reports said Jaffna academics and students at Eastern University were driven out or fled, while traders and professionals were intimidated. The upheaval extended beyond the university. Businesses owned by Jaffna Tamils closed across Batticaloa and surrounding towns after their owners were ordered to leave, and contemporary reports estimated that about 5,000 members of Jaffna-origin families left the area for Colombo, Vavuniya and Jaffna. Some traders reported receiving death threats, while property was reported to have been seized or looted. Prof. Raveendranath was himself from northern Sri Lanka and held the most senior position at the East’s principal university. Reports after his disappearance said there was a widespread belief that those responsible wanted him removed from Eastern University because of his northern origins. That alleged motive was never established in court. His case was part of a broader climate of violence and intimidation at the university. Kumaravel Thambaiah, a senior lecturer, was shot dead in May 2004, and by late 2006 lecturers and students were leaving the institution because of threats and insecurity. For years, Prof. Raveendranath’s disappearance remained unresolved. The investigation gained new momentum in April 2025, when officers of the Criminal Investigation Department arrested Mr. Chandrakanthan in Batticaloa. Investigators subsequently arrested others as the inquiry developed from an investigation into a disappearance into one alleging abduction and killing. ## How the Case Turned on Pillayan For nearly 19 years, no one was charged in Prof. Raveendranath’s disappearance. The investigation took a decisive turn after witnesses began providing accounts of what they said had happened at a clandestine camp in Sevanapitiya, in Polonnaruwa District. When the Criminal Investigation Department produced Mr. Chandrakanthan before the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court on April 2, after 359 days in detention, investigators said Prof. Raveendranath had been taken to the Sevanapitiya camp, which they alleged was operated by Mr. Chandrakanthan. They told the court that the vice-chancellor had been detained and tortured there before being killed and his body burned. Investigators identified Mr. Chandrakanthan as the principal suspect and said four people had been arrested in connection with the case. The C.I.D. described Sevanapitiya as an illegal detention and torture facility where civilians, government officials and businesspeople had been held. Investigators told the court that Mr. Chandrakanthan had no legal authority to operate such a site. Investigators also raised questions about weapons issued to Mr. Chandrakanthan during the conflict, telling the court that 362 T-56 assault rifles and 36 9-millimeter firearms remained unaccounted for. The investigation was conducted under provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Penal Code. A central part of the prosecution case rests on witness testimony. One former worker at the site told investigators that he recognised Prof. Raveendranath after seeing a newspaper report about his disappearance. Two of the suspects arrested in the investigation have also given confidential statements before a magistrate, according to representations made by the state in court. In June, Deputy Solicitor General Suharshi Herath told the Supreme Court that eyewitness testimony placed Prof. Raveendranath’s killing inside the camp. She made the disclosure while opposing a fundamental rights petition filed by Mr. Chandrakanthan challenging the legality of his arrest and detention. Mr. Chandrakanthan was represented by President’s Counsel Manohara de Silva and lawyer Udaya Gammanpila. The case was heard by a three-judge bench comprising Justices Mahinda Samayawardena, Arjuna Obeyesekere and Gihan Kulatunga. During those proceedings, the state told the court that prosecutors were preparing an indictment. Neither the former camp worker nor the two suspects who gave statements before a magistrate has been publicly identified. The authorities have also not publicly said whether they were members of the TMVP or the armed faction from which it emerged. The allegation that Prof. Raveendranath was taken to a camp in Polonnaruwa District predates the current investigation. A 2007 United States diplomatic cable recorded that Prof. Raveendranath’s son-in-law had told American officials that he had received information that the vice-chancellor had been taken to a camp in Welikanda and was no longer alive. Welikanda and Sevanapitiya are in the same part of Polonnaruwa District. The account was not established in court. Mr. Chandrakanthan’s political career grew out of the upheaval that followed the Karuna split. The breakaway eastern faction evolved into the TMVP and entered electoral politics. Mr. Chandrakanthan became the first chief minister of the Eastern Province in 2008, later represented Batticaloa in Parliament and served as a state minister. ### Sinhala Nationalist Monk Invokes Prabhakaran to Rebuke Sinhala Voters URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sinhala-nationalist-monk-invokes-prabhakaran-to-rebuke-sinhala-voters/ Last updated: 2026-08-17T05:39:12.000Z **COLOMBO —**A controversial Sinhala nationalist Buddhist monk invoked Velupillai Prabhakaran, the slain leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to rebuke Sinhala voters for what he described as their tendency to quickly forget the past and repeatedly make poor political choices. Ittekande Saddhatissa Thera, general secretary of the Sinhala nationalist organisation Ravana Balaya, said Sinhala voters had proved correct a remark he attributed to Prabhakaran: that they remember events for only “a week or two” before forgetting them. Saddhatissa Thera made the remarks recently at a Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, or SLPP, meeting in Polonnaruwa, where he called for the current government to be defeated and for Namal Rajapaksa to be elected president in 2029. “Prabhakaran said that the Sinhala people forget everything easily,” he said, pointing to Mahinda Rajapaksa’s defeat in the 2015 presidential election as evidence. Saddhatissa Thera said voters had removed Rajapaksa from power despite his leadership during the final military campaign that defeated the LTTE in 2009\. He described the LTTE as a “barbaric terrorist” organisation and accused it of atrocities against civilians in the Polonnaruwa area, including attacks that killed children and pregnant women. He said Sinhala voters had nevertheless rejected Rajapaksa, whom he credited with defeating the LTTE, restoring peace and providing fertiliser subsidies to farmers, and instead elected Maithripala Sirisena in 2015. Saddhatissa Thera also criticised the government’s handling of agriculture, saying farmers in Polonnaruwa were struggling to sell their paddy. He claimed the government had decided to purchase only 3,000 metric tonnes of an estimated 2 million metric tonnes produced by farmers, describing the policy as a betrayal of the farming community. He also accused the government of undermining the judiciary, disrespecting the Maha Sangha and placing obstacles in the way of traditional cultural events such as the Kandy Esala Perahera. Saddhatissa Thera said voters should use the next election to punish the government and called for a political campaign centred on protecting agriculture, nationalism and religion. “Our main objective is to defeat this government in 2029 and establish a new government under the leadership of Namal Rajapaksa,” he said. He urged supporters to unite behind Namal Rajapaksa, the son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and elect him president in 2029. ### Sri Lanka's Post-Election Optimism Ebbs as Government Approval Falls URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-post-election-optimism-ebbs-as-government-approval-falls/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T01:49:36.000Z **COLOMBO** — Approval of Sri Lanka's government fell to 50 percent in July from 65 percent in February, and the public's reading of the economy turned negative, according to the latest round of Verité Research's "Mood of the Nation" poll, reported in Colombo on Aug. 16. The research group surveyed 2,013 adults between July 11 and July 30\. Of those, 49.83 percent said they approved of the way the government was working, and 31.40 percent said they disapproved. Verité recorded disapproval at 16 percent in February 2025 and said the figure was unchanged a year later, which puts it at roughly double that level now. Answers on the economy moved further. Those saying conditions were "getting better" fell to 41.63 percent from 64 percent in February, while 40.29 percent said conditions were getting worse. On the state of the economy today, 55.59 percent said "poor" and 38 percent said "good" or "excellent," down from 57 percent five months ago. February had been the first round in the poll's four years in which positive ratings outnumbered negative ones. Verité's economic confidence index, which runs from minus 100 to plus 100 and combines views on present conditions with views on the direction of change, fell to minus 8 from plus 36. ## **What came before** The index opened at about minus 83 when Verité launched the poll in January 2022, as Sri Lanka's foreign reserves were running out. It reached minus 96 that June, when government approval stood at 3 percent. By June 2023 it had climbed to minus 44\. Its first positive reading came in February 2025, at plus 14\. This February it hit plus 36. Political approval followed a similar path. In July 2024, the last round before the presidential election that brought Anura Kumara Dissanayake to power, 24 percent of respondents approved of the government then in office, and 60 percent disapproved. Seventy-one percent called economic conditions poor and 65 percent said the economy was getting worse. Approval reached 62 percent in February 2025 and 65 percent this February. Approval today is more than twice the July 2024 level and disapproval roughly half of it. The 15-point drop since February is the first sustained fall the government has recorded. ## **The president and the government** Verité said the questions used in its poll differ from those used in other recent national surveys, which measure satisfaction with specific political figures rather than approval of the government as a whole. Its own asks whether respondents approve or disapprove of "the way the current government is working." A separate survey by the Centre for Policy Alternatives' Social Indicator unit, which polled 1,240 people across all 25 districts between May 23 and June 18, found 75.5 percent satisfied with Mr. Dissanayake's performance and 29.4 percent satisfied with that of the opposition leader, Sajith Premadasa. Satisfaction with the National People's Power government's capacity to govern efficiently was lower, at 62.8 percent. The same survey found less patience on household costs. Respondents split almost evenly on the government's handling of the cost of living, 45.3 percent satisfied against 44 percent dissatisfied. More than half, 51.4 percent, said their household finances had worsened over the past year; 18.2 percent said they had improved. Neither poll explains the shift. Verité's survey records what people say about the economy, not what has happened to it, and a single round cannot show whether the July reading is a correction after unusually high February figures or the start of something longer. ## **How the survey was done** The July round drew on a nationally representative, multistage randomised sample of 2,013 adults from separate households. Vanguard Survey (Pvt) Ltd. was the polling partner. Verité said the design allowed for a maximum sampling error of plus or minus 2.21 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level, and noted that lapses in fieldwork can widen it. The February round covered 1,048 adults from Jan. 24 to Feb. 3, with a margin of plus or minus three percentage points. Comparisons between the rounds carry the error of both. Mood of the Nation is part of Verité's Syndicated Surveys programme, which lets other organisations add questions to the sample. One February figure has no July counterpart in what Verité has released publicly: 59 percent then said they were satisfied with "the way things are going" in the country, the first time in four years of polling that the number had risen above half. ### Judges’ Retirement Plan Is a Cover for Preferred Appointments, Mano Ganesan Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/judges-retirement-plan-is-a-cover-for-preferred-appointments-mano-ganesan-says/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T01:49:38.000Z **COLOMBO —** Mano Ganesan, leader of the Tamil Progressive Alliance, has accused the Sri Lankan government of seeking to use its proposed extension of judges’ retirement ages to facilitate the appointment of preferred candidates to senior judicial positions, adding his voice to growing opposition to the proposed 22nd Amendment to the Constitution, which Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara has said will be presented to Parliament on Aug. 18. Ganesan, an opposition lawmaker, said he did not object in principle to judges serving beyond the current retirement age. Instead, he questioned the government’s stated justification for the change and alleged that the proposal could be used to influence appointments to senior judicial positions. “The age is not the issue,” Ganesan told reporters after a book launch in Colombo recently. “If they are capable, there is nothing wrong with extending it.” But he cautioned against interpreting that position as support for the government’s proposal. The government has argued that retaining experienced judges for longer could help address the large backlog of cases in Sri Lanka’s courts. Ganesan challenged that reasoning, asking why judicial vacancies had not been filled more quickly if reducing delays was the government’s principal concern. “If the government genuinely has that concern, why did it not promptly fill the judicial vacancies that existed in the past?” he asked. Ganesan pointed to several experienced judges who had already retired, including Priyantha Fernando, Ilancheliyan, Thurairaja and Kumudini Wickremasinghe. He argued that allowing experienced judges to leave the bench while subsequently seeking changes to retirement rules raised questions about the government’s intentions. “When such experienced judges were available, the government allowed them to retire,” he said, alleging that the administration was now seeking an opportunity to bring in “people of its own choosing from outside.” He said his party would not necessarily oppose an even higher retirement age if the policy were applied transparently and without political considerations. “We have no objection to increasing the retirement age to 70 or even 80,” he said. “What we oppose is this manoeuvre by the government to appoint people it wants.” Addressing President Anura Kumara Dissanayake directly, Ganesan invoked their years together in the opposition. “As someone who travelled alongside him in the opposition for many years, I tell my brother Anura Kumara Dissanayake: Do not do this,” he said. Ganesan also rejected government suggestions that opposition cooperation amounted to an effort to destabilise the administration, saying his alliance sought political change only through elections. “The government is trying to create a false narrative by claiming that there is a conspiracy to overthrow it,” he said. “We will change governments only through elections.” He also turned the accusation back on Dissanayake’s political movement, referring to the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna’s history of insurrection and political violence and arguing that the present opposition should not be portrayed as seeking an unconstitutional change of government. Ganesan challenged the administration to test public support for its policies at the ballot box. “If the government is not afraid, let it go before the people and find out whether it has a public mandate for this move,” he said. “The people will then give their answer.” That challenge comes as the government faces criticism over another unfulfilled electoral commitment. On Page 128 of the NPP’s 2024 presidential election manifesto, *A Thriving Nation, A Beautiful Life*, the party pledged that Provincial Council and local government elections, which had been repeatedly postponed, would be held “within a year” to allow voters to participate in governance. Local government elections were subsequently held in 2025, but Provincial Council elections have yet to take place. In May, JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva said the polls could not be held in 2026 and that the possibility of conducting them would be considered next year. Political analysts say the government’s reluctance to hold Provincial Council elections is driven by fear of another electoral setback after the NPP’s support fell sharply in the 2025 local elections. The party won about 43 percent of the nationwide vote in May 2025, down from 61.6 percent in the November 2024 parliamentary election. The decline was evident across the country, including in the Tamil-majority North and East: in Jaffna District, the NPP’s share fell to roughly 20 percent from 25 percent, while in Trincomalee District it dropped to about 24 percent from 42 percent. Analysts say those results have made the government wary of another nationwide electoral test that could further expose the erosion of the commanding mandate it secured in 2024. ### Local Council Vice Chairman Among Five Arrested in Mullaitivu Heroin Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/local-council-vice-chairman-among-five-arrested-in-mullaitivu-heroin-case/ Last updated: 2026-08-16T04:25:03.000Z **MULLAITIVU, Sri Lanka —** The vice chairman of a local council in northern Sri Lanka was among five people arrested after police said they recovered two grams of heroin during a road check on Saturday evening. Yogeswaran Anojan, vice chairman of the Maritimepattu (Karaithuraipattu) Pradeshiya Sabha, was arrested with four others while travelling along the Semmalai-Kokkilai Road, according to *Jaffna Monitor*’s reporter in Mullaitivu. Anojan is affiliated with Rishad Bathiudeen’s All Ceylon Makkal Congress, or ACMC, but contested the most recent local government election under the Samagi Jana Balawegaya, or SJB, as part of an electoral alliance, the reporter said. Kokkilai police made the arrests during a road-check operation on Saturday, Aug. 15\. Police said two grams of heroin were recovered during the operation. The five suspects were taken to the Kokkilai Police Station, where they were being held along with the substance and other evidence seized by police. Authorities were taking steps to produce them before court. ### EU Sets Reform Terms as Sri Lanka Faces Fresh Application for Trade Preferences URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/eu-sets-reform-terms-as-sri-lanka-faces-fresh-application-for-trade-preferences/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T01:49:40.000Z **COLOMBO —** The European Union has set out the legal and human rights reforms it expects Sri Lanka to carry out to keep preferential access to the European market, weeks before new rules require Colombo to apply again for the concessions. The reforms are set out in an assessment by the European Commission and the European External Action Service of Sri Lanka's performance under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus, or GSP+, covering 2023 to 2025\. The document, SWD(2026) 192 final, was submitted to the Council of the European Union on 16 July. Brussels is pressing Sri Lanka to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act and replace it with legislation meeting international standards, to change or repeal the Online Safety Act to protect freedom of expression, to strengthen domestic accountability mechanisms and independent prosecutions, to pursue a victim-centred reconciliation process, and to formally suspend the use of the death penalty as a step towards abolition. The Commission calls these its main priorities for future engagement and links them to Sri Lanka's continued eligibility, particularly under the revised rules taking effect in 2027\. The language stops short of an ultimatum, but GSP+ is a conditional arrangement under which countries receive tariff concessions in return for implementing international conventions on human rights, labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. The Commission estimates the scheme saved Sri Lankan exporters €139 million in duties in 2024. ## Sri Lanka must apply again The European Parliament approved a revised GSP regulation on 28 April and the Council adopted it in May. The new system takes effect on 1 January 2027 and runs for ten years. It expands the number of international conventions GSP+ beneficiaries must ratify and effectively implement from 27 to 32\. The additional agreements include the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Paris Agreement on climate change and the International Labour Organisation's Labour Inspection Convention. The rules also broaden the grounds on which preferences can be withdrawn to cover violations of environmental, climate and good governance commitments, and introduce an accelerated procedure for exceptionally grave violations. Current beneficiaries will not be carried over into the new system. Sri Lanka, along with Bolivia, Cape Verde, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Uzbekistan, must submit a new GSP+ application during a transition period ending 31 December 2028\. Applicants have to demonstrate compliance with the expanded set of conventions and submit an action plan explaining how they intend to implement them. Countries that do not apply, or that fail to qualify, would lose the preferences. The prospect of a new application appears in the Commission's discussion of child labour, where it notes shortcomings in Sri Lanka's data and encourages the government to conduct another survey and publish the results in time for what it describes as a possible GSP+ reapplication. The assessment says Sri Lanka demonstrated an increasing level of compliance with its obligations during the monitoring period, which included an EU mission in April and May last year. It credits the government of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake with pursuing an anti-corruption agenda and promising action on longstanding human rights concerns, but says translating those commitments into practice has been slow and uneven. ## The terrorism law Repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act has been a central issue in Sri Lanka's relationship with the European Union since GSP+ was restored in 2017\. Successive governments have promised to replace the law, known as the PTA, which gives the authorities broad powers of arrest and detention and has long been criticised by human rights groups and United Nations experts. The government published a proposed replacement, the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, for public consultation in December 2025\. The Commission acknowledges changes in the draft, including the removal of provisions allowing confessions made to police officers to be admitted as evidence and a greater role for magistrates, but notes that the United Nations has found parts of the proposed law still incompatible with international human rights standards. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published its comments in February. The government's review of the draft had not been completed when the European assessment was prepared. The Commission says the PTA continued to be used during the reporting period, including in 2025 in cases involving expressions of opinion about conflicts abroad. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act of 2007, whose Section 3 has been used in speech cases and criticised over its application against members of minority communities, has not been amended. The Online Safety Act, passed in 2024, gives the authorities broad powers over online content. The government appointed a committee in February last year to recommend amendments and opened a public consultation that August, but the changes had not been completed when the assessment was drafted. The Commission's language differs between sections of its report. The executive summary calls for the law to be amended to protect freedom of expression, while the detailed human rights recommendations call for its repeal. ## The death penalty The European Union is asking Sri Lanka to turn its decades-long practice of not carrying out executions into a formal moratorium, with abolition as the eventual goal. Sri Lanka has not executed a prisoner since June 1976, though judges continue to hand down death sentences. Citing the Ministry of Justice's 2025 progress report, the assessment says 817 people were on death row in September 2025\. Prison authorities put the figure at 806 this month. On 10 August the Ratama Ekata National Operations Council, chaired by Dissanayake, discussed the use of capital punishment for drug offences, concluding that narcotics trafficking threatened the economy, the tourism industry and the country's social values. Sri Lankan law already provides for the death penalty in certain drug cases. A 1984 amendment to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance introduced capital punishment for specified offences, and Act No. 7 of 2026 extended its application to manufacturing narcotics on the high seas. In 2019, when President Maithripala Sirisena sought to resume executions after more than four decades, the European Union warned that carrying out death sentences could have consequences for Sri Lanka's GSP+ status. The latest assessment also raises concerns about compulsory drug rehabilitation and conditions in rehabilitation centres, saying they create risks of ill-treatment and possible violations of the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ## Reconciliation in the North and East The Commission notes that Dissanayake's government won significant support in Tamil areas in the 2024 elections after campaigning on a promise to unite the country, and that it subsequently announced several reconciliation initiatives. Progress, the assessment says, remains very slow. Sri Lanka has continued to oppose the external investigative mechanism established under the 2025 United Nations Human Rights Council resolution. A National Roadmap for Reconciliation and Coexistence covering 2025 to 2029 was still being developed when the assessment was prepared. The Office on Missing Persons has been given resources to resolve more than 16,000 pending cases by the end of 2027. Communities in the North and East have regained access to some land and partial access to roads previously controlled by the military, and have been allowed greater space to hold memorial events. Disputes over land, including land occupied or claimed by the military, remain a major obstacle to reconciliation. The assessment records continuing reports of surveillance, intimidation and harassment of civil society activists and community leaders, particularly in Tamil-majority areas and among people working on enforced disappearances. Since December 2024, non-governmental organisations have been required to obtain clearance from the Ministry of Defence in addition to registering with the National Secretariat for Non-Governmental Organizations. The Commission calls for an end to such pressure and for stronger accountability for abuses by state authorities. It reports continuing allegations of torture and other ill-treatment in detention, as well as deaths in custody, and points to guidelines issued to the police by the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka in May 2025 intended to prevent custodial and encounter deaths. The European Union is also pressing Sri Lanka to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation protecting ethnic and religious minorities and LGBTIQ+ people, to decriminalise consensual same-sex relations, to strengthen protections against sexual and gender-based violence, and to establish a minimum age of marriage under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act. ## The trade relationship Sri Lanka lost GSP+ in 2010 amid European concerns over human rights compliance and regained the concessions in 2017\. It is now the third-largest beneficiary of the scheme. European Union imports from Sri Lanka declined from €3.2 billion in 2022 to €2.64 billion in 2024, an average annual fall of 8.4 per cent. Of the goods imported in 2024, €2.21 billion qualified for GSP+ preferences and €1.52 billion entered the European market using them. Sri Lanka's utilisation rate, the share of eligible exports that made use of the tariff preferences, fell from 67.9 per cent in 2022 to 58.9 per cent in 2023 before rising to 68.9 per cent in 2024, its highest level to date. Clothing, the largest export sector, used the preferences for 57.3 per cent of eligible exports, while fish, crustaceans and molluscs recorded a rate of 99.8 per cent. The Commission calculates that the duty savings in 2024 were equivalent to about 5 per cent of Sri Lanka's total export value to the bloc. The assessment does not threaten to withdraw Sri Lanka's existing preferences, nor does it say the country has failed to qualify under the new system. The European Union monitors compliance through visits, formal dialogue with governments and findings from United Nations and ILO bodies, and its rules allow preferences to be withdrawn for serious and systematic failures to meet the obligations underpinning the scheme. ### Sri Lanka Opens a Legal Route Home for Tamil Refugees in India. The Security Check Remains. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-opens-a-legal-route-home-for-tamil-refugees-in-india-the-security-check-remains/ Last updated: 2026-08-17T06:47:32.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** In May 2025, a 75-year-old Sri Lankan Tamil man landed at Palaly airport after decades as a refugee in Tamil Nadu. He had returned with the help of the United Nations refugee agency and carried the clearances his journey required. Immigration officials arrested him at the airport. The Criminal Investigation Department produced him before the Mallakam Magistrate's Court, which remanded him after objections to bail. His alleged offense was that he had left Sri Lanka decades earlier without passing through an authorized port. The court released him within days. The arrest drew attention to a law that had stayed on the books and in use for decades. Bimal Rathnayake, a government minister and the chief of the governing National People's Power in the Northern Province, said the arrest reflected an outdated law still being enforced rather than a decision by the government. He had raised the case with Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala, he said, and Mr. Wijepala agreed the law needed changing. Fourteen months later, the government has acted. The Cabinet has approved a procedure allowing Sri Lankans who fled to India during the civil war without valid travel documents, and who registered there as refugees, to return through authorized ports without prosecution under immigration law for the manner of their departure. The decision, taken on the advice of the attorney general and presented by Mr. Wijepala, addresses an unusual legacy of the country's long civil war. Tamils who fled for their safety could be arrested when they tried to come home, because the way they escaped had broken immigration law. For thousands of refugees in India, that danger is now gone. Other barriers remain. Under the new arrangement, returnees must first have their Sri Lankan nationality verified through Sri Lankan diplomatic missions in India. They must then obtain security clearance from the State Intelligence Service. Those who qualify can be issued temporary travel documents and enter Sri Lanka through an authorized port without action under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act of 1948 for their irregular departure. The procedure covers people who left before Aug. 1, 2006, and those who left irregularly between that date and May 19, 2009, when the war ended. People accused of murder, treason, or other serious offenses can still be detained on arrival and handed to the relevant authorities. The government describes the arrangement as a balance between humanitarian considerations and national security. For Tamils who fled the former conflict zones, the screening requirement is a delicate one. Security agencies dominated the North and East during the war, and fear of arrest, detention, and military operations was part of why many families left. The Cabinet announcement sets out what happens to those who receive intelligence clearance. It says little about those who do not. It fixes no deadline for completing the security assessment and no criteria for granting clearance. Nor does it provide any way to challenge an adverse finding. How that process is run will determine whether the policy lifts voluntary returns or simply swaps one obstacle for another. ### A Refugee Population That Outlasted the War Sri Lankan Tamils began crossing to the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu in large numbers after the anti-Tamil violence of July 1983\. More waves followed as fighting between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam intensified. Thousands crossed the Palk Strait in fishing boats, often with little more than the clothes they wore. The war ended in May 2009 with the military defeat of the Tigers. Many of those who had fled stayed where they were. Sri Lankan government estimates put the number of Sri Lankan Tamils living in and outside refugee settlements in Tamil Nadu at about 89,000 in early 2026, a substantial share of them born in India. The second generation shows how long the displacement has lasted. Children of those who fled have grown into adults in India, some with children of their own, and their legal status is still unsettled. Tamil Nadu has provided Sri Lankan Tamil refugees with shelter, schooling, and financial assistance for more than 4 decades. But on legal status and citizenship, the question that decides whether a refugee can build a permanent life, India's record is far weaker. India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and has no national refugee law. Sri Lankan Tamils have lived instead under a patchwork of administrative rules and executive decisions. Despite decades of residence, and in some cases birth on Indian soil, many have not been offered a straightforward route to Indian citizenship. The gap is sharpest in Tamil Nadu, where political parties have long treated the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils as a matter of ethnic and cultural kinship. The rhetoric has been strong. The legal protection behind it has not. It has also produced a divide within the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. Those who reached Canada, Britain, Australia, and Europe largely acquired citizenship. They travel to Sri Lanka on Canadian, British, Australian, or European passports and go back to countries where their rights are permanent. Those who made the far shorter crossing of the Palk Strait have fared differently. After more than 40 years in India, many families are still classified as refugees, holding a temporary status that has outlasted the war itself. Successive Indian governments have given them refuge without offering the durable route to citizenship that would let those who wish to stay belong fully to the country where they have spent most of their lives. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has facilitated voluntary repatriation from India for more than two decades. Nearly 18,000 refugees returned with the agency's assistance between 2002 and early 2022\. Sri Lankan government figures released this year, counted from a different starting point, put the number returning from Tamil Nadu between January 2009 and June 2025 at more than 18,500. Set against the size of the refugee population and the years that have passed since the war, those numbers are small. The reluctance is not new. When the government set up a committee in 2022 to examine repatriation from India, it estimated that about 58,000 Sri Lankans were living in camps in Tamil Nadu. About 3,800 were said to be willing to return. By May 2025, according to M.A. Sumanthiran, a former member of Parliament who represented the 75-year-old man arrested at Palaly, about 10,000 people had registered to go back. Mr. Sumanthiran asked at the time whether the arrest of a man returning through an internationally assisted process would deter others considering the same journey. Families weigh whether they still have homes or land in Sri Lanka, whether they can find work, whether children raised and schooled in India can build lives in a country they barely know, and whether returning adults can recover documents, property, and livelihoods left behind decades ago. For some, Tamil Nadu is no longer the place they fled to. It is where they have spent most of their lives. For others, Sri Lanka is still home. The Cabinet decision gives that second group a clearer legal route back than they had before, and some assurance that what happened at Palaly should not happen to the next returnee arriving under the new procedure. The harder test comes earlier, before anyone boards a plane or a ship. Seventeen years after the war, returnees must still be cleared by the State Intelligence Service, part of a security establishment that spent decades fighting the Tigers and that has faced serious allegations of arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance of Tamils during and after the war. Whether refugees accept the government's invitation may depend on whether they believe that screening will treat them as citizens coming home or as suspects. ### ‘Cry for Justice’: Tamils Rally as Chemmani Mass Grave Excavations Pass 100 Days URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/cry-for-justice-tamils-rally-as-chemmani-mass-grave-excavations-pass-100-days/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T01:52:46.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Tamil civil society activists in northern Sri Lanka are beginning a four-day campaign on Friday to demand international justice and accountability for alleged wartime atrocities, as excavations at the Chemmani mass grave continue to uncover human remains. The campaign, called “Cry for Justice — 2,” is being organise by the Homeland Task Force and will run from Aug. 14 through Aug. 17, culminating in a demonstration near the Chemmani mass grave site outside Jaffna. The organisers said the campaign would seek justice for people believed to have been killed and buried at Chemmani, as well as for their families, and would press for accountability over broader allegations of atrocities committed against Tamils. The campaign comes as excavation work at Chemmani has again focused attention on one of the most enduring questions from Sri Lanka’s decades of conflict: what happened to people who disappeared after coming into the custody of the security forces. According to the organisers, excavations at the site reached their 100th day on Aug. 8, with more than 500 human skeletons identified so far. From Friday through Sunday, organisers plan a series of activities intended to raise public awareness about the Chemmani mass grave and allegations of atrocities against Tamils. The campaign will conclude on Monday, Aug. 17, with a larger protest near the excavation site. Relatives of the forcibly disappeared are expected to join the demonstration alongside representatives of Tamil nationalist political parties, religious leaders, human rights and civil society activists, university students and members of the public. Chemmani has carried particular significance in northern Sri Lanka since the late 1990s, when allegations emerged that people who disappeared after government forces retook the Jaffna peninsula had been buried in clandestine graves in the area. Those allegations gained national and international attention following the 1996 rape and murder of the Jaffna schoolgirl Krishanthy Kumarasamy. A soldier convicted in that case later alleged that bodies of people killed after being taken into military custody had been buried at Chemmani. Subsequent excavations uncovered human remains. The latest excavations have revived demands from victims’ families and rights activists for an investigation capable of establishing the identities of those buried there, determining how they died and identifying those responsible. ### Sri Lanka’s Envoy to India Remembers Lakshman Kadirgamar, 21 Years After His Assassination URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-envoy-to-india-remembers-lakshman-kadirgamar-21-years-after-his-assassination/ Last updated: 2026-08-16T02:26:54.000Z **By: Aruliniyan Mahalingam** Twenty-one years after Lakshman Kadirgamar was assassinated in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s high commissioner to India has remembered the former foreign minister as the man who helped inspire her to join the diplomatic service and set a standard that continued to shape her career. Mahishini Colonne, herself widely regarded in Sri Lankan diplomatic circles as one of the country’s most accomplished career diplomats, said Wednesday that Kadirgamar was foreign minister when she entered the Sri Lanka Foreign Service and recalled the exacting standards he set for a generation of diplomats who served under him. “Twenty-one years ago today, Sri Lanka lost Honourable Lakshman Kadirgamar,” Colonne wrote in a Facebook post marking the anniversary. “For me, this is a deeply personal remembrance.” Colonne joined the Foreign Service in July 1998, during Kadirgamar’s first tenure as foreign minister. She took up her current post as High Commissioner to India in June 2025 and presented her credentials to President Droupadi Murmu the following month. Her previous assignments included two postings at Sri Lanka’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York and a stint as deputy high commissioner in India from 2011 to 2014\. Before returning to New Delhi, she served as Additional Secretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Foreign Ministry. “When I joined the Foreign Service, he was the Foreign Minister,” Colonne wrote. “His intellect, professionalism, and the dignity with which he represented Sri Lanka were among the reasons I was inspired to enter the Foreign Service.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/sri-lanka-s-envoy-to-india-rem-d81224-1-3.jpg) Mahishini Colonne Kadirgamar’s expectations, she recalled, extended beyond the formal duties of diplomacy. “He held us to a higher standard,” she wrote. “He believed that a diplomat’s work is never finished — that wherever we are and whatever we are doing, we are always representing our country.” There was another lesson she remembered: precision. “Among the things he taught us is that every word has meaning, and that in diplomacy, words matter.” Colonne also recalled Kadirgamar’s emphasis on institutions and the need to build a professional foreign service capable of outlasting individual governments and personalities. “He also understood the importance of institutions — of building institutions grounded in professionalism, competence, integrity, and institutional memory; institutions that are stronger than individuals and endure beyond political cycles,” she wrote. Born in Colombo in 1932, Lakshman Kadirgamar was a Tamil Christian who became one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent international figures during the civil war. He studied law at the University of Ceylon and later attended Balliol College, Oxford, becoming president of the Oxford Union in 1959\. He practised law in Sri Lanka and Britain and worked for international organizations in Geneva, including the International Labour Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization. He entered national politics relatively late, becoming foreign minister in President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s government in 1994, at the age of 62\. He served until 2001, returned to the ministry in 2004, and remained foreign minister until his assassination. His years in office covered some of the bloodiest periods of the conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which fought for an independent Tamil state in the North and East. Kadirgamar became one of the LTTE’s most determined international opponents. He travelled extensively to make the government’s case abroad and worked to restrict the Tigers’ overseas political and financial networks. His diplomatic campaign contributed to the LTTE’s proscription in several countries, including the United States and Britain. Yet he resisted the idea that opposition to the LTTE meant rejecting Tamil identity. He repeatedly argued for a Sri Lanka in which citizenship was not determined by ethnicity or religion and spoke of the need for Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims to rebuild trust after years of war. His tenure also produced a diplomatic legacy unrelated to the conflict. Kadirgamar led Sri Lanka’s campaign at the United Nations for international recognition of Vesak, resulting in a 1999 General Assembly resolution providing for its international observance at the United Nations. ## **The Other Side of Kadirgamar's Legacy** Kadirgamar’s legacy also carries a darker counter-narrative among human rights advocates, who argue that his diplomatic gifts served to shield successive governments while security forces faced mounting allegations of disappearances, extrajudicial killings and other abuses. Chemmani stands as perhaps the starkest case. After the 1996 rape and murder of Jaffna schoolgirl Krishanthy Kumarasamy, a convicted soldier claimed that hundreds of people who disappeared after the military retook Jaffna had been buried in mass graves there. Amnesty International documented roughly 600 disappearances in Jaffna during that period and called for an independent inquiry; later excavations recovered human remains, lending grim weight to the allegations. Critics accuse Kadirgamar of helping contain the international fallout, conveying Colombo’s assurances that allegations would be investigated even as accountability stalled. In their view, he became an extraordinarily effective defender on the world stage of a state whose own security forces stood accused of grave human rights violations. ## A Killing He Saw Coming On the night of Aug. 12, 2005, Kadirgamar was shot by a sniper at his heavily guarded private residence in Colombo, shortly after leaving his swimming pool. He was rushed to the National Hospital and underwent emergency surgery, but died of his wounds. He was 73. The government blamed the LTTE. As was often the case with high-profile assassinations attributed to the group, the Tigers denied responsibility. Kadirgamar had little doubt, however, that the organization wanted him dead. Just two weeks earlier, in an interview with *The Hindu* on July 29, he had spoken about intelligence reports warning of an LTTE plot against him. “They can get me anytime,” he said. “I get very serious reports that things are hotting up.” Fourteen days later, he was dead. ## The Assassination — and the Men and Woman Behind It More than two decades later, Jaffna Monitor has spoken to former LTTE members and sources familiar with the organization’s intelligence apparatus who provided an account of the team they say carried out the assassination. According to those sources, the man who fired the fatal shots was an LTTE operative known as Sempiyan, an experienced marksman. Another operative, Veerathevan, accompanied him. The sources identified Manimekalai, a senior female member of the LTTE intelligence wing, as the field commander of the operation. Former members who knew of her work described her as an intelligent and highly capable operative. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/sri-lanka-s-envoy-to-india-rem-d81224-2-1-1.jpg) Manimekalai At the time, the sources said, Manimekalai headed a small unit operating under Shanmugalingam Sivashankar, better known as Pottu Amman, the LTTE’s intelligence chief. Earlier in her career, they said, she had worked with Charles, a senior LTTE intelligence operative whose networks operated in Colombo and elsewhere in the South. Charles was associated with some of the organization’s most sensitive clandestine operations outside LTTE-controlled territory, including assassinations and bomb attacks. The three people whom the sources identified as directly involved in the Kadirgamar operation had markedly different fates. Veerathevan was killed in fighting at Semmalai in the Mullaitivu district in 2009, according to the former LTTE members who spoke to Jaffna Monitor. Manimekalai survived until the final phase of the war. As government forces closed in on the last LTTE-held territory around Mullivaikkal in May 2009, the sources said, she detonated an explosive vest and killed herself. What became of Sempiyan is less clear. None of the sources interviewed by *Jaffna Monitor* could establish his fate with certainty. Former LTTE members believe he was killed during the final days of the war in May 2009\. One account holds that he remained with the LTTE leadership until the end and may have died alongside Prabhakaran and a small group of operatives during the final fighting near the Nanthikadal Lagoon. ## Solheim: The Killing Signalled the Collapse of the Peace Process Erik Solheim, Norway’s chief peace facilitator during the ceasefire, places Kadirgamar’s assassination in the turbulent months after the 2004 tsunami, when an attempt to create a joint mechanism for the government and the LTTE to distribute international aid had collapsed. Solheim recalled in an interview with [*Jaffna Monitor*](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/had-prabhakaran-accepted-the-international-rescue-plan-thousands-including-himself-would-have-survived-erik-solheim/) that the tsunami had briefly created an unusual sense of common purpose. Government forces and the LTTE were helping civilians across communal lines, and Norway hoped that the cooperation could be turned into something more durable through a joint aid mechanism. It did not last. The arrangement became caught up in political disputes and was eventually blocked by the Supreme Court. “After that breakdown, the LTTE responded with the terrible killing of Lakshman Kadirgamar,” Solheim said. “It might not have happened without the collapse of that mechanism.” Solheim said the assassination sent an unmistakable message to those trying to keep the ceasefire alive. “He had been a very key figure on the government side, so his assassination sent an extremely strong signal that the LTTE did not truly believe in the peace process.” Prabhakaran never admitted ordering the assassination, Solheim said. But Solheim has no doubt about who was responsible. “There is no way such a meticulous attack could have been orchestrated by anyone other than the LTTE,” he said. Nor, in his assessment, could an operation of that scale have been undertaken without approval at the highest level of the organization. “These were not freelance actions,” Solheim said. “In my understanding, all major military operations of this kind had to be approved either by Prabhakaran himself or by Pottu Amman.” For Solheim, the consequences extended well beyond the death of one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent ministers. He had repeatedly warned Prabhakaran that continued assassinations would further isolate the LTTE internationally and ultimately lead to its proscription in Europe. For Colonne, Aug. 12, 2005, remains both a national event and a personal memory. “I remember 12 August 2005 as a terrible day,” she wrote. “His assassination was not only the loss of an exceptional Foreign Minister and statesman. For some of us who had entered the Foreign Service inspired by his example, it was also the loss of a standard to which we aspired.” Kadirgamar was posthumously awarded Sri Lankabhimanya, Sri Lanka’s highest national honour. The Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies in Colombo now bears his name. “Twenty-one years later, I remain grateful for the inspiration he gave me and for the example he set,” Colonne wrote. “Some standards are worth trying to hold on to, even when the institutions that once embodied them have faltered.” She ended: “Remembered with respect and deep gratitude.” ### Remembering Lakshman Kadirgamar: A Personal Account URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/remembering-lakshman-kadirgamar-a-personal-account/ Last updated: 2026-08-13T08:11:51.000Z ## In response to “Sri Lanka’s Envoy to India Remembers Lakshman Kadirgamar, 21 Years After His Assassination” (Jaffna Monitor, 13 August 2026, by Aruliniyan Mahalingam) **To the Editor,** I read with great interest your report marking the twenty-first anniversary of Lakshman Kadirgamar’s assassination, and High Commissioner Mahishini Colonne’s moving tribute to the standards he set for a generation of Sri Lankan diplomats. Her recollection of his insistence that “every word has meaning” in diplomacy, and his emphasis on institutions that outlast individuals and political cycles, matches precisely the man I knew through my own dealings with him in those years. I served alongside Mr. Kadirgamar in several capacities — as a member of the Sri Lanka chapter board of the South Asia Foundation, which he chaired from 2001, and as a participant in Board meetings of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), held at times at his residence and at times at the BCIS itself, where he served as chairman. I would like to offer a few recollections of my own, both to add texture to the record and, in one case, to pose a question I have long wondered about. ## **Security and the shadow of threat** Your report is right to note that Mr. Kadirgamar knew, with some precision, that he was a marked man. I can add a small corroborating detail: I recall that he was given, in writing, the specific nature of the threats made against him by the LTTE, and that he moved under what I understood to be roughly three layers of high security. The BCIS Board meetings held at the Centre itself, which I attended, were preceded by sniffer-dog searches. On one occasion, I received a telephone call — evidently from the LTTE — inquiring after his presence in Kandy at the Development Forum. That same call made a point of referencing my own attendance at meetings at his house, which understandably alarmed me. Fearing that my car might be targeted, I took the precaution of keeping the Secretary of Defence informed of my telephone numbers, my vehicle registration, and the regular routes I took, in the hope of some screening and protection. I mention this not to dwell on my own circumstances, but because it illustrates how far the shadow of threat against him extended — to those simply meeting with him on institutional business. ## **Two anecdotes worth preserving** President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was, as many will recall, notorious for arriving late to meetings — so notorious that her dog arriving ahead of her became a known signal in itself. When the dog arrived, that was LK’s own cue to set off for the cabinet meeting. On one occasion the dog had already arrived, and cabinet had risen to receive the President, only for her to be nowhere in sight — one of those occasions when she came a good deal later still. On a more serious note, it was said that CBK had wanted to appoint LK as Prime Minister, an ambition bitterly opposed by the man who went on to hold that office himself. I do not recall with certainty how the difficulty was conveyed to LK, it is possible Anura Bandaranaike carried the message on her behalf, but I recall clearly that LK felt she ought to have told him so directly, rather than through an intermediary. ## **The man himself** Away from the security apparatus, what I remember most is the sheer volume of his reading. I recall a bag full of his books being checked in at Geneva airport on one occasion, and, on another, seeing his hotel room littered with books — a habit entirely consistent with a man who, as your report notes, was still working on an academic journal on the very evening he was killed. Indeed, his last public act that evening was at the BCIS itself: he presided over the ceremony launching the inaugural issue of the Centre’s academic journal, International Relations in a Globalizing World, only shortly before he was shot, with the Indian High Commissioner, Nirupama Rao, present alongside him. I also recall a call with him lasting some thirty to forty-five minutes on the subject of an appointment he was making of a head of mission to another country — a reminder of how personally he approached even routine institutional decisions, weighing character and fit rather than simply signing off on a name. His years at Oxford, long before any of this, left their own mark on him. He read for a Bachelor of Letters at Balliol College in the late 1950s, and was elected President of the Oxford Union in 1958–59 — only the second Sri Lankan to hold that office. The college and the Union stayed with him for the rest of his life: his portrait was unveiled at the Oxford Union on 18 March 2005, by Lord Chris Patten, then Chancellor of the University, in a ceremony that made him the fifteenth Union office-bearer to be so honoured in the Union’s history. That was less than five months before he was killed. It is a detail I think of often — how much of the institutional, unhurried seriousness he brought to Colombo and to Geneva had its roots in that earlier, very different institution. ## **Geneva, and the scale of the response** I recall Mr. Kadirgamar chairing a standing-room-only meeting of partners in Geneva, organised by the Foreign Ministry and held at IFRC headquarters, convened specifically because of the scale of the humanitarian outpouring of support toward Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami. I had recommended such a meeting in a memo at the time, and its scale — every seat and much of the standing room taken — remains, for me, one of the clearest measures of how the world responded to Sri Lanka in that period. A contemporaneous account of that Geneva meeting survives in the press. A Daily News report from London, filed by Rodney Martinesz on 17 March 2005, records Mr. Kadirgamar meeting the IFRC in Geneva that week and calling on donor agencies to set up a “maintenance fund” so that tsunami reconstruction work would not fall apart for want of funds later on — a proposal made against the backdrop of the IFRC’s own US$340 million Draft Action Plan for post-tsunami Sri Lanka. The same report has him raising, separately, the LTTE’s acquisition of air capability with the British Foreign Secretary, and thanking the UK for absorbing ten per cent of Sri Lanka’s multilateral debt commitments for a decade — a reminder that even in the middle of a humanitarian crisis, he never let the political and security dimensions of his brief out of sight. ([https://archives.dailynews.lk/2005/03/17/news03.htm](https://archives.dailynews.lk/2005/03/17/news03.htm?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)) ## **A question for the record** Your report’s investigation into the men and woman behind the assassination — Sempiyan, Veerathevan, and Manimekalai — is a significant piece of reporting, and I read it with the attention the subject deserves. It brought to mind something I have not seen fully resolved in print: I recall a suspect, a man of humble means who I believe cut trees for a living, who was framed and imprisoned in connection with the case and who died before the matter was ever resolved in court. The public record I have been able to trace shows a gardener, Muttiah Sahadevan, and a three-wheeler driver, Isitor Arokyanadan, held as the last two named defendants after the original four — Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman, Charles, and Komadi Mani Mekala — were confirmed dead in 2010\. Arokyanadan was eventually acquitted in 2018 after thirteen years in detention. If any of your readers, or your reporting team, can identify this man — whether he is the same person who died in 2019, or a further case altogether — I would be grateful to see the record completed. Whatever the outcome of the investigations into who ordered Mr. Kadirgamar’s killing, the fate of the ordinary men swept up and held for over a decade under the Prevention of Terrorism Act deserves to be as clearly documented as the fate of those who planned it. *Yours faithfully,* **Jeevan Thiagarajah** ### Malwatte Mahanayake Says President Did Not Reply to Letter URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/malwatte-mahanayake-says-president-did-not-reply-to-letter/ Last updated: 2026-08-15T03:54:02.000Z **KANDY, Sri Lanka —** One of Sri Lanka’s most senior Buddhist prelates said President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has not responded to a letter from the country’s chief Buddhist monks concerning the government’s proposal to extend the retirement age of senior judges. The Most Venerable Thibbatuwawe Sri Siddhartha Sumangala Thera, the Mahanayake of the Malwatte Chapter, said the chief prelates had not received even an acknowledgment that their letter had reached the President. “When the Mahanayake Theras send a letter to the President or the rulers of the country, it is customary for us to receive a response acknowledging that the letter has been received,” he said during a meeting in Kandy with representatives of an international human rights organization. “We have received no response whatsoever to the letter setting out the position of the Mahanayake Theras of the three Chapters on the issue of judges’ retirement age,” he said. “We have not even been informed whether the letter was received.” The Mahanayake Theras had written to the President setting out their position on the proposed extension of the retirement age of judges. The Malwatte Mahanayake had earlier confirmed that the letter was sent. The government subsequently confirmed that the President had received the letter. Cabinet spokesman and Health Minister Nalinda Jayatissa said the government had received the communication and considered the concerns raised by the chief prelates. The proposal would require a constitutional amendment. Under the Constitution, Supreme Court judges retire at 65 and Court of Appeal judges at 63\. The government has proposed raising those retirement ages to 67 and 65, respectively. The proposal has also faced opposition from the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, which has urged the government to reconsider the planned amendment. The Malwatte Mahanayake said advising the country’s rulers on matters of national importance, both orally and in writing, was a longstanding role of the Maha Sangha. “Whenever an issue arises in the country, the Maha Sangha has advised the rulers in accordance with the Dhamma,” he said. “This has been the practice since the time when the country was ruled by kings.” “Providing advice and guidance is something we have traditionally done,” he added. “But what is happening now raises questions even for us.” He said the chief prelates had seen members of Parliament and ministers make statements suggesting that the President had not received a letter from the Mahanayake Theras. The Mahanayake Thera also criticized successive governments for failing to establish consistent national policies, saying policies introduced by one administration were frequently abandoned by the next. “Until now, no one has developed stable policies suitable for the country on important issues,” he said. “Policies are introduced on certain matters, and the next government comes in and abolishes them. That is the situation.” “The country remains in the same place,” he added. “There are no stable national policies on any issue.” He said politicians often failed to carry out commitments they had made while in opposition. “None of them do what they said they would do while they were in opposition,” he said. “Once they come to power, they forget.” The prelate also raised concerns about Sri Lanka’s education system, particularly the expansion of private tuition classes to increasingly younger students. “In the past, tuition classes were mainly for Advanced Level and Ordinary Level students,” he said. “Now tuition begins from Grade One. There are tuition classes everywhere.” He called for greater regulation of private tuition and said Sunday classes were preventing children from attending Dhamma schools. “Education suited to the modern world is certainly necessary,” he said. “But a country must also teach its future generations good values, discipline and culture, as well as an understanding of our traditions and customs.” The Mahanayake Thera said concerns about Sunday tuition had been raised with successive governments without producing action. He also criticized the quality of many goods available in the market, saying repeated representations to the relevant authorities had produced little result. The prelate pointed to protests taking place around the country and the difficulties facing farmers. “The country’s farming community is facing very serious difficulties,” he said. “If you speak with them, you can understand the true situation in the country.” Sources familiar with the government’s thinking said the failure to respond to the letter should not be interpreted as an attempt by the administration to distance itself from the Buddhist clergy or to challenge the traditional influence of the Mahanayake Theras. They pointed to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s repeated meetings with the chief prelates of the Malwatte and Asgiriya Chapters, during which he has sought their blessings and spoken publicly about the importance of protecting Buddhism and the role of the Maha Sangha in society. The government has also engaged directly with the chief prelates over the proposed changes to judges’ retirement ages. Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara and Cabinet spokesman Nalinda Jayatissa recently travelled to Kandy to meet the Malwatte and Asgiriya Mahanayakes and explain the government’s position on the proposed judicial reforms. Sources said those engagements made it difficult to regard the unanswered letter, by itself, as an act of defiance against the Buddhist hierarchy. Rather, they said, the issue appeared to concern the handling of this particular communication, though the government has yet to publicly explain why the Mahanayakes received no formal response. ### Former Student Sues University of Colombo, Seeking Rs. 5 Million Over Alleged Exam Irregularities URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-student-sues-university-of-colombo-seeking-rs-5-million-over-alleged-exam-irregularities/ Last updated: 2026-08-13T00:14:35.000Z **COLOMBO —** A former diploma student at the University of Colombo has filed a lawsuit seeking Rs. 5 million in damages, alleging examination irregularities, arbitrary marking and retaliation by lecturers. Sanath Kumara Athukorala filed the action in the Nugegoda District Court, naming several current and former university officials and lecturers as defendants. Athukorala was enrolled in the 2022/23 Advanced Diploma in Entrepreneurship and Small Business Management programme offered by the university’s Faculty of Management and Finance. According to sources familiar with the court filing, Athukorala says problems arose during his second semester, particularly over two subjects: Operations Management for Small Business, identified as subject 508, and Business Strategy and Sustainability, subject 510. Athukorala alleges that the lecturer responsible for subject 508 asked, through another student, for Rs. 80,000 to be deposited into her bank account because she was in urgent need of money. He says he refused. He also refers to an incident during a two-day workshop in Kiriella in May 2024\. Athukorala alleges that he refused a request to allow the lecturer’s husband, who was not connected to the university, to stay in his room. Athukorala claims that the lecturer subsequently became hostile toward him and gave him low marks, causing him to fail subject 508. He also alleges that questions appearing in an examination paper had been disclosed to another group of students before the examination. Athukorala has made separate allegations concerning a group project for subject 510\. He claims students were required to contribute money towards the project and that some students who did not actively participate nevertheless received full marks. Reports of the case give conflicting figures for the amount students were allegedly required to contribute, and Jaffna Monitor could not independently establish the amount. ### **From a Fail to a Pass** Results released in January 2025 showed that Athukorala had failed. He subsequently complained to the university administration. A later results sheet showed Athukorala and several other students as having passed. Athukorala says no repeat examination was held between the two sets of results and has questioned how students initially recorded as having failed were later listed as having passed. He says complaints about the alleged irregularities were also made to senior university officials and to the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption. Athukorala says the episode cost him time, money and opportunities and caused him humiliation among his fellow students. He is seeking Rs. 5 million in damages. Those named as defendants reportedly include current and former vice chancellors of the University of Colombo, senior officials of the Faculty of Management and Finance, lecturers associated with the programme, an examinations official and the Attorney General. The claims are allegations made in the civil action before the Nugegoda District Court. ### Group Says Tamil Police Officer Dismissed Over Alleged Pro-LTTE Posts URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/group-says-tamil-police-officer-dismissed-over-alleged-pro-ltte-posts/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T10:48:28.000Z **NEGOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A Tamil police officer attached to the Negombo Police Station has been removed from the force over social media posts said to be supportive of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, according to the group that campaigned for action against him. The group, The Sri COM, said this week that the officer, Jenistran Coonghe, was dismissed after an investigation. Sri Lanka Police has made no public announcement of any dismissal, and Jaffna Monitor could not independently verify the group’s account. The campaign began on June 10, when Srimal, a co-founder and administrator of The Sri COM who uses only one name publicly, posted screenshots he said were taken from Coonghe’s social media accounts. The group said some of the material expressed support for the LTTE and that other posts accused the Sri Lankan military of killing Tamils. The Sri COM also published photographs it said showed Coonghe in police uniform, and said he had recently been posted to the Negombo Police Station. The June post said uniform photographs disappeared from Coonghe’s Facebook account after he was tagged in posts drawing attention to the allegations, while similar images remained on Instagram. Why the accounts changed is not known. The group asked the Inspector General of Police and the Criminal Investigation Department to open an inquiry, arguing that a serving officer should not circulate material supporting a proscribed organisation or content capable of inflaming ethnic tensions. It later told followers to email complaints to the police chief. In an update this week, The Sri COM said those complaints triggered an official investigation that ended in Coonghe’s removal from service. It thanked participants in the email campaign and called the outcome a victory for public safety. Little about the reported dismissal is documented. The group’s announcement included no disciplinary order or other official record of the action, and did not say which police regulations or laws Coonghe was found to have broken. Nor is it clear whether Coonghe wrote the posts or shared them from other accounts, what investigators concluded about them, or whether he was given a chance to answer the allegations. Coonghe could not be reached for comment. Jaffna Monitor also sought comment from Sri Lanka Police but had not received a response by the time of publication. ### A Colombo Tamil Family Looks Back at the Country It Lost URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-colombo-tamil-family-looks-back-at-the-country-it-lost/ Last updated: 2026-08-16T02:27:07.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “For every Sinhalese soldier killed, we will kill a thousand Tamils!” This was the war cry echoing on the streets of strife-hit Colombo in July 1983 as Sharmala Kanagasundram and her family sped to safety in a car while vicious anti-Tamil violence swept the Sri Lankan capital. Sharmala, her husband Ajit, and their three young boys were part of the Colombo elite and led an idyllic life. They were sure they could be happy in the country until Ajit retired from the Central Bank. Fate willed otherwise. Their world was thrown into turmoil once the Tamil Tigers ambushed and massacred 13 Sri Lankan soldiers in faraway Jaffna on the night of July 23-24, 1983. In a very readable recount of her family’s rise, fall, and rise, Sharmala says the horrendous violence was planned by senior ministers Cyril Mathew, Gamini Dissanayake, and Lalith Athulathmudali, with the green light coming from none other than President J.R. Jayewardene. The carefully planned mayhem not only killed hundreds of Tamils and made thousands homeless, but it also shattered the faith of the Tamil minority in the very concept of Sri Lanka, forcing tens of thousands to flee the country for safety and greener pastures abroad. The savagery also metamorphosed a nascent Tamil militancy, until then largely confined to Jaffna, into a full-fledged insurgency across the north and east of Sri Lanka, which at one point threatened to break up the island nation. That was not on the minds of any of the battered and frightened Tamils as they tried to cheat death at the hands of Sinhalese thugs who, with the blessings of the state, seemed to be armed with a license to kill at will. “For our family, the world turned upside down. From a well-settled and integrated upper-class family, we were overnight turned into stateless refugees,” Sharmala says in the *Portrait of a Colombo Tamil Family* (Vijitha Yapa Publishers). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/image_0e99b9900c.jpg) It was a Sinhalese friend who drove Sharmala and the children to a safe house that day. The journey was terrifying. The roads were filled with men with glassy, drugged eyes, looking for Tamils to kill. This is when she heard the mobs shouting in Sinhala: “For every Sinhalese soldier killed, we will kill a thousand Tamils!” After a couple of hours, the distressed family shifted to Sharmala’s husband’s grandmother’s house, Ratna Bhavan, which was deemed safer as it was located in front of the President’s house. Her husband Ajit, was at the Central Bank when he was warned by colleagues not to drive home on his own as he was a Tamil. As he sat on the pillion on a colleague’s motorcycle, a shocked Ajit saw innocent and screaming Tamils being pulled out of their cars and slaughtered. Policemen and soldiers looked the other way. Eventually, he too reached Ratna Bhavan, which by then was sheltering 52 shaken Tamils – friends and relatives from Colombo and its suburbs. The family’s tragic moments were not over. The family estate at Hokandara, about 16 kilometres from Colombo, was burnt and vandalised by frenzied trade union leaders affiliated to the ruling United National Party (UNP). As if sadism has no limits, the vandals chopped the throats of all the dairy cows at the estate. Did the cows speak Tamil? Crucially, the flames lit at the estate also consumed the draft of a completed exhaustive research of the constitutional history of Ceylon prior to independence. Authored by Ajit’s late father, who worked on it for five years, it was about to be published. That was it. A stunned Ajit got tickets for the entire family to fly to Singapore the very next day. A friend, Anton Balasuriya, drove the family to the Katunayake international airport at great personal risk. The violence was still raging in the city. Ajit and Sharmala saw mobs setting fire to cars with Tamils. There was none to save them. It appeared that the Sri Lankan state was massacring Tamils. Assuming the occupants in Balasuriya’s cars to be Sinhalese, some in the mob approached them with a request: *Mahathaya, Rata Jathika sevaganna petrol tikkak thenna!* (Sir, to save the country and the race, please give us some petrol.) The family learnt that the person who led the mob to the Hokandara estate was none other than a local Buddhist Monk with whom Ajit was very friendly and to whose temple he donated food every month. Ajit, who later went on to build a fabulous career with Citibank in Singapore, told his equally agonizing wife in 1983: It is clearly the end of the road for Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Sharmala-Ajit family was no ordinary Tamil family. They were one of the leading Colombo families for eight decades. Ajit’s grandfather, Lambert Navaratnam, was a medical doctor of excellence and was reputedly one of the highest income tax payers in colonial Ceylon. Ajit’s father, K. Kanagasundram, was the Chairman of the Gal Oya project from 1952 to 1957\. This was the brainchild of Sri Lanka’s first Prime Minister, D.S. Senanayake, who wanted to settle Sinhala colonists from the Kandyan area to undo the injustice done to them when the British expropriated their ancestral lands. Once, Federal Party leader S.J.V. Chelvanayagam told Kanagasundram: “Young man, do you realise that you are driving a dagger into the heart of the Tamil people?” He told Chelvanayagam that he had witnessed the dire land hunger of the Kandyan peasantry as the assistant government agent at Kegalle, and that the lands colonized were uninhabited jungle. Whatever the case, once the SLFP came to power in 1956, Kanagasundram was unceremoniously eased out as the Chairman. Minister Philip Gunawardene told the new Prime Minister, “We can’t have a Tamil in such a powerful capacity”. The civil service protested. The government realised it had done an injustice to a highly respected civil servant. So, it made him the Deputy High Commissioner in London. He accepted the post but later died a broken man. Ajit Kanagasundram is a frequent visitor to Sri Lanka, where he has plenty of friends. In his part of the book, he compares Sri Lanka with Singapore, where he still lives, and explains lucidly why the city-state is a global success story, whereas the island nation, after showing great promise, has failed on most counts. Singapore’s founder-leader Lee Kuan Yew, never allowed the Chinese majority, to which he belonged, to dominate over Malays and Indians. Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil have equal status as national languages. Indeed, the Singapore national anthem is always sung in Malay. (Remember the hullabaloo when the Sri Lankan national anthem was sung in Tamil a few years back?) The executive presidency is rotated among the three races in Singapore. The Chinese accepted this as they realised that it was necessary to build a united country in a multi-ethnic community before economic progress could be achieved. Singapore is among the least corrupt countries. Sri Lankans know more than anyone else where their country stands vis-à-vis corruption. The Singapore elite, Ajit says, do not take Sri Lanka seriously as a business partner. Ajit has ideas for a better Sri Lanka. In the north and east, he wants Tamil-speaking policemen to be recruited so that Tamils can make a report or complaint in their own language. He wants Provincial Councils to be activated. He says that Tamils are ill-served by politicians who prefer confrontation with Colombo. “They prefer grandstanding to the Tamil Diaspora and making impractical demands for ‘Tamil self-determination’ and a federal state, blithely ignoring the reality that more Tamils live in the Sinhala south than in the north after 25 years of war!” He suggests the implementation of the “River for Jaffna” project, first advanced 60 years ago, to block the exits to the sea from the Elephant Pass lagoon, thus turning it into fresh water after two monsoons. He also advocates improving dairy farming in Jaffna, preferably with the involvement of forward-looking organisations. Ajit is full of praise for the all-round progress achieved by neighbouring Tamil Nadu. “Tamil Nadu has achieved this progress because its people are intelligent, humble and hardworking; they do not believe the world owes them a living or depend on handouts. They do not go on strike; there has never been a communal riot; they have embraced science, technology and English… Sri Lanka, too, can profit from their experience if we can only get over our innate sense of superiority over the humble and hardworking South Indian Tamil.” ### Final Tributes Paid to Journalist Arumugam Sabeswaran in Jaffna URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/veteran-tamil-journalist-arumugam-sabeswaran-mourned-in-jaffna/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T02:48:14.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The remains of Arumugam Sabeswaran, a Tamil journalist, editor and journalism lecturer who worked for years in northern Sri Lanka’s media, were brought to the Jaffna Press Club on Tuesday night, where journalists, academics and civil society representatives gathered to pay their final respects. Mr. Sabeswaran, known widely among colleagues as Sabes, died in Canada on July 29 after a period of ill health. He was 47. His death brought tributes from a journalistic community in which he had occupied several roles — as a newspaper editor, a teacher of aspiring journalists and a former leader of one of the North’s principal media organizations. Mr. Sabeswaran was a former editor of the Jaffna edition of *Thinakkural*, a Tamil-language newspaper, and served as president of the Jaffna Press Club. He was also a former lecturer at the Media Resources and Training Centre at the University of Jaffna, where he was involved in the training of journalists and media students. His career was closely tied to journalism in northern Sri Lanka, a region where reporters worked through years of civil war and the difficult period that followed it. In addition to reporting and editing, his work in journalism education placed him among those who helped train a younger generation entering the profession. After his death in Canada, Mr. Sabeswaran’s remains were brought back to Sri Lanka. On Tuesday night, they were taken to the Jaffna Press Club, the institution he had once headed. Journalists and other media workers gathered there alongside university lecturers and representatives of civil society to pay tribute to their former colleague and teacher. His remains will lie at his family home in Kokuvil on Wednesday for relatives, friends and members of the public to pay their respects. The final rites are scheduled for Thursday, after which the funeral procession will proceed to the Kombayan Manal Hindu Cemetery in Jaffna for cremation. ### 12,861 Acres on Paper. How Much Land Does Sri Lanka’s Military Really Hold in the North? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/12-861-acres-on-paper-how-much-land-does-sri-lankas-military-really-hold-in-the-north/ Last updated: 2026-08-17T04:01:36.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lankan security forces continue to occupy at least 12,861 acres of state and privately owned land across the five districts of the Northern Province, according to written responses from district authorities obtained under the country’s Right to Information law. But that figure captures only part of the military’s land footprint in the former war zone. The District Secretariats supplied figures for land classified as state or privately owned. The tally does not include thousands of acres administered by other government agencies, principally the Forest Department and the Department of Wildlife Conservation, where military installations are also located. Land already formally acquired or transferred for military use can also fall outside the figures describing property currently occupied by the security forces. The distinction is significant in the North, where the return of military-held land remains one of the most persistent unresolved issues nearly two decades after the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war. The dispute has been particularly visible in Valikamam North, on the Jaffna Peninsula, where displaced families have repeatedly demonstrated for the return of their property, often with the participation of politicians. Keppapulavu, in Mullaitivu District, has emerged as another focal point of demands for land release. To establish how much state and private land remains occupied by the security forces, Right to Information requests were submitted to the District Secretariats of Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya. Their written responses put the combined total at 12,861.08 acres: 4,562.88 acres of privately owned land and 8,298.20 acres of state land. In Jaffna District, the security forces occupy 3,440.78 acres, according to the District Secretariat. Of that, 2,570.18 acres are privately owned, and 870.6 acres are state land. The district also reported that 61.5 acres have been released since 2024. In Mullaitivu District, the reported total is 1,478.5 acres, comprising 330 acres of private land and 1,148.5 acres of state land. In Vavuniya District, officials reported 1,222 acres under military occupation, including 243.5 acres of private land and 978.5 acres of state land. The Kilinochchi District Secretariat put its total at 897 acres, comprising 182.88 acres of private property and 714.6 acres of state land. In Mannar District, officials reported that 5,020.80 acres of land are occupied by the security forces. ## What the Official Figures Leave Out The district figures, however, do not answer the larger question of how much land in the North is actually under military control. Across the Northern Province, substantial areas are administered by government agencies such as the Forest Department and the Department of Wildlife Conservation. Military installations occupy some of those lands, but they do not appear in the state-and-private-land figures provided by the District Secretariats in response to the Right to Information requests. Mullaitivu illustrates the potential scale of that gap. The District Secretariat reports 1,478.5 acres of state and private land under military occupation in the district. But documents reviewed by Jaffna Monitor indicate that, at a single location, security forces occupy roughly 8,000 acres of land administered by the Forest Department — more than five times the entire military-held acreage recorded in the district’s response. Among the documents is a letter from the Army Commander requesting that the land be transferred to the military, providing documentary evidence that this large tract falls outside the acreage reflected in the District Secretariat’s figures. And that is only one location. Several other large military installations in Mullaitivu are situated on land administered by government departments and are similarly absent from the district’s tally. The same problem may extend to Vavuniya, Mannar, and Kilinochchi, making it difficult to determine the military’s full land footprint solely from District Secretariat statistics. There is another complication. Land that has already been formally acquired, alienated, or transferred for military purposes may no longer be recorded as land merely “occupied” by the security forces. In administrative terms, its status may have changed. On the ground, however, it remains under military control. A comprehensive accounting would therefore have to distinguish among at least three categories: private and state land currently recorded as occupied by the security forces; land already formally acquired or transferred for military purposes; and land administered by other government departments on which military installations have been established. Taken together, those categories indicate that the military’s actual land footprint in the Northern Province is substantially larger than the 12,861 acres disclosed by the District Secretariats. Documents and other material examined in connection with the Right to Information inquiry suggest that, once these excluded categories are included, the total could approach 100,000 acres. That figure, however, cannot be independently established from the district responses and should be treated as an estimate until a comprehensive, parcel-by-parcel accounting is conducted across all five northern districts. The discrepancy exposes a fundamental problem in the debate over military-held land: different government agencies may be counting different categories of property, producing figures that can be technically accurate within their administrative boundaries while still failing to show the full extent of land under military control. More than 17 years after the civil war ended in 2009, that leaves a basic question without a definitive answer: How much land in Sri Lanka’s North remains under the control of the security forces, regardless of who formally owns it? ### Opposition Accuses Government of Concealing Buddhist Prelates’ Letter on Judges’ Retirement Age URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/opposition-accuses-government-of-concealing-buddhist-prelates-letter-on-judges-retirement-age/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T10:49:22.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka’s dispute over a government proposal to extend the retirement age of senior judges widened this week after an opposition leader accused the administration of concealing a letter from the country’s most senior Buddhist prelates expressing concern over the plan. Patali Champika Ranawaka, a former cabinet minister and leader of the United Republican Front, said the Mahanayake Theras had written to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake setting out their position on the proposed constitutional amendment. The existence of the letter has become a point of contention between the government and its critics. The Mahanayake of the Malwatte Chapter, the Most Venerable Thibbatuwawe Sri Siddhartha Sumangala Thera, has confirmed that the chief prelates wrote to the President, although he said he could not say whether the letter had reached him. Government representatives had earlier said that no such letter had been received. Ranawaka seized on the discrepancy, accusing the government of withholding a politically sensitive intervention by the Buddhist hierarchy. “We cannot accept claims by those in the government that such a letter was not received,” he told reporters. He was speaking after opposition parties met under the leadership of G.L. Peiris, former foreign minister and constitutional law professor, to consider their response to the proposed 22nd Amendment to the Constitution. The amendment would raise the mandatory retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67 and of Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65, extending the tenure of the judges currently serving on both courts. The proposal has drawn opposition from lawyers, opposition parties, and Buddhist religious leaders and has developed into a broader argument over judicial independence and the government’s justification for altering the tenure of sitting judges. The government has defended the proposal in part as a response to delays in the justice system and the enormous backlog of cases before Sri Lankan courts. Opponents dispute that rationale, arguing that only a small fraction of the backlog is before the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal and that extending the careers of superior court judges would do little to address delays concentrated in lower courts. Ranawaka sought to give the dispute a constitutional as well as political dimension, invoking Article 9 of the Constitution, which gives Buddhism “the foremost place” and requires the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana. He argued that failing to acknowledge a collective representation from the Mahanayake Theras amounted not only to a constitutional affront but to “a serious blow to the culture of this country.” Article 9, however, does not impose a specific obligation on the President or the government to disclose correspondence received from Buddhist prelates, making Ranawaka’s assertion a political and constitutional argument rather than an established breach of the Constitution. Ranawaka also suggested that the administration would have responded differently to an intervention by leaders of another religion. “If leaders of another religion had sent such a letter, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake would not have concealed it in this manner,” he said. “I believe he would have made it public.” The remark appeared to be a reference to the Catholic Church and the Archbishop of Colombo, Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith. He broadened his attack beyond the judicial amendment, accusing the National People’s Power government of operating without the transparency it had promised before taking office. Ranawaka cited controversies involving coal procurement, the release of 323 containers, and an alleged loss of $2.5 million in Treasury funds. He presented no new evidence for those allegations at the briefing. He also challenged one of Dissanayake’s central political messages, that no individual or institution should stand above the law, accusing the administration of selectively pursuing its opponents. “The President says no one is above the law,” Ranawaka said. “But only the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna appears to be above the law.” He accused the government of pursuing political opponents under the guise of law enforcement and said that if it was serious about holding those responsible for economic wrongdoing accountable, investigations should begin with the decisions that contributed to Sri Lanka’s economic collapse. Ranawaka ended by turning to another unresolved political issue: the long-delayed Provincial Council elections. The councils, established under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution as part of Sri Lanka’s system of devolution, have been without elected representatives for years. Ranawaka challenged the government to hold elections if it was as confident of its public support as it claimed. “If the people are with the government, it can hold the Provincial Council elections,” he said. “But the people are not with the government. It is because of that fear that the government is avoiding the Provincial Council elections.” ### Sri Lanka Weighs Executions for Drug Offenders, 50 Years After Its Last Hanging URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-weighs-executions-for-drug-offenders-50-years-after-its-last-hanging/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T06:14:12.000Z **COLOMBO —** President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s anti-narcotics council took up the question of executing drug offenders on Monday, reopening a debate that has surfaced twice in three decades and collapsed both times. The President’s Media Division said the “Ratama Ekata,” or A Nation United, National Operations Council met at the Presidential Secretariat and concluded that trafficking now threatens the economy, the tourism industry, and the country’s social values, and that harsher laws were needed. No new law is required to hang a drug offender here. A 1984 amendment to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance made manufacturing heroin, cocaine, morphine, or opium punishable by death or life imprisonment, along with trafficking or possession above set thresholds. For heroin the threshold is two grams of pure content. The last execution was in June 1976\. Every president since has declined to sign a death warrant, which puts Sri Lanka among the 40-odd countries that keep capital punishment without using it. It has the largest death row of any of them, more than 1,000 prisoners at the end of 2024. The discussion comes nine months into the largest anti-drug operation the country has run. Since it began on Oct. 30, 2025, police, the military, customs, and the Special Task Force have arrested 230,248 people and seized more than 15,900 kilograms of narcotics, Deputy Inspector General Ashoka Dharmasena of the Police Narcotics Bureau said in July. More than 7,300 of the detained were under 21. Sri Lanka’s 26 jails were built for 10,000 inmates and hold more than 40,000\. Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara told Parliament in January that every prison was at 300 percent capacity, with roughly 27,000 of some 38,000 inmates on remand rather than convicted. On July 5 and 6, a riot at Negombo Prison, built for 650 and holding about 2,600, killed 28 people, eight of them officers, and injured more than 100, the worst prison violence since Welikada in 2012\. Officials blamed feuding between inmate groups over drugs. Prisoner-welfare groups blamed the overcrowding the crackdown produced. ## What the council decided Officials said amendments to the drug control and bail laws have been drafted and will be gazetted before reaching Parliament. Neither the Presidential Secretariat nor the Justice Ministry has released the text, so whether they touch capital sentencing is unclear. Most of the meeting dealt with the Government Analyst’s Department, whose reports establish how much pure narcotic a seizure contains and therefore what a suspect is charged with. Men wait months in remand for a report that may place them below the trafficking threshold. The council was told 6,414 were issued in July. Mr. Dissanayake ordered seizure data classified by weight, in bands below five and below 10 grams, and told the department, the police and the prisons service to coordinate so suspects reach court as soon as a report arrives. ## The argument for The loudest case for hanging traffickers has come from inside the prison service. Prisons Commissioner Jagath Weerasinghe told a school programme in October that political leaders should press the president to execute large-scale traffickers to “protect future generations.” About 65 percent of inmates are held on drug charges. Parliament has already moved once. Act No. 7 of 2026, gazetted March 6 after a run of navy interceptions in international waters, made manufacturing those drugs on the high seas aboard Sri Lankan-registered or stateless vessels punishable by death or life imprisonment, for foreigners as well as citizens. Two presidents have tried before. Chandrika Kumaratunga announced in March 1999 that executions would resume, then retreated. Maithripala Sirisena, back from a Philippines visit where he praised Rodrigo Duterte’s drug war, said in February 2019 he would end the moratorium, advertised for two hangmen, and in June signed warrants for four drug convicts. The Supreme Court stopped him on July 5, 2019, barring any execution until it heard petitions from the condemned men, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka argued hanging breached Article 11 of the Constitution. In August 2021 the Attorney General’s Department told the court the policy of not executing anyone had not changed. ## The argument against Opposition has crossed party lines. When Mr. Sirisena signed the warrants, his own prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, disowned the decision, and a bill to abolish capital punishment reached Parliament within a fortnight. The sharper constraint is trade. The European Union restored Sri Lanka’s GSP+ tariff concessions in 2017, subject to conditions including compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 2019, Brussels called capital punishment cruel and degrading, said the evidence for deterrence does not hold, and warned that executions would contradict a commitment Colombo had given at the United Nations months earlier. Apparel, the largest export to Europe, rides on those concessions. Article 6 of that covenant confines the death penalty to the most serious crimes, which the U.N. Human Rights Committee reads as offences involving intentional killing. Drug offences fall outside. Sri Lanka ratified it in 1980 but never the protocol committing states to abolition. Critics at home say the policy would reach the wrong people. Ambika Satkunanathan, a former commissioner of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka who led the first national study of its prisons, argues that most people convicted of drug offences are poor, caught with small quantities and without competent counsel, and that jailing those who cannot pay bail or a fine amounts to the “criminalisation of poverty.” After the Negombo riot, she told Reuters the government should cut unnecessary imprisonment and treat dependence in the community rather than build cells. ### In Shenzhen, APEC Finds a Laboratory for People-First Technology URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/in-shenzhen-apec-finds-a-laboratory-for-people-first-technology/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T02:27:47.000Z **By: Sun Jin, Zhang Yu** **SHENZHEN —** The drone hovered a moment above his open palm, then settled onto it. “Wow,” said Eduardo Pedrosa. The reaction was not on the schedule. The executive director of the APEC Secretariat was at Shenzhen Bay Culture Square on May 5, midway through the first of two working visits to the city that will host the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in November. The following day, onstage at the “Tech for People” Nanshan Day event, he waved his spectacles at the audience and asked for help finding a tracker to attach to them. A drone that reads a hand and a wish for eyewear that can be located sit close to the argument Pedrosa has spent the year making: technology earns its value only when it solves a problem an ordinary person actually has. **Interoperability, not harmonization** 0:00 /9:18 1× Pedrosa returns often to a distinction he considers foundational — that economic expansion is a means rather than the object of development. Innovation worth pursuing, in his framing, widens access to opportunity, raises living standards and supports inclusive green growth across every population group in the Asia-Pacific. He is unpersuaded by the idea that the region’s 21 member economies should converge on a single regulatory rulebook. What he wants instead is interoperability: each economy retains its own rules, while digital, industrial and trade platforms continue to function across borders. “One of the things that APEC really looks at is not harmonization, but interoperability,” he said. “To make sure our systems can work together.” That distinction matters more as protectionist pressures build and cross-border digital divides persist. APEC’s function, on Pedrosa’s account, is to hold open a neutral channel where governments can align innovation agendas without surrendering regulatory autonomy. He points to industrial coordination across the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area as an existing model of the kind. ### **Three kinds of connectivity** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/in-shenzhen-apec-finds-a-labor-3b789d-1-2.webp) Eduardo Pedrosa (C), executive director of the APEC Secretariat, poses for a photo at Shenzhen Bay Culture Square. Zhen Jianhong Pedrosa first visited Shenzhen more than two decades ago. “Shenzhen is unrecognizable,” he said. “Nothing I see today resembles the quiet town I first visited.” He noted the thickening of links to Hong Kong in particular — ferries, bridges, and high-speed rail — as evidence of regional integration in physical form. APEC’s working definition of connectivity has three dimensions: physical infrastructure, institutional coordination, and people-to-people exchange. A May tour of Qianhai, the Shenzhen-Hong Kong cooperation zone established to pilot cross-border opening policies, left Pedrosa arguing for the third. On the fifth floor of Qianhai Block V, his delegation put on AI simultaneous-interpretation headsets and talked with local guides. There were immersive AI glasses and naked-eye 3D displays. The equipment that produced the most conversation, however, was considerably less advanced. Every member of the group tried the adjustable ergonomic office chairs. “This chair is far more comfortable than the one in my office,” Pedrosa said. Fernando Salas, the Secretariat’s communications director, offered that it was comfortable enough to make work difficult. Later, playing SenseTime’s Chinese chess robot, Pedrosa suggested developers turn their attention to mahjong. The unscripted stretches of the visit fed directly into his reading of the zone. “Physical connectivity refers to infrastructure, while institutional connectivity focuses on regulatory coordination,” he said. “But today’s visit drove home a clearer truth: human connectivity matters most. Engineers, designers, architects, and all kinds of talented minds converge in this innovation hub to exchange ideas and spark inspiration. This flow of people is what generates lasting momentum for collaborative breakthroughs.” What he singled out was the density of Qianhai’s ecosystem — researchers, financiers, and policymakers working in proximity, with laboratory results moving into consumer products. “I’m blown away by how this whole system generates real, on-the-ground impact,” he said. Returning in July for the APEC Ministerial Meeting on Forestry, Pedrosa turned to the city’s environmental record. “It’s fascinating to see skyscrapers rise alongside extensive greenery and protected mangroves,” he said. “Geospatial planning and zoning are crucial to ensure we urbanize without losing sustainability. Green spaces absorb heat and act as firebreaks.” Cities elsewhere in the region, he suggested, face the same trade-off between industrial growth and environmental protection, and could learn from how Shenzhen has managed it. ### **A shifting agenda** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/in-shenzhen-apec-finds-a-labor-3b789d-2-1.webp) Eduardo Pedrosa (R), executive director of the APEC Secretariat, (L) listens to an introduction to products during a visit to DJI Innovation in Nanshan District. Zhen Jianhong China has hosted APEC three times, and Pedrosa reads the sequence as a record of changing priorities. The 2001 meeting in Shanghai concentrated on trade and investment liberalization. The 2014 meeting in Beijing broadened the agenda toward cross-border connectivity. This November, in Shenzhen, technological innovation and long-term sustainability move to the centre. The choice of city follows from that shift. Shenzhen’s advantage lies in the completeness of its industrial chain, which shortens the distance between the research institution and manufacturer. Its output ranges from AI chips and smart home appliances to cleaning robots and AR glasses; some of it has found markets well beyond China, including at the most recent FIFA World Cup. Pedrosa flagged the convergence of artificial intelligence and renewable energy as the direction he considers most promising, and one that carries particular weight with younger researchers. He encouraged APEC delegations to examine Shenzhen’s innovation ecosystem before the November meeting. He also situates the agenda change within the APEC Putrajaya Vision 2040, the region’s stated goal of an open, dynamic, and resilient Asia-Pacific. Speaking at the APEC Study Centers Consortium Youth Scholars Forum in May, he argued that young researchers do something economic ties alone cannot: build a regional community held together by mutual understanding. The Greater Bay Area’s complementary industrial strengths, he added, offer a cooperation model that could be applied at larger scale. ### **What November will show** Looking out over the Shenzhen skyline, Pedrosa offered a preview of what he expects visiting leaders to take away. The construction record will impress them, he said. The more consequential thing on display will be a particular relationship between people and the machines they use. “Technology ultimately belongs to people,” he said. “It exists to serve humanity, earn their trust, and win their affection.” ***About the Authors*** ***Sun Jin is the Editor-in-Chief of Shenzhen Daily.*** ***Zhang Yu is the Chief Reporter of Shenzhen Daily.*** ### Sallay’s Counsel Questions Political and Religious Influence Over Easter Sunday Investigation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sallays-counsel-questions-political-and-religious-influence-over-easter-sunday-investigation/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T06:15:57.000Z **COLOMBO —** A lawyer for Sri Lanka’s former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay has questioned the independence of the continuing investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, arguing before the Court of Appeal that criminal investigations should remain free from political and religious influence. President’s Counsel Sanjeewa Jayawardena, appearing for Maj. Gen. Sallay, made the submissions on Monday, Aug. 10, as the court considered applications by several parties seeking to intervene in Sallay’s challenge to his arrest and detention under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The case was heard before a two-judge bench comprising Court of Appeal President Justice Rohantha Abeysuriya and Justice Priyantha Fernando. Jayawardena referred to recommendations by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry headed by Supreme Court Justice Janak de Silva, which investigated the Easter Sunday attacks, and argued that political interference in criminal investigations should be avoided and that the independence of institutions involved in the administration of justice should be protected. He also cited a statement made in Parliament by Leader of the House Bimal Rathnayake concerning calls from members of the Catholic community for former Criminal Investigation Department director Shani Abeysekara and former senior police officer Ravi Seneviratne to be involved in the investigation. Jayawardena used the statement to question whether investigators associated with political groups could conduct an inquiry that would be regarded as impartial. He further argued that religious leaders should not seek to influence criminal investigations or determine which officers should conduct them. Drawing a comparison with previous terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka, Jayawardena referred to the 1987 Aranthalawa massacre and the 1998 bombing of the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy. He argued that Buddhist religious leaders had not demanded that particular investigators be appointed to investigate those attacks. The submissions represented arguments advanced on behalf of Sallay. Jayawardena also argued that Sri Lankan authorities had received intelligence about the threat of Islamist extremism before the Easter Sunday attacks but had failed to take adequate preventive action. At previous hearings, Sallay’s lawyers have maintained that he had warned the country’s security establishment about the spread of Islamic State ideology years before the bombings and had proposed measures to counter the threat. Sallay, a former director of the State Intelligence Service and former head of military intelligence, is challenging his arrest and detention in connection with the renewed investigation into the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks. The coordinated suicide bombings targeted churches and luxury hotels, killing more than 260 people and injuring hundreds. The litigation has also drawn the intervention of Colombo Archbishop Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, who has argued that the current investigation should be allowed to proceed without interference. Appearing for the Cardinal at an earlier hearing, President’s Counsel Shamil Perera told the court that the Archbishop had intervened on behalf of the victims and maintained that previous investigations had failed to adequately uncover the circumstances surrounding the attacks. The competing submissions have placed a broader question before the court: whether the renewed investigation represents a long-delayed attempt to establish accountability for the Easter Sunday attacks, as the Cardinal and victims’ representatives contend, or whether aspects of the inquiry have been compromised by outside influence, as Sallay’s lawyers argue. The case is continuing before the Court of Appeal. ### Sri Lanka’s Judicial Age Fight Is About More Than Age URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-judicial-age-fight-is-about-more-than-age/ Last updated: 2026-08-13T01:41:40.000Z **COLOMBO —** There were men in the hall on the morning of 29 July who have spent much of the past decade attacking one another in public. Ali Sabry, justice and then foreign minister under Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Udaya Gammanpila, a minister of the same period who has fought much of Colombo’s political class in court and on air. M.A. Sumanthiran of the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi, who spent a career litigating against the governments the other two sat in. And Lal Wijenayake, of the National People’s Power leadership council, publicly said that his own party had got this one wrong. They had come to the Bar Association of Sri Lanka to vote on a single resolution. Some three thousand members were in the building, with hundreds more joining from the ninety-three branches, in what the association called the largest gathering in its history. When the resolution was put, not a single vote was cast against it. Two days earlier, the Cabinet had approved a proposal from Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara, listed as item twelve and titled “Make the Judicial Process More Efficient and Formal.” On 7 August, the Bill went into a Gazette Extraordinary. It is now a matter for Parliament, and after that, in all likelihood, the Supreme Court. **What the Bill would do** The Twenty-Second Amendment amends Article 107(5). Supreme Court judges would retire at 67 rather than 65, Court of Appeal judges at 65 rather than 63, and their permitted number rises from nineteen to twenty-four. A Chief Justice would leave on reaching 67 or after six years in the post, whichever came first. A companion Judicature (Amendment) Bill lifts the High Court age to 63 and the Magistrates’ to 62. Almost nobody has argued that 67 is an unreasonable age to leave the Supreme Court. Indian judges retire at 65, British judges at 75, and Sri Lanka’s ages have not moved since 1978\. The objection is to applying the change to judges already sitting, and to the month the government has chosen to do it. **Why December matters** Preethi Padman Surasena was sworn in as the 49th Chief Justice on 27 July last year, succeeding Murdu Fernando. He turns 65 late this year. As the Constitution stands, he goes home before the year is out. Should the amendment be enacted first, he stays until the end of 2028. The six-year cap is offered as a guard against any one judge holding the office too long. Applied to the incumbent it guards nothing. Six years from his appointment would carry him to July 2031; the new age ceiling stops him in late 2028, and the earlier date governs. The judge who would ordinarily follow him is Yasantha Kodagoda, President’s Counsel, the senior puisne justice, who took oaths as Acting Chief Justice in December. He went to the Supreme Court in February 2020, a few months into Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency, after three decades in the Attorney General’s Department. That timing has attached a label to him in political conversation. Lawyers who worked alongside him dismiss it as lazy shorthand. Seniority is not a binding rule; the Constitutional Council vets names, and the President recommends. But the Bar has defended the convention for decades, because it has usually been set aside when politicians wanted to reward or punish somebody. **The Bar’s case** The resolution is carefully drafted. The association “unequivocally opposes” raising the retirement age of superior court judges “while those judges are still in office.” It then sets out the proposition carrying most of the weight of the opposition case: “Public confidence in the administration of justice depends not only upon the actual independence of the judiciary but also upon the appearance of that independence.” The government’s own Justice Sector Assessment and Strategic Action Plan, prepared under the Ministry of Justice with Asian Development Bank assistance, lists a long series of reforms the courts need. Raising the retirement age is not one of them. Rajeev Amarasuriya, President’s Counsel, who has led the campaign, calls the move extremely unwise and says the opposition is well over 97 percent of the profession. He has also pointed out a fact the government has ignored: eight seats on the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have been vacant for months. Filling them requires no gazette and no two-thirds majority. **Where the cases actually are** Some 1.1 million cases are pending across 293 courts, and Nanayakkara has told Parliament that litigants have died waiting. The trouble is the distribution. More than 800,000 sit in the Magistrates’ Courts and roughly 260,000 in the District Courts. The two courts whose retirement ages are locked into the Constitution account for a small share of the whole. Nobody in government has explained why a ministry facing congestion at the base of the system reached first for the one remedy requiring a constitutional amendment. **The judges object** The Judicial Service Association, which speaks for District Judges and Magistrates, met on 11 July and voted by secret ballot, unanimously, against extension at every level. It wrote to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and, again on 22 July, to the Justice Minister. The reasoning is administrative. Extend everyone’s tenure by two years and promotion within the service stops for two years. Judicial officers already wait twelve to seventeen years for elevation to the High Court. A service in which nobody moves, the association warned, will lose its best young lawyers. These are the judges the reform is said to be for. Their letters arrived when confidence within the service was already thin. The transfer of a High Court judge out of Jaffna earlier this year drew formal protest from lawyers in the North, and is still raised there as evidence that judicial independence weakens with distance from Hulftsdorp. **Who decides, and who hears it** Changing Article 107(5) requires two-thirds of the whole membership of Parliament. The National People’s Power has the numbers. Article 83 is the harder question. It requires a referendum for amendments touching an entrenched list that includes Article 3, the sovereignty of the people. Cabinet spokesman Nalinda Jayatissa says no referendum is needed, and that reading has support: in 2020 the Supreme Court declined to import India’s basic structure doctrine. Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa put a different authority to Parliament on 4 August, citing a 2022 determination which he quoted as holding that any change to the retirement age of incumbent judges impinges on the independence of the judiciary and violates Article 3\. Amarasuriya has taken the same view. Where a Bill is described as a constitutional amendment, Article 120 confines the Supreme Court to that single question, and Article 121(3) gives it three weeks to answer. It also leaves a difficulty nobody has yet addressed. Every judge available to hear the challenge is one whose own tenure the Bill would extend, and recusal offers no escape, because no bench exists that the Bill does not touch. Nothing in that reflects on any individual judge. The problem was made by the drafters, and prospective application would have avoided it. **The manifesto test** Opposition has run well past the profession. The Chief Prelates of all four Nikayas wrote jointly to the President. The Church of Ceylon said the backlog justification was undermined by the unfilled vacancies. The Commonwealth Lawyers Association, LAWASIA and the French National Bar Council have all backed the Sri Lankan Bar. The government is not friendless. A group called Lawyers for Public Mandate says the administration is delivering an election commitment, and that the extension runs from Magistrates upward. The first of those claims will not survive contact with the document. The 2024 manifesto on which the National People’s Power was elected criticised ad hoc amendment of the Constitution and promised a new one drafted through broad consultation. It promised to rebuild public trust in a judiciary damaged by allegations of undue influence. It said nothing about judicial retirement ages. A government that asks to be judged by its mandate cannot claim one for a measure the mandate never mentioned. Government sources expect the Bill in Parliament by early October. Nanayakkara met a Bar delegation on the evening of 29 July, hours after its members had voted against his Cabinet paper. The meeting lasted an hour and produced only an undertaking to study the objections. The Bar also asked him to arrange a meeting with the President. It is still waiting. ### Pempalā URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/pempala/ Last updated: 2026-08-09T11:26:31.000Z **K. Mohammad Riyas** ***Translated b*y** [***eḻuttukkiṉiyavaṉ***](https://ezi.asokan.org/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com) ***(***[***https://ezi.asokan.org/about)***](https://ezi.asokan.org/about/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)**. *from the Tamil story “பெம்பலா” (pempalā) by K. Mohammad Riyas from the short story collection titled “சிகரி மார்க்கம் (cikari mārkkam)”*** Pempalā ’s bicycle was absent from its usual place under the lone palmyra tree outside the village. Had he been in town, he would have been there by this time of day. He was absent yesterday, too. One of the men playing cards under the tree declared definitively that if he was absent yesterday and absent today, then he must have fled the village. It was hard to dismiss the assertion. The man had lost a considerable sum of money to Pempalā over the past several days. He remembered how elegantly Pempalā would hold his cards in his hand, spread out like an umbrella. Without realizing it, he opened his palms and held them as if they were playing cards. “Pempalā fleeing in a bus? That’s a joke!” declared the butcher Rahim, a little miffed at having lost Pempalā’s custom that morning. “He would pedal his bicycle with his bad leg even to get to Maṇamēlkudi over there!” he continued, and the crowd tittered. “Rahim, count your goats! Perhaps Pempalā sneaked away with one of them.” “Stop it… you all know that Pempalā never coveted someone else’s property.” Rahim was more concerned about finding Pempalā quickly and taking him to the Dēvakōṭṭai goat market in his van that was parked nearby. Because it was autumn, the banyan tree at the center of the village had lost some of its shine. The village elders had assembled under it. The excoriating heat seemed to radiate in concentric circles like never before. Village folks sat atop the dried-out, completely sand-covered well debating the whereabouts of Pempalā. Everyone advanced their own theories, speculating where he was or who he was chatting with in which tea stall. The village chief sent someone to check at the Idiñcamēdu mosque colony where he lived. A white Ambassador car entered the village and started driving through every nook and cranny, leaving a cloud of dust in its wake. “A public announcement from the government for the people of the village. You have a golden opportunity to confirm your citizenship! Those of you whose citizenship may be questioned are required by this government directive to approach the Tehsildar with the thirteen types of documents needed for confirmation. This is a government order.” The government announcement reverberated across the three village ponds. Although the muezzin was well aware that it was time for the *Dhuhur* prayer, his ears were focused entirely on the village meeting by the covered well. He was indeed the last person to have had a long chat with Pempalā the previous evening. He thought of his unmarried daughter Rāfia, who sat in their front yard, wearing no jewelry whatsoever. Overcome with weariness, the muezzin closed his eyes. “*Vāppā…,*” she had said plaintively, “I am not yearning for *nikāh* again, *vāppā.* What do we do if the next man is also a drunkard like the previous one?’ “I know Pempalā very well, my child. I did talk at length with Uncle Mustafā. Pempalā had lost his parents at a young age. I am going to put the responsibility on God and go ahead with this, dear. Everyone needs a helpmeet to share the ups and downs of life with, before it is too late. I am always going to do what is good for you, child.” Someone in the village meeting quipped, “If the village elders had found a suitable bride for Pempalā in time, he wouldn’t be lost now. He’d be lying on his wife’s lap,” and guffawed. No one laughed. Saddened, the man continued, “We had an obligation and duty towards Pempalā.” The crowd listened in silence. Sahib Maraikkār stood up, put his towel over his shoulder, and declared that he did not care about a man who had fled, abandoning the preparations for his daughter’s wedding before they were completed. The crowd parted to make way for him as he walked forward, chasing the crows perched on the tree branches. "You must not issue a *fatwa* like that Maraikkāṉ!” said the chief of the village *jamāt*. The stagnant rainwater in the mosque pond, just to the left of the banyan tree had turned a shade of green. The hawks circling overhead seemed to know instinctively that the water was no longer fit for the villagers of Kōṭṭaiyūr — a place so utterly dependent on rain — to bathe or wash in. They dove for the tilapia fish in the pond, grabbed them with their sharp talons, flew to the topmost branches of the banyan tree to gobble the flesh, and dropped the leftovers on the heads of the village *panchāyat* assembled below. A hawk aimed for Maraikkār’s shiny bald head and did not miss. He yelled, “fucking *harām* shit!”, snatched up a rock, and flung it at the hawk. It landed on the mosque roof, making the people at the meeting titter. That only incensed Maraikkār further. The villagers had last seen Pempalā at the wedding in Sahib Maraikkār’s house. Despite their frantic searches, no one had seen him since. The stench of the rotting fish in the mosque pond was overwhelmingly nauseating. Unable to withstand the stench, people who had to pass by the banyan tree on their way towards the village store crossed the road to the left at Meezan Stone and walked through the Mayyattaṅkollai graveyard. Ayub, who was returning by bicycle after purchasing something at the village store , jumped off the bicycle, let it fall down by the roadside, and ran to the crowd atop the covered well. “I am going to get mad if anyone here badmouths Pempalā *machāṉ*. When my *ummā* lay dead, I didn’t even have money for the bus fare to go around informing people. It was *machāṉ* who went from village to village to convey the news. If he is lying dead somewhere today, I will foot the entire bill for all the funeral costs, from rosewater for the *ghusl* washing to changing into the *kafan* shroud. A *maulavi* from the south who had come with the hope of collecting some money from the village *jamāt* for his daughter’s wedding addressed the *jamāt* to ask, “Who is this Pempalā? What is his caste and provenance? What is he like? I had to change buses five or six times as I traveled here from Thenkāsi. Perhaps I may have seen him somewhere. Do you have a photo of him?” There was no response. “Don’t misunderstand me… I only want to help you. I don’t expect the *jamāt* to do anything for me in return. I need help in marrying off my young daughter. I won’t get another chance.” He spread out a piece of white cloth in front of the crowd and crossed his arms across his chest. “Respected members of the *jamāt*. I have been serving as the *imam* at the Karambakkudi *jamiyā* mosque for about twenty-five years. My salary is four thousand each month. I have three daughters …” Uncle Mustafā smoked his cigar as he listened intently to the maulavi. The muezzin hurriedly went into the mosque, picked up the microphone, and cleared his throat twice. “*Assalāmu alaikum* ladies and gentlemen! Pempalā, a long-term resident of our village has gone missing. If anyone has seen him in the village or in the neighboring villages, please notify the *jamāt*, currently assembled on the covered well. Once again, ‘’*Assalāmu alaikum*…” (2) Subaidā stood at her doorstep waiting to buy fish for lunch. The fisherwoman appeared with a bucket full of fish, hawking her wares. She was new to the village. She paused and asked Subaidā, “What really happened to Pempalā, *rātā*? Did he run away with someone’s money? Shāhul, who had returned home from abroad on vacation, was shaving inside his house as he listened to the conversation between the two women. He recalled a fond memory of Pempalā. Shāhul was probably nine back then. The torrential rains that year had filled the mosque pond to its brim, covering the steps on the men’s side. The wall separating the men’s and women’s sections was completely submerged. Only when he reached the middle of the pond did Shāhul realize the folly of his action. He started mouthing all the different names of the Lord that he could remember. His friends, eager to reach the submerged separating wall so that they could do somersaults off it, swam rapidly towards it, unaware that Shāhul was not following them. He felt the force of the water dragging him down. As he submerged, he watched the Meezan stone slowly disappearing from view. He had folded his sarong in half at the knee and tied it, trapping air inside like a balloon to keep him afloat. He felt the air seeping out of his balloon. Suddenly, Pempalā materialized out of nowhere, whipped off his sarong, jumped into the water, and hurried towards Shāhul like a speedboat. He grabbed the drowning boy by his hair and dragged him to the shore. Lying on the ground near the Meezan stone, Shāhul opened his eyes. Pempalā smiled and said, “Boy! You aren’t going to go see your maker so soon. You still have a few more balls of rice waiting for you on this earth.” Shāhul said, “Pempalā *machāṉ*, don’t rat me out to my parents.” Pempalā stroked Shāhul’s head and started walking towards the village store, dragging his feet behind him. The blade cut Shāhul’s cheek. He thought of Pempalā *machāṉ*’s compassion. He pictured a kid goat sprinting forward as he groped around under the sloping roof for the piece of alum stone to stem the bleeding from the cut. In his mind’s eye, he saw Pempalā herding goats in a grassy meadow, the village urchins scampering behind him and the goats, yelling “Pempalā *machāṉ*!” In Shāhul’s imagination, Pempalā *machāṉ* lay dead. Goats surrounded him and sniffed at him. They trampled on his chest. But he did not get up. He wondered if Pempalā *machāṉ* had perished at the Odāvimadam sea where he usually went to cast his fishing net, or on his way to Maṇamēlkudi to help fetch groceries to someone in need or having slipped while climbing a palmyra tree. In any case, Shāhul resolved, he would assume responsibility for burying Pempalā’s body. He wanted to see Pempalā’s smiling visage as he pointed it towards Al Kaaba in Mecca. Shāhul turned to face the loudspeaker in the mosque. Someone at the village *panchāyat* atop the covered well yelled aloud, “Pempalā is a sorcerer. He could talk to goats just like Mŭsā *nabi* could, and the goats talk back to him.” “Are you crazy? You are babbling like a crazed chicken.” The imam prepared to start the *Dhuhr* Waqt prayers. The *jamāt* folks from the meeting hurried for prayers. Utterly confused, the Thenkāsi *maulavi* from the neighboring village asked one of the worshippers, “I feel like I am going crazy. Who is this Pempalā? Where did he come from?” The worshipper stuffed a ten-rupee bill into the *maulavi*’s tunic pocket and hurried on. (3) Nasser the accountant lay unconscious. Pempalā lifted the body onto the funerary bed that had been brought from the mosque. He yelled at the top of his voice that he was going to bathe the corpse and that all the womenfolk should vacate the front yard. He had let jujube leaves soak in a cauldron of water. He now sprinkled a bit of water from Mecca’s Zamzam well and added the right amount of hot water so that the temperature would be just right. He used a tumbler to draw the water and gently poured it over Nasser’s body, careful not to rupture his bedsores resulting from having been bedridden for an extended time. He then turned the body over and inserted his thumb into the anus to draw out a lump of feces and flung it away. In order to purify the body before sending it on to God, he inserted his thumb again and poured the water from the tumbler as he chanted, “*Ashhadu an la ilaha illa Allah!*” He tore off long pieces of white *Kafan* cloth and wrapped Nasser’s body in them, stuffing all four corners with a paste of *javadhu* powder mixed with rose water. He then invited family members to view the body and came out of Nasser’s house. Uncle Mustafā was sitting under the canopy erected for the funeral. Pempalā smelled his hands, which still carried a funerary fragrance of rosewater and *javadhu* powder. “I don’t think the corpse will last for long, *māmā*,” he said. “I don’t think we should wait for Nasser’s son to arrive.” He wiped the sweat off his face with his sarong and sat down next to Uncle Mustafā, despite the many empty seats around them. Then, with a wisp of sadness, he said, "In these thirty years, there isn't a single corpse in Kōṭṭaiyūr that I have not cleaned, māmā!" He sobbed for a while. Uncle Mustafā remained silent because he understood why Pempalā was crying. He had confided in Uncle Mustafā before. Those words tear the heartstrings asunder every time one hears them. He asked again in a feeble voice, “*Māmā*, I don’t have a place to live in peace! Is there a place in this world where I can at least rest in peace?” (4) Preparations for the wedding at Sahib Maraikkār’s home swung into high gear. Pempalā was unloading sacks of vegetables, cans of oil, raisins, and spices from the truck that had arrived from the Gandhi market in Trichy. Since it was his only daughter’s wedding, Sahib Maraikkār had pulled out all stops: lavish preparations with ornate decorations and fragrant biriyani. He had invited the entire village for a feast. An army of women arrived as casual laborers to assist in the preparations. Pempalā was directing them towards various tasks like chopping vegetables and preparing the dishes. One of them, Vanarōjā, tugged at Pempalā’s sarong. “Pempalā *machāṉ*. I have no blemish whatsoever. I will even convert to be one of you.” “Get away from me, you water buffalo,” he cursed Vanarōjā and walked into the kitchen. “I’ll wait and see how long you’re going to last in this single life,” she retorted loudly. These days Pempalā increasingly felt that he was tripping over his past. He thought that grey hairs that started pouting here and there on his face and his yellowing teeth were all preparations for his old age. Although he would be at the forefront of every wedding in Kōṭṭaiyūr, he never expected to be paid for it. He treated every wedding as a wedding in his own household. He imagined that he saw his *rātā* in every bride being decked up for a wedding. He would be there to tie the banana tree decorations, to apply turmeric paste, and to chant the *fātihā* and drive down poles into the ground for holding up the marquee. But he would make himself scarce on the day of the wedding. He sees his *rātā* in bridal dress, being taken away in a truck, lunge towards him amidst gunfire. He sprints after the truck, panting and out of breath. He sees the helplessness of his father who promptly fainted. He bangs his chest in frustration. “Just leave with what you are wearing!” yells a fighter holding a gun. The fireworks launched to celebrate the wedding at Sahib Maraikkār’s home remind him of the shells flying overhead in his own land. He shuts his eyes tightly. It appears that an armored truck is hurtling towards the wedding guests. Another crowd was heading from Jabal Nagar towards Osmania Park in his own city. The multitudes of humanity were overwhelmed by weeping and whimpering. A fighter shoots in the air to attract their attention and announces into a megaphone, “Leave with what you have on you. You must leave the North within the next two hours. This is an order of the Leader.” Pempalā’s *vāppā* reports his assets to the fighter at the desk: two large stores, and land holdings near the house. His eyes brimming with tears, he looks up at the fighter and says, “We are like a punching bag being pummeled from both sides, the army on one side, and you guys on the other.” Pempalā thinks that the animal in the new flag hoisted over the town had bloodstains in the corners of its mouth. Sometimes Pempalā goes to their grocery store some three kilometers away. There was a different flag flying there. It features an animal holding a weapon. That weapon, too, is bloodstained. Pempalā looks at the people huddling together with them – old folks, women and children. Shaken, he asks his *vāppā* whether there was any flag in this world which could guarantee peace to them. *Vāppā* stays mum. The fighter who was recording people’s assets divides people into two streams, one to the left, the other to the right. The bright LED lamp of the truck begins to dim. So do Pempalā’s memories. He escapes into a forest. As he runs, a bullet strikes his left foot. He dives into the sea. Heavily armed patrol boats to the east scan the horizon for any signs of Pempalā. A fighter says, “He has shot two of our boys.” Pempalā opened and closed his eyes. He retreated to a corner and continued to weep. Over at Sahib Maraikkār’s home, Nagore Hanifa’s song played over the loudspeaker: “How many trials, how many sorrows, In the life of the flawlessly golden *paighāmbar* …” Unable to withstand the heat from the biriyani stove, Uncle Mustafā had taken off his shirt. Pempalā got up to walk over to the pot of boiling white rice and used a ladle check if the rice was done. Uncle Mustafā and the muezzin were waiting for just the right moment to have a chat with Pempalā as they had agreed between themselves. “I don’t have a particular desire to live on, *māmā*,” Pempalā said. Before I die, I want to visit my parents’ grave once. It was Uncle Mustafā who had found a shivering Pempalā as he stumbled off the wooden boat onto the shore and brought him into the village. He heard everything about Pempalā’s story and took pity on him. He cautioned Pempalā never to discuss his past with anyone. Even if someone ventured to inquire about Pempalā, Uncle Mustafā somehow deflected the question so that such enquiries never proceeded far. At the beginning, Pempalā did not talk to anyone at all. He would do any available odd job at anyone’s house, going to sleep in their verandah. Or he would herd the butcher’s flock of sheep onto the grassy meadows to graze. Pempalā’s jet-black complexion reminded Uncle Mustafā of a friend in Sri Lanka. That was why he had bequeathed the name ‘Pempalā’ on the young man who washed up his shore. Gradually, everyone in the village came to like Pempalā. On the day of the Kōṭṭaiyūr sandalwood casket chariot festival, when the flagpole started to tilt and everyone believed that it was a bad omen but no one dared to climb up the pole, Pempalā came forward without a moment’s hesitation, scrambled up the pole with hanks of rope around his neck, leapt on to a nearby bo tree, and secured the flagpole to the bo tree by tying a rope between them. No one could remember if the flagpole in Kōṭṭaiyūr had ever toppled. Grateful for preserving the honor of the village, the *jamāt* granted him a house in Idiñcamētu. Pempalā continued, “Mustafā *māmā,* life and hunger made me learn all sorts of professions. I know fishing, but no one will admit me to the Fishermen’s Society. I know how to build buildings, but I am not welcome at the Masons’ Guild. I know how to cultivate, but I don’t have the means to buy a plot of farming land. No one wants to include me, *māmā*.” “Why do you want to leave? Stay here. I will find you a wife,” Uncle Mustafā lit a cigar. The muezzin's face lit up with a hint of hope. “Enough! Having endured my *rātā*’s wedding is enough to haunt me. I don’t need another one. I am not as agile as I used to be. I have this irresistible urge to go visit my parents’ and my sister’s *qabr*. He accepted two cigars from Uncle Mustafā, unrolled them, tucked in some *ganja*, rolled them back up and retreated to a corner to inhale deeply. “If you want to go back to your village, you need a passport. What do you have, Pempalā?” Pempalā said nothing. Uncle Mustafā noted that a marriage might increase his chances of getting a passport. He suggested a marriage could be arranged between Pempalā and Rāfia, the muezzin’s daughter. But Pempalā did not budge. He appeared immune to all advice. “In this country, to get on to a train, or to buy sugar at the market, or to travel, you need an identity. Tell me what you have, Pempalā, what was your identity in your country?” “It is true that I have no one left back home. But it was there that my ancestors were shot at, it was there that they fell down and were buried. At least their *qabr* remains there, *māmā*.” “Pempalā, in this day and age, our own existence and the identity of our ancestors imprinted in this very land, have been called into question. You and I are all under suspicion. It is your identity that will determine who you are and how you are to be treated. Pempalā, what is your identity? What is indeed your real name? In truth, Pempalā did not even possess a photograph of himself. He had not even seen his likeness in a mirror for a long time. His face had taken on a yellowish tinge, patches of white had started to show up in his curly stubble. Pempalā, inhaled deeply once more, checked whether he still had a box of matches rolled up in his sleeve and started walking towards the sea. As he walked, he cursed the evil night that had toppled his identity. It was a starless night. He walked far away from Uncle Mustafā and the muezzin. Nagore Hanifa was crooning through a distant loudspeaker: “Having lost mother and father, having herded sheep, How many trials …” Two rings of smoke from his cigar rose up and led the way in front of him. Through the rings, he saw a Neynar motorboat at the Kōṭṭaiyūr shore, ready to venture into the sea. A man who looked like Pempalā’s *vāppā* was very slowly untying the knot that bound the boat to a pillar in the harbor. Pempalā sprinted towards the Neynar boat. The boat stopped. The old man holding the rudder sat with his back to Pempalā. He was smoking a cigar. Through the rings of smoke, he asked, “Where do you want to go?” Pempalā mumbled incoherently. In his confusion, he could not think of a place name. “Tell me the name of a coastal village and I will drop you off there,” said the old man. The yellow bag Pempalā was holding had no identity document whatsoever. He himself had forgotten his own identity. The old man looked at Pempalā with pity in his eyes. He cleared his throat and signaled Pempalā to come on board. Pempalā hopped on board and sat down. The boat launched into the sea. It roared forward for days on end, without regard to the time of day, be it midnight or dawn. It appeared as though the boat had a limitless supply of fuel. It kept chasing the ever-retreating horizon, singing songs of the sea. The endless journey exhausted Pempalā. He looked around and found himself surrounded by the sea. Seagulls circled overhead. The boat sped forward as if no shore had been created to welcome and cherish the birds. He felt himself aging, the grey in his hair and stubble slowly expanding. The old man at the helm did not turn around to look at him even once. **About the Author** — ***K. Mohamed Riyas, also known as Anisha Maraikkayar, is a Tamil writer from Kottaipattinam, India. He is currently based in Singapore, where he works as an information technology professional. He is the author of the short-story collections Attar and Sigari Markkam, as well as the novel Effendi.*** ### India Sends a Message to Colombo — and to Tamil Leaders URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-sends-a-message-to-colombo-and-to-tamil-leaders/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T06:14:19.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** The Indian government has publicly raised a demand for early Provincial Council elections in Sri Lanka despite knowing that powerful interest groups in the country are arrayed against devolution of power. During a hectic day-long visit to Colombo on Wednesday, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri urged President Anura Dissanayake to hold the much-delayed balloting to the Provincial Councils “at the earliest”. It is the closest India has come to saying that the elections, last held in 2014, should not be subject to repeated postponements for various reasons, including a plan to reserve seats for women. Provincial Councils with limited autonomous powers came into being in all nine provinces of Sri Lanka as a result of the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Agreement, which sought to end Tamil separatism. In the context of the Tamil-majority northern and multi-racial eastern provinces, where a war raged for an independent Tamil Eelam, the provincial bodies were conceptualised as a political alternative to Tamil separatism. But both the Tamil Tigers, who were finally crushed militarily in 2009, and Sinhalese-Buddhist hardliners turned against the 1987 pact, which birthed the Provincial Councils after the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution. While Sri Lanka’s dominant ruling party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), has shed its long-standing anti-India posture, not everyone in the Marxist outfit is comfortable with the idea of devolution of power, which is what Provincial Councils are all about. The JVP is not alone in this respect, say Indian official circles with intimate knowledge of Sri Lankan affairs. “Influential people in the Sri Lankan landscape are opposed to the Provincial Councils,” said one source, adding that the fear was that any power-sharing arrangement could dent the country’s unitary form of governance. This was stated more than once, even after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was routed when Mahinda Rajapakse was the president. The perennial argument given to Indian officials was that while the Indian landmass perhaps needed states for administrative convenience, an island nation like Sri Lanka did not need its provinces to have councils, even with limited power on subjects such as education, health, and agriculture. Indian officials would remind their Sri Lankan interlocutors that India was also a unitary state with a cozy federal structure and that the division of powers between a strong Centre and the states had worked reasonably well despite some irritants. After the then-northeastern province was split into two in 2008, the last Provincial Council elections were held in the Northern Province in 2013 and in the Eastern Province in 2012. In recent times, the JVP-led Sri Lankan government has been accused by the opposition of sidelining elected representatives in areas of local governance – a development not viewed favourably in New Delhi. Seen alongside the failure of successive governments to hold Provincial Council elections, a feeling gained strength in India that the limited autonomy granted to the provinces, including Tamil-majority areas, should not be allowed to be stifled by political opportunism. India is aware that, notwithstanding what the Tamil parties in Sri Lanka may desire, the Northern and Eastern Provinces are unlikely to be merged again, largely because of opposition from the Muslim community. Of the three districts which constitute the Eastern Province, Tamils are in a majority – and convincingly -- only in Batticaloa. Muslims, who too speak Tamil but are counted as a separate ethnic group, form the single largest bloc in both Trincomalee and Amparai. While Sri Lankan authorities did their best during the Tamil separatist war to cause fissures between Tamils and Muslims, the LTTE deepened the divide by massacring Muslim civilians in the East and forcibly expelling thousands of Muslims from the North. Muslim Home Guard units, for their part, were also implicated in grave atrocities against Tamil civilians in the East, including killings and massacres that further entrenched hostility between the two communities. Although present-day Tamil and Muslim leaders have overcome the earlier bitterness between the two communities, Muslims have no desire to be ruled by Tamil politicians in any province where they live in substantial numbers. The Indian foreign secretary made another important point, this time to Tamil leaders active in the north and the east. He said that, on constitutional reforms, India could not advocate arrangements benefiting only a single ethnic community and would instead emphasise equality for all Sri Lankan citizens. This amounted to an unstated affirmation that there was no stomach in India for issues like “federalism” and “internal self-determination” – concepts which are thrown up by Tamil leaders still tied to the Tamil Tiger ideology. It was also noted that ahead of a meeting between Tamil and Muslim parties with President Dissanayake, a group called the North-East Civil Society raised the need for a federal set-up in Sri Lanka. Indian officials are clear that federalism is a non-starter in Sri Lanka and that an overwhelming majority of the Sinhalese community view federalism as a dirty word, almost akin to separatism. But sections of the Tamil diaspora linked to the erstwhile LTTE and some Tamil politicians in Sri Lanka with a similar view keep clamouring for federalism. At times, they involve leaders in India’s Tamil Nadu state in their political machinations. In his diplomatic style, Foreign Secretary Misri drew a red line for the Tamils as well — defining what India can support and what it cannot. ### How Justice Was Derailed After the Muttur Massacre URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-justice-was-derailed-after-the-muttur-massacre/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T03:20:03.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** It was around 4:15 in the afternoon of Aug. 4, 2006\. The men who came through the gate asked in Sinhala what the aid workers were doing there when everyone else in the town had fled, according to an account assembled by the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) from police sources in Muttur. The staff answered that their office in Trincomalee had told them to stay and wait to be collected. A home guard interrupted and said they were Tamil Tigers. Seventeen employees of the French humanitarian organization Action contre la Faim, 16 of them Tamil and one Muslim, were made to kneel. They were shot at close range as they begged. Two who ran were killed away from the others. Their bodies were found separately, behind a vehicle. It was over within five minutes of the party's arrival, the group’s reconstruction found. All 17 were wearing white T-shirts and vests bearing their organization’s logo. They were inside a compound whose GPS coordinates had been provided to the Sri Lankan Army, Navy, and Police so that it would not be shelled. Twenty years later, no one has been arrested or indicted. A magisterial inquest, a criminal investigation, a human rights commission inquiry, and a presidential commission of inquiry all examined the killings. None identified a perpetrator. None produced a charge. This month, as the anniversary passed, United Nations human rights experts, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the French Embassy in Colombo, and the aid organization itself all called on Sri Lanka to reopen the investigation. The government has not responded. Independent investigators concluded that at least four types of ammunition were fired inside the compound. One type entered the official record. It was the 7.62 round carried by both sides in the war. A Jaffna Monitor review of reports by the International Commission of Jurists, the University Teachers for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the aid organization’s own investigations, together with interviews with former combatants, sets out what happened to the other three. ### The town Muttur sits on the southern shore of Trincomalee harbor. Fabrice Carbonne, who ran the organization’s Trincomalee base from March 2005 to June 2006 and had left before the killings, described it as the entry gate to its operations across the south of the district. The organization arrived in Sri Lanka as a tsunami response after December 2004 and remained as the cease-fire broke down. In the year before the killings, it delivered water and sanitation services to more than 116,000 people across Sri Lanka. By August 2006, the U.N. experts said this month, it was the only international aid group still working in and around Muttur. Fighting for the town began Aug. 1, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam captured Muttur on Aug. 2\. The organization’s new anniversary report says more than 150 people were killed in the surrounding area as civilians fled. The University Teachers for Human Rights, a group founded by academics at the University of Jaffna and critical of both the government and the LTTE, put the figure at about 50, most of them Muslim civilians killed by government shelling. The 17 staff members did not leave. “We believed that displaying our humanitarian identity would provide a form of protection,” said François Danel, the organization’s deputy director general in 2006\. “Realizing that we were wrong, and that the military paid no attention to it whatsoever, was devastating.” Between Aug. 1 and Aug. 4, the organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross attempted evacuation by road and by boat. Neither side in the fighting would guarantee safe passage. An army major, a colonel, and a senior superintendent of police were each personally asked by staff in Trincomalee to secure the safety of the trapped team. The Presidential Commission of Inquiry that later examined the case scrutinized the aid organization’s internal decisions in detail. It never examined the conduct of those three officers. ### The clock Radio contact with the team was lost at about 7:45 on the morning of Aug. 4, according to Andrew Mitchell, the organization’s desk officer at the time. A convoy sent to reach the compound after the team went silent was stopped at an army checkpoint six miles away. The LTTE withdrew from Muttur around midday. Government forces then moved in. If the killings occurred in the early morning, the rebels were plausibly in control of the ground. If they occurred in the afternoon, the security forces were. The commission of inquiry, chaired by Justice Nissanka Udalagama, placed the deaths in the early hours of the morning, relying on the judicial medical officer of Anuradhapura, who recorded the time of death as most likely early on Aug. 4\. The commission also concluded that no evidence placed army commandos anywhere near the compound at any point that day. A police witness told the same commission that commandos had been seen at a school nearby on Aug. 3 and 4. The University Teachers for Human Rights rejected the commission’s finding and assembled a competing chronology, set out in its Special Report No. 30, published on April 1, 2008. A religious leader in Muttur told the group that he had gone to the compound between 8 and 8:30 a.m. and urged the staff to leave on foot with the departing residents. They refused, he said, telling him their superiors had instructed them to remain in the office and wait to be collected. In a later report, Special Report No. 33 of August 2009, the group recorded testimony from the Rev. Albert Sornarajah, who saw the aid workers alive after 8:30 that morning. A staff member who was not lodging at the office and who left Muttur on foot with most of the town’s residents around 10 a.m. told the group that he believed his colleagues were still alive when he went. He had not seen them himself. His account rested on a woman who cooked for the team and who had met them after 9 a.m. The group cited, as corroboration, a report in the Tamil-language Sunday Virakesari of Aug. 13, 2006, quoting a neighbor who had fed the aid workers and warned them that everyone else was packing to leave. Later that day, sources the group reached in 2007 said, some of the staff walked to a grocery on the main road near the hospital to buy tea and biscuits. That would place them alive after the rebel withdrawal, which residents generally put at around noon. The group was not able to trace those sources again. The same report states that the Anuradhapura medical officer gave a different account privately. The group wrote that it had later learned he told Peter Apps, then a Reuters correspondent, that the probable time of death was the afternoon of Aug. 4\. The medical officer said this after examining some of the bodies at Trincomalee Hospital on Aug. 8, 2006, four days after the killings and well before he prepared his post-mortem reports. What he entered in the inquest reports was that death had occurred most likely in the early morning of Aug. 4. Apps was separately told by Sri Lankan commanders in Muttur on Aug. 5 that most rebel fighters had already withdrawn early on the 4th. The police obtained the cellphone numbers of all 17 victims and their call records from the operators within days. Those records have never been made public. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, the Nordic body overseeing the 2002 cease-fire, issued its assessment in late August 2006\. Given that government forces controlled the town, it said, no armed group other than the security forces could have been responsible. Ulf Henricsson, its head, called the killings a clear war crime and said an independent international commission was needed because the mission trusted neither side to investigate. ### What the rebels say Former Tamil Tiger fighters interviewed by Jaffna Monitor said the movement had never intended to capture Muttur. The offensive, they said, was commanded by its Trincomalee commander, Sornam, and was aimed at overrunning the Kaddaparichchan army camp. When the assault failed, the cadres moved into the adjoining town. They rejected any role in the killings, arguing from opportunity. Most of the aid workers were Tamils from areas the movement controlled. Had the Tigers wanted to kill civilians and blame the military, the former fighters said, the withdrawal offered far better opportunities, and the cadres passed large numbers of Muslim and Sinhalese civilians without harming them. “Sornam was no saint,” a senior former rebel leader said. “He was a ruthless commander who was responsible for the deaths of many innocent civilians.” The same man said Sornam had killed members of a Rupavahini television crew shortly after fighting broke out between the Tigers and the Indian Peacekeeping Force in October 1987\. Sornam was killed in the final phase of the war in 2009 and cannot answer the allegation. ### The compound Aid agencies did not reach the compound until Aug. 7, when the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies gained access and found the bodies. Some accounts, including one published by the organization’s British office, date the first entry to Aug. 6. Local police did not secure the scene, preserve evidence, or collect the dead. The bodies had lain where they fell for days. Action contre la Faim staff loaded their colleagues onto trucks themselves. ### The guns Two calibers of ammunition were in circulation in Muttur that week, and they were not equally revealing. The police at the Muttur station were generally issued the T-56, a Chinese-made copy of the Kalashnikov that fires a 7.62-by-39-millimeter round. So did the Tamil Tigers. It was the standard rifle on both sides. A recovered 7.62 projectile is consistent with the police, with the Muslim home guards attached to them, and with the rebels. The Naval Special Forces commandos deployed to Muttur on Aug. 3 were seen carrying M16 rifles and FN Minimi light machine guns, the University Teachers for Human Rights found. Both fire a 5.56-by-45-millimeter round. In 2006, that caliber was neither standard police issue nor standard rebel armament. It was a special forces caliber. Witnesses stated separately that government Special Forces carrying M16S were in Muttur at the height of the battle, a point acknowledged even in *The Muttur Massacre: A Quest for the Whole Truth*, an account written from within the government and published in July 2008. The same report identifies two further weapons carried by police constables in the party that went to the compound: an Uzi submachine gun, firing a 9-millimeter round, belonging to the station commander’s bodyguard, and a belt-fed light machine gun carried by a second constable. The group concluded that a minimum of four types of ammunition were fired inside the compound. ### A missing photograph Eleven of the 17 bodies were exhumed after burial. Second post-mortem examinations were conducted on Oct. 24 and 25, 2006, with an Australian forensic pathologist, Dr. Malcolm J. Dodd, observing. Seven bullets and three bullet fragments were recovered. The government analyst identified every one of them as 7.62. There was one exception, briefly. At the second autopsy, Dr. Dodd identified a projectile taken from the head of one of the women, Romila Sivapragasam, as 5.56\. The International Commission of Jurists reported the identification in April 2007 and set out what it implied about who had fired. In June 2007 the Attorney General’s Department moved to establish that the object was not a bullet at all, but the core of a 7.62 round. Dr. Dodd withdrew his identification. He did so, the University Teachers for Human Rights found, after being sent a photograph of the projectile that was not the original. The original certified photograph taken at the autopsy is missing. A fired 5.56 projectile carries rifling marks visible to the naked eye. The core of a 7.62 round is smooth. It is also the wrong color: cores are gray-black, jacketed bullets are copper. A police sub-inspector had earlier submitted actual cores to the court among productions from the scene, so both he and Dr. Dodd had handled the difference. Michael Birnbaum, the senior British barrister sent by the International Commission of Jurists to observe the inquest, examined the documentation of the ballistic exhibits and found numerous inconsistencies in how items were recorded, described, and transmitted. The commission’s published summary of his conclusions states that there was serious concern that a bullet of the type used by Sri Lankan military and special forces units was removed from the evidence and replaced with a bullet of a different caliber. The second magistrate to hear the inquest had ordered that the ballistic exhibits be opened only in the presence of the Australian expert. Birnbaum found that the police disobeyed that order. One of the earliest accounts obtained by the University Teachers for Human Rights came from an elderly Muttur resident who lived near the compound. He said he saw an army patrol enter the office at about 4:15 p.m. and leave shortly afterward. About 45 minutes later, he said, masked men in commando uniforms arrived on a convoy of motorcycles, followed by a senior officer in a vehicle accompanied by guards. They entered the compound and remained there for about half an hour. The group described that second visit as an attempt to remove ammunition that would not fit the official account. The witness later became untraceable. ### Removing the magistrate The Muttur magistrate, M. Ganesharajah, a Tamil, had conducted three hearings and was about to deliver his verdict on the post-mortems. That undelivered verdict described the killings as a crime against humanity and ordered a rigorous investigation, the University Teachers for Human Rights found. On Sept. 4, 2006, the Judicial Service Commission, acting through the Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, ordered the inquest transferred to the magistrate of Anuradhapura. Ganesharajah was replaced by a Sinhalese magistrate. Birnbaum found that no provision in Sri Lankan law justified replacing one magistrate with another at such an advanced stage of the proceedings. He described the move as unwarranted interference contrary to international standards, while concluding that both magistrates had nevertheless conducted the inquest with sensitivity and fairness. One of the three members of the Judicial Service Commission that removed Ganesharajah was Justice Udalagama. Three months later he was appointed chairman of the presidential commission that would examine the same case. ### The inquiry Birnbaum’s report, published in April 2007, identified two failures in the police investigation. Official police reports showed that from the outset, before any investigation had been conducted, the police had settled on the Tamil Tigers as the perpetrators. And the Criminal Investigation Department had not interviewed a single member of the Sri Lankan security forces. Nor had it interviewed any Tamil, apart from the families of the dead. President Mahinda Rajapaksa announced the commission of inquiry in September 2006, with a mandate covering about 15 alleged violations, including the Muttur killings. Foreign donors, skeptical of earlier Sri Lankan commissions, negotiated the creation of an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons to observe its work, chaired by P.N. Bhagwati, a former chief justice of India. The group could not investigate independently and had no access to witnesses of its own. Its reports went to the president, who could veto publication. In March 2008 it quit. Its final report concluded that the proceedings had fallen far short of transparency and of basic international standards, and identified conflicts of interest compromising the commission’s independence, the absence of witness protection, and the conduct of the Attorney General’s Department. The government, it concluded, was unwilling to investigate cases with vigor where the conduct of its own forces was in question. One commissioner had already been forced out by the president over a perceived conflict of interest, at the urging of counsel for the army. The commission exonerated the army and navy in 2009, attributing the killings instead to the LTTE or a Muslim militia group. Its full report was never published. ### The witnesses The University Teachers for Human Rights documented threats delivered by telephone and in person, forced reporting to police stations, abduction and assault, bribery and threats from the commission’s own police investigation unit, surveillance, illegal detention, house searches and threatening letters. Witnesses were intimidated inside the commission’s own witness protection room. Witnesses who had fled abroad were to testify by video link. A presidential directive stopped it. A key witness whom the police had themselves identified, Haji Abdul Rahuman, has been missing since late September 2006. Two people connected to the victims’ families died. The guardian of one of the dead drivers died after being beaten by a naval officer in an unrelated incident. The wife of another victim died of a brain hemorrhage a day after receiving a summons to appear before the commission, following months of harassment. Several families left the country. The 2015 U.N. investigation separately documented allegations that witnesses and officials connected with the case faced intimidation and harassment. ### The letters The commission wound up in mid-2009 without identifying anyone. Udalagama told the BBC that the culprits had not been identified because the commission had run out of funds. He said that video conferencing had been essential for hearing witnesses abroad and had been stopped by a presidential directive. Journalists who approached individual commissioners for copies of the report were referred to the president's office. On July 14, 2009, news organizations reported that the commission had cleared the army. Four days later, plainclothes police officers went to the homes of the victims’ families in Trincomalee and summoned them to Fort Frederick, then the army’s headquarters and the government’s administrative center in the town. A man who introduced himself as a private attorney from Colombo presented them with two letters in English and told them to sign, the University Teachers for Human Rights found. Others present filmed them. The letter addressed to the president thanked him for appointing the commission, said the families agreed with its finding that the deaths were caused by the Tamil Tigers, and said compensation should be paid by the aid organization for gross negligence. The second thanked the Attorney General’s counsel for their impartiality. “I do not know English, but I gathered from others that the truth had been turned on its head and we were to give our assent,” one parent said. “Some of us gave excuses, trying to wriggle out of it. The attorney was firm that we must sign.” The letters were collected on July 25\. After the BBC reported that the families had signed under duress, they came back by post on Aug. 1, 2009, stamped at Thampalakamam. ### Still no justice In 2011, the government’s own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission recommended further investigation and prosecution. Nothing followed. In 2015, the U.N. human rights office concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe members of the Sri Lankan security forces committed the extrajudicial executions. It recorded the government’s rejection of the allegation and its position that rebel involvement could not be ruled out. Its recommendation for a hybrid court was never acted on. In 2021, the U.N. human rights office said Sri Lanka remained in a state of denial about the past. Action contre la Faim left Sri Lanka in 2008. On May 15 this year, Dr. Robert Sebbag, the president of Action contre la Faim, wrote to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake requesting an account of what Sri Lanka’s governmental and judicial authorities had done to investigate the massacre and bring those responsible to justice, in accordance with what the letter called Sri Lanka’s international obligations. He asked to meet the president to discuss progress toward an impartial, transparent, and effective investigation. The letter said the organization was deeply concerned that twenty years on, there had been no justice for its colleagues, and that the families continued to endure the trauma of a decades-long wait. An open case file, it warned, sent a dangerous signal that attacks on humanitarian workers could be carried out without consequence. It noted that Sri Lanka has signed the Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel, which affirms its determination to end impunity for such attacks. In an accompanying statement on June 15, the organization called on the international community to support the request. It says it has received no reply from the president. Amuthan Sivajnanam, whose sister Kovarthani, 27, was among the dead, told The Guardian that years of fear had silenced many relatives. “I refuse to remain anonymous because fear has already taken too much from us,” he said. “I want the world to know my name, my sister’s name, and the names of the 16 others who died with her.” ### Cardinal Urges Court Not to Obstruct Easter Bombings Investigation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/cardinal-urges-court-not-to-obstruct-easter-bombings-investigation/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T13:07:37.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Colombo Archbishop Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith has urged Sri Lanka's Court of Appeal to allow the ongoing investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings to proceed without interference, arguing that previous inquiries had failed to properly investigate the attacks and that the current investigation was moving in the right direction. The submissions were made Thursday by President's Counsel Shamil Perera, appearing for Cardinal Ranjith in an intervening petition filed in connection with a writ application by former State Intelligence Service (SIS) Director Suresh Sallay. Sallay has petitioned the Court of Appeal challenging his arrest and detention under Sri Lanka's Prevention of Terrorism Act. The intervening petitions were heard for a second consecutive day before a bench comprising Court of Appeal President Rohanta Abeysuriya and Justice Priyantha Fernando. Perera told the court that Cardinal Ranjith had intervened on behalf of the victims of the Easter Sunday attacks, which killed more than 260 people and injured hundreds more. "Some ask why the Cardinal has come before this court," Perera said. "He is here on behalf of the victims of the Easter Sunday attacks." Perera referred to the controversial documentary aired by Britain's Channel 4, which alleged that Sallay was the mastermind behind the coordinated bombings. "Those allegations must be properly investigated," Perera argued. "No proper investigation was conducted in the past. A proper investigation is now underway. That is what the victims have been expecting. No action should be taken to obstruct that process." He also told the court that Cardinal Ranjith had played a significant role in calming communal tensions following the attacks, supporting victims and their families, and facilitating compensation payments of 2 million Sri Lankan rupees to the families of those killed and up to 1 million rupees for those injured. Perera said the Cardinal had not sought to influence the investigation and argued that it should be allowed to continue so that justice could be delivered to the victims. Responding on behalf of Sallay, President's Counsel Sanjeewa Jayawardena challenged several assertions made in the Cardinal's intervening petition. Jayawardena referred to submissions made during an earlier hearing concerning remarks by Leader of the House and Minister Bimal Rathnayake in Parliament, in which he said investigators Shani Abeysekara and Ravi Seneviratne had been appointed to their current positions at the Cardinal's request. Jayawardena also told the court that the Jayaki de Alwis Committee had recommended criminal charges against Abeysekara and Seneviratne and said the committee's report had been submitted to the court. He further argued that the Cardinal's petition contained a factual error, saying it incorrectly stated under oath that Sallay had been serving in the State Intelligence Service at the time of the Easter Sunday attacks. "The statement is not factually correct," Jayawardena told the court. President's Counsel Maithri Gunaratne, appearing for intervening petitioner Bengamuwe Nalaka Thera, also addressed the court. Referring to Rathnayake's parliamentary remarks, Gunaratne questioned the conduct of investigator Shani Abeysekara, alleging that he had travelled to France and recorded a statement from a person who was the subject of an arrest warrant while at the Sri Lankan Embassy there. "A police officer who encounters a person against whom an arrest warrant has been issued should arrest that person and produce him before court," Gunaratne argued. He also contended that arresting and detaining intelligence officers under the Prevention of Terrorism Act was contrary to the sovereignty of the people and undermined national security. President's Counsel V.K. Choksy, appearing for intervening petitioner Thapane Sumanawansa Thera, said his client's petition was not intended to obstruct the investigation but was filed in the public interest out of concern that similar retaliatory action could occur in the future. Senior Counsel Krishmal Warnakulasuriya, appearing for the Global Sri Lanka Forum, argued that Articles 3 and 4 of Sri Lanka's Constitution vest sovereignty in the people. "A fair investigation into these attacks must be conducted," he said. "However, justice cannot be expected from an investigation that is subject to political interference." After hearing the submissions, the Court of Appeal adjourned further consideration of the intervening petitions until Aug. 10. ### Jaffna Court Orders Gotabaya Rajapaksa to Give Evidence in Lalith-Kugan Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-court-orders-gotabaya-rajapaksa-to-give-evidence-in-lalith-kugan-case/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T11:51:44.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The Jaffna Magistrate’s Court has ordered former Sri Lankan President and Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa to appear before the Colombo Chief Magistrate’s Court on Sept. 29 to give evidence via video link in the long-running judicial inquiry into the disappearance of activists Lalith Kumar Weeraraj and Kugan Muruganandan. The order was issued on Friday during proceedings in a habeas corpus petition filed by the families of the two men, who disappeared in December 2011. Lalith and Kugan vanished on Dec. 9, 2011, in the *Avarankal* area of Jaffna while helping organize a demonstration by families of the disappeared that was scheduled to take place the following day, International Human Rights Day. Their relatives subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition before Sri Lanka’s Court of Appeal in 2012, seeking an investigation into their disappearance. During the proceedings, the Court of Appeal directed the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court to record evidence from relevant witnesses and submit its findings. The inquiry began on Sept. 19, 2012. In 2017, Rajapaksa, who served as defense secretary at the time of the disappearance, was added to the list of witnesses in the proceedings. The Jaffna Magistrate’s Court later ordered him to testify. Rajapaksa repeatedly informed the court that he was unable to travel to Jaffna because of security concerns. Through his lawyers, he subsequently sought permission to testify remotely. The court directed him to file an affidavit setting out the security risks that, he alleged, prevented him from appearing in person. On June 2, the court granted his request to give evidence via video link. When the case was taken up again on June 19, the magistrate ordered Rajapaksa to appear in person before one of Colombo’s Chief Magistrate’s Courts and testify via a live video connection to the Jaffna court. The court also directed him to inform the court which Colombo court he would attend and to provide three suitable dates for the hearing. When the case was heard again on Friday, the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court fixed Sept. 29 for Rajapaksa to appear before the Colombo Chief Magistrate’s Court and give evidence through the video-link arrangement. The inquiry into the disappearance of Lalith and Kugan has continued for more than a decade without the two activists being found or anyone being held accountable for their disappearance. ### Where Does the Fuel Money Go? Jaffna MP Points to the Ruling Party URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/where-does-the-fuel-money-go-jaffna-mp-points-to-the-ruling-party/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T06:18:36.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Independent Jaffna District MP Ramanathan Archchuna said the monthly fuel allowance paid to Members of Parliament had increased from 179,000 rupees to 244,000 rupees, and alleged that an amount equivalent to the allowance received by each of the Government's 159 MPs is deposited every month into accounts in Pelawatte, an apparent reference to the headquarters of the ruling Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The allegation was made in a Facebook post on Thursday. “The fuel allowances increased from 179K to 244K!!! The poor who are supporting the government don’t know that the same or nearly the same amount multiplied by 159 is being deposited into Pelawatte accounts,” Archchuna wrote. He further accused the Government of attempting to silence dissent in Parliament. “Watch today’s Parliament speech, and you will understand how the Government hates those who speak the truth,” he wrote, before ending the post with the phrases “Triple Gems will keep blessing you forever” and “Punarudaya” (“Renaissance”), the ruling National People’s Power’s slogan denoting national renewal. Archchuna also posted images of his parliamentary salary slips for the past two months, which show the increase in the fuel allowance. However, he did not provide any evidence to support his allegation that funds are being transferred to accounts in Pelawatte. Separately, a Government lawmaker independently told Jaffna Monitor that Government MPs remit their parliamentary salaries to the JVP each month and receive a fixed monthly stipend of approximately 80,000 rupees for personal expenses. The lawmaker did not specifically confirm Archchuna's allegation regarding the fuel allowance. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/before.jpg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/after.jpg) If Archchuna’s allegation is accurate, the transfer of approximately 244,000 rupees from each of the Government’s 159 MPs would amount to about 38.8 million rupees per month, or roughly 466 million rupees annually. The increase in MPs’ fuel allowances has attracted public attention amid continuing economic hardship, with critics questioning the justification for higher parliamentary benefits while many Sri Lankans continue to struggle with the rising cost of living. Jaffna Monitor contacted Government and JVP representatives for comment on Archchuna’s allegations, but had not received a response at the time of publication. ### Twenty Years After Muttur Massacre, International Pressure Mounts for Justice URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/twenty-years-after-muttur-massacre-international-pressure-mounts-for-justice/ Last updated: 2026-08-09T01:22:44.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Twenty years after the execution-style killing of 17 humanitarian workers from the French aid organization Action Against Hunger (ACF) in the eastern town of Muttur, a broad coalition of international governments, United Nations agencies and human rights organizations has renewed calls for Sri Lanka to deliver justice, warning that the failure to prosecute those responsible continues to fuel impunity for attacks on humanitarian personnel worldwide. The appeals, issued around the 20th anniversary of the Aug. 4, 2006, massacre, come as no one has been criminally convicted for one of the deadliest attacks ever carried out against humanitarian workers. The French Embassy in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Action Against Hunger, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Legal Action Worldwide have all called for renewed accountability, while previous investigations by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) remain central to the case against the backdrop of longstanding denials by successive Sri Lankan governments. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/twenty-years-after-muttur-mass-b4bf57-1-1.png) The 17 Sri Lankan humanitarian workers from Action Against Hunger who were killed in Muttur on Aug. 4, 2006, while delivering aid during Sri Lanka's civil war. The victims — 17 Sri Lankan employees of Action Against Hunger, 16 of them Tamils and one Muslim — had spent the previous two years helping communities recover from both the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Sri Lanka's escalating civil war, providing clean water and sanitation assistance to more than 116,000 people across the country. On Aug. 1, 2006, a team working on water supply projects in Muttur became trapped after heavy fighting erupted between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Seeking to emphasize their civilian status, the aid workers remained inside Action Against Hunger's compound, displayed additional signs identifying the premises as a humanitarian facility and wore the organization's T-shirts and vests, clearly marking themselves as humanitarian personnel. According to Action Against Hunger, the organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross made repeated attempts over the following days to evacuate the team by both road and sea, but neither side in the conflict could guarantee safe passage. The organization said it had also provided the Sri Lankan Army, Navy and Police with the compound's GPS coordinates to reduce the risk of accidental shelling. As civilians fled Muttur, more than 150 people were reportedly killed in the surrounding area during the fighting. Radio contact with the team was lost on the morning of Aug. 4, only hours before the Sri Lankan military announced it had recaptured Muttur. Humanitarian workers were able to reach the compound only after access was secured on Aug. 7, when staff from Action Against Hunger and other aid agencies discovered the bodies of all 17 victims. Fifteen lay in front of the main office building with gunshot wounds to the head, suggesting they had been lined up and executed at close range. Two others were found behind a vehicle, apparently after attempting to flee. Florence Daunis, then Action Against Hunger's Director of Human Resources, who attended some of the post-mortem examinations, later said the trajectory of the bullets indicated that many of the victims had been forced to kneel before being shot. The massacre drew worldwide condemnation and has since become one of the most emblematic unresolved atrocity cases of Sri Lanka's civil war. ### France renews call for justice Marking the anniversary, the French Embassy in Colombo paid tribute to the 17 victims and renewed France’s call for accountability. “The French Embassy in Sri Lanka and the Maldives pays tribute to the 17 humanitarian workers from Action Against Hunger who were found dead on August 4, 2006, in Muttur, Sri Lanka,” the embassy said. The embassy expressed solidarity with the victims’ families and “all those mourning this tragedy,” while reaffirming France’s commitment to international humanitarian law and the protection of humanitarian personnel. ### U.N.: A warning for the present United Nations humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said the Muttur killings remain relevant today as violence against aid workers reaches unprecedented levels. “The Muttur massacre is not simply a tragic event of the past. It is also a warning for the present,” Fletcher said. He noted that more than 1,000 humanitarian workers have been killed worldwide over the past three years, many while carrying out their duties, and stressed that attacks against humanitarian personnel must be properly investigated and those responsible held accountable. “When humanitarian workers are killed, communities lose far more than aid,” he said. “They lose hope.” ### Action Against Hunger seeks a fresh investigation In June, Action Against Hunger formally called on Sri Lanka to open a new independent investigation into the massacre, arguing that previous inquiries had failed to deliver justice. The organization said any renewed investigation should comply with international standards, particularly regarding transparency and witness protection, and urged the international community to support efforts to establish the truth. “Twenty years on, we continue to fight for justice for the brutal murder of our 17 colleagues, who were killed while delivering life-saving aid,” said Perrine Benoist, Co-Director of Action Against Hunger France. “We cannot accept that the perpetrators of this crime will remain unpunished.” Ms. Benoist warned that the continued lack of accountability had repercussions far beyond Sri Lanka. “For years, the lack of justice for this crime has had repercussions on the protection of humanitarians everywhere. Muttur sends a signal that such attacks can go unpunished. Today, we are witnessing a rise in attacks against humanitarians on an unprecedented scale. It is imperative that Sri Lankan authorities provide answers and that justice is finally served.” ### Human Rights Watch urges action Human Rights Watch said the Muttur massacre remains one of Sri Lanka’s emblematic wartime atrocity cases that successive governments have failed to prosecute despite repeated promises. The organization urged President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s administration to fulfill its pledge to establish an independent prosecutor capable of pursuing serious wartime crimes, including the Muttur killings. ### Amnesty: Justice cannot wait Amnesty International likewise renewed its call for accountability, saying justice for the victims “cannot wait after two decades of impunity.” The organization said ending impunity was essential not only for the victims’ families but also for restoring confidence in Sri Lanka’s justice system, recalling that previous investigations had failed to identify and prosecute those responsible. ### Legal Action Worldwide Legal Action Worldwide (LAW), an implementing partner of the Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel, said Sri Lanka’s recent decision to join the international declaration presented an opportunity to revisit unresolved atrocity cases. Executive Director Antonia Mulvey said that although accountability processes are often lengthy, “the passage of time does not diminish the obligation to investigate serious violations, or the rights of victims and their families to truth, justice and reparation.” “With the recent change of government, Sri Lanka now has the opportunity to ensure accountability and justice for the families of the victims,” she said. ### International investigations The massacre has been examined by several international investigations over the past two decades. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the Nordic ceasefire monitoring mission operating under the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, concluded shortly after the killings that there were strong indications the perpetrators were government security forces because the area was under military control at the time. In 2015, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, through its investigation on Sri Lanka, found there were reasonable grounds to believe that members of the Sri Lankan security forces committed the extrajudicial executions of the Action Against Hunger staff. The report also documented allegations that witnesses and officials connected with the investigation had faced intimidation and harassment. Successive Sri Lankan governments have rejected allegations that state forces were responsible, and no one has been convicted over the killings. ### Families still waiting Speaking to *The Guardian*, Amuthan Sivajnanam, whose sister Kovarthani, 27, was among those killed, said years of fear had silenced many relatives. “I refuse to remain anonymous because fear has already taken too much from us,” he said. “I want the world to know my name, my sister’s name, and the names of the 16 others who died with her.” ### Northern Central Hospital Convicted Over Expired Medicines in Jaffna URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/northern-central-hospital-convicted-over-expired-medicines-in-jaffna/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T06:18:07.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A private hospital in Jaffna has been fined 300,000 Sri Lankan rupees after pleading guilty to charges of possessing expired medicines and surgical supplies, while a private medical clinic was fined 100,000 rupees for charging patients above the government-approved maximum fee for a routine blood test, according to Sri Lanka’s Consumer Affairs Authority. The Jaffna Magistrate’s Court imposed the penalties on Aug. 4 after both institutions admitted the offences. In a further order, the court directed that details of the convictions be published in newspapers under Section 60(6) of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act, a measure intended to inform the public of consumer protection violations. The larger fine was imposed on Northern Central Hospitals (Pvt) Ltd, located in Thirunelvely, Jaffna, following an inspection by Consumer Affairs Authority officers on July 29. According to the authority, inspectors found expired medical products in several areas of the hospital, including expired ophthalmic medication used during eye surgery that had been displayed in a refrigerator, expired Ether Liquid and Hydrogen Peroxide stored in the medicine preparation area, and expired sterile surgical equipment kept on the premises. Medical experts warn that expired medicines and surgical supplies can pose serious risks if used clinically. Ophthalmic drugs used during eye surgery may lose their effectiveness, potentially compromising procedures, while expired sterile surgical equipment can no longer be assumed to be free of contamination, increasing the risk of infection. Chemicals such as hydrogen peroxide may also deteriorate over time, reducing their intended medical effectiveness. For those reasons, international medical standards require hospitals to immediately remove expired medicines and sterile supplies from patient care and dispose of them safely. The hospital pleaded guilty to three charges and was fined 100,000 rupees on each count, bringing the total penalty to 300,000 rupees. In a separate case, New Sun Rise Medi Clinic, on Navalar Road in Jaffna, admitted violating government price controls by charging 550 rupees for a Full Blood Count (FBC) test despite the legally prescribed maximum fee of 400 rupees. The clinic pleaded guilty and was fined 100,000 rupees. The Consumer Affairs Authority said the overcharging breached Direction No. 67, issued under the Consumer Affairs Authority Act, which sets maximum charges for several commonly performed diagnostic tests. The authority urged members of the public to report private hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories that charge above the approved maximum fees or possess expired medicines or medical equipment by calling its 1977 hotline during office hours. The latest convictions come less than a month after the Jaffna Magistrate's Court imposed a 3 million rupee fine on Venus Speciality Hospital (Pvt) Ltd for charging above the government-approved maximum fee for a Full Blood Count test, the largest penalty announced so far under the Consumer Affairs Authority's nationwide enforcement campaign. Yarl Mother Care Hospital was also fined 100,000 rupees in a separate case on July 21\. With the latest rulings against Northern Central Hospitals (Pvt) Ltd and New Sun Rise Medi Clinic, four healthcare institutions in Jaffna have now been fined under the authority's nationwide enforcement drive targeting overcharging, expired medicines and other consumer protection violations. The authority has launched inspections and prosecutions against private hospitals, medical laboratories, and pharmacies across Sri Lanka over allegations ranging from overcharging for diagnostic tests to the possession of expired medicines, chemicals, and medical equipment. Officials say inspections and legal action against offending institutions will continue. ### India Presses Sri Lanka on Tamil Devolution, Unveils New Financing URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-presses-sri-lanka-on-tamil-devolution-unveils-new-financing/ Last updated: 2026-08-09T01:22:46.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri called on Sri Lanka's government Wednesday to hold provincial council elections “at the earliest” and to fully implement the island’s constitutional provisions for the Tamil minority, India’s Ministry of External Affairs said, during his first stand-alone visit to Colombo since taking up the post. He met President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath, and Foreign Secretary Aruni Ranaraja, and held separate talks with Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa. He also met Tamil political representatives in two separate sessions: one with parties representing the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and another with leaders of the Indian Origin Tamil community from the central highlands. Most of the parties in a newly formed Tamil-speaking political alliance participated, but they were received separately, split along Sri Lankan Tamil and Indian-origin Tamil lines rather than as a single bloc. The alliance’s Muslim member parties did not participate, and neither the Indian nor the Tamil-speaking side publicly explained why the grouping was not engaged as one. Indian officials said the discussions were held under the government’s “Neighbourhood First” policy and its “Vision MAHASAGAR” initiative, and that both sides had carried out a comprehensive review of bilateral cooperation. ## **New Financing, Old Commitments** The two governments finalized two rupee-denominated Lines of Credit, worth $250 million for railway projects and $100 million for livestock and other priority needs. The agreements, concluded between the Export-Import Bank of India and Sri Lanka’s Finance Ministry, were exchanged in President Dissanayake’s presence by Sri Lanka’s Treasury Secretary and India’s High Commissioner. Reconstruction of houses and bridges damaged by Cyclone Ditwah will begin shortly under a $100 million grant that forms part of a larger $450 million reconstruction package announced after the storm. Officials also reported progress on medical equipment for the relocated Deniyaya Hospital, under a memorandum of understanding signed July 13, along with the supply of medical kiosks, equipment for schools, and an island-wide disaster warning system still being finalized. Rehabilitation of the Northern Railway corridor under a $5 million grant is complete, and train service has resumed. Both governments agreed to speed up several longer-term projects: an electricity grid interconnection, the Sampur solar power project, development of Trincomalee as an energy hub, and Sri Lanka’s Unique Digital Identity project, for which a tender process is underway. They also directed officials to begin talks on a memorandum of understanding to rehabilitate Kankesanthurai Harbour, to be financed by a proposed $61.5 million grant, and agreed to conclude a separate memorandum expanding the Suwa Seriya ambulance service, a commitment first made during Mr. Modi’s April 2025 visit. More than 1,000 Sri Lankan professionals have completed training under a capacity-building program launched last year, according to the Indian statement. On plantation housing, Mr. Misri pressed Colombo to speed up construction of the remaining houses under a 2017 Indian commitment to build 10,000 houses for the country’s Indian Origin Tamil workforce, noting recent progress on the fourth phase of the project. The two sides also welcomed initial talks held in June on updating the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement and the conclusion of negotiations on a bilateral Social Security Agreement, expected to be signed once both governments complete internal procedures. ## **Tamil Parties Press for Elections** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/india-presses-sri-lanka-on-tam-04c5e5-2.jpg) In a roughly 45-minute meeting on Wednesday afternoon, Mr. Misri met representatives of three Tamil parties: the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, represented by M.A. Sumanthiran, Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, P. Sathiyalingam, and K. Kodeeswaran; the Democratic Tamil National Alliance, represented by Selvam Adaikalanathan and Dharmalingam Siddharthan; and the Tamil National People’s Front, represented by its leader, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam. The Tamil representatives told Mr. Misri that President Dissanayake’s government had promised provincial council elections within a year of taking office, a pledge still unmet, and urged India to press Colombo to schedule the vote and ensure it is actually held. Mr. Ponnambalam argued separately that the provincial council system itself is structurally weak, since financial authority remains concentrated in the central government, leaving provincial administrations unable to fully manage responsibilities such as healthcare and education. Mr. Siddharthan acknowledged that divisions among Tamil parties had helped the governing National People’s Power make gains in the North, and Mr. Adaikalanathan said Tamil parties risk repeating that mistake unless they contest future provincial elections as a unified bloc. On constitutional reform, Mr. Misri said India could not advocate for arrangements benefiting a single ethnic community and instead emphasized equality for all Sri Lankan citizens, a principle Tamil representatives said they welcomed in theory but had yet to see realized in practice. Mr. Misri also asked whether land occupied by the military in the Northern and Eastern Provinces had been abandoned by its owners. The Tamil delegation said the land remained privately owned, and that its owners had been displaced by the civil war and related repression rather than having left voluntarily. They also raised concerns about continuing land acquisitions and the construction of Buddhist temples on disputed sites. On delays affecting Indian-funded projects, Mr. Misri said India was prepared to move quickly and that no delays originated on its side. He said Sri Lankan officials, when questioned in Parliament, had attributed slow implementation to administrative steps such as appointing a coordinating officer. ## **Hill Country’s Own Case** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/india-presses-sri-lanka-on-tam-04c5e5-1.jpg) In a separate meeting at India House in Colombo, Mr. Misri met Tamil Progressive Alliance leader Mano Ganesan and a delegation that included the party’s deputy leader and MP, V. Radhakrishnan, and Sri Lanka Workers’ Congress general secretary and MP Jeevan Thondaman. India’s High Commissioner, Santosh Jha, and officials from India’s foreign ministry also attended. Mr. Ganesan said his delegation focused on Provincial Council elections, constitutional reform, and implementation of the 13th Amendment, while pressing India’s concern that a new constitution might dismantle the provincial council system altogether. He said the delegation told Mr. Misri that President Dissanayake had committed to resuming constitutional talks from the point reached by an interim report drafted between 2015 and 2019, a document meant to strengthen provincial councils rather than replace them, and that the party was confident he would honor that commitment. Because Indian Origin Tamils are dispersed across roughly a dozen districts without a majority in any single province, Mr. Ganesan said his party intends to propose a “Non-Territorial Community Council” as an alternative form of power-sharing during constitutional negotiations. He said the party continues to support a reformed but reduced executive presidency, accountable to Parliament and elected nationally, arguing that a president who depends on votes from the whole country has more incentive to respond to minority concerns than one who does not. Mr. Ganesan also said some figures within the governing party had worked to undermine Tamil-inclusive negotiations even as President Dissanayake himself engaged Tamil representatives directly. He warned that responsibility for any breakdown would lie with those government-aligned figures, not with the president or with Tamil parties. **Fishermen and a Security Pledge** Mr. Misri also raised the long-running dispute over fishermen, urging Sri Lanka’s cooperation in releasing detained Indian fishermen and their vessels and calling for a humanitarian approach to continue guiding both governments while they negotiate a permanent solution. India said it welcomed an assurance President Dissanayake gave during his December 2024 visit to New Delhi that Sri Lankan territory would not be used in any way harmful to India’s security, calling it a foundation for deeper cooperation. Mr. Misri met separately with Opposition Leader Premadasa, where the two discussed regional developments and ways to deepen cooperation in trade, investment, technology, and economic development, according to a readout of that meeting. The visit closed with both governments reaffirming commitments made during President Dissanayake’s December 2024 trip to New Delhi and Mr. Modi’s April 2025 visit to Colombo, according to the Indian statement. ### India's Foreign Secretary Arrives in Sri Lanka for High-Level Talks URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indias-foreign-secretary-arrives-in-sri-lanka-for-high-level-talks/ Last updated: 2026-08-06T12:47:23.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India's Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, arrived in Colombo on Wednesday for a one-day official visit, as New Delhi and Colombo seek to sustain momentum in their expanding bilateral relationship following a series of high-level engagements in recent months. Mr. Misri, a career diplomat who heads India's foreign service and previously served as ambassador to China, Spain, and Myanmar, is scheduled to meet President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, and Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath, according to the Indian High Commission in Colombo. The visit follows a period of intensified engagement between the two countries and is expected to focus on the implementation of agreements reached during recent leadership-level meetings, as well as cooperation in connectivity, energy, trade, investment, maritime security, and development assistance. Officials said the discussions would review the progress of ongoing bilateral initiatives and explore ways to further strengthen cooperation across areas of mutual interest. India has emerged as Sri Lanka's closest regional partner in recent years, providing billions of dollars in financial assistance during the island nation's 2022 economic crisis and continuing to support major infrastructure, energy, and development projects. New Delhi has also sought to deepen strategic cooperation with Colombo as the Indian Ocean assumes growing geopolitical significance. Mr. Misri, who assumed office as India's Foreign Secretary in July 2024, is one of New Delhi's most experienced diplomats. Before taking over the ministry's top bureaucratic post, he served as Deputy National Security Adviser and was also Private Secretary to three Indian Prime Ministers. ### MP Questions Government's Reliance on 'National Security' to Retain Civilian Lands URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/mp-questions-governments-reliance-on-national-security-to-retain-civilian-lands/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T03:20:21.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Batticaloa District MP Shanakiyan Rasamanickam on Tuesday accused the Government of continuing to rely on outdated wartime justifications to retain civilian lands under military occupation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, arguing that nearly 17 years after the end of Sri Lanka's civil war, it could no longer invoke "national security" to deny displaced people the return of their properties. Raising a series of questions in Parliament, Mr. Rasamanickam sought detailed information on the total extent of privately owned and State-owned lands occupied by the armed forces in the North and East, the lands released since the present Government assumed office, the locations and dates of those releases, the extent of lands that remain under military control, and the Government's timeline for returning all remaining civilian lands. He also questioned the continued military occupation of 16 Grama Niladhari Divisions and parts of three others in Valikamam North, as well as the status of lands in Myliddy, Palaly, Keppapilavu, and Kilinochchi. In addition, he sought clarification on the release of lands occupied by places of worship, schools, and other civilian institutions. Responding after the Government's lengthy statement, Mr. Rasamanickam said the limited time available for supplementary questions had prevented him from addressing every aspect of the Minister's response. "The Minister repeatedly relied on the term 'High Security Zone' to justify the continued occupation of civilian lands," he said. "However, at the recent Defence Consultative Committee meeting, it was acknowledged that areas declared as High Security Zones during the war, based on the security circumstances that existed at the time, do not necessarily need to continue under that designation today. If that is the Government's own position, why are wartime justifications still being used to deny people access to their lands?" The MP also disputed the Minister's assertion that the public had access to religious sites within the Palaly and Myliddy areas. "The Minister claims that people can visit these religious sites. That is simply not the reality," he said. "There is no access to St. Sebastian's Church, Myliddy Roman Catholic School, or Vasavilan Sri Velupillai Vidyalayam. In fact, even the original site of St. Sebastian's Church no longer exists. It is therefore misleading to suggest that normal access has been restored." Mr. Rasamanickam further challenged the Government's argument that the military's continued presence in the Northern Province was necessary for maritime security, narcotics interdiction, and disaster response. "If preventing narcotics trafficking and responding to disasters are the reasons for maintaining such a heavy military presence in the North, then the same principle should apply equally along the Southern and Western coastlines," he said. "These are national responsibilities, not responsibilities unique to the Northern Province. The burden of militarisation cannot continue to fall disproportionately on one region under the guise of national security." Referring to the Minister's recent visit to the Northern Province, during which discussions were held with district representatives, the MP questioned why the Government's response indicated that only 11 affected landowners would receive the return of their lands while 44 others would continue to wait. "What criteria has the Government used to decide that only 11 people deserve justice while the remaining 44 continue to seek the return of their original properties?" he asked. "What is the timeline for resolving the claims of those who are still deprived of their lands?" He also criticised the Government's position on privately owned lands in Kilinochchi, where the Minister indicated that approximately Rs. 8 million would be paid to acquire lands because permanent military structures had already been built on them. "Who authorised the military to construct permanent buildings on private land in the first place?" Mr. Rasamanickam asked. "The owners certainly did not grant permission. How can the Government now argue that, because public funds have been spent on those unlawful constructions, the rightful owners should permanently lose their land? Occupying private property without consent and then attempting to legitimise that occupation through compensation is neither just nor acceptable." Mr. Rasamanickam said the issue extended beyond individual land disputes and raised broader questions about the rule of law, constitutional rights, and post-war reconciliation. "The people of the North and East are not asking for favours," he said. "They are asking for the restoration of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Seventeen years after the war, the Government cannot continue to hide behind 'national security', selectively release lands, or rely on compensation schemes while thousands of acres remain under military occupation." He called on the Government to abandon what he described as outdated wartime policies, publish a transparent and time-bound plan for the release of all remaining civilian lands, restore access to places of worship, schools, and other public institutions, and ensure that civilian properties are returned to their rightful owners without further delay. ### India Signals Preference for Building on Existing Constitution as Tamil Alliance Seeks Political Progress URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-signals-preference-for-building-on-existing-constitution-as-tamil-alliance-seeks-political-progress/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T06:18:14.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India has privately indicated that Sri Lanka should exercise caution before abandoning its existing constitutional framework in favour of drafting an entirely new Constitution, according to leaders who attended a meeting Tuesday between the country’s newly formed alliance of six Tamil-speaking political parties and Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha. Following the discussions, several participants told *Jaffna Monitor* that constitutional reform featured prominently during the nearly 90-minute meeting at India House in Colombo. According to participants, Mr. Jha asked whether the alliance intended to discard the existing Constitution entirely and begin drafting a new one from scratch. The question came a day after the alliance met with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, during which constitutional reform was one of the principal subjects of discussion. According to the President’s Media Division, Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) acting General Secretary M.A. Sumanthiran argued during Monday’s meeting that drafting a new Constitution should be approached through a broad national dialogue rather than as a unilateral exercise by any single political party. Participants at Tuesday’s meeting said they explained to the Indian High Commissioner that they were not proposing to dismantle the existing constitutional framework, which already contains a power-sharing structure through the 13th Amendment and the Provincial Council system. Rather, they said their objective was to build on that foundation and secure stronger devolution within a new constitutional arrangement. One participant said Mr. Jha responded that abandoning an existing framework after already making significant progress would not be a prudent approach, comparing it to returning to the starting point after travelling halfway towards a destination. Participants said Mr. Jha's remarks reflected India's longstanding position that the 13th Amendment remains the foundation for political devolution in Sri Lanka under the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. Participants also said Mr. Jha reiterated India’s support for the early conduct of Provincial Council elections and indicated that Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, who arrived in Sri Lanka on Wednesday, was expected to raise the issue during meetings with senior government leaders. ## **Leaders Leave Presidential Meeting Frustrated** Several leaders who attended Monday's meeting with President Dissanayake told *Jaffna Monitor* they were disappointed by the absence of concrete commitments, despite the cordial atmosphere. One senior participant said the President listened attentively and responded at length, but offered few implementation timelines. “The discussion was cordial throughout, but we came away without concrete solutions,” the leader said. “His responses were persuasive, much like his public speeches, but when we asked how and when issues would actually be resolved, there were no clear answers.” According to participants, this was particularly evident when they pressed the President on the release of military-held civilian lands in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. They said the President replied that he had already instructed the military to address the matter, but did not specify which lands would be released, the process that would be followed, or the timeframe for implementation. The President’s Media Division said after the meeting that the Government remained committed to constitutional reform, abolishing the Executive Presidency, addressing land issues, and building a broader national consensus before undertaking constitutional change. ## **Differences Over Constitutional Strategy** The discussions also exposed differing approaches within the Tamil speaking politial alliance, over how constitutional reform should proceed. One leader who participated in both meetings told *Jaffna Monitor* that, in his view, Mr. Sumanthiran was the only participant actively pushing for an entirely new Constitution. "For Sumanthiran, the new Constitution has become an ego issue rather than a practical one," the leader said. The leader noted that Mr. Sumanthiran had been closely involved in the constitutional reform initiative undertaken during the 2015–2019 Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration and had played a prominent, if not a leading, role in the Constitutional Assembly process, which ultimately failed to produce a new Constitution. He argued that, although the JVP, including its leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake, had actively participated in the Constitutional Assembly process during the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration, the current political reality made the adoption of a completely new Constitution highly unlikely. "The NPP has a commanding parliamentary majority, but there is no indication that the Government is preparing to pursue a new Constitution. Given the political realities, continuing to press for an entirely new Constitution is unrealistic. It may become a talking point, but it is unlikely to produce a practical outcome," the leader told *Jaffna Monitor*. ### Government Rules Out Returning Key Military-Held Lands in Northern Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/government-rules-out-returning-key-military-held-lands-in-northern-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-08-06T12:47:30.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —**Seventeen years after the end of Sri Lanka's civil war and the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the government said Tuesday that it would retain military control over lands in Valikamam North it considers essential to national security, reaffirming that large sections of the Palaly High Security Zone will remain under military control. The decision deepens the frustration of Tamil landowners, many of whom have spent decades seeking the return of properties acquired by the military during the war. Responding to questions in Parliament from Batticaloa District lawmaker Shanakiyan Rasamanickam of the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, Deputy Defense Minister Aruna Jayasekara said lands currently used by the armed forces in 16 Grama Niladhari divisions of Valikamam North were of continuing strategic and operational importance and therefore could not be returned to their former owners. Mr. Jayasekara said the lands occupied by the Sri Lanka Army were required for the area’s security and would remain under military use. He added that the government had legally acquired three Grama Niladhari divisions fully occupied by the Army for the Palaly High Security Zone under the Land Acquisition Act through an Extraordinary Gazette issued on April 26, 2013. The Deputy Minister also said five land parcels currently occupied by the Sri Lanka Navy in Valikamam North would not be released, describing them as critical to maritime security operations. The Navy uses the sites to monitor Sri Lanka’s northern waters, prevent narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and the movement of prohibited goods across the maritime boundary with India, and to respond to illegal fishing by Indian vessels, he said. Radar installations in the area provide continuous surveillance of coastal waters, while naval personnel conduct security patrols by boat, on foot,, and on motorcycles, according to the minister. He noted that the Navy had previously released six land parcels in Valikamam North for civilian administrative purposes, but said the remaining five sites were indispensable for national security. Mr. Jayasekara also ruled out the release of 774.98 acres occupied by the Sri Lanka Air Force within the Palaly High Security Zone, which includes Palaly International Airport. Because the Air Force operates jointly with the Civil Aviation Authority and Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd. in managing airport operations, the land could not be released, he said. He added that the Air Force did not possess detailed information identifying whether all of the lands it occupies fall within the 16 Grama Niladhari divisions and advised that such information be obtained from the Valikamam North Divisional Secretariat. Addressing longstanding public requests to regain access to religious sites and schools in Mayiliddy and Palaly, Mr. Jayasekara said those properties had also been acquired for the High Security Zone under the 2013 gazette. He said worshippers are nevertheless permitted to enter the sites for religious observances with authorization from the Security Forces Headquarters–Jaffna and the military’s Directorate of Operations. The Deputy Minister also outlined the government’s position on several disputed military-held properties elsewhere in the Northern Province. In Kilinochchi District, he said, land sought for the expansion of the Iranamadu Kannakambikai Amman Temple remains in use by the Army’s 1st Battalion. The land, he said, could be released only after the government recovered Rs. 8.47 million spent by the Army on buildings and other infrastructure constructed there. He said a separate parcel at Iranamadu Junction, previously used by the Army as a children’s park, was formally handed over to the Karachchi Divisional Secretariat on March 29, 2025\. Another parcel belonging to the Department of Agriculture, which the Army’s 6th Sinha Regiment had used, was returned to the department on March 11, 2026. On the disputed lands at Keppapilavu in Mullaitivu District, Mr. Jayasekara said that during the survey, 44 of 55 civilian landowners agreed to accept alternative land in place of their original properties. According to the minister, those families received 40-perch allotments in the Keppapilavu Model Village, together with newly constructed houses and public facilities, including a preschool, school, Grama Niladhari office, and community hall. The remaining 11 landowners declined the government’s offer of alternative land and housing, he said. Authorities subsequently explored whether they would instead accept financial compensation based on government valuations in exchange for transferring ownership of their original properties to the Army, but the proposal was rejected. Mr. Jayasekara said the government had since informed the Puthukudiyiruppu Divisional Secretariat that the remaining claimants could still be allocated land of equivalent size from the unused portion of the Army camp and provided with houses financed by the government and constructed with Army assistance. ### Government Seeks Royal Pardon for Anojan After Saudi Sentence URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/government-seeks-royal-pardon-for-sivarasa-anojan-after-saudi-sentence/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T00:34:14.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka is pursuing both legal and diplomatic efforts to assist Sivarasa Anojan, the Sri Lankan migrant worker sentenced by a Saudi Arabian court over a Facebook comment deemed insulting to the Prophet Muhammad, with officials confirming that discussions are underway on filing an appeal while seeking clemency from the Saudi government. Cabinet spokesman and Minister of Health and Mass Media Nalinda Jayatissa said Tuesday that the government was consulting Anojan's family about lodging an appeal and simultaneously exploring diplomatic options, including a royal pardon or a reduction of his sentence. Mr. Jayatissa made the remarks during the weekly post-Cabinet media briefing in Colombo in response to questions about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' handling of the case. Under Saudi law, he said, the period available to appeal is limited, and the consent of Anojan's family is required before any appeal can proceed. "We are discussing the matter with the family," Mr. Jayatissa said, adding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through Sri Lanka's Embassy in Riyadh, was also engaged in diplomatic discussions with Saudi authorities to explore the possibility of obtaining a royal pardon, a reduced sentence, or other forms of relief. His comments mark the Sri Lankan government's first detailed public explanation of the steps it is taking since news of Anojan's conviction emerged earlier this week. An official notification from Sri Lanka's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism, issued after receiving the judgment from the Sri Lankan Embassy in Riyadh, states that the Criminal Court in Al-Ahsa found Anojan guilty under Saudi law and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, effective from the date of his initial detention. The court also imposed a fine of three million Saudi riyals, ordered the confiscation of the electronic device allegedly used in committing the offence and directed the closure of the social media account connected to the case. The document further states that the judgment may be appealed within 30 days of its receipt. However, it notes that, according to legal advice obtained by the Sri Lankan Embassy from a Saudi lawyer, the likelihood of the appellate court accepting an appeal or reducing the sentence is considered "extremely low." The embassy nevertheless outlined legal options should Anojan decide to pursue an appeal. Anojan, a Sri Lankan Tamil from Kalmunai working in Saudi Arabia, was convicted after Saudi authorities determined that a Facebook comment he posted constituted an insult to the Prophet Muhammad. The case drew widespread attention in Sri Lanka after it became linked to this year's Pada Yatra, the annual Hindu pilgrimage to Kataragama. During the pilgrimage, a stray dog named Subramani by devotees became an unlikely social media sensation after accompanying pilgrims for hundreds of kilometres. Public attention intensified after a video showed a young Muslim man kicking the dog in Kalmunai, prompting widespread condemnation and his subsequent arrest before he was released on bail. As debate over the incident spread online, inflammatory comments targeting different religious communities appeared across social media. According to Anojan's family, one of his Facebook comments later became the basis of the Saudi prosecution. The case has unsettled Sri Lanka's migrant worker community and reignited debate over the legal risks faced by citizens employed in countries with strict blasphemy laws. Saudi Arabia enforces stringent laws governing speech considered offensive to Islam, with online expression capable of attracting prison terms and substantial financial penalties. Hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans work in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf, where remittances remain one of Sri Lanka's largest sources of foreign exchange. Rights groups have long warned that migrant workers can find themselves subject to legal systems that differ significantly from those in their home country. ### Opposition Lawmaker Questions Exclusion of Sirisena From Easter Bombings Prosecution URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/opposition-lawmaker-questions-exclusion-of-sirisena-from-easter-bombings-prosecution/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T15:49:02.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A Sri Lankan opposition lawmaker on Tuesday accused the Attorney General's Department of deliberately failing to prosecute former President Maithripala Sirisena and former State Intelligence Service Director Nilantha Jayawardena in the criminal case over the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, despite both having previously been found responsible by the Supreme Court for failing to prevent the attacks. Speaking during a parliamentary debate on a supplementary appropriation bill, Mujibur Rahman, a member of the opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), questioned why the two officials were not named in the Trial-at-Bar proceedings that last week resulted in death sentences for former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara and former Defence Ministry Secretary Hemasiri Fernando. "The Attorney General's Department deliberately failed in its duty," Mr. Rahman told Parliament. "Two people who should have faced prosecution were left out of the case." Mr. Rahman said the criminal case was based on the Wijith Malalgoda Committee Report, which he said had recommended legal action against 14 individuals. However, he said that indictments had been filed only against Mr. Jayasundara and Mr. Fernando. He also referred to the Supreme Court's 2023 judgment in the victims' fundamental rights petition, which held that former President Sirisena, Mr. Jayasundara, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando, former Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis, and former State Intelligence Service Director Nilantha Jayawardena had violated the fundamental rights of the victims by failing to act on intelligence warnings before the attacks. Mr. Rahman argued that the Attorney General's Department should have included Mr. Sirisena and Mr. Jayawardena in the criminal prosecution before the three-judge Trial-at-Bar. "How can two individuals whom the Supreme Court found responsible be excluded from the criminal case?" he asked. "This amounts to a clear failure of duty by the Attorney General's Department." He further noted that the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday attacks had also recommended legal action against both Mr. Sirisena and Mr. Jayawardena. Mr. Rahman argued that Mr. Sirisena, who was President and Defence Minister at the time of the attacks, exercised authority over the Defence Ministry and the armed forces and therefore could not evade responsibility for the failures identified by the commission and the Supreme Court. He also called for investigators to identify and prosecute the principal masterminds behind the Easter Sunday bombings, saying criminal proceedings should be initiated against all those for whom sufficient evidence exists and who were identified in the commission's report. "The victims deserve justice," he said. "Those identified by the evidence and by the commission as bearing responsibility must also be brought before the law." The Attorney General's Department has not publicly responded to Mr. Rahman's allegations. ### PMD and Tamil Leaders Emphasize Different Priorities After Dissanayake Talks URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/pmd-and-tamil-leaders-emphasize-different-priorities-after-dissanayake-talks/ Last updated: 2026-08-03T16:44:58.000Z ### **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** President Anura Kumara Dissanayake on Monday reaffirmed his government's commitment to introducing a new Constitution and abolishing the Executive Presidency, but said constitutional reform should proceed only after building "a new national consensus," according to a statement issued by the President's Media Division following talks with representatives of six Tamil-speaking political parties. The official account of the nearly two-hour meeting at the Presidential Secretariat broadly aligned with participants' descriptions on the subjects discussed but differed in emphasis and omitted several exchanges that delegates later described, including discussions on military-held land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and criticism of the parliamentary committee examining Provincial Council electoral reforms. According to the PMD, discussions covered constitutional reform, long-delayed Provincial Council elections, issues affecting the Northern and Eastern Provinces and the Malayagam community, and proposals to improve the living conditions of plantation workers. On constitutional reform, the PMD said ITAK General Secretary M.A. Sumanthiran urged that a new Constitution should emerge through an inclusive national process rather than be rushed or introduced by a single political party, as he argued had occurred with the Constitutions of 1948, 1972, and 1978. Responding, President Dissanayake reiterated that constitutional reform and the abolition of the Executive Presidency remain government policy. However, he said the immediate priority was to build a broad national consensus rather than introduce a hurried constitutional amendment, calling instead for an inclusive national dialogue. The PMD also said the President argued that his administration had laid the foundation for a country in which citizens increasingly identify as Sri Lankans rather than along ethnic lines, noting that no ethnic unrest had occurred during his tenure and reiterating his preference for a system of government accountable to Parliament. Provincial Council elections also featured prominently during the meeting. According to the PMD, the President said a Parliamentary Select Committee had already been appointed to study issues relating to the conduct of the elections and that he intended to discuss the concerns raised by the delegation with the committee. The PMD statement, however, does not mention an exchange described by participants, who said ITAK MP R. Shanakiyan and SLMC representative Nizam Kariapper, both members of the select committee, argued directly to the President that the committee had become a mechanism for delaying the elections and urged the government to proceed under the existing electoral system. The PMD also highlighted the government's proposal to grant legal title to 10-perch residential plots for plantation workers, plans to incorporate land ownership provisions into plantation lease agreements due for renewal before 2042, environmental protection measures in the Central Highlands, a proposed assistance programme involving the Thondaman Foundation and Nevada Foundation, and an increase in funding for the Ministry of Plantation and Community Infrastructure in the 2027 Budget. According to the PMD, President Dissanayake also announced that funding would be allocated through the 2027 and 2028 Budgets to construct 13,000 houses in two phases for people displaced during the civil war. He further said the government would provide permanent housing for families displaced by Cyclone Ditwah while continuing rental assistance until construction is completed. On land issues in the North, the PMD reaffirmed the government's commitment to resolving longstanding disputes, stating that land should ultimately belong to the people and noting that commissions had already been appointed to address those issues. Participants, however, described a more detailed discussion in which the President reportedly said he had asked the military to explain why privately owned land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces remained under military occupation and reaffirmed his intention to ensure those lands are eventually released. Those details do not appear in the PMD statement. The PMD also said representatives raised concerns about the Provincial Council electoral system, the Delimitation Commission, and the impact of what they described as outdated policies implemented by institutions, including the Department of Archaeology, the Department of Forest Conservation, and the Mahaweli Authority. Closing the meeting, President Dissanayake thanked the alliance for presenting a united voice on issues affecting Tamil-speaking communities while encouraging its representatives to frame those concerns within the broader national interest in order to avoid misunderstanding and promote common solutions. ### They Found Justice for Easter. Why Can’t They Find It for Mullivaikkal? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/they-found-justice-for-easter-why-cant-they-find-it-for-mullivaikkal/ Last updated: 2026-08-03T09:18:41.000Z **By Che Ran** The Easter Sunday bombings were one of the darkest days in Sri Lankan history. On 21 April 2019, suicide bombers walked into churches filled with families celebrating the resurrection of Christ and into luxury hotels serving breakfast. More than 260 people were killed. Hundreds more were injured. Children died in their mothers’ arms. Entire families disappeared in a matter of seconds. It was an atrocity. The people responsible—whether they built the bombs, funded them, or knowingly ignored warnings—must be held accountable. No serious person disputes that. And yet, as Sri Lanka triumphantly announces convictions and death sentences, another question echoes from the beaches of Mullivaikkal. Where was this passion seventeen years ago? Where was this urgency when tens of thousands of Tamil civilians were trapped in an ever-shrinking strip of land in the northeast in 2009? Where was this determination when hospitals that had provided their coordinates were repeatedly hit? When so-called “No Fire Zones” became some of the deadliest places on earth? When families dug bunkers with their bare hands and watched children die from shelling, starvation and untreated wounds? The United Nations itself estimated that at least 40,000 civilians may have died in the final months of the war. Other estimates are far higher. UN experts, journalists, satellite imagery, eyewitness testimony, mobile-phone footage and humanitarian workers have spent years documenting allegations of indiscriminate shelling, executions and enforced disappearances. Think about the contrast. For Easter Sunday, Sri Lanka spent seven years investigating whether intelligence warnings were ignored. For Mullivaikkal, mothers have spent seventeen years standing on roadsides holding photographs of children who never came home. For Easter Sunday, there are courtrooms, press conferences, speeches and promises. For Mullivaikkal, there are protests, military checkpoints and graves that may never be found. For Easter Sunday, politicians speak solemnly about justice. For Mullivaikkal, they speak about moving on. The absurdity is breathtaking. Sri Lanka has demonstrated that it can prosecute senior officials for failing to prevent a crime. It has shown that the machinery of the state—judges, prosecutors, investigators, and the media—can move with astonishing force when there is political will. Yet somehow, when it comes to the allegations surrounding the final months of the civil war, we are told the truth is too complicated. Too many years have passed. Too much uncertainty. Too many questions. Really? Thousands of videos exist. UN reports exist. Satellite images exist. Survivors exist. Doctors exist. Aid workers exist. Soldiers exist. Entire families still carry the scars of what they witnessed. The same state that insists it can reconstruct the chain of command surrounding Easter Sunday somehow asks us to believe that the events of 2009 are simply too mysterious to investigate. It is impossible not to see the selective morality at work. This is not an argument against justice for Easter Sunday. The victims deserve justice. Every church destroyed, every child killed, every family shattered deserves answers. But justice that stops at the doors of St. Anthony’s Shrine and never reaches Mullivaikkal is not justice. It is politics. A country cannot build reconciliation on selective memory. It cannot ask Tamils to celebrate accountability while the largest and most painful chapter of their history remains unresolved. Imagine telling the families of Easter victims to simply forget and move on. Imagine telling them that asking questions threatens national unity. Imagine telling them that justice is inconvenient. That is precisely what thousands of Tamil families have heard for nearly two decades. Sri Lanka loves to say that all lives matter equally. Prove it. Investigate every allegation. Open every archive. Examine every battlefield order. Follow every chain of command. Let judges decide what happened. Because if justice is truly blind, it cannot stop at Easter Sunday. It must travel north, to a narrow stretch of beach called Mullivaikkal, where thousands of families are still waiting for the country to acknowledge that their dead mattered too. ### How the LTTE Hollowed Out Tamil Society Long Before Its Military Defeat URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-the-ltte-hollowed-out-tamil-society-long-before-its-military-defeat/ Last updated: 2026-08-03T03:24:07.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** At a workshop for teenage Tamil girls in Jaffna, a teacher wanted to know who Nelson Mandela was. Several hands went up. Mandela fought for South Africa’s freedom and to end apartheid. The answer was apt. Okay, who was Mahatma Gandhi? Again, several hands went up. Gandhi led the Indian independence movement against the British. He was an apostle of non-violence. Correct. A third question followed: Who was (Appapillai) Amirthalingam? There was a silence in the classroom. No one seemed to know. After a few moments, two girls hesitantly raised their hands. One of them was told to speak up. After a brief pause, the student answered in a low voice: Amirthalingam was a traitor to the Tamil cause. The lady teacher asked no more questions. “This is the tragedy with our society,” said a Tamil political activist in Jaffna who related the Q-and-A session. “Thanks to the Tigers, the girls in the class knew nothing about Amirthalingam except that he was a traitor. Isn’t this a shame?” Indeed, when the school students were being queried, Sri Lanka’s prolonged war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was nearing its gory end. The teacher did not correct the girl’s understanding of the once towering Tamil leader, as the LTTE was still alive, although it would stop kicking soon. I have often wondered what would have been the direction of the armed struggle waged to carve out a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka if only the LTTE had desisted from denigrating anyone and everyone who disagreed with it as “traitors” – and doing away with them physically. Probably, no so-called revolutionary leader or movement killed or ordered the slaying of so many from their own community since Stalin unleashed a murder spree after succeeding Lenin because he didn’t want anyone around who could pose even the remotest threat to his authority. In Prabhakaran’s case, it was not really a case of anyone, barring perhaps a couple, that too if you go by the LTTE’s version – taking on the founder leader of the Tamil Tigers or trying to usurp his place. This was anarchism at its worst. Fellow Tamils were killed because they broke the LTTE's rules, were considered too independent, or were deemed too dangerous to be left alive. And who was to decide who could live and who must die? One man: the Tigers' supremo. There was no veto. What began as stray, stealthy murders gradually developed into a cancer that slowly devoured the once-liberal Tamil society, long before the Sri Lankan state ultimately pulverized the Tigers. And as everyone knows, the disease claimed hundreds of lives within the LTTE ranks too. As Prabhakaran’s earliest colleagues recall, there was no rational reason to kill Michael and Patkunan during the LTTE’s formative years. Michael only wanted to quit militancy; Patkunan felt Prabhakaran was not the best leader. Michael, one of the earliest Tamil militants, was taken to a forested patch and shot dead. His body was torched. Patkunan’s killing was more dramatic. While talking to him, Prabhakaran suddenly whipped out a gun and fired at him from close range. These were no aberration. Sickeningly, the killings never stopped. From one and two, the numbers began to soar. Over time, the murders were fine-tuned and perfected; assassinations became almost an art. The definition of the *drohi* too became expansive. It is sheer luck that friend-turned-foe Uma Maheshwaran did not die at the hands of the Tigers. He was lucky that Prabhakaran and an associate missed their mark when they fired at Uma in Madras in 1982\. On another occasion, also in Tamil Nadu, the LTTE wanted to kill Uma, but he didn’t reach the place where he was to be targeted. TELO leader Sri Sabarattinam had no such luck. Even as he begged for mercy, LTTE Jaffna commander Kittu gunned him down. Hundreds of TELO fighters, too, were slaughtered in Jaffna and elsewhere, decimating one of the biggest Tamil militant groups. I interviewed a TELO member (from Jaffna) who escaped death at the last moment because a relative begged Kittu to spare his life. But the lucky guy saw another TELO member (from the east) tied to an electricity post and shot in the head – “Sir, the skull splattered to pieces!” Cho Ramaswamy’s *Tughlaq* magazine carried a memorable cartoon then. It had National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali telling President J.R. Jayewardene the need for weapons to battle Tamil militants. No need, JR retorts, Prabhakaran is doing our job. When he is finished, we will move in! PLOT Jaffna leader Mendis was caught, tortured, and his bloodied body was handed over to his family, with his gold chain. Acting like a de facto state, the Tigers “banned” TELO and PLOTE, like how Colombo once outlawed the LTTE. The EPRLF was the next to be targeted. Much later, LTTE gunmen wiped out virtually the entire leadership of the group in a mafia-style attack in Chennai. EPRLF leader K. Pathmanabha’s only defence against an AK-47 was a pillow. By then, the LTTE had already assassinated Tamil United Liberation Front leader Amirthalingam – once the idol of militants, Prabhakaran included -- and colleague V. Yogeswaran. The LTTE forgot that Amirthalingam, despite his diminished political aura, was held in high esteem by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi until her own very end. The twin TULF murders were carried out when the Tigers were in so-called peace talks with President Ranasinghe Premadasa. This was also when the LTTE got the carte blanche to “arrest” scores of Tamils opposed to Prabhakaran from various places in southern Sri Lanka. With Colombo looking the other way, these men were taken to the LTTE lair in buses with tinted glasses, their hands tied and legs chained to seats. Most of them were never seen again. It was in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the LTTE opened large prisons in the country’s north. At its peak, these jails – torture chambers, in reality – held thousands of Tamils of all age groups, detained on a variety of charges. The treatment meted out to the Tamil prisoners would have put even hardened Sinhalese interrogators to shame. Some went insane due to torture. Among the prominent Tamils the LTTE assassinated were academic and rights activist Rajani Thiranagama, scholar and lawyer Neelan Thiruchelvan, and Tamil activist and human rights advocate Loganathan Ketheshwaran. Several other lesser mortals, too, were killed in the Tamil areas. Many Tamils fled Sri Lanka to escape the LTTE. A gunman shot dead an ex-Prabhakaran associate in Paris for daring to write a book on the Tamil Tigers leader. Prominent Tamil journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj was thrashed by thugs in Toronto. Several other Tamil diaspora members were also victims. The Tigers kept a key Tamil leader from London in an underground prison for 62 days before pressure from the Scotland Yard led to his release. In actions that only hardened the Sri Lankan state in the long run (despite many military setbacks), Prabhakaran ordered the assassination of several government leaders, including Ranjan Wijeratne, Premadasa, Athulathmudali, Lakshman Kadirgamar, Gamini Dissanayake, and Chandrika Kumaratunga (who, however, survived while losing an eye). The suicide bombing of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is well known. This was one assassination the LTTE came to seriously regret. This was not because of any respect for human life but due to a vicious crackdown that India launched till the Tigers were militarily routed. If one were to list all the “traitors” and “anti-Tamils” the LTTE did away with, one would end up writing thousands of words. Countless Tamils—notables and the not-so-well-known alike—were done to death in Colombo and across the north and east of Sri Lanka. All these chilling killings created a Stalinist state that the LTTE could control, and where no dissent was allowed. The Tigers’ totalitarian ideology and internal terror stifled free thinking in the once vibrant Tamil society. Ordinary Tamils became extremely cautious while expressing their feelings even outside the LTTE zone – because many felt the Tigers had ears and eyes everywhere, *a la* North Korea. The “traitors” were found even within the LTTE. Mahattaya, once the Tigers' designated No. 2, was tortured and executed, along with a few hundred fighters, on charges of being Indian spies. Karuna, one of the LTTE's top leaders, survived a massive manhunt after he revolted—and ultimately outlived Prabhakaran. But hundreds of Tigers seen as loyal to Karuna, including young women, were massacred. Several leaders, including Jim Kelly Thatha, were tortured and burned to death after being promised clemency if they surrendered. Such extreme cruelty and wanton killings were unheard of in any so-called liberation movement. Palestinian outfits had their woes, but were babies in this matter compared to the LTTE. The once formidable Naxalites in India splintered into dozens of factions; many of these outfits kept trying to unite, not to kill one another. The number of Tamils the LTTE killed in Sri Lanka could run into thousands. Did these murders serve any purpose – except to instill fear and generate hatred for the Tigers? Did it take Prabhakaran any closer to Tamil Eelam? Did it make Colombo throw up its hands in despair? Yes, it did create some awe about the Tigers' killing machine; Prabhakaran could reach an enemy, real or perceived, anywhere in the world -- just like Stalin got Trotsky in distant Mexico. We need to examine another largely ignored aspect. Considering the way it hollowed out the Tamil society from within, what would have happened if the LTTE had somehow won an independent Tamil Eelam? Would such a state have been any different from today’s North Korea? This commentary is no excuse for whatever murderous activities other Tamil militant groups indulged in, either in response to the Tigers or on their own. But no one in Sri Lanka’s Tamil society killed so many fellow Tamils, at times with barbarity, as did the Tamil Tigers. An armed struggle which began with one enemy – the Sinhalese state – ended up turning almost the entire world against it by the time it was routed: The unending “traitors” among Tamils, Sri Lankan leaders, a senior Indian leader, ordinary Sinhalese and Muslims, the Western world, other countries which armed Colombo *et al*. Mao believed in isolating the main foe by befriending everyone else; for Prabhakaran, it was “My Way or Highway.” “The first question we need to ask is who gave the authority to Prabhakaran and the LTTE to decide who was a traitor and who was not,” asks Ratna Rajadurai, a former Tamil militant from Batticaloa who now lives in the West. Rajadurai recalls with pain the long periods in the mid-1980s when he and his comrades, relatively poorly armed, spent time hiding from the Tigers or occasionally hitting back “when we should have been all fighting the Sri Lankan state”. According to him, around 600 Tamil militants, mostly from non-LTTE groups, were killed in internecine battles in just around four years in Batticaloa alone until early 1990. Rajadurai says the Tigers once shot dead an EPRLF activist, stripped his body of its clothes, dragged it to his home in the Mandoor area, and ordered that he should not be clothed even during his last rites. “This was shocking and absurd,” Rajadurai said. “It was against our religion. Somehow, the villagers found the courage to defy the LTTE's diktat. For once, the Tigers backed off. After all, they were not yet the dominant force in Batticaloa. But I can never forget that naked, bloodied body.” Without knowing what happened in Batticaloa, the Sri Lankan military similarly treated Prabhakaran after killing him. They took off his battle fatigues, leaving him in soiled undergarments. To those who had suffered at the hands of the Tigers, this was a karmic blowback. ### One Spoke of Karma. The Other Named a Conspiracy. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/one-spoke-of-karma-the-other-named-a-conspiracy/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T16:58:47.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Moments before a Colombo court sentenced them to death on Friday for failing to prevent the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, Sri Lanka's former police chief and former defence secretary were each invited, as the law requires, to explain why they should not receive the death penalty. Their answers could hardly have been more different: one was a quiet surrender to fate; the other, a defiant insistence that the men he said truly bore responsibility for the massacre remained shielded by the state. Pujith Jayasundara, who was inspector general of police when suicide bombers struck churches and hotels across the island on Easter morning, told the three-judge bench that he had never in his life committed a massacre, and that as a Buddhist, he could only understand his predicament as the karma of some wrong from a previous life now catching up with him. “From the very beginning of this case, I have been subjected to injustice,” he said, addressing the court in open session after his conviction but before sentence was passed. He acknowledged that, as part of the country’s national security apparatus, he “bore responsibility.” But others, he noted pointedly, had walked free. “Please consider how humane it is that someone who served as the Inspector General of Police of this country has been brought to such a situation.” He asked the judges to look upon him “with mercy and compassion,” said he had never deliberately neglected his duty, and closed simply: “I have nothing further to say.” Hemasiri Fernando, who was Secretary to the Ministry of Defence at the time of the attacks, told the court that there was no office formally called "Defence Secretary." He said he had served as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, a civil administrative post no different from that of any other ministry secretary and one that carried no special powers. He could act only on the instructions of the minister, he said. At the time of the attacks, the Minister of Defence was President Maithripala Sirisena, who was abroad, and no acting minister had been appointed. "When there is no minister, the functions of the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence are effectively paralysed," Fernando told the court. The intelligence, he insisted, had never reached him. He said the president had personally instructed him, on his appointment, to leave intelligence matters to Nilantha Jayawardena, the director of the State Intelligence Service, and to concentrate on administration. For four years, Fernando said, it was Jayawardena - not he -- who briefed the president directly. Until the day before the bombings, he said, he had received nothing on the threat but a single WhatsApp message. At an intelligence review meeting on April 9, he said, the spy chief presented nothing about the coming attack, though military and naval intelligence officers were in the room and could have acted had he spoken. Jayawardena, he told the court, “took steps to suppress these intelligence reports on seven occasions.” “Your judgment is the final outcome of that conspiracy surrounding the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks,” Fernando said. Two men, he added, would be pleased by his conviction: Sirisena, the former president, and Jayawardena, “whom the Attorney General’s Department has protected from the very beginning.” He called the intelligence chief “the principal conspirator behind these attacks.” He went further, describing how, in his telling, the two officials in the dock had come to be there at all. After the bombings, a committee headed by Justice Malalgoda investigated, and on the strength of Jayawardena’s own statement, the attorney general instructed the acting police chief to arrest 14 people, Fernando said. The acting chief, he claimed, took the matter to the president and warned that jailing all 14 would leave him unable to run the police. The president, according to Fernando, then asked who had ordered the arrests — and directed that only he and Jayasundara be taken into custody. “In what way is that just?” he asked. The presiding judge, Priyantha Liyanage, then read out the sentence of death for each man. ### Tamil Parties to Meet President, Opposition URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-parties-to-meet-president-opposition/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T16:26:37.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —**Representatives of the six Tamil-speaking political parties, who announced last month their decision to work together to advance the interests of Tamil-speaking people, are scheduled to hold separate meetings on Monday (Aug. 3) with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa The six parties — the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC), the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA), and the Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA) — had agreed to work together constructively on matters where common ground can be reached, while preserving their respective independence, policies, and political positions, with the welfare of Tamil-speaking people as their shared priority. As a continuation of that initiative, the parties formally requested a meeting with the President to discuss a range of national issues affecting Tamil-speaking communities. Against that backdrop, representatives of the six parties are scheduled to meet President Dissanayake at the Presidential Secretariat in Colombo at 10 a.m. on Monday. During the meeting, the parties are expected to place particular emphasis on three key issues: the drafting of a new Constitution, the immediate holding of the long-delayed Provincial Council elections, and the release of lands in the Northern and Eastern Provinces that remain under military occupation. The discussions are also expected to cover housing and livelihood assistance for the up-country Tamil community, the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the release of political prisoners, and measures to ensure truth and accountability for enforced disappearances, among other matters. Later in the day, at 3:30 p.m., representatives of the six parties are scheduled to meet Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa at the Office of the Opposition Leader in Colombo. They are expected to discuss the same range of issues concerning the welfare and political aspirations of Tamil-speaking people. ### Sudan and the Illusion of External Rescue: a mirror for Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sudan-and-the-illusion-of-external-rescue-a-mirror-for-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T10:10:02.000Z **Mr. Saifeldin Nemir and Prof Mahesh Nirmalan** ***Mr Saifeldin Nemir is a Sudanese national and the current Chief of UNICEF Field Office, Ethiopia. He was also the former Deputy Country Director for Islamic Relief Worldwide; Professor Mahesh Nirmalan is the Associate Vice President for Responsible Research Practice at the University of Manchester and Consultant in Intensive Care Medicine at Manchester Royal Infirmary, UK*** Sudan is geographically distant from Sri Lanka, but its recent history carries vital lessons for every post-colonial society with unresolved ethnic, linguistic and political tensions. The lessons are not limited to war and humanitarian catastrophe, but extend to misplaced faith in international agencies. It relates to the frequent belief that when human suffering associated with an internal conflict exceeds a given threshold and the violation of basic human rights become adequately manifest, ‘the guardians’ of such rights – The UN and/or its Western sponsors will intervene to deliver justice. Well, Sudan now and Rwanda previously proved that this was not the case. The most recent cycle of conflict in Sudan which erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has produced one of the world's gravest humanitarian crises. In a report by Reliefweb on 03/05/2026 the death toll was estimated to be around 150,000 and the number of people displaced – internally or externally, was quoted to be over 10 million. In addition civilians have also suffered extreme hunger, sexual violence, attacks on hospitals and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. Darfur, is already synonymous with atrocity and impunity and the world's inability – not necessarily unwillingness, to protect the vulnerable populations. When the decisive actions that are required conflict with geopolitical or electoral realities, the latter always prevails. The Tamil saying “*அழுதும் பிள்ளை அவளே பெற வேண்டும்*” (*Not withstanding the pain and tears, the baby has to be delivered by the woman who is pregnant*) aptly summarises the politics of Human Rights in the modern world. The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) evolved after the overt failures of Rwanda and Balkans. The premise here being that when states fail to protect their own populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, the international community has a responsibility to act. In theory, the sheer scale of killing and displacement in Sudan should have triggered such actions as the level of suffering is unprecedented. What we see however is a textbook description of the gap that exists between lofty moral language from airconditioned boardrooms and the ability of a modern democracy – largely driven by the needs of its own population, to act. This reality matters to countries such as Sri Lanka because sections of political thinking, both within the island and in the diaspora, continue to place considerable faith in external intervention. Many still hope that governments in Europe, North America or Australasia – bound by R2P or in response to organised electoral pressure from diaspora groups, will intervene to mobilise international legal mechanisms to deliver justice and accountability that domestic processes had failed to deliver repeatedly. ![Figure 1: Satellite images and verified videos show a picture of door-to-door killings in Darfur. Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) says they observed numerous clusters, consistent with the appearance of human bodies. (From Google Images)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/sudan-and-the-illusion-of-exte-mH6LJ4-kix27f2dle1ac9q.jpg) Figure 1: Satellite images and verified videos show a picture of door-to-door killings in Darfur. Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) says they observed numerous clusters, consistent with the appearance of human bodies. (From Google Images) Such wishful thinking emerge through genuine grievances following cycles of discrimination, anti-minority violence, militarisation, land disputes, the trauma of war, the unresolved pain of the disappeared, the mass graves of Chemmani (செம்மணி or චෙම්මනි) and the repeated cycles of betrayal by the ruling class. However understandable, hope and wishful thinking do NOT amount to sound political strategy. The lessons from Sudan vis-à-vis R2P are unmistakable. Western powers are increasingly reluctant to invest resources or place their soldiers in harms-way in poorer countries. The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have fundamentally altered public opinion and despite speaking the language of human rights, civilian protection and accountability, the democratic mandate for active intervention is hard to obtain. They therefore attempt to use diplomacy, soft sanctions, humanitarian aid restriction and expressions of concern as levers to resolve deep-seated ethnic conflicts. Such ‘soft power’ is rarely effective in shifting the position of parties locked in bitter disputes along ethno-relegious fault lines and - in reality, merely prolongs the conflict. ![Figure 2: The UNHRC has - since 2009, passed multiple resolutions on Sri Lanka. Despite the pressure, the National questions still remain with the fear of recurrence. (Source: Google Images)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/sudan-and-the-illusion-of-exte-mH6LJ4-kix9msp2iink9u.jpg) Figure 2: The UNHRC has - since 2009, passed multiple resolutions on Sri Lanka. Despite the pressure, the National questions still remain with the fear of recurrence. (Source: Google Images) Even if external actors can shape narratives and support humanitarian operations they are rarely neutral actors pursuing justice alone. Strategic, economic and security interests frequently determine the extent of their involvement. Sudan further illustrates a harsher truth: external engagement sometimes prolongs conflict rather than resolving it. The implications of these harsh lessons for Sri Lanka are no doubt uncomfortable. A country that has not resolved its internal national questions cannot indefinitely outsource those responsibilities to Geneva, New York, Washington, London, Delhi or Brussels. International advocacy can expose abuses, preserve evidence and maintain pressure. Though indispensable at times it cannot substitute for the difficult domestic work of constructing a political settlement that the peoples of Sri Lanka can collectively sustain – “*அழுதும் பிள்ளை அவளே பெற வேண்டும்” (Not withstanding the pain and tears, the baby has to be delivered by the woman who is pregnant*). ![Figure 3: Chemmani Mass Grave in Jaffna, where the skeletal remains of approximately 400 dead persons have been excavated to date. (Source: The Economist September 2025)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/sudan-and-the-illusion-of-exte-mH6LJ4-kixehuert13f4zz.png) Figure 3: Chemmani Mass Grave in Jaffna, where the skeletal remains of approximately 400 dead persons have been excavated to date. (Source: The Economist September 2025) Stating these stark realities of international politics is however not an argument for silence or surrender. The demand for dignity, equal citizenship, accountability and meaningful power-sharing by minority groups in Sri Lanka remains entirely legitimate. A country cannot move forward by asking victims to forget. But political realism requires a different question: if external actors are unlikely to deliver a lasting solution, what internal strategy offers the best prospect for durable progress? Part of the answer lies in moving beyond constitutional labels and focusing on constitutional outcomes. For decades, political discourse amongst minority groups has revolved around concepts such as federalism, devolution, autonomy and, at times, a separate state. These ideas emerged in a specific historical context and hence cannot simply be dismissed. Constitutional frameworks are however only conduits to achieve certain endpoints. They are means to an end rather than ends in their own right. The more important question therefore is what problems deserve resolutions or what are the impediments to inclusive nation-building? Indeed, one consistent weakness of ‘*minority politics*’ in modern times has been the failure to articulate clearly and consistently the fundamental concerns that challenge minority groups. Notwithstanding discussions that may have taken place behind closed doors with the political elite in Colombo, the real problems were neither defined nor articulated to the common decent men and women who determine the electoral fate of the country . In this context it is useful to place on record three primary concerns of all minority communities that stand out. *Physical security and protection against organised collective violence*: The memory of 1958, 1977, 1983, the final years of the civil war and the riots of Digana and Aluthgama remain deeply embedded in the political consciousness of minority communities. The concern here is whether constitutional order provides credible safeguards against recurrence. The crucial question is whether those occupying the highest offices of state - including Head of State, Defence Secretaries, Military Commanders, Police Chiefs and other senior officials, can be held legally accountable if they participate, facilitate or fail to prevent organised violence directed against any community? Constitutional arrangements that fail to do so will inevitably struggle to generate trust. This is a very legitimate concern for all people who have observed the vexed political journey of post-independence Sri Lanka and many other countries with similar problems. *Concerns over cultural assimilation*: This is often poorly understood outside Tamil political circles. The anxiety concerns the gradual disappearance of a distinct linguistic and cultural identity rather than individuals taking different identities through marriage or other circumstances. Examples from parts of the North Western Province demonstrate how minority communities can become assimilated into larger majoritarian populations within 2 generations. Even if not necessarily violent or coercive, such rapid transformations result in the erosion of language, historical memory and cultural continuity. The demands for separate state and even federalism stem from this basic and legitimate anxiety within the community. This concern raises the obvious questions of how language and cultural rights may be protected throughout the island?; How can educational institutions preserve linguistic and cultural traditions?; How can public administration support genuine Tri-lingualism?; and how can minority cultures be protected wherever they are – as a constitutional duty rather than as a ‘special favour’ rendered by any given leader. *Historical legitimacy and belonging*: Many Tamils and Muslims reject narratives that portray them as relatively recent arrivals and hence possess weaker historical claims to the island than others. They seek acknowledgement that Tamil-speaking people have been an integral component of Sri Lanka's civilisation, history and cultural tapestry for centuries if not millenia. This issue cannot be dismissed as being merely symbolic as symbols matter in Nation building. Nations are held together not only by constitutions or military power but rather by the stories we tell about ourselves. If the story we say is one of ‘*Us Vs Them*’, the ‘*Them*,’ will always want to become the ‘*Us*’ triggering powerful centrifugal forces that are hard to control. A durable settlement therefore requires an understanding of Sri Lanka's past that recognises the historical contributions and an honest reconciliation with the fact of co-ownership and co-evolution. Crucially, none of these three concerns necessarily require physical separation between communities or the creation of exclusive ethnic territories. Security, cultural continuity and historical legitimacy can potentially be secured through a range of constitutional arrangements. The real issue is therefore not one of ‘unitary Vs united’ or ‘federalism Vs unitary’ but rather if the chosen constitutional arrangements effectively address the above-mentioned concerns. This distinction matters because it shifts politics away from symbolic debates and towards measurable outcomes. Such a reframing would also make the concerns of the minority communities easier to comprehend. Security from collective violence, protection of cultural identity and the denial of historical and cultural legacy are principles with universal relevance. They invite practical discussion rather than ideological confrontation. In this context, the Tamil leadership and the diaspora face an important choice. Should they continue invest their political energy in persuading external actors to impose solutions that those actors are unlikely (or unable) to enforce anyway or should they combine international advocacy with a more grounded strategy involving the strengthening democratic institutions, investing in education and enterprise, nurturing civic organisations and supporting political initiatives capable of addressing the above three legitimate concerns. In the context of the 30-year war and the extent of the losses suffered, this transition is not emotionally easy. Internal engagement is slow, frustrating, unspectacular and lacks the perceived ‘victory’ of securing international condemnation. It requires dialogue with those who may deny, minimise or misunderstand legitimate grievances. It demands engagement with Muslim concerns in the East, the struggles of Malaiyaha Tamils and the anxieties of ordinary Sinhalese citizens. It is not a path that can be summarised through emotive electoral slogans such as “*செந்தமிழ் நாடென்னும் போதினிலே இன்ப தேன் வந்து பாயுது காதினிலே*” (*When calling out the name of the Tamil state a sweet ecstasy floods the ears*). Political settlements are not built through mutual validation of grievances alone. They emerge through institutions that allow communities with different memories and aspirations to coexist. The narrative that ‘*We are the cultural and historical owners and you are the polluting invader*’ is not helpful in moving the country towards any lasting settlement that creates the environment where economic development and the wellbeing of citizens become the focus. Sudan serves as a warning. Once conflicts become entrenched, everyone ultimately pays. The immediate victims may belong to particular communities, but prolonged instability eventually damages all parts of this integrated whole. If Sudan is too far a country, look at the families of the 60,000 Sinhala youth who lost their lives between 1987-1989, the 25,000 service personnel who perished fighting Tamil separatism or the economic meltdown of 2022 and the beeline of the Nation’s youth to the long and tortuous passport queues. Sri Lanka is clearly not Sudan. The two countries possess very different histories, demographics and state structures. But the broader lessons remain relevant. Fractured societies cannot assume that international actors will rescue them from the consequences of unresolved internal tensions. ![Figure 4: Call for Justice for the youth who were tortured and executed during the JVP uprising of 1987-1989. (Source: Sri Lanka Collective against Torture).](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/sudan-and-the-illusion-of-exte-mH6LJ4-kixrv87dqrautce.jpg) Figure 4: Call for Justice for the youth who were tortured and executed during the JVP uprising of 1987-1989\. (Source: Sri Lanka Collective against Torture). The international community may express concern, pass resolutions, investigate abuses and provide humanitarian assistance. These actions matter. Evidence should be preserved. Families of the disappeared deserve answers and victims deserve dignity and commemoration. Serious violations should not disappear beneath claims of ‘security considerations. International engagement however cannot replace domestic political settlement. For Sri Lanka, the internal agenda remains clear. It includes meaningful decentralisation of power, protection of land rights, equal implementation of language policy, independent institutions, effective accountability mechanisms and economic development that treats all regions as equal stakeholders in the national future. Equally important is the need for political leadership willing to speak honestly to its own constituencies. Tamil and Muslim leaders must discuss not only what is desirable but also what is achievable. Sinhala leaders must recognise that unresolved minority grievances will continue to undermine national cohesion. Both must move beyond narratives that treat compromise as weakness. The diaspora also bears responsibilities. Distance - despite preserving memories, can also freeze politics to a by-gone era of ‘burning libraries’. But politics and thinking can and must evolve in the changing world driven by the politics of Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Rupert Lowe and Marie LePen. ![Figure 5: The unprecedented curb on immigration in the USA following the election of President Donald J Trump is having a similar impact in Europe and Australasia. (Image obtained from Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons License)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/08/sudan-and-the-illusion-of-exte-mH6LJ4-kix3b0uto8wsmrl.jpg) Figure 5: The unprecedented curb on immigration in the USA following the election of President Donald J Trump is having a similar impact in Europe and Australasia. (Image obtained from Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons License) Those living abroad often enjoy security and opportunities unavailable to those still living in Sri Lanka whose fates can no longer be tied to the wave of migration - legal and illegal, heading towards the shores of Europe, North America or Australasia. That horse has bolted. The privileges the diaspora enjoys – albeit for the time being, should encourage constructive engagement rather than the perpetuation of unrealistic expectations. The most valuable contribution of the diaspora may be neither lobbying foreign governments nor defending old political orthodoxies. It may lie in strengthening the conditions necessary for long-term political progress: supporting education, funding research, investing in local enterprise, promoting civic participation, encouraging independent media and helping create the intellectual space for a more mature political discussion. The struggle for dignity, justice and equality must not not be abandoned. On the contrary, it should be deepened and clarified. The task however is no longer simply to argue about terminologies in constitutional law but rather to articulate precisely what kind of future is sought and how that future may be made possible. The false comfort of waiting for the world is that it postpones these more difficult conversations and Sudan reminds us that such waiting can become tragically long, and hence is not a neutral option. It enables violence to become normalised with the victims and the outside observers accepting status-quo as the norm for that community. Sri Lanka's challenge is to learn that lesson before another generation inherits the consequences of unresolved grievances and misplaced expectations. The hard truth is that no outside power will ultimately reconcile Sri Lanka's communities and the country cannot reach its full economic potential without reconciliation amongst its citizenry. That responsibility belongs to Sri Lankans themselves. The challenge is not merely to preserve memory, but to transform memory into institutions, rights and relationships capable of sustaining a shared future. We must not mistake international sympathy with political deliverance. **The views expressed in this article are that of the authors alone and do not represent the views of either the University of Manchester or UNICEF.** ### India’s Foreign Secretary to Visit Sri Lanka Amid Growing Tamil Political Coordination URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indias-foreign-secretary-to-visit-sri-lanka-amid-growing-tamil-political-coordination/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T14:57:03.000Z ### **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India's Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, is expected to arrive in Sri Lanka next week for an official visit, as Tamil-speaking political parties seek to strengthen coordination ahead of renewed engagement with New Delhi, according to people familiar with the plans. Mr. Misri is expected to meet Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister and other senior government officials, as well as Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa and representatives of Tamil nationalist and up-country Tamil political parties, the sources said. The visit follows an emerging effort by six Tamil-speaking political parties to coordinate on issues of common concern while retaining their individual identities and political positions. The parties have agreed to work together where consensus can be reached, with a focus on advancing the interests of Tamil-speaking communities. Representatives of the six parties are expected to meet Mr. Misri collectively during his visit, according to the sources. Ahead of that meeting, people familiar with the matter told *Jaffna Monitor* that representatives of the six parties are scheduled to meet with India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Santosh Jha, on Tuesday. Preparations for Mr. Misri's visit are expected to be among the topics on the agenda, the people said. ### The Easter Bombings: Anatomy of a State Failure URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-easter-bombings-anatomy-of-a-state-failure/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T02:11:26.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** At 8:27 on the morning of April 21, 2019, a foreign intelligence service sent one last message to the head of Sri Lanka’s State Intelligence Service. The bombers would probably move between six and ten that morning, it said, and one of their targets was a Methodist church in Colombo. Surveillance teams were being deployed. The police, it added, had already been warned. The first explosions came shortly before nine, less than twenty minutes later. Over the course of that day, seven suicide bombers struck three churches, three Colombo hotels, and a guesthouse in Dehiwala. The dead were counted at St. Anthony’s Shrine in Kochchikade, at St. Sebastian’s in Katuwapitiya, at Zion Church in Batticaloa, and in the breakfast rooms of the Shangri-La, the Cinnamon Grand, and the Kingsbury. In all, 268 people were killed, and 586 were injured. At least 42 of the dead were foreigners. Nothing on that scale had happened in the country since the war ended in 2009. ## **The verdict, seven years on** On July 31, 2026, the Colombo Permanent High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced two of the men who had been responsible that day to death: Pujith Jayasundara, the inspector general of police at the time of the attacks, and Hemasiri Fernando, then secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Jayasundara was convicted on 854 of the 855 counts against him. Two of the three judges, Priyantha Liyanage and Thilakaratne Bandara, voted to convict. The third, Viraj Weerasuriya, would have acquitted both men. On top of the death sentence, the court imposed twelve years’ rigorous imprisonment on each of 586 counts of abetting attempted murder, the terms to run concurrently. In practice, the death sentences are unlikely to be carried out. Sri Lanka has not executed a prisoner since 1976, and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has made clear that he intends to maintain the moratorium. As a result, death sentences are typically commuted to life imprisonment. Both men have the right to appeal. ## **Eight warnings in twelve days** The charges are built on eight pieces of intelligence that reached Jayasundara between April 9 and the morning of the attacks. The first came on April 9, in a letter from the director of the State Intelligence Service. Mohamed Zahran Hashim, the leader of a group called National Thowheeth Jama’ath, was planning suicide attacks with a circle of associates. The likely targets included prominent churches and the Indian High Commission. The letter named the men expected to take part, Rilwan, Shahid, Milhan, and others, and gave their addresses. The same day, a second warning, passed on by the Chief of National Intelligence on behalf of the Defence Secretary, repeated the substance, listed the methods the group might use, from suicide vests to a truck, and asked that the police be put on alert. A week later, the intelligence turned specific. On April 16, someone connected to the group set off a motorcycle packed with explosives at Palamunai, near Kattankudy, apparently as a test. The reports that followed traced the motorcycle’s chassis number back to Zahran’s people, tracked the suspects’ movements, logged their calls to numbers abroad, and described how relatives had been selling land to raise money. One report mentioned that some of the men were carrying automatic weapons. Another noted that officers at the Kattankudy police station had been in contact with a wanted suspect and had not arrested him. Then, on April 20, a foreign service reported that the group intended to carry out a martyrdom attack in Sri Lanka *“at any time on or before 21.04.2019.”* Eight places had been chosen, it said, among them a church and a hotel where large numbers of Indians stayed. The last message, the one that arrived at 8:27 the following morning, said only that the attackers would probably move within hours. ## **What the police chief did** When the case reached the Supreme Court, the judges pressed the defence on one question: What had Jayasundara actually done with these reports? His counsel could point to only four things. In one of the letters, the April 9 note from the Chief of National Intelligence, he wrote three letters, “F.N.A.,” and sent them on to four senior officers. One witness thought the initials stood for “For Necessary Action.” Another told the court that this was the kind of marking an officer uses to get a file off his own desk, not to demand that anything be done about it. Jayasundara himself never said what he had meant by it. When Nilantha Jayawardena, the intelligence director, asked him to hand the reports to the Criminal Investigation Department, Jayasundara’s reply, by Jayawardena’s account, was *“tell Ravi”* — meaning a senior deputy. After the April 20 warning, Jayawardena telephoned him again, and this time he was told, *“tell Nandana,”* another deputy. The fourth action was a note Jayasundara wrote on the dry-run reports, asking his intelligence branch to report back on progress by May 5\. He dated it April 21, the day the bombs went off. Both sides agreed, in a formal admission on the record, that Jayasundara had received each of those reports on the day it was written, April 18, 19, and 20, and not on the 21st, as his lawyers later suggested. He had therefore been sitting on the most detailed warnings for the better part of a week, and his response, written on the morning of the attacks, was to ask for an update in a fortnight. Jayasundara had accepted in court that Section 56 of the Police Ordinance applied to him. It requires every police officer to use their *best endeavors* to prevent crime and to gather and pass on intelligence affecting public order. The judges wanted to know how three initials on a letter and two telephone calls telling subordinates to handle it could count as best endeavors in the face of a plan to bomb churches. In 2024, a three-judge Trial-at-Bar had acquitted Jayasundara and Fernando on all charges. The Supreme Court found the reasoning behind that acquittal grossly erroneous. The trial court, it held, had demanded proof that Jayasundara was as culpable as the bombers when he was charged only with aiding the attack by failing to act. That error, the court said, let both Jayasundara and the force he commanded avoid answering for their inaction. The Supreme Court ordered a retrial, which ended in July 2026 with convictions and death sentences. ## **A government at war with itself** The failure, though, was never Jayasundara’s alone. The same warnings passed through the State Intelligence Service, the Chief of National Intelligence, and the Defence Secretary’s office. Some were produced inside the country. Others came from foreign services. The problem, in April 2019, was a government that could barely function. President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe were in open conflict, months after Sirisena had tried to remove him and set off a constitutional crisis. Wickremesinghe had stopped being invited to National Security Council meetings. Sirisena himself was out of the country from April 16 to 21, on a visit to India and Singapore, and had gone without appointing anyone to act as defence minister. The office at the centre of national security sat empty in the days when the warnings were mounting. A parliamentary committee that examined the attacks concluded that Jayawardena, the intelligence chief, had treated his job as finished the moment he forwarded the warnings. He did not tell the President, nor did he pass the reports to the army, navy, or air force. In the end, the intelligence never travelled beyond a small circle of senior men talking to one another on the telephone. The public was never warned. Churches and hotels went into the Easter weekend, when they were at their fullest, with no extra protection. ## **Not the first inquiry** The July verdict was not the first attempt to assign responsibility for the Easter Sunday attacks. A Presidential Commission of Inquiry, in its final report in January 2021, recommended criminal proceedings against a number of senior officials, including former President Maithripala Sirisena, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando, former Police Chief Pujith Jayasundara, intelligence chiefs Sisira Mendis and Nilantha Jayawardena, Jayasundara's deputy Nandana Munasinghe, and a former cabinet minister. Two years later, the Supreme Court, ruling on petitions filed by victims and their families, found several of those officials had violated the victims' fundamental rights and ordered them to pay compensation. For many families, however, the convictions of Jayasundara and Fernando marked only a partial reckoning. Several relatives who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor* welcomed the verdict before turning to the one person they believe has yet to be held fully accountable: former President Maithripala Sirisena. "They have punished the officials, and that matters," said a relative of a victim killed in the Easter Sunday attack on Zion Church in Batticaloa. "But Sirisena was the president. He was also the defence minister. He received the warnings, nothing was done, and he has never faced a criminal trial. That is not justice for our people." At the time of the attacks, Sirisena held the defence portfolio in addition to the presidency, placing him at the head of the country's national security apparatus. The only legal penalty he has faced was the 100 million rupee compensation payment ordered by the Supreme Court in 2023 after it found that he had failed to prevent the attacks, violating the fundamental rights of the victims. He has never been criminally prosecuted. Although the Presidential Commission recommended criminal charges against him, no government has acted on that recommendation. Victims' families and the Catholic Church have long argued that compensation cannot substitute for criminal accountability in an attack that killed 268 people. They continue to call for Sirisena and the other officials named by the commission to face trial. ## **The unanswered part** There is an unresolved awkwardness in who is now doing the reinvestigating. The two officers driving it, Ravi Seneviratne and Shani Abeysekara, were the men running the Criminal Investigation Department when the warnings arrived in 2019\. Seneviratne, a retired senior DIG who had overseen the CID for years, is now secretary to the Ministry of Public Security. Abeysekara, who was the CID’s director at the time of the attacks, was reinstated by the current government and returned as its director in July 2025\. Before he was sentenced, Fernando told the court that he believed former President Maithripala Sirisena had wanted only him and Jayasundara prosecuted, while others who shared responsibility had been spared. ## **What the verdict settles** The verdict settles one thing, even if only in part. What went wrong before Easter Sunday was not a lack of information. The authorities knew the group and its leader. They knew the likely targets and, by the morning of April 21, knew the attacks were imminent. They had the legal powers to intervene and the institutions to act. What failed was the final link: turning intelligence into orders and orders into police officers protecting the identified churches and hotels. Two men will now spend the rest of their lives in prison for what the court found they failed to do. Others, including former President Maithripala Sirisena, remain under a cloud of unresolved accountability as victims continue to press for criminal prosecutions. ## Whose Lives Demand Justice? For the families, however, no verdict can undo what happened that morning. "My child is never coming back," said Swarna, a Tamil mother who lost her son in the bombing at Zion Church in Batticaloa. "The lives of 268 people are gone forever. We can only hope that one day everyone who failed them will be held to account." Another relative, who also lost a family member at Zion Church, said the search for justice had endured because the Easter Sunday attacks cut across Sri Lanka's ethnic divide. "Sinhalese, Tamils and foreigners—we all died together that day," she said. "That is why the country could not look away. People from every community demanded justice, and Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith became its most powerful public voice." Then her voice faltered. "Sometimes I ask myself a painful question," she said. "If the bomb had exploded only at Zion Church in Batticaloa, killing only Tamil worshippers, would the same fight for justice have continued for seven years? Would Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith have become its torchbearer? I don't think so." She paused before continuing. "For decades, Tamil civilians in the North and East have lived through massacres, disappearances, the killing of priests, humanitarian workers, and countless other atrocities. Yet I never saw the same moral outrage from the national establishment or the same sustained campaign from the leadership of the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka. Those wounds were treated as Tamil tragedies, not national ones." She fell silent for a moment before offering one final thought. "Easter became the nation's wound because it claimed everyone. Had it been only another massacre of Tamils in the North or East, I believe it would have joined the long list of unresolved crimes this country has learned to live with. That is the hardest truth for me to accept." ### Nineteen Years After Nilakshan's Killing, Justice Remains Elusive URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/nineteen-years-after-nilakshans-killing-justice-remains-elusive/ Last updated: 2026-08-04T16:44:22.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Nineteen years after Sahathevan Nilakshan, a 22-year-old journalist and University of Jaffna student, was shot dead outside his home during a military curfew, no one has been charged in the case. His killing, former classmates and colleagues say, deprived not only Sri Lankan journalism of a promising young journalist but also the Tamil community of a potential future leader. Mr. Nilakshan, a former student of Jaffna Hindu College, was remembered by teachers and fellow students as a gifted organizer whose leadership qualities were evident from his school days. Many of his juniors still affectionately refer to him as "Nila Anna" ("Brother Nila"), recalling his willingness to go to any length to help and mentor younger students, as well as his ability to inspire those around him. Mr. Nilakshan, a media student at the University of Jaffna’s Media Resources Training Centre, was the editor of the student magazine *Saaralam*. He was killed on Aug. 1, 2007, one day after returning from a two-week journalism training program in Colombo. He had also served as president and later patron of the Jaffna Tamil Students’ Union. According to multiple individuals with direct knowledge of the case, the killing was carried out by a group led by Gunaratnam Sugantheepan, a former medical student at the Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna. Mr. Sugantheepan left his medical studies to work with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the 2002-06 ceasefire period before later joining the Sri Lankan military after falling out with the LTTE. He was later shot dead near his home in Kokkuvil by LTTE gunmen. According to accounts of the killing, the Jaffna Peninsula was under one of the strictest military curfews of the civil war when armed men arrived on motorcycles at Mr. Nilakshan's home in Kokkuvil between about 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. They called him outside and shot him dead in front of his parents before fleeing the scene. The killing took place in an area under tight government and military control. Nearly two decades later, there has been no public explanation of how the assailants were able to move through the curfew and carry out the attack. No suspects have been prosecuted, and the investigation has produced no publicly known breakthrough. Press freedom and human rights organizations have repeatedly cited Mr. Nilakshan’s killing as one of the many unresolved attacks on journalists during Sri Lanka’s civil war, pointing to it as evidence of the country’s enduring culture of impunity for crimes against the media. His mother spent more than 15 years seeking justice for her son’s killing before dying a few years ago without seeing the case resolved. On the 19th anniversary of his death, journalists and human rights advocates renewed calls for an independent and credible investigation, urging the Sri Lankan government to ensure accountability for crimes committed against media workers and to bring those responsible before the courts. Mr. Nilakshan’s death remains one of dozens of unresolved cases involving journalists who were killed, disappeared, or forced into exile during Sri Lanka’s decades-long conflict, with only a handful of those cases resulting in successful prosecutions. ### Vietnam Sees Historic Direct Flights as Gateway to Stronger Sri Lanka Ties URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/vietnam-sees-historic-direct-flights-as-gateway-to-stronger-sri-lanka-ties/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T01:49:58.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Vietnam and Sri Lanka are poised to reach a historic milestone in their bilateral relations with the launch of the first direct commercial flights between the two countries later this month, Vietnamese Ambassador Trinh Thi Tam said, describing the new air links as a catalyst for tourism, trade, and investment. Speaking at a tourism promotion programme in Colombo, Tam said the new services by Vietnam Airlines and Vietjet would end a 34-year period without direct air connectivity since the two countries signed an Air Services Agreement in 1992. “It has taken us 34 years to realise the dream of having direct flights,” the ambassador said. “The upcoming direct flights will create new opportunities not only for tourism, but also for trade, investment, and people-to-people exchanges.” Sri Lanka's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism, Prof. Ruwan Ranasinghe, described the new air services as more than just another commercial route, saying they would serve as a bridge connecting the people of Vietnam and Sri Lanka. He said improved connectivity would make travel easier, encourage greater cultural exchange, and foster lasting relationships between the two countries, while creating new opportunities for tourism and broader economic cooperation. He congratulated both governments and the aviation partners for bringing the long-awaited direct links to fruition after decades of effort. The ambassador was addressing “Vietnam – A World of Endless Wonders,” a tourism promotion programme organised by Vietravel in collaboration with the Embassy of Viet Nam in Sri Lanka and Hayleys Aviation, ahead of the launch of two direct routes linking Ho Chi Minh City and Colombo. The event brought together Sri Lanka’s Deputy Speaker Dr. Rizvie Salih, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism Prof. Ruwan Ranasinghe, Chairman of the Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau Buddhika Hewawasam, Vietravel Chief Executive Officer Tran Doan The Duy, Hayleys Aviation Chief Executive Officer Gerard Victoria, senior executives from Vietnam Airlines and Vietjet, and representatives from more than 100 Sri Lankan travel agencies and tourism companies. Tam said the direct flights would significantly reduce travel time, lower costs, and strengthen tourism, business, and cultural exchanges between the two countries. She urged airlines, tour operators, and tourism authorities to use the new connectivity to develop attractive travel packages and expand bilateral tourism cooperation. Vietravel used the programme to showcase Vietnam’s tourism attractions, including its cultural heritage, natural landscapes, and culinary traditions, while introducing travel packages tailored for the Sri Lankan market. The company also promoted closer cooperation between Vietnamese and Sri Lankan tour operators to encourage two-way tourism. Representatives of Vietnam Airlines and Vietjet outlined their expanding international networks and the forthcoming Ho Chi Minh City–Colombo services, which are expected to improve connectivity for both tourists and business travellers. A highlight of the evening was a live culinary demonstration by Chef Nguyen Van Thong, Vice President of the Vietnam Young Chefs Association, who prepared Vietnam’s iconic pho, banh mi, and fresh spring rolls for guests. The organisers also awarded familiarisation trips to Vietnam to three attendees through a lucky draw, enabling them to explore destinations firsthand. During her address, Tam said Vietnam welcomed more than 22 million international visitors in 2025, while Sri Lanka received over 2.3 million tourists, but noted that tourism exchanges between the two countries had remained below their potential because travellers were forced to transit through third countries. She said the direct flights would help unlock opportunities not only in leisure travel but also in religious tourism, MICE travel, eco-tourism, wellness tourism, and educational exchanges. The tourism promotion programme forms part of broader efforts by the Embassy of Viet Nam in Sri Lanka and its partners to strengthen Vietnam’s presence in the Sri Lankan tourism market and deepen the Comprehensive Partnership between the two countries through greater tourism, trade, and people-to-people connectivity. ### Former Sri Lankan Defense Secretary Sentenced to Death Over Easter Sunday Bombings URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-sri-lankan-defense-secretary-sentenced-to-death-over-easter-sunday-bombings/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T15:38:23.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka's former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando was sentenced to death on Friday after a special three-judge trial court found him guilty of failing to act on intelligence warnings ahead of the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, becoming the second senior official to receive the death penalty in the landmark case. The ruling by the Colombo Permanent High Court Trial-at-Bar came hours after the same court sentenced former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara to death over the attacks, which killed more than 260 people and injured hundreds. The court found that Fernando, who served as Defence Secretary at the time of the bombings, had received advance intelligence warning of the planned attacks but failed to take the necessary steps to prevent them. He was convicted of dereliction of duty and abetting murder through his omission. Speaking before the sentence was delivered, Fernando told the court that then-President Maithripala Sirisena had instructed authorities to arrest only himself and Mr. Jayasundara, despite legal advice to take action against a wider group of officials. He also alleged that the then Director of State Intelligence, Nilantha Jayawardena, had been a co-conspirator in the events surrounding the attacks. Fernando, 76, and Jayasundara, 66, are expected to appeal their convictions before the Supreme Court. The Easter Sunday suicide bombings, carried out on April 21, 2019, targeted churches and luxury hotels across Sri Lanka, killing more than 260 people, including dozens of foreign nationals, and injuring hundreds more. The attacks remain one of the deadliest acts of terrorism in the country's history. ### Former Sri Lankan Police Chief Sentenced to Death Over Easter Sunday Bombings URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-sri-lankan-police-chief-sentenced-to-death-over-easter-sunday-bombings/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T05:41:33.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s former police chief was sentenced to death on Friday for failing to stop the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, after a court found he had sat on a run of intelligence warnings that named the bombers and, at the end, the day they would strike. The three judges of the Colombo Permanent High Court Trial-at-Bar, Priyantha Liyanage, Viraj Weerasuriya, and Thilakaratne Bandara, convicted Pujith Jayasundara, who was Inspector General of Police at the time of the attacks, of abetting the killings through what prosecutors called an illegal omission. He had the warnings. He did not act on them. No head of the Sri Lanka Police had ever before been convicted, let alone condemned to death, over a failure to prevent an attack. It is one of the gravest rulings to come out of a case that has moved through the courts and through the country’s politics for seven years. The bombers struck three churches and three Colombo hotels on the morning of April 21, 2019, during Easter services. St. Anthony’s Shrine in Kochchikade, St. Sebastian’s Church in Negombo, and Zion Church in Batticaloa were packed with worshippers. The hotels were the Shangri-La, the Cinnamon Grand, and the Kingsbury. A seventh attacker blew himself up at a guesthouse in Dehiwala. Court records put the toll at 268 dead and 586 wounded; many of the dead were foreign tourists. The attackers belonged to a local group, National Thowheeth Jama’ath, that had pledged loyalty to the Islamic State. ## Eight warnings The case was about what did not happen. Between April 9 and the morning of the bombings, Mr. Jayasundara’s office took in at least eight intelligence reports, most routed through the State Intelligence Service and several traced to a foreign agency. Each warned that Zahran Hashim and his followers were preparing suicide attacks on churches and on hotels used by foreigners. The reports sharpened by the day. One named Zahran and his lieutenants pointed to Catholic churches and the Indian High Commission. Another, dated April 20, said the group had already rehearsed, detonating a motorcycle near Kattankudy on April 16, and was likely to strike on or before April 21, with eight sites chosen, among them a church and a hotel. A message on the morning of the 21st tightened it again: the attackers were expected to move between 6 and 10 a.m. What the Inspector General did with all that, by the court’s account, was very little. On one intelligence letter, he wrote three initials, “F.N.A.,” understood to mean “for necessary action,” and passed it down the line. On another, he told the intelligence chief to hand the matter to a subordinate. On a report about the Kattankudy rehearsal, he asked for a progress update by May 5 — more than a fortnight away. Nilantha Jayawardena, then head of the State Intelligence Service, testified that when he pushed for instructions, he was told to inform other officers, and not much more. In the ruling that revived the prosecution, the Supreme Court said the country’s most senior policeman had appeared content to write those three letters and move the threat along, with a mass-casualty attack all but announced. Whether that met his duty under the Police Ordinance, which requires every officer to do his utmost to prevent crime, was a question only Mr. Jayasundara could answer, the court held. On Friday, made at last to answer it, he was found to have failed. ## Acquitted, then retried The case turned twice on a point of procedure. In February 2022, an earlier Trial-at-Bar acquitted Mr. Jayasundara and the former defence secretary, Hemasiri Fernando, without even calling on them to defend themselves, ruling that the prosecution had not made its case. The Attorney General appealed. On Nov. 5, 2024, five Supreme Court judges--Preethi Padman Surasena, Yasantha Kodagoda, Kumudini Wickremasinghe, Mahinda Samayawardhena, and Arjuna Obeyesekere --set that acquittal aside, with none of them dissenting. Justice Surasena, writing for the court, found that the trial judges had misread the law, holding the prosecution to a standard the charges never required and denying it the chance to put the accused to his defence. A case of this weight, the court said, should not have closed with the two men freed unheard. It sent the trial back. That retrial ended on Friday. A death sentence in Sri Lanka is close to notional. The country keeps capital punishment on the books but has executed no one since 1976, and successive governments have held to the moratorium. Condemned prisoners remain in jail, and sentences are frequently commuted. Mr. Jayasundara is expected to appeal. ## The men now running the inquiry The conviction comes as President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government pushes a broader reopening of the Easter case, promising to go after both the plot’s backers and whoever obscured the truth afterward. In February, investigators arrested Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, a former military and intelligence chief, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act — a measure of how high the new inquiry is prepared to go. There is an awkwardness in it, and Mr. Jayasundara’s defenders and parts of the opposition have worked it hard. The two officials now steering the investigation both held senior police rank in 2019\. Ravi Seneviratne, now Secretary to the Ministry of Public Security, was then the Senior Deputy Inspector General over the Criminal Investigation Department. Shani Abeysekara, brought back into service and now the C.I.D.'s director, headed the department at the time. Hence, the question doing the rounds in Colombo: should officers who held senior security posts when the system broke down be the ones now sitting in judgment on that breakdown? Their critics, nationalist commentators, and government opponents, who have long resented the pair’s return, call it a conflict of interest and note that both belonged to a retired police group aligned with the governing party before they were rehired. The two men, and the campaigners who want the case pursued read it another way. The C.I.D. investigates crime; it was not part of the intelligence and prevention chain - the State Intelligence Service, the Inspector General, the defence secretary - that received the warnings and failed to move. Mr. Abeysekara has testified that his detectives were already on Zahran’s trail before the bombings, that intelligence officers loyal to the Rajapaksa camp obstructed them, and that his team was broken up once Gotabaya Rajapaksa became president. Mr. Abeysekara was later arrested and jailed. The Catholic Church, the most insistent voice for accountability, says it asked only that the investigators pushed aside under Mr. Rajapaksa be returned to the work, though a cabinet minister’s claim that the two were appointed at the Cardinal’s request is now itself in dispute. None of that fixes how it looks, and the argument will likely return on appeal, and in the wider fight over what the investigation finally concludes. ### U.N. Experts Urge Criminal Probe Into Chemmani Mass Grave URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-n-experts-urge-criminal-probe-into-chemmani-mass-grave/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T05:41:41.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** International accountability experts, senior lawyers, and United Nations officials have called on Sri Lanka to immediately launch a full criminal investigation into the Chemmani mass grave, arguing that the recovery of nearly 500 human skeletons has already established sufficient grounds for a criminal inquiry and that excavation alone cannot deliver justice. Speaking during a special online discussion in Geneva organized by the International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) following the release of its report, *The Chemmani Mass Grave: We Are Still Searching*, the experts warned that Sri Lanka risks repeating the failures of the original Chemmani investigation more than two decades ago unless those responsible are identified and prosecuted. The discussion brought together Johan Soufi, head of the Sri Lanka Accountability Project at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); senior Sri Lankan lawyer K.S. Rathnavel; and Ingrid Massagé, chair of the Sri Lanka Campaign and an international researcher on justice and accountability. ## Excavation Is Not an Investigation Soufi drew a sharp distinction between the ongoing archaeological excavation and a criminal investigation, saying the two should not be conflated. “Excavation means recovering the bodies from the ground and ensuring they receive dignified treatment,” he said. “A criminal investigation is about establishing what happened, who was responsible, and when the crimes were committed.” He argued that the evidence already emerging from Chemmani provides an adequate basis for criminal proceedings. “The information recovered from Chemmani indicates that those buried there did not die of natural causes,” Soufi said. “Moreover, individuals previously convicted have testified that many people who were killed were buried there. That provides the necessary basis to begin a criminal investigation.” Soufi also recalled that the 2015 OHCHR investigation into Sri Lanka identified enforced disappearances as among the gravest violations committed against civilians during the country’s conflict. He said Sri Lanka must not only investigate the crimes but also hold those responsible accountable, adding that the U.N.'s Sri Lanka Accountability Project stands ready to assist those efforts. ## Nearly 500 Skeletons, but No Criminal Inquiry Massagé contrasted the current response with the government’s handling of the original Chemmani investigation in 1999. During the first excavation, only 15 skeletons were recovered. Yet the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) opened investigations while excavations were still underway, questioning more than 300 witnesses and recording statements from over 400 people. Today, she noted, the situation is markedly different. Nearly 500 human skeletons have now been recovered during the renewed excavations ordered by the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court, yet no criminal investigation has been announced. “It is deeply shocking,” Massagé said, “that despite the discovery of nearly 500 skeletons, no criminal investigation has begun.” She also criticized recent remarks by Sri Lanka’s Justice Minister, who visited the excavation site and said the identities of those responsible were not known. “That is equally shocking,” she said. Massagé said the current process should differ fundamentally from that of 1999 because Sri Lanka is no longer in the midst of a civil war, creating greater scope for credible truth and justice mechanisms. ## Questions Over Command Responsibility Senior Attorney K.S. Rathnavel argued that the Chemmani case raises questions about accountability within Sri Lanka’s military hierarchy. He recalled that nine soldiers were named in the prosecution over the 1996 rape and murder of schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, whose case led to the original discovery of the Chemmani mass graves. Seven soldiers were convicted. But Rathnavel said that those convicted were all ordinary soldiers. “No senior military officers, including generals, were ever punished,” he said. “That raises the question of whether those who truly bore responsibility escaped accountability while lower-ranking soldiers were made responsible.” He added that such an outcome was consistent with Sri Lanka’s longstanding pattern of impunity. ## Evidence Already Exists Rathnavel said Chemmani occupies a unique place in Sri Lanka’s human rights history because it contains evidence of some of the gravest alleged crimes committed against civilians. He noted that the existence of the mass graves first became public after a convicted soldier revealed, following his sentencing in the Krishanthi Kumaraswamy case, that the bodies of many other victims had been buried in Chemmani. Excavations began in 1998 but were halted in 2000 following intervention by the Attorney General’s Department, effectively ending the investigation. The issue resurfaced in February 2025 after workers renovating the Chemmani Hindu cemetery discovered human skeletal remains, prompting the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court to order new excavations. Rathnavel noted that Jaffna had been under Sri Lankan military control since 1996 and said it was implausible that crimes of such scale could have occurred without the military’s knowledge. He also pointed to the significance of the location itself. According to Hindu religious practice, bodies are cremated rather than buried. The discovery of hundreds of skeletons buried haphazardly, many reportedly layered on top of one another, strongly suggests the site was not an ordinary cemetery, he said. The court has since declared the area a crime scene. ## Calls for International Expertise Massagé also questioned the forensic approach adopted in the current excavations. Although international experts monitored the 1999 excavations, they were not permitted to intervene directly, she said. This time, while the site has been visited by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, European Union ambassadors, and other international representatives, no international forensic specialists have been formally incorporated into the excavation process. She further noted that DNA samples have not been collected from victims’ relatives either during the original Chemmani investigation or the current excavations, preventing authorities from matching recovered remains with missing persons. She cited the example of the Matale mass grave, where recovered skeletons remain in storage years after excavation, with no meaningful progress in the investigation. Massagé also referred to a 2003 commission appointed by Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commission under Dr. Devanesan Nesiah, which interviewed victims, families, and witnesses and identified 35 individuals who, according to its report, should be held accountable. ### How Deep Do China-Sri Lanka Ties Really Go? A New Book Explores URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-deep-do-china-sri-lanka-ties-really-go-a-new-book-explores/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T12:05:39.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** China and Sri Lanka have enjoyed decades of close and warm relations. Many Sri Lankans also credit China with providing extensive military assistance that helped Colombo defeat the Tamil Tigers. But is there a side of this relationship that has been kept under wraps? Yes, says a Sri Lankan scholar in a revealing new book. After detailing at length the many ways China has come to the economic and military rescue of Sri Lanka since the 1950s, Colombo-based Bhagya Senaratne touches upon the not-so-known aspects of their bilateral military cooperation. She says in her study, *From Friendship to Dependency: Analyzing Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policymaking Towards China (KW Publishers, New Delhi), that Beijing’s military diplomacy in the 21st century shows it is keen to expand its links with Sri Lanka, focusing* on the latter’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean. “China is gradually moving from hardware defence sales to developing softer ways of defence diplomacy to pursue its interests in Sri Lanka, especially through exchanges, training and non-lethal equipment (communications),” says the scholar at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies. These, according to her, signal a shift in strategy, tools and ends, using defence diplomacy as an instrument to build influence. “Shrouded in secrecy, China has commenced close interactions with Sri Lankan military personnel to forward bilateral military relations. “China is using military aid, training and exchanges and high-level visits by working (with) defence personnel to implement its defence strategy. “In these interactions, China is favouring Sri Lanka by providing it opportunities and facilities that it is not providing others. This is visible from the lack of publicly available data on training and aid given to Sri Lanka.” Senaratne says that Sri Lanka would stand to benefit from these interactions “if it is aware of its strengths in negotiating and does not succumb to the power rivalry in the region”. The author, who holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Colombo, says Sri Lankan bureaucrats have come to understand the objectives behind China’s military sales and defence diplomacy. China, the book says, is using its military diplomacy with Sri Lanka to make further inroads into the Indian Ocean Region and achieve its foreign policy objectives in securing its interests in energy, construction, and expansion of its network of friendly countries. All this also assists in improving China’s domestic economy as Beijing expands construction projects in Sri Lanka. The 239-page study notes at the outset that China’s security relations with Sri Lanka were relatively understudied compared to its political and economic relationship with Colombo, despite the publicity that accrues when military or research vessels visit the island nation’s ports. According to Senaratne, there is a long-standing bilateral defence relationship between Sri Lanka and China that is less known to the public and the international community. After presenting data on training courses offered to Sri Lankan military personnel by China, she says the programme resumed from late 2022 after the Covid-19 epidemic caused a two-year break. While noting that Sri Lanka has not disclosed the latest data, she quotes a confidential source as saying that Colombo has sent a considerable number of military personnel in junior, middle-grade, and senior ranks to China. “Moreover, there are high-level military exchanges in various other seminars and forums.” While these courses give an exposure to Sri Lankan personnel to Chinese thinking and culture, “I would argue that China is hosting Sri Lankan officers to gain a better understanding of the geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Region, to understand the Sri Lankan thinking…” Military officers who have attended courses at China’s National Defence University (NDU) have formed a NDU Alumni Association in Sri Lanka which has more than 80 members, both serving and retired personnel. According to Senaratne, China is keen on strengthening its security connections with Sri Lanka, likely due to its location in the Indian Ocean as well as its proximity to India and international shipping lines. “It can be argued that China is attempting to wedge a divide between India and Sri Lanka by proposing ‘joint initiatives focussing on maritime security … accompanied by the transfer of military equipment, alluding to closer military cooperation between China and Sri Lanka’.” The focus of the well-researched book is how Sino-Sri Lankan relations rapidly expanded during a 21-year period starting from November 1994 when Chandrika Kumaratunga became the president to when Mahinda Rajapaksa lost power in January 2015. This includes some 15 years when Sri Lanka fought a bloody war against the LTTE, until the insurgents were routed in May 2009, and the six years which followed the end of the conflict. But Senaratne, who also goes into the early period of bilateral ties driven mainly by economics and trade, is clear that relations with Beijing have been extremely beneficial to the island nation. The foundation of the bilateral relationship was the celebrated Rubber-Rice pact of 1952 – one of the first agreements Beijing signed with a non-communist country. Accordingly, China paid a higher price for rubber from Sri Lanka and sold rice in return at below the market price. A grateful Sri Lanka co-sponsored the 1971 resolution, which helped China to join the United Nations. By 1975, China had become Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner. The book details how Kumaratunga diversified Sri Lanka’s relations with China, which were, until then, limited to state-to-state relations, giving a major push to private businesses both ways. Her Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, visited China frequently and was a great exponent of stronger ties with Beijing. All through the war against the military offensive against the Tamil Tigers, China played the role of a staunch friend, providing vast quantities of arms and ammunition to Colombo. Senaratne says the military assistance and the later heavy pressures mounted by Western countries, in particular, over human rights issues forced Rajapaksa to lean more on China. In doing so, he ignored the objections of both the West and India. The book does not analyse how Sri Lanka is balancing relations between China and India but underlines that Beijing’s relations with Colombo may not have been same had the latter been located elsewhere and not the Indian Ocean, close to India. (In Sri Lanka, Senaratne’s book can be bought on [www.vijithayapa.com](http://www.vijithayapa.com/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)) ### Tamil Clergy Demand International Inquiry Into Chemmani Grave, Breaking With Their Own Church URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-clergy-demand-international-inquiry-into-chemmani-grave-breaking-with-their-own-church/ Last updated: 2026-08-04T16:44:21.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Roman Catholic clergy in Jaffna demanded an international investigation into the Chemmani mass grave this week, pitting the Tamil priesthood of Sri Lanka's north against the leadership of their own Church. Its most powerful figure, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, spent years opposing international scrutiny of alleged wartime atrocities against Tamils — even as he now demands precisely such scrutiny for the mostly Catholic victims of the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. The demand came in a memorandum to Volker Türk, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, from the Justice and Peace Commission of the Diocese of Jaffna. It followed a march, when more than a hundred priests, nuns, and lay parishioners walked from St. Jude's Shrine in Ariyalai to Chemmani Junction. The memorandum sets out seven requests; in its sharpest passage, it says the scale of what has been unearthed amounts to "clear indications of the broader structural genocide experienced by the Tamil people." Cardinal Ranjith, the Archbishop of Colombo, is Sri Lanka's most forceful advocate of international justice for the Easter Sunday dead, most of them his own parishioners. He has repeatedly called for an international mechanism to investigate the bombings and travelled to Geneva to press the U.N. Human Rights Council for intervention. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/tamil-clergy-demand-internatio-nPCE7U-kix83k47uidnrjn.png) His stance on Tamil deaths has been the reverse. In 2012, when the then Bishop of Mannar, Rayappu Joseph, and others petitioned the Human Rights Council over wartime atrocities, the cardinal said the Church rejected any international accountability mechanism, calling such Western efforts "an insult to the intelligence of the people of Sri Lanka." Two years later, when Catholic bishops sought an inquiry into the army's alleged use of cluster munitions and chemical weapons against Tamil civilians, he said the Church did not support the allegations. An ethnic Sinhalese long allied with the Rajapaksa family, he has consistently opposed any international probe into the killing of tens of thousands of Tamil civilians in the war's final months. The dig the priests want placed under international oversight is now the largest of its kind in Sri Lanka. As of July 21, forensic teams had recovered 454 sets of skeletal remains, among them infants and children, surpassing the grave at Mannar's Sathosa site to become the biggest ever uncovered on the island. As the court-supervised third phase of excavation continued, later finds included skeletons without skulls and a body still in a raincoat. Feeding bottles, toys, and children's clothing have come out of the ground with the bones. The site first surfaced in 1998, when a soldier, Somaratne Rajapakse, testified that 300 to 400 bodies of disappeared Tamils lay buried at Chemmani. His claim emerged at the trial over the 1996 rape and murder of the schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy and the killing of three others who had gone looking for her. Internationally observed excavations in 1999 uncovered fifteen bodies before the ground was left undisturbed for a quarter of a century — until construction workers reopened it in February 2025. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/tamil-clergy-demand-internatio-nPCE7U-kix3tqdrij8wc87.png) The state's conduct since has only deepened that distrust. Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara visited the site in June and pledged to establish the truth within two years. But when relatives of the disappeared demonstrated during his visit, demanding international supervision, the minister and officials from the Office on Missing Persons walked past without stopping. Police had already obtained a court order barring seven people, several of them relatives of the missing, from disrupting the visit. Among the memorandum's seven requests: that exhumation and identification proceed under the Minnesota Protocol, the international standard for investigating suspected unlawful deaths; that independent DNA analysis and scientific dating be supported; that investigators be given access to military, police and detention records; that families, witnesses, lawyers and journalists be protected; and that a direct U.N. human rights presence be established in Jaffna, on the ground that witnesses will not speak without it. The Commission cast its appeal as pastoral, not political. Its aim, it wrote, is not vengeance or hostility toward any community but truth established by evidence and dignity for the dead. It asked Mr. Türk not only to intervene but to reply in writing, spelling out what the United Nations will do. In effect, the Tamil clergy of Jaffna have signalled that they no longer expect justice from within Sri Lanka — and that the leadership of their own Church, for all its recent talk of accountability, never demanded it on their behalf. ### Remembering Neelan Tiruchelvam URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/remembering-neelan-tiruchelvam/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T03:21:48.000Z **By Jeevan Thiyagaraja** ### **How I Came to ICES** Neelan Tiruchelvam — Tamil member of parliament, constitutional lawyer, and founder of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies — was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber on 29 July 1999\. These are personal recollections, offered on the anniversary of his death, of the years I worked alongside him and of the people whose lives that work brought together. I got to know Neelan Tiruchelvam by accident. Quadri Ismail, a brilliant writer and journalist who wrote for *The Times* in Sri Lanka and *Time* magazine in the United States, walked with me one day down Ward Place to the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) at Kynsey Terrace, in late 1983\. Quadri would himself be shot and badly wounded some years later, in November 1987 — hit in the neck by fire from a passing Indian Army helicopter as he tried to leave a restricted war zone he had slipped into to report. ICES had grown out of a Ford Foundation–sponsored conference on ethnic conflict held at Taita Hills, Kenya, in August 1981, followed by a second workshop at Trincomalee in March 1982, at which the Foundation resolved to fund a research centre on ethnicity in Sri Lanka. Neelan secured the initial grant; Prof. K.M. de Silva secured government approval to establish the institute and became its founding Chairman; and Radhika Coomaraswamy — then a young Yale- and Harvard-trained lawyer who would go on to become the UN's first Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and, later, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict — joined soon after as Associate Director in Colombo, alongside Sam Samarasinghe in Kandy. ICES was conceived as a research institute to study Sri Lanka's ethnic relations and the wider politics of identity and conflict in South Asia, with twin offices in Colombo and Kandy, and it grew over the years into one of the region's foremost independent centres for research on ethnicity, law, and conflict. The years that followed my joining were turbulent. Riots developed into something beyond comprehension — serious enough for the imposition of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. I recall protestors marching on Colombo from all sides on the eve of the Accord. It was a tense period. ### **Documentaries and the Journey North** In between, ICES produced a great many documentaries — directed by our foremost directors — promoting multiculturalism. The videos were played in rural settings, hosted by scores of simple community groups. In 1987–1988, Kusal Perera, I, and two Holy Family sisters travelled by train and bus to see for ourselves the impact of the war on ordinary people across the North and East. In Jaffna I walked so much that my shirt tore from sweat and salt. *Echoes of War* was the documentary that came out of that journey, funded by Bread for the World and directed by Dharmasiri Bandaranayake, with Suren de Silva on the crew. In the Vanni they were accosted and taken into custody by the LTTE, and were saved only by an IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) patrol passing by. Our hearts froze for a few days, not knowing their fate. ### **Election Observation, 1988–1991** In 1988 Neelan was invited to observe elections in Hungary. That experience led him to float an idea, which in turn led to him, Neville Kanakaratne — the veteran Sri Lankan diplomat who had served as Ambassador to the United States and High Commissioner to India — and me coordinating the visit of an eminent group of observers drawn from SAARC countries for Sri Lanka's 1988 presidential election. The environment was tense — the JVP insurrection in the south was at full strength. Ranasinghe Premadasa was standing for the UNP and Sirimavo Bandaranaike for the SLFP; she lost by a whisker. The observer group itself was remarkably distinguished. Among them were Niaz Naik, Pakistan's former Foreign Secretary and later the architect of Pakistan–India back-channel diplomacy; Fakhruddin Ahmed (1931–2001), a career diplomat who served as Bangladesh's Foreign Secretary twice (1974–75 and 1986–87), and as Ambassador to Italy and Yugoslavia and High Commissioner to the UK; Muchkund Dubey, who would later serve as India's Foreign Secretary; Nikhil Chakravartty, the veteran Delhi journalist and founder-editor of Mainstream; and Dr. Devendra Raj Pandey, Nepal's former Finance Secretary, who would later serve as Finance Minister in the caretaker government formed after Nepal's 1990 pro-democracy movement. The final report was written from Faletti's Hotel in the winter of 1988\. Faletti's, in Lahore, was one of four sister hotels built in the late nineteenth century by the Italian hotelier Giovanni Faletti — the others being Flashman's Hotel in Rawalpindi, Dean's Hotel in Peshawar, and the Cecil Hotel in Murree. A briefing chapter was written by Jayadeva Uyangoda. In that report we noted that it had been a monumental folly on the part of J.R. Jayewardene to proscribe the JVP, since the ban gave birth to the second uprising, at enormous cost. The factual narrative was correct, but Chandrananda de Silva, then Elections Commissioner, told me that Jayewardene would sue if the line was not withdrawn. ICES, for its part, was probably one of the rare few offices kept open every day, notwithstanding the closures the JVP imposed on the country — I used to walk in myself to keep it open. Election observation missions followed across the region: Pakistan — organised again when Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash and Benazir Bhutto was elected. In all we covered three elections there. Bangladesh — starting in 1990, we covered the 1991 election after the fall of Ershad, when Sheikh Hasina was elected, and two or three more after that. Nepal — we covered the election held after the king was deposed and the pro-democracy movement won multiparty elections. India — I was in Delhi when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in Tamil Nadu in May 1991. Anura Bandaranaike — son of S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and younger brother of Chandrika Kumaratunga, who would himself go on to serve as Speaker of Parliament and Leader of the Opposition — was with us on one of the Bangladesh missions. In one constituency the ballot boxes were thrown into the village pond, necessitating a by-election. Anura was famous all his life for his pranks — on one occasion sending out birthday invitations inviting scores of guests to the houses of his friends, who had no idea a party had been announced in their name, on another smuggling a pet leopard cub under a cabinet minister's chair at the family home on Rosmead Place, shortly before his father chaired a meeting there. In Dhaka, the two of us once slipped an amorous note under the hotel-room door of a distinguished lady observer overnight, purporting to be from Rauff Hakeem. Neither she nor Hakeem was ever any the wiser. Across all of these missions, we met some of the finest men and women of South Asia — a remarkable circle of jurists, scholars, and public figures drawn together by a shared belief in democratic process. It was a period of a South Asian Renaissance. It is in no small part to keep their memory, and Neelan's role in bringing us all together, that I set these recollections down now. ### Geneva, and the Wider South Asian Circle ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/WhatsApp-Image-2026-07-29-at-16.51.37.jpeg) Jeevan Thiagarajah, far left, and Neelan Tiruchelvam, in the gray suit, with former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, in the cream sari, during a meeting in Dhaka in the early 1990s. Another important programme was our work with the UN Working Group on Minorities in Geneva. It was after one such session that I had a long conversation with Neelan at Geneva airport as evening fell. Soon after, he left for a sabbatical in Italy before returning to Sri Lanka. He and I once met P.V. Narasimha Rao when he was preparing to go home, shortly before he was suddenly catapulted into becoming Prime Minister of India. We had similarly memorable conversations with Inder Kumar Gujral, who also went on to become Prime Minister. These were heady days in the renaissance of South Asian intellectual and political life — across the region we had extraordinary conversations, including early discussions about what would become the idea of a South Asian University. In Sri Lanka, Chandrika and Vijaya Kumaratunga once joined a dinner for Ashok Mitra, the economist from Calcutta — both dressed in black that night, if memory serves, with dinner served from banana leaf. There was a space at ICES called the Thatched Patio that hosted countless such gatherings. The Committee for Rational Development used to meet in Radhika's room, deliberating there in the years after 1983\. The CRD published a report titled Sri Lanka's Ethnic Problems: Myths and Realities (November 1983), which they expanded the following year into an edited volume, Sri Lanka, the Ethnic Conflict: Myths, Realities and Perspectives (New Delhi: Navrang, 1984), with contributions from scholars including Newton Gunasinghe and Kumari Jayawardena. Regi Siriwardena — the veteran writer, critic, and left intellectual, one of the most respected literary and political voices of his generation — was a maestro working at ICES at that time, editing its journal and held in great affection by the young researchers who passed through. Neelan's work ethic was indefatigable. There were only one or two of us who could decipher his handwriting, in pencil or pen; Hamza, his typist, was the other. It is most probable that he brought three people into politics. Two went on to become highly distinguished ministers under Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (CBK); the other resigned as an MP a while later. In the midst of all this, Neelan negotiated — and I helped conclude — a grant from NORAD that became an endowment for ICES, matched by counterpart contributions from the Ford Foundation, which continues to this day. ### Cambodia and SOAS In 1993 he decided I needed to go to Cambodia for the first UN-managed elections there. I spent a considerable amount of time working with Cambodian human rights NGOs and the UN's Human Rights Component. Among those in the UN component was Thant Myint-U, grandson of U Thant, the former UN Secretary-General; his book on his grandfather illustrates what the UN could achieve for peace. On my return, Neelan was responsible for sending me to the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, for a master's degree in South Asian Studies. He was similarly, deeply supportive of another, very personal matter of mine. His generosity in this respect was relentless. Scores of young activists and scholars passed through ICES in those years. Among the visitors before he went on to found the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) was Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu ("Sara"). D.B.S. Jeyaraj, the journalist who would go on to become one of the most significant chroniclers of Sri Lankan Tamil politics, was also in residence at ICES during that time. Neelan's trademark was his ability to hold the middle path and draw in so many different voices and colours. ### **The Humanitarian Years** Back in Sri Lanka in 1996, I joined the setting-up of a humanitarian consortium which, at its peak, probably numbered upwards of eighty agencies — local, foreign, UN, bilateral, and multilateral. During that period the Sri Lanka Army (SLA)'s then-Commander, Jaffna, wanted me to travel to Jaffna, and the Additional Defence Secretary — a rascal — prohibited me from doing so and told me so. A little later, a mischievous Vanni commander stopped the food convoys (FDL) crossing from functioning. During one such stoppage I called him and told him people were going hungry. His response was that he wanted the people to feel it. The strategy, it seemed, was to make people leave the Vanni. That story continues, in various forms, right up to the last days of May 2009 and the years after. In between, the 2004 tsunami struck, and for about 365 days it was a tsunami of work, seven days a week. ### **Constitutional Reform: From JRJ to CBK** Running alongside all of this was the constitutional work that consumed most of Neelan's life. It began around 1980, when he and Prof. A.J. Wilson, the constitutional scholar, and J.R. Jayewardene's own son-in-law, learned that Jayewardene had privately described to them the outlines of a possible islandwide anti-Tamil pogrom, and proposed the District Development Council scheme as a way to avert it through sustained Tamil-Sinhalese partnership. Neelan and Wilson doubted the scheme offered real devolution — each district also got a government-appointed District Minister, who held the real executive power, leaving the elected council itself largely advisory, but Jayewardene had promised that fuller powers would follow if it proved workable — a promise neither man was fully convinced of himself. The DDC elections went ahead as planned, in June 1981 — and were wrecked in Jaffna itself. The government sent a team of officials from the south to oversee the poll, among them Chandrananda de Silva, who would go on to become Commissioner of Elections — the same official who, years later, warned me that Jayewardene would sue over our 1988 election report. The spark itself was, by most accounts, unplanned: at a TULF rally on 31 May, two unidentified gunmen fired on the police, killing three officers. What followed was not — police and mobs bussed in from outside the peninsula went on a rampage through Jaffna town, wrecking homes, shops, and the TULF headquarters, and, that same night, the Jaffna Public Library, destroying tens of thousands of irreplaceable Tamil manuscripts and books. It became one of the defining injuries of the conflict, and hardened many Tamils' doubts about whether devolution offered through Colombo could ever be trusted. The larger effort came later, and closer to home. When Chandrika Kumaratunga — his childhood friend — became President in 1994, Neelan, working alongside her Constitutional Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, became a lead author of her devolution proposals, put forward on 3 August 1995 and known afterward as the "GL-Neelan Package." Peiris later credited Neelan as co-author of three successive drafts, in 1995, 1996, and 1997\. Each revision diluted the last: what began as a bold proposal for genuine power-sharing was pared down when tabled formally in January 1996, and pared down again when it reached Parliament as a white paper in October 1997\. Neelan was attacked from both directions throughout — accused of separatism by Sinhala hardliners, and of betrayal by the LTTE and its supporters. He was assassinated in the middle of that unfinished work, in July 1999. ### **The Day He Died** The day he died I heard a noise like a bomb going off in a garbage bin. I picked up my phone and ran toward the noise. As I ran, staff at ICES and LST, on either side of Kynsey Terrace, shouted that there could be another bomb. What I recall is his police security officer opening his door and getting out of the car, his driver likewise from the other side, and Neelan, in the back, in pieces. The bomber's head lay about forty or fifty yards south, on Kynsey Road. I recall asking a policeman to secure it. I remember thinking, in that moment, of the journey the bomber had made — literally, and as a human being — from person to human bomb, reduced to fragments strewn across the road. It was an extremely sad sight, and a sad moment. His backup jeep had rear door locks that could only be opened from the outside. At one point, his backup police car had a hole where the antenna should have been. Having said that, he had, in writing, been told by a government agency of the serious threat against him. Smoke was rising; at one point the car caught fire and I thought the petrol tank would explode. With a garden hose borrowed from a nearby dentist's house and surgery, we started hosing down the car. I asked an STF (Special Task Force) officer to lift his head and show me. The brain knows only what it has already seen or read — and what I saw was not something I knew. Things were moving fast, but time stood still for me. I asked a senior police officer to walk with me to see Sithy, Neelan's wife, up Rosmead Place. When my own father passed away I had been in Bangladesh on an election mission, and ICES had done a shoddy job of telling me — so I was conscious of that as I approached her. I remember telling Sithy that a police officer wanted to see her. She asked how Neelan was; before I could answer, she closed my mouth with her palm and held my head against the wall. I believe one, if not both, of their sons was at home, and one of them began to ask the same question but did not finish the sentence. The Chairman, Prof. K.M. de Silva, and Sam Samarasinghe, the director from Kandy, wanted me to take Neelan's place on the Board of ICES. It was opposed in Colombo. My final act for him was to drive his sons to Kanatte cemetery in Neelan's own jeep — to return, hand over the keys, and never go back. ### Every Militant a Tiger: How the Meenambakkam Bombing Came to Be Blamed on the LTTE URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/every-militant-a-tiger-how-the-meenambakkam-bombing-came-to-be-blamed-on-the-ltte/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T04:33:28.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** ### **A NAME FOR EVERY GUN** ***In an*** [***earlier article***](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/the-audacious-and-troubled-life-of-panagoda-maheswaran/)***, we examined the story of Panagoda Maheswaran and the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA), the militant group responsible for the bombing at Madras's Meenambakkam Airport on Aug. 2, 1984\. Although the attack was carried out by the TEA, it has long been attributed to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).*** ***This article examines how responsibility for the Meenambakkam bombing came to be associated with the LTTE, and why that narrative endured despite evidence to the contrary.*** When the suitcases exploded in the arrivals hall at Meenambakkam Airport on Aug. 2, 1984, killing 29 people and injuring dozens more, it was the deadliest bombing independent India had experienced up to that point. Suspicion fell almost immediately on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). By the middle of 1984, if not earlier, the average person in Tamil Nadu knew little about the crowded and often fractious world of Sri Lankan Tamil militant organizations. To many, there was only one name for them all: *Viduthalaip Puli* (Liberation Tiger). People who lived through that period told *Jaffna Monitor* that the label was applied indiscriminately. The Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) was often referred to as "EPRLF Viduthalaip Puli," the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) as "TELO Viduthalaip Puli," and the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) as "PLOTE Viduthalaip Puli." In the public imagination, the distinctions between the rival groups were largely blurred, and they were collectively remembered as *Viduthalaip Puli*—thanks in no small part to the sophisticated and highly effective public relations efforts of one man within the LTTE. That man is Baby Subramaniyam. He was the LTTE's political head in Tamil Nadu. He signed his correspondence as S. Subramaniyam, but almost everyone knew him simply as Baby Subramaniyam. Even those who worked closely with him could not explain how he acquired the nickname. Before joining the LTTE, Baby was associated with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and was a close associate of its leader, Appapillai Amirthalingam. In that role, he frequently traveled to Tamil Nadu with TULF leaders, years before he became publicly identified with the LTTE. By then, he had already built relationships with many of Tamil Nadu's leading politicians, all of whom knew him simply as "Baby." When he later took charge of the LTTE's political and public relations operations in Tamil Nadu, those connections proved invaluable. Former LTTE members credit him with building the organization's political network across the state and, in particular, with cultivating its close relationship with Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran (MGR). Several former LTTE members told *Jaffna Monitor* that, in the movement's early years, Prabhakaran admired both M. Karunanidhi and MGR. He was deeply drawn to Karunanidhi's command of the Tamil language and his oratory, while also being an ardent admirer of MGR and his films. They said it was Baby Subramaniyam who persuaded the LTTE leadership that cultivating MGR, rather than Karunanidhi, would better serve the organization's long-term political interests. The LTTE gradually aligned itself with MGR and distanced itself from the DMK. ### **THE FACE OF THE STRUGGLE** Long before the Meenambakkam bombing, according to early members of the LTTE who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor*, Baby was convinced that the Sri Lankan Tamil armed struggle needed a single, recognizable face—and that face should be Prabhakaran. He set about building that image systematically, with Prabhakaran's approval. Several early LTTE members said Prabhakaran had long displayed a fondness for personal adulation and was receptive to efforts that elevated his public image. One of the LTTE's earliest propaganda tools was a slim, 23-page booklet titled *Arasa Bayangaravadhamum Aayudha Puratchiyum* ("State Terrorism and Armed Revolution"), written by Anton Balasingham and published in April 1983, just months before the anti-Tamil pogrom of July that year. After the cover and publication details, readers encountered a striking full-page photograph of Prabhakaran holding a submachine gun, reportedly captured after the killing of Inspector Bastiampillai. The photograph was taken by Nadarajah Master of Madurai, who also designed the LTTE's tiger emblem. ![The photograph of Prabhakaran that appeared in the LTTE's 1983 booklet Arasa Bayangaravadhamum Aayudha Puratchiyum.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/every-militant-a-tiger-how-the-643DVg-kix2vr4ymbvbrxi.png) The photograph of Prabhakaran that appeared in the LTTE's 1983 booklet Arasa Bayangaravadhamum Aayudha Puratchiyum. When the booklet was republished in 1991, however, the LTTE replaced the original photograph with another image of Prabhakaran taken during an LTTE training camp at Iruttumadu, Udayarkattu, in 1983, in which he is seen holding a German-made G3A3 battle rifle. According to LTTE sources, the rifle had originally been issued to the Pakistan Army, for which the G3A3 served as the standard service weapon. They claim that it entered Bangladesh's illicit arms market in the aftermath of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. From there, the rifle was allegedly procured in Calcutta with the assistance of an LTTE supporter known as Lawyer Kandasamy (Vakkeel Kandasamy) before being secretly transported to Sri Lanka by Sellakili, one of the LTTE's earliest fighters. The same sources further claim that Prabhakaran later used that very rifle in the July 23, 1983, ambush of the Sri Lankan Army's Four Four Bravo patrol at Thirunelveli, the attack that triggered the anti-Tamil pogrom known as Black July. According to those accounts, Sellakili, the man who brought the rifle into Sri Lanka, was the LTTE's only fatality in the ambush. An early LTTE member told *Jaffna Monitor* that by publishing the book written by Anton Balasingham, the LTTE's and Baby's objective was not merely to promote Balasingham's political ideas. Baby wanted Prabhakaran's image to reach Tamil Nadu. The booklet somehow achieved that goal. The photograph was picture-perfect. Prabhakaran stood in a tailored military-style uniform reportedly fashioned from a Tamil Nadu police uniform and restitched with tiger-stripe insignia. A beret rested on his head. He held an unfamiliar submachine gun with the ease of someone entirely at home with it. For many in Tamil Nadu, this was their first glimpse of Prabhakaran. The July 1983 violence had not yet taken place, and the Sri Lankan Tamil question had not yet entered the political mainstream of the state. Compared with the leaders of other militant groups—who, as one former militant put it, looked like "பஞ்சத்தில் அடிபட்டவர்கள்" (men beaten down by famine) rather than guerrilla leaders—Prabhakaran projected confidence, discipline, and quiet menace. The unfamiliar weapon in his hands only amplified the effect. The rival organizations, according to many accounts, resented it. They dismissed the photograph as a "cinema pose," accusing the Tigers of staging a spectacle and trying to manufacture a hero out of a collective struggle. ### **CALENDAR AND CARAVAN** ![The cover of the LTTE's 1984 wall calendar, featuring Prabhakaran holding a firearm. The calendar was part of the organization's early effort to build Prabhakaran's public image in Tamil Nadu.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/every-militant-a-tiger-how-the-643DVg-kix4lj3mdl21v4q.png) The cover of the LTTE's 1984 wall calendar, featuring Prabhakaran holding a firearm. The calendar was part of the organization's early effort to build Prabhakaran's public image in Tamil Nadu. In January 1984, the LTTE published a wall calendar printed on high-quality art paper. It consisted of four leaves, each covering three months of the year. Once again, the cover featured Prabhakaran with a gun. By all accounts, the calendar sold remarkably well. Beginning in 1983, the LTTE also organized a series of exhibitions across the major towns of Tamil Nadu, often with the support of the Dravidar Kazhagam. They were carefully curated, pairing photographs of atrocities committed against Sri Lankan Tamils with images of LTTE military operations and prominently displayed portraits of Prabhakaran. The exhibitions presented the suffering of the Tamils alongside the image of the man portrayed as their defender. By the time the suitcases reached Meenambakkam, the groundwork had been laid over several years. In the minds of many in Tamil Nadu, Sri Lankan Tamil militancy had become virtually synonymous with the LTTE. When the bombs exploded, it was only natural that suspicion fell almost immediately on the Tigers. ### **THE BOMBING, AND ITS JUDGES** The bombing drew swift and near-universal condemnation across Tamil Nadu's political and public life. Yet it also produced a more uncomfortable reaction. In some quarters, there was a grudging admiration that whoever had carried out such a sophisticated operation was a force not to be underestimated. More consequentially, the attack handed a powerful argument to those who had long viewed the Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups with suspicion. Their warning suddenly appeared vindicated: one day, they said, these men would turn their guns on India itself. Among the most vocal critics was the influential *Thuglak*, edited by Cho Ramaswamy, which published a series of editorials and articles denouncing the militant movement. The celebrated writer Jayakanthan also joined the chorus of condemnation. For the LTTE, the bombing also created a different problem. Many of those killed were Sri Lankan civilians, including Sinhala workers travelling to the Middle East. Their deaths sat uneasily with the political line the LTTE was then projecting through Anton Balasingham, who argued that the movement's struggle was against the Sri Lankan state rather than the Sinhala people, and that Sinhala and Tamil workers shared common class interests. The Meenambakkam bombing contradicted that message and threatened to undermine the political image the organization had worked carefully to cultivate. ### **THE DENIAL, AND THE INVESTIGATION** Soon after the bombing, according to former LTTE members, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran summoned the movement's leaders and asked them directly whether they were responsible. They denied any involvement and, characteristically, went a step further: they promised to identify those who had carried out the attack and produce the evidence. As explained in the previous article, the LTTE's nascent intelligence wing concluded, based on the evidence it had gathered, that the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) was responsible. According to former LTTE members, the Tigers presented their findings to MGR, who accepted their assessment and passed the information to the Tamil Nadu police. Veteran LTTE members still recount this episode with quiet pride. While the police, with all their resources, had failed to identify the perpetrators, the LTTE's five-member intelligence unit had traced the attack to the TEA. Several former members recalled that MGR privately expressed admiration for the efficiency of the LTTE's intelligence network. ### **ABSORBING THE DEFEATED** With the TEA leadership driven into hiding, the organization's remaining cadres sought help from the poet Kasi Ananthan, who was also from Batticaloa and who, according to former LTTE members, introduced them to Baby Subramaniyam. Baby, they said, then lobbied Velupillai Prabhakaran to absorb the surviving TEA cadres into the LTTE. Prabhakaran agreed, and most of the remaining members subsequently joined the organization. According to former LTTE members, Prabhakaran also quietly approved efforts to secure bail for Thampirasa, who had been named by investigators as one of the alleged masterminds of the Meenambakkam bombing. However, he instructed those involved that the LTTE's role must remain completely concealed. Under no circumstances, he warned, should the organization's name be linked to the bail process. Former LTTE members said the bail was eventually secured through the late advocate TADA Dhanasekar, an LTTE sympathizer and long-time supporter. ### **THE PERCEPTION THAT WOULD NOT MOVE** The facts, in the end, changed very little. The LTTE consistently denied any involvement in the bombing and sought to distance itself from the attack. Yet in Tamil Nadu, responsibility remained firmly attached to the Tigers. Ironically, the misattribution cut both ways: it enhanced the LTTE's aura as a formidable militant organization while simultaneously damaging its carefully cultivated political image. An LTTE cadre who worked in Madras during those months described the daily reality more simply. Wherever they went, he told Jaffna Monitor, people confronted them with the same question: "Why did you do it?" Time and again, they replied that the bombing had not been carried out by the LTTE but by the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA). Few believed them. Some simply replied, "So it wasn't the LTTE—it was the TEA Viduthalaip Puli." ### JUSTICE, APPARENTLY, HAS A GUEST LIST URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/justice-apparently-has-a-guest-list/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T05:27:38.000Z **By Che Ran** Sri Lanka has discovered prison justice. Wonderful. Only took us forty-three years. Twenty-eight people are dead after the July 2026 violence at Negombo Prison: 20 prisoners and eight prison officials. More than 100 were injured. The government appointed an investigative committee. Police investigations began. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka launched its own inquiry. Ministers went to Parliament. Families demanded answers. Newspapers carried photographs of grieving relatives. Questions were asked about drugs, weapons, overcrowding, prison management, and responsibility. Good. Every damn one of those questions should be asked. Every officer who died deserves justice. Every prisoner who died deserves justice. Every family deserves to know how somebody entrusted to the custody—or employment—of the Sri Lankan state went to work or went into a cell and did not come home. There is only one uncomfortable problem. Sri Lanka has seen people killed inside its prisons before. And when some of those dead were Tamil, our national appetite for justice appears to have been considerably less energetic. Let me take you to another July. Not 2026. 1983. And to another prison. Not Negombo. Welikada. Colombo. There were 72 Tamil political prisoners being held there. On July 25, 1983, 35 of them were killed. The country then had an astonishing opportunity to demonstrate that this was an aberration. It had two days. Instead, on July 27, another 18 were killed. Fifty-three Tamil prisoners dead inside one of the most secure institutions controlled by the Sri Lankan state. This is not folklore. It is not diaspora mythology. It is not something somebody's uncle remembers hearing in Jaffna. Amnesty International documented the case. And the official legal record contains one sentence that should still make Sri Lanka profoundly uncomfortable: **T**he magisterial inquiries held the deaths to be cases of murder. Not unfortunate deaths. Not an unexplained prison disturbance. Murder. The magistrate ordered police to investigate further and bring suspects before court. **And then?** Nothing resembling criminal justice followed. Amnesty's 1994 review records that prison officials claimed they could not identify those responsible. No one was prosecuted for the 53 killings. That is not merely a historical curiosity. **That is a national obscenity.** ## **First, let us correct the history** There is a temptation, especially when writing about atrocities, to make the facts bigger because the emotion already feels too large for ordinary language. Don't. The facts are savage enough. It is not accurate to say that all 53 men had never been charged or convicted. Amnesty's finding is more precise—and damning enough without embellishment. There were 72 Tamil political prisoners at Welikada. Most of the 53 people killed were detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and had not been convicted. Amnesty records that six of the 72 prisoners were serving sentences. Some prominent prisoners, including Kuttimani and Jegan, had been convicted. That distinction matters. Because justice either cares about facts or it is merely propaganda wearing a tie. And whether a man was convicted, awaiting trial or never charged ultimately changes nothing about the state's obligation after locking the cell door. A convicted murderer has rights. A suspected terrorist has rights. A drug dealer has rights. A remand prisoner has rights. A prison officer has rights. The whole bloody point of justice is that you don't get to choose who qualifies for it. Once the state takes custody of a human being, it assumes responsibility for that human being's safety. You cannot imprison someone and then shrug when he is killed inside your prison. That is not incarceration. That is abandonment. ## **So let us say their names** History has a nasty habit of converting inconvenient people into numbers. Fifty-three. Easy. Clean. Almost administrative. But 53 is not a person. These were. Contemporary lists contain variations in English transliteration, so spellings differ between sources. The following 35/18 roll follows a historical compilation published by M. Nithyanandan and is consistent with Amnesty's documented total of 53. ### **Killed on July 25, 1983** **1\. Kuttimany Yogarajah** **2\. N. Thangathurai** **3\. Nadesathasan** **4\. Jegan** **5\. Sivarasa** **6\. Sivan Anpalagan** **7\. Balasubramaniam** **8\. Suresh Kumar** **9\. Arunthavarajah** **10\. Thanabalasingham** **11\. Arafat** **12\. P. Mahendran** **13\. K. Thillainathan** **14\. S. Kularajesekaran** **15\. Uthaya Kumar** **16\. S. Sivakumar** **17\. A. Rajan** **18\. S. Balachandran** **19\. Yogachandran Kili** **20\. S. Subramaniam** **21\. Mylvaganam Sinniah** **22\. G. Mylvaganam** **23\. C. Sivanantharajah** **24\. T. Kandiah** **25\. S. Sathiyaseelan** **26\. Kathiravetpillai** **27\. Easvaranathan** **28\. K. Nagarajah** **29\. Gunapalan Ganeshalingham** **30\. Anbalagan Sundaram** **31\. Ramalingham Balachandran** **32\. K. Thavarajasingham** **33\. K. Krishnakumar** **34\. R. Yoganathan** **35\. A. Uthayakumar** **Thirty-five.** Then Sri Lanka went to bed. The prison remained a prison. The government remained the government. The locks remained on the doors. The guards remained outside them. Forty-eight hours later, the killing happened again. ### **Killed on July 27, 1983** **36\. Muthukumar Sri Kumar** **37\. Amirthanayagam Philip** **38\. Kulasingham Kumar** **39\. Selachami Kumar** **40\. Kandasamy Sarwesvaran** **41\. A. Mariampillai** **42\. Sivapatham Neethirajah** **43\. Devanayagam Paskaran** **44\. Ponniah Thurairajah, alias Thangathurai** **45\. Gnanamuthu Navaretnasingham** **46\. Kandiah Rajendran, alias Robert** **47\. Dr. Somasundaram Rajasundaram** **48\. Somasundaram Manoranjan** **49\. Arumugam Seyan, alias Appu** **50\. Thamotherampillai Jegamohanandan** **51\. Sinnathamby Sivasubramaniam** **52\. Selliah Rajaratnam** **53\. Kumarasamy Ganeshalingham** There. **Fifty-three.** Not "Tamil detainees." Not "militants." Not "prison casualties." Names. People. And please notice something. Among them was Dr. Somasundaram Rajasundaram, a medical doctor and secretary of the Gandhiyam movement. There were political activists. There were detainees. There were convicted prisoners. There were men accused under one of the most controversial pieces of security legislation Sri Lanka ever enacted. They did not all have identical stories. They did not need to. A prisoner's right not to be murdered is not contingent upon his résumé. ## **The investigation that disappeared into the furniture** Sri Lanka sometimes says there was "no investigation" into Welikada. Technically, that is not quite correct. And the truth is actually more embarrassing. There were magisterial inquiries. They determined that the deaths were murders. Prison officials testified that they could not identify the perpetrators. The magistrate instructed the police to investigate further and produce suspects before the court. That is where meaningful criminal accountability effectively died. Think about the institutional absurdity. Thirty-five prisoners are killed inside a high-security prison. Nobody can identify the killers. Two days later another eighteen prisoners are killed. Again, apparently, accountability develops cataracts. Fifty-three dead. Zero prosecutions. Sri Lankan historical material also records that the first inquiry failed to establish basic questions such as how attackers obtained weapons or got access to the Tamil prisoners. Imagine trying that explanation today. Imagine 53 tourists dying inside a government hotel and the staff announcing: Sorry. Couldn't identify anyone. Imagine 53 parliamentarians dying inside Parliament and security saying: Very confusing afternoon. Imagine 53 bankers dying inside the Central Bank. Would Sri Lanka still be investigating forty-three years later? Don't be ridiculous. Colombo would have run out of committees by lunchtime. That is what selective governance looks like. It is not always a law explicitly saying one ethnicity deserves less justice. It is subtler. One death produces a national emergency. Another produces paperwork. One victim gets a press conference. Another gets a paragraph. One investigation hunts perpetrators. Another waits for witnesses to age. Eventually bureaucracy performs the miracle politics could not: time kills the case. ## **There actually was compensation. Sort of.** This, too, deserves accuracy. Relatives of 30 murdered prisoners filed civil cases against the state in 1985, alleging failure to protect those in custody. They persisted. For almost another decade. In April 1994, according to Amnesty, those cases were settled. The state agreed to make ex gratia payments without admitting liability. There is something almost poetically bureaucratic about that phrase. Without admitting liability. Fifty-three prisoners killed. Inside your prison. Magistrates call it murder. Nobody prosecuted. And eventually some families receive money under a legal formula carefully designed not to say: We failed you. That is not justice. It is accounting. ## **Now jump forward forty-three years** July 2026. Negombo. This time the dead include prison officers as well as inmates. The government's initial explanation was that the violence grew out of conflict connected to drug smuggling. Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara told Parliament that prisoners who had passed information about trafficking to authorities became targets and that violence escalated after officers intervened. Investigations remain underway. The final reported toll reached 28 dead: 20 prisoners and eight prison officials. And Sri Lanka responded. As it should. A three-member government committee was announced. The Human Rights Commission opened an investigation. Authorities began examining the circumstances surrounding the violence. Families got bodies back after post-mortems. There was public mourning for the dead officers. The country began asking questions. Again: good. This article is not demanding less justice for Negombo. It is demanding that Sri Lanka finally understand how obscene it is to ration justice according to whose coffin is being carried. ## **Then history performed a truly sick little trick** After Negombo, hundreds of prisoners were transferred elsewhere. Some went to Welikada. Yes. That Welikada. On July 7, 2026, the Human Rights Commission's Rapid Response Unit arrived there unannounced to check on inmates. They were denied access. The Commission says this violated its statutory authority to enter detention facilities without prior notice. Access was subsequently permitted, but when prison officials later explained that the refusal resulted from an unstable security situation, the HRCSL said it was not satisfied with the explanation. You could not write the symbolism without an editor accusing you of laying it on too thick. Welikada. A prison with 53 unprosecuted murders hanging over its history. Forty-three years later. Human-rights investigators arrive. And initially cannot get through the gate. History does not always rhyme. Sometimes it walks into the room carrying a loudspeaker. ## **And then came allegations of mistreatment** The HRCSL says it is investigating allegations that some inmates transferred after the Negombo violence were subjected to torture or other ill-treatment. Its officers observed injuries among some transferred prisoners and reported delays in medical treatment. Two transferred prisoners subsequently died in custody. The Commission has not yet made findings establishing what caused the injuries or deaths, and that caveat matters. Amnesty International has called for urgent investigation. So should everybody else. Because here's the test. Not whether the prisoners are nice. Not whether Twitter likes them. Not whether they have criminal records. Not whether they are Tamil, Sinhala, Muslim, Burgher, rich, poor, politically useful or completely forgotten. Did the state have custody of them? Then investigate. That should have been the principle in 1983. It should be the principle in 2026. It should be the principle forever. ## **Welikada was not even the last warning** Sri Lanka has had other catastrophic prison violence. In 2012, another incident at Welikada left 27 prisoners dead and around 50 injured. A later committee recommended charges against several senior officials. Ultimately, according to Human Rights Watch and other rights groups, only two prison officials were charged and one was convicted at trial in 2022\. Rights organisations argued that prosecuting a single official did not address the wider circumstances and systemic failures surrounding the deaths. Then came Mahara Prison in 2020. Eleven prisoners ultimately died following unrest amid Covid fears and severe overcrowding. Amnesty called for an impartial investigation into the deaths and the use of live ammunition, noting that it was already the third incident that year involving lethal force against prisoners. Then Negombo. Different governments. Different decades. Different explanations. Same country. Same astonishing national talent for becoming surprised by conditions we have spent years refusing to fix. ## **And look at the numbers** Negombo Prison was designed for roughly 650 people. When the July violence erupted, it held about 2,400. Sri Lanka's 22 prisons collectively contained about 41,000 prisoners, nearly four times their designed capacity. Around 65.5% of the prison population was incarcerated in connection with drug offences. Now, suddenly, after 28 people die, there is discussion of reopening facilities, creating new capacity, recruiting staff, introducing house arrest for some low-risk offenders and reconsidering aspects of incarceration. Again: Good. Do it. But we have a strange governing philosophy in this country. We don't repair roofs when they leak. We wait for the ceiling to fall on somebody. Then appoint a committee to study gravity. ## **This is what selective justice does to a country** The easy interpretation of Welikada 1983 is ethnic. Tamil prisoners died. A Sinhala-majority state failed to deliver accountability. That is plainly part of the history and pretending otherwise is intellectually dishonest. But there is an even larger lesson. Selective justice eventually stops being selective. Because once an institution learns that accountability is optional, it doesn't necessarily remain neatly confined to the minority against whom impunity was first tolerated. It spreads. That is the part Sri Lanka ought to understand. You cannot build a justice system that is defective only on Tuesdays. You cannot teach police not to investigate these deaths properly and expect investigative excellence everywhere else. You cannot allow prison accountability to collapse when the victims are politically inconvenient and then act astonished when prison governance deteriorates generally. Impunity is not a sniper rifle. It is mould. It spreads through the building. ## **And this is where karma comes in** I believe in karma. But not the cheap version. Not: They hurt us, therefore somebody hurt them. That is not karma. That is vengeance wearing incense. The officers killed at Negombo in 2026 did not murder the Tamil prisoners at Welikada in 1983. The prisoners killed at Negombo did not deserve death because another generation failed to obtain justice. Children who lost fathers this month do not owe a debt incurred before they were born. There is no moral ledger on which 28 new corpses somehow compensate for 53 old ones. No. Karma is consequence. Institutional consequence. National consequence. You tolerate injustice somewhere and eventually you create a system capable of producing injustice everywhere. You permit prisons to become invisible spaces. You tolerate overcrowding. You tolerate political interference. You tolerate brutality. You tolerate unexplained deaths. You tolerate unanswered questions. You tolerate investigations that become reports that become shelves that become dust. Then one morning you wake up and discover that the institution you neglected has become dangerous to everyone inside it. Tamil prisoner. Sinhala prisoner. Muslim prisoner. Prison guard. Doesn't matter. The monster eventually forgets whom it was originally built to eat. That is karma. ## **There is another uncomfortable question** Why do some Sri Lankan deaths belong to the entire nation while others apparently belong only to their community? We know this phenomenon. A Sinhala officer dies and Tamils are expected to recognise a Sri Lankan tragedy. Correctly. A Muslim civilian dies and the country should recognise a Sri Lankan tragedy. Correctly. A Tamil civilian dies and too often the conversation immediately becomes conditional. What was he accused of? Was he LTTE? Was he sympathetic? What happened beforehand? Were soldiers attacked? Was there a security situation? Interesting. Apparently some Sri Lankans must first pass a character examination before qualifying to have their unlawful death mourned. That is not justice. That is tribal bookkeeping. And Tamils should reject its mirror image too. A prison officer killed at Negombo is not less deserving of justice because Tamil prisoners were denied it at Welikada. Quite the opposite. We should be the people demanding justice for him most loudly. Because we know what unanswered graves do to families. ## **Justice cannot be retroactive nationalism** Sri Lanka loves retrospective heroism. Decades later everybody was against Black July. Everybody opposed racism. Everybody believes Welikada was terrible. Marvelous. Apparently 1983 Sri Lanka contained no racists whatsoever. A great mystery who did all the racist things. This is how nations launder memory. First comes denial. Then qualification. Then silence. Then, forty years later, everybody agrees it was awful once accountability is biologically impossible. History becomes safe when the suspects are dead. So let us make Welikada unsafe again. Not by inventing facts. By insisting on the ones already established. Fifty-three prisoners were killed. The deaths were judicially determined to be murders. Most of those killed had not been convicted. The magistrate ordered further police investigation. No criminal prosecution followed. Relatives spent years pursuing civil claims. The state eventually made ex gratia payments without admitting liability. Those aren't slogans. They are the record. And they constitute an extraordinary failure of justice. ## **So yes. Investigate Negombo.** Aggressively. Investigate how drugs apparently circulated inside the institution. Investigate how a prison built for 650 came to contain roughly 2,400 human beings. Investigate the deaths of prisoners. Investigate the deaths of officers. Investigate allegations concerning transferred inmates. Investigate the two subsequent deaths in custody. Investigate why Human Rights Commission officials were initially denied access to Welikada. Preserve CCTV. Preserve records. Interview everybody. Publish findings. Prosecute crimes where admissible evidence supports prosecution. Compensate victims where the state is legally responsible. Reform the prison system. Do the whole damn thing. But while Sri Lanka is rediscovering its passion for justice, could we perhaps enlarge the guest list? There are fifty-three people waiting. They have been waiting since 1983. ## **July 25\. July 27.** Maybe those dates should become national days of conscience. Not Tamil days. Sri Lankan days. Because Welikada is not ultimately an accusation against Sinhalese people. It is an accusation against impunity. There were also prison officials who reportedly tried to protect Tamil inmates during the massacre; later accounts have specifically remembered those who behaved courageously while others failed them. That matters too. Because history's dividing line is rarely as simple as Tamil and Sinhala. Sometimes it is between people who recognise another human being and people who don't. Between officials who understand their duty and officials who abandon it. Between governments interested in truth and governments interested in surviving the news cycle. Between justice and convenience. That is the line worth drawing. Forty-three years ago, 53 Tamil prisoners died behind Sri Lankan prison walls. Today Sri Lanka is again asking what happens when people die behind Sri Lankan prison walls. Perhaps this time we should answer properly. For the eight officers who died at Negombo. For the twenty prisoners. For those allegedly mistreated afterwards. For the victims of Mahara. For the dead of Welikada in 2012. And yes— For Kuttimany. For Thangathurai. For Nadesathasan. For Jegan. For Sivarasa. For Sivan Anpalagan. For Balasubramaniam. For Suresh Kumar. For Arunthavarajah. For Thanabalasingham. For Arafat. For P. Mahendran. For K. Thillainathan. For S. Kularajesekaran. For Uthaya Kumar. For S. Sivakumar. For A. Rajan. For S. Balachandran. For Yogachandran Kili. For S. Subramaniam. For Mylvaganam Sinniah. For G. Mylvaganam. For C. Sivanantharajah. For T. Kandiah. For S. Sathiyaseelan. For Kathiravetpillai. For Easvaranathan. For K. Nagarajah. For Gunapalan Ganeshalingham. For Anbalagan Sundaram. For Ramalingham Balachandran. For K. Thavarajasingham. For K. Krishnakumar. For R. Yoganathan. For A. Uthayakumar. For Muthukumar Sri Kumar. For Amirthanayagam Philip. For Kulasingham Kumar. For Selachami Kumar. For Kandasamy Sarwesvaran. For A. Mariampillai. For Sivapatham Neethirajah. For Devanayagam Paskaran. For Ponniah Thurairajah. For Gnanamuthu Navaretnasingham. For Kandiah Rajendran. For Dr. Somasundaram Rajasundaram. For Somasundaram Manoranjan. For Arumugam Seyan. For Thamotherampillai Jegamohanandan. For Sinnathamby Sivasubramaniam. For Selliah Rajaratnam. For Kumarasamy Ganeshalingham. All fifty-three. And for the people dying now. Not because one group matters more. Because none of them matters less. That is what equal justice means. Not justice for my dead. Not justice for your dead. Not justice when television cameras are outside the gate. Not justice when the dead wore uniforms. Not justice when the government likes the victims. Not justice when history has finally made justice politically inexpensive. Justice for all of them. Otherwise stop calling the bloody thing justice. Call it what it is. Selection. ## **Selected sources** · Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Deliberate killings, disappearances and torture (1994): https://www.amnesty.org/zh-hant/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ASA370151994ENGLISH.pdf · UNHCR Refworld copy of Amnesty International country report (1994): https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/amnesty/1994/96423 · M. Nithyanandan, Tamil Prisoners Massacre 1983 Revisited: https://sangam.org/tamil-prisoners-massacre-1983-revisited-by-m-nithyanandan/ · Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, access denial at Welikada Prison (2026): https://www.hrcsl.lk/hrcsl-meets-welikada-prison-officials-over-access-denial/ · Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, investigation into Negombo Prison violence and subsequent events (2026): https://www.hrcsl.lk/statement-on-investigation-into-violence-at-negombo-prison-and-subsequent-events-at-other-prisons/?lang=ta · Reuters, Sri Lanka moves to address prison overcrowding after riot kills 28 (10 July 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/sri-lanka-moves-address-prison-overcrowding-after-riot-kills-28-2026-07-10/ · Reuters, Drug smuggling caused deadly Sri Lanka prison riot, says minister (7 July 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/drug-smuggling-caused-deadly-sri-lanka-prison-riot-says-minister-2026-07-07/ · Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Death Sentence for Prison Official (2022): https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/17/sri-lanka-death-sentence-prison-official · Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Prison deaths must be investigated amid growing COVID-19 unrest (2020): https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/sri-lanka-prison-deaths-must-be-investigated-amid-growing-covid19-unrest-2/ · Daily FT, historical account of the Welikada killings: https://www.ft.lk/Opinion-and-Issues/The-ghastly-tale-of-the-killing-of-Tamil-prisoners-at-Welikada-in-1983/44-720871 ### "Sri Lanka's Strategic Importance Is Greater Than Ever Amid Middle East Tensions": Japanese Ambassador URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-strategic-importance-is-greater-than-ever-amid-middle-east-tensions-japanese-ambassador/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T03:07:03.000Z **COLOMBO —** Citing escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and Sri Lanka's growing importance as a maritime hub in the Indian Ocean, Japan on Tuesday said strengthening the island nation's border health infrastructure had become essential to safeguarding global trade and public health, as it inaugurated a new Port Health Office at the Port of Colombo. "Amid ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, Sri Lanka's strategic importance as a safe and reliable maritime hub in the Indian Ocean is greater than ever," Japanese Ambassador Akio Isomata said at the inauguration ceremony. "As the country experiences record growth in tourism and trade, building robust, crisis-resilient border health infrastructure today is indispensable to preventing future disruptions, safeguarding public health, and supporting Sri Lanka's long-term economic prosperity." The new facility, funded by the Government of Japan and implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), was formally handed over to Sri Lanka's Ministry of Health. It is intended to strengthen disease surveillance, health screening, and emergency response capabilities at the Port of Colombo, one of South Asia's busiest transshipment ports. The project forms part of Japan's broader effort to strengthen border health systems across Southwest Asia following lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. In Sri Lanka, the initiative also supports Bandaranaike International Airport through investments in medical equipment, infrastructure, waste management systems, operational procedures, and training for frontline personnel. ![The newly constructed Port Health Office at the Port of Colombo, funded by the Government of Japan and implemented by the International Organization for Migration, will strengthen Sri Lanka's capacity to screen vessels, monitor infectious diseases and respond to public health emergencies at the country's busiest seaport.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/-sri-lanka-s-strategic-importa-A7I6z0-kix7u6f3eocfpqs.jpg) The newly constructed Port Health Office at the Port of Colombo, funded by the Government of Japan and implemented by the International Organization for Migration, will strengthen Sri Lanka's capacity to screen vessels, monitor infectious diseases and respond to public health emergencies at the country's busiest seaport. Health Minister Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa described the project as an important step toward strengthening the country's health security and resilience against future public health emergencies. "Today's inauguration marks an important milestone in Sri Lanka's health security and national resilience," he said. "This initiative reflects our shared commitment to building a healthier, safer, and more resilient Sri Lanka while ensuring that our ports remain prepared to meet future public health challenges." The Port Health Office will inspect international vessels, issue Free Pratique and ship sanitation certificates, conduct disease surveillance and vector control activities, and coordinate emergency public health responses at the Port of Colombo. Ports and Civil Aviation Minister Anura Karunathilaka said the facility would improve Sri Lanka's ability to safely manage increasing international maritime traffic while meeting global health standards. According to the Ministry of Health, the Port Health Service issued more than 4,190 Free Pratique clearances and carried out 365 ship sanitation inspections in 2025, underscoring its role in protecting public health while facilitating international shipping. Kristin Parco, IOM's Chief of Mission for Sri Lanka and the Maldives, said the new facility represented a significant step in strengthening the country's capacity to detect, prepare for, and respond to cross-border public health threats. ### Why the President Needs the August 3 Meeting as Much as Tamil Leaders Do URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/why-the-president-needs-the-august-3-meeting-as-much-as-tamil-leaders-do/ Last updated: 2026-07-28T16:13:50.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** There is an important reason President Anura Dissanayake must be equally looking forward to a meeting on August 3 with leaders of six Tamil and Muslim parties in Sri Lanka. In the first major initiative since coming together on July 13 to flag issues of common concern, the six parties sought a meeting with Dissanayake to address a string of unresolved issues plaguing the Tamil-speaking communities. Immediately after Batticaloa MP Shanakiyan Rasamanickam sent a letter requesting a meeting, the president’s office readily consented. An amiable President also spoke to Shanakiyan, addressing him as *malli* (younger brother). The six parties – the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the All Ceylon Makkal Congress, the Ceylon Workers Congress, the Tamil Progressive Alliance, and the Democratic Tamil National Alliance – have not revealed what they plan to take up with Dissanayake. But the issues are expected to include promised constitutional reforms, the military’s occupation of civilian land in Tamil areas, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), allocation of land to Indian-Tamil plantation workers, activities of the archaeological department in Tamil-majority areas, and the much-delayed Provincial Council elections. It is a good sign that the President will meet with leaders representing the Tamil-speaking minorities, who continue to face challenges and broken promises from the government amid an assertive Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarian agenda. Dissanayake, who as an individual enjoys wide support among Tamils and Muslims, is very much aware of the burning issues confronting the two communities. Since taking office in 2024, his government has released land in the island's Tamil-majority north and multi-racial east that the military forcibly took from civilians during the war against the Tamil Tigers. But the military remains intransigent on the issue of giving back all civilian land in its possession, creating a lot of bitterness among Tamils. One area where all six parties are united is the need for early elections to Provincial Councils, particularly in the north and the east, so as to achieve limited regional autonomy. Muslims form the single largest group in two of the three eastern districts. Both Dissanayake and his National People’s Power (NPP) pledged during the 2024 ballot to have new Provincial Councils elected within a year of forming a government. But the promise has been breached. Opposition leaders say the JVP-led government is coming up with spurious excuses for delaying the elections because it fears major setbacks, worse than what it suffered in the 2025 local body polls. While Dissanayake may have his own views on some of the contentious subjects, he cannot ignore the thinking of those JVP colleagues who may not favour holding provincial elections in only one region. But a source close to the JVP said it would not mind an electoral battle in the north and east, as a defeat there could be explained as the sentiments of the minorities and not of the Sinhalese majority. In any case, Dissanayake is aware that on September 7, just a month after he meets Tamil and Muslim leaders in Colombo, the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) will begin in Geneva. Discussions in the Swiss city will cover the state of human rights in Sri Lanka, the continued existence in the statue books of the draconian PTA, and the need for an internationally monitored domestic accountability mechanism. Dissanayake is aware that his August 3 meeting will help Sri Lankan diplomats to claim at Geneva – irrespective of the outcome of the talks -- that Colombo is serious in tackling the concerns of the Tamil-speaking people. This is one reason the president may be amenable to many issues on paper but leave the critical implementation open-ended. This is why the six parties could put pressure on Dissanayake to announce elections in the northern and eastern provinces at least if the not in the rest of the country. It must be made clear to those with ideological blinkers that provincial councils are not a stepping stone to Tamil Eelam but were meant to show minorities that they could enjoy limited autonomy within Sri Lanka. It is precisely for this reason that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and fellow-travelers treated the provincial council system with disdain. On the other side of the ethnic divide, hardline Sinhalese nationalists still treat the councils as some kind of a new threat to the island nation. President Dissanayake must be politely but firmly told that the August 3 meeting should not be reduced to good optics or a photo opportunity, but should instead serve as a stepping stone toward achieving ethnic reconciliation. Of course, no election can resolve any country’s problems. But in the case of Sri Lanka, vesting autonomy in provincial councils will help herald a genuine process of accommodation that is missing even 17 years after the LTTE disappeared. ### The Mahavamsa Shashi Tharoor Left Out URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-mahavamsa-shashi-tharoor-left-out/ Last updated: 2026-08-04T16:44:26.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** Shashi Tharoor gave the sort of speech he is known for at the Colombo Literary Festival last week: fluent, warm, faintly flattering to its hosts. Standing in the Arcade at Independence Square, he called Sri Lanka a land “profoundly steeped in rich, mesmerising oral traditions,” and traced its historical pulse to two ancient chronicles: the Mahavamsa, or Great Chronicle, and its predecessor the Dipavamsa, or Island Chronicle. These, he said, were “a library of cultural memory,” and, in the phrase that lingers, “transnational literary and cultural highways that connect our people in faith, language, and history.” Borrowing from the American scholar Diana Eck, he described the island’s inheritance as a “sacred geography,” in which mountains and rivers are “not merely physical features on a map, but characters in a living, breathing national story.” For the Tamil-speaking people of this island, the Mahavamsa has never been only a library of cultural memory. For a century and more, it has been the founding text of a majoritarian creed that named us invaders and unbelievers, and, in the chronicle’s most quoted line, creatures worth rather less than men. The Dipavamsa was composed in Pali around the fourth or fifth century of the common era; the Mahavamsa came perhaps a hundred years later, the work of a monk called Mahanama writing within the Mahavihara, the orthodox monastery that dominated Anuradhapura. Neither is an eyewitness. The war they are best known for, between the kings Dutugemunu and Elara, was fought in the second century before the common era, which means Mahanama set down his famous account of it something like seven centuries after it happened, and set it down with a religious argument to press. Anyone who reads the Mahavamsa as a plain record of the deep past has mistaken a devotional poem for a ledger. The argument begins on page one. The Mahavamsa presents the island as Dhammadipa and Sihadipa: the land set aside to protect the Buddha’s teaching, and the land of the Sinhalas, the lion people. Its origin myth tells of Prince Vijaya, a descendant of a lion, being sent from north India to Lanka on the day the Buddha dies, to father the Sinhala race. Gananath Obeyesekere, the foremost Sinhalese scholar of this material, who died earlier last year, read the Vijaya story as an early nationalist “colonisation myth.” Sri Lankan schoolchildren today meet it not as myth but as history. Around this sits the tale of the Buddha’s three visits, during which he drives the yakkhas and nagas, the island’s supernatural, and by implication its prior inhabitants, off the land and blesses it for Buddhism. Put the pieces together, and the chronicle makes one claim above all others: that Lanka was meant, from the start, for a Sinhala-Buddhist people, and that everyone else is here on tolerance rather than by right. In the twenty-fifth chapter, Dutugemunu, a prince from the southern kingdom of Ruhuna, defeats Elara, a Tamil king of Chola stock who had held Anuradhapura for some forty years. The dead, the chronicle says, are beyond counting, and the victorious king cannot rest for remorse. Eight arahants, enlightened monks, come to settle his conscience. In Wilhelm Geiger’s 1912 translation, they perform a piece of arithmetic. Of all the slain, they tell him, he has in truth killed only one and a half human beings. The whole one was a layman who had taken refuge in the Buddha and kept the five precepts; the half was a man who had taken refuge but not the precepts. The rest, being unbelievers, were “not more to be esteemed than beasts,” and cost him no merit at all. Set that beside Tharoor’s sacred geography. The island’s foundational chronicle is telling a king that the killing of non-Buddhists, Tamils, in the story, barely registers on the moral scale, because the victims were not really people. A close study of the chapter from Queen’s University concludes that the episode lays “the foundation of a Sinhalese nationalism which justifies violence against the minority Tamil population”: make the enemy less than human and the Buddhist prohibition on killing quietly falls away. The Sinhala monk-scholar Walpola Rahula, who admired the story, wrote that it was from this war onward that “the patriotism and the religion of the Sinhalese become inseparably linked.” This is why the International Crisis Group, which has no stake in Tamil grievance, observes that under its historical surface the Mahavamsa carries “a profoundly religious-nationalist subtext,” and that the story of Elara’s defeat is taught to nearly every Sinhala child. Mahanama wrote a chronicle. More than a millennium later, it became a manifesto for modern Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. Its enduring political consequences were not the work of its author but of later ideologues who recast a medieval Buddhist narrative into a political doctrine defining who truly belonged on the island and who did not. Its chief architect was Anagarika Dharmapala. Born Don David Hewavitharana into Colombo's Buddhist bourgeoisie in 1864, he remade himself as a celibate lay evangelist, founded the Maha Bodhi Society, and carried the Mahavamsa into the columns of the revivalist press. He read its lion myth as literal history: the Sinhalese were an Aryan people, the island's first and rightful owners, and the Tamils and other minorities were latecomers spoiling an inheritance that had never been theirs. The chronicle supplied the antiquity; Dharmapala supplied the movement. He took a medieval devotional poem off the monastery shelf and made it a political programme, and the century that followed was built on the conversion. From there, the sequence is bitterly familiar. The chronicle’s logic sat beneath the Sinhala Only Act of 1956, which erased Tamil as an official language overnight. It justified the state colonisation schemes that reengineered the demography of the north and east. It ran under the anti-Tamil violence of 1958, 1977, and 1983\. Tamil politics gave the whole complex a name that has since entered the island’s vocabulary, the Mahavamsa mindset: the belief that to be truly Sri Lankan is to be Sinhalese, and to be truly Sinhalese is to be Buddhist, with the rest of us permitted rather than belonging. The end of the war did not retire the myth. When the army destroyed the Tigers in May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa was hailed, by his supporters and much of the press, as a second Dutugemunu, the hero-king come again to break the Tamil enemy. Asked about the comparison, Rajapaksa waved it away and said the old story had been misunderstood as one race’s triumph over another. It was a convenient thing to say while pocketing everything that misreading paid him. And the residue can be counted: Sinhalese Buddhists now make up more than 97 percent of the military and more than 92 percent of the state bureaucracy. It’s tempting to call the Mahavamsa a book of lies. It’s also wrong. A lie sets out to deceive; a sixth-century monastic chronicle braided from myth, legend, and dynastic record is doing something older and stranger than lying. But genre stops being a defence the moment the mytho-history is handed to schoolchildren and quoted from podiums as fact — and as fact, it can be tested. Held against ordinary evidence, the frame the anti-Tamil story hangs on does not survive. Start with the dates. The whole edifice of “two and a half thousand years of unbroken Sinhala-Buddhist civilisation” rests on the chronicles’ insistence that Vijaya landed on the day the Buddha died, in 543 BCE. That figure, the uncorrected long chronology, comes from the Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa themselves, and modern scholarship has largely abandoned it. Fixing the calculation against Ashoka’s known reign pulls the Buddha’s death forward to around 486 BCE. The 1988 Göttingen symposium moved it later still: Gombrich, Norman, and Bechert settled near 400 BCE, a date Norman notes fits the archaeology better. Then the blood. The Vijaya myth insists on a distinct Sinhala people arriving from northern India, the germ of the cruder modern claim of an “Aryan” Sinhala race set against “Dravidian” Tamil interlopers. Genetics does not cooperate. A whole-genome study published in Current Biology in June last year, the largest yet conducted on the island, and reported in Jaffna Monitor, found the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils sitting together in a single genetic cluster, both of them closer to the Dravidian-speaking populations of South India than to anyone in the north. Earlier work by Kshatriya had already put the two communities’ shared gene pool at roughly 55 percent, with the Sinhalese drawing their largest single ancestral share, close to 70 percent, from South Indian Tamils. Whatever northern migration the Sinhala language records, twenty-five centuries of the intermarriage the myth denies have worn it almost to nothing in the bone. The invader and the son of the soil turn out to be cousins. Then the empty island. The Buddha’s clearing of the yakkhas frames Lanka as a vacant vessel waiting for the Dhamma. Archaeology frames it as long occupied: modern humans have lived here for more than thirty-eight thousand years, the people archaeologists call Balangoda Man, and the island’s indigenous Adivasi carry more of that ancient ancestry than anyone else on it. And then the categories themselves, which is the finding that does most to dismantle the two-thousand-year war. In his essay “The People of the Lion,” the historian R. A. L. H. Gunawardana showed that the word “Sinhala” appears just twice in the whole Mahavamsa, and not at all in the island’s oldest Brahmi inscriptions, which record instead group-names like Dameda, Kabojha, and Milaka. The hard modern ethnic blocs, “Sinhala” and “Tamil” as sealed nations at each other’s throats since antiquity, are a colonial and post-colonial invention read backwards onto a looser ancient world of rival dynasties and porous loyalties. When Dutugemunu marched, Gunawardana argued, it was not, in the language of his own age, Sinhalese against Tamils. It was one dynasty against another. The strongest evidence against the Mahavamsa mindset is found within the Mahavamsa itself. The same chronicle that reduces Elara’s soldiers to beasts also draws Elara himself as a paragon of justice, the king who, in the famous anecdote, put his own son to death for crushing a calf beneath a chariot wheel. It has Dutugemunu build his defeated enemy a monument and command the living to honour it. It gives him his remorse, and gives his war a stated purpose that is the protection of the Buddhist order rather than conquest. Historians from K. M. de Silva to H. L. Seneviratne have argued for decades that the Dutugemunu-Elara conflict is far more tangled than the nationalist reading permits. Obeyesekere spent a career on the hybridity the myth buries, showing, for one, that the succession crisis the chronicle dramatises makes best sense once you notice that one of the royal claimants was himself half Tamil through his mother. DeVotta, who documents the ideology’s damage, calls the notion of Sinhalese and Tamils as enemies across two millennia simply false. As late as the eighteenth century, the Kandyan throne was held by South Indian Nayakkar kings who worshipped at Hindu and Buddhist shrines both, and ruled in Sinhala and Tamil, and the Sinhala nobility made no objection, so long as the king kept Buddhism safe. None of this is an argument for discarding the *Mahavamsa*, denying its literary greatness, or questioning the deep civilisational ties that bind India and Sri Lanka. It is a narrower argument: that we resist the sanitised version of the chronicle—the one that celebrates it only as a bridge between cultures while overlooking the ways it has, for more than a century, been invoked to legitimise exclusion, dispossession and majoritarian politics. Tharoor is right that books outlast treaties and travel further than armies. But some books have marched with the armies, and the right response to those books is not applause. It is the full memory, the monument, and the war together. ### How a Pilgrim's Dog Led to a Sri Lankan Worker's Prison Sentence in Saudi Arabia URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-a-pilgrims-dog-led-to-a-sri-lankan-workers-prison-sentence-in-saudi-arabia/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T05:41:50.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —**It began as a feel-good story about a stray dog that captivated thousands of Hindu pilgrims across Sri Lanka. It ended with a Sri Lankan migrant worker from the eastern town of Kalmunai being sentenced to five years in a Saudi prison over a single comment on Facebook. The worker, identified by his family as Anojan, a Sri Lankan Tamil employed in the kingdom, was sentenced on Sunday after posting a Facebook comment that Saudi authorities deemed insulting to the Prophet Muhammad. The court also imposed a fine of three million Saudi riyals, a mammoth sum equivalent to about 260 million Sri Lankan rupees, relatives said. News of the verdict emerged through Rajiv Kumar Rajeevkanth, a Sri Lankan social activist, who said in a video posted online that he had spoken by telephone with Anojan's brother shortly after the ruling. The family told him that Anojan had been sentenced to five years and fined three million Saudi riyals, Mr. Rajeevkanth said, adding that the man's mother and other relatives could be heard weeping during the call. The case grew out of an improbable chain of events set in motion during this year's Pada Yatra, the two-month Hindu pilgrimage that each year draws devotees from Sri Lanka's Northern Province to the shrine of Kataragama, in the island's deep south, dedicated to the deity Murugan. ![Subramani](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/how-a-pilgrim-s-dog-led-to-a-s-oK_At8-kixwkkn4dxgbd4t.png) Subramani Along the route, a stray dog attached itself to the pilgrims and would not leave. Moved by its persistence, devotees named it Subramani, another name for Murugan, and fed it a vegetarian diet of biscuits, bread, milk and rice. Videos of the animal padding alongside the procession for hundreds of miles spread quickly online, and many pilgrims came to regard it as a symbol of faith and endurance. The mood shifted in the eastern town of Kalmunai, where a young Muslim man was filmed kicking the dog. The footage circulated widely and drew broad condemnation, including from Muslim religious leaders. The man was arrested, apologized and was released on bail. The online anger did not stop there. As the argument spread across social media, abusive posts aimed at religious communities appeared on both sides. Among them, Anojan's family said, was the comment that Saudi authorities treated as an insult to the Prophet. Saudi Arabia enforces some of the world's strictest laws on speech deemed offensive to Islam. Such cases may be prosecuted under the kingdom's cybercrime statutes or under broad interpretations of Islamic law, and its courts have handed down prison terms and heavy fines for online expression in the past. In the video, Mr. Rajeevkanth accused some Sri Lankan Muslims of amplifying the controversy, arguing that any offense should have been investigated and prosecuted under Sri Lankan law rather than escalated into criminal proceedings in Saudi Arabia. The reported sentence has unsettled Sri Lankan migrant workers and rights advocates. Many in Sri Lanka's Muslim community have appealed for clemency, citing Islam's emphasis on mercy and forgiveness, with some arguing that the Prophet Muhammad himself, were he alive today, would have pardoned Anojan. "His comment was really bad, but we don't have to be so bad as to jail him," one Muslim commenter wrote on social media. A smaller number of voices, however, demanded severe punishment under their interpretation of Islamic law. Hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans work in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and the money they send home is a pillar of the national economy — a dependence that, rights groups have long warned, can leave workers exposed to legal systems far removed from those of home. ### Buddhist Monks Challenge NPP Government Over Constitution and Archaeological Lands URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/buddhist-monks-challenge-npp-government-over-constitution-and-archaeological-lands/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T04:17:15.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Thousands of Buddhist monks gathered in Colombo on Monday for a conference where speakers voiced concern over possible constitutional reforms, the administration of archaeological lands in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces, and what they said was growing criticism of the Buddhist clergy. The Maha Sangha Conference, held at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall under the theme *"Sukhā Sanghassa Sāmaggī"* ("The Unity of the Sangha Brings Happiness"), was organized by the Sasanarakshaka Sangha Sabha and drew monks from across the country. Organizers said the gathering was intended to discuss challenges facing the Buddha Sasana and promote unity within the Buddhist monastic community. ### **Calls for stronger protection of archaeological sites** Addressing the conference, Induragare Dhammarathana Thera urged the government to introduce stronger legal protections for Buddhist archaeological sites. He said a proposal to transfer lands administered by the Mahaweli Authority to Divisional Secretaries could place Buddhist archaeological sites at risk. Dhammarathana also said there were more than 1,000 Buddhist archaeological sites in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces, though he did not provide evidence for the figure. Archaeology has long been a politically sensitive issue in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where Tamil political parties and civil society groups have accused successive governments of using archaeological designations and land administration to expand state control over disputed areas. Buddhist organizations, meanwhile, have argued that ancient religious sites require stronger legal protection and preservation. Dhammarathana also expressed concern over possible constitutional reforms, saying they could weaken Buddhism's constitutional status. Article 9 of Sri Lanka's Constitution gives Buddhism "the foremost place" and states that it is the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana. He further alleged that there was an organized campaign to turn the public against Buddhist monks. ### **Monks defend their role during the civil war** Agalakada Sirisumana Thera, head of the Department of Sinhala at the University of Colombo, said Buddhist monks had played an important role during Sri Lanka's civil war. He said members of the Sangha had made sacrifices that contributed to protecting the country during the conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Sirisumana rejected suggestions that the conference was politically motivated, saying its purpose was to demonstrate unity within the Buddhist clergy rather than support any political movement. ### **Concerns over the Esala Perahera** Ulapane Sumangala Thera, who coordinated the conference, said senior Buddhist monks had increasingly become targets of criticism on social media. He also accused outside groups of attempting to influence the organization of Sri Lanka's traditional Perahera processions. Referring to recent public debate over the Kandy Esala Perahera, Sumangala criticized proposals to shorten parts of the annual procession, describing them as interference in long-standing Buddhist traditions. Earlier this month, Deputy Minister Eranga Gunasekara rejected claims circulating on social media that the government intended to alter the Kandy Esala Perahera, calling the reports false and urging the public to rely on official information. ### ### **Follows earlier declaration** Monday's gathering followed a conference held in February at the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, where about 500 monks adopted a ten-point "Sangha Declaration." The declaration reaffirmed support for Buddhism's constitutional status, opposed separating religion from the state, called for legislation criminalizing insults against Buddha statues, and urged action against online criticism of Buddhist monks. It also stated that "the irreligious should not rule this land" and announced a signature campaign opposing any constitutional separation of religion and the state. ### **Government yet to respond** The government had not publicly responded to the statements made at Monday's conference by the time of publication. The National People's Power administration has previously said it has no intention of removing Buddhism's constitutional status or altering Article 9 of the Constitution. ### Senior NPP Insider Says Coalition Never Approved Judges' Retirement Age Plan URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/senior-npp-insider-says-coalition-never-approved-judges-retirement-age-plan/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T04:17:22.000Z **COLOMBO —** A senior lawyer who sits on the governing National People's Power's leadership council and executive council has publicly broken with the government over its bid to extend the retirement age of judges, saying neither body ever took such a decision — and that he was told to keep his mouth shut when he raised the question internally. Speaking at a media briefing attended by President's Counsel and senior members of the Bar, Attorney-at-Law Lal Wijenayake, a veteran of the country's left and one of the NPP's own council members, said the proposal had never come before the party organs on which he serves. "I am a member of the NPP Leadership Council and Executive Council. No decision of this nature to extend the retirement age of judges has been taken at any NPP Executive Council or any other council that I am part of," he said. When he pressed the matter, he said, "I was told to keep my mouth shut." Wijenayake, who said he had practised law for 55 years and been part of the left movement for around 60 years, framed his objection as a matter of principle. "My politics is built on a vision, on a policy, for a civilised society," he said. He said he had fought for the independence of the judiciary under earlier administrations and that his opposition now was a continuation of that commitment. "I will continue to fight for it today. This is an arbitrary and uncivilised decision," he said. Political observers said Wijenayake's intervention is significant because it comes from within the ruling coalition itself, making it one of the first public challenges to the NPP leadership from a senior figure inside the alliance. A veteran political analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, told *Jaffna Monitor* that the episode has exposed tensions over how decisions are made within the NPP. "Although the NPP presents itself as a broad political coalition, this controversy suggests that key policy decisions may, in practice, be taken by a small group within the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP) Central Committee before being presented as decisions of the wider alliance," the analyst said. The government is weighing a constitutional amendment to raise the retirement ages of superior court judges, reported to be from 65 to 67 for the Supreme Court and from 63 to 65 for the Court of Appeal, with some accounts suggesting the extension could be widened to cover High Court judges, who currently retire at 61, and district judges and magistrates, who retire at 60\. Because the tenure of judges is fixed in the Constitution, any change requires a constitutional amendment; the NPP commands a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara has told Parliament that no Cabinet approval has been granted and that the idea remains at a conceptual stage, with the stated aim of retaining judicial experience and easing case backlogs. Critics note that no such measure appeared in the NPP's 2024 election manifesto. Opposition to the plan has hardened across the legal establishment. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has urged the President to abandon it and sought consultations with the Justice Minister; the Judicial Service Association of Sri Lanka, representing district judges and magistrates, has formally opposed it; and the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific has warned against an ad hoc change. The Communist Party, itself part of the governing bloc, has cautioned of "far-reaching and devastating" consequences, while former justice ministers G.L. Peiris and Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe have argued the move, coupled with unfilled vacancies on the top courts, amounts to interference with the judiciary. Wijenayake's account adds a new dimension to those concerns: an assertion, from inside the ruling party, that a measure being advanced in its name was never endorsed by the councils meant to sanction it. ### 1987: The Year Sri Lanka's War Could Have Ended URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/1987-the-year-sri-lankas-war-could-have-ended/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T04:17:54.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** It was close to midnight on July 28, 1987, when I got a tip I had been waiting for: Velupillai Prabhakaran and Anton Balasingham were in a meeting with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, ahead of his trip to Colombo to sign the India-Sri Lanka Agreement. My source was the indefatigable Shankar Rajee of EROS. This was breaking news. The Tamil Tigers, we knew, were unhappy with the proposed accord and were avoiding Gandhi. The TULF and other militants had given their approval, even if with reservations. The last person holding out was Prabhakaran. Now he, too, was talking to Gandhi. I immediately called Ashoka Hotel, where Prabhakaran was put up, to know if the LTTE leaders had returned to their room. They hadn’t. The meeting was still on. I kept telephoning every 12-15 minutes. On the fifth or sixth try, I struck gold. Balasingham came on the line. He did not want to talk at length. Will it be correct to say that the LTTE has accepted the India-Sri Lanka Agreement, I asked him. “You may say that,” he said. AFP became the first to report that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had given their approval to the pact. It would emerge much later that not only had Prabhakaran given the thumbs up to the agreement after pointing out his reservations, but he sought – and got – money from India to “rehabilitate” his fighters (this was kept under wraps). Just before he left, a grateful Gandhi gifted a bulletproof jacket to the Tiger boss. Little did Gandhi – and the rest of the world – realise that Prabhakaran had played a trick. Indian External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao (who would later become the prime minister) had told Gandhi that the accord should be signed by Colombo and the LTTE, not India. Rao’s junior, Minister of State K. Natwar Singh, insisted that Prabhakaran should be kept in Delhi till his men began to surrender their weapons in line with the accord. It is clear in retrospect that Prabhakaran realised that the only way to return safely and quickly to Jaffna, his lair, was to say “yes” – for now. He did that. The rest, as they say, is history. When we journalists flew into Jaffna soon after the first of Indian troops, ordinary Tamils were brimming with unconcealed joy. As far as they were concerned, this was the best thing to happen. It gave them respite from fighting – and the overlordship of armed actors. Ordinary men and women ran after slow-moving Indian military trucks, offering tender coconut water and bananas to startled Indian soldiers, most of whom knew no Tamil. *Namaste! Namaste!* Many on the streets shouted, using the only Hindi word they probably knew. Prabhakaran was furious when the wildest clapping for his August 4 speech at Suthumalai in Jaffna was triggered by his announcement that the Tigers had agreed to lay down their weapons. The disappointment showed on his face. *Nanrikatta sanam* (Ungrateful people), one of his lieutenants snapped. The LTTE’s arms surrender the next day was a farce, although the Indian media, goaded by the establishment, made a song and drama over it. It must be granted to Prabhakaran that he did not hide what he was scheming. He told Indian journalist P.S. Suryanarayana, whom he knew from his Chennai days, that he would play “games” with India that would shatter the peace process. He did that. Prabhakaran had once fasted in Chennai after the authorities seized his communication equipment. But in Jaffna, he told a junior cadre to undertake a fast because he was expected to die. Tamil supporters were encouraged to stage noisy protests outside and stone Indian military camps. As former LTTE guerrilla Niromi de Soyza revealed, after ordering LTTE leaders trapped at sea to take cyanide and die, Prabhakaran reacted with explosive anger—as if whatever had happened had come as a surprise to him. The LTTE-India war erupted. Four years later, Prabhakaran ordered the assassination of the very man who had once presented him with a bulletproof jacket. India was unprepared for what turned out to be a painful and bloody showdown. Among other things, it is evident that the Indian government had not conducted an exhaustive study of the man known as Prabhakaran. Could he be trusted? Should he be trusted? Would he agree to explore peace? Would he allow India to guide him after having spent long years underground with the singular aim of breaking up Sri Lanka? This was a colossal blunder, all the more so because Prabhakaran had spent more than three years in Tamil Nadu. The 1987 agreement sparked unprecedented protests across much of southern Sri Lanka, areas populated by the majority Sinhalese community. The nihilist JVP decided this was the best chance to take another violent jab at power. The opposition to the accord was on two fronts: one, India had deployed its military in the northeast (while Sri Lankan soldiers were confined to barracks); two, the bilateral pact was a “sell-out” to New Delhi and “Tamil terrorists”. As the war expanded, the LTTE changed its tune. Its “yes” of July 29, 1987, turned into an outright rejection of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement. As the Tigers made peace with Colombo, lulling President Ranasinghe Premadasa, and Gandhi lost elections in India, the Indian Army, badly bruised, returned home. The Tigers and their supporters celebrated, in Sri Lanka and everywhere. Today, in circa 2026, I hear many Tamils say that Prabhakaran should have built on the 1987 pact for a better future for the Tamil-speaking population, brick by brick, with New Delhi’s additional backing. The LTTE, one of its former leaders recalls telling Prabhakaran, was not formed to make an enemy of India. As for Sri Lanka, the war for Tamil Eelam would have ended in 1987\. Tens of thousands of lives on all sides that were lost subsequently could have been saved. I agree. My rider: Prabhakaran’s thinking was such that he would have never agreed to any peace that did not include a separate homeland. (I conveyed this to Erik Solheim, too, in late 2003.) The insurgents’ political immaturity would have ensured that. It did, until he was killed with select loyalists while some 12,000 of his guerrillas and sympathisers of all ages surrendered to a regime they had vowed to destroy. The larger Tamil society lay in bloody ruins in 2009 – and it still limps. July 1987 was the first solid opportunity Tamils in Sri Lanka got to achieve a semblance of autonomy. Was it the ideal solution? Perhaps not, but it was the best under the circumstances. Yes, it did not give them Tamil Eelam, but there was no Tamil Eelam in 2009, either. Tamil society was largely intact in 1987, even though the preceding four years had brought considerable turmoil, civilian suffering, strained Tamil-Sinhalese relations, and divisions within the Tamil community. Most Tamil leaders who could have contributed to the betterment of their people were still alive. Tamil-Muslim bonds had not yet been destroyed. Unfortunately, some on the Tamil side spat on the 1987 agreement, probably in fear of the LTTE, not realising the amount of work which went into making it a reality. Many of them are now hungry for the 13th Amendment and the Provincial Councils which flowed from that very accord. In 1987, rightly or wrongly, India gave the northeast administration in Sri Lanka on a platter to Prabhakaran. It was a last-ditch attempt to appease him – amid his “games”. He rejected it with contempt. Those under his sway lauded him for his “revolutionary” credentials. What Sri Lanka gave in 2009 was death, destruction, defeat, and despair – and a verdict that the Tamil Tigers were not invincible. 1987, in my view, was far better. But those who make history often think differently. In Prabhakaran’s case, he himself became history. ### Six Tamil-Speaking Parties Seek Meeting With President URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/six-tamil-speaking-parties-seek-meeting-with-president/ Last updated: 2026-07-25T11:09:35.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A coalition of six Tamil-speaking political parties has formally requested a meeting with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in what could be the first coordinated political initiative since the parties agreed earlier this month to work together on issues affecting Sri Lanka's Tamil-speaking communities despite their longstanding political differences. The request, made in a letter to the president following a meeting on Friday at the Parliament complex, comes as the government faces growing calls from Tamil and Muslim political representatives to address unresolved issues including power-sharing, land disputes, accountability for alleged wartime abuses, the release of detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), and economic disparities in the country's Northern and Eastern provinces. The alliance said it wished to discuss "matters of national importance affecting the Tamil-speaking communities," though it did not publicly specify the issues it intended to raise with the president. The six parties — the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchchi (ITAK), Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC), Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA), and the Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA) — said they remained committed to maintaining their separate political identities while working together on issues of common concern. "The parties agreed to work together on matters where common ground exists in order to advance the interests of the Tamil-speaking communities through constructive engagement," the joint statement said. After meeting the president, the coalition said it also intends to hold discussions with Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa and members of the diplomatic community as part of an effort to build consensus through democratic engagement. The initiative represents one of the broadest attempts in recent years to coordinate parliamentary representation across Sri Lanka's three principal Tamil-speaking constituencies — Northern and Eastern Tamils, Hill Country Tamils, and sections of the country's Muslim political leadership. For decades, Tamil-speaking politics has been fragmented by regional interests, ideological differences, and electoral competition. While parties have occasionally coordinated on individual parliamentary votes or constitutional debates, efforts to establish a sustained common political platform have repeatedly faltered over disagreements on devolution, constitutional reform, and relations with successive governments. The current grouping was announced earlier this month, when the six parties agreed to cooperate on issues where consensus could be reached while explicitly preserving each party's policies, electoral identity, and organizational structure. The arrangement stops short of creating a formal political alliance or electoral coalition. The move also comes at a politically significant moment for President Dissanayake's administration. Although his government has pledged constitutional reform, reconciliation, and institutional renewal following Sri Lanka's economic crisis, many longstanding demands raised by Tamil political parties remain unresolved nearly 17 years after the end of the country's civil war. Those issues include the full implementation of devolution under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, the return of privately owned land occupied by the military, investigations into enforced disappearances and alleged wartime abuses, repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and greater public investment in the war-affected Northern and Eastern provinces. Muslim political parties have also continued to press for stronger protections for minority rights and more equitable development. The coalition did not indicate when it expects the meeting with President Dissanayake to take place, but said it looked forward to a positive response. In its statement, the group said it remained committed to working collectively where consensus exists while pursuing "a just, peaceful, and durable political solution." ### ‘Our People Were Failed by Both National and International Justice Systems’: Shankari Chandran URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/we-are-still-reluctant-to-confront-our-own-role-in-the-failure-of-the-tamil-national-project-shankari-chandran/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T13:08:52.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** Shankari Chandran came to fiction the way some people come to prayer: after everything else had failed. For a decade in London she ran the pro bono programmes of one of the world's largest law firms. The work took her into more than thirty countries, into the question of who would represent the men held at Guantánamo Bay, and at one point into the office of a British prime minister. She believed what lawyers are trained to believe, which is that the law is a slow machine but that it arrives. In May 2009 it did not arrive. It stood on the shore and watched. Pregnant with her fourth child and stepping back from her career, Chandran began writing what she thought would be a gift to her children: an archive of a people's memory, running from the pre-colonial centuries to the present. What she finished was closer to an indictment. Five novels have followed, nearly all of them circling the same island. One of them, *Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens*, is set in a Tamil nursing home in Western Sydney with the war running beneath its floorboards. It won the 2023 Miles Franklin Literary Award, Australia's highest literary honour, given to a novel of the highest literary merit that portrays Australian life in any of its phases. Sydney is her home, and she does not pretend otherwise. She is exact about what her Australian passport buys her: the freedom to publish what the lawyers and activists who spoke to her cannot publish where they live. “We cannot tell these stories in Sri Lanka,” they told her. In this interview with *Jaffna Monitor*, she talks about the justice that never came, what fiction can hold that a court record cannot, the reckoning with 2009 that neither community has undertaken, and the parts of the Tamil national project that her own people still will not confront. ![Shankari Chandran with her award-winning novel, Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens, which won the 2023 Miles Franklin Literary Award, Australia’s highest literary honour.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/-we-are-still-reluctant-to-con-tmVOZk-kixyjvwjyu6a0eh.png) Shankari Chandran with her award-winning novel, Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens, which won the 2023 Miles Franklin Literary Award, Australia’s highest literary honour. **You were born in Britain, raised in Australia and have built your life there, yet Sri Lanka — and particularly the Tamil experience — remains central to your writing. What is Sri Lanka to you personally: a homeland, an inherited memory, an unresolved history, or something that cannot easily be named?** I feel a strange, almost inexplicable connection, because I have not lived in Sri Lanka for any length of time. For all intents and purposes, Australia is my home. We have created a home here with our family, and I love it here. At the same time, I feel something very powerful when I go to Sri Lanka, particularly when I go to Jaffna, and I don't know why. With my writing, I simply allow myself to explore that connection and try to honour it. So, what is Sri Lanka to me? I think of myself as Tamil. I think of Jaffna as our ancestral home. I think of it as the home of all the generations of my family, including the generations we are now raising in Australia. I want them to have a connection, particularly with the North and the East. It's hard for me to explain in some ways. I've written six novels now, and the sixth will be published next year. Five of those novels are directly set in Sri Lanka or are about Sri Lankan Tamils. I think I'm probably trying to work out what Sri Lanka is to me through my writing and through my work. I'm trying to understand why I feel so connected to it. **When did you first come to Sri Lanka, and particularly to Jaffna?** I first came in 1977\. Then we came again in 1980, 1981 and 1982\. After the 1983 anti-Tamil riots, we didn't come again for a number of years. I returned in 2014 for research because, by that point, I knew that I wanted to write *Song of the Sun God*. I had been writing and researching it for a couple of years by then. My husband and I did a very extensive research trip to the North in 2014, and that re-engaged me with the country and led me to start visiting on a regular basis. **You are a lawyer and, as I understand it, have also advised a British prime minister. Much of your professional life has been connected to the idea that law and international institutions can deliver justice. Then came the final stages of Sri Lanka's war in 2009, much of it unfolding before the eyes of the international community. Did that experience change the way you think about truth, justice and the ability — or willingness — of international law and international institutions to protect people?** I spent so much of my professional life believing in the institutions of justice and the framework of laws, pursuing those ideals and working within that system. And then 2009 happened. You see injustices happen all the time around the world, so the way Sri Lanka's war ended was, in many ways, not unusual in the history of the world. It was not different, because atrocities are committed around the world and always have been. But when the war ended the way that it did, I felt deeply disillusioned and devastated for our people. I was also disillusioned with the systems of justice that I had, until then, tried to engage with and be part of. At that point, I was stepping away from my career briefly because we were about to have our fourth child. Shortly afterwards, I thought: *Let me write something that is a gift to my children*, something that tries to record the history of our people and aspects of our culture that I love, as well as the family stories that have been passed down to me. I wanted to create a kind of archive of all our memories and my understanding of our history, from the pre-colonial period right up to contemporary history. And I realised that what I was really trying to do was to interrogate the injustices of that war — effectively to interrogate and prosecute, or at the very least to reveal, the injustices that had taken place. I felt that our people had been failed by the justice system, whether national or international. I don't think literature or fiction creates justice, but it certainly creates a record of things that people try to hide. And so I wanted to create a record. I wanted to understand what had happened, and I wanted people outside my own community to understand what had happened. ***Unfinished Business* is the first of your novels set entirely within Sri Lanka during the war. Seventeen years after 2009, how do you understand the role of fiction in the pursuit of justice? Can a novelist do more than preserve a record and bring people closer to the truth, or does justice ultimately remain the work of courts, governments and other institutions of power?** I think only the mechanisms and agents of justice can ultimately deliver justice. Institutions of power — courts, governments, lawmakers and lawyers — have the ability to pursue and achieve it, often because good people push them to act. I see myself as part of a broader community committed to justice and equity. My role, through fiction, is to engage people with the stories and truths behind these injustices. In doing that, I draw heavily on the work of lawyers and human rights organisations — their reports, research and witness statements — as well as conversations with lawyers and their clients. I was a lawyer; I am a lawyer, and that background gives me access to people and organisations doing extraordinary work in this field. There is an enormously powerful body of evidence and documentation produced by human rights organisations, and through fiction, I try to bring that work to a different audience and amplify it in a different way. So, writing is my way of contributing to the pursuit of justice, but it is only a small part of a much larger effort. I see my work as being in collaboration with the people and institutions doing the work that can ultimately bring about real change. **You write in English about people who often think, feel and experience the world in Tamil. What is inevitably lost in that translation that you can never quite recover?** When I was writing *Unfinished Business*, I went to a very specific research base. I interviewed journalists, lawyers, activists and survivors, and spent a lot of time with people, listening to them and thinking about what they had experienced. They shared their experiences with me because they wanted those experiences to be told through fiction. So there was an understanding and a relationship between us: they wanted those stories to be told. They did not feel that they could adequately tell those stories within Sri Lanka at that time. I started writing the novel, I think, in 2016, although it is set in 2009\. They wanted to participate in this project of using fiction to tell the truth. Inevitably, something is lost in translation. One of the greatest regrets of my life is that I don't speak Tamil fluently. I speak a little, but not enough. The testimony of war is extraordinarily specific, and every word needs to be understood and recognised, particularly because so much of that testimony has been erased, suppressed or deliberately hidden. I don't want, with my partial Tamil, to infer or, worse, guess what is being said to me. So when people speak to me in Tamil, I always have a translator with me. Journalists, lawyers and activists, however, would often speak to me in English. ![Shankari Chandran with the 2023 Miles Franklin Literary Award, which she won for her novel Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens. Photo: Ultimo Press](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/-we-are-still-reluctant-to-con-tmVOZk-kixqdh8zcxmjxa5.png) Shankari Chandran with the 2023 Miles Franklin Literary Award, which she won for her novel Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens. Photo: Ultimo Press **What can fiction do for a community whose history remains deeply contested? Can literature preserve truths that politics, journalism and official histories sometimes fail to preserve?** The short answer is yes. I think fiction absolutely can preserve histories and experiences that, as you said, politics, journalism and historians — or history itself — can fail to preserve. Journalists and historians are often prey to the power and whims of politics. In many ways, one could argue that we all are. But those of us who write fiction can choose, and often do choose, to step outside that and comment from the outside looking in. My agenda — and I think it will be contested by people who disagree with me — and my rendition and record of what happened in Sri Lanka, particularly in the North, across five novels, will most definitely be challenged by those who see things differently. But I can use fiction to create a record of a narrative that has often been dominated and drowned out by the narratives of politics, journalists and historians. ***Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens* is deeply rooted in both Australian life and the history and trauma of Sri Lanka's Tamil community. When stories born from such painful experiences find recognition and acclaim in countries far removed from where that suffering occurred, does that create any tension for you as a writer? What do you think about the relationship between telling these stories, literary recognition and the communities whose experiences they draw upon?** No, it does not create tension for me, because the value of the prize is that it elevates the story to a level that it had not previously achieved or received. And the purpose of storytelling is for that story to connect with as many people as possible — preferably people who don't know the story, and even people who might think they know it and disagree with my version of it. So, an award is just a tool that helps you to do that. It is an extraordinary honour, and there is an aspect of it that gives a book the imprimatur of a level of literariness. The Miles Franklin Literary Award recognises a writer who has written about an aspect of Australian life. There is value for Australians in understanding that Australian life can be defined expansively and generously, as a multiplicity of stories, and that Australian life is no longer just white colonial stories or white stories. It is the stories of all of us who have come here and are building lives here together. So, for me, there was a twofold value. One is that it says to Australia: remember, our stories are varied. Our stories are diverse and rich. The second value is, as I said, that the award is a tool that elevates the story to a wider audience that might not otherwise have read it. And that is, in part, why I tell stories: because I want them to be read. I have some 300 cousins, and my first novel was probably only read by my 300 cousins. *Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens* was read by more than 200,000 people. So the award is a tool that creates a happy outcome. The question then is really: what do I do with the platform that the award gives me? The novel I wrote and published after that was *Safe Haven*, a novel set in an offshore detention centre that looked at Australia's detention system and the lives of many people from different countries who seek asylum in Australia — in particular, a Sri Lankan Tamil doctor, what she had fled, why she had fled it, and the way in which her community in Australia tried to support her. The novel after that was *Unfinished Business*. I had actually written *Unfinished Business* before I wrote *Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens*. But because I won that award, by that point I had a brand that was well known enough to publish *Unfinished Business*. So, for me, the award does not create tension. It has created opportunities. And I had the opportunity to tell the story of 2009 in the way that I wanted to tell it. **The Tamil armed struggle emerged from decades of discrimination, failed political negotiations and violence against Tamils. Yet it ultimately ended in catastrophic military defeat and immense suffering. Looking back, what do you believe went fundamentally wrong?** There is a book coming out soon, and I will leave it to that book and that author — Ana Pararajasingham — to answer that question, because it is not something that can be answered in a half-hour interview. I think the prevailing question will always be: what are we willing to learn from that experience? Not just the experience of 2009, because it is very easy, I think — and disingenuous, in fact — for the human mind to focus only on, for example, the events of 2009. We are smart enough, and we should be brave enough, to focus on the long arc of history, because 2009 did not happen in isolation. We should be smart enough, and we should be brave enough, to consider the entirety of what happened. When did it start? Why did it start? Not just: how did it end? And then, of course, there is the question of what comes next. What do we learn from that history so that it doesn't happen again? **The overwhelming majority of Sri Lankan Tamils will continue to live on this island alongside Sinhalese and Muslims. Do you think Tamil politics has sufficiently confronted the practical reality that, whatever our historical aspirations, we must also find a viable political future within Sri Lanka?** I would never presume, from my home in Sydney, to prescribe what Tamil politics should or should not be doing in Sri Lanka. Only you know what you have to do, and what you are able to do, in order to live within the Sri Lankan nation-state, alongside and integrated with the Sinhalese community. That is for you to ask and answer. And I hope that you will tell the diaspora what it is that we can do, if anything at all, to be useful. **You belong to a generation of the diaspora that remains deeply connected to Sri Lanka, but the next generation may experience that relationship very differently. Many families in the North and East also depend heavily on money sent by relatives overseas. Do you worry that, as second- and third-generation diaspora Tamils grow more distant, both the emotional connection and the flow of remittances could weaken — and are we doing enough now to prepare for that? More broadly, what can sustain a meaningful connection between the diaspora and the homeland across generations?** I think the emotional attachment will weaken and change over time unless future generations, guided and facilitated by their parents and grandparents, actively maintain that connection. There is the connection with Sri Lanka, and with the North and the East, and then there is a separate thing, which is your connection with your own diasporic community. I think the connection we have with our diasporic community will always be strong and powerful, and it will evolve into its own cultural identity. The question of whether that connection with the homeland — our ancestral homeland — becomes abstract and ultimately more distant or weakened, or whether it remains strong, is really on the shoulders of my generation, and perhaps my parents' generation, although they are getting older. We have to actively try to create that connection: to bring our children — who are not children anymore, but young adults — to Sri Lanka; to have them meet their own family members who still remain there, if they have family there; and to engage in initiatives that strengthen the economy and the social fabric of the North and the East. Otherwise, of course, that connection will weaken. And if it does, then I think your conclusion that those generational remittances will decline is reasonable, because future generations will not have that same sense of connection, feeling, duty or responsibility. I'm not an economist or an accountant, and I don't know enough about the economy to know how dependent it is on diaspora remittances. But if it is as dependent as you say, and those remittances decline, then absolutely, that challenge will come in the future. That's just maths. **Do you think the diaspora sometimes exercises too much influence over political conversations in Sri Lanka without having to live with the consequences of the positions it advocates?** Look, I can probably only speak for myself in regard to that question, because the diaspora is so far and wide. The British diaspora is different from the Canadian diaspora, which is different from the Australian diaspora. For myself, and for the diaspora in Australia, for example, our engagement in Sri Lanka is not through politics or political statements. It is through organisations such as Palmera (www.palmera.org) or Vanni Hope (www.vannihope.org), where we are trying to contribute time, money and skills — such as we have them, if we have them — towards reconstruction efforts and economic empowerment. If you look at an organisation like Palmera Projects, its executive director is a Sri Lankan Tamil from Australia. I think she lives between Sri Lanka and Australia, and she does an extraordinary job of empowering entire communities, particularly women-led households, towards economic independence. Palmera doesn't just lift a family; the organisation helps lift an entire village and the economy around that village, that’s when systems start to change. That is where, for example, the Australian Tamil diaspora sees that it has a role to play, through organisations like Palmera or Vanni Hope. I am acutely aware that I don't have to navigate the political tensions of Sri Lanka's history and its present day. I don't have to live in, negotiate and navigate a country where two ethnic groups are working out how to live together post-war. And I don't have to navigate the economic uncertainties that Sri Lanka has faced in its recent past and continues to face. Therefore, who am I to dictate or suggest to you what you should be doing? **How can diaspora wealth and expertise be transformed from individual remittances into more sustainable investment in education, entrepreneurship, employment and institutions?** I think that's already happening, honestly. As I said, organisations such as Palmera, Vanni Hope, Sivan Arul Illam and Bridging Lanka are doing this. From my perspective as an Australian, I don't know which organisations other parts of the diaspora are connected to, but those are some of the organisations we are connected to. These are organisations where, instead of us giving only to our own families — or not even instead of, but in addition to giving to our families — we are giving to organisations that have the capability to create economic independence for families and communities. That's the long-term, sustainable approach. I don't think individual remittances create generational empowerment or independence. **Australia has given many Tamils safety, opportunity and extraordinary success. At the same time, successive Australian governments have taken hard positions on Tamil asylum seekers. How do you reconcile those two Australias?** I'm still trying to understand the many contradictions of human nature, and therefore of human politics. I explore this in my novel *Safe Haven*, which looks at the stance successive Australian governments have taken towards asylum seekers, while also looking at the ways in which Australian communities work to protect asylum seekers. That is a contradiction we will grapple with in Australia for many generations. **For decades, leaving Sri Lanka was seen by many Tamil families as the ultimate path to security and success. Do you worry that the continued migration of some of the most educated and ambitious young people could leave the North and East intellectually and economically hollowed out?** I think every country faces this when it has experienced the terrible disruption of civil war — particularly a prolonged civil war — and then economic failure. Of course, people will seek a better life for themselves: a more economically secure life, more justice and more equity for themselves and their children elsewhere. It is impossible for me to say that people should stay in Sri Lanka and contribute to its reconstruction, because I live in Australia. I am, again, acutely aware that I live in Australia. The only thing a country can do to keep its people is to improve the conditions under which they live and help them feel a sense of wanting to be part of that country's reconstruction — a sense of wanting to rebuild the nation together. And Sri Lanka will always be competing with the allure of economic success, professional opportunities, stability and justice in places like Australia. **Seventeen years after the war, families are still searching for answers about the disappeared, while fundamental questions of truth and accountability remain unresolved. Is it possible for a society to genuinely move forward without first establishing the truth about what happened?** Lawyers, I think, will always say that a country cannot move forward until there is — even if there is no mechanism for justice — at least a mechanism for truth. Families don't forget. The impact of the loss, the grief and the anger is passed down through generations. People learn to live, and they learn to hide what they think and what they feel. But that doesn't mean the grief, the questions, the longing and the rage have gone away. I think that for a country to rebuild itself, it needs strong foundations of truth-telling. And that requires enormous courage. I don't know that Sri Lanka would agree with me on the need for that. My concern is that you can tell people to move on, and you can tell people to keep going, but the feeling still sits in the body. And it still sits in the bodies of the children who come after. I don't know that you are building something that will last if its foundation is not based on truthfulness. **The mothers whose sons and daughters were forcibly disappeared are still waiting for answers. How do you see this continuing injustice?** I have four children, and if I did not see a body, I would not believe that my child was dead. I would hold on to hope for the rest of my life. Unless I saw it with my own eyes, I would hold on to that hope forever. So I can understand an aspect, an element, a tiny fragment of what those mothers and fathers are feeling, what they are thinking, and why they refuse to give up hope. That is a very deep injustice that continues to be done to them. Not only is it highly likely that their children are dead, but they may never have full confirmation of that, or be able to perform the rites that I have participated in myself for other members of my family whom I love — rites that do, indeed, give you some ability to accept what has happened. **At the same time, no society can live permanently inside its trauma. How do Tamils preserve memory and continue demanding truth and justice without allowing the war to define every generation that comes after it?** Isn't that an interesting question? Do you think that Israel and the Jewish community globally are not defined by what happened to them and by their trauma? The default answer to your question is that societies are always defined by the trauma they have encountered. But I think we can, and we will, do better than that. In fact, I think we are already doing better than that. I think we are the sum total of who we are. When I look at my own family — if I look at just the Chandrans, or if I look at the Kathiravelpillais, my father's family — individually, we are able to do different things that are quite excellent. But collectively, holistically, we can do, and we do achieve, much more together than we achieve alone. Therefore, within our Tamil community, in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, I think every person has to do their job. Every person has to do the thing that they are good at doing towards a shared goal, which is our collective betterment, both in Sri Lanka and outside of it. What that means is that there will be people who have to keep fighting the fight for truth and reconciliation. And there will have to be people who let them fight for truth and reconciliation while they continue the journey of economic empowerment. You will have to use your skills to tell all sides of the story, as you do, and I will have to use my skills in fiction to preserve culture and history — in many ways, preserving culture for people in our diaspora whose connection may change over time. I don't need to preserve culture in Sri Lanka for Sri Lankan Tamils, because they are living that culture. But I need to learn from them and try to communicate that history to the child in Strathfield, or elsewhere in Western Sydney, where there is a large Sri Lankan Tamil community. Although, often, the child in Strathfield or Western Sydney is more likely to teach me how to be a better Tamil. We now have so many Tamils here in Sydney that there are many language schools. When we migrated, shortly after the White Australia policy ended, you could count on one hand the number of brown people living in Canberra, the city where I grew up. It was a different nation. It was a different country. So, yes, I think we can do better than being defined by our trauma. But what it takes is a community of skilled and good people, each doing their job. **What does reconciliation actually mean to you? Is it primarily something that must happen between communities, or must it begin as a political process requiring fundamental changes in the structures and institutions of the state?** I think reconciliation will have to be led by people and communities, because I think political leaders are too invested in maintaining the status quo. They won't necessarily have the will or the courage to engage in systemic change. To the extent that systemic change occurs, it will have to be driven by Tamil and Sinhalese people together — people who saw what happened, who saw their own children die, Tamil and Sinhalese, and who don't want it to happen again. **You write about a community to which you belong but whose daily realities you experience largely from abroad. Does that distance give you greater freedom to speak, or does it impose a greater responsibility to listen?** All of the above. I think, first and foremost, it gives me a very deep and heavy sense of responsibility to try to get it right. And you should read my work and tell me if I've got it right or wrong. It absolutely means that I have a great responsibility to listen. In Australia, Aboriginal people talk about deep listening. You're listening to learn. You're not listening to react, you're not listening to respond, and you're not listening to solve. You're just listening to learn. As a writer, that is my first job. Does that distance give me greater freedom? Yes. But that freedom is a privilege that I don't take lightly, so I am not irresponsible with it. I have worked with lawyers and activists in Sri Lanka who have said to me, "We can't tell these stories in Sri Lanka. We are not safe to tell these stories in Sri Lanka. We do not feel safe. We know we are not safe." I have a safety, purely by existing outside the country, that allows me to tell these stories. That is not a privilege I take lightly. I am well aware that this freedom comes with a responsibility. **What is the hardest truth about Tamil society that you think Tamil writers, intellectuals and political leaders are still reluctant to confront?** I think, because we are human, we are still reluctant to confront the ways in which we contributed to, or were culpable in, the failure of the Tamil national project. The challenge for us is: are we courageous enough to reflect on that? And are we wise enough to learn from it? **You have children growing up far from the world that shaped your parents' generation. What do you want them to inherit from their Tamil identity, and what do you not want them to inherit?** I don't think they need to inherit the diasporic and vicarious trauma and guilt that my generation inherited. I think there is a generational transition. It's almost natural that my generation would inherit that trauma and guilt, and then that we might allow — and want — our children not to inherit it. What do I want them to take from their Tamil identity? I love Hinduism. I think Tamil Hinduism has been one of the greatest gifts of my life, and I would like my children to take that with them because it offers a pluralism and a respect for difference that is overlooked, to our detriment and damage. I would like them to take forward the extraordinary Tamil commitment to community and family. And I think we have a work ethic like no other — a determination to do better and be better, and a determination to give back. I feel a very strong sense of both justice and equity, and of wanting to give not just to my own community, but to have a sense of connection and community with people I don't know. I think that comes from my Tamilness, and I want them to have that. I think that's what I want for them. ### As El Niño Builds, Sri Lanka’s North Faces Heat, Water Stress and the Risk of Floods URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/as-el-nino-builds-sri-lankas-north-faces-heat-water-stress-and-the-risk-of-floods/ Last updated: 2026-07-26T14:26:46.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Northern Sri Lanka should brace for a long spell of heat, growing strain on its water, and sharp swings from drought to downpour as El Niño gathers strength in the Pacific, a University of Jaffna climate scholar has warned. Prof. Nagamuthu Pratheeparajah, a professor of geography and dean of the university’s Faculty of Arts, said people should start conserving water now and managing their wells, tanks, and reservoirs with more care, especially in districts that already run short every dry season. He was speaking at an awareness programme run by the Women’s Right to Life Association at the Vadamaradchi East Divisional Secretariat. High temperatures and dry weather could hold into October, he said, naming Mannar, Kilinochchi, and Mullaitivu as the districts most exposed to water scarcity. The warning lands at a moment when meteorological agencies at home and abroad agree on one thing: El Niño is here and building. What that means for Sri Lanka, though, is not simply months of unbroken drought. The historical record points both ways. In an El Niño year, parts of the North and East can go without rain for long stretches and then take more than their share. The region may be looking at two problems back to back — water stress in the dry months, then heavy rain, flooding, and crop damage once the second intermonsoon and the northeast monsoon set in. The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration moved the Pacific to an El Niño Advisory in June, raising it from a watch after sea-surface temperatures crossed the threshold. Its Climate Prediction Center now puts the odds of El Niño lasting into early 2027 at about 97 percent, and gives a roughly 63 percent chance the event turns “very strong” between November and January — strong enough to rank among the biggest since consistent records began in 1950. ![Prof. Nagamuthu Pratheeparajah](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/as-el-ni-o-builds-sri-lanka-s-VMMP8c-kix3mzycbpbgkld.png) Prof. Nagamuthu Pratheeparajah Sri Lanka’s Department of Meteorology said much the same in an outlook dated July 2\. Warmer-than-average water across the central and eastern equatorial Pacific, it reported, had come with shifts in atmospheric circulation that fit an El Niño pattern, and the event looked set to strengthen into the Northern Hemisphere winter of 2026-27. The World Meteorological Organization puts the chance that El Niño stays the dominant Pacific state through at least November at near or above 90 percent. Its latest monthly Global Seasonal Climate Update spoke of a fast build toward a strong event over July to September, while warning that no one can yet pin down how high it will peak, or when. ### **What Is El Niño?** El Niño is not a storm, a cyclone or a heat wave. It is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern called the El Niño–Southern Oscillation, or ENSO. When an El Niño takes hold, the surface waters of the central and eastern tropical Pacific turn unusually warm, and the winds and pressure patterns above them shift. That reorders the way moisture and heat move through the atmosphere, and it can bend rainfall, temperature and storm behaviour thousands of miles away. An El Niño does not hand every place the same weather, and it does not lock in drought or flooding anywhere. What it does is change the odds. Local monsoons, Indian Ocean temperatures, wind circulation and passing weather systems still do most of the work. That matters for Sri Lanka. Rain here is ruled by the southwest monsoon, the northeast monsoon and two intermonsoon spells, and El Niño touches each one differently. ### **What the Official Forecast Says About July to September** Look at how past El Niño years actually played out, and there is no clean, across-the-board drop in rain over the North. In July, the department found, rainfall in earlier El Niño events tended to sit near or below normal over most of the country, though the Western, Southern and North Western Provinces came out wetter, along with parts of Sabaragamuwa and the Ampara and Matale districts. August flips the picture. Parts of Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu ran above normal in past El Niño years, and so did stretches of Anuradhapura, Puttalam, Matale, Ampara, Monaragala and Hambantota. Much of the rest of the country stayed near normal or a little under. September usually landed close to the long-run average nationwide, a touch wetter in parts of Polonnaruwa and Monaragala, a touch drier in Puttalam. These are tendencies from earlier years, not a district-by-district forecast for 2026\. A district can post a near-average total for the season and still sit through long dry weeks, cop a few violent downpours, or watch one village drench while the next stays parched. So the worry about heat and water stress is well founded, all the more because July through September is already a dry patch across much of the North and East. But the record does not say El Niño will simply bake the whole region for three straight months. ### **Why the North Is Vulnerable Even Without a Rainfall Collapse** The North leans hard on shallow groundwater, house wells, small tanks and whatever the season brings. When the rain thins out, drinking water, livestock, home gardens and cultivation feel it fast — most of all where the groundwater is already salty or pumped too hard. Heat makes it worse. It pulls water off reservoirs and soil faster and pushes up demand in homes and fields at once, so farmers reach for more irrigation just as the wells and tanks refill more slowly. The strain reaches past farming. A long hot spell raises the danger of dehydration, heat exhaustion and heatstroke, and it falls heaviest on the old, the young, outdoor workers and people already unwell. Schools, building sites and farms may have to shift their hours and make sure there is drinking water on hand. El Niño can also nudge up global temperatures, because the Pacific gives off extra heat into the air. The WMO has said the building event raises the odds of heat waves on land and at sea, though no single hot spell can be laid on El Niño alone. Human-caused climate change has lifted the baseline that events like this one now sit on top of. ### **The East Could Face a Different Risk Later in the Year** October and November bring the second intermonsoon, when thunderstorms, low-pressure systems and cyclonic weather over and around the Bay of Bengal can dump heavy rain. The northeast monsoon that follows delivers the bulk of the year’s rain to the North and East. And El Niño does not always choke off that rain. Sometimes it feeds it. In a study that others still build on, the climate scientists Lareef Zubair and Chester Ropelewski showed that the link between ENSO and India’s southwest monsoon has weakened over the decades, but the link between ENSO and the northeast monsoon over Sri Lanka and southern India, from October to December, has not — if anything the circulation firms up in a way that adds to the rain. A 2025 paper in the journal Climate Dynamics went further, finding that Sri Lanka’s northeast-monsoon rain answers the two phases of ENSO unevenly, with a much stronger and generally wetter response under El Niño than under La Niña. Read together, they carry a warning: a dry run earlier in the year may not ease off gently. It may break in downpours. For people in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara, that means getting ready for both ends of it. Officials may have to guard drinking water now while they clear drains, mend irrigation works and get low-lying villages ready for floods months down the line. Rain after a long drought does not always fix a shortage, either. A hard downpour can run straight off to the sea, swamp the drains, and foul open wells with floodwater, sewage or salt, while baked, packed soil turns much of the rest away. ### **The Indian Ocean Also Matters** El Niño will not have the last word on Sri Lanka’s weather. What happens in the Indian Ocean, and above all the Indian Ocean Dipole, can lift, blunt or reroute the Pacific’s pull. Through the October-to-December season the dipole often tracks the North and East’s rain more closely than the Pacific’s own Niño indices do. The Department of Meteorology reported the dipole neutral in mid-June, with models hinting at a positive phase later in the year, most likely around August or September — though it cautioned that the forecasts scatter widely on both timing and strength. A positive Indian Ocean Dipole usually means warmer-than-normal water in the western Indian Ocean and cooler water off Indonesia. How it plays with El Niño shapes rain across the wider region, but the outcome for Sri Lanka comes down to where several atmospheric systems sit and how hard they push. That is why forecasters resist the image of El Niño “entering” the Indian Ocean. It works through winds, ocean temperatures, circulation and moisture, not as a mass of heat sailing toward Sri Lanka in one piece. El Niño influences Sri Lanka not because heat physically travels across the ocean at a fixed rate, but because unusually warm waters in the tropical Pacific alter atmospheric circulation, wind patterns and moisture transport across much of the globe. Those large-scale changes can affect rainfall and temperatures in distant regions, including Sri Lanka, though local conditions in the Indian Ocean also play an important role. Nor can anyone say for certain that low-pressure systems will hold off until after October. They are more common and usually more damaging for Sri Lanka during the intermonsoon and northeast monsoon months. But they can turn up at other times. ### **What Households and Authorities Can Do** Professor Pratheeparajah urged households not to waste water and to protect what they have — fixing leaks, going easy on treated water for non-essentials, keeping stored water covered, and keeping rubbish, wastewater and farm chemicals out of wells and tanks. Local authorities can watch groundwater levels and salinity, flag the villages likely to run dry, line up emergency water deliveries, and get word to farmers before the crops are lost. Health officials, for their part, can push heat warnings harder when temperatures spike, above all for outdoor workers and schoolchildren. Agriculture officers may need to steer farmers on planting dates, hardier crops*,* and irrigation as the season’s forecasts firm up. Take the department’s outlook as an early warning, not a verdict. El Niño shifts the odds. It does not write the weather for any one village or district. For the North and East, then, the smart move is not to dig in against drought alone or floods alone. It is to be ready for both, in that order. ### Can an MP Skip Court to Attend Parliament? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/can-an-mp-skip-court-to-attend-parliament/ Last updated: 2026-07-25T10:44:42.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — A heated confrontation in Sri Lanka’s Parliament on Friday over an arrest warrant issued against Jaffna District independent MP Ramanathan Archchuna exposed a broader constitutional question: What happens when a Member of Parliament is required to appear before court on the same day Parliament is sitting? Opposition lawmakers argued that the warrant infringed upon parliamentary privilege and interfered with an elected legislator’s constitutional duties. Government members countered that Members of Parliament remain subject to the ordinary processes of the courts. The legal position, however, is more nuanced than the political exchanges suggested.. ### **The warrant** The Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court issued an arrest warrant for Archchuna after he failed to appear in a criminal case in which he is accused of obstructing Fort Police officers in the discharge of their duties. According to court proceedings, his sureties were also absent when the case was called. Several hours later, Archchuna was attending Parliament, where lawmakers were debating a no-confidence motion against Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara. Interrupting the debate, Archchuna raised a question of parliamentary privilege. He told the House that although he was attending Parliament, an arrest warrant had been issued against him for failing to appear before the court. The intervention immediately triggered a constitutional debate. Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa argued that an elected Member of Parliament has both the right and the duty to attend parliamentary sittings and that no institution should obstruct a legislator from carrying out those responsibilities. Samagi Jana Balawegaya MP Harsha de Silva similarly argued that issuing an arrest warrant against a member attending Parliament raised a question of parliamentary privilege requiring the attention of the Speaker. Deputy Speaker Rizvie Salih declined to make a ruling, saying the matter fell within the jurisdiction of the courts. Instead, he asked Archchuna whether the court had been informed that he would be attending Parliament. Archchuna replied that his lawyers had appeared before the magistrate while he himself attended the parliamentary sitting. Government members rejected the opposition’s interpretation. Deputy Minister of Public Security and Parliamentary Affairs Sunil Watagala said defendants in both civil and criminal proceedings are required to appear before the court, and that the parliamentary office does not exempt a person from complying with judicial process. Urban Development Minister Anura Karunathilaka said Parliament had heard only one side of the dispute and could not determine whether the warrant had been properly issued without knowing what had transpired before the magistrate. ### **What does the law actually say?** The Constitution does not give Members of Parliament a general immunity from court proceedings. Article 67 provides that the powers, privileges, and immunities of Parliament and its members are those established by law, principally through the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act. The provision most frequently cited in disputes of this nature is Section 5 of that Act. Section 5 protects a Member of Parliament from arrest, detention, or molestation “in respect of any debt or matter which may be the subject of civil proceeding” while travelling to Parliament, attending a sitting or returning from one. The section is headed “Freedom from arrest in civil proceedings.” Legal practitioners familiar with parliamentary law told Jaffna Monitor that the section is confined to civil proceedings and does not create a comparable protection in criminal cases. Because the proceedings against Archchuna arise from a criminal charge, they said, Section 5 does not exempt him from complying with a court summons or from appearing in person. They also noted that while Section 7 extends to Sri Lankan Members of Parliament the privileges traditionally enjoyed by the House of Commons, nothing in the Act creates a general immunity from criminal proceedings. ### **When Parliament and court sit on the same day** The law does not establish an automatic rule giving parliamentary sittings priority over court proceedings. Lawyers familiar with parliamentary practice told Jaffna Monitor that where a Member of Parliament is unable to attend court because Parliament is sitting, the accepted practice is to notify the court through counsel and seek either an adjournment or an exemption from personal appearance. Whether such a request should be granted is entirely a matter for the presiding judge. If the court accepts the explanation, it may excuse the appearance or postpone the hearing. If it is not satisfied, it may proceed under the ordinary law, including issuing an arrest warrant where the legal requirements are met. That makes one exchange in Parliament particularly significant. Deputy Speaker Salih specifically asked Archchuna whether the magistrate had been informed that he would be attending Parliament. Archchuna replied that his lawyers had appeared before the court while he attended the parliamentary sitting. Legal experts who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor* said the legality of the warrant cannot be assessed solely from the parliamentary debate. They said the decisive question is whether the magistrate was informed in advance of Archchuna's parliamentary attendance and, if so, whether the explanation placed before the court was legally sufficient to excuse his absence. The precise reasons recorded by the magistrate for issuing the warrant were not immediately available to *Jaffna Monitor*. Until those reasons are known, it is not possible to determine whether the court rejected an explanation that was presented or whether no legally sufficient explanation was placed before the court, the experts said. ### **Separate constitutional roles** Legal practitioners who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor* said Parliament and the judiciary exercise distinct constitutional functions and that neither institution can assume the powers of the other. They said Parliament may determine whether one of its own privileges has been infringed during parliamentary proceedings, but it has no authority to suspend, cancel, or invalidate an order issued by a court. Likewise, they said, the lawfulness of an arrest warrant is a judicial question that may be challenged only through the courts. For that reason, the experts said, Friday's dispute ultimately turns not on the fact that Parliament was sitting when the warrant was issued, but on whether the magistrate had before the court a legally sufficient explanation for Archchuna's absence and, after considering that explanation, had lawful grounds to issue the warrant. The magistrate's reasons for issuing the warrant were not immediately available to *Jaffna Monitor*. Until those reasons are known, the experts said, it is not possible to determine whether the court rejected an explanation that was placed before it or whether no legally sufficient explanation was presented. ### Sri Lankan Court Allows Key Witness to Retestify in Prageeth Eknaligoda Disappearance Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-court-allows-key-witness-to-retestify-in-prageeth-eknaligoda-disappearance-case/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T15:45:10.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A three-judge bench of the Colombo High Court ruled on Friday that a witness who has twice changed his account in the case of the abducted journalist Prageeth Eknaligoda may be recalled to testify again, after he told the court that the evidence he gave four years ago had been extracted from him under duress. The witness, Sumathipala Sureshkumar, known in the case papers as Thaveendran and, more commonly, as Murali, is the fourth prosecution witness in a trial-at-bar against nine members of Sri Lanka's Army Intelligence Unit. The bench, comprising Judges Nayana Senaviratne, Nalin Hewawasam, and Lakmali Hewawasam, said the date for recording his fresh testimony would be fixed after the court vacation. Further proceedings were put off to Aug. 7. The order is a narrow procedural one, but it goes to the centre of a case that has come to stand for the durability of impunity in Sri Lanka. Eknaligoda, a columnist and cartoonist for the news website Lanka eNews, was last seen on Jan. 24, 2010, two days before the presidential election in which he had been a critic of the incumbent, Mahinda Rajapaksa. Sixteen years on, no body has been recovered, and no one has been convicted. Murali gave confessional statements to the Criminal Investigation Department and to the Homagama Magistrate's Court during the investigation. When he entered the witness box before the trial-at-bar in June 2022, his evidence departed from those statements, and the Attorney General's Department informed the court that it proposed to treat him as hostile. After the change of government in September 2024, Murali filed an application through Senior Counsel K. S. Rathnavel,, stating that his 2022 testimony had been given under pressure and requesting permission to present what he called his true evidence. The Attorney General's Department supported the application. Deputy Solicitor General Wasantha Perera told the court in June that the witness had given conflicting accounts because of threats and pressure attributed to the first accused, retired Brigadier Shammi Kumararatne, the former commanding officer of the Giritale army camp. Counsel for the nine accused objected strongly. The defence argued that the witness was biased, and told the court that a separate prosecution over the alleged intimidation of the witness was still pending before the Trincomalee Magistrate's Court without any final determination. That prosecution arose in June last year, when Kumararatne was arrested on a charge of intimidating a key witness and remanded by the Trincomalee court. ### **The Giritale camp** The Attorney General filed the indictment under the 2015–2019 administration, alleging that the accused conspired to abduct Eknaligoda between Jan. 24 and 27, 2010, and to cause his death. Investigators told the court that after he was taken, Eknaligoda was driven from Battaramulla to the Giritale army camp in the early hours of Jan. 25, and that the presence of all nine accused at Giritale that day was established through mobile telephone tower records obtained from service providers. Murali's significance to the prosecution is that the second accused is alleged to have telephoned him at about 8 p.m. that evening to say he had met Eknaligoda. The C.I.D. said it later confirmed the information with the operators. The accused are all on bail. They appeared before the newly constituted bench when the trial resumed on May 4, represented by a defence team led by President's Counsel Anuja Premaratne, with President's Counsel Upul Kumarapperuma appearing for the aggrieved party. ### **A trial that keeps stopping** The recall order comes after a year in which the case barely moved. Proceedings were suspended for months after Justice Namal Balalle was suspended pending a disciplinary inquiry and Justice Mahen Weeraman retired, leaving the bench unable to sit. In October, the court was told that the two vacancies had still not been filled, and the case was put off again. Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena eventually appointed the present bench, which ordered in May that the trial sit weekly, on Fridays. The hearings have since been held not at Hulftsdorp but at a court set up in a former ministerial residence on Wijerama Mawatha in Colombo. Other gaps in the prosecution remain unclosed. In November 2022, counsel for the aggrieved party told the court that the failure to summon Shani Abeysekara, the former C.I.D. director who led the original investigation, had seriously weakened the case; the then deputy solicitor general conceded in open court that it was a serious lapse by the department. Abeysekara has since been listed as the 109th witness — a position on the list that, at the trial's current pace, places his evidence years away. The government that came to office in 2024 promised to resolve the killings and disappearances of journalists. In January, one of the accused in this case, Erantha Peiris, was promoted to the rank of colonel, drawing criticism from human rights organisations. Eknaligoda's wife, Sandya, who has pursued the case for sixteen years, has continued to report threats and abuse. Whether Murali's second retraction advances the prosecution or further damages it will not be known until he testifies. A witness who has now given two materially different accounts is, for the defence, an argument in itself. ### Shashi Tharoor Urges India and Sri Lanka to Deepen Ties Through Literature URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/shashi-tharoor-urges-india-and-sri-lanka-to-deepen-ties-through-literature/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T12:45:03.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Literature can build bridges where politics sometimes cannot, Indian parliamentarian and author Shashi Tharoor said on Friday as he inaugurated the first Colombo Literary Festival, urging India and Sri Lanka to strengthen their ties through books, translation, and cultural exchange. Addressing an audience at Arcade Independence Square, Tharoor described the launch of the festival as “an act of optimism,” saying it affirmed that books, ideas, and meaningful conversations continued to matter in an increasingly fragmented world. He congratulated Sri Lanka’s independent publishers for working together to establish the event, calling their collaboration a model for strengthening literary culture. “Literature flourishes best not when it is divided into rival camps, but when everyone invested in books works together to expand the community of readers,” he said. Tharoor said literary festivals served a purpose far beyond celebrating books, providing spaces where writers and readers from different countries could exchange ideas and develop lasting relationships. “Stories continue to unite us in ways that politics sometimes cannot,” he said, arguing that literature fostered understanding across borders through empathy and shared human experience. Reflecting on his lifelong relationship with books, Tharoor said reading had shaped his thinking from childhood, exposing him to diverse cultures and traditions. While acknowledging the rise of digital media, he argued that sustained reading offered intellectual and emotional rewards that technology could not replace, including patience, empathy, and critical thinking. He urged publishers and booksellers to focus not only on selling books but also on creating new generations of readers. Turning to South Asian literature, Tharoor rejected suggestions that the region lacked global recognition, saying its writers had already earned international acclaim. The greater challenge, he argued, was ensuring wider access to literature written in South Asia’s many languages through increased translation, publishing, and distribution. He said too many outstanding works remained confined to their original languages and noted that South Asians themselves often failed to read one another’s literature. “Before asking why the world has not fully discovered us, we should also ask whether South Asia has fully discovered itself,” he said. Tharoor also highlighted the deep literary and cultural connections between India and Sri Lanka, describing the ancient *Mahavamsa* and *Dipavamsa* chronicles, together with the *Ramayana*, as part of a shared civilisational and literary heritage linking the two countries. The Mahavamsa and Dipavamsa, however, remain deeply contested in Sri Lanka. Many Tamil historians and scholars have argued that successive Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movements have relied on interpretations of the chronicles to advance majoritarian narratives and to justify policies that marginalized Tamil and other minority communities. Concluding his address, Tharoor expressed hope that the Colombo Literary Festival would become an annual institution attracting increasing international participation. He also called on foreign diplomatic missions to support the festival by bringing authors, poets, and translators from around the world to Colombo. “Books have always travelled farther than armies and endured longer than treaties,” he said, adding that literature remained one of the most enduring means of building understanding between nations. ### ‘Farewell, Ceylon’: China’s Ambassador Reflects on Six Years in Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/farewell-ceylon-chinas-ambassador-reflects-on-six-years-in-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T12:27:01.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** China’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, Qi Zhenhong, used a farewell message marking the end of his six-year posting to praise deepening political trust, expanding economic cooperation, and closer cultural ties between the two countries, while urging continued collaboration under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. In the letter, Mr. Qi reflected on what he called the longest diplomatic assignment of his career, describing Sri Lanka as a country of rich history, cultural diversity, and warm hospitality. He thanked Sri Lanka’s government, political leaders, businesses, media, religious institutions, and civil society for supporting bilateral relations during his tenure. The ambassador said China and Sri Lanka had strengthened cooperation through a series of crises, including the Covid-19 pandemic, Sri Lanka’s economic collapse, Cyclone Ditwah, and the global energy disruptions linked to conflict in the Middle East. He said the two countries had remained committed to the spirit of the 1952 Rubber-Rice Pact despite changing domestic and international circumstances. Mr. Qi highlighted high-level exchanges in 2025, including visits by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya to China, saying the meetings with Chinese leaders had provided new direction for bilateral relations. He said political trust, trade, investment, and people-to-people exchanges had continued to expand. The ambassador pointed to several Chinese-backed infrastructure and development projects that advanced during his tenure, including Colombo Port City, Hambantota Port, the resumption of construction on the Central Expressway, the National Hospital outpatient complex, the China-Sri Lanka Friendship National Nephrology Hospital, affordable housing projects, and education digitization initiatives. He also described China as one of Sri Lanka’s largest sources of foreign investment and development assistance. He said cooperation had increasingly expanded into sectors including agriculture, digital technology, tourism, port development, and capacity building, and pledged that China would continue supporting Sri Lanka’s development through high-standard Belt and Road cooperation. Much of the letter focused on cultural and educational exchanges. Mr. Qi said he and his wife had travelled throughout Sri Lanka, visiting temples, schools, and communities while participating in Chinese-funded welfare projects. He noted that China had donated school uniform fabric for four consecutive years since 2023, benefiting more than 4.4 million Sri Lankan students, and said the program would continue next year. The ambassador also cited Chinese cultural programs, including language competitions, film festivals, Tai Chi events, and tea ceremonies, as evidence of growing public engagement between the two countries. He described Buddhism as a longstanding bridge connecting China and Sri Lanka and said exchanges between Buddhist institutions continued to strengthen bilateral ties. He added that he and his wife had also visited Hindu temples, mosques, and churches during their posting. On international affairs, Mr. Qi said China and Sri Lanka had consistently supported the United Nations-centered international system, coordinated positions in multilateral forums, and backed each other’s core interests. He also promoted China’s Global Development, Global Security, Global Civilization, and Global Governance initiatives as frameworks for future cooperation. Looking ahead, the ambassador said China hoped to deepen cooperation in infrastructure, renewable energy, digital transformation, agriculture, marine industries, science and technology, while expanding Sri Lankan exports to China. He noted that next year would mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Concluding the letter, Mr. Qi said he and his wife would leave Sri Lanka but would continue to support China-Sri Lanka relations, expressing gratitude to Sri Lanka’s government, Parliament, political parties, business community, media, Buddhist clergy, and diplomatic corps for their cooperation during his tenure. **Below is the full text of Chinese Ambassador Qi Zhenhong's farewell letter to Sri Lanka, titled "Farewell, Ceylon; Together We Continue the Story Across Mountains and Seas."** Six years ago, bearing the trust and expectations of General Secretary Xi Jinping, carrying with me the profound friendship of the Chinese people, and shouldering the noble mission of elevating China-Sri Lanka relations to a new height, I arrived in Sri Lanka—the “Pearl of the Indian Ocean.” This vibrant land, with its beautiful natural scenery, rich historical and cultural heritage, and warm and kind-hearted people, has left a deep impression on my wife, Jin Qian, and me. The warmth and friendship of the Sri Lankan people have touched us deeply. I also felt deeply honored by the mission entrusted to me and keenly aware of the great responsibility it carried. Six years have passed in the blink of an eye. This has been the longest diplomatic posting for both of us. As we bid farewell, looking back on this unforgettable, fulfilling, and extraordinary journey, our hearts are filled with gratitude and a deep reluctance to leave. Over these 2,000 days, the bustling streets of Colombo, the serene and sacred Cultural Triangle, the misty and lush tea plantations of the up-country, the historic Galle Fort where the East meets the West, the ancient sites echoing with millennia-old heroic legacies, the distinctive local cuisine, and the culturally vibrant festivities—all have shown us this land’s exceptional natural endowments, splendid civilization, and magnificent history. My wife and I have also had the privilege of meeting many sincere friends from Sri Lanka’s government, parliament, political parties, media, think tanks, Buddhist community, civil society, and youth groups. Together, we have written a new chapter in carrying forward the traditional friendship between China and Sri Lanka and created countless beautiful memories. This journey has witnessed China–Sri Lanka friendship become as deeply rooted and flourishing as the Sacred Bodhi Tree.China and Sri Lanka have a long history of friendly exchanges which have grown stronger over time. The moving stories of the ancient Silk Road from thousands of years ago have transcended mountains, seas, and the passage of time. Today, they continue to flourish and shine with renewed vitality in the new era. The friendly relations between China and Sri Lanka are rooted in deep historical ties, a solid political foundation, strong bonds of shared interests, and broad social support. Over the past 6 years, we have together weathered the test of the COVID-19 pandemic, joined hands to tide over Sri Lanka’s economic difficulties, rallied to withstand the impact of Cyclone Ditwah, and stood shoulder to shoulder in coping with the energy crisis triggered by the Middle East conflict. No matter how the political landscape changes or how the international situation evolves, China and Sri Lanka have always stood firmly together, carrying forward the spirit of independence, self-reliance, solidarity and mutual assistance enshrined in the Rubber-Rice Pact. Together, we share weal and woe and set a fine example for friendly coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation among countries. In 2025, President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders met with President Dissanayake and Prime Minister Amarasuriya during their visits to China, reaching important consensus and fruitful outcomes of cooperation. These interactions have provided new strategic guidance for the development of bilateral relations. Today, political mutual trust between our two countries has continued to consolidate, economic and trade cooperation has further expanded, people-to-people and cultural exchanges have grown increasingly rich, and interactions at all levels—across departments, regions, and sectors—have become ever closer. At present, China-Sri Lanka relations are facing a historic opportunity to build on past achievements and forge ahead into the future. Both sides are committed to deepening the China-Sri Lanka strategic cooperative partnership featuring sincere mutual assistance and everlasting friendship, painting a splendid picture of a China-Sri Lanka community with a shared future through concrete actions. This journey has witnessed China–Sri Lanka cooperation shine as brilliantly as Ceylon sapphires. China and Sri Lanka are fellow travelers on the path toward development and revitalization, and good partners of win-win cooperation. China has always supported Sri Lanka in pursuing a development path that suits its national conditions, and in focusing on economic development to achieve national prosperity. Over the past 6 years, I have been delighted to see fruitful outcomes in high-quality Belt and Road cooperation and exchanges across various fields between our two countries. The Colombo Port City and Hambantota Port are thriving as key coastal hubs; construction on the first phase of the Central Expressway has fully resumed, accelerating connectivity between the central and western regions; the outpatient building of Sri Lanka’s National Hospital and the China-Sri Lanka Friendship National Nephrology Hospital have been put into operation, greatly improving local medical and health conditions; the China-aided project for the digital transformation of general education is progressing steadily, contributing to advancing the digitalization of education in Sri Lanka; nearly 2,000 units of affordable housing built with Chinese assistance have provided shelter for Sri Lanka’s low-income groups; and bilateral training programs tailored to Sri Lanka’s needs have become an important “booster” for capacity building. Today, China is one of Sri Lanka’s largest sources of foreign investment and one of its largest aid providers. The level of China-Sri Lanka economic and trade cooperation has been steadily rising, with robust exchanges and cooperation in port economy, modern agriculture, digital economy, culture, tourism, and other fields—vigorously promoting Sri Lanka’s economic and social development while bringing tangible benefits to the peoples of both countries. China will continue to share opportunities, pursue development, and promote prosperity with Sri Lanka through high-standard opening-up. This journey has witnessed the friendship between our peoples become as rich and mellow as Ceylon tea. As a Sri Lankan poem says, “A true friend shares your joys and sorrows, like a mural that never turns its page.” Over the past 6 years, my wife and I have traveled to every province of this beautiful island, visiting numerous temples, villages, communities, and schools, carrying out livelihood assistance initiatives, including school supply donation events, and attending inauguration ceremonies for China-aided water supply projects, water purification facilities, and Chinese language training centers. These events have brought the local people supplies and equipment brimming with the profound friendship and best wishes of the Chinese people. When we met local officials and residents, all we saw and heard were warm smiles, eyes longing for friendship, and voices eager for cooperation. Since 2023, China has donated school uniform fabric to Sri Lanka for 4 consecutive years, benefiting over 4.4 million students, and will continue to do so next year. The “small yet beautiful” livelihood projects have blossomed across the country. China’s goodwill has been highly praised by all sectors of Sri Lankan society, the bridge of people-to-people connection has become ever wider, and our two peoples have grown closer, hand in hand and heart to heart. I vividly remember that my wife and I celebrated the Chinese New Year with Sri Lankan friends at the Nelum Pokuna Theatre, where everyone warmly greeted us in Chinese with wishes of “Happy Chinese New Year!” The Dragon Boat Culture Festival, the “Tea for Harmony” Yaji Cultural Salon, the “Chinese Bridge” Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign Secondary School Students, the Tai Chi Promotion Event, and the Chinese Film Festival have all been warmly embraced by the Sri Lankan people—a “Chinese culture craze” has truly taken hold here. My wife and I have also spent many Sinhala and Tamil New Years, Vesak Festivals, and Poya days, participating in a dazzling array of cultural and people-to-people exchange activities in Sri Lanka. Together, our two countries have composed a new chapter of dialogue, mutual learning, closer interaction, and mutual inspiration among civilizations in the new era. The millennial Buddhist bond between China and Sri Lanka is deeply rooted in the hearts of our peoples. Venerable monks and esteemed Buddhist leaders crossed mountains and seas to sow the seeds of friendship, leaving behind treasured tales—such as Master Faxian’s journey to seek scriptures and spread the Dharma, and Master Tissara’s eastward voyage to preach Buddhist teachings. Today, Buddhist exchanges and cooperation between our two sides have become a golden bridge connecting our peoples, injecting strong spiritual momentum into the advancement of bilateral relations. My wife and I have also visited numerous kovils, mosques, churches, and other places of worship to distribute food packages, maintaining good interactions with believers of all faiths. This journey has witnessed mutual trust and support between China and Sri Lanka stand as firm as Sigiriya Lion Rock. China and Sri Lanka have always steadfastly upheld the international system with the U.N. at its core, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. We have adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, supported and coordinated with each other in multilateral fields, and safeguarded each other’s core interests and international fairness and justice, sending a strong message of Global South solidarity and self-reliance, as well as a shared commitment to regional peace, stability, development and prosperity. Our two countries are jointly advancing the building of a community with a shared future for humanity and implementing the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative, so as to address global challenges and create a brighter future for the world. The China-Sri Lanka friendship reflects the shared aspirations of our peoples, and China-Sri Lanka cooperation represents the trend of the times. Next year will mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Sri Lanka. Looking ahead, China is willing to continue marching forward side by side with Sri Lanka to carry forward traditional friendship, expand mutually beneficial cooperation, and deepen people-to-people and cultural exchanges. We will further strengthen the synergy of development strategies, deepen industrial and investment linkages between our two countries, advance high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, and continue to promote cooperation in infrastructure, new quality productive forces, new energy, modern agriculture, rural revitalization, poverty reduction, digital transformation, tourism, marine economy, port economy, science and technology, and other fields. We will expand Sri Lanka’s exports of specialty products to China, join hands to open up broad prospects for mutual success and shared prosperity, and build a China-Sri Lanka community with a shared future. By doing so, we can better benefit our two peoples. History and facts have proven and will continue to prove that partnering with China means embracing opportunities; believing in China means believing in tomorrow; and investing in China means investing in the future. Though mountains may separate us, we share the same clouds and rain; though miles lie between us, we look upon the same moon. As a diplomat, I am destined to keep moving forward, ever embarking on new journeys. My wife and I are about to leave Sri Lanka, but we will always keep Sri Lanka in our hearts and continue to contribute to the cause of China-Sri Lanka friendship. We would like to take this opportunity to express our special gratitude to all sectors of Sri Lankan society—government, parliament, political parties, businesses, think tanks, media, and the Buddhist community—for their valuable contributions to the development of China-Sri Lanka relations and their strong support for the work of the Embassy. We also appreciate the sincere assistance of my fellow colleagues from the diplomatic corps in Sri Lanka. We are grateful to the overseas Chinese, Chinese enterprises, teachers and students in Sri Lanka for their vital role in deepening exchanges and cooperation and enhancing the friendship between our peoples. May the friendship between China and Sri Lanka endure and flourish forever! May our two countries prosper and flourish! May our peoples enjoy lasting happiness and well-being! ### ‘They Set Fire to the Hearts of the People’: Deputy Minister Blames Ranil, UNP for Jaffna Library Burning URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/they-set-fire-to-the-hearts-of-the-people-deputy-minister-blames-ranil-unp-for-jaffna-library-burning/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T13:26:18.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A Sri Lankan deputy minister has accused former President Ranil Wickremesinghe and other senior figures associated with the United National Party of bearing responsibility for the political climate surrounding the 1981 burning of the Jaffna Public Library. Eranga Gunasekara, the deputy minister of urban development, said the destruction of the library, one of the most searing symbols of Tamil cultural loss in Sri Lanka, had “set fire to the hearts of the people” and contributed to the cycle of violence that engulfed the country in the years that followed. “The burning of the Jaffna Public Library in 1981 was one of the principal incidents that paved the way for the 30-year war and the Black July violence of 1983,” Mr. Gunasekara said at a news conference organised by the Socialist Youth Union. He singled out Mr. Wickremesinghe, who was a young cabinet minister in the United National Party government at the time, along with several other prominent figures in the party. Mr. Gunasekara did not present evidence directly linking Mr. Wickremesinghe to the burning of the library. The Jaffna Public Library was set ablaze in late May and early June 1981, during a period of escalating political violence surrounding elections to the newly established District Development Councils. The attack destroyed tens of thousands of books and manuscripts, including rare and irreplaceable works documenting Tamil history and culture. Mr. Gunasekara accused the United National Party government of President J.R. Jayewardene of using state power in an effort to secure victory in the Jaffna District Development Council election. He said politicians and supporters had been brought to Jaffna as part of an effort to interfere with the electoral process and described the burning of the library as the culmination of a broader campaign of anti-democratic violence. “The Jaffna Public Library was not merely a building or an ordinary library,” Mr. Gunasekara said. “It was a treasure containing more than 94,000 rare and historically significant books.” He said the library had occupied an almost sacred place in the cultural life of Jaffna, with visitors traditionally removing their footwear before entering as a mark of respect. Mr. Gunasekara also cited parliamentary Hansard records that he said showed that Mr. Wickremesinghe and several other United National Party politicians, including Gamini Dissanayake and Gamini Lokuge, were in Jaffna at the time of the violence. “Those who were in the United National Party at the time set fire to the feelings and hearts of the people,” Mr. Gunasekara said. “What they did that day caused devastation beyond the killing of individuals.” The burning of the library came two years before Black July, the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 in which hundreds, and possibly more than 1,000, people were killed and tens of thousands were displaced. The violence accelerated the country’s descent into a civil war between the government and Tamil separatist militants that ended in 2009. Mr. Gunasekara argued that the library’s destruction and the violence and political turmoil that followed should be understood as part of the chain of events that ultimately led to Black July and the war. ### Speaker Calls Archchuna a ‘Fool’; Government Leader Says He Is ‘Psychologically Affected’ URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/speaker-calls-archchuna-a-fool-government-leader-says-he-is-psychologically-affected/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T11:59:27.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The leader of Sri Lanka’s Parliament told the chamber on Thursday that a controversial independent lawmaker from Jaffna was “psychologically affected” and that lawmakers were patiently waiting for him to seek treatment and recover, an unusually personal attack that came during a chaotic exchange over parliamentary decorum. Bimal Rathnayake, the transport minister and leader of the House, also said the conduct of the lawmaker, Ramanathan Archchuna, was insulting to “the entire community,” an apparent reference to Sri Lanka’s Tamil community. The confrontation began during question time, when Mr. Ramanathan sought permission to ask supplementary questions. The Speaker, Jagath Wickramaratne, allowed him to proceed but ruled him out of order after he raised matters the Speaker said were unrelated to the question before the House. Mr. Ramanathan persisted, prompting an increasingly heated intervention from the chair. “Do not behave in a way that makes Parliament a laughingstock,” the Speaker told him. “Do not cause disruptions. Do not behave like a fool.” The remark drew an immediate objection from Sajith Premadasa, the leader of the opposition, who challenged the Speaker’s choice of words. “No one should speak in a manner that insults a member of Parliament,” Mr. Premadasa said. “While occupying the chair, it was inappropriate for the Speaker to call M.P. Archchuna a ‘fool.’ Such language is unbecoming of the House.” Mr. Rathnayake then rose to respond, saying it was surprising to hear the opposition leader lecture the chamber about parliamentary order when, he said, some opposition lawmakers had been disrupting proceedings since the morning. “The degrading conduct of some opposition members is not broadcast by the media, but the walls of Parliament know what has happened,” Mr. Rathnayake said. He also questioned Mr. Premadasa’s defense of Mr. Ramanathan, pointing to a previous confrontation between the two men. “The leader of the opposition is now speaking in support of M.P. Archchuna,” he said. “The people of this country know how these two clashed with each other in the past.” The reference appeared to be to Mr. Ramanathan’s first day in Parliament, in November 2024, when he occupied the seat traditionally reserved for the leader of the opposition and initially refused to move, leaving Mr. Premadasa to take another seat. Mr. Rathnayake then turned to Mr. Ramanathan’s mental state. “M.P. Ramanathan Archchuna is psychologically affected,” he said. “We are patiently waiting in the hope that he will receive treatment and recover.” The Speaker then disclosed that another Jaffna lawmaker, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, the leader of the Tamil National People’s Front, had formally asked not to be seated beside Mr. Ramanathan. Mr. Wickramaratne said Mr. Ramanathan had behaved improperly in the chamber and had directed “extremely degrading remarks” at him. He said Mr. Ponnambalam had written to say that he could no longer sit beside Mr. Ramanathan and that the seating arrangement had subsequently been changed. In a letter dated June 23, Mr. Ponnambalam accused Mr. Ramanathan of repeatedly abusing him from the neighboring seat, using derogatory language, and making threats of violence at district coordinating committee meetings and on social media. He told the Speaker that sharing a parliamentary bench with Mr. Ramanathan had become untenable. The acrimony between the two Jaffna lawmakers has also spilled beyond Parliament. At a district coordinating committee meeting in Tellippalai in June, Mr. Ramanathan was recorded referring to Mr. Ponnambalam as a “dog.” Mr. Ramanathan, a first-term independent lawmaker whose confrontational style has repeatedly generated controversy inside and outside Parliament, has faced disciplinary action before. In March 2025, the Speaker suspended the broadcast of his parliamentary speeches for eight sitting days and ordered earlier remarks removed from the official record after Mr. Rathnayake sought action over a sexually violent remark directed at Swasthika Arulingam, a human rights lawyer. Two months later, in May 2025, Mr. Ramanathan was ordered to leave the chamber under Standing Order 71 after another confrontation during parliamentary proceedings. Mr. Ramanathan has, however, made allegations of misconduct against Mr. Ponnambalam as well. In January, he asked the Speaker to move Mr. Ponnambalam’s seat, accusing him of verbal abuse, and called for his removal from Parliament’s Committee on Ethics and Privileges. Thursday’s confrontation brought those long-running disputes back into the chamber, but it also raised a broader question about the language used by those responsible for maintaining order in Parliament: The Speaker called an elected lawmaker a “fool,” while one of the government’s most senior parliamentary figures publicly suggested that the same lawmaker was psychologically unwell and in need of treatment. ### Black July Was Not an Accident URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/black-july-was-not-an-accident/ Last updated: 2026-07-27T18:04:34.000Z **By Jeevan Thiyagaraja** Black July was not a weather event. It means something more disquieting: a set of interlocking failures — constitutional, political, institutional, moral — had been accumulating since independence, so that by the time the Thinnavely ambush of 23 July supplied the occasion, the machinery of a violent, organized pogrom was already lying to hand (Jeyaraj 2021). One caveat belongs at the front of this account. As in 1958, so in 1983: many officers in uniform attempted, at the ground level, to do their duty. What undid them was not will but authority: the absence, at the critical hour, of orders from the Commander-in-Chief. Inspector-General Rudra Rajasingham pressed for a curfew from the first night; his Senior DIG urged the same. The order did not come until the next day; by then the damage was done. The same pattern held two days later inside Welikada Prison: an unidentified Sinhalese jail guard in C3 hid the cell keys in a toilet and barred the corridor with his own body, telling the men crowding toward him that they would have to kill him first — alone among seventeen jailors on duty, he held his wing. His courage could not substitute for the curfew order only a President had the authority to give. Commissioner C. T. Jansz's exhausting round of appeals across both massacre days, and Major Sunil Peiris's decision to move his commandos in within twenty minutes of a single call, were likewise courage well beyond duty — neither man's conduct is cited here as anything but that. This is not an exculpation of the state — it is, if anything, a sharper indictment, because the failure was not one of capacity but of will at the very top. ### **A childhood memory of the fire** I did not read about 23 July 1983\. I lived inside it, as a schoolchild, and the memory has never required footnotes. That morning, a mob of close to four hundred persons set about breaking down the wooden gates of a house owned by the Sir P. Ramanathan Trust. Six of us inside — I was one of them — faced the real prospect of death by burning. We were saved, if the word can be used for something so arbitrary, because the children of the family that owned the Mount Lavinia Hotel next door came out and persuaded the mob not to attack. That same morning, a howling crowd ran across our garden chasing a school van driver, having already set the van on fire. The nights that followed were spent listening for noises in the dark, in case mobs returned. The Parakrama family in the lane beside ours sheltered scores of frightened people, while someone stood guard at the top of the lane through the night. Seeds of hate had already crept into the minds of schoolgoers; one small consequence, years earlier , was my own quiet boycott of an elite group whose culture I would no longer stomach. The country we knew failed us that week. I say this having served briefly in positions of authority in government myself — which makes the judgment harder to write, not easier. A state does not get to plead extenuating circumstances to a six-year-old, or a nineteen-year-old, cowering behind a wooden gate while four hundred ruffians try to break it down. ### **The slow unbuilding of a shared state** Sri Lanka did not inherit an ethnic civil war from the British; it constructed one, statute by statute. The Official Language Act of 1956 reversed a cross-party consensus on dual-language policy within two years, making language "a permanent and thus far irreconcilable issue" (Perera 2001, citing Kearney 1967). The 1972 republican constitution deleted the clause barring parliament from legislating to the prejudice of minorities; a joint Tamil reform submission that year was rejected outright (Perera 2001). University admissions, "standardized" from 1971, cut Tamil representation in science faculties from 35.3 to 19 percent by 1975 (Perera 2001) — reversed in 1977, but not before a generation learned the doors were closing by design. Two negotiated paths existed and were both abandoned: the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 and the Dudley–Chelvanayakam Pact of 1965, each torn up under pressure from whichever party was, at that moment, in nationalist opposition (Perera 2001). Perera writes it is "generally accepted" that had either survived, the conflict would not have escalated as it did — twice negotiated, twice discarded, because generosity toward a minority can always be outbid at the next election. The Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976 and the Tamil United Liberation Front's near-clean sweep of northern seats in 1977 on a separatist platform (Perera 2001) read as the electorate's verdict on thirty years of broken pacts. ### **Post-1977: a government with everything, and still not enough** The build-up after 1977 is its own chapter. Jayewardene's government won five-sixths of parliamentary seats — enough that no opposition arithmetic could threaten it — and used it to rewrite the constitution, instituting an executive presidency while abandoning a pledge to first convene an all-party conference (Perera 2001). In 1981 the Jaffna Public Library was burned by organized UNP "thuggery and terror," destroying some 95,000 books; no one, not even the implicated MPs, was ever prosecuted (Perera 2001). In 1982 the government postponed the next election through a referendum "acknowledged to be full of corruption" (Perera 2001), and made the Prevention of Terrorism Act, introduced in 1979 as temporary, permanent (Perera 2001) — alongside emergency regulations tied to arbitrary arrest, torture and extrajudicial killing (Perera 2001). A government that did not need to cheat, cheated anyway. ### **The week itself** The ambush that supplied the occasion is documented down to individual names. On 23 July 1983, a fifteen-man Army patrol out of Mathagal was destroyed at Thinnavely by an LTTE unit of nineteen cadres — of a total force then of perhaps thirty full-time members — under Sathasivam Selvanayagam, with Velupillai Prabhakaran among them. Thirteen soldiers were killed; only two survived (Jeyaraj 2021). Reprisal killings by the same battalion in Jaffna took fifty-one civilian lives, including a lecturer and a human rights editor pulled from a van and shot; the battalion's commanding officer proved "either unwilling or unable" to stop them (Jeyaraj 2021). What happened next is best told in the words of the man who watched it happen from inside the Police hierarchy. Ramachandra Sundaralingam, then Senior DIG of Police in charge of Ranges, sent the following account to journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj in July 2017 (excerpted below): "1) Thinnavely LTTE ambush killed 13 soldiers on July 23, 1983\. Army HQ informed, President JR via Gen Attygalle ordered Army Commander Weeratunge get to Jaffna immediately. \[…\] 4) Gen. Attygalle in hourly discussion with Army Chief Weeratunge. In Jaffna the situation was deteriorating, with Army revolt, damage to property and injury to several persons; Weeratunge was unable to exercise control. Gen Attygalle informs JR, who in turn instructs that the soldiers be buried in Jaffna, as happens in war. When conveyed to Gen. Weeratunge, his prompt reply: 'Sir I will also be buried here, make arrangements to shift the bodies to their native places early.' \[…\] 6) Direction received at Police HQ: the ambulance plan is cancelled, bodies to be brought to Ratmalana for common burial at Kanatte. Tension was mounting in Colombo, with large crowds heading there. 7) IGP Rudra Rajasingham, DIG Ernest Perera and I visited Kanatte; the situation looked tense. We strongly advised the IGP to meet the President immediately to impose curfew, otherwise it would get out of control. He left to meet JR at Ward Place. Curfew was never declared until the next evening, by which time it was the worst damage in the country's history. JR could have averted this, but failed to declare curfew. Who decided to bring the bodies to Kanatte for a common burial? Minister Thondaman told me it was Cyril Mathew. All this is history." — Ramachandra Sundaralingam, email to D.B.S. Jeyaraj, July 2017 (reproduced in Jeyaraj 2021) Note what this account shows: a President whose first instinct was to bury the soldiers where they fell, overridden only by his Army Commander's refusal; a second, humane plan — separate burials, approved and quietly cancelled; and a common funeral at Kanatte, insisted upon by a named minister, from which the mobs marched. From there the violence organized itself with a precision no spontaneous crowd achieves: Householder Lists targeting Tamil homes street by street, government vehicles ferrying gangs, police ordered not to arrest, detained rioters released on ministerial orders (Jeyaraj 2021). The International Commission of Jurists, investigating independently, reached the same verdict: this had been a coordinated operation rather than a spontaneous outburst of communal anger (ICJ 1984). The killing peaked on 27 July and subsided only on the 28th, the day India's Prime Minister dispatched an emissary — after which "the law enforcement machinery got re-activated miraculously" (Jeyaraj 2021). It was not a miracle. It was proof the machinery had worked all along, when someone with authority wanted it to. ### **The Welikada Prison massacres** Two days after the Thinnavely ambush, while its aftermath was still being negotiated in a Colombo boardroom, the same violence broke out inside Welikada Prison, under the Commissioner of Prisons and a platoon of the 4th Artillery. Over three days it killed 53 of the 72 Tamil detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act — a 74 percent death rate among men already in the state's own custody. The reconstruction that follows draws throughout on Sameer's 2008 Sunday Times account (Sameer 2008). The prison's chapel section was built as a cross — four wings, A3 through D3, each behind a locked iron door off a central lobby watched by sixteen guards. In July 1983 it held six TELO and PTA detainees in the front section of B3 — including leaders Kuttimani, Thangathurai and Jegan, appealing death sentences for the 1981 Neervely bank robbery; 28 more Tamils under the PTA in C3; 29 Tamil youths arrested on suspicion, already cleared for release, in D3\. Nearby, the Youthful Offenders Building held nine Tamil professionals — two doctors, three priests, a lecturer, an editor, an architect — none convicted of anything. At 2 p.m. on 25 July, curfew was declared across Colombo. Inside Welikada, some 400 convicts broke out into the lobby; about 25, armed with poles, axes, crowbars and a saw from the woodshed, went to work in B3 and D3\. Commissioner Jansz and his staff tried to intervene and failed. By the time seven soldiers under Lieutenant Mahinda Hathurusinghe arrived — the mob, he said, dropped its weapons and fled upstairs the moment it saw armed troops — all 35 men in B3 and D3 were dead or dying; Kuttimani's eyes had reportedly been gouged out. In C3, a single unidentified Sinhalese guard held the wing alone, hiding the cell keys in a toilet and blocking the corridor with his own body, telling the attackers they would have to kill him first. It was the only wing that afternoon in which nobody died. What followed says as much about the state as the killing. Lieutenant Hathurusinghe would not release the truck of bodies without authorization "from the top" — the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, inside the same Security Council meeting chaired by Jayewardene. Jansz spent the next hours in a circuit echoing Sundaralingam's account of the same week: Borella police, short-staffed; Senior DIG Sundaralingam, leaving for that meeting; Army Commander Weeratunga, verbal "no objection" but nothing in writing; IGP Rajasingham, nothing more to offer. By the time Jansz returned, the bodies had been beaten again in the lobby, dragged into the compound, beaten again, loaded into the truck — witnesses recalled the sound continuing even once inside it. The prison doctor did not examine them for another hour, pronouncing all 35 dead at the gate. The inquest opened the next afternoon. No lawyer applied to represent the dead, and none appeared. Of seventeen jailors on duty, only the guard locked inside C3 ever testified to what he had seen. Under Emergency Regulation 15A, issued a week earlier, the bodies could be released for disposal on the Ministry of Defence's authority alone, bypassing the ordinary requirement that they be returned to their families. Wrapped in white sheets, the 35 dead were driven to Kanatte Cemetery before dawn, dumped into a pit, and burned. The survivors asked to be housed together and were refused: transferred out of C3 overnight, they were placed three and four to a cell in the Youthful Offenders Building instead. That morning, Chief Jailor W. M. Karunaratne told Jansz the prison's own intelligence had picked up word of a second attack. Jansz raised it with the Ministry of Justice, and that afternoon, at a second Security Council meeting, with Jayewardene himself — who wanted the detainees moved to Jaffna, talked out of it only when two Ministers warned it would further inflame Sinhalese opinion. A compromise, Negombo, was rejected as inviting "a repeat performance." Nobody transferred them to the one place a former Deputy Commissioner of Prisons later said would have been genuinely safe — the Magazine Prison, which had held the 1962 coup defendants without incident — because that required instructions from the Deputy Minister of Defence, whom Jansz could not reach. At around 4 p.m. on 27 July, the moment curfew began, prisoners in A3 overpowered the overseer bringing their evening meal and, joined by roughly 300 others armed with tools from the same woodshed, stormed the Youthful Offenders Building. Dr. S. Rajasundaram was killed trying to reason with the mob; Dr. S. A. Tharmalingam, in his seventies, urged the others to fight back. Eighteen of the 28 men transferred from C3 died with him — 53 of 72 PTA detainees dead in three days. No prison officer ever identified a rioter, and no identification parade was held after either massacre. The remaining detainees survived only because Major Sunil Peiris and a twelve-man commando team reached the prison within twenty minutes of a call to Army Headquarters, fired into the air and at the attackers, and moved the survivors out that night to Batticaloa prison, from which nearly all escaped that September. Only Father Singarayer, who chose to stand trial, and Dr. Tharmalingam, too old to travel, remained behind (Sameer 2008). Peiris went on to found and command the Army's Commando Regiment, and, by one widely circulated but unverified account, resigned in 1988 rather than send twenty-six detainees at the Ganemulla Commando base to their deaths during the JVP insurrection (unverified account, n.d.; cf. Fernando 2021, who confirms only that he resigned “to protect his honour, conscience and manhood”). The officer who moved fastest to end one massacre would, five years later, give up his career rather than start another. ### **The ledger** What did the country actually spend that week, and in the years it opened? Jeyaraj's retrospective puts the toll at over 4,000 Tamils and Muslims killed, close to 300,000 displaced, more than 2,500 businesses destroyed (Jeyaraj 2021); other estimates run as low as 300 to 2,000 killed nationally (Pavey 2008, cited in Jayawardane 2013: 16). No government ever cared enough to settle the number. The soldiers killed at Thinnavely and the 35 men murdered in Welikada's B3 and D3 wings were burned at the same cemetery, Kanatte, days apart — one common grave ordered from above to spare the state thirteen separate funerals, the other a pit because no next of kin was ever permitted to claim the dead. Both were decisions, not accidents, made by the same apparatus in the same week. But the ledger the country has not closed is larger than any single death toll. How many young men, in the twenty-six years of war that followed, paid with their lives serving the state's forces, and how many serving the LTTE and other groups Black July helped recruit and finance — a militancy that grew from thirty full-time cadres in 1983 to a force generating an estimated $100–200 million a year at its height (ICG 2010, cited in Jayawardane 2013: 6, 22)? How many youth of other groups were killed, by whom, and how many remain missing, conscripted, or simply disappeared from the record, uncounted by either side, or fled the island altogether? What was the cumulative cost to a country that might, with different choices in 1957, 1965, or the last week of July 1983, have spent that generation building instead of burying? And there is a harder question, one that cuts against the grain of grievance: what did the attacked communities choose \*not\* to do in return? Ordinary Sinhalese and Muslim neighbors sheltered Tamil families at real personal risk that week — the Parakramas in my own lane were one small instance of a pattern repeated across the island — a fact worth insisting on precisely because it complicates the "spontaneous mass uprising" the government wanted told (Jeyaraj 2021). That restraint, when the state itself showed none, is as much a part of this history as the violence is. By the late 1980s the reckoning came again, from the south: the JVP's second insurrection of 1987–89, whose seeds trace in part to the same moment — a state that had just shown its willingness to clothe extrajudicial violence in the language of national security, and a banned movement that concluded the parliamentary road was closed to it too (Perera 2001). The cost, atop the war already burning in the north and east, was immense. Something was structurally wrong with Sri Lanka's state — not one government, one minister, or one mob, but the machinery itself. ### **What 1983 might hear from 2026** In 2026, Sri Lanka is still working through a different reckoning: court proceedings connected to the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, testing not who planted the explosives but who knew, who was warned, who failed to act, and who may have had reason to let the attack proceed. The angles explored — command responsibility, the gap between operational knowledge and political will, whether inaction was negligence or complicity, the long delay before accountability was pursued — are not new to Sri Lankan public life. They are almost exactly the angles 1983 has never been made to answer. Substitute 1983 for 2019 and ask the same questions a court would ask. Was the Inspector-General's request for an immediate curfew a "warning" unheeded, as pre-Easter intelligence warnings went unheeded? Was the delay negligence, or does Sundaralingam's sequence — a countermanded plan, a minister's insistence on an alternative funeral, a president reachable but not reached in time — meet a higher standard? Was releasing detained rioters on ministerial orders command interference of the kind now alleged in the Easter Sunday cases? Would a court in 2026 find that the eighteen-year delay before the Presidential Truth Commission was appointed in 2001 — a Commission that then reached no findings of individual culpability at all (PTC Report 2002; ICJ 2010: 106) — was itself obstruction rather than administrative slowness? No one will ever bring such a case for 1983; the distance of four decades, the deaths of every principal actor, and the absence of any surviving investigative file make that certain. But asking the question is not idle. It exposes how much more forgiving Sri Lankan public life has been toward July 1983 than toward April 2019 — and suggests the difference has less to do with the gravity of what happened than with which victims a court, or a country, has finally decided are owed an answer. ### **What the history actually teaches** The lesson of Black July is not that ethnic hatred is ineradicable in Sri Lankan society. It is structural: a majoritarian democracy that repeatedly discards negotiated settlements, normalizes emergency law over ordinary law, lets one act of impunity go unpunished and then another, and eventually governs through extra-legal violence rather than against it, cannot contain that violence to the target it first had in mind. The instruments built to manage a minority end up managing — or failing to manage — the whole society. Sri Lanka spent thirty years building the conditions for July 1983, then twenty-six more years paying for the week itself. A formal apology did not come until 2004 (Jayawardane 2013: 20); there is still no state memorial, and schoolchildren still do not learn what happened that week (Jayawardane 2013: 22). The guard who held C3, the commissioner who would not stop calling, the major who reached the prison in twenty minutes — none of it was enough, because individual courage cannot substitute for a decision only the top of a state can make. A state testing, in open court, how far accountability reaches for 2019 has not finished the reckoning it owes for 1983 — and until it does, every new reckoning will carry the same unanswered question underneath it. \--- ### **References** **Fernando, Lalin (Major General). 2021\. “Bravery and Betrayal: Stirring and Thrilling Story of a Commando Unit.” Review of The Commando Regiment, by Lt Col Sunil Peiris. The Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), September 5, 2021\. https://www.sundaytimes.lk/210905/sunday-times-2/bravery-and-betrayal-stirring-and-thrilling-story-of-a-commando-unit-454427.html.** **International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 1984\. Findings on the July 1983 violence in Sri Lanka, cited in Jayawardane 2013: 16.** **International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 2010\. Report on accountability mechanisms in Sri Lanka, cited in Jayawardane 2013: 106.** **International Crisis Group (ICG). 2010\. Estimates on LTTE diaspora financing, cited in Jayawardane 2013: 6, 22.** **Jayawardane, Sash. 2013\. "A Study of Impunity in Postcolonial Sri Lanka." Impunity Watch Research Report, January 2013.** **Jeyaraj, D.B.S. 2021\. "Black July 1983 And The Foul Deeds Of 'Weeraya' Weeratunga And 'Yodaya' Athulathmudali." dbsjeyaraj.com, July 24, 2021, including the reproduced July 2017 email of Ramachandra Sundaralingam, former Senior DIG of Police.** **Kearney, Robert N. 1967\. Cited in Perera 2001, on the entrenchment of the language issue.** **Pavey, Eleanor. 2008\. Cited in Jayawardane 2013: 16, on academic death-toll estimates.** **Perera, Sasanka. 2001\. "The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline." World Bank, February 2001.** **Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (PTC Report). 2002\. Government of Sri Lanka, cited in Jayawardane 2013.** **Sameer, Firoze. 2008\. “That massacre upon massacre.” The Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), Plus section, July 27, 2008\. https://www.sundaytimes.lk/080727/Plus/sundaytimesplus\_08.html.** **Sundaralingam, Ramachandra. Email to D.B.S. Jeyaraj, July 2017, reproduced in Jeyaraj 2021.** **Unverified account. n.d. “Lieutenant Colonel Sunil Peiris: A Commander of Justice.” Social media post, publication venue and author not identified; specific claims (the 1988 Ganemulla order and the figure of twenty-six detainees) could not be independently corroborated for this piece and are presented as an unverified account only.** **\*Personal testimony: eyewitness account of the events of 23 July 1983 at Mount Lavinia, related by the author.\*** **\*Note on the 2019 Easter Sunday comparison: the accountability proceedings referenced are ongoing as of 2026; specific case outcomes were not independently verified for this piece and readers should treat the comparison as an analytical framework rather than a report on any particular verdict.\*** ### Two Jaffna Private Hospitals Fined Rs. 3.1 Million in Consumer Affairs Crackdown URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/two-jaffna-private-hospitals-fined-rs-3-1-million-in-consumer-affairs-crackdown/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T03:50:29.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A private hospital in Jaffna has been fined 3 million Sri Lankan rupees after pleading guilty to charging patients more than the government-set maximum price for a common blood test, the largest penalty imposed in a nationwide enforcement drive against private hospitals and medical laboratories. Venus Speciality Hospital (Pvt) Ltd, on Palaly Road in Kandarmadam, had been charging Rs. 550 for a Full Blood Count, or FBC, test, despite a legally prescribed maximum charge of Rs. 400 for the test and its report, according to Sri Lanka’s Consumer Affairs Authority. The violation was uncovered during a special inspection carried out by CAA officers on July 13\. The authority subsequently filed legal action against the hospital in the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court. When the case was taken up on July 21, the hospital pleaded guilty to the charge, according to the authority. The court imposed a fine of Rs. 3 million and ordered the hospital to publish a notice about the offence in national newspapers at its own expense. Following public inquiries about the legal basis for the price ceiling, the Consumer Affairs Authority issued a clarification on its official Facebook page, citing a price-control order that has been in effect for nearly 6 years. Under Order No. 67, issued under Section 20(5) of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act, No. 9 of 2003, the maximum charge for an FBC test and its report is Rs. 400\. The same order sets a maximum charge of Rs. 1,200 for a Dengue NS1 Antigen test and its report. The price controls took effect on July 29, 2020, and were published in Gazette Extraordinary No. 2186/17, dated July 29, 2020, according to the authority. The CAA urged patients using private hospitals and medical laboratories to be aware of the legally prescribed maximum charges and to obtain proper bills or official receipts for payments. Consumers who are charged above the prescribed rates can lodge complaints through the authority’s 1977 hotline during office hours, providing receipts and other available evidence. The Venus case was among 23 prosecutions brought following a series of inspections and raids targeting private hospitals, medical laboratories, and pharmacies across Sri Lanka. Courts have so far imposed fines totaling Rs. 5.798 million in those cases, according to figures released by the CAA. The violations identified during the broader enforcement operation varied across institutions and included the use of expired chemicals for diagnostic and laboratory testing, the storage of expired medicines for patient care or sale, charging laboratory fees above the maximum prices prescribed by the authorities, and storing expired chemicals alongside unexpired supplies without proper segregation. The CAA’s statements do not indicate that Venus Speciality Hospital was accused of using expired chemicals or possessing expired medicines. The case against the Jaffna hospital concerned charging Rs. 550 for an FBC test for which the legally prescribed maximum was Rs. 400. Another Jaffna health care institution, Yarl Mother Care Hospital, was fined Rs. 100,000 by the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court on July 21. Lanka Hospital Diagnostics (Pvt) Ltd received the second-largest individual fine, Rs. 800,000, from Colombo Magistrate’s Court No. 5\. Asiri Hospital Holdings PLC, Nawaloka Laboratories, Kings Hospital Colombo, and Durdans Hospital were each fined Rs. 100,000 in separate cases before the same court. Other prosecutions involved health care institutions and laboratories in Badulla, Anuradhapura, Eravur, Negombo, Bandarawela, and Matara. Ceylon Hospital PLC was fined Rs. 400,000 in Badulla and Rs. 50,000 in a separate case in Negombo. The enforcement campaign comes amid concerns over the cost and oversight of private health care in Sri Lanka, where many patients depend on private laboratories for routine diagnostic testing. The CAA said further legal action was expected against other institutions investigated during the operation and that inspections and raids would continue across the country. Members of the public can report suspected overcharging and other consumer law violations to the CAA through its 1977 hotline during office hours. ### The Audacious and Troubled Life of Panagoda Maheswaran URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-audacious-and-troubled-life-of-panagoda-maheswaran/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T13:08:57.000Z **By: Aruliniyan Mahalingam** ***This profile first appeared in the Jaffna Monitor at the time of Maheswaran’s death. It is republished, lightly revised, to mark the second anniversary of his passing.*** Thambapillai Maheswaran, one of the earliest figures in the armed Tamil struggle and the founder of the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA), died of a heart attack in Jaffna two years ago. He was among the first to bring a certain audacity to the movement — the raids, the jailbreaks, the vehicle bombs that preceded and, in some measure, inspired operations the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam would later make infamous. Yet for all his early influence, Maheswaran remains one of the struggle’s most contested figures: to some a committed liberationist, to others an impulsive adventurer more drawn to the thrill of the attack than to the politics of freedom. He came from an affluent family in Pungudutivu. His father, Thambippillai, was a prosperous restaurateur, one of many islanders who made their fortunes in the trade, and the owner of the well-known Dhawalagiri Hotel in Maradana, Colombo, which he sold, for reasons he never explained, before the 1980s. There is an irony written into the son’s very name. Thambippillai was routinely mispronounced as Thambapillai, and so the son became Thambapillai Maheswaran; his militant group, in turn, was first known as the ‘Thampa Group’. His siblings prospered abroad — a sister who became a doctor, a brother who retired as an accountant, a younger brother in the United States, and an elder sister in the United Kingdom. At Jaffna Central College, Maheswaran had been a standout: a sharp memory, strong academics, and a genuine athlete who turned out at cricket and football for the school. The family’s wealth, built largely on the hotel business, sent him to Queen’s College at the University of London in the mid-1970s, where he lived with his elder sister and her husband, an established accountant. He read civil engineering before switching to aeronautics, sources close to him said. Unmarried all his life, he would in his final years be supported by the same siblings whose generosity he had once tested so sorely. ### **London** In London, he fell in with Anton Balasingham — later the LTTE’s chief theoretician — and with Ratnasabapathy, a founding member of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS). Balasingham had not yet attached himself to the Tigers or to their leader, Prabhakaran. At Maheswaran’s funeral, PLOTE leader Dharmalingam Siddarthan claimed it was Maheswaran who first drew Balasingham toward the LTTE, introducing the theoretician to the movement he would come to define. It was also in London, friends told the Jaffna Monitor, that Maheswaran took his first drink, in Balasingham’s company — a habit that would shadow him for the rest of his life. Who he really was depends on whom you ask. To some who knew him, Maheswaran was driven by a genuine, almost consuming desire for Tamil liberation, a man moved by the oppression of his people and the hope of social justice. To others, he was something more restless: impulsive, captivated by the sheer audacity of striking at the Sri Lankan state, and comparatively uninterested in the slower, harder work of political strategy. True to that restlessness, Maheswaran abandoned his studies and returned to Sri Lanka in 1980 — and did so, characteristically, by taking his sister’s jewellery to fund the journey. She lamented the decision for years: a promising education traded for a revolver. “With your jewellery I did nothing for myself,” he reportedly told her. “I just bought two revolvers.” ### **‘Panagoda’ Maheswaran** His legend was sealed in the early 1980s at Panagoda, one of the country’s high-security military detention centres. He sawed through the iron bars of his cell, disguised the cuts with chewing gum, and slipped out in early 1983 — celebrated afterwards as the first jailbreak in Sri Lankan history and the source of the nickname that followed him ever after: “Panagoda Maheswaran.” The escape thrilled a generation of Tamil youth. It also lasted barely a day. He was recaptured the following morning after a tip-off from a Muslim household in Peliyagoda. That weakness haunted a friendship of decades. Over drinks, one close friend would needle him, recently as much as ever: “You were an impulsive youth with no ideology and no plan. If you’d had one, things might have been different.” The charge went further. Your family sent you to London, the friend would say; instead of finishing your studies and building or joining a movement from there, you ran home to start your own, proof, he insisted, of a bourgeois restlessness rather than a revolutionary’s discipline. Maheswaran, the friend recalled, never had an answer. He was among the handful of Tamil prisoners who survived the massacre inside Welikada Prison during the July 1983 riots, when Sinhala mobs, with, of course, the state’s blessings, turned on Tamil political detainees. Alongside Douglas Devananda, then a young militant and today the EPDP general secretary, he knotted bedsheets and whatever else came to hand into makeshift barricades and weapons, jamming the cell doors against the attackers. Devananda would later credit Maheswaran’s quick thinking with saving his life. The survivors were moved to Batticaloa Prison, and it was there, two months later, that Maheswaran engineered one of the boldest escapes in the country's history: the Batticaloa jailbreak of 23 September 1983. ### **Funding the fight, and a blueprint for what came after** In the years when the Tamil movements financed themselves at gunpoint, the TEA proved adept. Its most famous raid struck the People’s Bank at Kattankudy, Batticaloa, in 1984, netting cash and jewellery worth some 30 million rupees, an enormous sum at the time, along with a high-end 250cc police motorcycle. The bike, sources said, was later shipped to Chennai and turned up in an LTTE camp in Tamil Nadu. On 23 September 1985, Maheswaran attempted something that would become a signature of Tamil militancy. Against the joint police-and-army camp at Kilinochchi, he rigged a lorry with explosives and staged a petrol tanker nearby, intending the first blast to ignite the second into a single devastating fireball. The lorry detonated at midnight, tearing into the police station and its surroundings; the tanker never caught. The Tamil Eelam Army claimed the attack, which Maheswaran oversaw himself — one of the earliest vehicle-borne bombings of the war, executed with the technical knowledge he had picked up in London. The idea outlived the group. The LTTE, credible Tiger sources told the Jaffna Monitor, studied the Kilinochchi attack and asked a simple, terrible question: What if a fighter had been sent inside the lorry? The answer took shape on 5 July 1987, when Captain Miller- Vallipuram Vasanthan- drove an explosives-laden truck into the army base at Nelliady Madhya Maha Vidyalayam. ### **A Base Beyond India’s Reach** Maheswaran never quite trusted India. From his earliest militant days, associates said, he insisted the movement needed a base beyond Indian reach — “we can’t rely completely on India” — and he tried, without success, to establish one on a Maldivian island and later in an African country. Ahead of his time here, too, he pioneered arms procurement from abroad, though the weapons he managed to source were cruder than those the LTTE would later command. ### **Meenambakkam** ![An Indian Express newspaper clipping reports on the deadly Meenambakkam airport bombing in Madras in August 1984, an attack linked to Panagoda Maheswaran and the Tamil Eelam Army.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/the-audacious-and-troubled-lif-yL_h-I-kixdnzfznqtkjro.png) An Indian Express newspaper clipping reports on the deadly Meenambakkam airport bombing in Madras in August 1984, an attack linked to Panagoda Maheswaran and the Tamil Eelam Army. Then came Meenambakkam. On 2 August 1984, Maheswaran masterminded the bombing of Madras’s Meenambakkam airport (today Chennai International) in a plot aimed not at India at all, but at crippling Sri Lanka’s economy through its main airport at Katunayake. He packed explosives into two suitcases bound for Colombo on Air Lanka flight UL-122, the timer set for 10:52 p.m., the moment the aircraft was due to land. The charge was calibrated to detonate once the luggage had been offloaded into the cargo complex — powerful enough, by his design, to destroy half a dozen aircraft on the ground. The plan failed in the worst possible way. Maheswaran bought a ticket but never boarded. The suitcases, meant for the Colombo flight, were misrouted into baggage for London. When staff realised the ticketed passenger had not boarded, customs impounded the bags, and the Air Lanka flight departed around 8:15 p.m. without them. From inside the airport, Maheswaran watched it unravel and began phoning warnings about the explosives in the seized luggage. But a customs inspector, convinced the suitcases held contraband, apparently gold, and perhaps hoping to pocket it himself, refused to release them. Only after a third anonymous call did he relent. By then, it was 10:52 p.m., and a baggage handler was lifting the luggage to move it. The blast tore through the international arrivals hall, killing more than thirty people, twenty-three of them Sri Lankans, including a woman from Kilinochchi, and wounding some thirty-eight others. The ceiling came down on passengers waiting for an early flight to Abu Dhabi; one victim was decapitated, the head thrown a hundred and fifty feet. Maheswaran was arrested with ten others, jumped bail, was rearrested, and would not walk free until 2010. The bombing was immediately blamed on the LTTE, the best-known Tamil group in Tamil Nadu, where press and public alike tended to call every militant a “Tiger.” Stung, Prabhakaran ordered his men to find the real perpetrators, with proof. The task fell to Karuna Amman, later the LTTE’s military chief for Batticaloa-Ampara. Though Maheswaran himself was a northerner from Jaffna, most of his TEA fighters were Batticaloa men, and Karuna’s local networks led him to the truth. The Tigers passed their findings to the Indian and Tamil Nadu authorities, and, sources said, the authorities later presented the discovery as their own. Meenambakkam sent Maheswaran underground and hardened the LTTE’s move to ban every rival organisation, the TEA among them. Rather than fight, Maheswaran told his men to lay down their arms and go quietly. Many did: fighters such as Thampirasa, Siththa, ‘Appuchi’ Varathan, and some twenty-five to thirty others crossed over to the LTTE and trained at its tenth camp in Kolathur. Siththa, now living quietly in Europe, was remembered by the Tigers as a fearsome fighter; ‘Appuchi’ Varathan became a trusted lieutenant of Pottu Amman and masterminded the bombing of the Joint Operations Command on Flower Road before taking cyanide and dying at the home of Up-Country People’s Front leader Periyasamy Chandrasekaran. A former senior Tiger who worked closely with these ex-TEA men told the Jaffna Monitor that, although he never met Maheswaran, the calibre of his fighters left no doubt that their commander had been formidable. ### **The weight of conscience** ![Panagoda Maheswaran in his later years.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/the-audacious-and-troubled-lif-yL_h-I-kixuyc30oph8iny-1.png) Panagoda Maheswaran in his later years. In his later years, friends said, Maheswaran became a prisoner of his own conscience. Meenambakkam weighed on him most, but so did the memory of quieter cruelties. Part of the gold seized at Kattankudy had been handed to three goldsmiths in Nelliady, Vadamarachchi, to be melted down. When they skimmed a few grams for themselves, an enraged Maheswaran summoned them to a hideout and had them executed. In Batticaloa and Jaffna, too, he ordered the killing of a handful of people the TEA considered traitors. According to several friends who remained close to him, Maheswaran came to reflect deeply on the lives taken by his own hand or on his orders. The guilt he carried, they believed, was one reason he sank increasingly into alcohol. The commander who had once inspired fear and awe ended as a man tormented by his own record. What became of the roughly three crores taken at Kattankudy remains murky. Some went to arms and operations; much of it, sources said, was simply pocketed by TEA men. It was an open secret that one of Maheswaran’s own deputies built a house in Jaffna with the proceeds. Within the TEA he was never “leader” or “commander” or “comrade,” but simply Thamba, or Annaachi — the Batticaloa term of elder-brotherly affection. His group operated across the Sinhala border villages of Batticaloa, Ampara, and Polonnaruwa and in Muslim areas, yet largely spared local civilians, keeping a working understanding with Sinhala and Muslim communities and with other militant groups alike. ### **Later life, and the ironies of mourning** After Meenambakkam, Maheswaran spent years in Indian prisons, emerging in 2010\. He tried to join his siblings in the West, travelling to Tanzania, only to be jailed again there for a visa violation. It was Douglas Devananda, his old jailmate from Welikada and Panagoda, and by then a minister, who arranged his passage home, cleared him personally at the airport, took him to his Colombo house, and gave him refuge. Maheswaran never formally joined the EPDP, but he aligned himself with the party and stayed close to Devananda to the end. His death drew condolences from quarters that might have been expected to disown him. The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) mourned, through its self-styled prime minister Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, the loss of a great man who had stood firm on the path of Tamil Eelam, this despite Maheswaran’s own well-attested contempt for the TGTE, an outfit he spoke of, associates said, as something he wanted to bite and be done with. The Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF), forever adjudicating who is patriot and who is traitor, anointed him a patriot through its MP Kajendran and spokesman Sugash Kanagaratnam. Sivagnanam Shritharan offered condolences in Parliament. It may be the first time a figure so closely associated with the EPDP was mourned by the LTTE’s own proxies. The irony would not have been lost on Maheswaran. At an EPDP meeting not long before his death, he is said to have snapped that “Prabhakaran’s foolishness led this struggle to failure.” Now the very people who once treated Prabhakaran as a god were calling Maheswaran a patriot and a pillar of Tamil Eelam. One friend offered the shrewdest explanation for the sudden warmth. In the LTTE’s vocabulary, every rival was a traitor — so why the tributes now? Because he reasoned, Maheswaran never fought the Tigers when they banned his group; he told his men to comply, and compliance kept him off Prabhakaran’s list. And because he spent so many of his prime years in prison, he was never a functioning rival for long. Had he stayed free, the friend said, he would surely have been marked for death. In the end, that friend argued, Maheswaran was less Prabhakaran’s opposite than his forerunner: daring, ruthless, more moved by the thrill of a spectacular operation and the impulse for revenge than by any fully formed design for liberation and, like Prabhakaran, careless of human life. Of course, Maheswaran was no Prabhakaran, the former militant cautioned; Prabhakaran, in his view, was a military genius. “How Maheswaran would have built the organisation, I cannot say,” he told Jaffna Monitor. “But of one thing I am absolutely certain: put him in Prabhakaran’s place and, driven by the same appetites, he would ultimately have led the movement — and the people — to the same end at Mullivaikkal.” ### At Chemmani Mass Grave, Families Tell European Diplomats: ‘Our Lives Are in Your Hands’ URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/at-chemmani-mass-grave-families-tell-european-diplomats-our-lives-are-in-your-hands/ Last updated: 2026-07-25T10:42:55.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A high-level delegation of European diplomats visited the Chemmani mass grave excavation in Jaffna on Wednesday, meeting relatives of the forcibly disappeared and telling them that a petition they submitted would be treated as more than a symbolic appeal as the families renewed their demand for international intervention. “The petition you have given us is not merely a piece of paper,” the diplomats told representatives of the families, according to those present at the meeting. “We accept it with our hearts. We cannot make promises, but we know your pain and suffering. As far as we are able, we will raise your concerns at the United Nations and with countries that uphold human rights.” The delegation was led by Carmen Moreno, the European Union ambassador to Sri Lanka, and included the ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Senior European Union officials also took part in the visit, which came as the continuing excavation at Chemmani draws renewed attention to unresolved allegations of disappearances and extrajudicial killings stemming from Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil conflict. The diplomats visited the excavation after receiving permission from the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court and were briefed on the progress and procedures of the investigation. They also spoke with judicial and forensic officials and lawyers involved in the court-supervised excavation. Outside the site, relatives of the disappeared, university students, Tamil political representatives, and other demonstrators gathered along the main Kandy-Jaffna road, calling for an independent international investigation into Chemmani and other mass graves discovered across Sri Lanka. The protesters also demanded truth, justice, and accountability for enforced disappearances and guarantees that such abuses would not recur. Many of the families have rejected domestic investigative mechanisms, saying decades of commissions, inquiries, and government promises have failed to establish what happened to their missing relatives. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/image-1.png) A high-level European Union delegation visits the Chemmani mass grave excavation site in Jaffna on Wednesday. Police and intelligence personnel closely monitored the demonstration, photographing and filming participants, according to people at the scene. Officers also repeatedly asked those gathered near the site to disperse. The European delegation later met two representatives of the Association of Relatives of the Enforced Disappeared from the Northern and Eastern Provinces, including Kanagaranjini, one of the group’s leaders, on the grounds of the Sithupathi Hindu Cemetery. The families presented the diplomats with a 12-page petition calling, among other things, for an independent investigation into Sri Lanka’s mass graves. According to Kanagaranjini, the diplomats said they could not promise a particular outcome but would seek to raise the families’ concerns internationally. They also expressed continued support for efforts to secure justice and accountability for victims. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/image-2.png) Relatives of the forcibly disappeared stage a protest outside the Chemmani mass grave excavation site in Jaffna on Wednesday amid a heavy police presence. Speaking afterward, Kanagaranjini said the families had exhausted their faith in Sri Lanka’s domestic institutions. “We need to know what happened to our relatives,” she said. “We will never accept domestic mechanisms, domestic investigations, or offices established by the Sri Lankan government, such as the Office on Missing Persons.” She said the families had appeared before numerous commissions and met representatives of successive governments without obtaining answers about the fate of their relatives. “It is only after all of this that we have come to demand an international investigation,” she said. The families also want the international community to recognise the violence against Tamils as genocide and pursue accountability through international institutions, including, where legally possible, the International Criminal Court. The Sri Lankan government has rejected allegations that its forces committed genocide during the conflict. Kanagaranjini said more than 450 relatives who had participated in the long-running campaign for answers about the disappeared had died without learning what happened to their loved ones. “After the brutal war and genocide, the international community must obtain and reveal information about what happened to those who were handed over,” she said. The diplomats’ visit came a day after they met Tamil political leaders in Jaffna, where C.V.K. Sivagnanam, acting president of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, or ITAK, urged them to support a separate scientific investigation aimed at establishing the period in which the victims discovered at Chemmani were buried. Mr. Sivagnanam argued that determining the approximate dates of the burials could help establish who controlled the area at the time and potentially assist investigators in identifying those responsible. The continuing excavations have uncovered human remains in circumstances that have intensified demands for a credible investigation capable of establishing both the identities of the dead and how they came to be buried there. The families have made similar appeals to international officials for years, maintaining that they have little faith left in Sri Lanka’s domestic mechanisms to uncover the fate of the disappeared. Kanagaranjini said they had sought to convey the urgency of their appeal when they handed the petition to the European delegation. “This is not merely a report,” she said. “We are placing our lives in your hands.” ### Sri Lanka Says It Has No ‘Political Prisoners,’ Despite President’s Pledge to Free Them URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-says-it-has-no-political-prisoners-despite-presidents-pledge-to-free-them/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T02:52:16.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s justice minister told Parliament this week that the country holds no prisoners officially classified as “political prisoners,” a legalistic distinction that has reopened one of the most sensitive disputes of the postwar era and raised questions about the government’s commitment to a promise made to Tamil voters by both President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and his party’s election manifesto. Harshana Nanayakkara, the minister of justice and national integration, said neither the Prisons Ordinance nor prison regulations recognize political prisoners as a separate category. “No one has been remanded or detained by a court as a political prisoner,” he said. “Accordingly, there are no political prisoners.” The statement came in response to questioning from Ajith P. Perera, the deputy opposition whip and a lawmaker from the Samagi Jana Balawegaya, who pressed the minister over commitments Mr. Dissanayake made while campaigning in the Tamil-majority North and East. “If there are no political prisoners in this country, why did the president promise during the election campaign in the North and East to release political prisoners?” Mr. Perera asked. Mr. Dissanayake’s promise is a matter of public record. At a rally in Vavuniya days before the November 2024 parliamentary election, he said his government would move toward releasing Tamil detainees on the advice of the attorney general, coupling the pledge with a commitment to return military-held land in the North. The National People’s Power manifesto had also promised to release political prisoners, return occupied land, and establish a truth and reconciliation commission. Mr. Nanayakkara said he had examined the list of prisoners in question several times. Cases had been filed against all of them, he said, and several had been convicted. “They were arrested for offences involving violations of the law,” he said, while acknowledging the political circumstances in which many of the cases arose. Legal and political experts interviewed by Jaffna Monitor said the exchange reflected a distinction that has persisted throughout Sri Lanka’s postwar years: While the state does not recognize political prisoners as a separate legal category, Tamil political parties, prisoners’ families and human rights advocates argue that the arrests and prosecutions cannot be divorced from the conflict in which they arose. Successive governments have taken essentially the same position. In 2021, Ali Sabry, then the justice minister, told Parliament that Sri Lanka had no political prisoners, while acknowledging that some detainees faced no charges or pending cases. In late 2024, weeks after Mr. Dissanayake’s pledge, the former justice minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe made a similar assertion. Tamil groups and rights advocates have long challenged that reasoning. They point to prisoners prosecuted over alleged links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, some of whom have spent decades behind bars in cases arising from Sri Lanka’s nearly three-decade civil war. In April, a petition signed by 324 organizations and individuals — including two Catholic bishops, 29 priests, seven nuns, and two Buddhist monks — called on Mr. Dissanayake to immediately release 10 Tamil prisoners who had spent at least 15 years in prison. At least two, according to the petition, had been incarcerated for nearly three decades. Among the cases highlighted by campaigners is that of Vigneswaranathan Parthiban, who has been imprisoned for about three decades. His sister has appealed to successive presidents for his release and handed a letter to Mr. Dissanayake during a visit to Jaffna in January 2025. Nearly all of the detainees at the center of the dispute were arrested or prosecuted under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act, or P.T.A., enacted in 1979 as Sri Lanka’s separatist conflict intensified. The law has long been condemned by international human rights organizations for permitting prolonged detention without trial and allowing confessions made in police custody to be used as evidence. Sri Lanka committed in 2017 to replacing the law with legislation consistent with international human rights standards after the European Union restored the country’s access to its GSP+ preferential trading arrangement. Successive governments, however, have failed to complete that process. Even as he rejected the term “political prisoner,” Mr. Nanayakkara indicated that the government was considering relief for some long-serving inmates. He said particular attention was being given to prisoners who had spent lengthy periods behind bars and that the government would consider measures including reductions in sentences and presidential pardons, based on recommendations submitted by a committee chaired by S. Thurairaja, a retired Supreme Court justice. The committee, appointed by the Cabinet in June 2025, was tasked with reviewing the exercise of presidential clemency under Article 34 of the Constitution, along with the laws and administrative procedures governing pardons. It submitted its report to Ayesha Jinasena, the secretary to the Justice Ministry, this month. Its mandate covered the pardons system as a whole rather than specifically addressing prisoners whose cases arose from the civil war. Mr. Nanayakkara emphasized that any measures resulting from that process would not be confined to Tamil prisoners or to cases originating in the former conflict areas. “This will cover the entire country — the North, East, and South,” he said. The debate comes as Sri Lanka’s prison system faces a broader crisis of overcrowding. The country’s prisons hold roughly 27,000 to 29,000 people in facilities designed for about 10,000. The pressure on the system came into stark relief this month after violence at Negombo Prison on July 5 and 6 left at least 28 people dead, including eight prison officers. The opposition has since moved a no-confidence motion against Mr. Nanayakkara. But the dispute over political prisoners predates the current crisis and touches on a deeper question left unresolved since the civil war ended in 2009: whether people imprisoned for years or decades in cases rooted in the conflict should be treated solely as ordinary criminal defendants, or whether the political circumstances of their detention demand a different response. The issue now presents the government with a moral as well as a political challenge. Having campaigned on a promise to release political prisoners, it must explain how it intends to fulfill that pledge while insisting that, as a matter of law, no such prisoners exist. ### ITAK Accuses Government Authorities of Defying Court Order at Kanniya URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/itak-accuses-government-authorities-of-defying-court-order-at-kanniya/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T15:04:37.000Z **TRINCOMALEE, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s main Tamil political party has accused government authorities of beginning religious construction at the disputed Kanniya site in the eastern district of Trincomalee despite a court order that it says prohibits such work. Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, the parliamentary group leader of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi, or ITAK, said the Department of Archaeology, together with the Trincomalee district secretary and other government officials, had commenced construction work at the site on Wednesday morning. Mr. Rasamanickam said he had attempted to contact the director-general of the Department of Archaeology after learning of the development. ITAK representatives had only recently held discussions with archaeology officials over a series of longstanding disputes involving religious and archaeological sites, with an emphasis on resolving them through dialogue and within the framework of the law. “The Kanniya site is the subject of a 2020 court judgment, which clearly states that no religious construction should be carried out at the location,” Mr. Rasamanickam said in a statement. “If the reported construction has proceeded despite that judgment, it raises serious concerns regarding compliance with the rule of law and the authority of the courts.” Kanniya, near Trincomalee, has for years been at the center of competing religious and historical claims, making construction and archaeological activity at the site a politically and religiously sensitive issue. Mr. Rasamanickam said actions by state institutions that appeared to disregard judicial decisions risked undermining efforts to settle such disputes through engagement and dialogue. “At a time when we are making genuine efforts to resolve sensitive issues through engagement and dialogue, actions of this nature undermine confidence and create unnecessary tensions,” he said. “State institutions must act in accordance with court orders and the law at all times.” He said M.A. Sumanthiran, ITAK’s general secretary and a President’s Counsel, would take legal action over the matter. Mr. Rasamanickam also cited a response from the minister responsible for Buddha Sasana and religious affairs, who, according to the lawmaker, said that if a court order existed, it must be respected and that appropriate action would be taken in accordance with both the judgment and Sri Lanka’s archaeological laws. “I trust that the Government will act swiftly to uphold the law and ensure that no public institution acts in contravention of a valid court order,” Mr. Rasamanickam said. The dispute comes amid longstanding tensions over archaeological and religious sites in Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces. Tamil political representatives have repeatedly accused state agencies of using archaeology and heritage conservation to facilitate the expansion of Buddhist religious sites in areas they regard as historically Tamil. Government authorities and Buddhist groups have rejected such allegations in the past, maintaining that archaeological interventions are intended to protect sites of historical and cultural significance. ### Seized Indian Trawlers Choke Myliddy Harbour, ITAK Lawmaker Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/seized-indian-trawlers-choke-myliddy-harbour-itak-lawmaker-says/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T05:16:30.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Thuraireasa Ravikaran, a member of Parliament for the Vanni district from the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, or ITAK, has urged the government to remove Indian trawlers and other vessels that have long crowded Myliddy Fisheries Harbour, saying they are preventing local fishing families from fully using a harbour that was once one of northern Sri Lanka’s most important fishing centers. Mr. Ravikaran raised the issue at a meeting of Parliament’s Ministerial Consultative Committee on Ports and Civil Aviation, according to a statement issued by his office. He called on the authorities to clear the vessels and make the harbour fully accessible to fishermen from the surrounding communities. Myliddy, on the northern coast of the Jaffna Peninsula, was once a major center of Sri Lanka’s fishing industry before war and mass displacement devastated the local economy. The harbour was built in 1973 following demands from fishermen in the area, Mr. Ravikaran said, and was used by about 1,000 fishing families until residents were displaced from their homes in 1990. More than three decades later, local fishermen say they are still unable to make full use of the harbour. Mr. Ravikaran said he visited Myliddy on June 5 after receiving complaints from fishermen and found parts of the harbour crowded with Indian trawlers seized by Sri Lankan authorities after allegedly entering the country’s territorial waters illegally. Many of the seized vessels have been left at the harbour for an extended period, taking up valuable space while local fishermen struggle for access. Despite previous efforts and announcements concerning the removal of such vessels, fishermen say the problem has persisted. Mr. Ravikaran said local fishermen had also complained that much of the remaining usable space, apart from the areas occupied by the seized Indian trawlers, was being used by fishermen from southern Sri Lanka. “Please do not create a situation in which our fishermen, who live near the harbour, are forced to stand by and watch while being unable to use it,” Mr. Ravikaran said. “Our fishermen, too, must be able to earn their daily livelihood.” He described the situation as a violation of the fishermen’s basic rights and urged the authorities to remove the seized vessels and restore the harbour for local fishing activities. “Do not strike at the livelihoods of our Tamil fishermen,” he said. Anura Karunathilaka, the minister of ports and civil aviation, said the matter would require discussions with the fisheries minister and officials responsible for fisheries and aquatic resources before further action could be taken, according to Mr. Ravikaran’s statement. ### Tamil Leader Urges Scientific Inquiry Into Chemmani Mass Grave as European Envoys Visit URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-leader-urges-scientific-inquiry-into-chemmani-mass-grave-as-european-envoys-visit/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T13:43:00.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka** — A senior Tamil political leader has urged European diplomats to press for a separate scientific investigation into the Chemmani mass grave, arguing that establishing when the victims were buried could help determine who was in authority at the time and ultimately identify those responsible. C.V.K. Sivagnanam, acting president of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, or ITAK, said he made the request during a meeting in Jaffna with a high-level European delegation that included the European Union’s ambassador to Sri Lanka and the ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. “If we can determine the period during which the victims were buried, it would be possible to identify who was in authority at that time and, through that, identify those responsible and take action against them,” Mr. Sivagnanam told reporters after the meeting at the Jetwing Jaffna hotel. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/image.png) European Union Ambassador Carmen Moreno and the ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands meet Tamil political leaders in Jaffna during a high-level diplomatic visit to Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. The eight-member delegation includes Carmen Moreno, the European Union ambassador; Dr. Felix Neumann, the German ambassador; Rémi Lambert, the French ambassador; Damiano Francovigh, the Italian ambassador; and Wiebe de Boer, the Dutch ambassador. Senior European Union officials are also part of the delegation. The Jaffna Magistrate’s Court granted permission for the diplomats to visit the excavation site after an application was filed last week through a lawyer for the Office on Missing Persons. The diplomatic visit comes as archaeologists continue to uncover human remains at Chemmani. During the 37th day of the third phase of excavations, investigators identified a skeletal assemblage in an unusual position, with the legs folded and the body apparently seated upright. The jaw was also found fractured. The archaeologist Raj Somadeva examined the remains before they were exhumed. No associated artifacts or other evidentiary material were found with the skeleton, according to information from the excavation. Two additional skeletal assemblages have also been identified behind the remains and are expected to be examined in the coming days. Researchers are now expected to compare the discovery with skeletal remains found in a similar position during an earlier phase of the excavation. Assistance from the University of Jaffna’s Faculty of Hindu Studies is also expected to be sought for the study. The continuing excavation has intensified demands from families of the disappeared and Tamil civil society groups for international involvement in the investigation. The Association of Relatives of the Enforced Disappeared of the North and East called for a demonstration near the Chemmani Arch on Wednesday to coincide with the European delegation’s visit. The group said an international investigation was necessary both into the mass grave and the broader issue of enforced disappearances, accusing successive Sri Lankan governments of failing to deliver justice years after the end of the civil war. Mr. Sivagnanam, meanwhile, urged the European diplomats to press the government to hold Provincial Council elections under the previous electoral system, noting that the Northern Provincial Council has been without an elected administration for years. He also sought European assistance to attract diaspora investment, develop the agriculture and fisheries sectors, and address longstanding infrastructure problems in the North, including solid-waste disposal and drainage. But it was Chemmani that loomed over the diplomats’ visit. The mass grave has become an increasingly significant test of Sri Lanka’s ability to conduct a credible investigation into allegations surrounding its violent past. ### United but Vulnerable: JVP Faces an Uncertain Electoral Future URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/united-but-vulnerable-jvp-faces-an-uncertain-electoral-future/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T17:54:26.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Despite ideological U-turns since taking power in 2024, Sri Lanka’s dominant ruling Marxist party remains a united political force, although it is most likely to lose if fresh elections were to take place now, experts and insiders say. Most people spoken to insist that President Anura Dissanayake remains personally far more popular than his own Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) or the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, which he leads. Dharman Wickramaratne, an acknowledged expert on the left-wing JVP, says the majority of the party’s hardcore supporters are disillusioned with the ideological compromises it has made after forming a government. But they still support the administration because they have no choice, he said in response to questions. The JVP, born in 1965, was for decades on the fringes of Sri Lankan politics before mass protests sparked by an unprecedented economic collapse catapulted Dissanayake to the presidency. He then led the JVP-headed NPP combine to a sweeping win in parliament, stunning friends and foes alike. Since then, the JVP has come under widespread attack on a variety of issues, including for continuing with the IMF-suggested economic reforms and failing to improve the economic lot of those hard hit by the 2022 fiscal crisis. The JVP surprised everyone by shaking hands with its immediate neighbour, India — a country it once vocally denounced as “expansionist.” How will the JVP, one of Sri Lanka’s best-organised parties, fare if fresh elections were to be held now? Can it secure another two-thirds majority in the 225-seat parliament? “If a general election is held now, the opposition groups will come to power. But if a presidential election is held first, AKD will win,” Wickramaratne said, referring to the president the way many Sri Lankans address him. Political analyst Dayan Jayatilleka, a former diplomat and a keen student of Left politics in Sri Lanka and beyond, was equally certain that the JVP and NPP cannot win an election now. “The JVP-NPP will lose rather like the Sirimavo Bandaranaike-led United Front lost in a landslide defeat in 1977,” he said, referring to the world’s first woman prime minister who took power for a second term in 1970 with the backing of Marxist allies. Jayatilleka said the JVP was aware of the public mood, and this was why the government was not holding the much-delayed elections to Provincial Councils across all nine provinces. “If there had been a chance of winning, the JVP-NPP would have held elections and picked up several Provincial Councils and chief ministerships to augment its power. “The reason the JVP-NPP will lose by a landslide is the drastic deterioration of the material conditions of life of the majority of citizenry on its watch,” he added. Although a recent survey by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has said that Dissanayake and his government enjoy high popularity rankings, it warned that economic hardships faced by the people were real and painful. This, many argue, is bound to impact a future electoral outcome. Jayatilleka said poverty had increased and not decreased since the JVP-NPP embraced power. He quoted economist Sirimal Abeyaratne as saying that Sri Lanka has gone back a quarter century vis-à-vis poverty and poverty alleviation in recent years. However, both Wickremaratne and Jayatilleka asserted that the JVP, one of the best-organised parties in the country, remained united at the top despite murmurs at different levels over ideological compromises. Wickremaratne, who has authored five books on armed insurrections by the JVP in the 1970s and 80s, said there were no differences between Dissanayake and the JVP strongman Tilvin Silva. “These are stories created by the media.” Jayatilleka too said that there was no evidence of any tussle within the JVP leadership. “Anura is the undisputed leader, but not like (JVP founder Rohana) Wijeweera or (Tamil Tigers leader Velupillai) Prabhakaran, because it is a duumvirate with Tilvin Silva,” he said. Silva is widely seen as the real power in the government. “Tilvin and Anura are on the same page,” he went on. (But) Anura doesn’t defer to Tilvin.” But some political sources insist that there are differences between the two top men. An opposition MP who did not want to be quoted by name said he heard about a recent spat between Dissanayake and Tilvin Silva from various people he knew. “Of course, I don’t have any evidence, but there is a buzz that all is not well between them,” he said. JVP leaders have consistently dismissed allegations of a power struggle between the president and Tilvin Silva as propaganda by a disgruntled and divided opposition. But a Sri Lankan source in a European city with access to the JVP leadership also said that there were differences in perception on some issues between Dissanayake, 57, and Tilvin Silva, 69. “Differences have always existed in the JVP over the decades, in particular between its political and (earlier) armed wings,” the source said. “This does not mean the party is going to break up or anything like that.” Both in 1970-71 and in 1987-89, the JVP staged two bloody armed insurrections in a bid to capture state power. It failed on both occasions, and the resultant violence and counter-violence left tens of thousands dead. It was later that the JVP decided to pursue parliamentary politics. Even then, it slogged for a long time before striking gold in 2024. Can the JVP return to its ‘revolutionary’ past if it were to lose power? “Certainly not,” said Jayatilleka. “However, it can return even while in power, to violence – rather like a Latin American cartel would.” On a different subject, Wickramaratne said the government would find it difficult to defeat the Tamil parties in Provincial Council elections in the Tamil-majority north despite winning most parliamentary seats there in 2024. “No matter what concessions are given to the North, they will vote against the Sinhalese parties of the South. But if the JVP contests, it will win a few seats,” said the former editor of the Sinhalese-language *Silumina* weekly. Tamil sources agree with this assessment, pointing out that the JVP-NPP combine did come on top in civil body polls in the Tamil-speaking areas in 2025 but lost millions of votes compared to the parliamentary battle a year earlier. ### Can Sri Lanka’s Tamil and Muslim Parties Stand Together? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/can-sri-lankas-tamil-and-muslim-parties-stand-together/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T04:39:44.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Six political parties representing Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka have come together for the first time in years to pressure the government on issues concerning the minorities ahead of Provincial Council elections expected next year. But even as commoners voice scepticism about the grouping’s viability, one of its key leaders asserts that the front will “advance the historical responsibilities” towards the Tamil-speaking people that transcend elections. Political pundits admit that the opposition in general is troubled by the aggression of the JVP-led coalition government and its visible attempts to ride roughshod over rivals on the strength of its brute majority in parliament. Amid widespread assessments that the center-left National People’s Power is likely to lose support among the Sinhalese electorate in any future election, the government is expected to focus on wooing indigenous Tamils, Indian Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslims. This is why it worries the Tamil and Muslim parties that President Anura Dissanyake continues to be popular as an individual among their own constituents despite the many minuses that have plagued his government since taking office in 2024. On July 17, the six parties announced in Colombo a common platform for coordination on issues of shared concern, including constitutional reforms, provincial council elections, and land issues affecting the minorities. The initiative brought together the Sri Lanka People’s Congress (SLPC), the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), the Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA), the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), and the Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA). Critics wonder how long leaders of the six parties can stick together, considering that each party is engaged in portraying itself as the dominant political force in its respective regional spheres of influence. The CWC and TPA are long-time foes in the areas populated by the 1.5-million-strong ‘Indian Tamil community,’ while the ITAK, the country’s main Tamil party, has many reservations vis-à-vis the DTNA and other Tamil outfits in the country’s north and east. Similarly, the SLMC and SLPC are in competition for the same Muslim votes spread across the island nation. In any case, there are major issues on which these parties do not see eye to eye. TPA leader and multi-time MP Mano Ganesan says this is a wrong way of viewing the front, which he prefers to call “a national political platform” and which he says stands on a common minimum programme or CMP. The platform’s first major demand is the early conduct of the much-delayed elections to Provincial Councils in all nine provinces. Dissanayake and the NPP had promised that these would be held within a year of their taking power. The front wants the government to hurry up with its stated commitment to draft a new constitution that guarantees the full rights of the Tamil-speaking minorities, before Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism, weakened by the mass protests that followed the 2022 economic collapse, creeps back. Ganesan, 66, says the government must also give back all the private land taken from Tamils in the north and east during the war against the Tamil Tigers and distribute unused plantation land to workers employed in tea estates – one of the most economically depressed sections in Sri Lanka. According to him, other long-established parties such as Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam’s Tamil National People’s Front are welcome to join the front, but underlined that “both internal and external disputes between (various) parties should not be brought onto this platform”. Tamil sources say one major reason the six parties have come together is a growing sense that the JVP-led government is unlikely to yield even on minimum demands, even as it takes steps to undercut the influence of other political forces — including Muslim and Tamil parties — at the grassroots level. Not everyone in the country is enthused by the new formation. Some Tamils spoken to at random in Jaffna, Mullaitivu, and Kandy dismissed the six-party grouping as an opportunistic coming together of political forces that were stunned by the JVP/NPP in the parliamentary battle of 2024. One man in Jaffna who has traditionally voted for the ITAK said, “I don’t see much hope in these people. When Tamil parties (in the north and east) cannot unite on issues affecting the Tamil community, how can they expect bonding with Muslims and plantation (Indian) Tamils?” Others argue that such scepticism is the result of seeing the new formation as an electoral alliance and not as a way of putting pressure on the government on major issues on which there is a broad agreement among the minorities. The fact is that when the JVP swept the elections two years ago, including in almost all Tamil and Muslim areas, there was anticipation that at least some of the historical wrongs in the country would be set right. But that hope has given way to despondency, though the JVP remains an attraction. Instead, the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), for long an outsider vis-à-vis the political system, is seen to be increasingly aggressive and haughty. For example, Dissanayake had vowed to repeal the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). He also pledged to return the vast tracts of land taken from ordinary Tamils during the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Neither promise has been kept. The JVP government says it is committed to repealing the PTA. But it promises to unveil a new law which critics warn will be harsher. ITAK acting general secretary M.A. Sumanthiran pointed out that it was the first time in a long time that political representatives of the northern, eastern, Indian-Tamil and Muslim communities had shaken hands on agreed issues. He added that each party would keep its independent existence and views. “This is a platform where Tamil-speaking parties can raise a common voice on issues that affect us all. It is not an alliance. Each party remains free to hold its political views. Where there is a common ground, we will work together because a united voice carries greater strength.” Tamil sources admit that a united front may not necessarily lead to a joint electoral front, although this cannot be ruled out. The latter could happen because the JVP-led government has made almost everyone its political foe. The government’s Praja Shakthi programme, while aimed at banishing rural poverty through community empowerment, allegedly seeks to impose JVP cadres on official bodies, bypassing elected leaders of other parties. This has caused great resentment among Tamil and Muslim parties. “The president tours Tamil areas and walks freely among the people,” one Tamil leader pointed out. “This is good. It means the law and order is under control. But when it comes to Tamil land, the military cites security concerns as a reason for not returning it. This amounts to speaking with a forked tongue.” Pro-JVP social media accounts are already accusing the six Tamil and Muslim parties of whipping up ethnicity to score political points. But Tamil and Muslim leaders say they are firmly opposed to racism and fundamentalism of any kind. ### The Cardinal Who Talks Like a Politician URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-cardinal-who-talks-like-a-politician/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T13:43:07.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “He is a cardinal, isn’t he? Why does he always talk like a politician?” No one could have put it better when describing Cardinal Albert Malcolm Ranjith Patabendige Don, known simply as Malcolm Ranjith. And those words came from a respected member of Colombo’s Catholic community. Probably because the government appears to be on his side, the Cardinal may not realise that there is widespread disgust over his unending aggression about a supposed international conspiracy behind the Easter bombings of 2019. He is, of course, not alone. At least two other Catholic priests regularly appear in the media, offering their own spin on the horrendous terrorist attacks of April 21, 2019, which killed more than 260 people and injured hundreds. But it is Malcolm Ranjith who occupies the heart of this belligerence. The Islamic State promptly claimed responsibility for the Easter savagery. Nobody denies that they carried out the attacks. The dispute is over whether someone wanted the bloodbath to occur and, if so, whether they egged on the Islamist attackers. A string of investigations within Sri Lanka and outside has shown that the Islamic State acted on its own. Among those who came to this conclusion are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Scotland Yard. Malcolm Ranjith, however, insists that elements in Sri Lanka other than ISIS were responsible for orchestrating the bombings with a view to bringing Gotabaya Rajapaksa to power. The former defence secretary played a key role in defeating the Tamil Tigers. His views echo those of Maulana Azad, a Sri Lankan Muslim who alleged, while claiming asylum in Europe, that it was he who arranged a meeting between the Islamists and Suresh Sallay, a career intelligence officer who was known to be close to Gotabaya. Neither Maulana nor Malcolm Ranjith has provided any evidence to support these allegations. As far as Maulana is concerned, his testimony has been rubbished by former Tamil militants who have known him for years. Gotabaya, a younger brother of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, did storm to power in the election that followed the Easter mayhem. He subsequently appointed Sallay as head of the country’s main intelligence agency, the State Intelligence Service (SIS). Many find it amusing that an officer like Sallay, who once headed the Military Intelligence, needed a novice like Maulana to get introduced to hardened Islamists in Sri Lanka. And that, after a closed-door meeting with the would-be bombers, Sallay told Maulana, who was waiting outside, what had transpired during the top-secret discussions. Both these claims defy logic and common sense. One is not saying that Sallay did not do what he has been accused of doing. If we have to believe that Gotabaya and Sallay were indeed behind the bombings on Easter Sunday, there must be solid proof. None has been provided yet. Indeed, except for a lot of bluster one has heard in Sri Lanka’s parliament, there is not an iota of evidence that has become public that can make up a firm legal case against Gotabaya and Sallay. Insinuations can make for political drama; they won’t stand scrutiny in a court of law. So, the question that needs to be asked is: How does Malcolm Ranjith know that there was a conspiracy and that the Islamic State needed someone to encourage its members to do what they did? Has he had access to any intelligence file of any country that others have not seen? Is it possible that the Cardinal knows what the FBI, the Australians, or the British do not? Is this possible? Are we to believe that everyone except the Prelate is telling a lie? If the Cardinal possesses details of a conspiracy, why does he not make it public? There is another aspect to Malcolm Ranjith’s personality that does not inspire confidence. Here is a man who is supposed to spread Jesus’ teachings and treat everyone as equal in the eyes of God. What is the Cardinal’s record? Is it not a fact that Malcolm Ranjith maintained a stony silence when the Sri Lankan military bombed churches in the Northern Province during the war against the Tamil Tigers? Is it not true that numerous innocent Tamils, including Catholics, were killed in these attacks? Did not many Tamil members of the clergy disappear or get killed during the war? Did Malcolm Ranjith denounce any of these? Did his silence at a time of bloodbath and terrible human suffering not amount to being an accomplice in the war crimes? Who can forget that the Cardinal – he became one in 2010, a year after he was named the Archbishop of Colombo – ranted against those who wanted international scrutiny into the agonies Tamil civilians underwent. Sri Lankans won’t approve of outside intervention, he screamed. And the same Cardinal now wants a further independent, international investigation to unravel what he calls a conspiracy behind the Easter killings. He has made the demand in Geneva. He is also pressing the Vatican. We assume that a new international probe as sought by him will not affect Sri Lanka’s image. But Sri Lanka would have suffered humiliation if such an investigation were to have taken place into the war crimes of 2008-09. [As a Jaffna Monitor editorial](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/archbishop-archbishop-why-hast-thou-forsaken-us-in-our-hour-of-sorrow-and-slaughter/) noted, it is no one’s case that sections of the clergy did not collude with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) when the Tigers were the de facto masters of the northeast. That is another saga. Coming back to Colombo, not everyone in the Catholic community is happy with what the Cardinal is up to. As one Catholic said, the Cardinal may have certain reservations or doubts about what happened on Easter Day. He had every right to make his fears public. But to go on and on, in the name of seeking justice, is something else. “I know many Catholics in and outside Colombo are not happy with the Cardinal,” an elderly Catholic said. “If he has proof, he must give it to the government. What he is doing is propaganda.” There are other questions too. Is the Vatican aware of the goings-on in Sri Lanka? Is the Cardinal speaking on behalf of the Vatican? If so, does that mean the Vatican is interfering in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs? If Malcolm Ranjith is speaking on his own behalf, can he do so with his priestly robes on? Another Catholic in Colombo said he respected the Cardinal when he repeatedly called for peace in the country after the Easter bloodbath. “I felt proud. But for his appeal, who knows what could have happened? But what he is doing now is not right. It almost looks as if he is acting in concert with the powers that be.” ### Sumanthiran Shown the Gate? Alumni Protest Roils Victoria College Anniversary URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sumanthiran-shown-the-gate-alumni-protest-roils-victoria-college-anniversary/ Last updated: 2026-07-18T16:49:22.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A decision to invite M.A. Sumanthiran, the acting general secretary of the ITAK and a politician widely blamed by his critics for the decline of both Tamil politics and the ITAK’s standing in Jaffna, to the 150th anniversary celebrations of Victoria College in Sulipuram drew protests from a group of former students on Saturday — before the school announced that he would not attend after all. The former students gathered outside the college to object to the invitation extended to Mr. Sumanthiran, a former member of Parliament and President’s Counsel. Their first objection was procedural. Mr. Sumanthiran is not an alumnus, they said, and an event marking the institution’s 150th anniversary should have honored a distinguished former student rather than an outside politician. But the complaint quickly widened into a political one. The protesters called him an opportunist and attacked his positions on the Tamil national question and accountability for the final stages of Sri Lanka’s civil war. The opposition had been building on social media for days. In a strongly worded Facebook post that circulated ahead of the demonstration, one former student accused the college’s administrators and some members of its alumni community of acting according to a political agenda. The post charged that Mr. Sumanthiran had belittled the Tamil armed struggle and the sacrifices made over decades of war and accused him of undermining the Tamil political cause. Hours after the protest, the college principal, Sulapamathi, issued a statement saying that Mr. Sumanthiran would not take part in the anniversary walk — but attributed his absence to travel plans rather than the objections. “We had invited former member of Parliament and President’s Counsel M.A. Sumanthiran as a guest for the school’s walk,” the principal said. “However, he has officially informed us that he will be travelling to India and will therefore be unable to participate in the event.” ### China ‘Fully Agrees’ With Sri Lanka Government’s Policies, Departing Ambassador Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/china-fully-agrees-with-sri-lanka-governments-policies-departing-ambassador-says/ Last updated: 2026-07-18T15:48:26.000Z **By: Asela Kuruluwansha** **KANDY, Sri Lanka —** China’s outgoing ambassador to Sri Lanka said Beijing was in full agreement with the policies of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government and would continue supporting the country’s development, as he prepared to leave the island after a six-year diplomatic posting. The ambassador, Qi Zhenhong, made the remarks during farewell visits on Friday to the chief Buddhist prelates of the Malwathu and Asgiri chapters in Kandy. Speaking to reporters after the meetings, Mr. Qi said the Chinese government “fully agreed” with the policies pursued by Sri Lanka’s current administration and that the country was making progress through their implementation. He said there should be no doubt that China would continue to support Sri Lanka’s development, as it had done in the past. Mr. Qi, who is expected to leave Sri Lanka after completing his tenure on July 31, described the country as his “second home” and said he was departing with a sense that there was still more work to be done. “I feel as though there was more I could have done,” he said, according to remarks reported after the meeting. Mr. Qi said Sri Lanka had endured several crises during his tenure and that China had stood by the country and provided assistance during those periods. He also thanked the Sri Lankan government, political parties and the public for the support extended to him during his posting. The ambassador said ties between China and Sri Lanka, which he described as two Buddhist countries, had continued to deepen and that he saw no reason for the longstanding friendship between them to be undermined. During his visit to the Malwathu Maha Viharaya, Mr. Qi met the Most Venerable Thibbatuwawe Sri Siddhartha Sumangala Mahanayake Thera, the chief prelate of the Malwathu Chapter, who praised the ambassador’s contribution to strengthening relations between Sri Lanka and China. The prelate cited Chinese assistance to Sri Lanka, including the provision of school uniforms and support extended during times of crisis, and said Mr. Qi had carried out his diplomatic responsibilities with dedication. The Chinese government’s decision to keep Mr. Qi in Sri Lanka for six years reflected the manner in which he had performed his duties, the prelate said, adding that he would have welcomed the ambassador remaining in the country until his retirement. Mr. Qi later visited the Asgiri Maha Viharaya and received the blessings of the Most Venerable Warakagoda Sri Gnanarathana Mahanayake Thera, the chief prelate of the Asgiri Chapter. The Asgiri prelate also praised Mr. Qi’s work in Sri Lanka and his efforts to maintain close relations with the country’s leading Buddhist institutions. Mr. Qi’s departure will bring to an end a tenure that spanned one of the most turbulent periods in Sri Lanka’s recent history, including a severe economic collapse, political upheaval and a change of government. Throughout those years, China remained one of Sri Lanka’s most consequential economic and diplomatic partners, making the future direction of the relationship an important test for the Dissanayake administration. ### In Jaffna, Tamil Parties Back a Six-Party Bloc They Cannot Build Between Themselves URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/in-jaffna-tamil-parties-back-a-six-party-bloc-they-cannot-build-between-themselves/ Last updated: 2026-07-18T13:53:33.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka** — Leaders of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) and the Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA) met in Jaffna on Saturday to discuss a newly formed six-party grouping of Sri Lanka's Tamil-speaking parties — even as the two northern formations remain unable to forge an alliance of their own. The talks were held at the residence of C.V.K. Sivagnanam, the ITAK leader. He and M.A. Sumanthiran, the party's general secretary, represented ITAK. The DTNA delegation included Dharmalingam Siddharthan, Suresh Premachandran, M. Chandrakumar, C. Venthan and N. Ratnalingam. Speaking afterward, Mr. Sumanthiran and Mr. Premachandran said the two sides had reviewed the country's political situation and the new six-party initiative, which was announced in Colombo on Monday. The grouping joins ITAK and the DTNA — the principal Tamil parties of the north and east — with four parties drawn from Muslim and up-country Tamil constituencies: the All Ceylon Makkal Congress, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the Ceylon Workers' Congress and the Tamil Progressive Alliance. Its backers have cast it as a serious effort to align Sri Lanka's Tamil-speaking parties behind shared concerns: constitutional reform, greater devolution, long-delayed provincial council elections and land disputes affecting minority communities. But the pairing has also raised doubts about how durable the wider project can be. For more than a year, ITAK and the DTNA have held rounds of talks aimed at reviving, in some form, the unity once embodied by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). They have yet to reach an agreement. That failure is telling, observers say, because the two formations have far more in common with each other than with their new partners. Both draw their strength from the Tamil population of the north and east; their constituent parties once shared the TNA banner; and they hold broadly common positions on the demands that have defined postwar Tamil politics, from devolution to a political settlement of the ethnic conflict. Yet a common structure has repeatedly eluded them. The six-party initiative now asks them to coordinate not only with each other but with Muslim and up-country Tamil parties whose priorities are shaped by different constituencies and, on some issues, competing interests. The six parties unveiled the arrangement at a joint news conference in Colombo on Monday, saying they had agreed on a common platform to exchange views, build consensus and coordinate action while keeping their separate identities and policy positions. They set out three immediate demands: that the government honor its promise of a new Constitution with meaningful devolution, that provincial council elections be held without further delay, and that longstanding land disputes affecting Tamil, Muslim and up-country Tamil communities be resolved. ### Land, the PTA and a Postponed Vote: Europe's Ambassadors on the North's Unfinished Business URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/land-the-pta-and-a-postponed-vote-europes-ambassadors-on-the-norths-unfinished-business/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T13:43:09.000Z **By: Aruliniyan Mahalingam** When the French Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Rémi Lambert, and the German Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Dr. Felix Neumann, travelled together to Jaffna, the visit was more than a diplomatic stop in the island’s north. Over a series of meetings with political leaders, civil society representatives, academics and other local stakeholders, the two envoys heard first-hand about the region’s potential, hopes and frustrations as well as its unresolved challenges. In a joint interview with Jaffna Monitor, they reflected on what they saw, what they heard and how France and Germany view the future of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. ***For brevity, they are referred to below as Ambassador Neumann (Germany) and Ambassador Lambert (France).*** **During your joint visit to Jaffna, what did you observe or hear that most challenged the way Colombo-based diplomacy usually understands the North?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** What stood out for us most when we were in Jaffna seemed to be the special importance of local perceptions — of dignity, access, and participation in governance. From a Colombo-based perspective, some of these concerns appeared, or can appear, to be resolved on paper. But when we were on the ground, talking and listening to the people, we heard a particular emphasis on lived experience, trust, and inclusion. At the same time, we saw growing expectations within the local business community for more transparent and decentralised processes, alongside an improved ease of doing business, that would make it more straightforward for potential investors to engage, navigate resolutions, and establish operations in the region.Maybe I will limit myself here and hand it over to my French colleague. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** Thank you very much. I will echo what my German colleague said. We discovered — or rather had confirmed — the vibrant potential, particularly of a vibrant civil society and a private sector that is willing to engage. At the same time, we have seen the challenges the North faces in terms of connectivity and remoteness. As the German ambassador said, there is a lot to do, and many challenges we have to address from that point of view. There is also the potential of the diaspora, which is willing to return and to give back to this part of the country. Maybe that, too, could be a contribution. **What specific governance, livelihood, or social cohesion gaps did you identify in Northern Sri Lanka that will directly shape your future development priorities there?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** We got the impression that gaps remained in local economic opportunities, fair land access, and administrative capacity. These "gaps," as you call them, directly affect livelihoods, and they also influence long-term social cohesion and confidence in public institutions. In terms of local economic opportunities, Through GIZ, Germany has supported Jaffna's local business community by helping create Hatch Kalam, the city's first maker and co-working space. Today, it serves as a centre for entrepreneurship, innovation, and the development of startups and small businesses. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** During this mission, in our meetings with the young entrepreneurs and the business community, we had the opportunity to see how willing they were to address these challenges. Some of them are already working with the support of the German Embassy. We too are willing to work with them, through the French instruments of cooperation, or with the French Development Agency (AFD). ![Ambassador Dr. Felix Neumann of Germany, left, and Ambassador Rémi Lambert of France during their joint interview with Jaffna Monitor.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/land-the-pta-and-a-postponed-v-0mlAMI-kixrwmyeamq4mfn-1.jpg) Ambassador Dr. Felix Neumann of Germany, left, and Ambassador Rémi Lambert of France during their joint interview with Jaffna Monitor. **Based on your discussions with provincial officials, business leaders, and civil society, how would you describe the current relationship between the Northern Province and the central government?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** My French colleague and I felt that the relationship is functional — no doubt. Yet, at the same time, it seemed to us to be still marked by a considerable degree of mutual distance. Yes, there is engagement on all sides, but also a rather clear expectation in the North for deeper consultation, faster decision-making, and, as soon as possible, more consistent devolution in practice. If I may add, a strong view was expressed that sustained progress would depend on the government actively building trust with local communities in the North — by following through on commitments and delivering on promises in a consistent and transparent manner. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** We observed that the decision-making process still depends largely on central government decisions, which we can understand, given the structure of Sri Lanka's national state. But we did observe an expectation that the views and priorities of this region, particularly in terms of development and business opportunities, should be taken into account. I would say the analysis is that many of these issues are not specifically related to the North; they concern Sri Lanka as a whole, particularly in terms of business opportunities, transparency, and coordination. But that said, coordination between the central state and the province is certainly key to the development of the region. **You both spoke about the importance of connectivity. Having travelled to Jaffna yourselves, you must have personally experienced how long and difficult the journey can be. Do France and Germany view stronger north–south connectivity as an urgent national development priority for Sri Lanka?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** I think both of us remember the long journey, and the long time we needed to get to Jaffna. We even met along the way, when we had a break, without having coordinated it. So, yes — improved connectivity is a development issue as well as a cohesion issue. Better transport and administrative connectivity would, from our point of view, strengthen national integration and economic opportunities. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** We both remarked, I think, when we were on our way to Jaffna, that Colombo and Jaffna needed an expressway. It's a long way, even though we could enjoy the beautiful landscapes. But yes — better connectivity in terms of road, but also rail connectivity, port access, and, maybe beyond transportation, digital connectivity and logistics, are certainly essential to development and the region's potential. I would add that we are talking here about domestic connectivity, but for the development of the region, regional connectivity with the Bay of Bengal and the wider regional environment is also very important. And if you will allow me, I would add that developing connectivity and infrastructure is important — but from the French, German, and broader European perspective, it is equally important that infrastructure projects respect transparency, are environmentally sound, and are socially inclusive. Those standards are also very important for us. That is what we are promoting. ![Ambassador Dr. Felix Neumann of Germany, second from left, and Ambassador Rémi Lambert of France, second from right, with Northern Province Governor N. Vedanayagan during the ambassadors' joint visit to Jaffna.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/land-the-pta-and-a-postponed-v-0mlAMI-kixidnixh25so8r.png) Ambassador Dr. Felix Neumann of Germany, second from left, and Ambassador Rémi Lambert of France, second from right, with Northern Province Governor N. Vedanayagan during the ambassadors' joint visit to Jaffna. **Why was this joint Franco-German visit to Jaffna strategically important, and could it signal a deeper long-term European focus on Sri Lanka's North and East?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** Let me start by saying, yes — this was a joint German-French visit, underscoring the importance that both France and Germany place on coordinated engagement in South Asia, and our shared commitment to gaining a better understanding of local dynamics in order to better inform future cooperation and policy. Furthermore, the visit was based on a shared European interest in understanding the whole of Sri Lanka — not only parts of it, but the entire country. This signals sustained attention to inclusive development and regional balance, in Sri Lanka and in the region itself. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** It's not a shift; it's a deepening of our engagement. We have worked across Sri Lanka, including in the North, and we have already jointly developed some projects, particularly cultural ones. For example, on a regular basis, we have worked together on cultural projects in Jaffna. We had the Itinerant Library project across the country, including Jaffna; the Sister Library project last year, whose launch we jointly participated in; as well as the Roots We Take project. We have developed, and continue to develop, projects jointly between Germany and France. And, as the German ambassador said, this is also part of a broader European engagement with the region, based on fostering inclusive governance in particular. **More than seventeen years after the end of the war, how do France and Germany assess the current state of reconciliation, accountability, and minority inclusion, based on what you saw and heard in Jaffna?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** Of course, this was one reason for us to go on a joint mission: to see and to hear. We heard about progress in some areas, no doubt, particularly in reconstruction and basic services. But we also heard about continuing sensitivities around accountability, trust, and inclusion. From our point of view — and we, as Germans, know this from our own experience — reconciliation is always, and everywhere, a work in progress. It is not a one-day project. It is a longer process that requires work every day. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** I would say, as my colleague has said, that it made sense for us to focus our visit in particular on reconciliation and these issues. As you may know, an important part of our joint commitment in Europe, and of European reconstruction, has been built on reconciliation between our two countries. Historically, it made a difference and completely changed the political and democratic landscape of our continent. So I think this is also an important message, and we are willing to support every effort made by the government and by local actors in that regard, including different aspects such as transitional justice, which has to be pursued. As for France, we are currently a member of the Human Rights Council until the end of this year. So, within that framework as well, we want to be supportive of efforts to promote dialogue. We have also supported the extension of the mandate under the Human Rights Council resolution entitled *Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka*. **Significant areas of civilian land in Northern Sri Lanka — including land belonging to my own friends and relatives — remain under military control even seventeen years after the end of the war, while militarisation continues to shape daily life. Do France and Germany view this as an unresolved post-war justice issue? And beyond symbolic land releases, what would genuine civilian resettlement look like from your perspective?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** Indeed, when we undertook our joint mission and listened to nearly all our interlocutors, we noted ongoing concerns regarding land use and the presence of military structures in civilian life there. From our perspective — a European perspective — durable solutions require transparent processes and the full, but fair, restoration of livelihoods wherever possible. Germany finances projects on social cohesion and, together with our European partners, the Barometer project, which shows how much these questions are on people's minds. Using scientific methods, these projects have shown over the years that what you mentioned is not only an issue for your family, but also a cornerstone of reconciliation in the area. Supported by Germany through GIZ's SCOPE programme, the Sri Lanka Barometer measures public attitudes on reconciliation, trust, and social cohesion. Its findings help policymakers, civil society, and researchers better understand public opinion and shape more informed responses to the country's social challenges. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** I can echo what my German colleague has just said. In fact, this issue was raised during our visit, and it is a matter of concern, which has also been raised by the UN Human Rights Council. That said, since coming to power, the government has taken some important steps towards building trust with conflict-affected communities in the North and the East, including the release of some lands. So we are encouraging the government to move forward, because we have observed how important this is for the progress of reconciliation in these regions. **Sri Lanka has repeatedly delayed Provincial Council elections for years. Do France and Germany view this continued absence of elected provincial governance as a serious democratic and devolution deficit rather than merely a procedural delay?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** This question has two sides and, therefore, two answers. On the one hand, this is the kind of question that, obviously, Sri Lanka, as a sovereign state, has to decide on. And we are confident that Sri Lanka will do so. Internationally, there is a widespread consensus among democratic states that regular elections are a cornerstone of democratic governance. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** I fully share this assessment. I think we know that this is sometimes also related to the debate in Sri Lanka about the nature and structure of the state — whether it is a central, unitary state or another form of structure. Representing a country that has historically a strongly centralised state, like France, and a very unitary approach, that does not prevent us from having locally elected representatives. France combines an administrative organisation that is centralised, while at the same time relying on representative, elected local councils. So we have that experience, and we think it is good — as my German colleague has said — for the governance of the country as a whole. **Sri Lanka has pledged to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Have your governments directly called for time-bound repeal, and what minimum safeguards must replace it for Europe to view reform as credible?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** You ask about our governments. I would answer that, in line with many other democratic states and international institutions, our governments have consistently encouraged reforms aligned with international human rights standards — including clear safeguards, judicial oversight, and time-bound implementation. We share the conviction that all legislative reforms should be credible, transparent, and aligned with the principles of the rule of law. This applies to the Prevention of Terrorism Act as well. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** We note that the conditions under which the PTA was adopted were different, as its rationale was combating terrorism, which is reflected in its title. Many states, in that respect, have adopted legislation on such matters. But that said, as my colleague has said, it is very important that it complies with international human rights standards and commitments. We have noted the intention of the government to repeal it, and we fully support that intention. As for the replacement — whatever the future legislation may be — it is important that it be aligned with those international standards, with strong judicial and procedural safeguards. ![Ambassador Dr. Felix Neumann of Germany and Ambassador Rémi Lambert of France with business leaders from Jaffna during their joint visit to the city.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/land-the-pta-and-a-postponed-v-0mlAMI-kix91f46udvxigl.png) Ambassador Dr. Felix Neumann of Germany and Ambassador Rémi Lambert of France with business leaders from Jaffna during their joint visit to the city. **Critics often view GSP+ as political leverage rather than a purely economic partnership. Do France and Germany believe Sri Lanka is genuinely meeting both the technical requirements and the broader democratic obligations of GSP+, and should future trade preferences remain a meaningful lever for reform?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** Let me first state that GSP+ is a trade arrangement, no doubt. But it is a trade arrangement that enables privileged economic relations between partners who share the same values-based framework. If partners act within the same values-based framework, they can have a deeper understanding of each other and closer cooperation. That is the thinking behind it. Continued eligibility therefore depends on sustained compliance with international conventions, which enables the two trading partners to rely even more on each other, knowing that they are both members of the same system of international conventions. Thus, GSP+ encourages steady and measurable progress. That is the rationale, as we see it. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** GSP+ provides a major opportunity for Sri Lanka in terms of international integration into values-based supply chains. It must not be considered, as it is sometimes wrongly presented, as a constraint on Sri Lanka. On the contrary — through GSP+, the European Union is providing Sri Lanka with a tremendous opportunity to integrate into those supply chains and to attract investment into the country, provided that the set of 27 conventions is respected. **Would France and Germany support stronger protections for authentic Northern-origin products in European markets, to protect local industries and regional identity?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** Our countries strongly support a free, rules-based international trade order, which creates predictable conditions for business and helps integrate partners into global value chains. You may understand that, in that context, companies in the North — like those elsewhere in Sri Lanka and all over the world — can benefit on an equal footing: from fair access to international markets, and the opportunity to participate in global supply networks. Having said that, alongside these broader efforts, steps can be taken to strengthen regional branding and competitiveness. The international, free, rules-based trade system provides opportunities for branding, through quality labels, to identify local origin. But what is important is that all actors have the same right to enter these global systems. That, at least from a German point of view, is very important. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** This is also the French point of view. It would be extremely difficult, in terms of EU customs treatment, to differentiate products by provincial origin within Sri Lanka. Rather than having separate customs treatment, we think it is much more important that businesspeople and private companies in the North explore the possibility of using instruments such as geographical indications, which have been developed with the support of the European Union. For France, we have also worked in Sri Lanka on developing geographical indications. That is one example of what we encourage producers in Sri Lanka, particularly in the North, to do, in order to make their products better known to foreign customers. **Which sectors in Northern Sri Lanka do France and Germany see as genuinely investment-ready today; what are the main concerns facing foreign and diaspora investors; and how can investment be encouraged without deepening land disputes or political tensions?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** During our visit to the North, we were told that agriculture, fisheries, and renewable energy, in particular, show promise. Yet we were also informed that key concerns for investors include land clarity, regulatory predictability, and long-term policy stability. Finally, it was mentioned that the engagement of the rather large diaspora could be an additional asset — if, as was underlined several times, the confidence of this diaspora can be strengthened. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** There is a lot of potential in the North, ranging from fisheries, cold-chain development, agri-food, renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital services, vocational skills, and logistics. But, in general, the North does not have, to my understanding, a separate business regime. It is facing the same challenges that foreign — European, French, and German — investors encounter when seeking to develop ties with Sri Lanka. As the German ambassador has said, there are a number of issues. I would also add the risks posed by corruption, which we know the government is addressing, as well as land issues, disputes, and settlements. All these elements are important in creating a business environment conducive to developing stronger investment ties. As for France, the French Development Agency, AFD, is certainly willing to explore opportunities to support projects, as it has done in the past — for example, with the Jaffna water treatment plant. **How important do France and Germany consider the development of Palaly Airport and Kankesanthurai Harbour in Northern Sri Lanka? Do you see these projects as essential for regional development, connectivity, and broader strategic engagement — and are you concerned that the current government may not be prioritising these strategically important Northern infrastructure projects aggressively enough?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** The development of infrastructure is always, and everywhere, of great importance. And yes — in Sri Lanka's North, if you look at the map, you realise it has a clear and special economic relevance, particularly for connectivity and trade. So, from our point of view, such projects should indeed be a priority. But, like all projects, they must be sustainable and locally beneficial. **Ambassador Lambert (France):** I share the same assessment. Now, financing these infrastructure projects raises the question of funding. There is, of course, public financing, but there are also other possible avenues. One would be the role of the local private sector: would it be ready to participate and invest, for instance, on a public-private partnership (PPP) basis? We have observed examples in the region, in countries close to Sri Lanka. One is the Sialkot International Airport, which was developed with the support of the local business community. So that may be an avenue — food for thought. It is just an example. In any case, as I mentioned earlier, when the French Development Agency (AFD) resumes its support to Sri Lanka — which requires the signing of a host agreement — AFD is willing to support transport projects. This could be one example. And, more generally, France and Germany belong to the European Union, which supports a strategy called the Global Gateway, which places a very strong emphasis on developing connectivity and infrastructure in a sustainable and inclusive manner. ***Editor's note: From this question onward, the order of responses changes. The French ambassador answers first, followed by the German ambassador.*** **How do France and Germany balance support for rights-based initiatives, including gender equality and LGBTQI+ inclusion, while navigating local cultural and political sensitivities?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** Both countries have been very much committed to these inclusive policies, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy, and we have been working very actively on them. For instance, France has been promoting feminist diplomacy. Last year, in a dialogue with the government, we advanced this approach, and on these issues, as on many others, we work very closely with Germany. In Sri Lanka, and particularly in the North, I mentioned the cultural projects, including the Sisters Library project, which is an example, because it also promotes the voices of women authors in literature. There are many other projects on which we are working. France has been funding projects on period poverty through networks of organisations, as well as supporting feminist organisations in terms of women's empowerment, women entrepreneurs, and addressing gender-based violence, working with networks of local organisations, including in the North and the East. **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** As my French colleague has said, we represent two countries and two embassies that share the conviction that human rights principles are universal and comprehensive. So everyone is included, and that means gender equality and non-discrimination as well. Yes, we have had various projects. The Sisters Library project was already mentioned. We also held an event at the German residence that brought together women in decision-making positions across the administration here in Sri Lankan Ministries, Civil Society, UN missions and in the embassies. I was the only man in the room, which showed the approach we take. But at the same time, we recognise that such progress is most sustainable when it is locally anchored and context-sensitive. We do not want to shock anyone, but rather to embrace and invite people into this universal and comprehensive understanding. **In the wake of Cyclone Ditwah and Sri Lanka's growing climate vulnerability, what major French and German climate resilience, renewable energy, or sustainable development initiatives do you believe are most urgently needed to help Sri Lanka build a more secure and sustainable future?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** We are facing the same challenges as Sri Lanka. A few months before Cyclone Ditwah hit Sri Lanka, French islands La Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean were also affected by cyclones. We know that these major events, caused by climate change, may, unfortunately, repeat in the future. So it is highly important that our commitment to climate action — which France and Germany are very actively promoting at the multilateral level — is pursued together with Sri Lanka. There are many projects that can be undertaken to improve the resilience of infrastructure, protect biodiversity, and restore mangroves. I do not want to mention all of them, but I can say that, from our perspective, we are working in Sri Lanka with the Regional Centre for Maritime Studies (RCMS), which operates from Colombo while serving all of Sri Lanka. It brings together experts on issues related, in particular, to the protection of the marine environment, and in the future we will develop the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) component within this centre. **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** Yes, of course. As the French ambassador said, I remember very well — and Germany remembers very well — the catastrophic impact of Cyclone Ditwah. Sri Lanka, France, and Germany were, within the European framework and through European Union assistance, among the major contributors helping to reconstruct, as quickly and as far as possible, what had been damaged. But it is equally true that repairing damage comes later. Better is to work on the climate before the damage occurs. As a sovereign state, Sri Lanka develops its own priorities in all these areas, and we have taken note that the Sri Lankan government has launched its Clean Sri Lanka initiative, which is a broad programme. It includes key priorities such as coastal protection, which is linked to the Regional Centre for Maritime Studies the French ambassador mentioned; renewable energy, in which we share projects with the European Union; resilient agriculture; improved disaster preparedness; and climate adaptation. These are increasingly central to long-term stability and livelihoods, and we encourage Sri Lanka, within this programme and others aligned with its priorities, to continue moving forward. **As two of the European Union's most influential member states, how do France and Germany envision their leadership role in shaping broader EU engagement with Sri Lanka — particularly in areas such as reconciliation, democratic governance, trade reform, climate resilience, and Northern development — and can the North expect greater access to future EU-led strategic initiatives through your partnership?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** As members of the European Union, as you said, France and Germany are actively supporting the strategy developed here by the EU Delegation. We support it in particular within the GSP+ framework, which I mentioned earlier. As I said, GSP+ is an opportunity for Sri Lanka to expand its export markets. The European Union is the second-largest export market for Sri Lanka, and it offers an opportunity for greater integration of Sri Lankan exports into the global economy. Through these instruments and opportunities, Sri Lanka can become more competitive, more predictable, and better integrated into global value chains through preferential market access. I think another important element is the possibility of developing a better framework for re-exports, because one key element for Sri Lanka is greater international economic integration. Investors will be more attracted to Sri Lanka if they also have the possibility to re-export from Sri Lanka. **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** As we have heard, both Germany and France support a coherent EU approach, which reflects the common position of all European member states — big member states and small member states alike. This is the character and the strength of the European Union: within it, we build a consensus among all member states and then take that common position forward. Therefore, EU member states think in terms of regional cooperation, and I very much support what the French ambassador has said. We encourage Sri Lanka to think in regional terms as well. This is not only a major economic advantage, but also a significant political one. Countries that share the same values can develop regional cooperation in the economic field, and the objective of such cooperation is to build partnerships that support the long-term resilience of all partners. The European Union would like to be a partner in that process, and to support inclusive growth for all. **What is one difficult truth from Jaffna that Europe should continue repeating, even if it complicates official diplomacy?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** I would say that there is no difficult truth. We are committed to engaging with Sri Lanka at every level, including with the authorities in the provinces, through dialogue. So there is nothing that dialogue cannot solve. We are here to promote it. **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** On the same line — diplomacy is designed for all questions. So we are not afraid of complicated diplomacy. Diplomacy is the art of dealing with all kinds of situations, and, of course, it should follow the principles of international law. In this spirit, we believe that everywhere, mutual trust, participation, and perceived fairness remain just as important as physical development. **Both Germany and France currently require visa applicants from Northern Sri Lanka to travel nearly 350 to 400 kilometres to Colombo to provide biometric fingerprints and complete visa formalities. Given the North's large diaspora-linked population and the significant time and cost involved, would your governments consider expanding visa services beyond Colombo in the future? Do you see value in introducing biometric collection or visa application facilities in Jaffna to make the process more accessible for people in the North?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** Access to visa services is regularly reviewed within our administration. Visa procedures involve the processing of sensitive biometric data, which requires very high technical and security standards. At this stage, France therefore will maintain a centralised system in Colombo, in order to ensure the highest level of security, reliability, and protection of personal data. Nevertheless, we continue to explore ways to improve the experience of applicants and facilitate administrative procedures whenever possible. **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** I have exactly the same answer as my French colleague has just given. ### **Country-Specific Questions: Germany** ![Ambassador Neumann (Germany)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/land-the-pta-and-a-postponed-v-0mlAMI-kix9xpduiabtgo2-1-1.jpg) Ambassador Neumann (Germany) **Does Germany plan to expand vocational and skills-training models in Northern Sri Lanka, and if so, in which sectors?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** Kilinochchi, for example, in the North, already hosts a vocational training institute established by GIZ with the support of the German government. It reflects a longstanding German commitment — and, now, a Sri Lankan commitment — to skills development and local capacity building in the region. Today, this institute, together with the even older one — German Tech in Moratuwa, near Colombo — is governed by Sri Lanka, and both institutions play an important role in equipping young people with practical, employment-oriented skills. Today, it is for Sri Lanka, as a first step, to decide whether there is still additional capacity within these facilities that could be further utilised, offering scope to expand their operations and maximise their impact in line with local labour-market needs and future economic opportunities. Based on the assessment carried out by Sri Lanka, Germany will continue to be a reliable partner in developing, together with Sri Lanka, the direction that is most suitable. **How does Germany ensure that macroeconomic support to Sri Lanka benefits regions like Jaffna, not just Colombo?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** The joint visit by the German and French ambassadors to the North of Sri Lanka shows that we have this in mind. It is just one example of our shared understanding of Sri Lanka as a whole. In this spirit, we continue to encourage inclusive planning that benefits all provinces. We were just talking about Kilinochchi. It is not by accident that one of the German Tech centres is in the south-west, near Colombo, while the other was established in Kilinochchi. So there is a German tradition of maintaining regionally balanced engagement, and together with our French friends and our European partners, we will continue to do that in Sri Lanka. **How is Germany engaging its Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in development and reconciliation?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** In Germany, nearly all Sri Lankan nationals are successfully integrated into German society. It is our basic principle that Germany respects the individual background of every foreigner coming to Germany — and of every Sri Lankan, each of them. In this spirit, Sri Lankans of Tamil origin in Germany, as well as others, are welcomed as partners in helping us understand as much as possible about today's possibilities and challenges. And again, this applies to all of Sri Lanka — not only to one region, but to a balanced understanding of the whole country. **What reforms do German investors require before significantly expanding their footprint in Sri Lanka?** **Ambassador Neumann (Germany):** What German investors and companies very often tell me is that their key expectations include legal certainty, transparent and fair land administration, efficient dispute resolution, and consistent regulatory enforcement. Very often, predictability is mentioned as being more important than incentives. The incentive is that Sri Lanka is a beautiful country and has great potential. What is important is that the procedures within Sri Lanka follow the principles I have just mentioned. That is what investors tell me. ### **Country-Specific Questions: France** ![Ambassador Lambert (France)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/land-the-pta-and-a-postponed-v-0mlAMI-kixbv6y9coyhuf1-1.jpg) Ambassador Lambert (France) **How does France measure the long-term impact of cultural diplomacy initiatives in Jaffna?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** We can, in the first instance, measure it through our long-term commitment to the Alliance Française de Jaffna, which has been established for decades and participates in the training of young people from Jaffna in the French language. I personally met many of them during my joint visit with the German ambassador. It is also interesting to note that, culturally, the German Centre is very popular. That is another indication of the closeness of our relationship in cultural terms, including in Jaffna, where we have avenues of cooperation together with Germany. The Alliance Française de Jaffna also provides cultural activities and has partnerships with the University of Jaffna. The University of Jaffna is an important academic institution, and we are currently working on a social research project in the fields of social sciences and statistics, which will include the university. Apart from that, and in addition, there are the projects I mentioned earlier, which we have undertaken in partnership with civil society on women's empowerment and gender issues. **Which sectors in Northern Sri Lanka are genuinely attractive to French investors?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** We, the French, have been active in a number of infrastructure projects. I mentioned earlier the water-treatment project in Jaffna. To date, this facility, which development has also been supported by ADB, is providing drinking water to the greater Jaffna area, in coordination with the Sri Lanka Water Board. That is one example, and we are open to assessing the possibility — particularly with the French Development Agency — of developing further projects in the future. I would also say that, in general terms, it will be easier to increase the attractiveness of the North for investors and infrastructure projects as issues relating to land access, dispute resolution, predictability, and everything else contributing to the business climate are addressed — in the North, as well as in the rest of the country. **How strategically important is Northern Sri Lanka within France's broader Indo-Pacific vision?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** Northern Sri Lanka, and Sri Lanka as a whole, is strategically very important because of its location in the Indian Ocean. We, as Europeans — and the French and the Germans in particular — have developed an Indo-Pacific strategy with a strong Indian Ocean outlook. Such a strategy has also been adopted at the level of the European Union. Within it, it is important for us to contribute in a positive and systematic manner to the connectivity of a country like Sri Lanka. Developing connectivity across Sri Lanka as a whole also contributes to the North in particular and, hopefully, benefits every sector and every province of the country. We also consider that, since we are speaking about the Indian Ocean, connectivity encompasses many issues — including security, maritime security, maritime safety, protection of the marine environment, or the fight against illicit trafficking. These are addressed, in particular, through the Regional Centre for Maritime Studies (RCMS) in Colombo, with which we work, together with the Sri Lankan authorities, on matters relating to the maritime domain. We do so in partnership with others, including, first and foremost, our European partners — including Germany, which provides support and contributes through capacity building. **As a key creditor nation, what governance and anti-corruption expectations does France have for Sri Lanka's long-term recovery?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** As my German colleague has already said, and as I have emphasised, it is very important that we address governance and anti-corruption. If we want to develop the attractiveness of Sri Lanka, and of the North in particular, in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), everything that contributes to a durable, transparent, and rules-based recovery framework sends a very positive signal. **There are longstanding concerns in Sri Lanka that significant remnants of the LTTE's former intelligence and international networks later found refuge in countries such as France. How seriously does the French government view the security, legal, and diplomatic implications of this legacy, and what steps does France take to ensure that its territory is not used by former militant structures in ways that could threaten Sri Lanka's reconciliation efforts?** **Ambassador Lambert (France):** First, let me put it very clearly. The LTTE movement has for long been on the European Union's list of terrorist organisations, which carries significant penal and financial consequences — including the prohibition of financing, the freezing of potential assets, the monitoring of support networks, and political and judicial cooperation with European and international partners. The French authorities have already conducted several judicial operations in the past within this framework, and we are doing everything to support the international mobilisation against terrorism, in Sri Lanka as well as in the rest of the world. That said, LTTE are not representative of the diaspora in France. France has an important community of Tamil origins, composed of people from different backgrounds, and it is as a whole a very important part of our society. We consider it an asset, and a very positive contribution to the development of ties and relations with Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan diaspora contributes to the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of our society in France, and is also likely to contribute to the further development of relations between our two countries, including with a positive contribution to reconciliation. ### President Sought Answers After Kilinochchi Meeting Descended Into Chaos URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/president-sought-answers-after-kilinochchi-meeting-descended-into-chaos/ Last updated: 2026-07-18T13:51:25.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** President Anura Kumara Dissanayake telephoned Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar on Friday morning to ask what had caused the turmoil that brought a district coordinating committee meeting in Kilinochchi to an abrupt end a day earlier, the minister said, as the fallout from the confrontation continued to reverberate across Sri Lanka’s north. “The president called me this morning and spoke to me,” Mr. Chandrasekar said at an event in Jaffna. “Yesterday’s incident had also surprised the president. I explained to him what actually happened there.” The Kilinochchi District Coordinating Committee meeting was suspended midway on Thursday after a series of heated exchanges involving Ramanathan Archchuna, an independent member of Parliament. Elected representatives and senior government officials walked out before the police intervened. The episode quickly became a political controversy, with claims circulating on social media that Mr. Chandrasekar had tried to assault a lawmaker. The minister rejected the allegation on Friday. “Rumours were spread that I had attempted to attack a member of Parliament,” he said. “But I am not such a person. Fighting with anyone or becoming involved in confrontations is not in my nature.” Mr. Chandrasekar then turned to the government’s anti-corruption campaign, warning that those who had misused public money in the north would eventually face investigation. “All corrupt individuals from the Jaffna District who have looted public money will certainly have to face investigations,” he said. “This is Anura Kumara’s government. There is no room for fraud here.” District-level branches of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption would be established, he said, allowing residents to lodge complaints directly about suspected wrongdoing. Mr. Chandrasekar also invoked the legal troubles of two former presidents to underscore what he described as the government’s willingness to enforce the law regardless of a person’s political standing. “Ranil Wickremesinghe counted prison bars,” he said. “Mahinda Rajapaksa, too, may find himself in a position where he has to count prison bars. When we enforce the law, we never consider a person’s status or standing.” The minister was speaking at the launch of the first phase of a 35 million rupee livelihood programme run by the Northern Provincial Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The programme provided sewing machines and support for goat farming to 130 female-headed households and women entrepreneurs in the Jaffna and Kilinochchi districts. The president had also asked him to collect accurate data on female-headed households and women living in poverty in Jaffna, Mr. Chandrasekar said, as the government prepares to make poverty reduction a priority in the coming year. “My ministerial position does not belong to one particular political party alone,” he said. “Our primary objective is to serve all people without discrimination.” ### N.P.P. Lawmaker Faults Northern Party Chief After Kilinochchi Meeting Collapses URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/n-p-p-lawmaker-faults-northern-party-chief-after-kilinochchi-meeting-collapses/ Last updated: 2026-07-17T11:51:09.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A governing-party lawmaker has publicly criticized a cabinet minister from his own coalition over the collapse of a district coordinating committee meeting in Kilinochchi, a rare public break in the National People’s Power that has drawn attention to tensions inside the governing alliance in the north. Rajeevan Jeyachandramoorthy, an N.P.P. member of Parliament from the Jaffna District, said it was wrong to remove the independent lawmaker Ramanathan Archchuna from Thursday’s meeting, and that neither a minister nor anyone else present had the authority to stop an elected representative from raising questions on behalf of the public. “People will raise certain questions through a member of Parliament, and he has a responsibility to ask those questions on their behalf,” Mr. Jeyachandramoorthy said. “He must be allowed to ask them. Preventing that is not democracy.” The comments were a public rebuke of Ramalingam Chandrasekar, the fisheries minister who heads the N.P.P.'s operations in the north and chaired the meeting. Mr. Jeyachandramoorthy faulted Mr. Chandrasekar’s conduct of the meeting as well, saying a chairman had a responsibility to maintain order and to keep proceedings moving amid political disagreement. “A chairman must have the ability to control and conduct a meeting,” he said. “If that control is absent, there is no leadership.” His criticism cut in two directions. Mr. Archchuna should have been allowed to raise questions as an elected representative, he said, but the chairman should also have kept the proceedings from descending into disorder. Suspending the meeting before its agenda was complete, he added, was wrong regardless of who had walked out. The intervention was notable in a coalition that has largely maintained public discipline since sweeping to power in 2024, and it placed two of the N.P.P.'s Tamil politicians on opposing sides of an increasingly contentious debate over how the government is managing political and administrative affairs in the north. ### **A Meeting Descends Into Disorder** Thursday’s meeting at the Kilinochchi District Secretariat began at 9 a.m. under Mr. Chandrasekar’s chairmanship and ended roughly two hours later, without completing its agenda. Mr. Archchuna arrived about 15 minutes late and was soon in a heated exchange with Sivagnanam Shritharan, another member of Parliament. According to people who attended, Mr. Archchuna used derogatory language during the confrontation. Mr. Shritharan objected to what he described as the chairman’s failure to restore order, and walked out. Tensions escalated when Mr. Archchuna alleged irregularities in a coconut cultivation distribution program in the Thiruvaiyaru area. An assistant commissioner of the Department of Agrarian Services disputed his account, telling the meeting that no money had been released and no fertilizer subsidy provided under the program. Mr. Archchuna rejected the explanation and accused the Kilinochchi District Government Agent of corruption. According to people present, he also made remarks that the official interpreted as threatening. The Government Agent denied the allegations and challenged Mr. Archchuna to produce evidence. The district’s four divisional secretaries, joined by other government officials and members of the District Secretariat staff, walked out in protest. The confrontation continued after they left. Mr. Archchuna argued with Mr. Chandrasekar and with civil society representatives, and at one point the exchange appeared close to turning physical, prompting members of the minister’s staff to intervene. Police later escorted him from the premises. By then, much of the district’s senior administrative leadership had gone, and the meeting ended at about 11 a.m. In a Facebook post later that day, Mr. Chandrasekar called the suspension of the meeting regrettable and blamed the irresponsible and uncivilized behavior of unnamed individuals. He did not mention Mr. Archchuna by name. Meetings convened to address livelihoods, infrastructure, agriculture, fisheries, education, and health, the minister wrote, should not become platforms for personal political disputes. “We will never abandon Kilinochchi,” he added, promising greater government attention to the district. ### **A Rare Public Disagreement** Mr. Jeyachandramoorthy, a former school principal who was once associated with the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi and a staunch supporter of one of its leading figures, M.A. Sumanthiran, entered Parliament on the back of the N.P.P.’s breakthrough in Tamil-majority areas in the 2024 election. Mr. Chandrasekar, by contrast, is a longtime member of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, the party that forms the organizational and ideological core of the broader N.P.P. coalition. Several political and civil society figures in the Northern Province said Mr. Jeyachandramoorthy’s intervention reflected a broader challenge facing the N.P.P.: how to reconcile politicians recruited from Tamil civil society and professional backgrounds with a party structure still heavily shaped by the J.V.P. ### **Questions Over the Chairman’s Role** Thursday’s breakdown has also revived criticism of Mr. Chandrasekar’s handling of earlier confrontations involving Mr. Archchuna at district coordinating committee meetings. Civil society representatives and officials in the north have accused the minister of failing to intervene decisively when meetings turned disorderly, particularly in Jaffna, where Mr. Archchuna has repeatedly clashed with politicians and officials. The confrontations, critics say, have consumed meetings intended to address some of the region’s most pressing problems, among them land disputes, infrastructure, agriculture, fisheries, and public services. A video that circulated on social media after one such meeting appeared to show Mr. Chandrasekar pinching Mr. Archchuna at the waist, a gesture some critics portrayed as evidence of an overly familiar relationship between the two men. The disorder has also raised concerns among local journalists about access to the coordinating committee meetings. Reporters said they feared that journalists and photographers could be excluded from future meetings in Kilinochchi, following restrictions imposed on media access to meetings in Jaffna. Shutting out the press, some journalists and political observers argued, would address the visibility of the disorder rather than its underlying cause. The repeated confrontations have also raised a more troubling question: whether the chaos, deliberately or otherwise, is helping the government avoid scrutiny of difficult issues in the north. ### The Lunch That Was Never Opened URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-lunch-that-was-never-opened/ Last updated: 2026-07-17T06:05:39.000Z **MARUTHAMUNAI, Sri Lanka —** The motorcycle was still largely intact after the accident. Hanging from its handlebar was a packet of lunch that Thyagaraja Jayakrishna’s wife had prepared for him that morning. He had left their home in Pandiruppu as he did on other working days, heading to his job at the Kaluwanchikudy Divisional Secretariat. The rice packed for his lunch was still there when people gathered at the scene of the accident. Mr. Jayakrishna never reached his office. The government officer was killed Thursday morning on a road in Maruthamunai, a few hundred metres from a fuel station, after his motorcycle slipped on a wet section of the roadway and he fell into the path of a bus travelling toward Kataragama, according to CCTV footage reviewed by the police. Mr. Jayakrishna, originally from Kallady in Batticaloa, had moved to Pandiruppu after his marriage 18 months ago. His wife told the inquiry into his death that the morning had begun like any other. She made breakfast, packed his lunch, and watched him leave for work. About 15 minutes later, she left for her own job teaching information technology at the Karaithivu Vocational Training Centre. Then she received a telephone call from her brother’s phone. There had been an accident, she was told. Her husband had been injured and taken to a hospital. Her relatives knew by then that he had died, but they could not bring themselves to tell her. She travelled to the hospital believing that he might still be alive. When she arrived, she was not permitted to see his face because of the severity of his injuries. “The last time I saw him was that morning,” she told the inquiry, according to B. Fahad Zaman, the coroner who recorded her statement. “I still haven’t seen him since.” There was another detail that made the timing of his death particularly painful. The previous evening, the couple had made plans to travel together to Kataragama on Friday. The bus involved in the accident was heading there. ### **The Final Seconds** CCTV footage from the area appears to show the circumstances that led to Mr. Jayakrishna’s death. Shortly before he approached, a person at a business along the road was seen spraying water onto part of the roadway. When Mr. Jayakrishna’s motorcycle reached the wet section, it slipped. He fell from the motorcycle and slid into the path of the approaching bus. Police are continuing their investigation, and no formal determination of responsibility has been announced. But the circumstances of the accident have drawn attention to an everyday practice on Sri Lankan roads that is rarely regarded as a road-safety hazard: allowing water from shops, homes, and vehicle washing to flow onto the roadway. It is a familiar sight across the country. Shopkeepers spray the ground in front of their businesses to settle dust. Hotels wash their entrances. Garages clean vehicles, leaving water to run across the edge of the road. Mr. Jayakrishna’s death came amid a continuing rise in fatal road accidents across Sri Lanka. The country recorded 2,562 fatal road accidents in 2025, resulting in 2,710 deaths, according to police, 322 more deaths than the previous year. Police officials have said the toll has continued to rise this year, with the country now averaging roughly eight fatal crashes a day. Motorcyclists and pedestrians account for a large proportion of those killed, reflecting a road system in which those with the least physical protection often face the greatest risk. Police have traditionally identified speeding, drunken driving, fatigue, and drug use among the leading causes of serious crashes. But road safety is also shaped by less conspicuous dangers: poorly lit streets, damaged surfaces, inadequate drainage, and hazards so commonplace that few people think of them as hazards at all. Water flowing across a road is one of them. Preventing it would require neither a major infrastructure project nor vast public investment. Local authorities could regulate the discharge of water onto busy roads, require businesses to direct wastewater away from traffic, and warn the public about the danger that unexpectedly wet surfaces can pose to motorcyclists. At the Kaluwanchikudy Divisional Secretariat, Mr. Jayakrishna’s colleagues remembered him as a diligent young officer who would stay to finish a file rather than leave it for another day and who treated the people who came to the office with courtesy. He was also an accomplished cricketer and a regular presence on the office team. ### Chaos Follows Archchuna to Kilinochchi as Officials Walk Out — Critics Question Government’s Role URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/chaos-follows-archchuna-to-kilinochchi-as-officials-walk-out-critics-question-governments-role/ Last updated: 2026-07-17T12:24:07.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka —** A district coordinating committee meeting in Kilinochchi ended abruptly on Thursday after a series of heated confrontations involving lawmaker Ramanathan Archchuna, prompting elected officials and senior government administrators to walk out before police intervened. The meeting, held at the Kilinochchi District Secretariat, began at 9 a.m. under the chairmanship of Ramalingam Chandrasekar, fisheries minister and chairman of the district coordinating committee. Mr. Archchuna arrived about 15 minutes late and was soon embroiled in a heated exchange with Sivagnanam Shritharan, a fellow member of Parliament. According to people present, Mr. Archchuna used derogatory language while responding to remarks made by Mr. Shritharan. Mr. Shritharan protested the chairman’s failure to bring the situation under control and walked out of the meeting. The tensions escalated when Mr. Archchuna alleged irregularities in a coconut cultivation distribution program linked to Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha in the Thiruvaiyaru area. An assistant commissioner of the Department of Agrarian Services rejected the allegation, telling the meeting that funds for the program had not yet been released and that no fertilizer subsidy had been provided. Mr. Archchuna refused to accept the explanation and turned his criticism toward the Kilinochchi District Government Agent, accusing the senior official of corruption and, according to those present, making remarks the official regarded as threatening. The Government Agent rejected the accusations and challenged Mr. Archchuna to produce evidence to support his allegations. The confrontation then widened. The district's four divisional secretaries, along with other departmental officials and District Secretariat employees, walked out in protest at Mr. Archchuna's conduct. Mr. Archchuna also traded heated remarks with Minister Chandrasekar as the meeting descended further into disorder. Even after the officials had left, he continued arguing with the minister and with representatives of civil society organizations. At one point the confrontation appeared close to becoming physical, prompting members of the minister's staff to intervene. Police eventually stepped in and escorted Mr. Archchuna from the premises. With much of the district's administrative leadership having already walked out, the meeting was brought to a close at about 11 a.m., roughly two hours after it began, and without completing its scheduled proceedings. In a Facebook post later on Thursday, Mr. Chandrasekar described the suspension of the meeting as regrettable and blamed what he called the irresponsible and uncivilised conduct of unnamed individuals. He did not name Mr. Archchuna. Forums convened to address livelihoods, infrastructure, agriculture, fisheries, education, and health, the minister wrote, should not be turned into stages for personal political drama. Attending such meetings, he said, carried an obligation to respect democratic convention, administrative procedure, and the dignity of officials. Persistent baseless allegations against officials and attempts to derail development work, he added, would not be accepted. Mr. Chandrasekar said the day's events had again shown the need for appropriate action against such conduct and drew a contrast between those who create chaos and those who create development. "We will never abandon Kilinochchi," he wrote, pledging that the National People's Power government would give greater attention to the district. The committee would reconvene soon, he said, and take firm decisions aimed at meeting public expectations. Thursday's breakdown follows longstanding complaints about Mr. Chandrasekar's own handling of similar disruptions. Civil society figures and officials in the Northern Province have accused the minister of failing to act when Mr. Archchuna has disrupted coordinating committee meetings in Jaffna, allowing proceedings to collapse rather than exercising the chair's authority to restore order. Those complaints intensified after a video circulated widely on social media appearing to show Mr. Chandrasekar pinching Mr. Archchuna's waist during a meeting — a gesture critics interpreted as encouragement rather than restraint. The Jaffna Monitor has not independently verified the circumstances of the footage, and Mr. Chandrasekar has not publicly explained the exchange. After video of the chaotic meeting went viral, local journalists expressed concern that Mr. Chandrasekar might, as he did in Jaffna, bar reporters and photographers from attending future coordinating committee meetings in Kilinochchi. Some local reporters also criticised Mr. Chandrasekar’s handling of the meetings, arguing that, as chairman of the coordinating committees in both Jaffna and Kilinochchi, he had failed to take a firm stand to restore order and had instead allowed Mr. Archchuna’s disruptions to dominate the proceedings in Jaffna. They said the resulting chaos prevented several crucial issues facing the Jaffna District from being properly discussed. While much of the public criticism has focused on Mr. Archchuna’s conduct, some journalists and observers questioned whether the disorder had also served the government’s interests by diverting attention from difficult issues that might otherwise have come under scrutiny. ### JVP Minister Reads New Tamil-Muslim Platform as a Verdict on Sajith Premadasa’s Decline URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jvp-minister-reads-new-tamil-muslim-platform-as-a-verdict-on-sajith-premadasas-decline/ Last updated: 2026-07-16T13:34:00.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A senior government minister has welcomed a new political platform uniting six parties that represent Sri Lanka’s Tamil-speaking communities, casting it not as a minority initiative but as a judgment on the opposition leader, Sajith Premadasa. The parties — representing Sri Lankan Tamils, Muslims, and Indian Tamils — announced last week that they would work together on constitutional reform, the long-delayed provincial council elections, and land disputes affecting their communities. They called it a common platform, not an electoral alliance, and said each would keep its own identity, ideology, and policy positions. Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation Minister Lal Kantha offered a different reading. “The unity of Tamil-speaking political parties in seeking solutions to the fundamental problems of the Tamil people is welcome,” he told reporters after an event in Kandy. “Having realised in advance that there is no longer any benefit in joining forces with the Leader of the Opposition, the Tamil and Muslim political parties represented in Parliament have come together through a common consensus,” he said. “This is a good development.” Mr. Premadasa, he added, “no longer has a political future.” Tamil and Muslim leaders had grasped that staying with him would block them from delivering development to the voters who elected them, the minister said. The platform brings together the Sri Lanka People’s Congress, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress, the Tamil Progressive Alliance, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, or ITAK, and the Democratic Tamil National Alliance, or DTNA. It was announced at a joint news conference at a hotel in Colombo, where Rishad Bathiudeen of the People’s Congress, Rauff Hakeem of the Muslim Congress, Jeevan Thondaman of the Workers’ Congress, Mano Ganesan of the Tamil Progressive Alliance, M. A. Sumanthiran, ITAK’s general secretary, and Selvam Adaikkalanathan and Surendran Gurusamy of the dTNA appeared together. Their joint statement set out three priorities: a new constitution with meaningful devolution and power-sharing; provincial council elections, delayed for years; and settlements to land disputes affecting Tamil, Muslim, and Indian Tamil communities. The forum, the parties said, would let them trade views, find common ground and coordinate without surrendering their separate ideologies. The breadth of the grouping is also its problem. Critics and political observers have asked whether parties that disagree on the constitutional and territorial foundations of the Sri Lankan state can sustain a common project at all. The sharpest fault line is the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. ITAK and the parties inside the dTNA have long backed unification, treating the North and East as the traditional homeland of the Tamil-speaking people. Muslim parties, whose base is concentrated in the East, have opposed a merger or registered deep reservations about it. Nothing in the platform resolves that. Sceptics have read the initiative as expediency, and they have a pointed precedent to work with: ITAK and the DTNA, rooted in the same Northern and Eastern Tamil electorate, have been trying to form a broader Tamil alliance of their own for months, and have yet to sign anything. If parties competing for the same voters cannot combine, the argument runs, a platform stretching across Tamil, Muslim, and Indian Tamil politics has a longer distance to travel. Turning to farmers’ disputes, the minister accused Mr. Premadasa of repeatedly trying to politicise grievances against the government. The administration had met farmers’ basic demands, he said, including subsidised fertiliser and money allocated for paddy purchases. He also questioned Mr. Premadasa’s record on farmers during the previous “good governance” administration. ### Fratricide in Jaffna: The Night the LTTE Massacred Its Fellow Tamils URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/fratricide-in-jaffna-the-night-the-ltte-massacred-its-fellow-tamils/ Last updated: 2026-07-20T02:24:15.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Kandiah Gnanathas can never forget the moment when he came face to face with death: an American-made M-16 grenade launcher. Only a moment earlier, Kandiah, whose nom de guerre was Sivam, had wondered about the loud boom he had heard. Had some untoward incident occurred outside the house in Jaffna where he was being held prisoner? As if in answer, he heard pathetic cries in Tamil of people not far away who were running here and there, screaming in fear. Before he could make sense of what was going on, the wooden door of his room shattered to pieces when a grenade fired from a launcher tore through it and hit several prisoners. At the doorway stood a grim Aruna, a senior member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He fired again from the powerful grenade launcher at those still barely standing in the cramped room. “I can never, never forget Aruna’s face,” Kandiah said in a telephonic interview from Mannar, recalling the night of mass murder that unfolded shortly after unknown men attacked the LTTE’s Jaffna commander, Kittu, on March 30, 1987. Kandiah was one of the many members of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) who were taken prisoner by the LTTE after they landed in Mannar by boat from India in December the previous year. That was the month the LTTE, emerging as the new masters of Sri Lanka’s northeast, had “banned” the EPRLF, months after a more vicious crackdown on the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) that left hundreds dead. By the time the EPRLF came on the LTTE radar, Kandiah had spent nearly two years in Tamil Nadu, India, undergoing arms and ideological training in pursuit of a struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam homeland. Soon after the “ban”, the LTTE forcibly took over EPRLF camps and seized both its weaponry and communication equipment across much of the Tamil-majority Northern Province. Many EPRLF fighters were disarmed and taken captive. Many others escaped. In Mannar, Kandiah said, the LTTE resorted to trickery. Its Mannar leader Radha, called the EPRLF for “talks”. When an unsuspecting EPRLF responded, everyone was overpowered. Three EPRLF cadres were killed. In Tamil Nadu, there was panic in the EPRLF camp. Its leader, K. Pathmanabha, made frantic appeals on an EPRLF radio station, saying that every Tamil had a similar goal and that no harm should be done to any EPRLF member. The LTTE had other ideas. Using the seized EPRLF wireless sets, it forced an EPRLF member to repeatedly tell its India-based leaders that they were holding some Tigers prisoner and therefore urgently needed reinforcements from India, along with weapons. Falling for the ruse, the EPRLF tried to send some men from Tamil Nadu but failed three or four times due to stepped-up naval presence in the narrow sea that divides India and Sri Lanka. Finally, on December 30, 1986, a dozen EPRLF members carrying four AK-47 assault rifles and a walkie-talkie landed on the north-western coast of Mannar. One in the group was a member of the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) who was suffering from acute polio. He was returning to Sri Lanka for medical treatment. A few LTTE cadres received them on the shore, pretending to be from the EPRLF. The latter didn’t know that the Tigers had overheard the EPRLF leaders instruct the sailing cadres to answer violence with violence. ![Kandiah Gnanathas](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/fratricide-in-jaffna-the-night-CltmM0-kixxlkplempis17.png) Kandiah Gnanathas But the subterfuge didn’t last long. The new arrivals became suspicious when they were not addressed as *thozhar* (comrade), as was the custom in the left-wing EPRLF. One thing led to another. It dawned on the EPRLF that something was seriously wrong. The men who received them were not what they claimed to be. But before they could run back to their boat to escape, the LTTE swooped on them and made them prisoners, Kandiah said. The polio patient, too, was taken in. The LTTE now had a total of some 35 “prisoners” in Mannar. In no time, the Tigers, who kept accusing Colombo of violating human rights of Tamils, began beating, thrashing and torturing everyone in custody, according to Kandiah. EPRLF cadres were accused of committing robberies and acting against the war for Tamil Eelam. Some prisoners were beaten more severely than the others. After a month of agony, the prisoners were blindfolded and shifted to Jaffna, the Tamil heartland, which the LTTE more or less controlled, Kandiah said. The blindfolds came off only when the whole lot reached a two-storey house away from a main street in Jaffna, surrounded by vegetation. Parked outside, but within the house courtyard, were vehicles taken from the TELO and EPRLF. The hands of all the men—mostly in their late teens or 20s—were chained and locked every night, Kandiah recalled. Food packets came every day, but the quality was often poor. The EPRLF prisoners were kept in one room. TELO captives in another. There was one bathroom-cum-toilet on the ground floor. There were more prisoners, mostly from TELO, on the first floor too. Kandiah estimated there were some 60 captives in all. The daily regime included beatings and torture. The same questions were repeatedly flung at them: How many weapons do you have in India? Where have you stored your weapons? How many camps do you have? How many fighters? What did they tell you before sending you here, even after we ‘banned’ you? Kandiah saw some TELO prisoners being taken away from the house in pairs. They never returned. One day, when Kandiah went to the back of the house, an elderly man living in a neighbouring house mumbled over the boundary wall: “*Thambi*, be careful. They are taking away people and shooting them dead.” The LTTE had not succeeded at that time in imposing a totalitarian regime it later did, choking the Tamil society and stifling its soul. Another day, the LTTE brought seven dazed Sri Lankan soldiers to the “prison.” According to Kandiah, the seven were killed by the Tigers in October 1987 after a group of LTTE leaders, including Kumarappa and Pulendran, took cyanide and died while in Sri Lankan military custody. Somehow, Kandiah and the others endured the painful daily routine. No one knew how long the torment would continue. And then came the mysterious but well-planned attack on Sathasivan Krishnakumar alias Kittu, the Jaffna commander of the LTTE and a childhood friend of Tamil Tigers boss Velupillai Prabhakaran. The March 30, 1987, assault with grenades and gunfire when Kittu was returning from his girlfriend’s house is widely believed to have been an inside job. The attackers were never caught. Kittu lost one of his legs, forcing him to quit Jaffna for good. Masters in diverting attention, the LTTE took out its impotent anger on the scores of helpless Tamil prisoners from other groups it was holding across Jaffna, a gruesome happening recorded by human rights groups too. This was when the LTTE’s Aruna appeared, along with a fellow Tiger, Kamini, at the house where Kandiah was and unleashed misery through his grenade launcher. “Before firing the last of the grenades, Aruna abused us in the filthiest manner and yanked off a red thread tied around one prisoner’s neck,” Kandiah said. “I believe nearly 60 people were massacred that night,” he added. Almost all were TELO and EPRLF prisoners. Also killed was an abducted Jaffna jewellery shop owner who hadn’t paid protection money and his two assistants. “Believe it or not, they even killed the polio prisoner. His fingers were so deformed that he could not have even pulled a trigger. But they shot him, too.” Kandiah remembers two EPRLF members from Batticaloa, Rasiq and Papa, who were killed that night. When they realised that they were going to be gunned down, they shouted in unison that they too were warriors for Tamil Eelam. “Suddenly, gunshots rang out. Then there was silence. Both were dead.” Wounded in the leg and back, Kandiah collapsed in pain and agony. Before fainting, he saw several others lying dead in small pools of blood. One person had been shot in the head, his skull breaking up. It was all over in 15-20 minutes. Aruna left the house-cum-prison like a victor. But some of those who were shot were alive, and in visible pain. When Kandiah came to his senses, he heard painful cries around him. One person was screaming: “Water, water!” Although he himself was in excruciating pain, Kandiah staggered towards the bath to get water for the dying young man. He was still in the bathing area when a fuming Sathiya, the head of the “prison”, stormed in. Kandiah, from inside the bath, initially heard him asking who had committed this atrocity. And then, in a strange twist of circumstances, Sathiya himself began shooting at the survivors with a pistol, Kandiah said. For good measure, someone else opened up with an AK-47. “With that, everyone in the house was dead. Everyone means everyone. The killers left. The house became very quiet. Only dogs were barking furiously outside.” Kandiah, now without a shirt, came out of the house, haltingly and in fear, to see no one except a young LTTE sentry. The sentry, probably made of a different mould, took pity on him. He let Kandiah go after telling him to get back to the house and put on a shirt. “That night the Tigers committed more than one mass killing,” he said. Unfamiliar with Jaffna, Kandiah was walking with a limp along a deserted and dark street when a van came down the main road. It belonged to the LTTE and was apparently moving to the house to collect the blood-soaked bodies. With quick thinking, Kandiah pretended to be urinating on the side path. The van’s occupants didn’t pay heed. The dazed EPRLF guerrilla took shelter at the house of a stranger for a night and at a barren cemetery for four more nights, battling fatigue, pain, and hunger. Later, he made it to the Jaffna bus stand to go back to Mannar. But he fell into the hands of the Sri Lankan military as he didn’t have a National ID card. He tried to bluff that he got injured while committing a robbery, but the truth came out. He was arrested and thrashed, now by soldiers, and jailed. Kandiah was about to be sent to prison after being sentenced when the India-Sri Lanka Accord was signed on July 29, 1987. In line with it, all Tamil political prisoners were released. Kandiah finally found his freedom – after six months of confinement. ![Kandiah Gnanathas](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/fratricide-in-jaffna-the-night-CltmM0-kix3tis1lph3k6p.png) Kandiah Gnanathas How Kandiah, now around 60, spent the subsequent decades, till Prabhakaran and the LTTE were crushed militarily in 2009, can fill a book. He spent years in part in Tamil Nadu and the Gulf and in greater part in Sri Lanka. He remained a bitter ideological foe of the Tigers. Much of his life was spent enduring physical and mental agony. But Kandiah—now a diabetic and a father of three who manages cattle for a living—can never forget his early beginnings or the way the LTTE treated him and other Tamils. “When I set out from home at age 19, I was angry about the way the Sinhalese had treated us in 1983\. All of us wanted justice for the Tamils. We didn’t know who Prabhakaran was or who Pathmanabha was. It didn’t matter. “I may have joined one militant group, and others may have joined other outfits. So what? Our goal was the same, wasn’t it? “But the LTTE destroyed everything. Their fascism destroyed the Tamil society.” Surprisingly, he is not angry at the mass of LTTE fighters who surrendered to the military in 2009, after over a quarter century of bloodshed. “Some ex-Tigers have apologised to me. They say they were brainwashed. They didn’t know what they were doing till it was too late. “I believe them. After all, I am alive today because a young LTTE sentry allowed me to go in 1987, right? That boy took an enormous risk and saved me. “It is the LTTE leadership, Prabhakaran in particular, who must be held primarily responsible for the mess the Tamil society is in today. “In his blind chase for Tamil leadership, he killed thousands of Tamils who did not agree with him. Ultimately, he too died. What did he achieve for the Tamils?” ### Inpam and Selvam: Two Killings That Still Haunt the Birth of the PTA URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/inpam-and-selvam-two-killings-that-still-haunt-the-birth-of-the-pta/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T13:43:12.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** In July 1979, as the government armed itself with sweeping new powers to confront a growing Tamil militancy in the north, two men disappeared into the custody of the security forces. Their bodies were later found near the Pannai causeway, the narrow stretch that links the islands west of Jaffna to the city. They were K. Viswaratnam and S. Selvaratnam, better known as Inpam and Selvam. Nearly half a century later, their deaths remain lodged in the political memory of the north. Tamil accounts have long tied the killings to the birth of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the emergency-era law passed that same month and still on the books 47 years later. The two men were not prosecuted or formally detained under the PTA, which was certified on July 20, 1979\. They were killed during the security crackdown that surrounded its introduction. But for many Tamils, their deaths came to mark the beginning of what the law would represent: arrest stripped of ordinary safeguards, long detention, torture, disappearance — and a hardening conviction among Tamil youth that the law did not protect them equally. The anniversary arrives as President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government has again promised repeal, this time before the end of 2026. “For many years, people struggled to secure the repeal of the PTA,” Mr. Dissanayake told Parliament on June 25, adding that final discussions on a replacement law had concluded. His own party, the JVP, was brutally suppressed under the same act during its second insurrection in the late 1980s. Similar pledges have been made and broken by this government and its predecessors, and the skepticism in the north is well-earned. For families there, the PTA has never been contained in the text of a statute. It is remembered through names. Among the earliest are Inpam and Selvam. ### **A Crackdown in the North** By July 1979, President J.R. Jayewardene’s government was confronting the beginnings of an armed Tamil insurgency. Emergency powers were extended in the north, and Brigadier Tissa Weeratunga, a relative of the president, was sent to Jaffna with instructions to wipe out what the government called terrorism by the end of the year. It was a significant expansion of the military’s role in the Tamil-majority north. Inpam had been an early Tamil militant, arrested in connection with the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the former mayor of Jaffna, and later released. Selvam was his relative. The two men had married sisters and lived in the Kalviyankadu area of Jaffna. Their bodies, bearing signs of violence, were left near Ilanthaiyadi. The Tamil writer Shobasakthi, who grew up nearby, has described how the news moved through his village. One morning, he recalled, people walked fearfully along the causeway until they reached the place where the bodies lay. Adults kept the children back. The children listened while the adults talked. That is how a generation of Tamil children first encountered the state’s expanding security apparatus — as a story told over their heads. ### **A Law Written in Days** The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act was presented, debated, and passed with extraordinary speed. Introduced as a temporary measure, it outlived the conflict for which it was written and remained in force long after the war ended in 2009. The act handed the authorities broad powers of arrest and detention and thinned the protections available to suspects under ordinary criminal law. Rights organisations have since documented arbitrary detention, torture, and the use of coerced confessions in cases brought under it. International jurists raised the alarm almost immediately. Virginia Leary, who visited Sri Lanka for the International Commission of Jurists in 1981, compared its provisions to South Africa’s apartheid-era terrorism legislation. Paul Sieghart, who later examined the country’s legal system, found the powers it granted extraordinarily broad, with few parallels in any democratic state. ### **What the Crackdown Made** The operation was meant to crush a small militant movement. It did the opposite. The excesses carried out under Weeratunga, with Jayewardene’s blessing, deepened an anger already taking hold among Tamil youth. For many, the disappearances of 1979 confirmed that democratic politics and the ordinary protections of the law had nothing left to offer them. Four years later came the anti-Tamil violence of 1983, and scattered groups of young men, many driven at first by little more than rage and revenge, became a war. No straight line runs from any single killing to any of this. The roots of the conflict lay deeper — in decades of political discrimination, communal violence, failed agreements, and the steady erosion of Tamil faith in Parliament. But the episodes mattered. They were the evidence a generation cited: that the normal rules could be suspended when the suspect was Tamil, and that detention could end not in a courtroom but beside a road. Forty-seven years on, the country is again debating the end of the law born in that month. If the government keeps its word, the Prevention of Terrorism Act may finally leave the statute books. The memories attached to its beginning will be harder to repeal. ### The Real Battle for Credibility URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-real-battle-for-credibility/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T13:43:13.000Z This month, I was invited to speak at the second Sri Lanka–India Media Friendship Association (SLIMFA) Media Fest in Colombo, on the theme “Trust, Truth and the Battle for Credibility.” Illness prevented me from attending. I have chosen instead to publish the thoughts I had prepared as this month’s editorial, because the issues they address extend far beyond a conference hall. ### **Where I Stand** I come from Northern Sri Lanka, a region devastated by nearly three decades of civil war. My entire childhood and adolescence were lived inside that conflict. For those of us in the North, and, I believe, for many in the East, misinformation and disinformation are not new. They did not arrive with social media, artificial intelligence, or the digital age. They were woven into the media environment in which we grew up. People understood that much of what they read, heard, and watched was shaped by political interests, competing narratives, and wartime agendas. Misinformation was not an exception. It was part of the game. Let me say something uncomfortable. The war left many people in Northern Sri Lanka with so little faith in mainstream media that they approach it with the same scepticism they reserve for rumour-driven Tamil websites, Facebook pages, TikTok videos, and YouTube channels. Why? Because we grew up watching the same event presented in entirely different ways by the two warring parties — the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. Each promoted its own version of reality. Consider one example from my childhood. During Operation Leap Forward, the military offensive on the Jaffna peninsula, the Sri Lanka Air Force bombed the Church of Saints Peter and Paul in Navaly, where hundreds of civilians had sought shelter. About 150 people were killed. That night, state radio announced that the Air Force had successfully attacked an LTTE camp in Navaly and killed scores of terrorists. The next morning, Tamil newspapers carried photographs of bodies inside a church and reports that civilians, not fighters, had died. It would be tempting to conclude that the Tamil press stood on the side of truth. In that instance, it did. But that was only part of the story. Those same newspapers could not publish, or even whisper, anything critical of the LTTE. The organisation exercised overwhelming, if not total, control, and journalists were largely at its mercy. Take another example. In 2004, when the LTTE’s Eastern commander, Karuna, broke away, it marked the beginning of one of the movement’s most consequential ruptures. Yet most Tamil newspapers remained silent. Many people in Jaffna were barely aware that the LTTE was facing a profound internal crisis. I still remember watching Sun TV report the split from Tamil Nadu while newspapers in Northern Sri Lanka made no mention of it. The silence was born of fear. Like the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE showed little tolerance for dissent. Journalists did not have to become outspoken critics to place themselves at risk. The slightest departure from the approved narrative could carry deadly consequences. That fear was real. But the resulting silence was more than an absence of information. It was a form of misinformation in itself. I write, then, for my generation — the children of the 1990s — and for the one before us, the children of the 1980s. For us, believing the news as it was presented was never simple. Too often, what we read or heard contradicted what we had seen with our own eyes, or what plain common sense told us. That scepticism has been handed down to a generation that never lived through the war. I still remember a report in a leading Tamil newspaper, published years after the fighting ended. The story was simple: a man had died in a motorcycle accident. But the report did not stop there. It added that the victim’s uncle had once been a notorious member of a paramilitary group. The detail had no bearing whatsoever on the accident. Its only purpose, it seemed, was to suggest that the man’s death was some karmic settling of accounts for his uncle’s past. ### **My Greatest Challenge** Today, as the editor of an English publication based in Northern Sri Lanka, my greatest challenge is not confronting misinformation or disinformation. It is rebuilding trust in journalism itself. The tools have changed. Algorithms, deepfakes, and artificial intelligence have transformed how falsehoods are created and spread. But the underlying problem is much the same. People have learned, often through painful experience, that neither official narratives nor viral content can be accepted at face value. Every day, we try to persuade our readers that journalism can be independent, impartial, and grounded in evidence — that news can simply report what happened, without serving a political or ideological agenda. Even that is difficult. That is why the challenge looks different here. In many places, the battle for credibility is about exposing falsehoods. In the North and East, it is also about restoring faith in the possibility of objective journalism. ### **Silence** There is another threat to truthful journalism, one that receives far less attention. It is silence. In my region, many journalists worry less about spotting misinformation than about what might happen if they publish a story that draws the establishment’s attention. To understand how widely this concern is shared, I recently called ten Tamil journalists from the North and East and asked each of them a single question: What worries you more, misinformation and disinformation, or the consequences of reporting the truth? Seven gave the same answer. They feared the consequences of reporting the truth. The war ended seventeen years ago. Journalists are no longer killed on the roads like dogs, as they once were. But many of the structures that presided over that era remain, and the memory of what happened to those who reported the truth has not faded. Self-censorship has settled deep into our journalistic culture. The question my colleagues ask is often not “Is this true?” but “Is this safe to publish?” That is why silence deserves as much of our attention as misinformation. The public is not only misled by what is falsely reported. It is misled, just as surely, by what is never reported at all. And a press that is not free to report cannot, in the end, be a press its readers trust. ### **The Phone Call** The security forces and intelligence agencies in the North and East do not merely monitor Tamil journalists. At times, they seek to use them as sources. Cover a public meeting in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Vavuniya, or elsewhere in the region, and a phone call may follow. Who organised the event? Who funded it? Who attended? Who spoke? Journalists are asked to hand over photographs, video footage, and the names of those present. Many do not want to comply. But fear is real. These institutions still wield significant power, and their history casts a long shadow. It does not have to be spoken aloud to be understood. This is where credibility suffers its deepest damage. A journalist known, or even suspected, to be passing information to the intelligence services, whether out of fear or coercion, will struggle to earn the trust of the community. And when people no longer trust journalists, they stop talking to them. The loss is not only for the press. It is the public’s right to know. I should add that I have not experienced this personally, as I no longer work as a field reporter. It is a reality described to me, independently and repeatedly, by colleagues who continue to report on the ground. ### **Where the Lines Blur** Not every threat to our credibility comes from the state. In parts of the North and East, it is no longer unusual for people with open political affiliations to register themselves as journalists. In one case, a politically affiliated individual launched a news website, registered as a journalist, joined the Vavuniya Press Club, and went on to serve first as its secretary and then as its president. The press club is now defunct. Similar patterns can be seen across almost all Tamil-speaking areas of Sri Lanka. Economics is another driver. One district correspondent for a leading Tamil newspaper recently told me he earned Rs. 2,500 for an entire month’s work. At some Tamil newspapers, reporters are still paid under the old “foot-ruler” system. Once an article appears in print, its length is measured with a ruler, and payment is calculated by the column inches it occupies rather than by its quality, importance, or impact. It is difficult to expect independent, courageous journalism from reporters paid so little they can barely survive. Low wages leave them exposed to political influence, patronage, and self-censorship. ### **Where Do We Go From Here?** Technology can help journalism, but it cannot save it. Artificial intelligence, fact-checking tools, and other innovations can expose falsehoods, speed up verification, and strengthen reporting. But the foundation of public trust lies in the independence, integrity, and courage of journalists. Some of these battles cannot be won by journalists alone. We cannot erase decades of fear, nor transform the standards of a profession overnight. That requires change across the profession, its institutions, and the society it serves. What a newsroom can control is its own conduct. At Jaffna Monitor, we have adopted a simple philosophy: we tell our readers that we are human too. We rigorously investigate and carefully verify, but we are not infallible. When we make a mistake, we acknowledge it openly, correct it transparently, and explain what happened. Admitting an error does not diminish credibility. Refusing to acknowledge one does. We also try not to preach. We do not stand above our readers. If anything, we assume they are as informed and as intelligent as we are, and often more so. That is why we try to remain open to criticism. We publish articles and letters to the editor that challenge Jaffna Monitor. A newspaper that holds others to account must be willing to be held to account itself. A newsroom that invites scrutiny will earn more credibility than one that insists it is never wrong. Media houses and journalists often ask, “How do we make people trust us?” That is the wrong question. The better question is: what makes us worthy of that trust? Trust is not built through branding, or by claiming to be right all the time. It is earned by being transparent, by welcoming scrutiny, and by being accountable to the people we serve. That means showing our evidence wherever possible, distinguishing clearly between fact and interpretation, correcting our mistakes, and being honest about what we know, what we do not know, and what cannot yet be verified. It also means applying the same standards to everyone. If we investigate the government, we must be equally willing to scrutinise our own communities, our political movements, and those with whom we sympathise. Journalism also requires humility. There is integrity in saying, “We do not know yet.” Journalism is not the business of certainty; it is the disciplined pursuit of evidence. There is reason for hope. Research by the Reuters Institute has found that when people encounter information they suspect may be false, they still turn to trusted news organisations more often than to fact-checking websites. The public has not abandoned journalism. It is still searching for institutions worthy of its trust. Journalism is often described as a search for truth. In the North and East of Sri Lanka, it has become something more fundamental. Before we can persuade people to believe the truth, we must first persuade them that truth can still be found — and that independent journalism is capable of finding it. That is the real battle for credibility. With love, **Aruliniyan Mahalingam** ### Rights Group Accuses Sri Lanka of Obstructing Chemmani Mass Grave Investigation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/rights-group-accuses-sri-lanka-of-obstructing-chemmani-mass-grave-investigation/ Last updated: 2026-07-17T12:23:51.000Z For three decades, the state’s answer to the families of Jaffna’s disappeared has been that it does not know. A report released this week argues that it has always known — and has spent thirty years making sure that nothing could be done about it. The report, published by the International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP), a London-based group that has documented Sri Lankan war crimes since 2013, lands as excavators returned to the Chemmani salt flats on Tuesday to resume a dig that has already yielded 412 sets of skeletal remains, of which 409 have been exhumed. Together with the 15 skeletons recovered in a brief, aborted excavation in 1999, the number of dead recovered from the site now stands at 427 — more than at any other mass grave uncovered on the island. Titled *“Chemmani Mass Grave: ‘We Are Still Searching’”* — the 88-page document assembles perpetrator confessions, court records, habeas corpus filings, and the career histories of seven Sri Lanka Army officers into a single argument: that the failure at Chemmani has not been a failure of information, but of will. “It has been thirty years since it was first discovered, but despite enormous publicity and two phases of excavation, one still in progress, no commander has yet been held criminally accountable,” the report states. What it calls most astonishing is that the Army continued to use the site as a dumping ground for bodies even after the first excavation. “Nothing speaks to the level of impunity more than this.” ### **A schoolgirl, and then a confession** Chemmani entered Sri Lanka’s public consciousness through a single crime. On 7 September 1996, Krishanthy Kumaraswamy, an 18-year-old student, was stopped at a checkpoint on her way home to Kaithady after sitting a chemistry A-Level paper. She was taken into a bunker, raped repeatedly, and strangled. Her mother, Rasamma, a school vice-principal; her 16-year-old brother Pranavan; and a neighbour, Siddambaram Kirubamoorthi, who went to the checkpoint to look for her, were all killed the same evening. All four were stripped and buried in shallow graves behind the checkpoint. The 1998 convictions in that case were, at the time, treated as evidence that justice had returned to Jaffna. Instead they opened a much larger door. Offered a chance to address the court after sentencing, Lance Corporal Somaratne Rajapakse — the senior soldier at the checkpoint — testified that he and others had buried as many as 400 Tamil victims in the surrounding salt flats. “Almost every evening,” he said, “dead bodies were brought there, and the soldiers were asked to bury them.” Rajapakse and four co-convicts subsequently recorded voluntary statements before the Human Rights Commission naming the officers above them. They described bodies delivered by tractor after curfew and buried by torchlight; instructions that corpses be stripped and their clothes burned in a separate pit to defeat identification; detainees “assaulted and killed” at Thavalkada Junction camp; a well behind the checkpoint capped with a metal plate and covered with earth. The state’s response, the ITJP argues, set the template for everything that followed. Rajapakse was beaten unconscious in Welikada prison by a guard who wanted him to sign a letter recanting. An anonymous note signed “Some members of the Army” warned his wife that a return to Chemmani would cost the family their lives. Excavation was delayed until the monsoon threatened the evidence. A first dig in March 1999 collected soil samples from what local observers dismissed as an implausible location — without Rajapakse’s guidance. The excavation that did proceed, in June and September 1999 under Additional Magistrate Manickavasagam Ilanchelian and with international observers present, produced 15 skeletons from eight burial sites — a young boy, a woman, and 13 men, most showing blows to the head and chest, several bound, several blindfolded. Two were identified: Rasaiah Satheeskumar, 28, and Mahenthiran Uthaskaran, 23, mechanics seized from their Ariyalai garage in August 1996\. Their families had, weeks earlier, received “letters of regret” from the Ministry of Defence saying the men could not be traced. Then the wider Chemmani area was left undisturbed for the next 25 years. ### **The officers who were promoted** Five suspects were arrested in 2000 on the strength of the convicts’ statements. Their case was moved from Jaffna to Colombo on the grounds that they feared for their lives; they were bailed within months. In 2010, the Criminal Investigation Department told the court it was still awaiting the Attorney General’s advice on a report filed in 2001\. Sixteen years later, the ITJP says, that advice has still not come. The report’s second annex tracks what happened to seven officers named by the convicted men. Amal Karunasekara, identified as running the intelligence unit at the Ariyalai camp, went on to command Sri Lanka’s first peacekeeping contingent in Haiti, became Director of Military Intelligence, and rose to Chief of Staff of the Army before retiring in 2018\. Gamini Jayasundara, the brigadier, the confessions credit with instituting the aggressive “intelligence” regime in Jaffna from July 1996, commanded the 51st Division and later ran the National Cadet Corps. Duminda Keppetiwalana, commander of the Navatkuli camp, was named as the first respondent in nineteen habeas corpus applications arising from a single cordon operation on 19 July 1996 in which 24 people vanished; he served as a deputy chief military personnel officer for the United Nations in Haiti and retired a major general in 2019\. Lalith Hewa retired a brigadier in 2024, honoured the previous year by a Colombo university for his contribution to the hospitality industry. None has been tried. Two — V.D.S. Perera and Sachindra Wijesiriwardena — were still serving as recently as last year, the report says. ### **‘We don’t have the information for 1998’** On 19 June, Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara visited Chemmani and told civil society organisations that identification would require “two public requests” from family members and an item associated with the victim — and that families must also name the perpetrator. Families were “not coming forward,” he said, and “people don’t remember; some of them are not even living.” Asked about the 1998 statements and the forensic findings from the 1999 dig, the minister said the government no longer possessed them. “We don’t have the information for 1998.” He rejected an offer Rajapakse renewed in 2025 to name the senior officers involved in exchange for his freedom, saying only, “let’s see if it’s true or false separately.” On international assistance, he said: “The criminal law in our country is quite sufficient,” adding that “this investigation has not reached that level yet. It is still at the excavation stage.” Six days later, he told parliament the government would seek foreign help with DNA identification “once excavations are completed.” The ITJP calls these positions irreconcilable with the record and with international standards, under which forensic identification and criminal investigation run in parallel, not in sequence. It notes that the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka reached a similar conclusion in September 2025, describing “an overarching gap in capacity and will among law enforcement authorities,” and reporting that roughly 90 percent of remains exhumed had been unclothed, indicating a “reasonable likelihood” of extrajudicial killing. The commission also recorded “disturbing” allegations that law enforcement officials had intimidated people working on the exhumation, and noted that many at the site were unpaid volunteers. ### **What lies in the pits** The current excavation began by accident, when contractors building a crematorium at the Ariyalai Sinthubathi Hindu Cemetery struck bone on 13 February 2025\. It has advanced in fits and starts ever since: 19 skeletons in nine days that May; 240 by September; a halt through the monsoon, when the pits filled with stagnant water; drainage attempts in February and March; funding delays that Tamil civil society observers have described not as administrative oversight but as a form of obstruction. The third phase ran for 12 days in late April, resumed in June and stopped again on 23 June. Among more than 100 artifacts recovered are a small sandal, a schoolbag, a squeaky toy, a bead bangle, and a baby’s feeding bottle. On 9 June, of nine sets of remains uncovered, seven were children and an eighth an infant. No official breakdown of the dead by age or sex has been released, because the forensic examinations have not been done. No remains from 1999 were ever returned to the families who identified them. Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, visited the site in June 2025 during a three-day *Anaiya Vilakku* — Imperishable Lamp — vigil and laid flowers at the memorial flame. “Like thousands of others, they want closure after 30 years of not knowing,” he said. The plinth holding the flame was smashed that October, rebuilt by residents, and smashed again in December. The ITJP’s recommendations run to fifteen points: criminal investigation by the CID of every named perpetrator, encompassing command responsibility; suspension of serving officers credibly implicated; replacement of the Office on Missing Persons with an independent body holding subpoena and prosecutorial powers; an independent DNA laboratory; targeted sanctions. Families themselves, in the six demands they handed Türk last year, asked for UN monitoring of the excavations and referral to the International Criminal Court. The report closes with the line that gives it its title, and with an older one. In 1999, Paramanathan Selvarajah, whose son disappeared in August 1996, told a reporter: “I would be shattered if the remains of my son were found buried at Chemmani, and I would be shattered if they were not. The only way I can be happy is if my son returns to me alive.” ### Should Sanctions Extend to a General's Memoir? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/should-sanctions-extend-to-a-generals-memoir/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T01:23:18.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Realising that the war for Tamil Eelam would need a constant supply of weapons, Velupillai Prabhakaran set up in 1985 *Kadal Pura*, a modest sea wing in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Over the years, it grew into the formidable Sea Tigers, which threatened to overwhelm Sri Lanka’s navy. Once the fourth and final Eelam War resumed in August 2006, it became payback time. The Sri Lankan Navy rapidly sank in 2007 the LTTE’s awesome warehouse ships, left and right. The next year, it dealt knockout blows to the Sea Tigers. Due to the wholesale destruction, the Tigers had no choice but to keep retreating as there was not enough ammunition to fight. The LTTE’s final decimation came in 2009. This is the crux of the story, which Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, who was the naval chief during the crucial war years, has unveiled in his book, *The Turning Point: The Naval Role in Sri Lanka’s War on LTTE Terrorism*. The book, published by Penguin India, came out last year. It immediately drew criticism over Karannagoda’s alleged wartime human rights abuses. Penguin India subsequently withdrew its contract with the author, and Amazon UK removed the book from sale after being told that selling it could amount to a criminal offence because Karannagoda had been sanctioned by the UK. In March 2025, the UK government sanctioned retired Sri Lankan General Shavendra Silva, for enforced disappearances and killing civilians; Karannagoda, implicated in the abduction and torture of 11 Tamils by naval officers in 2008-09; former army chief General Jagath Jayasuriya, also for enforced disappearances and torture; and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna, a former senior LTTE commander for recruiting child soldiers and summary executions. The US also sanctioned Karannagoda and Silva. I can understand the legal complexities involving the sale of Karannagoda’s book in the UK as a result of the sanctions. But I could not fathom why Penguin India axed its contract with Karannagoda, whose book I read only this week, as a result of my interest sparked by his arrest and bail in an alleged case of corruption involving one of the sons of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Indeed, I had a tough time getting hold of *The Turning Point*. None of the leading bookstores in Delhi appeared to have the book. I requested Penguin India to provide me with a copy upon payment, but there was no response. Finally, I obtained a copy from a Hyderabad bookseller who specialises in used books. Karannagoda’s fast-paced 341-page book is as much about the Sri Lankan Navy’s role in crushing the LTTE as it is about the Tamil Tigers in their dying years. Karannagoda tells us about the crucial role played by the Sea Tigers as the insurgency escalated and expanded. He reveals the petty jealousies that at times derailed the military offensive against the Tigers. He admits that a section of senior officers in uniform pocketed money in the name of weapons purchases. Karannagoda comes up with how the navy began to match the Sea Tigers and eventually overtook its fighting capabilities; how he overhauled the navy, replacing inefficient crew and equipment; and how help from other countries, in particular the US, helped to turn the tide against the LTTE. “We (the LTTE) lost the war because of the Sri Lanka Navy,” the author quotes Shanmugam Kumaran Tharmalingam alias Kumaran Pathmanathan, the chief arms procurer for the Tigers, as saying after his capture. “When the first three (warehouse) ships were destroyed by the Navy in early 2007, the Sea Tiger leader Soosai told me (KP) over the phone, ‘Anne, we are slowly dying’. The destruction of the remaining four (warehouse) ships in September and October 2007 was the end of the LTTE.” These warehouse ships stored mammoth quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives, and were often berthed in the sea, away from normal shipping lines, as far away as Australian territory, from where supplies were ferried to the war theatre in Sri Lanka. Not everything Karannagoda has written is factually correct. Much of this relates to the early years and evolution of Tamil militancy, as well as certain aspects of India. But once you overlook these deficiencies, this is a very important addition to the growing literature on how the LTTE, for long one of the world's most powerful insurgent groups, was militarily crushed. If Karannagoda did indulge in human rights abuses, particularly against innocent civilians, he must face the law, notwithstanding the role he played in decimating the Tigers. But what has that got to do with this book? The former naval chief’s royalty earnings may have been hit by the decisions taken by Amazon and Penguin India, but I am sure the man is not starving. Indeed, if the logic against *The Turning Point* is taken to its logical conclusion, then Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle) should not be sold or read; after all, there was no greater war criminal than the German. We were able to read *Gota’s War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka* only because he was not designated a war criminal by any Western country. One may like or dislike Prabhakaran and his methods, but there should be no ban on his books, his speeches, and interviews. The moral of the story is that Sri Lankan generals who wish to write their memoirs, particularly related to the war on the LTTE, should get them published within Sri Lanka. ### The Missing Half of Sri Lanka's Post-War Recovery URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-missing-half-of-sri-lankas-post-war-recovery/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T14:09:50.000Z **By Jeevan Thiagarajah** Seventeen years after Sri Lanka's civil war ended, the country has run one of the world's more closely studied reintegration experiments — and left another almost entirely undone. On one side, 12,196 former LTTE combatants passed through a state-run rehabilitation programme that concluded in 2021\. On the other, hundreds of thousands of state security personnel — soldiers, sailors, airmen, and police who fought the same war — returned home to no equivalent programme at all. Both groups carry the same underlying burden: unresolved trauma, eroding health, economic precarity. Neither is tracked over time. That gap, not any shortage of goodwill or expertise, is the real policy failure. ### **The Case for Both Sides** But why the state owes each group ongoing monitoring is not the same question, and the answer shouldn't be flattened into "both suffered." State personnel who served twenty-plus-year careers receive a pension — compensation for service, not treatment for what that service did to them. Financial assurance and welfare are different goods, and Sri Lanka has supplied only the first. There is a fiscal logic here, too: untracked veteran decline surfaces later as suicide, family breakdown, and disability claims the state pays for anyway, just without the chance to intervene early. Former LTTE combatants have neither a pension nor an institutional safety net of any kind, so their exposure to the same health-and-livelihood spiral is structurally worse. Their claim on the state rests on something else: responsibility for the conditions of a peace it declared complete. The Bureau of Rehabilitation formally closed its programme in 2021, transferring risk from a managed institutional setting onto individuals with nothing left to catch them. There is also a security argument unique to this group — an untracked, stigmatised population concentrated in the districts that supplied the most recruits is a recognised risk factor for the instability the war grew out of in the first place. Monitoring here is risk management, not generosity. Neither argument needs to borrow the other's language. Both, independently, arrive at the same missing piece: nobody tracks either population after the point of exit. ### **What the Families Carry** Nor should tracking stop at the combatant. Every soldier and every former cadre returned, or failed to return, to a household, and the war's costs did not stop at the individual. A 2018 proposal from the Centre for Humanitarian Affairs, built around the Ranaviru Authority's divisional network, already names roughly 30,900 kith-and-kin families alongside 13,000 disabled veterans as a population needing support — spouses who managed decades of deployment and absence, children raised around a parent's untreated trauma, families now providing full-time care for a disabled veteran. None of this is monitored yet, either; the proposal names the population without yet building the instrument for it. On the rehabilitation side, there is no equivalent proposal at all. Families of former combatants absorbed stigma, economic exclusion, and in some documented cases, the consequences of a livelihood grant spent on a motorbike instead of working capital — with no household-level support structure, only an individual one aimed at the ex-combatant. A caregiver managing a disabled veteran, or a widow raising children on a failed grant, is not a footnote to the primary case. They are a second case, any serious platform has to be built to see. ### **What the Evidence Actually Shows** Sri Lanka's own record makes the cost of not tracking hard to ignore. Major General (Retired) Dharshana Hettiarachchi, who oversaw the LTTE rehabilitation programme, points to seventeen years without a single rehabilitee returning to militancy as its clearest vindication. That claim deserves scrutiny rather than repetition: there has been no systematic tracking of rehabilitees since 2015\. A zero-recidivism figure over a population nobody has checked on for a decade is not a verified outcome — it is an absence of bad news reaching the centre, which is not the same thing. Dr. Dayani Panagoda, former Director of Policy at the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process, estimates the reintegration effort was roughly 70 percent effective, and locates the missing 30 percent precisely in what happened after graduation: women released early facing community stigma, some with no support structure to catch them; livelihood grants spent on the wrong things, generating friction with host communities instead of easing it. The scale of unaddressed trauma in the north is not in dispute. A 2025 mixed-methods study of 336 war-affected residents across five northern districts — published in SSM-Mental Health by Thamotharampillai and colleagues — found depression in 57 percent of respondents, anxiety in 61 percent, PTSD in 47 percent, and functional disability in 36 percent, concentrated in Kilinochchi, Mullaithivu and Jaffna, the same districts that supplied the largest numbers of LTTE recruits. That overlap is a reasonable proxy for the scale of the problem in affected communities, though it is not direct outcome data on the 12,196 rehabilitated individuals specifically — which is exactly what real tracking, rather than a proxy study, would tell us. Community-level indicators were stark regardless: 86 percent of communities reported illicit drug use as a problem, 84 percent alcohol abuse, and the "linking" social capital connecting ordinary people to the institutions meant to serve them scored poorly everywhere. On the security-forces side, the fragments that exist are more concrete but far from complete. The Centre for Humanitarian Affairs proposal envisions training 1,000 community "befrienders" to serve roughly 104,000 people — the disabled veterans and their immediate families — at a ratio of about 175 beneficiaries per befriender, anchored by 250 drop-in centres and a crisis hotline. It is a sound model, but it is costed, conceptually, for 104,000 people, not for the full population this argument describes, which runs into the hundreds of thousands once all serving and retired personnel are included. Scaling a befriender ratio designed for one population to one several times larger is a different undertaking, and nobody should call that "modest incremental cost" without the arithmetic to back it up. The honest path is to pilot on the disabled-veteran-and-family cohort first, and cost each expansion phase on its own terms. ### **How the Platform Would Work** None of this requires new institutions. The Bureau of Rehabilitation, the Ranaviru Authority, the Ministry of Health's base-hospital network already exist and already touch these populations. What is missing is the connective infrastructure between them: a shared data spine, a standard assessment instrument used identically on both tracks and extended to families, annual head-to-toe checks — physical and psychological — for as long as an individual needs them, and a socioeconomic vulnerability check run on the same cycle, so that a failed livelihood grant or a household sliding into debt gets caught before it becomes the next crisis. The British Army's Trauma Risk Management model offers a proven, low-cost template: peer-delivered, unit-embedded risk identification that lets most people recover within the normal four-to-six-week window, and flags the minority who don't for a proper clinical follow-up, without routing every case through a psychiatrist first. In practice this could run as a mobile-first platform, not a paper file. A member or dependent logs an annual head-to-toe check on their phone — vitals, chronic conditions, standard PHQ-9 and GAD-7 wellbeing screens, a functional assessment covering everything from a child's developmental milestones to an elderly dependent's mobility. A traumatic incident, logged instead by a peer TRiM practitioner in the field, triggers the same system reactively. Either way, the data lands with a backend triage engine, not a filing cabinet, which sorts every case into one of three plain statuses: green, cleared until the next annual check; amber, recovering but held in closer, community-level monitoring for a few months; or red, routed straight into clinical care. Anything that looks like an acute emergency — a dangerous blood-pressure reading, signs of severe psychological distress — goes red immediately, bypassing the ordinary process entirely: an automatic alert goes to the individual and to the nearest Ministry of Health base hospital, and the case is pushed straight into the hospital's clinical queue. Everything else enters the normal four-to-six-week TRiM recovery window, after which a peer practitioner checks back in and scores the standard risk factors — amber if recovery is on track, red if it has stalled. Crucially, the peer practitioner doing that check-in never needs to open the person's full medical file to log it; access is split by role, so a neighbour trained as a TRiM practitioner can flag a case without becoming privy to someone's entire clinical history. That distinction is what makes the surveillance fear and the neglect fear answerable at the same time — the system sees enough to act, and no more than that, and the people doing the seeing are drawn from the same community being watched. A basic feature phone and an SMS gateway are enough to reach someone in a low-connectivity district; a low-bandwidth backend built to sync with the Ministry of Health's existing hospital records system means a base-hospital doctor already has the file by the time a flagged patient walks in the door. None of the pieces here are exotic — the innovation is simply that, for the first time, someone would be watching continuously, on both sides of this war, instead of only at the moment someone happens to ask. ### **Stabilising Livelihoods, Not Just Watching Them** Monitoring only answers half the problem. A platform that flags a household sliding into debt is worthless if nothing structured happens next, and the rehabilitee side of this story already shows what "nothing structured" looks like: Dr. Panagoda's account of livelihood grants spent on motorbikes rather than working capital is not really a story about individual bad judgment. It is a story about a one-time cash transfer handed over with no scaffolding around it, and no one checking back. A smarter version of the same money would move away from individual, one-off grants toward small cooperative structures — former combatants and family members pooled into shared agricultural, fisheries or craft ventures in the districts where those livelihoods already exist, paired with a mentor drawn from the same befriender network proposed for health monitoring, and with disbursement staged against a simple business plan reviewed on the same annual cycle as the health check, rather than paid out once and forgotten. Vocational certification should work the same way: an NVQ issued in 2013 needs periodic refreshing against real local labour demand, not permanent status as a credential frozen in time. The security-forces side already has one idea worth borrowing wholesale: a proposed disaster-relief volunteer registry that turns economically stable, physically fit retirees into a standing civic resource instead of a closed file. There is no reason that registry should stop at veterans. A former combatant flagged by the platform as stable and capable is exactly the kind of person a district-level civic or disaster-response corps should be recruiting — a livelihood measure that also hands someone a paid, dignified public role, rather than a grant that simply runs out. And when the vulnerability check itself catches a household in genuine distress — debt, a lost primary earner, a failed harvest — the response built into the platform should be an automatic route into a small stabilisation fund or bridging micro-loan, not a note that sits in a file until next year's review. ### **The Politics of One System** There is a political risk worth naming honestly. Publicly tracking former LTTE combatants and state soldiers under one visible programme will, to some audiences, read as moral equivalence between the two, and that reaction alone could stall the idea regardless of its merits. The answer is not to abandon a shared architecture — building one data spine instead of two remains the efficient choice — but to keep the two tracks visibly and administratively distinct: separate governance, separate communications, each accountable to the population it serves, sharing nothing with the public except a well-engineered back office. Governance itself need not be elaborate: a joint steering arrangement across the Bureau of Rehabilitation, the Ranaviru Authority, the Ministry of Health, with independent oversight from a body such as the Centre for Humanitarian Affairs to offset a trust deficit both populations report toward the state, publishing aggregate, non-identifying findings every year. That transparency matters on its own terms: the same 2025 study found communities in the north reporting fear of state surveillance and communities in the east reporting outright neglect. A platform that is honest about what it measures, who sees it, and what triggers a referral — and that structurally limits who can see a full file, rather than promising restraint after the fact — is more likely to be trusted, and therefore actually used, than one that repeats the state's closed, security-first posture. Sri Lanka does not lack psychiatrists, hospitals, or administrative structure. It lacks the connective tissue that would let a single person's health and economic situation be tracked from the day they leave a rehabilitation centre or a barracks to the day, years or decades later, when they might need help again — and it lacks any mechanism at all for tracking the households that waited for them. Building that infrastructure, grounded in two distinct arguments and extended to families on both sides, is a modest ask against the scale of what this country's war actually cost. ### ITAK Challenges Government to Prove Archaeology Department Is Free of Ethnic Bias URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/itak-challenges-government-to-prove-archaeology-department-is-free-of-ethnic-bias/ Last updated: 2026-07-16T05:34:37.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka's largest Tamil party has urged the government to resolve a series of long-running heritage disputes in the country's Northern and Eastern Provinces and to demonstrate that the state's archaeology authority operates without ethnic or religious bias. The Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) said its lawmakers had raised the concerns directly with the Director General of the Department of Archaeology, Prof. D. Thusitha Mendis, at a recent meeting, calling for fair solutions acceptable to all communities to problems surrounding the department's work in the two provinces. The party was represented by its general secretary, M.A. Sumanthiran, a President's Counsel, and by the Batticaloa District lawmaker Shanakiyan Rasamanickam. Mr. Rasamanickam said Tamil confidence in the department would take hold only if it were seen to function without ethnic or religious discrimination. To that end, he called for the removal of 54 shops operating within the premises of the Thirukoneswaram Temple in Trincomalee, one of Sri Lanka's most revered Hindu shrines, and for the withdrawal of court cases filed against the Poratheevupattu and Valaichenai Pradeshiya Sabhas. He also asked the Director General to visit Batticaloa District in person to examine archaeological disputes at several sites, including the Thanthamalai Murugan Temple, and to work toward outcomes acceptable to the Tamil community. Mr. Sumanthiran criticized the department's official emblem, arguing that it carried symbols representing only one religion and did not reflect the identities of the country's other faiths and ethnic communities. He called for the emblem to be redesigned to represent all religious and ethnic groups. The Department of Archaeology falls under the Ministry of Buddhasasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs. The party also questioned whether the department had any involvement in the establishment of 42 Buddhist temples along a 37-kilometre stretch of Kuchchaveli, in the Eastern Province, and pressed for the immediate approval of long-delayed development work at the Thirukoneswaram Temple, including construction of a clock tower. ITAK further urged the government to guarantee that Tamil worshippers can freely exercise their religious rights at sites including Kurunthurmalai and Vedukunari Malai. It said existing court orders, if properly enforced, would safeguard those rights, but alleged that actions taken in violation of judicial rulings continued to obstruct Tamil worshippers in practice. Disputes over archaeological sites in the north and east have simmered for years, with Tamil political parties, Hindu clergy, and civil society groups accusing the department of facilitating the expansion of Buddhist heritage claims in predominantly Tamil areas. Kurunthurmalai has been a particular flashpoint: in October 2025, Mr. Rasamanickam publicised a complaint to the Criminal Investigation Department alleging that a departmental officer had scattered Buddhist religious objects across nearby land that was subsequently recorded as an archaeological site. The Department of Archaeology has historically maintained that its work is aimed at protecting the country's archaeological heritage irrespective of ethnicity or religion, and that it is guided by the Antiquities Ordinance rather than by communal considerations. ### One library that began a story URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/one-library-that-began-a-story/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T06:11:08.000Z ### **By: Shankari Chandran** ### **Editor's Note:* As Australian High Commissioner Matthew Duckworth presents the complete collection of Shankari Chandran's novels to the Jaffna Public Library today, Jaffna Monitor republishes this essay by the Miles Franklin Award-winning Sri Lankan Tamil author, who reflects on the burning of the library, its enduring place in Tamil memory, and the lasting power of stories against erasure.* ### ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/WhatsApp-Image-2026-07-14-at-10.08.49.jpeg) ****Australian High Commissioner Matthew Duckworth presents the complete collection of Shankari Chandran’s novels to Jaffna Municipal Commissioner D.C. Aravintharajah at the Jaffna Public Library on Tuesday.** My footsteps slow when I pass a library. Any library. I am pulled inwards, to its endless stories and the possibilities they hold. The public library of a country houses that nation’s stories, even the contested ones. It is a monument to the storytelling we call history. The political history of Sri Lanka is especially contested. Which race arrived on the island first, which warring faction committed the most atrocities, how many people died and how many remain missing. These are the narratives we still fight over. New ones have emerged — how corrupt was the previous regime, how many billions did they steal, how much do we owe China and how many children will go hungry as a result of it. Libraries hold stories, but for me, one library also began a story. My novel, *Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens*, was inspired by the burning of the Jaffna Public Library. It uses this act of cultural erasure to explore racism in my ancestral homeland, Sri Lanka, and my chosen homeland, Australia. The Jaffna Public Library sits in Jaffna (Yalpanam), the ancestral capital of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. It was constructed between 1953 and 1959, and its domed ceilings and gleaming white stucco walls stood proudly over the city, more like a palace than a library. It stored one of the largest archives of Tamil culture in the world — at its height, the collection contained 100,000 books, ancient manuscripts and historical records about Tamil civilisation in Sri Lanka. It is — or was — a place of almost mythical cultural significance to the Tamil people. In 1981, the Jaffna Public Library was burned to the ground by mobs and police. Two thousand years of Tamil culture, history and language were destroyed. Some texts were the only copies in existence and have been lost forever. The Jaffna Public Library told a story about the place of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The political authorities of that time wanted to suppress this narrative; burning the archive was a quick and conclusive way to do it. For many Tamils, this biblioclasm was the culmination of decades of laws that disempowered the Tamil people. And it foreshadowed the civil war that was to come, two years later. That war led to the forced migration of Tamil people to many parts of the world, and for my family, to Australia. It also led to the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of Tamil people. I was born and raised in the Tamil diaspora. For decades, my parents were afraid to return to Sri Lanka because of my father’s political activism. We moved to London and then Australia (where I was raised) in 1977, a few years after the end of the White Australia Policy. I call Australia my chosen home because I have left many times and I always long to return. I am deeply happy and connected to both people and place here. From the strength and safety of Australia, I use fiction to interrogate the injustices that drove my family from one home and challenged them to create another. Fiction allows me to assert myself in the present, and to understand how that present has been shaped by the past. At a recent literary panel, someone asked me if I felt my fiction was constrained by my ethnicity and our history. This was my answer: I stride into the future with stories, and it is vital to me that I take my history with me. I am uplifted, not burdened, by it. (At the same panel, a reader told me that my latest novel’s assertion of racism in Australia was deeply offensive. I smiled politely and said I find racism deeply offensive and destructive. I wanted to add — but didn’t — ‘Your local library will have a copy of *White Fragility*’.) When the Jaffna Public Library was burned, I became bereft of a history, an archive of the past that helped anchor my place in the present. It is a moment in time that I have memorialised in all my writing. As a writer and storyteller, all my work returns to the burning of books and stories. I cannot let go of the burning of books, the burning of the bodies and the burning of truth that followed. Through fictional stories about Sri Lanka, I have tried to record our path to war and the terrible mistakes made by both sides. Through fiction, I’ve tried to understand how so many were killed and why there will not be justice for the living or the dead. On my last trip to Sri Lanka in January 2019, I returned with three generations of our family. My parents took their children and grandchildren to our ancestral villages; to all the places they had loved and left behind. We saw how much had been erased by war; how much of our history had been erased by the post-war ‘rebuilding’ of the north. We took our children to the new Jaffna Public Library, built on the ruins of the old one. It is still a stately building, its architecture an homage to the original design, but its archive will never be the same. We assembled the Chandran grandchildren in front of the library and took a photograph of them with their grandparents, recounting some of the stories that had been destroyed. We whispered the words, because although we were in the Tamil heartland, history had taught us to be afraid. We choked on the words because we felt the grief rise up through our bodies and threaten to overwhelm us. Finally, we pressed and we kissed the words into our children because the stories of their ancestors will help them write their own. Standing outside the new Jaffna Public Library, on the hard, red earth of our ancestral homeland, I felt completely at home, while completely dispossessed of home. Since that visit, the Library has added my novels to its collection. It is a small contribution to the librarians' ongoing work of rebuilding the cultural record of the Sri Lankan Tamil community, and one of the greatest honours of my life. I am deeply grateful for it. And I feel the yearning I always feel to begin a new story. ### Video of Military-Harvested Vegetables Fuels Anger Over Jaffna Land Occupation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/video-of-military-harvested-vegetables-fuels-anger-over-jaffna-land-occupation/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T00:59:07.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A video appearing to show Sri Lankan soldiers delivering vegetables cultivated on military-controlled private land in Jaffna to a wholesale collection center supplying a supermarket has gone viral on social media, rekindling longstanding resentment among displaced residents of Valikamam North, where the military continues to occupy thousands of acres of privately owned land despite the end of Sri Lanka's civil war 17 years ago. The footage, circulated widely over the past several days, shows what residents say are soldiers unloading large quantities of vegetables at a purchasing centre in Urumpirai along the Palaly Road. Residents allege the produce was cultivated on privately owned land that has remained under military control for decades. The video surfaced days after Deputy Defence Minister Aruna Jayasekara told Parliament that the military requires 1,661 acres of land in Valikamam North for security purposes and that the government was taking steps to compensate landowners. He also said the military’s farming activities on those lands were intended for its own consumption. Displaced residents rejected that explanation, saying the viral footage contradicts the government’s claim. “They took our lands in the name of security. Now they cultivate those lands and sell the harvest back to the very people they displaced,” several residents told *Jaffna Monitor*. They said the practice not only deprives them of their property and livelihoods but also places local farmers at a commercial disadvantage by allowing the military to compete in agricultural markets. V. Velayutham, 67, whose family home has remained inside the military-controlled area for 37 years, said the military had expanded far beyond its security role. “The military is doing everything except the work it was created to do,” he told *Jaffna Monitor*. “They are farming, running businesses, and profiting from lands that belong to civilians while we remain displaced.” Valikamam North was declared a High Security Zone during Sri Lanka’s civil war, forcing thousands of families from their homes. Although portions of the area have been released since the war ended in 2009, significant tracts of privately owned land remain under military occupation, making it one of the island’s longest-running land disputes. Residents renewed their call for the government to return the lands rather than acquire them permanently through compensation, arguing that they want restoration of their property—not payment for land they never willingly surrendered. The Defence Ministry has not publicly responded to the allegations surrounding the viral video. ### Amirthalingam Knew Death Was Coming. He Wasn't Afraid. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/amirthalingam-knew-death-was-coming-he-wasnt-afraid/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T03:30:08.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** About a month before his assassination, Appapillai Amirthalingam was told by his elder son in London about a strong rumour in the UK that he had been killed. “This is what some people expect to happen,” the Tamil political stalwart responded. “If that happens, I wouldn’t mind.” What was rumoured did indeed happen on the evening of Thursday, July 13, 1989\. Tamil Tiger assassins shot dead an unsuspecting Amirthalingam, 61, and his colleague, V. Yogeswaran, 55, at their Colombo residence after consuming cold drinks served by Yogeswaran's wife. M. Sivasithambaram was shot and wounded. All three men were veterans of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), Sri Lanka’s leading Tamil party, which, despite being eclipsed over the years by Tamil militants, enjoyed wide support and respect among the mass of Tamils in the country. A lawyer by training, Amirthalingam was an institution in his own right. Ever since he became the virtual right-hand man of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the Gandhian of Tamil politics, Amirthalingam was the livewire of Tamil activism and later the face of increasingly turbulent Tamil politics. Even as Tamil militancy developed into full-scale insurgency after the anti-Tamil orgy of 1983 in Colombo, Amirthalingam remained the tallest among all elected Tamil leaders. This is why the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) decided to kill him, says his younger son Baheerathan. “They had to kill him to become the no. 1 (on the Tamil side),” Baheerathan, 66, said in a telephonic interview from London. “My father may not have been the no. 1, but he was a democratically elected leader. So he had to go.” He added, “The LTTE also knew that my father could not be frightened. So, he had to be eliminated.” Although Amirthalingam was a pale shadow of his former self by the time he passed away, his stature as a towering figure in Tamil politics earned him a respect the Tigers could not digest. Although he could no longer visit Tamil areas freely, diplomats and others regularly called on him. On the D-Day itself, Amirthalingam had been invited to a dinner at the Taj Samudra hotel facing the Galle Face promenade hosted by the Indian envoy to Colombo in honour of B.G. Deshmukh, who was visiting Sri Lanka as a special envoy of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. I was in Colombo when the double assassination took place. A journalist who rushed to the crime site mistakenly identified one of the three assassins, Visu, as Yogi, a high-ranking LTTE leader who was one of the Tigers then engaged in peace talks with the government. It took a while for the confusion to melt and the real story to be known. The LTTE killers had gained entry into the otherwise secure residence after Yogeswaran foolishly told the police guards not to frisk them. The Tigers had said they wanted to talk to Amirthalingam to bring about unity among Tamil parties and outfits. The TULF men, wise otherwise, fell for the trick. Once the LTTE gunmen opened fire, the police guards shot dead all three assassins. If the killers had escaped, the Tigers would have denied any link with the murders and probably tried to blame some other Tamil group. Amirthalingam was the first major mainstream leader ordered killed by LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran, whose appetite for gore never stopped until he himself became history much later. In 1990, an LTTE hit squad wiped out almost the entire leadership of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front in Chennai. This was followed the next year by the assassinations of Sri Lankan Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne in Colombo and former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi near Chennai. It is only after Amirthalingam’s passing away that LTTE propagandists began describing Prabhakaran, a nobody when Amirthalingam was a popular Tamil patriarch, as *thesiya thalaivar* (national leader). Those who killed Amirthalingam in the most cowardly fashion – we want to talk, they said; please do not let the cops frisk us, they pleaded; they sipped cool drinks and made small talk; and, then, whipped out a gun and shot him dead – did not realise that their victim was anything but a coward. When former MPs M. Alalasundaram and V. Dharmalingam were shot dead in Jaffna in 1985 by suspected militants, Amirthalingam told a memorial meeting in Chennai that Tamil political stalwarts were ready to pay the ultimate price. This was no rhetoric. He would often quote to both his sons, the elder Kandeepan (who died in 2022) and the younger Baheerathan, an iconic line from Shakespeare: “Cowards die many times before their deaths. The valiant never taste of death but once.” As he flew from India to Colombo after the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord, which ran into serious problems among most Sinhalese, Amirthalingam told TULF colleague V. Aanandasangaree: “We know what lies in store for us in Sri Lanka. But we must face it if we are to help our people.” Despite an affinity to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (until her assassination in October 1984), Amirthalingam was no Indian stooge. He had a mind of his own. It was Amirthalingam, more than anyone else, who took the Tamil story after the 1983 frenzy to world capitals. But once Rajiv Gandhi took office, he realised that India would accept only a negotiated settlement. Indira Gandhi may have had other ideas, but her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi was of a different mould. Amirthalingam was all for the 13th Amendment that followed the 1987 pact, promising autonomy to Tamil areas and other provinces in Sri Lanka. Many who mocked him then are today clamouring for the same legislation. When India urged the TULF to hold talks with the Sri Lankan government in Bhutan in 1985, Amirthalingam insisted that the dialogue would be pointless unless the Tamil militant groups were also invited. His elder son objected, but he did not budge. Prabhakaran’s men too went to Bhutan. But he later turned openly critical of Amirthalingam, asking why he was talking to Colombo when the aim was to form a free Tamil Eelam. Amirthalingam preferred silence despite such indignities from those who knew nothing of diplomacy. Like many Tamils, Amirthalingam was disgusted when the LTTE unleashed bloody violence against other Tamil groups. He was not one for bloodshed, notwithstanding his aggressive politics in an earlier era. For him, according to his son Baheerathan, the TULF and the Tamil militant groups had to mirror the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Féin. The TULF leader remained calm even as friends complained that Sri Lanka’s main Tamil party was being sidelined by India post-Indira Gandhi. Later, he did not want the war between the LTTE and the Indian military to continue. As the fighting raged, he refused to contest the Provincial Council elections in Sri Lankan northeast in 1988, angering the Indian establishment. In 1989, India’s new envoy to Sri Lanka, Lakhan Lal Mehrotra, decided to honour Amirthalingam with a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister’s special envoy. But the LTTE killed him before he could make it to the Taj Samudra. Baheerathan was in London when he heard the shattering news. “I was devastated. He was not just my father. He was also my best friend.” In the end, the Sri Lankan government, which he fought for years, tried to keep him safe – and its personnel even killed his assassins. Those who cut short his life were those who once saw Amirthalingam as their *thalapathy* (general) and who promised to lead the Tamil community to a free Tamil state. It was a dream Amirthalingam realised was not feasible – even if it looked possible once. For this, he was dubbed a “traitor”. Those who called him so led the Tamil community to a horrific and wholesale ruin in 2009. ### Amirthalingam’s Son Says the Tigers Destroyed the Cause They Claimed to Defend URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/amirthalingams-son-says-the-tigers-destroyed-the-cause-they-claimed-to-defend/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T16:26:40.000Z Thirty-seven years to the day after gunmen from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam assassinated the Tamil leader Appapillai Amirthalingam, his son has accused the group of destroying not only his father but also the political cause it claimed to represent. In a Facebook post marking the anniversary, Dr. Baheerathan Amirthalingam, a physician who settled in Britain after the killing, wrote that the assassination on July 13, 1989, had "turned our family's life upside down" and that its consequences had extended far beyond a single household. He said the LTTE went on to eliminate rival militant groups, kill countless fighters and civilians, alienate the foreign governments that had once supported the Tamil cause, and ultimately destroy itself — "and, in the end, destroyed our aspirations as well." “They did not merely take my father’s life,” he wrote. Mr. Amirthalingam, the secretary-general of the Tamil United Liberation Front, was among the most prominent Sri Lankan Tamil politicians of his generation. He became Leader of the Opposition after the 1977 general election, in which his party, campaigning on a platform that demanded a separate Tamil state, won the largest bloc of opposition seats in Parliament. He was shot on the evening of July 13, 1989, on Bullers Road in Colombo, during a meeting with Tiger emissaries convened, ostensibly, to discuss Tamil unity. A fellow party leader, V. Yogeswaran, was also killed, and a third, M. Sivasithamparam, was wounded. The three assassins were shot dead by Mr. Amirthalingam’s police bodyguards. The Tamil Tigers first denied responsibility and later admitted it. Dr. Amirthalingam, who was 28 at the time, had flown to London the day before to begin postgraduate medical studies, expecting only a temporary stay. He learned of his father’s death as he traveled from the airport, he has said, and never moved back. In his anniversary message, he urged Sri Lankans, and Tamils in particular, to reflect on “who bears responsibility for the helpless situation in which we find ourselves today.” Some had sought to justify the killing because the Tigers had carried it out, he wrote, while many others who believed it was wrong had chosen to stay silent. Those responsible, he added, had also worked to erase his father’s memory — a legacy he said writers had struggled to preserve under a climate of fear. He noted that the first biography of his father, *Murder of a Moderate*, by the writer Sabaratnam, appeared only in 1996, seven years after the killing, when few were willing to discuss the slain leader publicly. A second, *Amirthalingam Sagaptham* (“The Amirthalingam Era”), by Kathir Balasundaram, followed in 2002\. Efforts are now underway, he said, to republish the first book as part of commemorations for his father’s birth centenary, which falls in 2027. Dr. Amirthalingam has made his case at greater length before. In an interview with Jaffna Monitor in March 2025, he argued that the Tigers had branded his father a traitor because they wanted to establish themselves as the sole representative of the Tamil people, and viewed the Tamil United Liberation Front, the democratically chosen voice of Tamils after the 1977 election, and the party that foreign diplomats sought out first, as the chief obstacle. By silencing moderate and experienced leaders, he said then, the armed groups had cut Tamil society off from global diplomacy and left the community with no room to negotiate. Dr. Amirthalingam has long argued that rejecting the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord was the LTTE's greatest political mistake. The Indian-brokered agreement, which his father supported but the Tigers rejected, would have preserved hard-won Tamil political gains and spared much of the bloodshed that followed, he contends. When the accord was signed, he has noted, the war's dead numbered in the low thousands; by its end, the toll had risen to hundreds of thousands. "We achieved absolutely nothing," he said in the 2025 interview, describing the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka's Constitution, the accord's principal surviving provision intended to devolve power to the provinces, as existing "merely on paper." The verdict on Mr. Amirthalingam has long been contested among Tamils. A fiery orator once celebrated by Tamil youth, he helped frame the 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution, which first declared the goal of an independent Tamil Eelam. He later moderated that stance in favor of a power-sharing settlement within a united Sri Lanka — a shift that hardliners, and the Tigers, cast as betrayal. For years after his death, some continued to justify the assassination on those grounds. Tamil political power in the north and east, once concentrated in Mr. Amirthalingam’s party, has since splintered. Its principal successor in the north, the Illankai Tamil Arasu Katchi, has watched its dominance collapse — losing seats there even to the governing, Colombo-based National People’s Power. Dr. Amirthalingam has turned to preserving his father’s memory in more concrete form as well, converting the family’s Jaffna house, the only property, he has said, that his father personally owned, into the Amirthalingam-Mangaiyarkarasi Memorial, named for his parents. “This is not just about remembering my father,” he said last year. “It is about ensuring that our political struggle is not forgotten by the younger generation.” ### Ex-Army Major's Prison Account Renews Focus on Sri Lanka's Overcrowded Jails After Deadly Riot URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/ex-army-majors-prison-account-renews-focus-on-sri-lankas-overcrowded-jails-after-deadly-riot/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T14:03:23.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A retired army major and attorney who spent more than three years inside Sri Lanka's largest prison has offered a rare firsthand account of conditions in the country's overcrowded prison system, days after the deadliest prison riot in more than a decade left 28 people dead and intensified scrutiny of long-standing failures in the country's jails. Ajith Prasanna, who was released from prison earlier this year after serving a contempt-of-court sentence, published the account on Facebook following the July 5–6 violence at Negombo Prison. The clashes killed 28 people, including eight prison officers, making them the country's deadliest prison riot since the 2012 Welikada prison massacre. Prasanna wrote that several of the officers killed at Negombo had left Welikada Prison on temporary deployment the morning the violence erupted — the same prison where he had spent three and a half years until his release earlier this year. His account, while based on personal experience and not independently verified, echoes concerns documented for years by prison reform advocates, human rights organizations and government officials about chronic overcrowding, inadequate medical care and deteriorating living conditions inside Sri Lanka's prisons. Prasanna was sentenced by the Supreme Court in January 2023 to four years' rigorous imprisonment for contempt of court after criticizing judicial decisions during press conferences while practicing as a lawyer. He later received two additional six-month prison terms from the Court of Appeal and the Colombo High Court on similar contempt charges, bringing his total sentence to five years. He entered Welikada Prison on Feb. 24, 2023, and said he was housed in several wards during his incarceration. According to Prasanna, prisoners housed in cell blocks are locked inside from 5:30 p.m. until around 6 a.m. without access to toilets, forcing them to use metal containers inside their cells. He described meals as thin and inadequate, said inmates slept on mats laid directly on concrete floors, and wrote that access to dormitory-style accommodation with overnight toilet facilities was considered a privilege rather than the norm. He said prisoners wore white shorts and short-sleeved shirts, were required to keep their hair closely cropped and were prohibited from growing beards. Convicted prisoners not awaiting appeal worked daily in prison industries including carpentry, masonry, sewing, farming and coir production. Prasanna said he was assigned to the sewing section. Family members were allowed to bring home-cooked meals only on a handful of religious and national holidays each year, he wrote. New inmates were subjected to full strip searches conducted manually rather than through body scanners — a practice he noted he had previously criticized publicly as a lawyer before later experiencing it himself as a prisoner. Prasanna described medical services as severely inadequate, alleging that seriously ill inmates sometimes died because they did not receive timely treatment. Prisoners without family visitors, he wrote, often went months without basic necessities such as soap and toothpaste. He argued that rehabilitation programs were largely ineffective, saying that meaningful personal reform depended almost entirely on prisoners themselves. His account comes as Sri Lanka confronts a prison system operating far beyond its intended capacity. Prasanna estimated the country's prison population had grown to about 44,000 from roughly 27,000 when he entered prison in early 2023\. Official figures point to a similar trend, although slightly lower totals. The justice minister told Parliament in May that about 39,000 people were incarcerated, while the minister overseeing prison reforms said this month that the number had risen to around 41,000. The country's 36 prisons were designed to hold approximately 10,500 inmates. Negombo Prison, built to accommodate about 650 prisoners, housed roughly 2,400 inmates when the violence erupted. Prasanna argued that overcrowding had been driven largely by mass arrests during the government's "Ratama Ekata" anti-narcotics campaign, which he said targeted drug users more often than major traffickers and left thousands detained on remand for extended periods. He estimated that about 30,000 prisoners were incarcerated primarily because of poverty. He also questioned the circumstances surrounding the Negombo deaths, predicting that subsequent investigations would show many of those killed had not participated in the violence. Authorities have said prisoners attacked officers and attempted to breach the prison's main gate, prompting officers to use what officials described as the minimum force necessary to restore control. Hospital officials reported that many of the dead had suffered gunshot wounds, while rights groups have questioned whether the use of force was proportionate. A committee headed by a retired Supreme Court judge is investigating the riot, including how violence that officials initially described as contained on the first day escalated into a far deadlier confrontation the following day. In his Facebook post, Prasanna also appealed to the Minister of Women and Child Affairs, Saroja Savithri Paulraj, to consider the hardships faced by families of imprisoned breadwinners and said he hoped to advocate for prison reform and support for inmates' families. The government has since announced a series of reforms, including reopening a colonial-era prison previously earmarked for conversion into a hotel, recruiting about 1,300 additional prison officers after years of frozen hiring, and preparing legislation to allow low-risk remand prisoners to serve their detention under electronically monitored house arrest. Rights advocates have welcomed those measures but say they will have limited impact unless accompanied by broader reforms aimed at reducing incarceration. Ambika Satkunanathan, a former member of Sri Lanka's Human Rights Commission, told Reuters that the priority should be reducing unnecessary imprisonment and treating drug dependence through community-based programs rather than expanding prison capacity. Official inquiries into both the 2012 Welikada prison massacre, in which 27 inmates died, and the 2020 Mahara prison riot, which left 11 prisoners dead, identified overcrowding as a central cause of unrest. Many of their recommendations remain unimplemented as Sri Lanka's prison population continues to grow. ### Six Tamil-Speaking Parties Launch Common Platform on Constitution, Elections, and Land Rights URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/six-tamil-speaking-parties-launch-common-platform-on-constitution-elections-and-land-rights/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T14:07:01.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Six political parties representing Sri Lanka’s Tamil-speaking communities announced on Monday that they had agreed to establish a common platform to coordinate on issues of shared concern, including constitutional reform, long-delayed provincial council elections, and land disputes affecting minority communities. The announcement came at a joint news conference at the Renuka Hotel in Colombo's Bambalapitiya suburb, where leaders of Tamil, Muslim and Indian Tamil parties stood together to launch a common platform aimed at coordinating action on shared political issues while maintaining their separate party identities. The initiative brings together the Sri Lanka People’s Congress, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress, the Tamil Progressive Alliance, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), and the Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA). Among those attending the news conference were Rishad Bathiudeen, leader of the Sri Lanka People’s Congress; Rauff Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress; the party’s General Secretary, President’s Counsel Nizam Kariapper; Jeevan Thondaman, leader of the Ceylon Workers’ Congress; Mano Ganesan, leader of the Tamil Progressive Alliance; M. A. Sumanthiran, President’s Counsel and General Secretary of ITAK; and Selvam Adaikkalanathan and Surendran Gurusamy, leaders of the Democratic Tamil National Alliance. In a joint statement titled *“Tamil-speaking Political Parties Agree to Establish a Common Platform to Work Together on Matters of Common Concern,”* the parties said the new forum would allow them to discuss issues affecting their communities, exchange views, and build consensus on areas where their interests overlap. The statement emphasized that each party would retain its own political ideology and policy positions. However, it said the platform would serve as a mechanism for identifying common interests and coordinating action where agreement could be reached. The parties said they had already reached consensus on three priority issues. First, they called on the government to honour its election pledge to introduce a new Constitution. They said any constitutional reform should guarantee justice, equality, and meaningful devolution of power, while providing for the maximum possible power-sharing arrangements. Second, the parties expressed concern over continued delays in holding provincial council elections. Although the government had previously indicated that the polls would be held within a year, they urged the administration to conduct the elections without further delay, arguing that they are essential for democratic participation and regional representation. Third, the parties said longstanding land-related issues continue to affect Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils and Muslims. They called on the government to engage in meaningful consultations with affected communities and to provide fair and sustainable solutions to those long-standing disputes. The parties said they would continue discussions through the new forum, expressing hope that coordinated action on shared issues would strengthen reconciliation, democratic governance and the protection of minority rights. ### Thousands Gather for Japanese Bon Odori Festival in Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/thousands-gather-for-japanese-bon-odori-festival-in-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T13:06:33.000Z **MAHARAGAMA, Sri Lanka —** Thousands of people attended the Japanese Bon Odori Festival 2026 in Maharagama on Saturday, celebrating Japanese culture through traditional dance, music, food, and cultural exhibitions. The event, held at the National Youth Services Council (NYSC), was attended by Sri Lanka's Deputy Minister of Youth Affairs, Dinidu Saman Hennayake, Japan's Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Kamoshida Naoaki, and other Sri Lankan and Japanese officials. The festival featured Bon Odori dances, traditional Japanese taiko drumming, Japanese folk and pop performances, karate demonstrations, and cultural presentations by students from the Japanese School in Colombo, the Lanka Nippon BizTech Institute, and the NYSC, alongside performances by Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers and Sri Lankan artists. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/thousands-gather-for-japanese-q2fu2U-kixj705kqcerpga.jpg) Visitors also sampled Japanese cuisine from several restaurants and explored cultural exhibits showcasing origami, Japanese language, and educational exchanges. Organizers said the annual festival aims to strengthen cultural ties and people-to-people exchanges between Japan and Sri Lanka, reflecting the longstanding friendship between the two countries. ### SPECTRE OF THE "DEEP STATE": PLANNED CAPTURE OF THE JUDICIARY BY THE EXECUTIVE URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/spectre-of-the-deep-state-planned-capture-of-the-judiciary-by-the-executive/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T11:12:51.000Z **By: Professor G. L. Peiris** **D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D. (Sri Lanka); Former Minister of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and National Integration; Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London; Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.** The government, it would seem, plans to amend Article 107(5) of the Constitution to extend the age of retirement of judges of the Supreme Court from 65 to 67 years, and judges of the Court of Appeal from 63 to 65 years. ### **I. A Flawed Policy Rationale** An attempt is made to justify this measure by resorting to a simple argument: life expectancy has greatly increased as a result of improved medical facilities, with consequent extension of the productive segment of life; and the community will therefore benefit from the accumulated knowledge and experience of judges who still have much to offer, as they approach the age of retirement currently stipulated. This contention is spurious and entirely unsustainable. ### **II. Prospective and Retroactive Reform** The age of retirement of judges is, of course, not an immutable norm. There is lively discussion the world over regarding the age to be fixed by law as the point of compulsory retirement. Significant variation in approach is seen in different jurisdictions. In the United States, judges of the Supreme Court are appointed for life, and the age at which they relinquish office is a matter of personal decision. When a mandatory threshold is laid down, it may vary from 65 and 70 to 75\. An inflexible determination is contrary to practice, and is not consistent with sound policy. This, however, is not the issue. It is a red herring across the trail, intended to distract attention from the central issue. What is important is that the age of retirement, at whatever level it is decided upon, should be determined prior to appointment of the judge, so that when he embarks upon his judicial duties, he knows the span of his judicial career. Its duration should not be changed while he is in office. The constitutional instrument or other definitive text should stipulate, in advance, the point at which the appointment ceases, and the enacted principle should apply across the board to all judges, with no discrimination from case to case. The effects of departure from this principle are gravely prejudicial to the prestige and stature of the Judiciary. This is well illustrated by the sequence of events in our own country. During the first half of this year, 2026, three judges of the Supreme Court retired. If the proposed extension of tenure had been effected at the beginning of the year, these judges would have been entitled to its benefit, and would have continued in office for an additional two years. The precise moment at which the change is brought into operation is the decisive factor in deciding who, among the judges of the court in question, will be beneficiaries of the innovation, and who would be left outside its scope. The decision as to timing is entirely in the hands of the Executive, with the support of a majority of the Legislature at its disposal. The seriously disquieting result is that the government of the day, by having recourse to ad hoc amendment of the Constitution for this purpose, becomes fully empowered to decide which judges will be recipients of its largesse, and which will not. This amounts to picking and choosing among the judges of the court, the overriding consideration being the goodwill and discrimination of the government in power. Whatever the actual intention may be, this inevitably gives rise in the public mind to a doubt whether the decision by the Executive is predicated on acknowledgment of past empathy, or an incentive to future understanding. The arising of this doubt is, by itself, fatal to public perceptions of the objectivity and impartiality of the Judiciary. The answer lies in the prospective, rather than retroactive, prescription of the age of retirement. Nothing is cast in stone, and changing social circumstances certainly call for accommodation in the substance of the law. But the principle to be insisted on is that the changes contemplated should apply to judges to be appointed after the amendment is made, and should not be available as a lever for use to confer on some sitting judges advantages which are tactically withheld from others. ### **III. Classification and Discrimination** By their very nature, arguments which appeal to longevity, productivity, and waste of talent in human resources, apply universally across the public service. Any limitation to one section, arbitrarily chosen, erodes the very foundation of the suggested rationale. University professors and other academics in our tertiary education system retire compulsorily at 65 years. The age of retirement of medical consultants is currently fixed in our country at 63\. Heads of Department throughout our public service relinquish their functions at 60. In each of these categories, the accumulated experience is considerable. Is it only judges who remain capable of adding value to the public wellbeing at 65? On what rational ground is similar reasoning withheld from other categories of specialized personnel, such as cancer, kidney, and heart specialists, whose contribution in their respective spheres is noteworthy, and should continue to be available to the public? The Minister of Justice, on the floor of Parliament, tried to justify the government plan by pointing out that judges in developed countries serve beyond the age of 65\. He cited as examples several jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Germany and Brazil. What he did not mention is that judges in all these countries are not treated as an isolated exception. On the contrary, the enhanced age of retirement finds its place in an overall culture which lengthens the working lives of all public service personnel in keeping with transformed social conditions and expectations. The attempt to distinguish judicial officers from all other public officers is capricious, invidious and insincere, and altogether lacks the ring of conviction. ### **IV. Mandate and Legitimacy** An interesting feature of the government plan is the identification of this particular issue as being worthy of high priority and immediate legislative action. No one, to our knowledge, has agitated for urgent legislative intervention in this area, nor has it received even passing mention in the manifesto of National People's Power. By contrast, when it went before the people almost two years ago, it committed itself to decisive action in other fields, including in particular the abolition of the Executive Presidency. Current political experience in the country highlights the importance of many other constitutional issues, in particular, anomalies besetting the electoral system. This has been repeatedly invoked as a reason for delaying the conduct of Provincial Council elections. There are other issues which call for very early responses in light of current developments -- such as the recent ruling by the Vavuniya High Court suspending operation of the Gazette issued by the Governor of the Northern Province, removing from office the Mayor of the Vavuniya Municipal Council. This situation vividly exposes the ambiguities in the constitutional provisions governing the competence of a Governor to exercise the powers of a Provincial Council which is defunct in the absence of elections. It seems strange, to say the least, that all these crucial issues are going by default, while the obsessive focus of the government is on a matter which is peripheral and divisive. Furthermore, this issue is sought to be taken up on a stand-alone basis, rather than as an integral aspect of a comprehensive constitutional reform initiative. ### **V. Impact on the Subordinate Judiciary** The question arises in stark form regarding the impact of the proposed change on the ranks of High Court and District Court judges, as well as Magistrates. These are public officers who have devoted their entire working lives to the administration of justice in our country. Given their dedication and commitment, upward mobility in their chosen profession is no less than their due. And yet, their legitimate expectation of promotion to higher levels of the judiciary is stultified by the unexpected extension of the tenure of judges of superior courts. This will unavoidably result in demotivating these judges, with consequent loss of enthusiasm. The government, in pursuing its current initiative, has repeatedly stressed the need to retain the services of judicial officers of high calibre. This requires, at the very minimum, the provision of a conducive working environment in which conscientious application is recognised and rewarded. This can hardly be done by depriving judges of access to proper avenues of promotion on which they had relied with every justification. The problem is certainly not solved by offering to extend the tenure of all judges (not only judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal) by two years. If implemented, the effect of this is that serving judges of subordinate courts will stagnate in the positions they hold at present, since natural rotation and promotion is interfered with, by the higher judiciary retaining their positions beyond the time span contemplated prior to the proposed innovation. ### **VI. Equal Protection of the Law** If the government proceeds with its plan to carve out one section of the public service, which is organically an integrated whole, and to confer on it substantial advantages which are deliberately withheld from other strata, the resulting problem has more than a moral or ethical dimension: it produces justiciable legal consequences. This arises from the operation of Article 12(1) of the Constitution, which provides that "all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law". Trade unions and professional bodies representing services prejudicially affected will thus acquire the right to approach the courts with grievances of constitutionally impermissible discrimination. The glaring anomaly then arises that it is none other than the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction in terms of Chapter XVI of the Constitution, that would have the non-delegable duty to adjudicate upon the matter. This is a flagrant violation of the essential elements of natural justice, in so far as the direct and exclusive beneficiaries of the impugned measure function as judges in their own cause -- a situation which would scarcely invite public confidence in the institution. ### **VII. Absence of Consultation** A measure so far-reaching in its impact must necessarily be preceded by extensive public consultation. This is amply borne out by international practice. In the United Kingdom, for instance, when extension of judicial tenure was considered in earnest for more than a whole year in 2021, the government proposal was opened up for public debate, eliciting no fewer than 1,200 responses expressing a wide range of points of view. The striking contrast in our own country is that the proposed amendment is being hatched in secrecy, unbeknown even to members of the government, let alone the community at large. When the Bar Association communicated with the Minister of Justice, the non-committal and evasive reply was that the matter had not been discussed at Cabinet. A furtive and clandestine approach, indicative of singular lack of confidence, is hardly the right approach to constitutional reform in so critical an area. ### **VIII. Conclusion** The government's planned proposal is one of the most dangerous constitutional adventures proposed to be embarked upon in recent times. If the amendment is carried into effect, it will spell the doom of democratic institutions as well as individual and group rights, as we know and cherish them. Most calamitous of all, it will shake the foundations of public confidence in the integrity and objectivity of the Judiciary. What is quite remarkable is that the government initiative is not a response to overtures by the legal community, civil society, or informed and interested groups. It is a self-serving, partisan political initiative by the government in power. ### Sri Lanka Bans Forced-Labour Imports, but Enforcement Remains Unclear URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-bans-forced-labour-imports-but-enforcement-remains-unclear/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T10:33:18.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka has prohibited the import of any goods produced wholly or partly through forced labour, under an order that took effect on July 10 as the government moves to avert a proposed United States tariff of 12.5 percent that would leave its exporters at a disadvantage to regional competitors. The order was issued by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake in his capacity as Minister of Finance, under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. It requires importers to submit documents to the Director General of Customs certifying that their goods were not mined, produced, or manufactured using forced labour at any stage. It also empowers the Minister to designate specific goods, entities, regions, or countries for enhanced restrictions, taking into account decisions of the International Labour Organization (ILO). It is the first time Sri Lanka has barred an import on the ground that it was made with coerced labour. Earlier import restrictions, including the wide curbs imposed during the 2022 foreign-exchange crisis, were aimed at conserving currency. ### **THE U.S. TARIFF BEHIND THE ORDER** The measure follows a determination by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). On June 2, the USTR concluded under Section 301 of the Trade Act that 60 economies had failed to impose or effectively enforce a prohibition on imports made with forced labour, a failure it termed “unreasonable” and a burden on U.S. commerce. It found that 54 economies, including Sri Lanka, had no such ban, while six others — Canada, Ecuador, the European Union, Indonesia, Mexico, and Pakistan — had one but did not enforce it. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the failures forced American workers to compete on “an uneven playing field.” The USTR proposed additional duties of 12.5 per cent on economies without a ban and 10 percent on those that had legislated one. That gap is central to Sri Lanka's response: its proposed 12.5 percent rate is higher than the 10 percent facing garment rivals such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, a difference exporters say could divert orders. Industry stakeholders have been lobbying the government to secure Sri Lanka's inclusion in the lower tier, which is reserved for countries that maintain a forced-labour import ban. The U.S. Trade Representative's concerns extend beyond labour conditions within individual countries and focus on the integrity of global supply chains, particularly those involving cotton and other raw materials from China's Xinjiang region. Under the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act, the United States presumes that goods produced wholly or partly in Xinjiang are made with forced labour unless importers can provide clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. U.S. officials argue that raw materials from the region can be exported to third countries, processed into yarn, fabric or finished garments, and then shipped to the United States with their original source obscured. The USTR cited China-linked intermediary manufacturers operating in ten economies under investigation, including Sri Lanka, as examples of supply chains that could be used to circumvent those restrictions. China has consistently rejected allegations of forced labour in Xinjiang, describing them as politically motivated and without factual basis. Chinese officials say employment in the region is voluntary, that cotton production is highly mechanised, and that the United States is using the forced-labour issue to justify trade restrictions and contain China's economic development. The United States is Sri Lanka's largest export market, purchasing about $3 billion worth of goods each year, most of them apparel. The apparel sector generated about $5 billion in export earnings last year and employs around 300,000 workers. The industry is already under pressure: apparel exports fell 7.4 percent to $1.53 billion in the first four months of 2026, while tea exports also declined. Deputy Finance Minister Anil Jayantha Fernando said in June that Sri Lanka would strengthen Customs screening and adopt further international labour standards to address the U.S. concerns, adding that the country “already has good labour practices” and an existing legal framework. He cited its ratification in April of ILO Convention No. 190 on violence and harassment at work. The July 10 order is the first legislative step to follow. ### **HOW FORCED LABOUR IS DEFINED** Under the ILO Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which Sri Lanka ratified in 1950, forced labour is work exacted from a person under the “menace of any penalty” and to which the person has not agreed voluntarily. Sri Lanka has also ratified the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, the convention's 2014 Protocol, and, in April, Convention No. 190. The ILO lists eleven indicators used to identify forced labour: abuse of vulnerability, deception, restriction of movement, isolation, physical and sexual violence, intimidation and threats, retention of identity documents, withholding of wages, debt bondage, abusive working and living conditions, and excessive overtime. The ILO says a single indicator is rarely conclusive, and that investigators weigh the overall circumstances, including whether a worker is able to leave freely. ### **WHY ENFORCEMENT IS DIFFICULT** Labour-rights specialists say forced labour is hard to detect because it is a condition of the workplace rather than a feature of the product, and can occur at any point in a supply chain. A garment may be assembled in one country from fabric woven in a second and cotton grown in a third, with coercion possible at any stage and none of it visible in a finished item. Countries with established systems have built them over several years. U.S. Customs and Border Protection can issue a Withhold Release Order to detain goods when information reasonably indicates forced labour, placing the burden on the importer to prove otherwise; under the Xinjiang law, goods traced to the region are presumed barred unless the importer demonstrates they are not. The European Union has adopted a forced-labour regulation, an investigation-led model that will apply in full from December 2027\. The anti-slavery organisation Walk Free has cautioned that several import bans introduced in 2026 still lack the operational procedures and resources needed to be effective. ### **WHAT THE ORDER LEAVES UNSPECIFIED** The order requires importers to certify that goods are free of forced labour but does not state what the certification must contain, how declarations will be verified, or what penalties apply for false statements. It does not identify who will investigate allegations, what standard of evidence Customs will apply, or whether goods may be detained on reasonable suspicion. It provides no mechanism for trade unions, workers, or civil society groups to submit information about suspected forced labour in overseas supply chains, and no commitment to publish the goods, entities, or countries designated, or the criteria for listing them. Officials have said implementing guidelines are expected. Sri Lanka Customs is primarily equipped to assess tariff classifications, values, and origin documents. The order does not indicate whether a specialist forced-labour unit will be established, or how Customs will coordinate with the Department of Labour, the Foreign Ministry, and law-enforcement agencies. Trade analysts have said smaller importers, which lack the compliance departments and audit programmes of large firms, may find the requirements harder to meet. ### **CONCERNS OVER SRI LANKA'S OWN RECORD** The measure applies only to imports and does not address forced-labour risks within Sri Lanka's own economy. In May, Amnesty International reported that conditions on some private tea estates in the south “may amount to forced labour,” citing debt bondage, withheld wages, restricted movement, and abuse among Malaiyaha Tamil workers across 45 estates in the Galle and Matara districts, and called on the government to open criminal investigations. Successive U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons reports have faulted Sri Lanka for failing to investigate forced labour on estates and for weak protection of migrant workers. Some labour-rights groups have argued that the government should pair the new import controls with stronger enforcement against exploitation at home, and treat border measures as part of a broader labour-rights strategy rather than a trade instrument alone. ### **AN UNCERTAIN TEST** Trade specialists and rights groups broadly welcomed the order as a significant development that aligns Sri Lanka more closely with international efforts to keep goods made with forced labour out of supply chains, and that may support its case for a lower U.S. tariff. They said its effect would depend on enforcement powers, resources, and transparency that the government has not yet established. The government has described the regulation as a demonstration of its commitment to international labour standards and ethical trade, and said the goods and countries covered would be named in later notifications. The government's first enforcement decisions are likely to determine whether the new regulation becomes an effective tool against forced-labour imports or remains largely a documentary requirement for importers. ### Sri Lanka Knows How to Fight Dengue. So Why Is the Government Still Losing? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-knows-how-to-fight-dengue-so-why-is-the-government-still-losing/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T03:29:39.000Z **COLOMBO / JAFFNA —** On 6 July, the University of Moratuwa, one of the country's foremost engineering schools, sent its students home and moved teaching online for two weeks, after a cluster of more than fifty dengue infections spread through a campus where examinations were still underway. Several of those students, the university acknowledged, had sat their papers while feverish. It was the third campus disrupted in a matter of weeks. The University of the Visual and Performing Arts in Colombo had already suspended on-site activity for the same reason, and at the University of Colombo, where more than seventy students had fallen ill since May, several faculties shifted to online or hybrid teaching. The University Grants Commission announced it would issue new dengue guidelines for institutions across the island. By 12 July, the National Dengue Control Unit had recorded more than 68,000 dengue cases for 2026 and 47 deaths, a case-fatality rate of roughly 0.07 percent. June alone produced about 21,500 infections, the worst month of the year, and the first eleven days of July added nearly 12,700 more — around 1,150 a day, compared with about 720 in June. At that rate, July will pass June to become the outbreak's worst month. Five of the dead were children under five, and officials noted that mortality was running higher among women. More than half of all cases, 52.5 percent, by the Health Ministry's count, came from the Western Province, with Colombo and Gampaha districts alone making up about a fifth of the national total. Health officials concede that 2026 is on course to rival or exceed the 2019 epidemic, when more than 105,000 cases were recorded nationwide, and clinicians warn that the strain dominant this year, DENV-2, carries a heightened risk of severe illness for those infected a second time. In the hospitals, the strain was plainly visible. At Peradeniya, patients lay in corridors. At Kandy General, a physician described occupancy at three times capacity, with two patients to a bed and others on the floor. At Ragama, the platelet count at which patients are admitted was quietly lowered, sending home people who would have been kept in a month earlier and leaving them to monitor their own blood counts. Daily admissions, which had hovered around 750, climbed to between 950 and 1,000\. To map the danger, the authorities turned much of the island into a patchwork of "high-risk" zones: by late June the NDCU had flagged more than 300 Medical Officer of Health divisions and 538 Grama Niladhari divisions across fourteen districts, and the Health Ministry launched a "special" drive across twenty-three high-risk areas in the Western Province. Yet residents in many of these zones describe the same short-lived rhythm they have watched for years — a burst of fogging and clean-up when the cameras arrive, and silence once the attention moves on. ### **A quiet North, and how fast it turns** The North presents a different picture. As of early July the Northern Province had recorded fewer than 1,000 dengue cases — about 1.6 percent of the national total — with Jaffna accounting for more than 700 of them, outnumbering Vavuniya, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu combined. On paper that makes the North one of the least affected regions in the country this year. Health officials are not treating it as one. Jaffna sits among the districts marked for intensified surveillance, and the reason is recent memory. In November 2019 the district recorded 2,641 cases in a single month, five times the figure of the year before; tuition centres closed by the dozen, and Jaffna Teaching Hospital was so overrun that surgical wards were turned over to dengue patients. The municipal council had exhausted its stock of fogging chemicals and could not have it replaced in time, while hospital officials accused the municipality of acting too slowly. That collapse took only weeks to arrive, which is why a quiet July on the peninsula reassures no one who lived through it. A physician who spoke to the Monitor put it plainly: a low count today is no guarantee against a surge tomorrow. ### **A crisis foreseen** None of this was unforeseeable. Health officials have pointed, fairly, to the debris of Cyclone Ditwah — the storm that killed more than 600 people in late November and left waterlogged wreckage across all twenty-five districts, from discarded tyres to blocked drains to abandoned construction, ideal nurseries for Aedes aegypti as the southwest monsoon arrived. But the storm's aftermath was known in December. Entomological indices were climbing in January and February. Public health specialists say the months immediately after Cyclone Ditwah offered the best opportunity to remove mosquito breeding sites before the southwest monsoon accelerated transmission. Instead, the large-scale national response did not begin until 22 June, after cases had already surged. The response has also been undercut from within. In late June, at the peak of the surge, Grama Niladhari trade unions — the village-level officers who identify breeding sites, run inspections, and carry health messages into households — withdrew from field duties and warned they might abandon dengue work entirely, over a grievance as basic as an unpaid fuel allowance for official travel. "We are only asking for the basic facilities required to carry out these duties," the unions' national organiser, Buddhika Rangana, told reporters. "We need fuel allowances to continue dengue activities." Entomologists have long questioned the government's heavy reliance on fogging. They say the method kills only adult mosquitoes, leaving larvae in stagnant water untouched. Over time, they warn, excessive use can also make mosquitoes less susceptible to insecticides. ### **How other cities hold the line** Unlike many infectious diseases, dengue prevention depends less on sophisticated medical technology than on sustained mosquito control. The mosquito that spreads the virus breeds in stagnant water found in everyday places — uncovered water containers, blocked drains, roof gutters, discarded tyres and construction sites. Health officials have long said that removing those breeding sites is the most effective way to prevent outbreaks before they begin. The clearest recent example in South Asia is Delhi. When the Aam Aadmi Party took office in 2015, the capital recorded 15,867 cases of dengue and chikungunya combined. By 2018 the dengue count had fallen below 2,800, and in 2025 Delhi reported roughly 1,400 dengue cases and a handful of deaths. The method was neither costly nor sophisticated. Its centrepiece was a weekly civic ritual — "10 Hafte, 10 Baje, 10 Minute," or ten weeks, ten o'clock, ten minutes — in which residents were asked every Sunday morning to spend ten minutes emptying standing water from their own homes, then to telephone ten others to do the same. Around it the city layered thousands of domestic breeding checkers going door to door, tens of thousands of legal notices against premises where larvae were found, pre-monsoon fogging, fever clinics, and saturation publicity. No city has eliminated dengue, and Delhi still suffers bad years — but it converted an annual crisis into a managed, low-level threat. The insight is simple: a mobilised public, backed by enforcement, is the only inspection force large enough to find every bottle-cap of water in a city. Singapore has pursued the same logic for half a century, and further. In the 1960s, nearly half its premises harboured mosquito larvae; through relentless source reduction, public education, and a legal regime that fines households and construction sites where breeding is found, it drove that share to around one percent. Its National Environment Agency treats dengue as an environmental and governance problem, running a dense, year-round surveillance grid of tens of thousands of "Gravitraps" that reveal where mosquito numbers are rising before the cases do, then concentrating control exactly where the data points. On that foundation it has built Project Wolbachia, releasing male mosquitoes carrying a bacterium that renders their offspring non-viable; the programme has cut Aedes aegypti populations by 80 to 90 percent and dengue risk by more than 70 percent in treated areas, reaching some 740,000 households by early 2026 with a target of covering half the country by year's end. In 2025 Singapore recorded 4,036 dengue cases — its lowest tally since 2018. ### **A toolbox left on the shelf** Sri Lanka is no stranger to these methods. It has run a National Dengue Control Unit for years, with detailed risk maps and trained public health inspectors. It even piloted Wolbachia: in partnership with the World Mosquito Program, Monash University, and the Australian government, specially bred mosquitoes were released from around 2020 across Colombo North and Nugegoda, covering some 240,000 residents, with results officials themselves called encouraging. Six years on, that pilot has not been scaled. The National Dengue Control Programme is only now seeking a plot of Colombo municipal land on which to build the country's first local Wolbachia breeding facility, the eggs having until now been imported from Australia, while expansion to the rest of the Western Province has got no further than a recommendation awaiting sign-off. A dengue vaccine already in use in more than forty countries remains, in the authorities' own word, under "discussion." Sri Lanka's problem is not a lack of understanding about dengue. Public health officials have spent decades fighting the disease and know what works. The challenge lies in carrying out those measures consistently across the country. Public Health Inspectors, who are responsible for identifying mosquito breeding sites and ensuring they are removed, have long complained that their numbers are insufficient to cover every community effectively. The health sector has also been struggling with broader pressures. Thousands of doctors and nurses have left the country in recent years, while hospitals have faced shortages of medicines and other essential supplies following Sri Lanka's economic crisis. Public health experts say such constraints make it harder to sustain year-round dengue prevention, leaving authorities to intensify their efforts only after cases begin to rise. ### Ketheshwaran Loganathan: The Tamil Nationalist the LTTE Could Not Tolerate URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/ketheshwaran-loganathan-the-tamil-nationalist-the-ltte-could-not-tolerate/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T03:56:17.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Every night before sleeping, he devoured pages from the Bhagavad Gita authored by Swami Chinmayananda. It was the last thing Ketheshwaran Loganathan read before he was shot dead by a Tamil Tiger on the morning of August 12, 2006. August 2026 would mark the 20th anniversary of one of the most despicable killings during Sri Lanka’s long-drawn war. I have met Kethesh, as he was widely known, many times – in Colombo, Chennai, and New Delhi. Most of our meetings took place when he was with the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). In our discussions, Kethesh emerged as a fierce Tamil nationalist but one who believed that all communities in Sri Lanka – Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims – can and should live together, notwithstanding their differences. Kethesh felt at home in the EPRLF because he believed that the group led by K. Pathmanabha stood for similar goals, although it was committed to the establishment of a Tamil Eelam homeland at one point. His distaste for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) developed early on. This was cemented by the LTTE’s murderous onslaughts on other Tamil groups, including the EPRLF, a frenzy which left hundreds of young Tamils dead. One day, seated in a hostel room at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, Kethesh told me animatedly that the LTTE had dubious links with Western powers, in particular the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He offered no evidence to back his claim. But looking back at the way the LTTE bought and shipped weapons and explosives from around the world with seeming ease for long years, I do wonder if Kethesh knew more than what he said. Kethesh, to the best of my knowledge, never wielded a weapon. He probably disliked weapons. He certainly hated needless violence but admired Che Guevara and his brand of revolution. No, he was no coward or an armchair intellectual. Had he been one, he would never have thrown in his lot with the EPRLF in the first place. His father was a highly successful banker. If Kethesh had wanted to, he could have lived a comfortable life, either in Sri Lanka or abroad. Born in Jaffna, the Tamil heartland, Kethesh's pursuit of higher studies and scholarship took him to many places, including Colombo, Madras, the United States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Norway. But his heart always beat for Jaffna, the Tamil community, and Sri Lanka. Yes, Sri Lanka too. Which is why a section of Sinhalese-Buddhists – the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) of the earlier era included – hit below the belt when they taunted Kethesh as a covert Tiger sympathiser even after he joined the government’s peace secretariat. It was this attitude – if you are a Tamil, you must be a Tiger – that gave implicit legitimacy to the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam. No wonder the LTTE prospered for decades. I was not surprised when he quit the EPRLF in 1994, four years after LTTE gunmen massacred Pathmanabha and fellow leaders in Chennai. Like most others, Kethesh enjoyed a cosy and warm relationship with the soft-spoken Pathmanabha. The latter’s death deprived Kethesh of the crutch that kept him in the EPRLF despite many ups and downs. Indeed, after Pathmanabha’s killing, it was Kethesh who, then in Delhi, contacted a wide spectrum of Indian leaders, Rajiv Gandhi included, to seek condolence messages for the ERPLF leader. With his command of Tamil and English, he undertook his earlier role as the EPRLF spokesperson with a certain expertise. But he did not take up any post when the EPRLF formed an administration in Sri Lanka’s northeast after India had deployed its military in the region and waged war against the LTTE. He was respected for his knowledge. When LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran and others came to the Madras airport to see off their delegates to Thimpu in 1985, the Tiger boss turned to Lawrence Thilakar (one of the two LTTE representatives to Bhutan) and said: “When in doubt, take advice from Anne.” The ‘Anne’ was a reference to Kethesh, who incidentally opened the talks with the Sri Lankan government at Thimpu on behalf of the Tamil side despite the presence of the veteran Appapillai Amirthalingam. From the EPRLF, Kethesh graduated to an independent political life, which initially took him abroad and then brought him back to Sri Lanka, where he plunged into writing. Towards what turned out to be the last years of his life, he became a Director at the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) in Colombo. Reams have been written on why he left the CPA in 2006 and became a Deputy Secretary General in the Sri Lankan government’s Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP). Apparently, Kethesh had wanted to sign up with the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies. That is when President Mahinda Rajapaksa, probably eager to have a Tamil face in the Secretariat, wooed Kethesh. Anyone who even remotely believes that Kethesh sold his soul to the Sri Lankan establishment by joining the Secretariat is foolishly off the mark. If this allegation were to be true, then the LTTE must be dubbed the biggest agent of Colombo for accepting money, weapons, and more—in plenty—from President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Kethesh may have thought that, by playing a role in the government Secretariat, he might be able to somehow influence the limping peace process, with which he was not happy. At worst, he was naïve to believe so. For this, he paid with his life. The LTTE gunman who fired several shots at Kethesh after calling him out of his residence in Dehiwala, Colombo, would have been told by his trainers that this bespectacled, skinny man was a traitor to Tamil Eelam. He had to go. Was it a coincidence that Kethesh was assassinated exactly a year after a LTTE sniper took out Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, another Tamil? It is true that the LTTE did not take responsibility after Kethesh lost his life. But the Tigers also did not claim to have killed Rajiv Gandhi or Kadirgamar. It was their style. However, pro-LTTE commentators showed where they stood on the murder. Days later, one Tiger propagandist described Kethesh as “a loose cannon”, “a bundle of contradictions,” and “an unabashed chameleon careerist”. Those who counted themselves on the side of the LTTE dubbed him a “traitor”. Away from politics and ethnicity, Kethesh led a simple life. He had few wants. He was a voracious reader, like his wife, Bhavani, who was two years older than him. Only ten days before he was killed, he expressed a fear to Bhavani. With his many ailments, how would he manage if she died before him? After all, he suffered from failing hearing, weak eyesight, and irritable bowel syndrome, which had never spared him since childhood. He often fell ill. By gunning him down, the LTTE resolved the worry he had. Those who ordered his cowardly killing did not realise that karma never spares anyone. Those who heap violence on others will die violently one day. This is true for everyone in the world, the LTTE included. ### Police Assure Tamil Journalist They Will No Longer Demand Confidential Sources URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/police-assure-tamil-journalist-they-will-no-longer-demand-confidential-sources/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T03:11:07.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lankan police have assured a Tamil journalist that officers will no longer ask reporters to disclose their confidential sources after the country's largest journalists' union raised the issue with the Inspector General of Police, the journalist said. The assurance was given on Sunday to Murukaiya Thamilselvan, a Kilinochchi-based journalist, during a meeting at the office of an Assistant Superintendent of Police in Jaffna. Officers there recorded a detailed statement from him concerning a dispute that began after he published surveillance footage from the Jaffna Teaching Hospital. Mr. Thamilselvan said officers told him they would inform both the Police Headquarters in Colombo and the Jaffna Police Station that journalists should not be asked to reveal confidential sources in future investigations. He also said the officers agreed that compelling journalists to identify their sources was inappropriate and conducted the meeting in a professional and courteous manner. The police have not publicly confirmed Mr. Thamilselvan's account. [The dispute](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-journalist-alleges-police-pressure-to-reveal-confidential-source/) began on April 20, when Mr. Thamilselvan published CCTV footage on Facebook showing an altercation at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital involving a medical specialist and a hospital security officer. The video circulated widely on social media and drew significant public attention. Dr. Sellakkuddy Selvaganesh, a plastic surgeon at the hospital, subsequently lodged a complaint with the Jaffna Police, requesting that investigators determine how Mr. Thamilselvan had obtained the footage. Mr. Thamilselvan was summoned to the Jaffna Police Station on May 24\. He said investigators repeatedly asked him to identify the source of the video, but he refused, arguing that journalistic ethics required him to protect confidential sources. Instead, he urged police to investigate the authenticity of the footage itself rather than its origin. He said the complaint was the third occasion on which he had faced pressure to reveal a source. The case was later taken up by the Sri Lanka Working Journalists Association, which met with Inspector General of Police Priyantha Weerasooriya in Colombo and formally protested police attempts to compel journalists to disclose their confidential sources. The association urged the police to end the practice. According to Mr. Thamilselvan, Sunday’s meeting took place after the Inspector General instructed the senior officer responsible for the Jaffna Police Division to review the matter. Sri Lanka has no comprehensive legal shield protecting journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources, despite longstanding calls by press-freedom organizations for stronger legal safeguards. Media rights groups have also expressed concern that the Online Safety Act, which grants authorities broad powers to investigate certain categories of online speech, could further discourage investigative reporting. Sri Lanka ranked 134th out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders, improving five places from the previous year but remaining in the organization’s “difficult” category for press freedom. ### Prime Minister Says Sri Lanka to Review 65,000 Acres in Trincomalee URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/prime-minister-says-sri-lanka-to-review-65-000-acres-in-trincomalee/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T17:11:49.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka's government is reviewing tens of thousands of acres of protected land in the eastern district of Trincomalee with the aim of returning land, or providing alternative plots, to people who lived there before 1985, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya told Parliament on Wednesday. Responding to questions from Kugathasan, an opposition lawmaker representing Trincomalee District from the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), Ms. Amarasuriya said the initiative forms part of a permanent land administration programme covering former protected areas that are now under the jurisdiction of the Department of Forest Conservation and the Department of Wildlife Conservation. The programme includes approximately 33,563 acres administered by the Forest Department and 31,627 acres administered by the Wildlife Department. Areas under review include the Navy headquarters area, Periya Sober, Siriya Sober, Seruvila Allai, Trikonamadu and Puraath Theevu. Ms. Amarasuriya said the government was examining those areas to determine whether lands occupied by residents before 1985 could be released or whether affected families should instead receive alternative land. The Prime Minister also outlined plans to restore abandoned irrigation infrastructure in Trincomalee District to boost agricultural production. According to government data from 2021, 210 irrigation tanks in the district had fallen into disuse. Of those, 15 have been rehabilitated, while work remains on the remaining 195\. Of 25 abandoned dams, eight have been restored, with 17 still awaiting rehabilitation. She said the restoration programme had been delayed because lands controlled by the Forest and Wildlife Departments had not yet been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Development and because funding had been insufficient. The relevant Divisional Secretariats are now taking steps to release the 195 irrigation tanks and 17 dams that have remained inaccessible to farmers because they lie within the boundaries of protected forest and wildlife areas, she said. Ms. Amarasuriya said the broader land-release programme was also being implemented in the districts of Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, Batticaloa and Anuradhapura. Lands released under the programme would be rehabilitated through the agriculture and agrarian development authorities before being allocated to farmers for paddy cultivation. The government expects the initiative to increase Sri Lanka's domestic rice production, she said. ### Nishan Canagarajah, Jaffna-Born Scholar, Is Knighted at Windsor Castle URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/nishan-canagarajah-jaffna-born-scholar-is-knighted-at-windsor-castle/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T03:29:42.000Z More than four decades after he left a war-shadowed Jaffna on a scholarship, Professor Nishan Canagarajah knelt before King Charles III at Windsor Castle on Tuesday and rose a knight. During the investiture ceremony in Berkshire, the British monarch touched the shoulders of the kneeling academic with a sword to formally confer the honour of Knight Bachelor. Sir Nishan, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leicester, was named in the 2026 King's New Year Honors for his "inestimable contribution to higher education," with particular recognition for his work championing diversity and inclusion. He was accompanied at the ceremony by his wife, Thabitha, and their children Aarabi, Sujan, and Dheeran. "I am deeply honoured and grateful to receive this award from King Charles," Sir Nishan said afterward. "As a boy from the once war-torn land of Sri Lanka, to being recognised by royalty is quite a remarkable journey. It is because of the transformative power of education and the opportunities it presents that this has been possible." That journey began far from the ceremonial grandeur of Windsor. Growing up in Jaffna, Sir Nishan lived in rented homes his family moved between every few years. Both his parents were teachers, but money was scarce. In an interview with [*Jaffna Monitor*](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/grasp-every-opportunity-dont-be-afraid-sir-nishan-canagarajah/), his first since the knighthood was announced, he recalled a childhood shaped by want. "Even something as simple as playing football could become a challenge — I did not always have the money to buy boots and often had to borrow them from other players," he said. "There were times when we went to school without food, simply because finances were stretched." The hardest years, he said, fell between the ages of 12 and 15\. His father died when Sir Nishan was 15; the schoolboy spent three nights at his father's bedside in Jaffna Hospital before he passed away on the third. Only later did the family learn how many debts had accumulated over the years. He came of age as Jaffna burned — from the destruction of its public library to the violence of 1983 — and watched classmates and seniors choose the path of armed struggle. Many did not return. "Many of my friends joined the armed groups, and tragically, many of them lost their lives," he said. "On the one hand, you saw friends and people around you taking up arms, and I often asked myself whether I was being selfish by not doing the same." He chose education instead, a decision he described as a "constant moral dilemma" for which, even now, he does not claim a clear answer. The turning point came after his A-Levels, when his school principal nominated him for a scholarship established to support students from the North in the aftermath of the 1983 riots. Selected after an interview with a panel of professors from Colombo, he took up a place at Christ's College, Cambridge — the first in his school batch to graduate from any university. From that opening, Sir Nishan built a career in engineering research and university leadership across Bristol, Birmingham, and, since 2019, Leicester. His central conviction, he said, was forged in Jaffna. "The real problem we face globally is not a lack of talent, but a lack of opportunity," he said. "It does not matter whether you are a migrant or a native — if you are given the opportunity, you can achieve remarkable things." His rise carries particular weight in British higher education. Sir Nishan is the first minority ethnic vice-chancellor at Leicester — a university in what is often described as the United Kingdom's first majority-minority city. Under his leadership, the institution has become one of the country's most diverse, with roughly 69 percent of its students drawn from minority ethnic backgrounds and 38 percent from highly disadvantaged areas. He has directed much of his energy toward opening doors he once needed opened for himself, from literacy programmes for Afghan refugee women in Leicester to research partnerships in Sri Lanka. In 2023, he opened a Centre for Digital Epidemiology at the University of Jaffna, now linked with universities in Britain. Asked what single lesson he would offer a young person in Jaffna studying for O-Levels or A-Levels, Sir Nishan did not hesitate. "Grasp every opportunity, because you never know where it might take you," he said. "Don't be afraid. You never know what you can achieve." When the honour was announced, he marked it not with dignitaries but with about forty friends — many of them Sri Lankans he had gone to school with in Jaffna. ### "I Can't Sit With This Guy": Gajendrakumar Complains to Speaker About Archchuna URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/i-cant-sit-with-this-guy-gajendrakumar-complains-to-speaker-about-archchuna/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T12:54:31.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka's Parliament has weathered no-confidence motions, a sovereign default, and, on one notorious day in 2018, chairs and chili powder flung across the chamber floor. This week, the latest parliamentary battle was over who should sit next to whom. Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, leader of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, has formally petitioned the Speaker to move the seat of Archchuna Ramanathan, the independent lawmaker immediately to his left, after accusing him of repeated abuse and threats — reducing one of Sri Lanka's most public political rivalries to a dispute over who sits next to whom. In a letter to the Speaker, Mr. Ponnambalam wrote that Mr. Ramanathan had “constantly” abused him, threatened violence, and used derogatory language — at District Coordinating Committee meetings and, in the modern manner, on social media. The conduct had deteriorated, he wrote, to the point where sharing a bench had become “impossible” and was distracting him from his parliamentary duties. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/the-letetr.jpg) The Letter Mr. Ponnambalam, whose party carries a long lineage in Tamil nationalist politics, also raised a question of protocol. Mr. Ramanathan, a medical doctor elected as an independent in 2024, is a first-term member, and such lawmakers, the letter noted, are ordinarily seated after the leaders and senior members of recognised parties. Instead, he complained, this one had been “allowed to sit between recognised political party leaders and senior members” — an affront, in his telling, to the natural order of the chamber. There is a certain symmetry to the grievance. Mr. Ramanathan’s own parliamentary career opened with a seating controversy: on his first day in the House, in November 2024, he installed himself in the chair reserved for the Leader of the Opposition and declined to vacate it, obliging Sajith Premadasa, the actual opposition leader, to perch in the corner of the row. He has since asked the Speaker, on his own account, to reassign his seat. The two Jaffna politicians have carried their rivalry well beyond the chamber. At a recent District Coordinating Committee meeting in Tellippalai, Mr. Ramanathan called Mr. Ponnambalam a “dog,” among other epithets, and the pair have traded accusations on social media and at public events for months. The Speaker’s Office has not responded publicly to either man’s request — leaving the two lawmakers, for now, exactly where they started: side by side. ### Tamil Lawmaker Demands Timeline for Return of Military-Held Land URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-lawmaker-demands-timeline-for-return-of-military-held-land/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T01:10:40.000Z Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, the parliamentary group leader of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), called on Sri Lanka's government to disclose to Parliament how much civilian land remains under military control in the country's north and east, saying the administration had been too slow to fulfill its election pledge to return the land and reduce the military's presence in the region. Seventeen years after the end of Sri Lanka's civil war, Mr. Rasamanickam said, the continued occupation of private and state land was preventing displaced families from returning home, delaying the restoration of civilian administration, and hampering reconciliation between the island's Tamil-majority north and east and the Sinhalese-majority south. “While the armed conflict ended seventeen years ago, the ethnic conflict remains unresolved,” Mr. Rasamanickam said, arguing that the military’s continued presence in civilian areas did nothing to address it. He said he had asked the government — through the Ministerial Consultative Committee on Defence, which is chaired by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake in his capacity as defence minister — to disclose the total extent of private and state land held by the armed forces in each district of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, how much had been released since the administration took office, and a timetable for returning the rest. The National People’s Power, the leftist coalition that swept to power in 2024, pledged during its campaign to expedite land releases and resettle displaced communities, and Mr. Dissanayake has said publicly that the land rightfully belongs to the people. Progress, Mr. Rasamanickam said, has not matched that promise. He welcomed the recent handover of two military camps in Batticaloa, in the east, but said the overall pace of releases remained far too slow. Among the cases he cited were about 556 acres near Myliddy Harbour belonging to roughly 700 families; a further 556 acres in the Palaly area belonging to about 300 families; and 59.5 acres in Keppapilavu, in Mullaitivu District. In Valikamam North, he said, sixteen Grama Niladhari divisions have not been fully released, and three remain entirely closed to their original owners. He disputed the government’s account of Keppapilavu, where officials have said displaced residents were given alternative land. Only 44 families had been allocated temporary plots at Seniyarmottai, Mr. Rasamanickam said, and land belonging to a Hindu cemetery at Kurumbaichitty had still not been returned. Also occupied, according to his statement, were land needed to expand the Karaichchi public library and the Iranamadu Agricultural Research Institute, along with churches, a Hindu temple, and two schools in Jaffna District that residents have been unable to access. The land question has become a recurring flashpoint. Peaceful protests have continued for months across the region — in Palaly, Myliddy and Keppapilavu, among other places. Mr. Rasamanickam noted that voters backed the governing party in the elections largely because of its promise to return their land. There was no immediate response from the Defence Ministry to Mr. Rasamanickam’s demands. The ministry said this month that the National Security Council would finalise the release of military-held land in Jaffna and the Palaly cantonment following a high-level meeting in Parliament. The war, which pitted government forces against the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, ended in 2009 after more than a quarter-century of fighting. Successive governments have released tens of thousands of acres in stages, but large tracts — much of it around the sprawling Palaly cantonment on the Jaffna Peninsula, the military’s principal base in the north — remain under army, navy and air force control, an enduring grievance for Tamil families barred from their homes, farms, temples and churches since the 1990s. “The affected communities have waited for seventeen years,” Mr. Rasamanickam said, referring to the period since the end of Sri Lanka's civil war. “They should not be made to wait any longer.” ### Archchuna Joins Opposition in Black-Armband Protest Over Negombo Prison Deaths URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/archchuna-joins-opposition-in-black-armband-protest-over-negombo-prison-deaths/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T11:13:27.000Z **COLOMBO —** Independent Jaffna District lawmaker Archchuna Ramanathan wore a black armband in Parliament on Wednesday in protest over the deadly violence at Negombo Prison, joining members of the opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya in demanding that the government accept responsibility for the deaths. Opposition lawmakers, including Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa, entered the parliamentary chamber wearing black armbands during Wednesday's sitting. Several other legislators also attended dressed in black. SJB lawmakers said the symbolic protest was intended to hold the government accountable for all those who died in the Negombo Prison incident. Mr. Ramanathan, who sits as an independent member representing Jaffna District, also wore a black armband during the session. Members of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) and lawmakers from other parties did not participate in the protest by wearing black armbands. ### Families of the Disappeared to Convene in Jaffna, Renewing Calls for International Justice URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/families-of-the-disappeared-to-convene-in-jaffna-renewing-calls-for-international-justice/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T13:29:11.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Families of Sri Lankan Tamils who vanished during decades of political violence said they would convene an international conference in Jaffna on Aug. 30, renewing their demand for international accountability and rejecting the government's efforts to address the issue through domestic mechanisms. The gathering will mark the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Organized by associations of relatives from the Northern and Eastern Provinces, it is expected to draw victims’ families, civil society groups, university students, political representatives, and members of the public, the organizers said at a news conference at the Jaffna Media Centre. The conference, the organizers said, would press the case for international justice, contending that successive Sri Lankan governments had failed to investigate enforced disappearances credibly despite decades of promises. Tamil men and women, they said, had been abducted, detained, and disappeared by state security forces and allied paramilitary groups in the country’s north and east, and elsewhere on the island. “The government has remained silent for decades about what happened to the disappeared and who should be held accountable,” the associations’ representatives said, accusing a succession of administrations of mounting inquiries that produced no meaningful justice. The families were especially critical of the governing National People’s Power, which they said had recast enforced disappearances as a shared national tragedy afflicting Sinhalese families in the south as much as Tamil families in the north and east. The issue, they said, could not be settled through compensation, government jobs, or the issuance of death certificates. Their demand was unchanged: to learn what had become of their relatives, and to hold those responsible to account. They also accused the government of using discoveries such as the mass graves at Chemmani, where investigators have resumed excavations in recent months to identify remains believed to date from the war, to nudge families toward accepting compensation. More than 400 parents who took part in years of roadside protests have died without learning the fate of their children, the associations said, warning that the campaign was losing its elderly leaders with each passing year. The organizers urged political parties, civil society groups, students, and the public to attend, regardless of political affiliation. Enforced disappearances remain among the most contentious legacies of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and its southern insurrections. Human rights groups estimate that tens of thousands of people vanished across different periods of violence, including the civil war between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the two uprisings led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. Successive governments have appointed commissions of inquiry and created bodies such as the Office on Missing Persons, but many families say those mechanisms have failed to establish the truth or deliver accountability. ### Minister Concedes Environmental Lapses in Mining as ITAK Leader Presses for Permit Cancellations URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/minister-concedes-environmental-lapses-in-mining-as-itak-leader-presses-for-permit-cancellations/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T11:52:33.000Z **COLOMBO —** The minister responsible for Sri Lanka’s mining sector conceded in Parliament that mineral-extraction projects had gone ahead without any environmental assessment, that companies had profited by trading and transferring their licenses, and that the country had no plan to add value to the raw minerals it exports — admissions a Tamil opposition leader said should force the cancellation of every permit issued under those conditions. The concessions by Sunil Handunnetti, the Minister of Industry and Entrepreneurship Development, whose portfolio includes the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau (GSMB), came in response to sustained questioning from Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, the Batticaloa lawmaker who leads the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) in the House. The exchange followed a recent conference on mineral resources and gemstone mining that the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce organised in Colombo and that Mr. Handunnetti attended. Mr. Rasamanickam anchored his argument in the Supreme Court’s ruling in SCFR Application No. 137/2017, which held that the bureau’s treatment of license applicants must conform to the guarantee of equal treatment under Article 12 of the Constitution. The court found the GSMB’s unsolicited, “first-come, first-served” system for granting exploration licences to be unconstitutional, and the permits issued under it remain suspended pending review. Licences, Mr. Rasamanickam noted, had been granted for terms of 15 to 20 years. Responding on the floor, Mr. Handunnetti acknowledged that no Initial Environmental Examinations (IEE) or Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) had been carried out for the projects at issue, calling the omission a serious shortcoming. He said a list of the companies involved was available and would be tabled in the House. He confirmed that firms had earned substantial profits by trading and transferring their permits — validating long-standing concerns about how the licences have been used — and agreed that Sri Lanka had no comprehensive policy to add value to its mineral wealth, leaving the country exposed to exporting raw minerals while absorbing the irreversible costs of extraction. If the government accepted those admissions, Mr. Rasamanickam argued, every mining permit issued without proper environmental approval should be cancelled and put through a fresh, lawful approval process. He called for the entire licensing framework to be reviewed against the court’s ruling, for IEE and EIA procedures to be made mandatory before any extraction is approved, and for a national policy on value addition. Indiscriminate mining, he warned, depletes mineral deposits and groundwater alike — resources that cannot be replenished once exhausted. The bureau, Mr. Rasamanickam said, was now preparing to issue extraction permits on the basis of mineral surveys conducted earlier across the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Provinces. He singled out the eastern coastal areas of Thirukkovil, in Ampara District, and Vakarai, in Batticaloa District, where he said such activity posed a serious threat. Both lie on a Tamil-majority stretch of coast rich in mineral sands; Vakarai has seen repeated community protests in recent years against ilmenite mining and the acquisition of land. The lawmaker also levelled a series of allegations specific to Batticaloa. He said that during a presidential visit to the district, complaints had been made that a district engineer collected 50,000 rupees from each permit holder, purportedly to raise funds for diabetes patients. Permits in Batticaloa, he alleged, could not be obtained directly from the GSMB engineer but only through intermediaries or brokers. He added that requests submitted by the Valaichenai and Aaraiyampathy Pradeshiya Sabhas remained pending while similar applications from private companies had already been approved. He urged the government not to post to Batticaloa a GSMB official previously rejected by the Hambantota District Coordinating Committee, and to appoint an impartial engineer instead. Citing the minister’s own remarks, Mr. Rasamanickam said Mr. Handunnetti had described all 25 engineers attached to the bureau as touched by corruption. Transferring engineers between districts, the MP argued, would merely relocate the problem; what was required was structural and institutional reform of the GSMB itself. In reply, Mr. Handunnetti said he agreed with the concerns raised. He told the House that all permits issued to date were under review by a special committee and that action would follow its recommendations. The GSMB, which regulates mining under the Mines and Minerals Act of 1992, was moved from the Ministry of Environment to the industries portfolio — a shift welcomed by mining investors and criticised by conservationists who saw the bureau’s environmental brief diluted. Over roughly three decades it has issued hundreds of exploration licences — 471 by one recent tally — without a single one resulting in a working mine, according to environmental campaigners who have opposed the sector’s expansion along the eastern and southern coasts. Concluding, Mr. Rasamanickam pressed the government to cancel all permits issued without environmental scrutiny, overhaul the licensing framework in line with the Supreme Court judgment, make IEE and EIA assessments mandatory, adopt a national value-addition policy, and reform the bureau to restore public confidence. ### Tamil Lawmaker Accuses Sri Lankan Governments of Double Standards Over Prison Killings URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-lawmaker-accuses-sri-lankan-governments-of-double-standards-over-prison-killings/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T11:17:13.000Z **COLOMBO —** A Tamil opposition lawmaker on Tuesday accused successive Sri Lankan governments of applying double standards to prison violence, saying that past massacres of Tamil political prisoners had never been fully investigated, while lawmakers now demanded accountability for the recent killings at Negombo Prison. P. Sathiyalingam, a member of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), made the remarks during a parliamentary debate, where he expressed condolences to the families of the prison officers and inmates killed in last week's violence at Negombo Prison. Referring to earlier incidents involving Tamil detainees, Mr. Sathiyalingam said the country had yet to answer longstanding questions surrounding the deaths of dozens of Tamil political prisoners. He cited the killing of 53 Tamil political prisoners at Welikada Prison during the anti-Tamil violence of July 1983, the deaths of three Tamil political prisoners at Kalutara Prison on Dec. 12, 1997, and the killing of 27 Tamil detainees at the Bindunuwewa detention centre in 2000. "Today, everyone in this House is speaking about the killings at Negombo and asking who should be held responsible," he said. "But no answers have ever been given about the massacres that took place 43 years ago. Who committed those killings? Were they identified? Were they punished? Or were measures taken to ensure that such incidents would never happen again?" Mr. Sathiyalingam said those who had failed to act after the killings of Tamil political prisoners at Welikada Prison were now calling for action over the Negombo violence. "At least now, this government must take the necessary steps to ensure that prisoners are never massacred again," he said. He ended with a reference familiar to many Tamil speakers, quoting a line popularized by the comedian Vadivelu: "When it happens to me, it's blood; when it happens to you, it's tomato chutney" — a comic expression commonly invoked to criticize hypocrisy and selective outrage. ### Who Speaks for Tamil Catholics? Jaffna's New Bishop Revives an Old Debate URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/who-speaks-for-tamil-catholics-jaffnas-new-bishop-revives-an-old-debate/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T00:17:31.000Z **JAFFNA —** The Diocese of Jaffna has a new bishop, and many within its clergy are questioning how he came to lead it. On June 29, Pope Leo XIV appointed Anton Ranjith Pillainayagam, until then the Auxiliary Bishop of Colombo and Apostolic Administrator of Batticaloa, as the next Bishop of Jaffna. Almost immediately, northern clergy noted another aspect of the appointment. Bishop Anton Ranjith is widely regarded as a close confidant of Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, the Archbishop of Colombo. Word of that connection spread quickly across the peninsula, deepening concerns that had little to do with his personal qualifications and much to do with what his appointment was seen to represent. On paper, nothing was irregular. The Vatican accepted Gnanapragasam’s resignation on grounds of age, moved a serving auxiliary bishop from the titular see of Materiana to a vacant diocese, and named the outgoing man Apostolic Administrator until his successor takes canonical possession. The Apostolic Nunciature announced it in three lines. Those three lines have reopened a wound the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka has never squarely confronted. Over the past week, in more than a dozen conversations with Jaffna Monitor, Catholic priests and lay parishioners — most speaking on condition of anonymity, citing the obedience their Church demands — described an appointment that has unsettled the clergy of the peninsula and revived an old question: who is entitled to speak for the Tamil Catholic, and to whom. None of them questioned the new bishop’s competence. “He is well educated, he is a good priest, he is more than capable,” one senior Jaffna priest said. “The question is not whether he is worthy. The question is why, in a diocese with a dozen able sons of its own soil, Rome had to fly a shepherd up from Colombo.” The unease is not universal. As the criticism spread, priests and prominent lay Catholics in both Jaffna and Colombo pushed back, some of them sharply, insisting that a papal appointment is a matter for faith and obedience, not grievance. ### **A Jaffna son, a Colombo career** ![Bishop Justin Bernard Gnanapragasam, right, with Bishop Anton Ranjith Pillainayagam, left, who was appointed by Pope Leo XIV as the new Bishop of the Diocese of Jaffna.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/who-speaks-for-tamil-catholics-UZ4d4E-kixz1rrpjlqwqus.png) Bishop Justin Bernard Gnanapragasam, right, with Bishop Anton Ranjith Pillainayagam, left, who was appointed by Pope Leo XIV as the new Bishop of the Diocese of Jaffna. Anton Ranjith is not, by any measure, a stranger to the north.He was born on Sept. 23, 1966\. In a 2020 interview with the Vatican-linked agency AsiaNews, given shortly after Pope Francis appointed him auxiliary bishop of Colombo, he said he was born in Karampon, a small island village off the Jaffna Peninsula that has produced several successive Bishops of Jaffna. He was baptised in Jaffna and belongs to Sri Lanka’s Tamil community. He has a twin brother. After his father’s death the family moved briefly to Colombo before returning north, where he attended St. Patrick’s College in Jaffna, one of the region’s most prominent Catholic schools and a training ground for much of its clergy and leadership. From there, his path diverged from the men who have led the diocese. By his own account, the then-Bishop of Jaffna refused him permission to attend university three times; rather than give up, he and four fellow seminarians left the Jaffna seminary and enrolled at the University of Jaffna, where he earned a degree in mathematics. When he was ordained a priest in September 2000, it was not for the Diocese of Jaffna. It was for the Archdiocese of Colombo. The rest of his career belonged to the capital. He served as vice-rector of St. Joseph’s College in Colombo, has directed the Tamil Theologate — the formation programme for Tamil-speaking priests — since 2009, and became Rector of St. Sebastian’s College, Moratuwa, in 2019\. In July 2020 Pope Francis made him the third Auxiliary Bishop of Colombo, under Cardinal Ranjith, who was his principal consecrator that August at St. Lucia’s Cathedral, with Gnanapragasam among the co-consecrators. He later took on the roles of Apostolic Administrator of Batticaloa and Secretary General of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Sri Lanka. ### **The Cardinal’s shadow** The sharper anxiety concerns the man the northern clergy believe put his name forward. Several priests told Jaffna Monitor they are convinced Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith advanced Anton Ranjith’s candidacy in Rome, using the access of a prelate who has spent decades inside the Vatican. Jaffna Monitor could not verify that, and no evidence was produced. Under Church law, appointments to dioceses are the prerogative of the Pope, who acts on confidential consultation gathered by the Apostolic Nuncio and the Vatican’s Dicastery for Bishops. The process is sealed. That makes the suspicion impossible to prove, and just as impossible to put to rest. Others say the charge misunderstands how bishops are chosen. The names that reach the Pope, they note, are shaped first not by any archbishop but by the Pope’s own ambassador in Colombo, the Apostolic Nuncio — currently Archbishop Andrzej Józwowicz, a Polish diplomat who presented his credentials only in April. It is the Nuncio who quietly canvasses bishops, priests, religious, and trusted lay Catholics, draws up a confidential list of three names with his own assessment, and sends it to the Dicastery for Bishops, which weighs it again before any name reaches the Pope. The consultation for Jaffna would have run largely over the past two years, a stretch in which the nunciature itself changed hands. To reduce all of that to a word from one cardinal, these Catholics say, is not only unprovable but an insult to the process and to the Holy See that runs it. His record alarms the north as much as his connections do. For much of his tenure, Malcolm Ranjith was among the most prominent Church voices against the international accountability that the Tamils have demanded for the mass killings at the end of the war. In 2012, when Bishop Rayappu Joseph of Mannar and other clergy petitioned the United Nations Human Rights Council for an international accountability mechanism, Ranjith declared that the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka rejected such moves, calling Western efforts “an insult on the intelligence of the people of Sri Lanka.” In 2013, he warned that “foreigners should not tell us what to do… we are not a pack of fools.” In 2014, when Catholic bishops raised the use of cluster munitions and chemical weapons against Tamil civilians with US officials, Ranjith said the Church in Sri Lanka did not support those allegations. He has defended the constitutional primacy of Buddhism, called the country “rooted in Sinhala Buddhist traditions,” and for years was closely identified with the Rajapaksa camp. Only after the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, which killed more than 250 people, many of them Catholics of his own archdiocese, did he become a fierce advocate of an international investigation — a reversal his critics have not let him forget. For the priests of Jaffna, that history is the point. “How can an associate of the cardinal who stood with the state during the war years, who denied our dead and called our demand for justice an insult, now carry our grievances to Rome and to the world?” one priest asked. Another framed it more soberly: a bishop formed entirely within the Colombo system, however sincere, may not instinctively grasp “the sensitivity of the Tamil problem” — the disappearances, the military-held land, the mass graves, and the annual remembrances, including for the war dead, in which northern priests have long and openly taken part. ### **The village that keeps producing bishops** The second complaint is quieter, and it points homeward: at the departing bishop and the ground he came from. Four men have led the Diocese of Jaffna since 1950: Jerome Emilianuspillai, its first native son; Jacob Bastiampillai Deogupillai; Thomas Savundaranayagam; and Gnanapragasam. That is the church record. What a section of the clergy say the mitre has a habit of returning to the same small, interrelated world off the Jaffna coast — to one village above all — arriving there through blood, familiarity, and a quiet word in Rome rather than the merit of the wider priesthood. The village is Karampon. Deogupillai, who took the diocese in 1972, was born there; so was Gnanapragasam, who took it in 2015\. Two bishops, four decades apart, from one settlement on Velanai island — a place so accustomed to sending its sons to the altar that the north calls it the “Little Vatican.” By the time Gnanapragasam was named, local papers counted seven bishops born there, along with a long line of priests and nuns. To the priests who raise it, that is the grievance: a diocese spread across the peninsula and its islands, led again and again out of one tight parish. And here the two complaints meet, because Anton Ranjith was born in Karampon too. **“Not my will, but yours”** To many Catholics, none of this amounts to the scandal its critics describe. Bishops, they point out, are routinely sent to dioceses where they have no roots; that is the norm, not the exception. They cite Oswald Gomis, born in Kelaniya near Colombo and an auxiliary bishop of the capital for 28 years, whom Pope John Paul II sent in 1996 to lead the Diocese of Anuradhapura, a see to which he had no prior tie, before he returned to Colombo as its archbishop. Set against that, they argue, a Karampon-born Tamil educated in Jaffna is a far less foreign choice than many appointments the Sri Lankan Church has accepted without a murmur. A candidate's hometown, one senior churchman familiar with the appointment process told *Jaffna Monitor*, is not a factor Rome considers. If several bishops have come from Karampon over the years, he said, it reflects the qualities of those individuals rather than the influence of the village itself. He added that new episcopal appointments in Sri Lanka almost invariably prompt objections, but such discontent usually subsides once the bishop begins his ministry. Nor, he said, does the Pope revisit an appointment after it has been made. "The Holy Father will not change it," he said. "That is not how the Church works." That argument has found blunt expression online. In a Facebook comment, Andrew Nishanthan, a consultant vascular and transplant surgeon, wrote that the appointment was the work of the Holy Father, not of local politics or anyone’s preference, and that to suggest the Pope had merely acted on a request was to undermine the authority of the Church itself. He admitted he had favoured other names, including priests who had served Jaffna with distinction, but said personal expectation could not override the Pope’s decision, echoing Christ’s words in Gethsemane, “Father, not my will, but yours be done,” and warning that a divided Church leaves everyone poorer. A longer reflection, circulated in Tamil under the name A. Arun, made the canonical case point by point. Citing the provision of Church law that reserves the appointment of bishops to the Pope, who freely appoints them or confirms those lawfully elected, it argued that the process — for all the human consultation it involves — is ultimately an act of spiritual discernment under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, not a contest won by influence. To call it lobbying, the writer said, misrepresents the faith, and invoked Catherine of Siena’s warning that to refuse obedience to the Pope is to refuse obedience to Christ. ### **The questions Rome has not answered** Set the personalities aside, and three structural questions remain — the ones that make this more than a parish quarrel. The first is transparency. Even as the universal Church talks of synodality and listening to local churches, the process behind this appointment is entirely closed. The Vatican’s notice records a resignation accepted and a successor named, with a short curriculum vitae. There is no indication, and no mechanism to show, that the survivors of the war or the clergy of the conflict zone were consulted about the man who will now shepherd them. The second is representation. The Sri Lankan Church is numerically dominated by Sinhalese Catholics, yet the regions the war devastated are Tamil. Priests in the north argue that bishops drawn from those communities are the surest guarantee that the national Church’s statements will reflect what is still lived on the ground: the militarisation, the seized land, the unrecovered dead. The third is the unfinished moral reckoning of the war. Independent inquiries and United Nations reports have documented grave violations by the state and by the LTTE alike, and the national Church leadership has never given a full account of its own conduct in those years. Until it does, every appointment to a Tamil see becomes a proxy contest over whether the Church will side with the demand for truth or with the preference for stability. One Jaffna priest reduced it to a sentence. “We do not say the new bishop is a bad man,” he said. “We ask one thing: will he stand with the mothers still searching for their disappeared children, or will he stand with the cardinal who stood with the state?” No communiqué will answer that. The months ahead will: whether Bishop Anton Ranjith takes his place among the families at the remembrance days and presses the north’s case in Rome, or governs as the careful, quiet administrator his admirers describe. For now, the diocese is receiving its new bishop and watching to see which way he turns. ### Sri Lanka Pushes House Arrest and Electronic Monitoring After Deadly Prison Riot URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-pushes-house-arrest-and-electronic-monitoring-after-deadly-prison-riot/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T10:57:32.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka's government will fast-track legislation to allow courts to place some suspects under house arrest with electronic monitoring instead of remanding them in overcrowded prisons, Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara said on Tuesday, presenting the proposal as part of a broader effort to address chronic congestion in the country's prison system following the deadly violence at Negombo Prison. Speaking in Parliament, Mr. Nanayakkara said Sri Lanka's prisons were operating far beyond their intended capacity, with facilities built for about 10,000 inmates now holding roughly 27,000\. About three-quarters of those in custody are remand prisoners awaiting trial rather than convicted offenders, he said. The proposed reforms would introduce house arrest and electronic tagging for eligible suspects, reducing the number of people held in pretrial detention while allowing authorities to monitor their movements. Electronic monitoring, typically through GPS-enabled ankle bracelets or radio-frequency devices, is widely used in several countries as an alternative to imprisonment for selected offenders. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and several European countries, including Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, use various forms of electronic monitoring for defendants awaiting trial, offenders serving community-based sentences, and prisoners nearing the end of their custodial terms. Research on the effectiveness of such programmes has produced mixed results. Criminal justice experts generally agree that electronic monitoring can reduce prison overcrowding, lower incarceration costs, and allow low-risk offenders to maintain employment and family responsibilities while awaiting trial or serving sentences. However, they caution that electronic monitoring alone does not prevent reoffending and is most effective when combined with judicial supervision, probation services, and clear eligibility criteria. The announcement came days after violence at Negombo Prison left seven prison officers and 19 inmates dead in one of the country's deadliest prison disturbances in recent years. Addressing Parliament, Mr. Nanayakkara said preliminary information suggested the violence may have begun with a clash between rival groups linked to the illegal drug trade, though he stressed that investigations remained ongoing and no final conclusions had been reached. According to the minister, an initial confrontation between inmates on July 5 left two prisoners dead and 35 injured before order was restored. Violence flared again the following morning, when inmates were being prepared for court appearances. He said investigators suspected the dispute may have involved inmates who had provided information to prison authorities about attempts to smuggle narcotics and other contraband into the prison, making them targets for organised criminal groups. Mr. Nanayakkara also alleged that a small organised group deliberately destroyed CCTV cameras and a body scanner during the unrest, apparently to disable security systems designed to detect contraband. He said several unarmed prison officers were killed while attempting to protect colleagues who had come under attack. Authorities are also investigating how inmates obtained firearms during the disturbance, he said. The minister acknowledged longstanding structural problems within Sri Lanka's prison system, including severe overcrowding, staff shortages, and lengthy delays in criminal proceedings. He said delays in receiving forensic reports from the Government Analyst's Department often keep suspects in remand custody for months, while the department itself has suffered from staffing shortages. He said the government had filled 78 vacancies in the department since taking office, but warned that deeper institutional reforms would be required to significantly reduce delays in the criminal justice system. A committee headed by retired judge Priyantha Fernando has been appointed to investigate the Negombo Prison violence, while the Criminal Investigation Department is conducting a parallel inquiry. ### The Fighters the Tamil Diaspora Left Behind URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/the-fighters-the-tamil-diaspora-left-behind/ Last updated: 2026-07-18T22:33:41.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Ex-Tamil Tiger N could not restrain himself when he saw a group of diaspora Tamils visit a rehabilitation centre to see for themselves how former combatants who had fought the Sri Lankan military were being treated by the government. The visitors came with Selvarasa Pathmanathan, alias Kumaran Pathmanathan, alias KP, a senior member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had been captured in Malaysia just before the war ended in 2009. “You came in big vehicles to (LTTE-held) Vanni when we were in bunkers and did not even speak to us,” N blasted away. “You poured money only as long as we fought. Now you give us nothing because we don’t fight anymore, right?” There was all-round embarrassment at the rehabilitation centre at Poonthottam in Vavuniya district. The accusation was true and stinging. N went on. “We fought this government for years, but they are looking after us and helping us to get on our feet. What have you done to rebuild our lives? You have not given us even a mosquito net!” By the time N finished, the diaspora Tamils who had been ferried in two buses were in moral trauma. A few amongst them shed tears. A few mumbled they would make up for lost time and contribute monetarily to the rehabilitation of the former LTTE fighters. But nothing happened after they returned to their homes in the West. Barring a few exceptions, the Tamil diaspora largely turned its back on the nearly 12,000 Tamil Tigers who gave up or captured in 2009, despite having massively funded the Tigers during a quarter century of one of the world's bloodiest conflicts. Sri Lankan officials recall this incident to underline why the country has seen no revival of the once lethal LTTE in the 17 long years since the war ended, although everything is not honky dory in the north and east, the earlier war theatre. “Even today, the LTTE diaspora will give money for separatist activities, propaganda, or acts of violence but not for charity,” said a professional volunteer who was closely associated with the sweeping rehabilitation programme run by Colombo after the war. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/the-fighters-the-tamil-diaspor-TllflE-kix6vhmyypjnm1j.png) LTTE fighters fire a heavy machine gun during clashes with Sri Lankan government forces in Akkaraayan in 2008. A retired military official added that it has become a sore point that the Tamil diaspora in the West still spends heavily on politics both in Sri Lanka and in their adopted countries, but not to help the former insurgents find a new life. “(Former president) Mahinda Rajapaksa and (his brother and later president) Gotabaya Rajapaksa may be accused of war crimes, but they did a fine job when it came to rehabilitating the mass of LTTE cadres,” the official said. The volunteer professional recalls that the bulk of LTTE guerrillas, male and female, taken into custody in 2009 shuddered just thinking what could happen to them in captivity. Would they be tortured? Would they be killed? While some seniors in the LTTE hierarchy faced the judicial process, others went into rehabilitation camps after a mandatory prison term and learnt, over time, a variety of vocational skills. More importantly, the overwhelmingly Sinhalese staff at the camps surprised the former Tigers by engaging them in a friendly manner and treating them as equals, ensuring that they would never be made to feel as outsiders or “terrorists”. In contrast, the vocal pro-LTTE diaspora, stunned by the Tigers’ military defeat, loudly clamoured for the closure of the rehabilitation centres, dubbing them de facto prisons and insisting on the immediate release of LTTE members. Most international NGOs, particularly those with earlier links with the LTTE (and Colombo), were upset because they were kept away from the rehabilitation process. Simultaneously, the Tamil diaspora put enormous pressure on a handful of Western bodies that provided assistance to the Sri Lankan government. The World Food Programme (WFP), which supplied food for the Tigers in the camps, suddenly pulled out in December 2009, just ahead of Christmas. Having anticipated this, the government immediately roped in the military, which agreed to share its rations with the former LTTE guerrillas. This, the volunteer professional said, was a crucial turning point. “When the ex-Tigers realised what had happened, many of them were shocked,” the source told Jaffna Monitor. “The fact that a military they had fought so bitterly all these years was giving them their ration was too much. “And many were disgusted that the Tamil diaspora had played a major role in the WFP decision not to supply them food.” Both retired military officers and Tamil sources said the diaspora felt personally defeated when the LTTE brass, including its founder Velupillai Prabhakaran, went down, ending one of the world’s longest-running insurgencies. Worse, in contrast to repeated LTTE assertions that its members would kill themselves with cyanide rather than be taken prisoner, a whopping 12,000 cadres and close sympathisers surrendered wholesale to the military or were captured. Many tried to merge with the tens of thousands of Tamil civilians displaced by the fighting. In the eyes of the pro-LTTE diaspora, this was downright treachery. This is the reason the diaspora ideologues never talk about the mass surrender and refuse to help those who once fought for Tamil Eelam. The diaspora’s largely negative outlook is a key reason why former LTTE guerrillas, despite suffering enormously on livelihood issues even today, accuse Tamils settled in foreign countries of letting them down. “All said and done, these boys and girls fought for Eelam. The diaspora lived peacefully in the West and only sent money (to the LTTE). It is the young here who fought and died,” said a Tamil man in Kilinochchi who had a brother in the Tigers. “Once the war ended, the diaspora abruptly shut the money tap,” he said. “Yes, they give money to temples and churches, to friends and relatives, and to some select ex-Tigers. The rank and file of the Tigers have been forgotten. They lead pathetic lives today. Some work as laborers, some drive auto-rickshaws, some run small shops, and others do odd jobs for a living. Many are plagued by injuries and illnesses. A few are blind. Will anyone who sees their condition ever want to fight for Eelam again? This Tamil source, however, is one of those who is not enamoured of the rehabilitation program the government put together. “I feel the rehabilitation was a big cage, certainly better than a prison,” he told Jaffna Monitor. “They did teach some useful things. But once the Tigers returned to their villages and towns, there was no concrete help. They were left to fend for themselves.” This, the source said, was a great disservice done to the ex-fighters. The objective of rehabilitation was to prepare former cadres to rebuild their lives through employment or self-employment. In reality, very few received meaningful post-release support. Many struggled to convert the vocational training they had received into sustainable livelihoods. “Forget the government. If only every ex-Tiger had been adopted by three or four diaspora Tamils, these people would have come up in life,” he said. “But the diaspora shuns them. Perhaps, the diaspora wants the war to go on and on.” Other Tamil sources said a small section of the diaspora does help the former guerrillas. “But this is a small group. For all practical purposes, the fighters have been dumped,” said another Tamil source. “It is shocking, but at times the ex-fighters are told on their face by their neighbours: ‘Why didn’t you also die?’” Another thing happened in 2009\. Many financially well-off LTTE members, particularly those with friends or relatives abroad, escaped from Manik Farm in the country’s north, where thousands were interned. They never underwent the detention, rehabilitation or reintegration process. These escapes were facilitated by corrupt military personnel and others in exchange for large sums of money. Several ex-Tigers said that before entering the rehabilitation hubs, almost every former LTTE cadre was taken to military camps where they were thrashed and brutally interrogated for days. Although the government presented the rehabilitation as a success, a small number of supposedly rehabilitated cadres later attempted to revive militant activities with assistance from pro-LTTE networks abroad. All those attempts failed, largely because there was no Prabhakaran-like figure to unite or lead them. But the incidents raised disturbing questions about the programme's long-term effectiveness. While the rehabilitation programme itself may have had value, there was little structured support once the cadres were released. Many received no financial assistance, access to credit, employment opportunities, or practical support to establish businesses based on the vocational skills they had acquired during rehabilitation. That, along with the diaspora's lack of concern, is the main reason the bulk of former fighters continue to suffer. ### Gotabaya Rajapaksa Accused of Misleading Court as Arrest Battle Intensifies URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/gotabaya-rajapaksa-accused-of-misleading-court-as-arrest-battle-intensifies/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T11:50:02.000Z **By Jaffna Monitor's Court Correspondent** **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka's Attorney General asked the Court of Appeal on Monday to throw out a petition by former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa seeking to block his arrest in the reopened investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, contending that he had misled the court and that the case belonged before the Supreme Court. Mr. Rajapaksa is seeking a court order to prevent his detention as investigators revisit the coordinated suicide attacks, which killed 269 people at churches and hotels on Easter morning. The case resumed before a two-judge bench: the president of the Court of Appeal, Rohana Abeysuriya, and Justice Sarath Dissanayake. Appearing for a third day, Romesh de Silva, a President's Counsel representing the former president, said investigators had unfairly singled out his client during the renewed probe. None of the major official inquiries into the attacks — the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, the Jayaki de Alwis report, or the Justice Imam report — had implicated Mr. Rajapaksa, he said. "Yet the authorities are now attempting to arrest him based solely on a statement made by Azad Maulana," he told the court. Both the Prevention of Terrorism Act and ordinary criminal law, Mr. de Silva said, require investigators to hold a reasonable suspicion before an arrest — one grounded in evidence from an objective investigation, not an effort to target a particular person. Citing Supreme Court judgments, including rulings by the former Justices Mark Fernando and Gamini Amarasuriya, he maintained that there were no reasonable grounds to arrest his client under Section 6(1) of the Act. Suharshi Herath, a deputy solicitor general, countered that the authorities cited by the defense addressed the threshold for detention, not arrest. Mr. de Silva rejected that distinction, saying the judgments make clear that reasonable suspicion is required before an arrest under Section 6(1), while preventive detention falls separately under Section 9. Mr. de Silva further questioned the impartiality of the inquiry, noting that Senior Superintendent of Police Shani Abeysekara — who now leads the Easter Sunday investigation — had been removed as director of the Criminal Investigation Department after Mr. Rajapaksa became president, only to be reinstated later. He suggested that Mr. Abeysekara was pursuing a personal vendetta against his former superior. "If that is the case, how can this be regarded as a fair investigation?" he asked. Mr. Abeysekara, he added, bore his own share of responsibility for failing to prevent the attacks and should not be leading the inquiry into them. After the petitioner's submissions concluded, Ms. Herath opened the Attorney General's response. The petition rested fundamentally on alleged violations of constitutional rights, she contended, and therefore lay outside the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction. Counsel for Mr. Rajapaksa had repeatedly invoked personal liberty and freedom of movement, she noted — relief constitutional in nature, and pursuable only before the Supreme Court under Article 126 of the Constitution. Under Article 126(3), she said, the Court of Appeal may refer such matters to the Supreme Court. "For that reason, this court should either transfer the petition to the Supreme Court or dismiss it," she submitted. Ms. Herath also accused the former president of failing to approach the court with "clean hands," saying he had made false statements in his petition. In paragraph 17 of his application, she said, Mr. Rajapaksa had stated that he did not know Azad Maulana and had never met him — a claim the Attorney General's Department disputed with photographs it said showed a relationship between the two men. "But the evidence is not limited to photographs," she said. She then cited a statement given to the Criminal Investigation Department by Iniya Bharathi, whom she described as a suspect. Shortly before the 2019 presidential election, according to the statement, Iniya Bharathi was summoned by Kapila Hendawitharana to Mr. Rajapaksa's residence in Mirihana, where he found Azad Maulana — described as the private secretary to Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, widely known as Pillayan — along with Prasanthan, another associate of Pillayan; Pillayan's brother; and the group's treasurer, Jeyaraj. That account, Ms. Herath said, made Mr. Rajapaksa's claim not to know Mr. Maulana false and amounted to misleading the court. Mr. Maulana was not the only witness against the former president, she added; investigators had taken statements from several others. "The petitioner has concealed the truth while seeking relief from this court," she submitted. "His application should therefore be dismissed at the threshold." The court adjourned the hearing until July 9. ### Activists Accuse Sri Lankan Government of Concealing Scale of Deadly Prison Violence URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/activists-accuse-sri-lankan-government-of-concealing-scale-of-deadly-prison-violence/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T17:58:21.000Z **COLOMBO —** Prisoners' rights advocates escalated pressure on Sri Lanka's government on Monday, accusing it of concealing the scale of deadly violence at Negombo Prison and of neglecting the overcrowding, staff shortages, and inadequate medical care that they said had pushed the country's prison system beyond its capacity. At separate news conferences, the Prisoners' Rights Protection Association and Wasantha Mudalige, an activist with the People's Struggle Front, said the authorities had yet to provide a full official account of the unrest, even as they claimed the death toll had risen to 25 and anxiety spread among prisoners' families. The association warned that it would bring relatives of inmates and prison officers into the streets in protest if the government did not act at once. Its coordinator, Sudesh Nandimal Silva, said the violence was the product of long-standing structural failures rather than an isolated confrontation. Prisons were operating with roughly a quarter of the officers needed to manage their populations, he said, and facilities designed for about 650 inmates now held more than 2,000\. In some blocks, he added, 250 to 300 prisoners shared a single toilet, a level of crowding he said inflicted severe psychological strain on inmates and guards alike. Mr. Silva also asserted that overcrowding and substandard medical care had contributed to the deaths of five female inmates from dengue fever, and that many prisoners accused of drug-related offences spent years in custody awaiting Government Analyst reports and action on their cases. More than 70 percent of inmates, he said, were dependent on drugs and required rehabilitation programmes rather than imprisonment. Mr. Mudalige accused the government of obscuring the true scale of the violence and of allowing misleading accounts to circulate, including a suggestion that the unrest was merely a clash between rival underworld groups in the drug trade. "The government must tell the country the truth," Mr. Mudalige said, calling for an urgent official statement to counter speculation and reassure the families gathered outside the prison. He also faulted successive governments for filling prisons with low-level drug users while leaving major trafficking networks intact. Both groups cast the bloodshed as the culmination of years of neglect rather than a lone security lapse, and pressed the government for immediate intervention and wider reforms to ease overcrowding, improve conditions and restore public trust. The government had not responded publicly to either group's allegations at the time of their remarks. ### The Negombo Prison Killings: A System That Failed Long Before the Riot URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-negombo-prison-killings-a-system-that-failed-long-before-the-riot/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T11:50:04.000Z **NEGOMBO, Sri Lanka —** At around one o’clock on Sunday afternoon, in a prison built for a fraction of the men it holds, a rumour spread through the wards: that an inmate had informed on a drug-trafficking operation running inside the walls. Over the next twenty-four hours, as many as 25 people were killed and more than 100 injured. Some of the dead were beaten so badly that they could not immediately be identified. Once again, failures that the country has long documented and long ignored were exposed. By Monday evening, police put the toll at 25, reported to include five prison officers and twenty inmates, with more than 100 wounded. The figure rose through the day: two, then seven, then fifteen, then nineteen, then twenty-five. Other counts differ. The director of Negombo Hospital, Pushpa Gamlath, said the facility had received 23 bodies. The most critically injured were moved to the National Hospital in Colombo. Whatever the final number, it is the country’s deadliest prison riot in years. ### **How it began** Police say the first clash, shortly after 1 p.m. on Sunday, was between a group of remand prisoners and a group of convicted inmates. Two inmates were killed and dozens injured — figures ranging from 34 to 38 across official statements. Groups of male and female prisoners then climbed onto the prison roofs in protest; part of the roof gave way, injuring four more. Police, the Special Task Force, and the army were deployed on Sunday night, and prison authorities announced the situation had been brought under control by midnight. It had not. On Monday morning, as officers entered to distribute breakfast, the two factions clashed again. According to the Prisons Department spokesman, A.C. Gajanayake, the inmates then turned on the officers pursuing them toward the main gate and trying to force their way out. Officers stationed at the gate said they used the minimum force necessary to restore order. Gunfire was heard from inside; police have acknowledged firing shots to bring the situation under control. Rioting prisoners stormed the prison infirmary and stole officers’ mobile phones. Sinhala-language outlets reported that the fighting was between two gangs known as "Doom" and "Madda" and was allegedly instigated by a serving prisoner, Katuwellegama Suresh Pushpakumara, described as a close associate of a notorious underworld figure. He was himself wounded and, according to those reports, could not be taken out for treatment because the situation inside remained too dangerous. The same reports also said that when the violence erupted in the prison, which held more than 2,000 inmates, only about 20 officers were on hand to contain it. ### **The question of the guns** Police sources told *Jaffna Monitor* that Monday's escalation began after inmates seized firearms from the prison armoury. But other security officials disputed that account, saying the weapons had been removed from the armoury on Sunday night precisely because authorities feared prisoners might try to take them. If that account is correct, the firearms used in the violence on Monday could not have come from the armoury. Police have confirmed that officers opened fire during the unrest. ### **What the government says** Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara delivered the government's first official account of the violence, attributing it to a clash between rival inmate factions and saying the incident was being treated with the utmost seriousness. He acknowledged that overcrowding and chronic staff shortages had long plagued Sri Lanka's prison system, pledged a full inquiry, and accepted responsibility in his capacity as minister in charge of both justice and prisons. As is often the case in Sri Lankan politics, however, accepting responsibility stopped short of offering to resign. The machinery of investigation moved quickly into motion. The Commissioner General of Prisons appointed a special inquiry team, police opened a parallel investigation, a magistrate began a judicial inquiry, and three inmates identified as key figures in the unrest were transferred to the Pallansena prison camp. Yet in the crucial early hours of Sunday's violence, according to local media reports, the Justice Minister, the prisons spokesman and the police spokesman could not be reached for comment. ### **What the opposition says** The Leader of the Opposition, Sajith Premadasa, called for an independent and transparent investigation and said the government must be held accountable for the loss of life, arguing that the episode exposed a breakdown in prison administration under an administration elected on a promise of systemic change. He pointedly recalled that the President, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, had himself maintained, while in opposition, that governments should be held accountable for deaths that occur inside prisons. A sharper critique came from a figure who once held responsibility for the prisons himself. In a statement circulated on social media, former Foreign Minister Ali Sabry — who also served as Justice Minister, with the prison-affairs portfolio, under the previous government — argued that a government consumed by pursuing its predecessors has little energy left for the harder work of governing. He named the country’s overcrowded prisons directly among the problems going unaddressed while the state busies itself with arrests and prosecutions, warning that “a prison cell is not evidence of good governance” and that the instruments of coercion a government celebrates today may one day be turned against itself. Sabry presided over the same overcrowded system during the lethal prison unrest of 2020, though he was publicly critical of the congestion even then. The failure he describes belongs to every recent government, his own included. Rights advocates were more specific still. The president of the Committee for Protecting the Rights of Prisoners, attorney Senaka Perera, said the Negombo unrest reflected long-standing problems — severe overcrowding, staff shortages, and the absence of rehabilitation for drug-dependent inmates. Three weeks earlier, his organisation had submitted a detailed account to the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture alleging entrenched torture, overcrowding, and impunity, and noting that Sri Lanka’s prisons still operate under a Prison Ordinance dating to 1877. ### **A system four times over capacity** The scale of that overcrowding is not in dispute. Official figures cited on Sunday put the national prison population at 41,250 — roughly four times the system’s intended capacity. Even in a calmer accounting, the prisons held 29,789 people against a capacity of 10,395, an occupancy rate of some 287 percent. Negombo, holding between 1,800 and more than 2,000 in a facility built for far fewer, is one instance of it. Experts who have studied Sri Lanka's prison system told *Jaffna Monitor* that many of the country's prisons have fallen below even basic living standards. They describe a network that is overcrowded, understaffed, and dysfunctional, where rehabilitation is minimal and criminality, corruption, and repeat offending flourish. Cells designed for a single prisoner now routinely hold between three and eight inmates, while first-time offenders are housed alongside hardened repeat offenders. "What do you think we can do about separating prisoners?" one senior jailor at Welikada Prison asked a national commission, underscoring the constraints prison officials say they face. In wards this crowded, under tropical heat and with poor ventilation, prisoners often organise themselves into gangs. Much of that violence is fuelled by the drug trade. Nearly two-thirds of those in Sri Lanka's prisons on any given day have not been convicted of a crime but are awaiting trial. Drug-related charges alone accounted for about half of all remand admissions in 2024, while drug offences made up roughly two-thirds of convicted admissions. Yet, experts say, those filling the cells are rarely major traffickers. They are overwhelmingly poor and marginalised people arrested with small quantities of drugs, many imprisoned simply because they cannot afford a lawyer or pay a fine. Wealthier drug users, they argue, are far less likely to enter the prison system. The government's anti-narcotics campaign, Operation Yukthiya, arrested tens of thousands of people and drew criticism from the United Nations and human rights organisations over allegations of arbitrary arrests, torture and military-run rehabilitation. The result, they say, is a prison system operating at more than four times its intended capacity, filled largely with low-level offenders while organised traffickers continue to direct criminal networks from behind bars — a struggle that police believe lay behind the violence in Negombo. The consequences are reflected in prisoners' mental health. Experts told *Jaffna Monitor* that psychological distress is far higher inside prisons than in the general population, driven by overcrowding, violence, isolation, lack of privacy, and inadequate mental health care. Regional research has estimated the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in South Asian prisons — among the world's most overcrowded — at between 40 and 100 percent, even as prison mental health services remain severely limited. Men struggling with addiction and untreated mental illness are frequently confined together without adequate supervision or treatment, in conditions that often deepen both problems. Experts also argue that the corruption exposed by the Negombo violence is less the cause of Sri Lanka's prison crisis than a symptom of it. The movement of drugs, mobile phones, and even firearms through prisons reflects a system that has long ceased to function effectively, they say, and neither tougher crackdowns nor further militarisation are likely to solve the underlying problem. Instead, they point to weaknesses that run across the criminal justice system, including repeated allegations of police collusion with drug traffickers. Prisoners interviewed during official inquiries described being framed with planted evidence, entering prison as first-time detainees, and leaving with criminal connections and hardened attitudes. The lesson, experts argue, is that a prison system that strips people of dignity is unlikely to rehabilitate them; it is more likely to send them back into society angrier, more violent, and better connected to organised crime. ### **A pattern the state keeps repeating** Sri Lanka has been here before. In December 2012, Special Task Force officers killed 27 prisoners at Welikada during what began as a search operation and what a court later found had included premeditated killings carried out by officials acting beyond their lawful authority. In March 2020, two inmates were shot dead at Anuradhapura during a protest over pandemic restrictions. Eight months later, prison officers opened fire during unrest at Mahara, killing 11 prisoners and wounding more than 100. Each episode was followed by the appointment of an inquiry. None of the resulting reports has been made public. The Welikada case ultimately resulted in a single conviction over a single death, while other defendants were acquitted. No one has been held criminally accountable for the killings at Anuradhapura or Mahara. The investigations announced after the Negombo violence now enter a history in which inquiries have been plentiful, but public disclosure and accountability have been far harder to find. ### **Where It Stands** By Monday night, prison authorities again said the situation was under control — the same assurance they had given late Sunday, hours before the violence escalated. Additional police officers had been deployed, inmates had been transferred, and security around the prison had been tightened. Meanwhile, the prisoner whom authorities say instigated the violence remained hospitalized under guard, while the families of those killed continued to wait for answers. The investigations have begun. Whether they produce accountability — or simply another unpublished report — remains to be seen. ### Development, Division and Sovereignty in a Divided and Contested World URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-16/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T13:29:56.000Z **Professor Mahesh Nirmalan MD, FRCA, PhD, FFICM,** **University of Manchester, UK** Sri Lanka, is a nation shaped by paradoxes at every level. In 1819 missionary and future Bishop of Calcutta Reginald Heber captured this paradox in his poem as *“What though the spicy breezes* *Blow soft o'er Ceylon's isle,* *Though every prospect pleases,* *And only man is vile”* Despite the colonial prejudices that are evident in the above words, the verse does capture the paradoxes of Sri Lanka which stand true to this day. The aspersion Heber casts on the native Sri Lankan, can be argued to be true of all human societies in general – divided, tribal, self-centred and potentially capable of extreme violence and cruelty to the *‘other’*. As a small island located at the crossroads of major maritime trade routes and regional rivalries it has considerable geopolitical significance disproportionate to its size. It is also a society marked by significant internal divisions - linguistic, religious, and cultural, which boiled over as a 30-year war which influenced its political and developmental trajectories. In this context, understanding the challenges in governance and sustainable development, requires a vision beyond simple linear economics. The country’s trajectory will clearly be determined by the interaction of geopolitical pressures - regional and beyond, internal fragmentation, development dependency, diaspora dynamics, and the search for sovereign economic pathways. At the heart of these challenges lies a deeper question on whether Sri Lanka can align its diverse identities into a shared national vision sufficient to withstand external pressures from an increasingly contested world. Sri Lanka’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean has always defined its external reality. Situated along critical maritime routes, it occupies a position of disproportionate importance in global trade and security. This draws Sri Lanka into the gravitational pull of two major powers: India and China which holds the country as a ‘*prisoner of geography*’. Both powers have - and are willing to deploy, the necessary tools to exacerbate or ameliorate internal differences in order to pull the country in directions that are beneficial to their Regional aspirations. When American interests in curtailing the influence of China in the region are added to the mix, the foreign policy challenges increase exponentially. Sri Lanka must therefore engage with these three powers while fiercely preserving its sovereignty. This external constraint inevitably shapes internal policy choices, linking development decisions to geopolitical considerations. If geography defines Sri Lanka’s external environment, its internal challenges stem from the country’s post-independence political evolution. The early years of independence offered promise, but this gradually gave way to a majoritarian political model that privileged some segments of society. Policies such as the ‘Sinhala Only Act’ making Sinhala as the sole official language of the country altered the trajectory of the state, marginalising Tamil-speaking communities and embedding identity politics into the socio-political fabric. This marginalisation was aided and abetted by some members of the academic and professional class who went that ‘extra mile’ of denying Tamil language, Tamil culture, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity - integral components of the broader Sri Lankan culture, their due places in the cultural and historical tapestry of the country. The adoration of Lord Shiva as the lord of Koneswaram (Trincomalee) and Ketheeswaram (Mannar) by the Saivite saints - Sambanthar and Sundarar, from the 7th and 8th centuries AD is well documented. The Sivan Kovils of Pollonaruwa (10-11th century AD) are living symbols of Saivaism in the North Central province. Similarly, the ruins at Thondeswaram temple in Devinuwara (such as the Sivalingam and Nandhi or the Holy Bull), historic records of Royal Grants to the Muneswaram Temple in Chilaw by the kings of Kotte (Parakrama Bahu VI, 15th century) and the repeated reference to Kathirgamam (or Kataragama) by the 14th century poet Arunagirinathar in his compositions (known as Thirupuhal) confirm these sites to be integral to Sri Lankan culture. Beyond religion, M B Ariyapala’s seminal PhD thesis submitted to the University of London in 1949 clearly refers to the use of musical instruments such as the Veena, Mattalam and Nagachuram (or Nadaswaram) at the royal courts in the 13th century. The archaeological findings such as the stone inscriptions at Lankatillake Viharaya (Figures 1 & 2) and the Galle Trilingual inscription (Figure 4) too clearly demonstrate Tamil culture and language to be integral components of ancient Sri Lanka. Despite such overwhelming literary, cultural and archeological evidence, some post-colonial historians painted a picture of a pristine mono-ethnic native culture that was contaminated by periodic Tamil invasions from South India. Such sentiments were carefully nurtured by including these discourses into text books such as *Kumarodhaya 2* \- a Sinhala text book used in primary schools. This mindset and the consequent narratives provided the ammunition to a very parochial and orthodox Tamil Leadership, influenced by the concurrently evolving *‘Dravidian politics*’ of South India, to launch their own brand of identity politics. They in turn articulated a version of history that clearly demarcated the Sinhala and Tamil societies into polarised socio-cultural-political and geographical spaces. These divisive discourses sadly distorted a truly inclusive Sri Lankan history and progressively escalated into a prolonged civil war with lasting scars. Case studies from the stone inscriptions of Lankatillake Viharaya in Kandy and the Tri-lingial stone slab from Galle summarised below illustrate the co-existence of Sinhala and Tamil in pre-colonial Sri Lanka sharply contradicting the mono-ethnic narratives. ![Figure 1: Sinhala (or pre-Sinhala) inscriptions](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/untitled-draft-pAb_Jw-kixjwp69v7u14c7.jpg) Figure 1: Sinhala (or pre-Sinhala) inscriptions Figure 1 shows a part of the stone inscriptions at Lankatillake Viharaya in Kandy. This temple, from the Gampola Period (14th century) was commissioned by King Bhuvanekabahu IV. Externally the temple demonstrates a unique blend of Sinhalese, Dravidian and Indo-Chinese architectural styles. The inscriptions on the adjoining mountain face are in Sinhala (Figure 1) and Tamil (Figure 2). ![Figure 2: Tamil (or pre-Tamil) inscriptions](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/untitled-draft-pAb_Jw-kixe9ixlt5ytcos.jpg) Figure 2: Tamil (or pre-Tamil) inscriptions The Sinhala and Tamil inscriptions appear in the same block of granite stone - one below the other, implying that the same message was inscribed in both languages that co-existed at the time. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/untitled-draft-pAb_Jw-kixm8mqpwiu34fn.jpg) *Figure 3: The sign board installed by the Department of Archeology at the site of the inscription* The sign-board from the Department of Archeology at the above stone inscription however sadly refers to the language as “Medieval Sinhala” (Figure 3: yellow arrows) with no reference to the Tamil script. Such errors of omission and commission - accidental or otherwise, feed into the Tamil fears of loss of identity through assimilation. ![Figure 4: The Galle Trilingual Inscription (1409) is a stone tablet with an inscription in Chinese, Tamil and Persian discovered in the Southern Province. It was installed by admiral Zheng He, the Chinese expeditionist. The text refers to offerings made by Zheng to the Buddha, Allah and the Thennavara Nayanar (தென்னாவர நாயனார் or තෙන්නාවර නායනාර්) at Thondeswaram. (Source: Wikipedia).](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/untitled-draft-pAb_Jw-kixjsbzqit5wtxi.jpg) Figure 4: The Galle Trilingual Inscription (1409) is a stone tablet with an inscription in Chinese, Tamil and Persian discovered in the Southern Province. It was installed by admiral Zheng He, the Chinese expeditionist. The text refers to offerings made by Zheng to the Buddha, Allah and the Thennavara Nayanar (தென்னாவர நாயனார் or තෙන්නාවර නායනාර්) at Thondeswaram. (Source: Wikipedia). These historical realities - including the well established presence of Islam in pre-colonial Sri Lanka, stand in stark contrast to the divisive narratives of the post-independence period. Even after the end of the war in 2009, reconciliation has remained incomplete and mistakes of the past only partially rectified. Despite the positive, well-intentioned and constructive messages from President Dissanayake’s government, governance is dominated by identity politics and ethno-nationalistic undertones that are hard to overcome. This has had a lasting impact on development as creating the institutional trust and policy continuity needed for long-term progress is nearly impossible in a fragmented society. It is in this context that the economic crisis of 2022 needs to be seen. This financial meltdown was the culmination of several systemic failures - fiscal mismanagement, dependence on borrowing and a fragile governance structure that systematically exacerbated internal differences. The crisis exposed the limitations of a development model overly reliant on concessional grants and insufficiently grounded in domestic resilience and inclusive nation-building. What was most striking was the cultivated internal differences being deployed to mask systematic corruption by presenting a narrative of “*We are poor because they exploited us*” – an endeavour in which a small but vociferous group from the professional and academic class acted as collaborators. Recovery has since been pursued through external assistance, particularly through IMF-supported reforms aimed at stabilisation. While necessary, these measures come with significant trade-offs. Fiscal consolidation and structural reforms often impose social costs, particularly on vulnerable populations. Developmental projects vital for economic recovery - such as the development of the Trincomalee oil storage tank farms or the Colombo Port City, have been delayed as the developmental partners were evaluated through the ‘ethnic prism’ rather than the merits (or demerits) of such partners. This highlights the central dilemma of how Sri Lanka can rebuild its economy and control its development priorities? Development assistance - aid, concessionary lending, tariff free trade etc.; has long been central to Sri Lanka’s progress. Yet the politics of aid, in whatever form is rarely neutral. In fact, aid and fiscal assistance are very much extensions of foreign policy of powerful countries and carry conditions, explicit or implicit, that restrict policy direction. More fundamentally, aid can foster dependency and weaken domestic resource mobilisation, distort development priorities, and align national policy with external interests. Like Sri Lanka several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa too face significant challenges in raising capital for vital developmental projects amidst internal fractures - along tribal lines, and external threats. How some of these low-income countries are navigating these challenges is therefore an interesting comparator. In this context, Ethiopia’s experience with the recently concluded Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is provocative. Faced with limited external support, Ethiopia mobilised domestic resources - through bonds, state financing, and widespread public contributions - to build a transformative national project. This model was not merely financial; it was symbolic. Despite Ethiopia’s own ethno-tribal tensions that remain unresolved, the success of financing GERD entirely through internal mechanisms fostered a sense of national ownership, collective responsibility, and developmental sovereignty. The surge of emotions and pride amongst Ethiopians at the launch event was palpable and infectious across the entire African continent. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/nile-river.png) Figure 5: The Nile Basin Map. The origins of River Nile in Ethiopia (The Blue Nile) and in Uganda (White Nile). These two tributaries merge in Sudan to form the main Nile river that flows through Sudan and Egypt. Plans to build a dam across the Nile to meet the water/power needs of Ethiopia had been thwarted by powerful countries based on the fear that such a project would seriously affect the viability of Egypt. (Source: www.atlanticcouncil.org) For Sri Lanka, the lesson is not that external aid should be abandoned, but that true sustainability requires internal alignment - of state, society, and diaspora. It should be built through building a covenant between the state and ALL sections of society. In this context, the Sri Lankan diaspora in general and the Tamil diaspora in particular has special relevance. If handled fairly but firmly, this group can become one of the country’s significant assets. Highly educated and globally connected, it carries financial, intellectual, and institutional capital that could contribute to national development. Yet diaspora engagement is complex. It is shaped by historical memory of conflict, displacement, and exclusion. This memory, while legitimate, can sometimes limit engagement with the present realities. Though the diaspora can provide investment and expertise, it can also reinforce divisions if engagement is driven by past grievances. The challenge to the current and future governments therefore lie in reorienting diaspora engagement towards a future-focused partnership grounded in trust. At the core of Sri Lanka’s internal divisions lies a deeper civilisational paradox. The island’s two major religious traditions, Buddhism and Hinduism - are often presented as markers of division. Yet philosophically and historically, they are profoundly interconnected through concepts of dharma, karma, compassion, and transcendence. Both have coexisted for centuries, influencing each other’s practices, rituals, and ethical frameworks. In many respects, they are not opposites, but two interconnected world-views within a shared civilisational and philosophical continuum. This insight opens a powerful pathway forward. Reconciliation in Sri Lanka has often been framed in political or constitutional terms - power-sharing arrangements, institutional reforms, international mechanisms of accountability. While these undoubtedly remain important, they are insufficient on their own. Sustainable peace requires a deeper cultural and philosophical accommodation. Building bridges between Buddhism and Hinduism offers such a possibility. It allows reconciliation to be grounded not in abstract frameworks imposed by external agencies, but in cultural narratives that are familiar, legitimate, and authentic. Crucially however, this approach must avoid assimilation or dominance or changing historical realities. Neither tradition can subsume the other. The objective is not homogenisation, but mutual recognition - an understanding that these identities can coexist without threat. This form of cultural reconciliation could provide a foundation for rebuilding trust, particularly in regions where historical grievances remain strong. It offers a way of addressing identity not as a zero-sum contest, but as a shared inheritance. ![Figure 6: The annual pilgrimage from Selva-Sannidhi in Jaffna in the North and Kataragama (or Kathirgamam) in the South brings together Buddhist and Hindu devotees from the two extremes of the country in common faith. (Source: Google Images)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/untitled-draft-pAb_Jw-kix23ee1k326b0d.jpg) Figure 6: The annual pilgrimage from Selva-Sannidhi in Jaffna in the North and Kataragama (or Kathirgamam) in the South brings together Buddhist and Hindu devotees from the two extremes of the country in common faith. (Source: Google Images) Sri Lanka’s future therefore lies in aligning its internal and external realities into a coherent framework for development. These need to happen simultaneously rather than sequentially as they form parts of a mutually inter-dependent matrix. This requires several paradigm shifts: From dependency to agency: reducing reliance on external assistance while engaging it strategically. From division to inclusion: building a political culture that recognises and respects diversity. From diaspora alienation to partnership: harnessing global Sri Lankan networks as collaborators in development. From technocratic solutions to cultural grounding: recognising that reconciliation must be rooted in shared civilisational values. External aid will continue to play a role, geopolitical pressures will remain and diaspora engagement will be a double-edged sword. But none of these, in isolation, will determine Sri Lanka’s future. The decisive factor will be whether the country can draw upon its own internal resources - its institutions, its people, and its cultural traditions to create a shared vision of co-ownership. In this context, the recognition that Buddhism and Hinduism represent not opposing forces but complementary strands of a shared civilisational heritage may offer one of the most powerful tools for healing. The building of bridges between Buddhism and Hinduism however will not automatically include Islam and Christianity which are important, independent and inalienable components of this complex equation. Rather, it would demonstrate that identity is not a zero-sum contest and create the conditions for a more inclusive dialogue involving all segments of society. In the final analysis, sustainable development in Sri Lanka is not only about infrastructure, investment, or policy. It is about trust - between all segments of society, between state and society, and between the past and the future. Only when this trust is rebuilt can Sri Lanka move from a position of constraint to one of confidence - charting its own path in a complex and contested world. **The views expressed in this article are that of the author alone and do not represent the views of the University of Manchester on the subject.** ### Karuna Amman Reportedly Tells Investigators Former Spy Chief Backed Pillayan's Network URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/karuna-amman-reportedly-tells-investigators-former-spy-chief-backed-pillayans-network/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T15:14:40.000Z **COLOMBO —** Former Minister Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, the one-time eastern commander of the Tamil Tigers better known as Karuna Amman, has reportedly told Sri Lanka's Criminal Investigation Department that the country's former intelligence chief helped arrange and finance safe houses used by a rival Tamil paramilitary group, according to a report published by a Sinhala-language news website. Jaffna Monitor could not independently verify the claims, as neither the Criminal Investigation Department nor Karuna Amman has commented on the reported statement. According to the report, the statement was recorded as part of the reopened investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, which killed 269 people. Citing investigators, it said Karuna Amman described a close working relationship between the group led by Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the former Eastern Province chief minister known as Pillayan, and Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the retired director of the State Intelligence Service. Karuna Amman reportedly told investigators that the individuals who provided accommodation for Pillayan's group in the Eastern Province had been introduced by General Sallay, and that the funds used to maintain those safe houses had also been channelled through the same intermediaries. The report said Karuna Amman had produced supporting material but did not specify its nature. Pillayan, who was arrested in April 2025, was held for 359 days under the Prevention of Terrorism Act before being produced before a magistrate this April. He has not been charged with any offence related to the Easter bombings. The cases currently before the courts concern the 2006 disappearance of Prof. Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, a former vice chancellor of Eastern University, and five killings in Batticaloa District in 2008\. He has been remanded until July 13\. As he was led from court last week, Pillayan dismissed the allegations against him, telling reporters in Tamil that they were fabricated. General Sallay, who was arrested in February and identified by investigators as the third suspect in the Easter bombing investigation, has likewise not been charged over the attacks. He began a hunger strike in June and was hospitalized in Colombo before ending it after about three weeks. His lawyers have argued that the case is politically motivated and that the decorated intelligence officer is being humiliated. Both Sallay and Pillayan remain in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act — the same law under which thousands of Tamil suspects have been detained over the past four decades. Karuna Amman and Pillayan both aligned themselves with former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, but the two men remained bitter rivals for years. Both broke away from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam during the movement's 2004 split led by Karuna Amman and became part of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, which later aligned itself with the Sri Lankan state. Pillayan eventually displaced Karuna Amman as leader of the group in what former witnesses have described as an internal coup encouraged by military intelligence. The report also said the Criminal Investigation Department had expanded its inquiry into an alleged torture facility operated by Pillayan's faction in the Welikanda area of Polonnaruwa and had recorded statements from several witnesses. Investigators were also seeking to identify individuals who allegedly supported the group's activities in Colombo, according to the report. The line of inquiry linking the paramilitary faction, intelligence officials and the Easter Sunday suicide bombers has largely stemmed from allegations made by Hansir Azad Maulana, Pillayan's former spokesman, who is seeking asylum in Europe. His claims featured prominently in a 2023 documentary by the British broadcaster Channel 4\. Investigators have said other witnesses and additional leads point in the same direction. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's government, which came to power promising a fresh investigation into the Easter bombings, has repeatedly argued that the attacks formed part of a conspiracy to help return the Rajapaksa family to power. While the government has advanced that theory forcefully in Parliament, prosecutors have yet to file a single Easter-related charge against any of the principal suspects currently in custody. ### 'They Know They Will Lose': Mano Ganesan on Why Sri Lanka's Provincial Elections Remain Frozen URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/they-know-they-will-lose-mano-ganesan-on-why-sri-lankas-provincial-elections-remain-frozen/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T02:35:27.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** **NEW DELHI —** Sri Lanka’s JVP-led government will not go for the much-delayed Provincial Council elections because the results will dominantly go against them, ‘Indian Tamil’ leader and multi-time MP Mano Ganesan has said. “I will be happy to be proved wrong,” he quickly added, when asked why President Anura Dissanayake’s government had not kept its election pledge to hold the polls in all nine provinces within a year of taking office. “They will not hold the Provincial Council elections,” the Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA) leader said, referring to the ruling NPP alliance that is headed by Dissanayake’s Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). He said this was not because the JVP was against power sharing – a position it held in earlier times. “They know the elections won’t be favourable for them,” Ganesan said. “If the elections are held, they will be exposed... The results will be negative for them.” The 66-year-old veteran leader of the Indian-origin Tamil community said this in a brief interview hours before flying back to Sri Lanka after three days of meetings with policymakers and others in New Delhi. Ganesan said the JVP had created a perception of popularity for its government with the help of friendly social media. “It is a constructed popularity… They have created an artificial picture,” he said. “They know the reality due to intelligence reports. And we also know the truth.” Elections to Sri Lanka’s nine Provincial Councils, a product of the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord, have not been held by successive governments since 2014, undermining the system of devolved governance. Dissanayake and the now-ruling National People’s Power (NPP) promised to hold them within a year of taking office. Dissanayake became the president in 2024 and led the NPP-JVP combine to a sweeping win in parliamentary elections in 2025. Local body elections held also in 2025, however, saw the alliance lose millions of votes, although it managed to outsmart a divided opposition. The opposition alleges the government’s appeal has since eroded due to a variety of reasons. Ganesan is one of four opposition members of the Parliamentary Select Committee to decide about Provincial Council elections. The next meeting of the committee is slated for July 10. The entire opposition and civil organisations want the Provincial Council battle to be held under the present electoral system. But the NPP, citing quotas for women, wants a new framework which, if enforced, will further delay the already delayed electoral battle. “We are not against women’s representation,” the MP said. “But in the name of women’s quotas, everyone is being denied their democratic rights.” The NPP’s insistence on a new system, he felt, was a ruse to put off the elections. A combative Ganesan, who otherwise counts President Dissanayake as a personal friend, added that the JVP had become “arrogant” since it stormed to power. “They are arrogant because they fail to recognize and respect the opinions of others,” said the former minister. “They are shamelessly taking credit for even the achievements of the past governments. “Anura comes to parliament one day and seeks cooperation from the opposition. But when we try to get across with ideas, he says ‘No, thanks’.” The TPA leader agreed that Dissanayake was more popular than the NPP-JVP alliance but said the president found it difficult to carry everyone in the ideologically driven JVP with him. Ganesan is among the key leaders of the 1.6 million-strong Tamil community of Indian origin whose ancestors were primarily shipped to Sri Lanka during the British colonial rule to work in the island nation’s plantations. The community has, over the decades, made major strides socially and economically. Today, only around 100,000 ‘Indian Tamils’, as they are widely known, are employed in the tea industry. While the community now asserts its identity as a separate ethnic group besides the Sinhalese, indigenous Tamils, and Muslims, its members are still among the poorest in Sri Lanka. On top of the economic deprivation, those employed in the tea plantations still largely do not have ownership of the land where they live. “The right to land is our primary demand,” Ganesan said, adding that New Delhi’s financial assistance to build houses for the ‘Indian Tamil’ community could not proceed without the government first providing land. Some 10,000 of the promised 14,000 houses remain to be built, he said, pointing out that the Indian aid for every dwelling had risen from 900,000 SLR in the original MoU to 2.8 million SLR now. Ganesan reiterated his community’s demand for a Non-Territorial Community Centre (NTCC) as an administrative entity for the ‘Hill Country Tamils’. The NTCC has been proposed as part of the promised constitutional reforms to better represent the widely dispersed community, which spans six of the country’s nine provinces rather than being concentrated in one region. The NTCC is designed to protect the minority community’s identity and advocate for its specific socio-economic needs. It will include as members MPs, provincial councillors and local government leaders from the ‘Indian Tamil’ community. ### India Names New Visa Contractor, Expands Consular Reach in Eastern Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-names-new-visa-contractor-expands-consular-reach-in-eastern-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-07-05T07:35:26.000Z **COLOMBO, 5 July 2026** India will transfer its visa, passport, and consular processing in Sri Lanka to a new outsourcing contractor on Monday, the High Commission of India in Colombo has announced, reviving an intermediary system that its diplomatic missions had run themselves for the past eight months. Alhind Global Services, an arm of a Kerala-based travel and services group, has been appointed the outsourcing service provider for visa, passport, Overseas Citizen of India (OCI), and attestation services, with operations beginning on 7 July. The firm will process applications for the High Commission in Colombo, the Assistant High Commission in Kandy, and the Consulate Generals in Jaffna and Hambantota. The handover also widens India's consular reach in the east. A new Indian Consular Application Centre is to open in Batticaloa, adding a fifth collection point to the network and giving applicants in the Eastern Province a dedicated facility rather than obliging them to travel to Jaffna or Colombo. For much of the past year, Sri Lankans seeking Indian visas had dealt with the missions directly. The High Commission took consular processing in-house on 3 November 2025, after the departure of the previous contractor, IVS Lanka, which had operated application centres in Colombo, Kandy, and Jaffna. Alhind's appointment restores the outsourced model that has long handled the bulk of routine consular traffic between the two countries. Alhind secured the Sri Lanka contract through competitive tender, emerging as the lowest bidder in a process overseen by the High Commission. The award formed part of a wider regional expansion: the same group won a parallel mandate for Indian consular services in the United Arab Emirates, where it opened 16 centres on 1 July, displacing the long-standing provider there. Headquartered in Kozhikode, the Alhind group operates more than 130 offices and is among a small number of agencies authorised by India's Ministry of External Affairs to run attestation centres. From 7 July, applicants can book appointments and lodge applications through a dedicated portal, www.icacsrilanka.com. In Jaffna, the new centre will operate from No. 43, Racca Road; the outgoing IVS office had stood on Temple Road, while the missions' interim counter had run from the Indian consulate's own premises in Nallur. The Colombo centre will be on Bauddhaloka Mawatha. The change arrives amid brisk India–Sri Lanka engagement across trade, energy, and connectivity, and touches a steady stream of ordinary travellers — students, patients seeking treatment in Indian hospitals, pilgrims, and families with cross-strait ties — for whom the North's proximity to Tamil Nadu makes Jaffna's consular services a routine necessity. ### **WHERE TO APPLY — from 7 July 2026** **Colombo:** No. 536, Bauddhaloka Mawatha, Colombo 8 **Kandy:** First Floor, Building No. 478/1/B, Wathuwala, Nugawela, Harispattuwa, Kandy **Jaffna:** No. 43, Racca Road, Jaffna 40000 **Hambantota:** CGHW Highway, Hambantota **Batticaloa:** No. 25, Lake Road 01, Puliyanthivu (Puliyanthivu West 179A), Batticaloa **Appointments:** www.icacsrilanka.com ### No 'Golden Platter': Douglas Devananda Says Tamils Must Shape Their Own Political Future URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/no-golden-platter-douglas-devananda-says-tamils-must-shape-their-own-political-future/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T13:08:37.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Douglas Devananda, secretary general of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), said on Saturday that Sri Lanka's Tamil people should not expect any government in the country's south to voluntarily grant a political settlement, arguing instead that Tamils must create the conditions necessary to secure their own political rights. Mr. Devananda made the remarks during a meeting with key EPDP figures and party activists from the Nallur electorate. "No government that comes to power in southern Sri Lanka will present a political solution for the Tamil people on a golden platter," he said. "We must create the conditions ourselves to secure our political rights." Mr. Devananda defended the EPDP's long-standing political approach, saying history had demonstrated that the party's alternative political policies were the most practical path toward resolving Sri Lanka's ethnic question. He reiterated the party's support for strengthening and fully implementing the Provincial Council system, arguing that a provincial power-sharing arrangement was the only framework likely to receive India's support. "The system of power-sharing based on the provinces must be strengthened and fully implemented. Only such an approach will have the support of the Government of India," he said. Mr. Devananda also criticized the Tamil National People's Front-led Tamil National Council, whose delegation recently met political leaders in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, including Chief Minister Joseph Vijay. Without naming individual delegates, he accused them of pursuing "self-serving politics" by calling for an international investigation into alleged wartime atrocities and advocating federalism. "Such empty slogans will bring no benefit whatsoever to our people," he said. Mr. Devananda said the EPDP's long-term objective remained to begin with the Provincial Council framework before advancing toward what he described as "federalism at the centre and autonomy at the state level." He argued that, after years of political setbacks, other Tamil political parties had begun to embrace positions that the EPDP had advocated for decades. Mr. Devananda also acknowledged that the party had failed to communicate its political programme effectively to the public, describing that as one of the principal reasons for its political setbacks. He urged party members to intensify efforts to take the EPDP's policies and proposals to the public through every available platform. ### Chinese Envoy Uses Xi Book Launch to Press for Closer Sri Lanka Ties URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/chinese-envoy-uses-xi-book-launch-to-press-for-closer-sri-lanka-ties/ Last updated: 2026-07-05T01:55:04.000Z **COLOMBO —** China's ambassador to Sri Lanka on Friday used a forum marking the release of the fifth volume of "Xi Jinping: The Governance of China" to press for deeper economic and political cooperation between the two countries, a year before they are to mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Speaking at the China-Sri Lanka Readers Forum at the Hilton Colombo, Ambassador Qi Zhenhong described the volume as an authoritative compilation of President Xi Jinping's latest thinking and said it offered Sri Lanka "useful reference and inspiration" as the country works to revive its economy. The event drew a senior Chinese delegation and a cross-section of Sri Lankan officials. Among the guests were Hu Kaihong, deputy head of the Central Office of Cultural and Ethical Progress of China, and Yu Tao, vice president of the China International Communications Group, alongside Jagath Wickramaratne, the Speaker of Sri Lanka's Parliament; Madhura Senevirathne, deputy minister of education and higher education; and G. Weerasinghe, general secretary of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka. Mr. Qi said the volume, the latest in a series that began publication in 2014, set out what he called "new strategies, new perspectives, new assertions, and new requirements" for advancing Chinese modernization. He described the underlying ideology, Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, as "the Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21st century." Much of the address focused on Beijing's foreign-policy framework. Mr. Qi said the book elaborated on Mr. Xi's vision of "a community with a shared future for humanity" and traced the progress of three signature programs — the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. He noted that Mr. Xi had since proposed a fourth, the Global Governance Initiative, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin in September, which the ambassador said was aimed at building a "more just and equitable global governance system." Turning to bilateral relations, Mr. Qi said the two countries' friendship spanned more than 2,000 years and tied the themes of the volume to Sri Lanka's own development goals. He said Beijing was ready to deepen cooperation in areas including port economy, modern agriculture, the digital economy, new energy and poverty reduction, and to strengthen coordination under the Belt and Road Initiative. He noted that next year would mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries. The forum was one of a series of events China has organized abroad to promote the governance series, which Beijing presents as a guide to understanding its political system. Mr. Qi said he was confident the fifth volume would become "a window" for Sri Lankans to understand China, adding, "The Volume V belongs not only to China, but also to the world." **Full text of the speech as delivered:** Hon. Hu Kaihong, Deputy Head of Central Office of Cultural and Ethical Progress of China, Hon. Jagath Wickramaratne, Speaker of the Parliament of Sri Lanka, Hon. Madhura Senevirathne, Deputy Minister of Education and Higher Education, Hon. Yu Tao, Vice President of China International Communications Group, Hon. G. Weerasinghe, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends, Good afternoon! It is a great honor to gather here with you today for the China-Sri Lanka Readers Forum on Xi Jinping: The Governance of China(Volume V). Together, we will jointly explore the profound theoretical insights and rich practical achievements of this book. I would like to extend warm welcome to all the distinguished guests, and express my heartfelt gratitude to friends from all walks of life who have long been caring for and supporting China and China-Sri Lanka relations. Just now, Hon. Hu Kaihong delivered an in-depth and systematic exposition of the core tenets and rich essence of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China(Volume V), with a focus on China-Sri Lanka cooperation and exchanges. I believe that everyone here has gained a deeper understanding of the stances, viewpoints, as well as methods contained therein. Hon. Yu Tao will provide further elaboration later. I would like to take this opportunity to share a few reflections from my own study. This work demonstrates that Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era is broad and profound, while keeping pace with the times. This thought is the Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21st century. It embodies the finest of the Chinese culture and the Chinese spirit of our times, serving as a scientific guide for our endeavors to build a great country and advance national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization. Meanwhile, it has made a global contribution to people of all countries in enhancing cultural exchanges and mutual learning, jointly pursuing modernization, and addressing the common challenges confronting humanity. The Volumes I to IV systematically reflect the development trajectory and key content of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Since the publication, the series have drawn widespread attention and sparked strong responses, playing a vital role in helping the international community gain a comprehensive and accurate understanding of China’s path, China’s governance, and China’s philosophy. The Volume V, sharing the same origins with the preceding volumes, stands as an authoritative work that systematically presents the latest achievements of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. It vividly presents new strategies, new perspectives, new assertions, and new requirements for advancing Chinese modernization, and elucidates the governance experience of the Communist Party of China—such as putting people first, deepening reform and opening up, and upholding fundamental principles while breaking new ground. It helps countries around the world further grasp the“intellectual key”to understanding a real China and enables them to accurately decode the secret of how China’s governance has succeeded. This work articulates China’s latest approaches to grasping the major trend and following the right path to address global challenges.Nowadays, the international landscape is witnessing turbulence and transformation. Against this backdrop, the Volume V offers a profound elaboration on the rich connotations and practical achievements of the vision of building a community with a shared future for humanity. It further provides a scientific answer to the pressing questions of how to respond to a changing world. It also charts the progress of the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative in building a better world. Furthermore, it fully demonstrates China’s broad vision and sense of responsibility in bringing new momentum and new opportunities to the world through its own new development. Following the publication of the Volume V, President Xi Jinping put forward the Global Governance Initiative at the SCO Tianjin Summit, advocating for building a more just and equitable global governance system. The four major global initiatives, interwoven and organically integrated, light the way forward for a world searching for direction and contribute China’s wisdom and solutions to building a shared future of prosperity and well-being for all. This work provides new inspiration and guidance for the continued development, revitalization, and win-win cooperation of China and Sri Lanka. The China-Sri Lanka friendship, spanning over two thousand years, has always remained deep-rooted and flourishing. As China forges ahead along the new journey of building a great country and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization, Sri Lanka is also striving to boost economic development, improve people’s livelihoods, and realize the vision of “a thriving nation, a beautiful life.” The guiding principles and practical pathways set forth in the Volume V on deepening reform comprehensively, expanding high-standard opening-up, achieving high-quality development, and pursuing Belt and Road cooperation provide useful reference and inspiration for Sri Lanka. These contents also outline a new horizon for the two countries to join hands in advancing modernization and achieving common prosperity. Next year will mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Sri Lanka. China stands ready to continue working alongside Sri Lanka, further strengthen the synergy of development strategies, and deepen exchanges and cooperation in areas such as port economy, modern agriculture, digital economy, new energy, and poverty reduction. With our joint efforts, we can paint a more magnificent picture of building a China-Sri Lanka community with a shared future. The Volume V belongs not only to China, but also to the world. It records the exploration and practice of an ancient civilization striding toward modernization, and it carries the reflections and sense of responsibility of a major country for the future of humanity. I am confident that Volume V will become a window for people from all walks of life in Sri Lanka to understand China in the new era. Let us build consensus through dialogue, enlighten one another through mutual learning, and forge the future through cooperation. Together, we can build a China-Sri Lanka community with a shared future, bringing greater benefits to our two peoples! In conclusion, I wish this Readers Forum a complete success! Thank you all! ### Why Ask a Quasi-Federal Indian Chief Minister to Back a Federal Sri Lanka? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/why-ask-a-quasi-federal-indian-chief-minister-to-back-a-federal-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T02:35:29.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** It really beats me how some Sri Lankan Tamil politicians continue to cling to a dead past even as they try to reinvent themselves in a world without the Tamil Tigers. It would have made sense if a team of Tamil leaders who called on Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Joseph Vijay confined themselves to the problems faced by Tamil fishermen in Sri Lanka and the Tamil refugees living in India. But old habits die hard. The delegation, led by Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, also pressed the actor-politician to back an international probe into alleged wartime atrocities on Tamils and support a federal power-sharing system in Sri Lanka. This is truly bizarre. India is a quasi-federal state in which the central government holds dominant powers, increasingly so in recent years. Some Indian states, which do enjoy authority in various areas, complain that New Delhi is steadily chipping away at their limited autonomy. This being so, how do you expect a politician in a quasi-federal India to call for a fully federal set-up in a neighbouring country? Also, why should Tamils, even sections of them, call for federalism in Sri Lanka after the LTTE’s (now late) Anton Balasingham was loudly denounced for suggesting in Oslo a solution within a federal framework to end the ethnic conflict? Is it because federalism was a dirty word when it was felt that an independent Tamil Eelam was around the corner, and that federalism is the new flag to flaunt since the homeland dream has crashed? There is no doubt that thousands – the precise figure is disputed – of innocent, non-combatant Tamils died during the end of the war in 2008-09\. No credible global investigation has taken place into the mayhem, though 17 years have passed. In all probability, no such inquiry will take place. Now, what is the point in asking a chief minister in India – mind you, not the Indian government -- to jump into the fray? Will Vijay’s appeal make any difference? Or is this demand meant to placate the pro-LTTE diaspora, which is known to fund “Tamil nationalist” politicians in Sri Lanka? As I said in an open letter to Vijay after he became the chief minister, the two subjects where he should try to be proactive relate to the Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka languishing for long years in Tamil Nadu and the grievances of the Tamil fishermen in the island’s north vis-à-vis their Tamil Nadu counterparts. Unfortunately, on the fishing row, most Tamil Nadu politicians tend to focus only on the repeated arrests of Indian fishermen and the confiscation of their vessels instead of understanding the reasons for the enormous losses suffered by the fishing communities in northern Sri Lanka. In any case, Vijay is not unaware that the Ponnambalam-led delegation had dismissed his political making with contempt when Tamil Nadu was ruled by the DMK and Vijay, new to politics, was struggling to woo voters. Ponnambalam and others had on an earlier trip to Chennai called on then Chief Minister M.K. Stalin, the AIADMK brass, and Seeman, who could not win a single seat in the Tamil Nadu Assembly compared to Vijay’s 108. Vijay (like any leader in Tamil Nadu) should certainly meet politicians from Sri Lanka, Tamils included, but must be wary of those who keep in their heart the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which was outlawed in India after it assassinated former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Vijay must remember that the “Tamil nationalist” leaders in Sri Lanka have never condemned the LTTE’s murder spree, including the gory killings of Gandhi and Sri Lankan leaders, as well as any number of Tamils deemed rivals at best and “traitors” at worst. Vijay should also note that Ilaiyaraaja, an accomplished senior in the Indian Tamil film industry, was forced to cancel a planned concert in Paris on July 4 because of appeals bordering on threats from pro-LTTE elements. Ilaiyaraaja, now 83, is no ordinary soul. He is a respected musician, composer, orchestrator, multi-instrumentalist, lyricist, and playback singer with a rich career of 49 years during which he has composed over 5,000 songs, provided film scores for nearly 1,000 feature films in nine languages, and performed in over 20,000 concerts. Such a man was vilified in posters put out by pro-LTTE Tamils in Paris and told to “get lost”. One bombastic pro-LTTE character gloated that they had written “polite” letters to Ilaiyaraaja but received no reply! And what was Ilaiyaraaja’s “crime”? The performance, arranged by some Sri Lankan Tamils, clashed with the Black Tigers event of July 5, when Tamils, according to LTTE sympathisers, are supposed to be in mourning and not attend musical or such joyful events. A similar community event of Tamils belonging to Inuvil in Jaffna was also axed in Toronto, Canada, after telephonic threats from pro-LTTE persons. Ilaiyaraaja is a Tamil from India and is not a member of the LTTE. Why should he be subjected to such a code? Who knows, one day pro-LTTE voices from Sri Lanka may inject this culture into Tamil Nadu and tell Vijay not to have any celebrations (including movie shows) on July 5 or the day Tamil Tigers chief Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed or any other days deemed important in the LTTE calendar. Those who forced the cancellation of Ilaiyaraaja’s concert in Paris were not “Tamil nationalist” politicians but activists allied to the LTTE. However, the political ecosystem of both categories is the same. This reminds me of a laughable claim the LTTE made during the time the Indian military was at war with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. A press release by the LTTE’s Paris representative, Lawrence Thilagar, claimed that it had “uncovered” a plot by the Indian intelligence to kill noted Indian Tamil playback singer T.M. Soundarrajan at a concert in the French capital and put the blame on the Tigers. The LTTE, it said, had saved him! Clearly, in all these years, the Tiger stripes have not changed. In 1988, the Tigers “saved” one Indian film personality in Paris, and in 2026, they “ousted” another Indian film personality from the same city. At the same time, in Chennai, "Tamil nationalist" politicians courted Vijay after having earlier treated him with disdain. Tamil leaders from Sri Lanka should discuss with the Tamil Nadu leadership concrete proposals that, through investment or collaboration, could improve the economic conditions in their country's economically battered north and east. And seek from Tamil Nadu support for the implementation of the 13th amendment of the Sri Lankan constitution and the much-delayed Provincial Council elections. Is the antipathy a result of the LTTE’s opposition to the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord that led to the Provincial Councils? When will Sri Lankan "Tamil nationalist" politics come out of its time warp? ### Mahinda Rajapaksa Rules Out Automatic Presidential Nomination for Namal URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/mahinda-rajapaksa-rules-out-automatic-presidential-nomination-for-namal/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T01:39:02.000Z **By: Asela Kuruluwansha** **COLOMBO —** Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa said on Saturday that the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) would choose its next presidential candidate based on public demand, adding that the party would not nominate his son, Namal Rajapaksa, unless the people wanted him to contest. "If the people do not ask for Namal, we are not prepared to make him the presidential candidate," Mr. Rajapaksa told reporters after paying homage at the Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy. The remarks come as Sri Lanka's main opposition parties continue to reassess their leadership and electoral strategies following last year's presidential and parliamentary elections. Mr. Rajapaksa said he was saddened by the country's current situation and pledged to rebuild and strengthen the SLPP by reuniting factions that had drifted apart. He also dismissed suggestions that he was preparing to retire from politics, saying he believed he still had more to contribute to the country. The former president further criticized the government, alleging that it lacked an understanding of the challenges facing Sri Lanka's farming community. ### When India's Intelligence Listened to Prabhakaran and Balasingham URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/when-indias-intelligence-listened-to-prabhakaran-and-balasingham/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T13:08:40.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “Are you still angry with me?” This was Anton Balasingham’s poser to Tamil Tigers chief Velupillai Prabhakaran as the two men spoke over the telephone in an attempt to make up after some two years of frosty ties. The conversation took place months before the fourth and final Eelam War broke out in August 2006, which militarily destroyed the once awesome Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and decimated its leadership. Addressing the LTTE founder-leader as *Veera Maarthandar*, Balasingham asked Prabhakaran whether he still felt angry with him. When Prabhakaran insisted that he was not at all upset with Balasingham, the latter sought to know why he had been sidelined then for almost two years after having served the Tigers so faithfully for so long. The pain in Balasingham’s voice was evident. As the two men spoke, Indian security services monitored the conversation in real time from one of their intelligence hubs in southern India. India's technical and human intelligence capabilities against the LTTE were far more extensive than even the Tiger leadership had feared. Clearly at his diplomatic best, Prabhakaran replied that he stopped consulting Balasingham out of concerns over the latter’s deteriorating health. That Balasingham was battling serious health issues was widely known. His wife, Adele, a former nurse from Australia, had in later years warned him against travelling to the LTTE's lair in Sri Lanka, fearing that even a mosquito bite could prove life-threatening because his immune system had become so severely weakened. The lack of physical contact only widened the gulf between Prabhakaran and Balasingham, who had known each other since the early 1980s. A former Tamil journalist, Balasingham, who considered himself a Marxist, moved closer to Prabhakaran when the latter was a largely unknown personality. Once the LTTE carried out an ambush that killed 13 soldiers in Jaffna in July 1983, triggering a Tamil separatist campaign in earnest, Balasingham came to be seen as an ideologue of the Tamil Tigers. Although the two men appeared to get along well despite their 16-year age gap, Balasingham, who never wielded a gun, always had his differences with the younger LTTE leader. This remained true even while he was based in India. Balasingham expressed his views to those he trusted, even outside the LTTE circles. But Prabhakaran chose to ignore the pinpricks, probably out of consideration for Balasingham’s age and wider exposure to the world. Balasingham was seated next to Prabhakaran at the press conference in Kilinochchi in April 2002 following the Norway-brokered ceasefire between the LTTE and Colombo. That is when he gloated that the LTTE chief was the “President and Prime Minister of Tamil Eelam”. But their decades of friendship unravelled within months. In December 2002, Prabhakaran was furious after Balasingham signed the “Oslo Declaration” that committed the LTTE to explore a political solution based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. This was anathema to Prabhakaran, who was determined to carve out a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka's north and east and for whom peace talks were merely a stepping stone to an independent Tamil Eelam. The LTTE leader was so enraged that he tore up the Oslo Declaration when a copy reached him in Kilinochchi, then the LTTE's administrative hub. From 2003, Prabhakaran began to ignore Balasingham, who became a kind of recluse even as the peace talks between Colombo and the Tigers continued, although haltingly. Even after their renewed ties following the telephonic conversation, Balasingham remained critical of Prabhakaran’s limited worldview, warning a select few who met him in London that the LTTE would meet its nemesis if it ignited a war again with the Sri Lankan state. His concerns mounted after Karuna, the Tamil Tigers' long-time eastern regional commander, revolted in April 2004, seriously weakening the once-monolithic LTTE. Among others, Balasingham complained to Erik Solheim, the Norwegian peace facilitator, that some senior LTTE leaders were responsible for the rupture in his relationship with Prabhakaran because they were jealous of the warm and enduring personal bond the two men shared. Balasingham admitted frankly that his desire was to see an end to the conflict in Sri Lanka before he died, with the Tamil side getting its due honour. Although the telephonic conversation monitored by the Indians ended the chill between the two men, Balasingham and Prabhakaran did not become the close chums they were for long years. On his part, Balasingham became more and more critical of Prabhakaran as his health began to worsen. He did not reveal his mind publicly. He knew the LTTE supremo did not like anyone contradicting him, that too publicly. But he continued to tell Tamils who met him that Prabhakaran had stopped listening to his sage advice and refused to see reason that any future armed showdown with Sri Lanka would prove to be disastrous to the Tigers. He also stunned the LTTE leadership and its sympathisers by issuing a virtual apology over the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, calling the crime “a monumental historical tragedy”. Balasingham died in London, his base for long years, in December 2006 due to cancer and other health complications. Amid the war, Prabhakaran conferred the title *Thesathin Kural* (Voice of the Nation) on Balasingham. By then, the last of the LTTE-Sri Lanka war was underway. In less than three years, the LTTE and its military brass would become history. This is precisely what the politically astute Balasingham had feared could happen. ### Former Navy Chief's Arrest Renews Focus on Sri Lanka's Unresolved 'Navy 11' Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-navy-chiefs-arrest-renews-focus-on-sri-lankas-unresolved-navy-11-case/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T01:39:06.000Z **COLOMBO —** The arrest on Friday of Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda on corruption allegations, followed by his release on bail later the same day, has renewed questions among many Sri Lankan Tamils, human rights advocates and families of the disappeared, not over the decision to arrest him in the corruption case, but over why he has never been taken into custody in connection with the long-running investigation into the disappearance of eleven civilians during the final stages of Sri Lanka's civil war. Karannagoda, 73, was arrested by investigators from the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption after appearing before the commission in Colombo. He was later released on bail after being produced before the Colombo Chief Magistrate's Court. The case concerns the alleged recruitment in 2006 of Yoshitha Rajapaksa, son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, as a cadet executive officer despite not meeting required qualifications, and his subsequent training at Britain's Britannia Royal Naval College using public funds outside established procedures, according to investigators. The allegations are unrelated to the long-running "Navy 11" investigation, one of Sri Lanka's most controversial wartime criminal cases, in which Karannagoda was once named as a suspect before prosecutors withdrew the case against him. That contrast has become the focus of public debate, particularly in Sri Lanka's Tamil-majority North and East, where enforced disappearances remain among the most painful legacies of the civil war. "If the state can arrest him over a recruitment file, why has it never arrested him over the disappearance of eleven young men?" is a question increasingly being asked by relatives of the missing, civil society activists, and many Tamil social media users following Friday's arrest. The "Navy 11" case concerns eleven civilians who disappeared after allegedly being abducted in Colombo between August 2008 and February 2009. According to Criminal Investigation Department findings presented in court, the victims — most of them Tamils, along with several Muslims and one Sinhalese man — were allegedly abducted by naval intelligence personnel, held at naval facilities in Colombo, transferred to secret detention sites inside the Trincomalee naval base, and never seen again. Investigators said relatives later received ransom demands amounting to millions of rupees. Some families paid, believing their sons would be released. None returned home. Court proceedings have heard that one victim, Rajiv Naganathan, telephoned his mother and told her he was being held by the Navy before all communication stopped. Nearly seventeen years later, none of the eleven has been found. Ironically, the investigation itself originated from a complaint lodged by Karannagoda. In May 2009, after a dispute with his personal security officer, Lieutenant Commander Sampath Munasinghe, Karannagoda reported him to police. During a search of the officer's quarters, investigators recovered identity cards belonging to several of the missing men, leading the inquiry to expand into one of Sri Lanka's largest wartime disappearance investigations. Following renewed investigations after the change of government in 2015, the Criminal Investigation Department named Karannagoda as the fourteenth suspect in 2019. Prosecutors alleged that naval personnel operating under his command carried out the abductions and that he bore command responsibility because he was informed of the operation but failed to prevent or investigate it. Karannagoda has consistently denied all wrongdoing and has never been convicted of any offence related to the case. In August 2021, however, the Attorney General's Department informed the court that it would not proceed against him, citing a confidential report. He was formally discharged from the case two months later. The decision drew criticism from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Amnesty International, both of which said it dealt a significant blow to accountability for one of Sri Lanka's most prominent enforced disappearance cases. International scrutiny has continued. The United States imposed visa restrictions on Karannagoda in 2023, while the United Kingdom sanctioned him in 2025 with an asset freeze and travel ban over alleged gross human rights violations. Domestically, however, petitions seeking to overturn the Attorney General's decision remain pending before the Supreme Court. For many families of the disappeared, Friday's arrest therefore represented a paradox. The first time Karannagoda was taken into custody, it was not over the allegations connected to one of Sri Lanka's most notorious wartime disappearance cases, but over an alleged abuse of recruitment procedures. For many relatives of the missing and human rights advocates, Friday's arrest was therefore met with mixed reactions. They acknowledged it as a sign that President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's government is prepared to pursue corruption allegations involving politically influential figures. But they also questioned whether the administration would show the same resolve in reviving one of the country's most consequential unresolved criminal investigations. Nearly two decades after the eleven young men disappeared, the central question for those families remains unchanged: whether this government will move to restore accountability in the Navy 11 case, or, like successive administrations before it, leave one of Sri Lanka's most enduring disappearance investigations unresolved. ### Court Order Sets Stage for Constitutional Test of Governor's Powers URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/court-order-sets-stage-for-constitutional-test-of-governors-powers/ Last updated: 2026-07-05T01:36:40.000Z **VAVUNIYA, Sri Lanka —** A Sri Lankan court has temporarily blocked the Northern Province governor from enforcing his decision to remove the elected mayor of Vavuniya, setting off a broader constitutional dispute over the powers of unelected governors in the absence of provincial councils. The Vavuniya High Court on Friday granted interim relief suspending a Gazette notification issued by Northern Province Governor Nagalingam Vethanayahan, removing Vavuniya Municipal Council Mayor Sundaralingam Kandeepan from office and stripping him of his seat as a councillor. The court also barred authorities from acting on the notification or taking steps to appoint a replacement mayor until further orders. The respondents have been directed to appear before the court on July 15, when they are expected to present their case. Until then, the interim orders will remain in force. The ruling came after Kandeepan filed a writ petition challenging the governor's decision. The respondents, although served with notice, did not appear when the case was called. Appearing for the mayor, President's Counsel and acting General Secretary of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), M.A. Sumanthiran, argued that the governor's action raised fundamental constitutional questions extending far beyond the removal of a single elected official. He contended that the case required the court to determine whether, in the prolonged absence of elected provincial councils, a governor could lawfully exercise all powers ordinarily vested in the provincial minister of local government. Sumanthiran relied on the Supreme Court's determination on the Divineguma Bill, in which the court held that the views of the then Northern Province governor, G.A. Chandrasiri, could not substitute for those of an elected provincial council during the years the north had none. That reasoning, he argued, pointed to a broader principle: that the powers of an elected provincial administration do not automatically pass to an appointed governor merely because no council has been elected. He further argued that the governor had failed to observe the principles of natural justice by removing the mayor without disclosing the reasons for doing so. According to Sumanthiran, the governor neither informed Kandeeban of the grounds for his removal nor provided reasons even after they were requested, and the two allegations against the mayor were unsupported by any evidence. The judge initially indicated that the court might first hear the respondents before deciding whether interim relief was warranted. But after nearly two hours of submissions supported by constitutional arguments and judicial precedents, the court concluded that immediate intervention was justified and granted the interim orders sought by the petitioner — suspending the Gazette notification, barring officials from acting on it, and restraining authorities from electing or appointing anyone in Kandeepan's place, as mayor or councillor, pending further proceedings. The order is the first time a court has suspended one of Governor Vethanayahan's gazetted removals of an elected local government official. The dismissals have drawn criticism from opposition politicians and constitutional lawyers, who say they test the limits of executive authority under Sri Lanka's devolved system of government. Kandeepan had been removed under Section 277 of the Municipal Councils Ordinance after an inquiry commissioned by the governor. The Gazette stated that the governor was satisfied that the mayor was unfit to continue in office, but did not publicly set out the factual basis for that conclusion. The governor's office has maintained that the removals followed independent inquiries and fell within the powers the law confers on him. The case is expected to become an important test of the constitutional relationship between provincial governors and elected local authorities, at a time when Sri Lanka's provincial councils have remained dissolved for years, leaving governors to exercise powers that would ordinarily be subject to political oversight by elected provincial administrations. ### After Passing Over Vijay, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalist Leaders Seek His Support URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/after-passing-over-vijay-sri-lankan-tamil-nationalist-leaders-seek-his-support/ Last updated: 2026-07-04T15:51:09.000Z **CHENNAI, India —** A delegation of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist leaders who once passed over Vijay when he was an opposition politician met him Friday as Tamil Nadu's chief minister, marking a striking reversal as the actor-turned-politician completed his rapid rise to power. The seven-member delegation from the Tamil National People's Front-led Tamil National Council held talks with Mr. Vijay at the Tamil Nadu Secretariat in Chennai, presenting a memorandum on Sri Lankan Tamil political rights, alleged wartime atrocities, federalism, refugee issues, and the dispute involving Indian and Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen. According to multiple sources familiar with the discussions, the meeting came only after weeks of efforts by the delegation to secure an appointment with the new chief minister. The visit stands in contrast to the delegation's previous engagement in Tamil Nadu before the state's last election. During that trip, the group met then-Chief Minister M.K. Stalin, opposition leader Edappadi K. Palaniswami, Naam Tamilar Katchi leader Seeman, and several other political figures. One notable omission was Vijay. At the time, people familiar with the Tamil National People's Front's internal deliberations told *Jaffna Monitor* that the party leadership saw little political future for the actor, who had only recently entered politics, and therefore chose not to seek a meeting with him. Less than six months later, Vijay occupies the state's highest elected office, while the same Sri Lankan Tamil leaders have now sought his support on some of the most sensitive issues facing Tamils in Sri Lanka. ### **The Common Broker** Both the earlier visit to meet Mr. Stalin and other Tamil Nadu leaders, and Friday's meeting with Mr. Vijay, were facilitated by the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), led by Thol. Thirumavalavan. At the time of the earlier visit, Mr. Thirumavalavan's party was an ally of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) government headed by Mr. Stalin. It is now aligned with Mr. Vijay's Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK). Friday's meeting was attended by VCK minister Vanniarasu, who serves in the Tamil Nadu government as Minister for Social Justice and Empowerment and Minister for Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare. In a statement issued after the meeting, the delegation reiterated its familiar demands, urging Mr. Vijay to back an independent international investigation into alleged atrocities against Eelam Tamils and to support a federal political settlement recognizing Tamil national sovereignty, before turning to more practical issues such as cross-border fishermen's disputes and the long-standing concerns of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India. ### At Freedom 250 Celebration, U.S. Embassy Hails Cinema as America’s Global Gift URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/at-freedom-250-celebration-u-s-embassy-hails-cinema-as-americas-global-gift/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T07:41:17.000Z **COLOMBO** — Addressing several hundred guests on the floodlit grounds of the United States Embassy on Thursday evening, the senior American diplomat in Sri Lanka framed the 250th anniversary of American independence not around treaties or trade, but around the movies. "Tonight, we celebrate 250 years of American independence by honoring one of our nation's greatest gifts to the world — the art of cinema," said Jayne Howell, the chargé d'affaires who has run the embassy since January. For more than a century, she said, American filmmakers had used their creative freedom "to craft stories that resonate across every border and culture," casting cinema as an expression of the same liberties the United States was marking that night. The event, branded "Freedom 250," commemorated the signing of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, two days ahead of the anniversary itself. The chief guest was Nalinda Jayatissa, the Minister of Health and Mass Media and cabinet spokesman for President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's government, who joined government officials, diplomats, and business leaders on embassy grounds converted for the night into an open-air cinema. Howell has led the mission as chargé d'affaires since Jan. 17, following the departure of Ambassador Julie Chung, who left Colombo after nearly four years. The top diplomatic post remains formally unfilled: the White House nominated the career diplomat Eric Meyer in July 2025, but his appointment awaits confirmation by the U.S. Senate, leaving Howell as the acting head of mission. The celebration unfolded against a strained economic backdrop. In her remarks, Howell described a partnership "built on opportunity and shared democratic values," sustained through trade, investment, and security cooperation. That language comes as Sri Lankan exporters absorb a 20 percent U.S. tariff — reduced from a 44 percent rate first announced in April 2025 — with apparel and tea shipments, the island's principal earners in the American market, already showing signs of strain this year. The United States remains Sri Lanka's single largest export destination. Much of the evening was given over to the cinematic theme. Howell traced a lineage that ran, in her telling, from the opening of what she called the world's first dedicated movie theater in New Orleans in 1896, through Disney's *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs* — which she described as the first full-length animated feature — to modern spectacles such as *Avatar*, *Star Wars,* and *Jurassic Park*. She invoked *The Wizard of Oz*, *E.T.*, *Forrest Gump,* and the space documentary *Apollo 11* as stories she said spoke to courage, wonder, and resilience. For the local audience, the most resonant reference was *The Bridge on the River Kwai*, the 1957 Best Picture winner shot on the Kelani River near Kitulgala — a production that Howell noted had "forever" linked the island to Hollywood history. An open-air screening under the stars followed, stitching together clips that moved from early silent films through the "bullet time" effects of *The Matrix* to Christopher Nolan's *The Dark Knight*, which the embassy cast as an example of the superhero film turned toward questions of justice and society. The evening closed with fireworks over the Colombo skyline and a set by the III Marine Expeditionary Force Band, the U.S. Marine Corps' forward-deployed band in the Indo-Pacific, based in Okinawa, Japan. Guests were served a menu built around American beef and other U.S. food and beverages — a nod, the embassy said, to the country's agricultural exports. Closing her address, Howell returned to the theme of freedom — "the freedom to tell any story," she said, "to show America at its best and its most complex" — and cast it as the value the anniversary was meant to honor. ### Former Sri Lankan Navy Chief Arrested Over Rajapaksa Son's Recruitment URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-sri-lankan-navy-chief-arrested-over-rajapaksa-sons-recruitment/ Last updated: 2026-07-04T02:06:56.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s anti-corruption commission arrested a former navy commander, Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, on Friday over the 2006 recruitment of a son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa into the navy and his subsequent officer training in Britain at state expense, deepening an inquiry into how the country’s most powerful political family bent state institutions to its purposes. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, known as CIABOC, said Admiral Karannagoda was taken into custody at about 10:05 a.m. at its premises in Colombo and was to be produced before the Colombo Chief Magistrate’s Court. Investigators contend that the way the recruitment and the overseas placement were arranged amounts to an offense of corruption. The arrest had been coming for weeks. The commission said it had summoned Admiral Karannagoda twice, on June 16 and again on June 22, to record a statement on the matter, and that he had not appeared on either date. He was detained after finally presenting himself. The case centers on Yoshitha Rajapaksa, the second son of Mr. Rajapaksa, who was president from 2005 to 2015 and remains one of the island’s most influential figures. Yoshitha Rajapaksa, 38, a former naval officer, was himself arrested by the commission on June 17 in connection with the same recruitment and later released on bail on three personal bonds, ordered to surrender his passport and barred from leaving the country while the investigation proceeds. ### **What investigators allege** According to the commission’s findings, the standard requirement for a cadet officer entering the Navy’s executive branch was a pass in the sciences or mathematics at the Advanced Level examination. Mr. Rajapaksa had sat his Advanced Levels in the arts stream and, investigators say, did not meet that bar. The commission alleges that the recruitment criteria were then revised and fresh advertisements issued in a manner that matched his academic record; concerns raised over his Ordinary Level qualifications were said to have been resolved in the same way. He enlisted in December 2006. Investigators say that in September 2006, Admiral Karannagoda, then the commander of the Sri Lankan Navy, wrote directly to the Royal Naval College in Britain seeking a place for Mr. Rajapaksa, bypassing normal channels. The college replied in November that a place could be arranged, but would not be offered on a full scholarship and would have to be paid for. Mr. Rajapaksa traveled to Britain in January 2007 and trained there for more than 18 months, the commission says, with the cost borne by the Sri Lankan treasury. Prosecutors have argued that he was sent before completing the basic training required of every cadet at the Naval and Maritime Academy in Trincomalee. The commission has framed the alleged offence as aiding and abetting corruption. ### **This is not the Navy 11 case** Friday’s detention has nothing to do with the enforced disappearance of the “Navy 11” — eleven youths, most of them Tamil, abducted for ransom between 2008 and 2009 and held at naval facilities in Colombo and at the underground “Gun Site” detention cells inside the Trincomalee base before they vanished. None have been found; all are presumed murdered. Admiral Karannagoda was named in 2019 as the 14th suspect in that case, on the basis of command responsibility, before the Attorney General dropped the charges against him in 2021 — a decision condemned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and by Amnesty International. He was afterward appointed governor of the North Western Province by then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Petitions by the victims’ families to reinstate the charges remain before the Supreme Court. ### **A wider reckoning** Admiral Karannagoda holds the honorary five-star rank of Admiral of the Fleet, the highest in the Sri Lanka Navy. In March 2025, Britain sanctioned him for gross human rights violations; the United States had earlier imposed a visa ban after the State Department described the allegations against him as serious and credible. The recruitment inquiry is one strand of a broadening effort by CIABOC under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, whose government took office pledging to dismantle networks of political patronage. Yoshitha Rajapaksa is already out on bail in separate money-laundering proceedings; on the day of his father’s associate’s arrest, the Court of Appeal dismissed a revision application he had filed in one such case. ### The Pilgrim Dog That Walked Into a Religious Firestorm URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-pilgrim-dog-that-walked-into-a-religious-firestorm/ Last updated: 2026-07-04T15:51:11.000Z **JAFFNA** — It began as a small miracle on a long road. Somewhere along the Pada Yatra, the two-month foot pilgrimage that winds from the Tamil north down to the shrine of Kataragama, in Sri Lanka’s deep south, a stray dog fell in step with the devotees and simply kept walking. Moved by the animal’s persistence, the pilgrims named him Subramani, another name for Lord Murugan, the deity to whom Kataragama is sacred. It is also the name of the puppy that Kamal Haasan and Sridevi dote on in Balu Mahendra’s 1982 classic, *Moondram Pirai*. The devotees marked the dog’s forehead with holy ash and watched, with growing wonder, as he walked beside them for hundreds of kilometres. For more than a month, an animal that had survived on the street and on scraps of meat ate only what the pilgrims put in front of him: biscuits, bread, milk and rice, all vegetarian. To many, he became an emblem of faith and discipline. Carried by social media, his supposed holiness travelled far beyond the pilgrim column. Subramani became a celebrity. Then, in Kalmunai, a young Muslim man kicked him, for reasons known only to himself. The act, filmed and shared online, turned a beloved animal into a communal fault line. A section of Tamil Saiva social media erupted. Muslims widely condemned the assault, and the suspect — later arrested and released on bail — apologised. But extremists on both sides seized the moment, and a story about kindness to a stray curdled into something older and more dangerous. One abusive comment aimed at a Hindu sacred symbol drew a response far more dangerous: an insult against the Prophet Muhammad. The man who posted it, a Sri Lankan Tamil named Anojan who works in Saudi Arabia, was arrested by the Saudi police and is now reportedly under interrogation. In Saudi Arabia, insulting Islam or the Prophet can carry grave consequences. Online offences may be prosecuted under the kingdom’s cybercrime law, which tends to produce prison terms and heavy fines. Blasphemy and apostasy, however, fall under a religious legal framework that can be treated far more harshly. The kingdom has no codified penal code; judges rule according to their own interpretation of Sharia, and outcomes are notoriously unpredictable. Rights monitors and the U.S. State Department note that blasphemy can in principle carry the death penalty, though no such sentence for speech alone has been carried out in recent years. Across Sri Lanka’s Muslim community, many have called for mercy. Some argued that if the Prophet were alive today, he would have forgiven the offence. Others, from a harsher fringe, demanded severe punishment in the name of Sharia. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/07/the-pilgrim-dog-that-walked-in-w_EEuU-kixwfjp1om0w7pu.png) Subramani, meanwhile, keeps making headlines. Officials of the Department of Wildlife Conservation have appealed to the public to stop feeding him sugary yoghurt and milk, warning that the constant offerings appear to have pushed up his blood sugar, and have asked well-wishers not to lift or kiss him. They have also ruled that the dog will not be allowed to walk the final forest stretch, which begins at the Okanda Murugan Temple, where pilgrims enter dense jungle, because of the risk of leopard attacks. Instead, wildlife officials will take Subramani through the same forest route by vehicle, before reuniting him with the pilgrims at the far end of the jungle so that the little pilgrim can complete the final leg of his journey to Kataragama alongside the devotees. ### The Party at 105: China Makes Its Case to Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-party-at-105-china-makes-its-case-to-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T11:07:52.000Z **COLOMBO —** China's ambassador to Sri Lanka, Qi Zhenhong, used a reception marking the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China to defend Beijing's political system, promote its global development agenda, and signal deeper engagement with Sri Lanka's political parties under the leadership of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Addressing politicians from across Sri Lanka's political spectrum, diplomats and government officials, Mr. Qi said the Communist Party of China had transformed the country through poverty reduction, economic growth, and technological innovation, while portraying China as a force for global stability and development. "The leadership of the CPC is the choice of history, and more importantly, the choice of the people," Mr. Qi said, describing the party's rule as the foundation of China's modernization and national rejuvenation. The ambassador linked China's domestic achievements to its expanding international role, highlighting the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing's Global Development, Global Security, Global Civilization, and Global Governance initiatives. He said the proposals had been embraced by nearly 160 countries and international organizations and demonstrated China's commitment to peace, development, and international cooperation. Mr. Qi also emphasized growing ties with Sri Lanka following recent high-level exchanges between Beijing and Colombo, saying the meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake had "mapped out a new blueprint" for bilateral relations. He said relations between the Communist Party of China and Sri Lanka's political parties would remain a key pillar of the broader partnership. Beijing, he said, was prepared to expand exchanges on governance, poverty alleviation, digital-city development, and people-to-people cooperation while adhering to the principles of mutual respect, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs. The reception brought together representatives of Sri Lanka's major political parties, including Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna General Secretary Tilvin Silva, Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna General Secretary Sagara Kariyawasam, United National Party Chairman Wajira Abeywardena, and Communist Party of Sri Lanka General Secretary G. Weerasinghe, alongside ministers, lawmakers, and members of the diplomatic corps. Mr. Qi also echoed Beijing's broader foreign policy message, arguing that the world faced unprecedented changes requiring greater international solidarity. "To walk with China is to walk with opportunities; to believe in China is to believe in tomorrow; to invest in China is to invest in the future," he said. He concluded by calling for closer cooperation between China and countries around the world to promote what he described as lasting peace, common prosperity, and a "community with a shared future for humanity." ## **Full Text of H.E. Ambassador Qi Zhenhong's Speech at the Reception Celebrating the 105th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China** ## ## **Honorable Tilvin Silva, General Secretary of JVP,** **Honorable Sajith** **Premadasa, Leader of the SJB,** **Honorable Sagara** **Kariyawasam, General Secretary of the SLPP,** **Honorable Wajira Abeywardena, Chairman of the UNP,** **Honorable G. Weerasinghe, General Secretary of the CPSL,** **Honorable Leaders of other political parties,** **Honorable Ministers, Members of Parliament,** **Excellencies and Members of the Diplomatic Corps,** **Distinguished guests,** **Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,** **Good evening!** It is a great pleasure and privilege to gather with all of you to celebrate the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC). On behalf of the Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka, I would like to extend my warmest greetings and heartfelt gratitude to all our distinguished guests! Today, a gathering was held in Beijing to celebrate the 105th anniversary of the founding of the CPC. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, delivered an important speech at the gathering, reviewing the glorious journey the CPC has traversed /ˈtrævərst/ and looking ahead to the bright prospects for the development of the cause of the CPC and the Chinese people. A China that is constantly advancing toward modernization will surely provide more opportunities for the world, inject more momentum into international cooperation, and make greater contributions to the progress of humanity. One hundred and five years of journeying through trials and hardships, one hundred and five years of remaining true to our original aspiration. Born at a time of national peril, the CPC grew through arduous struggles, and thrived during the era of reform and opening-up. From Shikumen, where the Party was founded, to Tiananmen, where New China was proclaimed; and from Xingye Road, home to the Party's birthplace, to Fuxing Road, a symbol of the great journey toward national rejuvenation, our Party has always breathed the same breath, shared the same destiny, and linked its heart with the people. History has demonstrated a profound truth: the leadership of the CPC is the choice of history, and more importantly, the choice of the people; it is an inevitable outcome of practice, and a calling of the times. Dear friends! Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, have upheld fundamental principles while breaking new ground, kept pace with the times, and written a magnificent chapter for the new era. **Seeking happiness for the people**, we have won the battle against poverty and completed the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects. Our achievements in poverty reduction have drawn worldwide attention, and improvements in livelihoods are shared by all. With the education, medical care, and social security systems fully covering both urban and rural areas, the 1.4 billion Chinese people enjoy a profound sense of gain, happiness, and security. **Seeking rejuvenation for the nation**, Chinese modernization is advancing with steady and rapid strides. China's total economic output has exceeded 140 trillion CNY, and its status as the world's largest trading nation remains solid. From the "Chang'e" lunar exploration to the "Fendouzhe" deep-sea submersible, from high-speed trains speeding across the country to our leading position in 5G, technological innovation changes with each passing day, and China's major strategic equipment continues to set new milestones. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible historical course. **Seeking progress for humanity and harmony for the world**, President Xi Jinping proposed the building of a community with a shared future for humanity, which has been written into UN resolutions and become a global consensus. The Belt and Road Initiative connects oceans and continents, and the China-Europe Railway Express traverses thousands of miles, injecting strong momentum into global development. The four major initiatives—the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative—have systematically responded to the questions of the times, of history, and of the people, contributing Chinese wisdom and offering Chinese solutions. These Chinese proposals and initiatives have been embraced by nearly 160 countries and international organizations. China remains a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, and a defender of the international order. Dear friends! The friendship between China and Sri Lanka dates back to ancient times, and the exchanges between our political parties have forged a deep bond. The CPC and various political parties in Sri Lanka treat each other with mutual respect and equality. We exchange views on state governance and seek ways for common development. The successful meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has mapped out a new blueprint for China-Sri Lanka relations. Inter-party relations are an important component of China-Sri Lanka relations, and party-to-party exchanges have played a vital role in deepening bilateral communication and cooperation. On the basis of the principles of "independence, complete equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs," the CPC stands ready to strengthen the exchange of governance experience with all political parties in Sri Lanka, advance pragmatic cooperation in poverty alleviation and digital cities, and promote people-to-people bonds and shared interests. Looking into the future, we look forward to working together with the Sri Lankan side to fully implement the important consensus reached by the two heads of state, hand in hand explore development paths suited to our respective national conditions, promote the building of a China-Sri Lanka community with a shared future of strategic significance, and bring more benefits and greater dividends to the two peoples. Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends! In today's world, changes unseen in a century are accelerating, and the torrent of the times calls for solidarity and mutual assistance. Facing the grand questions of "What has happened to the world and how should we respond?" the CPC is willing to join hands with all countries, guided by the four major initiatives, to promote the construction of a clean and beautiful world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness, and inclusiveness. 105 years marks a historical milestone, and more importantly, the starting point of a new journey. The CPC always walks with the people and advances with the times. It is evident that to walk with China is to walk with opportunities; to believe in China is to believe in tomorrow; to invest in China is to invest in the future. Standing at a new historical starting point, we are ready to work with political parties and peoples of all countries—to follow the right path of the world, create a better future together, shoulder the mission of the times, and compose a new chapter of win-win cooperation! Now, I propose a toast: To the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, To the good health and prosperity of all distinguished guests, And to the deep friendship and common prosperity of the peoples of all nations, Cheers! ### After Court Blow, Sallay Faces Return to the CID He Called a ‘Hell Hole’ URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/after-court-blow-sallay-faces-return-to-the-cid-he-called-a-hell-hole/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T15:49:27.000Z #### **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka –** Former Sri Lankan intelligence chief Suresh Sallay has finally ended three weeks of hunger strike, but his legal quagmire seems to be worsening. Just when it seemed that public opinion was swaying towards Sallay, detained on charges of orchestrating the bloody 2019 Easter bombings, the judiciary has dealt multiple blows at a man who once headed the country’s feared security apparatus. His family and admirers admit it is going to be a long – and tough – road ahead for the former Director of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), who was arrested in February. On Wednesday, the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court ordered Sallay to provide the passwords to his mobile phone and laptop to the Central Investigation Department (CID) to facilitate further investigation. This is something the former spymaster had been stalling for more reasons than one. Magistrate Pasan Amarasena also rejected a plea to remove CID Director Shani Abeysekara – who Sallay feels is responsible for his physical and psychological torture in CID custody – from the ongoing investigation. Sallay’s plea to be provided with writing materials and his request to make a confidential statement were also turned down. The court ruling – a rude jolt to Sallay – came hours after his lawyer announced that the ex-SIS Director had agreed to give up his indefinite fast, which he began on the night of June 5 in protest against his alleged degrading treatment in custody. Two days later, as his health condition deteriorated, he was shifted to the Colombo National Hospital, where he later developed complications of the heart. Sallay’s wife, Manori, told Jaffna Monitor that the decision to end the hunger strike was taken as doctors felt that would be the best course for him from the medical point of view. “Dehydration was aggravating the heart problem,” she said. “Accordingly, he ended the fast before the court hearing.” In no time, doctors allowed Sallay to drink water orally, though he found it difficult to swallow. The family supplied yoghurt to the hospital on Wednesday night as part of a slow return to normal food intake The doctors are expected to start administering him semi-solid food to begin with, before switching to solid food. This is expected to be a gradual process. But the court ruling could mean that with his fast ended, Sallay may be shifted back to the CID detention, which Sallay had earlier said he won’t accept again after calling it a “hell hole”. A close friend of Sallay called the court ruling “a real blow”. “This is very, very annoying,” the source said. “It looks like he won’t get any reading or writing material in custody. “And if he is suddenly sent back to CID custody, it will only add to his health issues as it will take him time to get used to normal food.” One of the major complaints Sallay made while in CID detention was that the food provided to him was, at times, rotten, and that even rice and curry were given to him on paper, not in a plate. The next court hearing has been scheduled for September 2\. Since the second 90-day period of CID custody will end on August 27, it is feared that his custody will be extended by another 90 days. “All this is very distressing,” said a family friend who did not want to be quoted by name. Sallay’s wife, Manori, said she was extremely worried about the impact her husband’s prolonged detention was having on their two children – a boy and a girl. “Obviously, they are upset, and this is affecting their studies,” she said. “The court case we can fight, but what do I do about the children’s suffering?” Another family source said Sallay’s lawyer convinced him that he needed to end the fast because he needed energy to fight a long battle against custodial torture and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). Sallay has been arrested under the draconian PTA, which was first enacted in 1979 and which successive governments have refused to repeal despite criticism within Sri Lanka and abroad that it has been misused to target government critics, particularly those from the Tamil and Muslim minorities. Decades of criticism by Tamils about the harsh PTA was generally dismissed by most Sinhalese as unwanted criticism. But the mood has changed among sections of Sinhalese-Buddhist hardliners since Sallay’s own arrest. On his part, Sallay has repeatedly denied allegations that he was in any way linked to the April 2019 Easter bombings blamed on Islamists, which killed over 260 people and wounded hundreds. It was the worst terror attack in Sri Lanka since the military crushed the Tamil Tigers in 2009. The case against Sallay relies primarily on the claim by a Sri Lankan Muslim who alleged, after fleeing to Europe, that he arranged a meeting between Sallay and the Islamists. The Muslim, widely known as Azad Maulana, quoted Sallay has telling him that Sri Lanka needed to be destabilized so as to bring back to power Gotabaya Rajapakasa, who, as Defence Secretary, oversaw the war against the Tamil Tigers. Many who knew Azad Maulana have debunked his claim, saying it was made to seek political asylum in Europe. Maulana has refused to return to Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan ministers have told Parliament that they have enough evidence to act against Sallay, but have produced no proof in any court. Recently, however, President Anura Dissanayake said that security forces were indeed involved in the Easter bloodbath as well as in the killing of a former newspaper editor and the savage attacks on two other journalists who then fled Sri Lanka. Authorities have since put a travel ban on former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too. A similar travel ban was placed on Sallay before he was taken into custody. ### Exiled Sri Lankan Muslim Woman Writer Renews Calls for Inquiry Into Easter Bombing Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/exiled-sri-lankan-muslim-woman-writer-renews-calls-for-inquiry-into-easter-bombing-case/ Last updated: 2026-07-04T03:27:18.000Z A prominent exiled Muslim woman writer has renewed calls for Sri Lankan authorities to explain why a man who arranged covert medical treatment for the brother of the 2019 Easter Sunday bombing mastermind was released without ever being brought to trial. In a Facebook post this week, Sharmila Seyyid, a novelist and activist who has lived in the United States since 2021 after years of threats from Islamist extremists in Sri Lanka, said she had filed two formal complaints — with the Criminal Investigation Department and the Terrorism Investigation Division — alleging that the man, Riza Marzook, played a deliberate role in concealing evidence connected to the bombings that killed 269 people. Marzook, an engineer who was working in Saudi Arabia at the time, has said he believed he was simply helping a burn victim and was unaware of any connection to a terrorist plot. He was returned to Sri Lanka by the Criminal Investigation Department, questioned at length, and ultimately released without prosecution — a sequence of events Seyyid’s post argues was never adequately explained to the public. ### **The Kattankudy connection** According to Seyyid’s account, the case traces back to August 2018, months before the Easter attacks, when an explosive device detonated in the hands of Ilham Hashim, known as Rilwan, the brother of attack mastermind Zahran Hashim, during a bomb-making attempt in Kattankudy, in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. Rilwan lost an eye, suffered severed fingers, and sustained severe burns, Seyyid wrote. Members of the National Thowheeth Jama’ath, the extremist group behind the bombings, removed Rilwan from the scene before police arrived and told both residents and officers that a household gas cylinder had exploded, causing a minor injury, according to the post. Kattankudy police recorded it as a routine accident. Seyyid wrote that because Sri Lankan law requires hospitals to notify police of any patient treated for explosion or gunshot injuries, Rilwan was kept out of the state hospital system entirely. Marzook, she said, arranged for a doctor he knew at Colombo National Hospital to advise on the injuries remotely, sending photographs of the wounds from Saudi Arabia. Zahran Hashim later traveled to Colombo under an alias to arrange his brother’s continued treatment in secret, according to the post, with medicines purchased privately and procedures carried out outside any hospital. ### **Questions about the investigation** Seyyid’s post questions how Marzook secured release from custody without facing court proceedings. She wrote that Marzook has consistently maintained the same account he gave investigators — that he had been told only that someone had been injured in a cylinder explosion, and that he acted on humanitarian grounds. In the months following the Easter Sunday bombings, more than 2,200 people — overwhelmingly Muslims — were arrested under emergency regulations and Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act, a law long criticized by human rights groups for permitting prolonged detention without trial, according to figures cited by Seyyid. Authorities later narrowed that number to 735 people identified as having direct links to the attacks or the broader extremist network. Of those, 493 have since been released on bail, while 196 remain in detention. Court proceedings are continuing against 81 people accused of leading the network or providing financial and logistical support. Meanwhile, 24 alleged principal conspirators, including Naufar Moulavi, Mohamed Ibrahim, and Milhan, remain in custody under a single High Court case involving more than 23,000 individual charges, a volume of material Seyyid said has significantly delayed the proceedings. Seyyid also wrote that Marzook’s public persona since his release, as an organic farmer, masks what she described as the continued, indirect promotion of Wahhabi ideology. ### **A wider reckoning online** Seyyid’s post is the latest contribution to an increasingly heated debate among sections of Sri Lanka’s Muslim community over the legacy of a man critics accuse of helping build the ideological ecosystem that allowed Wahhabi extremism to take hold in the country and, ultimately, to produce the Easter attacks. After years out of public view, Marzook has re-emerged presenting himself as an organic farmer who has moved on from his past. Critics argue he has neither publicly acknowledged nor apologized for his prior activities, nor expressed any regret for the role they believe he played in fostering religious extremism. In recent days, hundreds of Sri Lankan Muslims have shared accounts on social media describing how they say they were ostracized, harassed, or branded enemies of Islam by Marzook and his associates after speaking out against Wahhabi ideology and extremism. Some wrote that their past association with him, or with the wider network they say surrounded him, brought them under police scrutiny after the Easter Sunday attacks, leading to arrests, prolonged investigations, and lasting personal hardship. Many of those voices argue that although Marzook has adopted the public image of an organic farmer, his underlying ideological convictions remain unchanged. Marzook could not immediately be reached for comment. ### "Like Anura's Mouth": Pillayan Calls Charges 'False Accusations' URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/like-anuras-mouth-pillayan-calls-charges-false-accusations/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T07:41:56.000Z **BATTICALOA, Sri Lanka** — Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the former state minister better known as Pillayan, was ordered held in custody on Tuesday over a separate series of killings dating to 2008, even as the terrorism investigation that has kept him imprisoned for more than a year over the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings has yet to produce a single criminal charge. Mr. Chandrakanthan, a former chief minister of the Eastern Province and one-time commander of the breakaway Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, was remanded until July 13 by the Batticaloa Magistrate’s Court after investigators named him a suspect in five murders committed across the Eastern Province in 2008. It was his first appearance before a court in the Eastern Province since officers from the Criminal Investigation Department arrested him in Batticaloa in April 2025\. Security was heavily reinforced in and around the courthouse. Prosecutors told the court on June 15 that the five victims were killed with T-56 assault rifles in a series of attacks throughout 2008\. According to investigators, two men — including a former police officer — were shot near the Murugan Temple in Kallady on Jan. 9\. Two more were killed along a main road in Kattankudy on May 22, and another man was abducted before being shot in the Vavunathivu area on Aug. 20. Two co-accused were remanded last month, while another suspect is believed to have fled the country. Mr. Chandrakanthan was already being held at Welikada Prison in Colombo when the new case was filed. He remains in custody over the 2006 abduction and killing of Prof. S. Raveendranath, the vice chancellor of Eastern University, Sri Lanka. Prof. Raveendranath disappeared after an administrative meeting on Dec. 15, 2006\. The Criminal Investigation Department alleges that he was taken to a clandestine detention and torture site at Sevanapitiya, where he was killed and his body burned. Investigators have identified Mr. Chandrakanthan as the principal suspect in that case. As the prison bus departed the courthouse on Tuesday, Mr. Chandrakanthan rejected the allegations, shouting to reporters in Tamil that the accusations were fabricated. “Like Anura’s mouth,” he said, referring to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, “all of them are false accusations.” When the Criminal Investigation Department arrested Mr. Chandrakanthan at his party headquarters on April 8, 2025 — just days before the sixth anniversary of the Easter Sunday bombings that killed 269 people — the arrest immediately fueled speculation that investigators had uncovered evidence linking him to the deadliest terrorist attack in Sri Lanka's history. Within 48 hours, Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala told Parliament that investigators had obtained information connecting Mr. Chandrakanthan to the Easter bombings. In the months that followed, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake repeatedly cited the arrest as evidence that long-delayed justice was finally moving forward. By July, Mr. Wijepala went further, telling Parliament that Mr. Chandrakanthan had prior knowledge of the attacks and had met their leader, Zahran Hashim. Yet when Mr. Chandrakanthan was finally produced before the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court on April 2 this year, after spending 359 days in detention under the Prevention of Terrorism Act without appearing before a judge, prosecutors filed no charge related to the Easter attacks. Instead, the proceedings focused exclusively on the 2006 killing of Prof. Raveendranath. Monday’s remand concerned an entirely separate set of killings from 2008. More than a year after his arrest, no indictment or charge sheet has been filed linking Mr. Chandrakanthan to the Easter Sunday bombings. The contrast has drawn increasing scrutiny from legal observers, who note that the government’s strongest assertions were made in Parliament, where lawmakers enjoy parliamentary privilege, while court proceedings have centered on unrelated criminal investigations. “If the government possessed sufficient evidence linking him to the Easter attacks, as it repeatedly told Parliament and the public, why has it still not filed a single charge?” said one observer who has closely followed the proceedings. Mr. Chandrakanthan’s supporters have consistently rejected the allegations. His former lawyer, Udaya Gammanpila, has argued that the accusation was implausible because Mr. Chandrakanthan was himself being held on remand when the Easter bombings took place in April 2019, leaving him, he said, no practical means of orchestrating the attacks. ### Sri Lanka Sends Its Largest Force to Haiti. Its Past Goes With It. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-sends-its-largest-force-to-haiti-its-past-goes-with-it/ Last updated: 2026-07-02T16:38:28.000Z **COLOMBO —** More than a thousand Sri Lankan soldiers and police officers are preparing to deploy to Haiti in August, the largest single contingent the country has ever sent abroad — and a return, after more than a decade, to the same Caribbean nation where its peacekeepers were once documented running a child sex ring that went unpunished. The deployment, announced by the government, comprises 900 army personnel drawn from several regiments, 189 officers of the Police Special Task Force, and, for the first time, 43 female soldiers trained in demining and explosive ordnance disposal — a total of 1,132\. The battalion will travel with armoured vehicles, locally manufactured Uni Buffel troop carriers, and two bulletproof vehicles supplied by the Presidential Security Division. Human rights organisations tracking the mission have referred to a force of roughly 900 soldiers and 140 police, and say an advance team was expected in Port-au-Prince within days. The personnel will join the Gang Suppression Force, or G.S.F., a U.S.-backed multinational mission authorised by the U.N. Security Council to help Haitian security forces claw back territory from the armed groups that control much of Port-au-Prince. Although the Council mandated it, the force is not a U.N. peacekeeping operation; troop contributions are coordinated by a U.S.-led Standing Group of Partners, with logistical support from a new U.N. office in Haiti. Fifteen countries have pledged more than 11,500 personnel for a force of 5,500. On June 26, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake told departing peacekeepers they represented an armed force committed to "the protection, democracy and human rights of oppressed people wherever they may be" — a lofty description of an institution that has spent decades facing allegations of enforced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings and attacks on journalists at home. ### **A call to halt the deployment** On June 25, fourteen rights and advocacy groups — among them the International Truth and Justice Project, the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice, and People for Equality and Relief in Lanka — issued a joint statement addressed to the United Nations, the Haitian government, and the partners overseeing the force. They demanded that the deployment be suspended until an independent, credible vetting mechanism is established, with meaningful participation by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and full access to relevant U.N. records. “No individual should be deployed without an independent assessment of involvement in past violations,” the groups said. They argued that any official whose own conduct or command role created an actual or perceived conflict of interest should play no part in supervising, certifying, or approving the screening. The organisations also pressed the U.N. and the G.S.F. to retain the names, photographs, and DNA records of every deploying officer before departure, so that any allegation of sexual violence or paternity could later be investigated, and to establish a confidential, victim-accessible complaints mechanism inside Haiti. ### **The Legacy of Abuse** The coalition’s alarm is rooted in what happened the last time Sri Lankan troops served in Haiti. Between 2004 and 2007, under the U.N. Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, a confidential investigation by the U.N.’s Office of Internal Oversight Services found that at least 134 Sri Lankan peacekeepers, spread across six battalions, had sexually exploited and abused Haitian children. The findings were made public in 2017 by an Associated Press investigation that obtained the internal report. Nine children were identified as victims, some as young as eight. Investigators documented a sustained ring in which children were passed from soldier to soldier in exchange for food, small sums of cash — sometimes only $3 to $5 — cookies, juice, or a mobile phone. One girl told investigators she was first raped at twelve, before, in her words, her body had begun to change. A boy known in the report as Victim No. 9 said that over three years, he had been abused by more than a hundred Sri Lankan peacekeepers, on some days four in a single day. The U.N. concluded the abuse was systematic, occurred across multiple sites, and that some commanding officers were aware of it, and in certain cases involved themselves. Of the roughly 950-member contingent, 114 peacekeepers were sent home. Not one was ever imprisoned. Because the United Nations holds no criminal jurisdiction over national troops, prosecution was left to Sri Lanka, which never charged a single soldier with sexual assault or misconduct committed on a peacekeeping mission. ### **An inquiry that cleared its own** Sri Lanka’s own response did little to reassure investigators. A team dispatched to Haiti in late 2007 interviewed only about two dozen soldiers out of more than 900 in the country and concluded that just a handful had any contact with victims. Years later, the government said it had examined the cases of only 18 personnel, and that the U.N. Secretariat had, as of September 2014, considered the matter closed. In 2016, the state made a one-time ex gratia payment to a single victim and her child. A subsequent abuse complaint in 2013 was investigated for the army by Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias, who cleared the accused soldier without interviewing the complainant or the medical staff who had examined her. Dias himself stood accused of atrocities during Sri Lanka’s civil war; he was nonetheless later promoted to army chief of staff. Rights advocates note that the commanders of all six battalions implicated in the original sex ring went on to rise through the ranks. ### **A vetting process advocates do not trust** Sri Lanka’s government says it is developing a National Human Rights Vetting Mechanism for all troops bound for U.N. field missions, and a delegation led by the defence secretary, Air Vice Marshal (Retd.) Sampath Thuyacontha discussed screening requirements with U.N. officials in New York in April. The State Department, which is overseeing the assembly of the force, says it condemns “any and all acts of sexual exploitation and abuse,” that contributing countries operate under strict guidelines, and that it has found no evidence of prior violations by the incoming Sri Lankan personnel. It added that the U.N. human rights office had conducted its own vetting. The coalition disputes this. The current process, it argues, leans too heavily on self-certification and diplomatic consultation — falling short of the independence international standards require. The groups say at least one proposed candidate has already been rejected by the U.S. embassy, which they contend shows the danger of letting the Sri Lankan military screen its own. If red-flagged individuals are being put forward at all, they argue, a process built on good faith has already failed. Frances Harrison, director of the London-based International Truth and Justice Project, said advocates seeking information on who is being screened had been passed between U.N. departments and given no clarity on accountability for the past allegations. “When everyone has a mandate, but no one owns responsibility, accountability disappears,” she said. She noted that among those seeing the soldiers off in Sri Lanka was a man who had been deputy commander of one of the six battalions implicated in the original abuse, and who has since risen in the military. ### **Impunity that begins at home** For the coalition, Haiti is the downstream symptom of a deeper problem: a military that has never been held to account for the conduct of its own war. During the final months of the armed conflict against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009, tens of thousands of Tamil civilians were killed in the Mullivaikkal pocket of the north-east. A 2015 U.N. investigation found evidence of conduct that, if proven, would amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity — indiscriminate shelling, the bombing of hospitals, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and the execution of surrendering combatants. No senior figure has ever been prosecuted in Sri Lanka. In February 2020, the United States barred Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva — commander of the army’s 58th Division in 2009 and later Chief of Defence Staff — and his family from entry, citing “gross violations of human rights.” In December 2021 Washington designated Sunil Ratnayake, convicted of murdering eight Tamil civilians at Mirusuvil, and a naval intelligence officer. In January 2023, Canada sanctioned former presidents Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. And in March 2025, the United Kingdom imposed asset freezes and travel bans on three former commanders — Silva, the former navy chief Wasantha Karannagoda, and the former army commander Jagath Jayasuriya — along with the ex-paramilitary leader Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as Karuna Amman. Successive governments have rejected those measures as unwarranted interference, and the present administration has been no exception. Colombo called the British sanctions a “unilateral action” that would complicate reconciliation, insisting that past violations be addressed through domestic mechanisms. President Dissanayake, elected in 2024 on a reformist platform, has pursued corruption cases vigorously but declined to move against those implicated in wartime atrocities, and has continued to meet senior officers, including some who remain under sanction. ### **Another lesson learned too late** The concerns are not hypothetical. The force the Sri Lankans are joining already carries a fresh stain: a recent U.N. report implicated members of the earlier Kenya-led mission in at least four cases of sexual violence, including the alleged rape of a 12-year-old girl, in the same Artibonite region where the Sri Lankan contingent is expected to operate. Kenya rejected the findings, though its own inquiry, the Miami Herald reported, was conducted by investigators who spoke neither Creole nor French. The coalition has been careful to say it is not arguing that Sri Lanka can never contribute to peacekeeping. Its objection is narrower and, it argues, more fundamental: that a contingent drawn from a military with a documented record of abuse in Haiti, and a structural pattern of impunity at home, is being sent back without a transparent, independently verifiable screening in place. “Haiti cannot afford another lesson learned too late,” Harrison said. Survivors, she added, deserve justice, and accountability and credible vetting must come before deployment — not after. ### Sri Lanka–India Media Fest Returns to Colombo With Focus on Journalism's Future URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-india-media-fest-returns-to-colombo-with-focus-on-journalisms-future/ Last updated: 2026-07-02T07:43:06.000Z **COLOMBO —** A media-industry body that works to deepen ties between Sri Lanka and India will hold the second edition of its annual Media Fest in the capital on July 11, the organizers said. The Sri Lanka–India Media Friendship Association, known as SLIMFA, said the gathering would take place at the Taj Samudra hotel under the theme “Staying Relevant in a Changing World.” It follows the association’s inaugural festival, held over two days in April last year at the same venue. The association said the event aimed to share best practices and deepen media friendship between the two countries, combining panel discussions, training workshops, interactive learning sessions, and networking to support professional development for media professionals from Sri Lanka and India. This year’s program will examine how journalism and media can adapt to shifting technology, economics, and audience habits while upholding the values of accuracy, independence, verification, and public trust, the association said. Sessions are expected to cover audience engagement, misinformation and fact-checking, digital transformation, media sustainability, new storytelling formats, and the future of news consumption. The program will feature keynote addresses and panel discussions with speakers from India, including Smita Prakash, editor at the news agency ANI; Marya Shakil, managing editor at India Today; and Ashok Malik, a former adviser in India’s Ministry of External Affairs now with the strategic advisory firm The Asia Group, alongside industry figures from Sri Lanka, the association said. The festival is open to journalists, editors, publishers, broadcasters, content creators, communication professionals, and journalism students, SLIMFA said. SLIMFA was inaugurated in May 2024 under the patronage of the Indian High Commission in Colombo and is led by its president, Nisthar Cassim, the editor of the Daily FT. The association says it was set up to strengthen media ties between the two countries and has since organized roundtables, discussions, professional exchanges, and a masterclass on artificial intelligence in journalism. Its first Media Fest, in April 2025, carried the theme “Navigating the New Media Landscape Together” and was inaugurated by Satyanjal Pandey, then the acting Indian High Commissioner, and Nalinda Jayatissa, the minister of mass media. That edition featured Indian journalists, including Palki Sharma of Firstpost, Sidhant Sibal of WION, Shailesh Shekhar of the India Today Group, and L.V. Krishnan, chief executive of TAM Media Research. Seating for the event is limited, the association said, and registration and further details are available on the festival website, mediafest.lk. Additional speakers and the full program are to be announced in the coming weeks. ### Brutal Attacks on Journalists Now Haunt the Rajapaksas URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/brutal-attacks-on-journalists-now-haunt-the-rajapaksas/ Last updated: 2026-07-02T07:43:27.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa was meeting exporters at Temple Trees when his phone rang. The businessmen noticed the President listening attentively to the person on the other end. His demeanour changed as the call ended, but he continued with the meeting. None of those discussing the problems faced by exporters with the President knew that Lasantha Wickrematunge, one of Sri Lanka's most independent and fearless journalists, had been gunned down just minutes earlier near the offices of *The Sunday Leader* in Colombo in a commando-style operation. The date was January 8, 2009, months before the military pulverized the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and slaughtered thousands of Tamils in the blood-soaked Northern Province. The war was supervised by Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Mahinda’s younger brother and the all-powerful Defence Secretary. Lasantha’s audacious murder was condemned around the world. *Reporters Without Borders* openly blamed Mahinda, who claimed the killing was an attempt to discredit his government. Much later, former army chief Sarath Fonseka, who himself came under attack over Lasantha’s assassination, alleged that Gotabaya had ordered the strike. Gotabaya kept mum. Fellow journalist Keith Noyar was marginally lucky. The Associate Editor of *The Nation* was seized by unidentified thugs near his home in May 2008, mercilessly beaten and tortured for seven agonizing hours, and then dumped writhing in pain. ![Keith Noyahr after he was severely wounded in an attack by unidentified assailants in 2008.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/brutal-attacks-on-journalists-FT9GGE-kix3a4087wl6065.png) Keith Noyahr after he was severely wounded in an attack by unidentified assailants in 2008. Only 12 days earlier, Noyar, another respected journalist, had written a column titled “An army is not its commander’s private fiefdom”. Around that time, Gotabaya had warned that journalists who published reports that harmed security forces were “traitors”. After the harrowing experience, Noyar fled Sri Lanka for Australia. Less than two weeks after the Tamil Tigers were crushed, another leading journalist in Sri Lanka, Poddala Jayantha, was abducted by men in a white van while walking near his home in a Colombo suburb. He was also the general secretary of the Working Journalists Association. His attackers thrashed him but did not kill him. He suffered leg and head injuries. His head and beard had been partially shaved. Jayantha later left for the United States. ![Poddala Jayantha](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/brutal-attacks-on-journalists-FT9GGE-kix6ngkzjngjw6e.png) Journalist Poddala Jayantha, who survived a brutal abduction and assault in 2009. No one was arrested in any of the three cases, even after the Rajapaksas lost power, returned to office, and were finally ousted in 2022 following Sri Lanka’s economic crash. Now, President Anura Dissanayake has told parliament that security forces were involved in all three attacks, making an implicit connection to the Rajapaksas, whom he did not name. There is hardly any Sri Lankan, whatever the ethnicity, who believes that Lasantha – who was hugely popular and whose funeral drew thousands – could have been assassinated without the sanction of those who ruled the island nation or those close to them. Noyar and Jayantha were so brazenly assaulted only because the attackers felt they enjoyed the protection of the powers that be. It is another matter whether Dissanayake’s government would be able to join the various dots – some of which would have faded by now - and pin down the Rajapaksas over the savagery. But this is where the three cases differ from the 2019 Easter Day bombings, which killed more than 260 people and which Dissanayake put in the same bracket as the attacks on the three journalists. The Easter bloodbath has divided Sri Lanka, both despite and because of the arrest of former intelligence head Suresh Sallay and allegations that he orchestrated the carnage in order to help Gotabaya to return to power. That case hinges on a widely discredited claim by a Sri Lankan Muslim that it was he who introduced the Islamists to Sallay. While Sallay has been in prison since February, and the government claims that it has proof of his involvement in the Easter bombings, no charges have been filed in any court. While the Easter mayhem happened when the Rajapaksas were out of power, attacks on and abductions of journalists were widespread when they ruled Sri Lanka with an iron fist. The crushing victory over the once seemingly invincible LTTE only seems to have emboldened them further. The fear of the Rajapaksas was such that it was said in Sri Lanka that they could do and get away with anything. Frederica Jansz, who succeeded Wickrematunge as the Editor of *Sunday Leader*, was allegedly threatened by Gotabaya, who reportedly used vile language. She told *Reporters Without Borders* that Gotabaya warned her that she would get killed. “People will kill you!!! People hate you!!!” When she asked if this would happen on his directive, Gotabaya went on: “What?? No. Not mine. But they will kill you – you dirty f…..g shit journalist.” It was not the first time Jansz had been threatened. When Reporters Without Borders asked why she thought Gotabaya had threatened her over the phone, she replied: “Gotabaya Rajapaksa is the second most powerful man in Sri Lanka, next to his brother, the President. He enjoys complete immunity, coupled with the trappings of power inherent in the highest office in this land — and that of the President.” This is not the first time Rajapaksa has threatened journalists. In fact, he has succeeded in cowing Sri Lanka’s journalists into submission. They are terrified of this man and will not dare challenge his abuse of power.” Jansz was asked if there was really no accountability for officials in Sri Lanka. Her answer: “Not where Gotabaya Rajapaksa is concerned. No.” According to published reports, at least 14 journalists were killed in Sri Lanka in the decade since Mahinda Rajapaksa became the president in 2005\. It is not without reason that *Reporters Without Borders* put him on its list of “Predators of the Freedom of the Press”. The Committee to Protect Journalists ranked Sri Lanka on its “Global Impunity Index,” citing numerous unresolved killings of journalists during the Rajapaksa era. It is this malaise during the Rajapaksa era that President Dissanayake has vowed to expose. His statement reveals what was already known: that the killings, abductions and torture of journalists were carried out by security personnel in civilian clothing. They probably used service weapons to commit the murders. The questions are: Who gave the orders? Who has protected them all these years? While Dissanayake’s attempt to deliver justice must be welcomed, Sri Lanka seems ethnically divided even at this hour! Two of the three journalists the President named are Sinhalese; their attackers must also be, in all probability, Sinhalese from the security forces. What about the non-combatant Tamils who were killed in thousands, particularly towards the end of the war? What about the Tamils who were jailed and tortured on mere suspicion that they may be Tamil Tigers? While these happened under successive governments, they touched a new high under the Rajapaksas. Will Dissanayake ensure justice to Tamils too? ### Reforming the State: Why Independence, Accountability and Technology Must Converge URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/reforming-the-state-why-independence-accountability-and-technology-must-converge/ Last updated: 2026-06-27T03:00:50.000Z **By: Jeevan Thiyagaraja** Sri Lanka's public service, a legacy of British colonial administration, faces persistent challenges in maintaining independence and integrity amidst evolving political landscapes. . While designed to operate on principles of meritocracy and impartiality, it has been profoundly shaped by the political dynamics of post-independence history. By 2015, growing public dissatisfaction fuelled calls for more independent and corruption-free public services. A decade later, numerous indictments and court cases have implicated public officials, highlighting the ongoing struggle for accountability and integrity. The public service remains a challenging domain, characterised by island-wide transferability, provincial rotations, diverse cultural contexts, and varying demands. This context raises fundamental questions about the essence of public service, the imperative for its independence, and the ideal balance between autonomy and accountability. In the World Bank's most recent Worldwide Governance Indicators, Sri Lanka's Government Effectiveness score for 2023 was 41.04%, placing it in roughly the lower two-fifths of nations worldwide. This stark figure illustrates the tangible gap between constitutional design and lived reality when institutional stability is compromised. ### **Why Independence Must Be a Constitutional Component, Not an Administrative Courtesy** Wanasinghe's account already answers, in effect, why reform bodies need independence: every implementing unit he traces — the Salaries and Cadres Committee, the Ministry's stripped-out policy division, the donor-funded RMU — failed not because its mandate was wrong but because it had no protected standing of its own. Each lived inside a ministry, a budget cycle, or a donor project that someone else controlled, and each was reshaped or starved the moment its host's priorities changed. The lesson generalises beyond personnel reform: in Sri Lanka, anything that depends for its survival on an ordinary parliamentary majority or a single minister's goodwill will eventually be unwound by exactly that majority or that minister, regardless of how sound its design was on paper. This is why the comparison to the Constitutional Council, the Public Service Commission, the National Police Commission, and the Human Rights Commission matters. These bodies show that Sri Lanka already knows how to build independent institutions — the constitutional language and appointment machinery exist. What the country has not yet done is apply that same architecture to the body responsible for administrative reform itself, or entrench the independence already granted to the others so it cannot be reversed by the next government with the right numbers in Parliament, as happened repeatedly across the Seventeenth to Twentieth Amendments. Treating administrative reform capacity as a constitutional component — rather than a unit inside the Ministry of Public Administration — would mean three things in practice. First, the appointment of its head and core team should follow a process similar to the Constitutional Council's nomination procedure, requiring cross-party concurrence rather than a single appointing authority, so the institution survives a change of government. Second, its core funding should be a charge on the Consolidated Fund or an equivalent ring-fenced vote, not an annual ministry allocation that can be quietly reduced, and not a donor project that expires with its funding cycle — the flaw that sank the UNDP-staffed RMU. Third, its existence and core functions should require a constitutional or, at minimum, a specially entrenched statutory basis, so that abolishing or hollowing it out demands the same supermajority that creating it required, not a simple amendment Act. Independence of this kind is not an end in itself. It exists to protect a specific capability: the ability to say that a ministry's structure is irrational, that a cadre is bloated, or that a transfer was retaliatory, without that finding depending on whether the minister currently in charge wants to hear it. Wanasinghe's seven Secretaries in six years is the cautionary case — an institution whose leadership changes that often cannot accumulate the standing to make findings stick. An independent, long-tenured body can. ### **Accountable to Whom?** Independence without accountability is its own failure mode, and Wanasinghe was alert to this — his ARIA proposal paired independence from line-ministry control with a deliberately layered reporting structure: quarterly to a Presidential Cabinet sub-committee, half-yearly to Parliament, and continuous to the public through active dissemination. That three-tier design is worth taking seriously as a template, because each tier answers a different question. Reporting to a Cabinet sub-committee answers the question of executive coordination — does the reform body's work align with government priorities, and can the executive flag operational problems quickly, without that channel becoming a vehicle for the executive to redirect or quietly bury findings it dislikes. Reporting to Parliament answers the question of democratic legitimacy — can elected representatives, including the opposition, examine what the body has found and what it has done about it, in public session, on the record. Reporting to the public answers the question that the first two cannot: can a citizen, a civil society organisation, or a journalist independently verify that the first two channels are functioning, or whether a quarterly Cabinet report and a half-yearly parliamentary report have, in practice, become a formality nobody reads. This third tier deserves more weight than Wanasinghe's report could give it in 1994, before routine digital publication was possible. A reform or implementation body accountable chiefly to two closed institutional audiences is accountable in name only if those audiences have no external pressure to act on what they receive. Publishing findings, cadre data, project timelines, and outcome metrics on a standing public portal — not as occasional press releases but as a continuously updated record — converts accountability from a private exchange between the executive and the body into something the public can check. The HRCSL's experience is instructive here: its formal reporting lines exist, but its referrals to the Attorney General have not reliably produced visible follow-up, partly because there has been no statutory deadline forcing a response and no public dashboard making the absence of a response conspicuous. The fix proposed for that case — a statutory duty on the Attorney General to prosecute, decline in writing, or refer onward, within a fixed deadline — is really a generalisable accountability mechanism: pair every independent finding with a forcing function and a public record of whether the forcing function was honoured. So "accountable to whom" has no single correct answer — it is all three at once, and weakening any one of them reproduces the conditions under which Wanasinghe's earlier reform bodies quietly died, unaccountable to anyone because no one outside government was watching, and unaccountable inside government because oversight had no teeth. ### **Technology as the Implementing Layer: A Worked Example** Wanasinghe's report is fundamentally about coordination failure — the same problem recurring whether the task was cadre rationalisation across ministries or, in the later devolution discussion, reconciling national policy with provincial authority. Multi-agency coordination problems of exactly this kind are still Sri Lanka's default condition, and they are visible in concrete, present-day tasks like greening urban open spaces or improving the welfare of poor households. Both cases illustrate why technology — used carefully — is less a separate initiative than a tool for solving the institutional-custody problem Wanasinghe diagnosed. Take a greening example. Responsibility if given of all open space in an urban area would typically split across the Urban Development Authority, the Forest Department, the Irrigation Department, central and provincial planning authorities, water resource board and the relevant local government body — five or more institutions, each with a legitimate claim on part of the decision, none with full authority over the outcome. This is structurally identical to the fragmented-custody problem Wanasinghe documented for administrative reform itself: when responsibility is split this many ways, the default outcome is not balanced coordination but inaction, because no single agency bears the cost of the space staying unused and degraded, and any agency that tried to act unilaterally would be acting outside its mandate. A shared digital register — a single geospatial layer where every open space in a local authority's jurisdiction is mapped once, with its land-use status, governing authority or authorities, current condition, and any ongoing or planned intervention visible to all five institutions and to the public — does not by itself solve the coordination problem, but it removes the most common excuse for it: that no one had visibility into what the others were doing or planning. Layering simple automated tracking on top of that register — flagging spaces with no recorded activity for a defined period, or surfacing spaces where two agencies have logged conflicting plans — turns a static map into something closer to an early-warning system, prompting a human decision rather than making one. This is a modest, realistic role for AI in this kind of work: pattern-spotting and prioritisation across data that already exists but is currently held in five incompatible filing systems, not autonomous decision-making about which trees to plant where. The same logic extends more directly to household-level welfare work, where the stakes are higher and the margin for error is smaller. A family's quality of life depends on inputs from Samurdhi/Aswesumna welfare transfers, Social Services Department casework, district health services, school enrolment and attendance systems, Divisional Secretaries and often local government infrastructure — water, sanitation, roads — each tracked, if tracked at all, in a separate system that does not talk to the others. A family flagged as vulnerable in one system is frequently invisible in the others, not because any single agency is failing at its own task, but because no one holds the composite picture. Here the system's job is narrower than in the greening case: identifying, from existing administrative records, which households show multiple compounding risk indicators — for instance, a household combining welfare-eligibility flags with a health-system record of malnutrition risk and a school record of irregular attendance — and routing that composite case to a named caseworker, rather than leaving each agency to notice its own slice of the problem independently and usually not in time. Two design principles should govern this kind of system, precisely because the underlying task touches vulnerable people and because Sri Lanka's own recent history with both Samurdhi and Aswesumna targeting has shown how badly automated eligibility decisions can misfire when there is no effective appeal channel. First, AI-supported systems of this kind should inform and prioritise human casework, not make eligibility or enforcement decisions unsupervised — the technology's job is to make the existing bureaucracy notice problems faster and more consistently, not to replace the judgment of a social services officer or a Grama Niladhari who knows the household. Second, every automated flag needs a visible, appealable trail: a family or a citizen affected by a system-generated decision must be able to see why it was made and contest it through a human channel, echoing the same logic as the reversed burden-of-proof and mandatory show-cause protections proposed elsewhere for officers facing retaliatory action — due process is not a luxury that gets dropped once a decision is automated, it is exactly the point at which due process matters most. Equally important, and consistent with the wider reform agenda Wanasinghe pointed to but the 1986–87 Committee never directly addressed, this kind of coordination cannot be purely technocratic. A geospatial registry of open spaces or a household risk-flagging system designed entirely by central planners, with no community input, will reproduce the same blind spots as the centrally-administered economy Wanasinghe argued Sri Lanka's bureaucracy had been built for and had not yet escaped. A mixed model — government systems providing the data infrastructure and the AI-supported triage, community structures (Grama Niladhari divisions, school development societies, community-based organisations, local civil society) providing ground-level verification, contesting flags that don't match lived reality, and proposing interventions the data alone would miss — is both more accurate and more legitimate than either a purely top-down or purely informal approach. It also gives the technology a check against the single greatest risk of administrative data systems: that they become confidently wrong at scale because no one close to the ground was asked to verify them. ### **Continuous Improvement as an Institutional Property, Not an Event** The recurring failure across every case Wanasinghe documents was that reform was conceived as a finite project with an end date, rather than a standing institutional function. The ARC reported once, comprehensively, in 1987, and the assumption embedded in that design was that implementation would follow and then the work would be largely done. The Organizational Review was a one-off World Bank-funded exercise that produced a report and then, by Wanasinghe's account, simply stopped — "the matter rests there." The RMU's mandate was redirected twice and then terminated rather than renewed, because it had been built as a project with a lifespan, not a permanent function. ARIA's design, and by extension any reform or coordination body built on the same principles, has to resist this pattern explicitly. A minimum five-year contract for the Co-ordinator, core government funding rather than donor project financing, and standing — not ad hoc — Teams on Personnel Policy, Administrative Systems, Organisation Audit, and Training were all Wanasinghe's attempts to build permanence into the institution's structure rather than leaving it to depend on continued political enthusiasm. The same applies to the technology layer described above: a geospatial open-space registry or a household-risk-flagging system is not a one-time IT procurement that gets switched on and then left alone. It needs the same standing custody — a team responsible for keeping the underlying data current, auditing the AI-generated flags for accuracy and bias on a fixed schedule, incorporating community feedback into how the system is calibrated, and reporting publicly on what the system has and has not caught. Continuous improvement, in other words, is not a separate fourth item alongside independence, accountability, and technology — it is the property that determines whether the other three survive contact with Sri Lanka's actual political cycle. An independent body with no mechanism for revisiting and updating its own findings becomes a museum of its founding report. An accountability structure that reports the same metrics the same way every year without ever asking whether those are still the right metrics becomes a ritual rather than a check. Concretely, this could mean an annual public audit — distinct from the quarterly and half-yearly reports already proposed — that asks a narrower question: did the system catch what it was built to catch, did any flagged case get successfully appealed and overturned, and what changed in response. Skipping that question is how a calibration choice made in year one quietly becomes wrong by year five, exactly as Sri Lanka's cadre numbers drifted upward by double digits in the years immediately following a reform exercise meant to shrink them. The institutional answer Wanasinghe proposed thirty years ago — a permanently resourced, long-tenured, publicly accountable body whose mandate is reform itself rather than any single reform — remains the right shape for the answer today, whether the task at hand is rationalising ministries, protecting whistleblowing officers, greening a city, or making sure a poor family is seen by more than one part of the state at a time. ### A Sri Lankan President Acknowledges Security Forces' Crimes — but Only Some URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-sri-lankan-president-acknowledges-security-forces-crimes-but-only-some/ Last updated: 2026-07-02T16:38:36.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** For decades, allegations that Sri Lanka's security forces were implicated in murder, abduction, and torture were, in the country's mainstream politics, largely dismissed as a Tamil grievance. Raised by victims in the north and east and by the families of the disappeared, they found little sympathy within the Sinhala-majority political establishment that has governed the country since independence. This week, the man who now leads that establishment — and serves as commander-in-chief of the security forces — bluntly acknowledged that members of the security forces had committed grave crimes. Addressing Parliament recently, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake acknowledged that members of the security forces had been involved in a series of grave crimes — among them the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, the 2009 assassination of the newspaper editor Lasantha Wickrematunga, and the abductions and assaults of the journalists Keith Noyahr and Poddala Jayantha. Yet Tamil political observers say that, while the admission was significant, it was also selective. The crimes Mr. Dissanayake chose to acknowledge were those committed largely in the south: the killing of a Colombo newspaper editor, the abduction of two journalists, and the failures surrounding the Easter Sunday attacks, whose victims were predominantly Catholic and Christian. He made no mention of the security forces' long record of alleged abuses in the Tamil-majority north and east — the enforced disappearances, the white-van abductions, and the killings that victims' families have spent years trying to bring before the courts. Nor did he address allegations of grave violations committed during the final months of the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, when thousands of Tamil civilians were killed. Still, they said, it marked the first time that a truth long resisted by Sri Lanka's Sinhala political mainstream had been acknowledged from within its own ranks — even if only in part. The clearest measure of the government’s intent came in Mr. Dissanayake’s disclosure that investigators would travel to Australia to record a statement from Mr. Noyahr, the former associate editor of The Nation, who was bundled into a white van in 2008, tortured, and later resettled there. The abduction is widely believed to have been carried out by a military intelligence unit then operating under the Defense Ministry, which was headed by Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who went on to become president. Political observers said the president's decision to single out the killing of Lasantha Wickrematunga and the abduction of Keith Noyahr was both a significant acknowledgment and a calculated political choice. With the long-promised prosecutions over the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings facing legal and evidentiary hurdles, some analysts believe the government may also seek to pursue former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa over alleged crimes committed during the years he oversaw Sri Lanka's security apparatus. According to a senior government source familiar with the administration's thinking, the Easter bombings are not the only avenue under consideration. If prosecutors are unable to build a viable case against Mr. Rajapaksa over the Easter attacks, investigators could instead rely on earlier cases, including the killing of Mr. Wickrematunga and the abduction of Mr. Noyahr, the source said. "The government remains determined to prosecute Gotabaya Rajapaksa," the source told Jaffna Monitor, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss internal deliberations publicly. "If the Easter case does not succeed, these earlier cases could provide another legal basis to proceed against him." The former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay is already in custody, accused of orchestrating the Easter bombings — an attack that killed more than 260 people — allegedly to engineer Mr. Rajapaksa’s return to power. The killing of Mr. Wickrematunga and the assaults on the two journalists all took place while the Rajapaksa brothers held power. Mr. Wickrematunga, the editor of The Sunday Leader and an unflinching critic of those in power, was shot dead on a Colombo street in January 2009\. Anticipating his own death, he had written an editorial that his paper published after the murder, under the haunting headline, “And Then They Came for Me.” No one has been convicted. Mr. Noyahr was seized in May 2008, a year to the month before the military crushed the Tigers. Mr. Jayantha, who campaigned for press freedom as general secretary of the Sri Lanka Working Journalists’ Association, was beaten and dumped in a pit with severe head and leg injuries in June 2009; his attackers shaved part of his head and beard. Both men later fled the country, Mr. Jayantha settling in the United States. None of those responsible for the attacks on the three journalists have been arrested or convicted. Mr. Dissanayake also rose to the defense of senior investigators now under fire from the opposition, naming Shani Abeysekera, the director of the Criminal Investigation Department; Ravi Seneviratne, the secretary of the Ministry of Public Security; and Dileepa Peiris, a deputy solicitor general. “Is the opposition telling us not to take action against wrongdoers?” he asked. Mr. Abeysekera has drawn criticism over the arrest of Mr. Sallay; detractors note that he led the C.I.D. when the Easter attacks occurred and failed to act on Indian intelligence warnings of an imminent strike. Analysts say the government’s broader objective is to trace the attacks back to the Rajapaksa brothers and, in doing so, to hollow out their Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, the party routed in the 2024 elections but now maneuvering for a revival. ### Jaffna Mourns Prasanth Sachin, a Teenage Thavil Virtuoso of Extraordinary Promise URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-mourns-prasanth-sachin-a-teenage-thavil-virtuoso-of-extraordinary-promise/ Last updated: 2026-07-01T02:42:15.000Z **JAFFNA** — Prasanth Sachin, a teenage *thavil* virtuoso from a family of *thavil* musicians whose self-taught command of the instrument had marked him, in the eyes of senior artists, as one of the most gifted of his generation, and some believed, a successor in the making to the great Yazhppanam V. Thedchanamoorthy, died on Tuesday night. He was 17. His death, at his home on Rasapathai Road in Kopay North, was ruled a suicide following an inquest conducted by the Inquirer into Sudden Deaths, Namasivayam Premkumar. Born on Nov. 2, 2009 — barely six months after Sri Lanka’s long civil war ended at Mullivaikkal with the military’s final defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam — Sachin belonged entirely to the generation that came after. He was among the children who carried no memory of the conflict, growing up instead in its quiet aftermath. He took up the *thavil* at the age of eight under the guidance of his father, Prasath, himself a *thavil* player, fellow *nadaswaram* and *thavil vithuvans* in Jaffna said. Yet, despite that lineage, he did not remain confined to tradition. Where most players learn within an established grammar handed down through teachers and family, Sachin developed a technique of his own — a distinctive style that audiences came to recognise as unmistakably his. By his teens, temples and concert organisers across the Jaffna peninsula were requesting him by name. A close friend from the music industry told Jaffna Monitor that Sachin was known for his discipline and single-minded devotion to his craft. Unlike some musicians, the friend said, he neither drank, smoked nor chewed betel, choosing instead to focus almost entirely on his music. As performance requests grew, he eventually left school to keep pace with the demands of his schedule. Earlier on the day he died, Sachin had travelled to a temple in Pungudutivu to perform at a *thavil* concert. He was scheduled to perform later that day at a temple in the Achchuveli area, but did not appear. Just a few hours before his death, he had been playing with his sister’s children, a family member told Jaffna Monitor. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/jaffna-mourns-prasanth-sachin-JOk1LI-kixo6ok1gzd9b47.png) Friends and relatives told Jaffna Monitor that Sachin had been in a relationship with a woman about 10 years older than him, who also came from a musical family. They said she was separated from her husband, a *thavil* player, and that divorce proceedings were underway. Screenshots purporting to show chats between Sachin and the woman shortly before his death later circulated widely on Facebook. A senior *nadaswaram* musician who knew his work, and who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Sachin’s stature was evident in the demand for his performances. Temples and organisers pressed specifically for his inclusion in their line-ups, the musician said — a level of demand rarely commanded by someone so young. That reputation extended to the Tamil diaspora, taking him abroad for performances while he was still a boy. In such a short span of time, he achieved what takes most musicians decades," the musician said. "Many of us believed he would one day be spoken of alongside the great masters. But he is gone far too soon. ***If you or someone you know is struggling or in crisis, help is available in Sri Lanka. The National Mental Health Helpline can be reached on 1926 (toll-free, 24 hours). Sri Lanka Sumithrayo offers free, confidential emotional support on 0707 308 308 (WhatsApp: 0767 520 620). The CCC Foundation crisis line is 1333\. For young people, Childline Sri Lanka can be reached on 0114 602 806\. Reaching out for help is a sign of strength, and support is available.*** ### Sri Lanka Cricket Abandons Plan for Jaffna International Stadium, Citing Financial Constraints URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-cricket-abandons-plan-for-jaffna-international-stadium-citing-financial-constraints/ Last updated: 2026-07-01T02:42:21.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka Cricket will build a cricket ground in this northern city, but has abandoned the international stadium it once promised, saying it cannot afford a venue of international standard. The retreat scales back what had been billed as a landmark for the country’s war-scarred north, where cricket commands the same devotion as in the rest of the island but where world-class facilities have never existed. The governing body has concluded that the project it originally approved — an international cricket stadium, a sports city**,** and a housing development — lies beyond its means, its honorary secretary, Prakash Schaffter, said. “We have to review the final scope of the project that we want to have, because our review of the originally approved project is that it is beyond the scope of S.L.C.,” Mr. Schaffter said. “We do not have the current financial strength to complete it.” He declined to give figures. Mr. Schaffter said the board remained committed to cricket in the north but would narrow its ambitions. “We are committed to having a cricket ground in Jaffna,” he said. “I do not think we have the funds at this point of time to invest in an international cricket stadium in Jaffna.” In its place, he said, will come a modest ground. The decision marks an abrupt turn for a venture that had carried unusual political and emotional weight. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake laid the foundation stone on Sept. 1, 2025, on Mandaitivu, an island off the Jaffna coast, predicting that the first match could be played within months and the first international fixture within three years. The plan envisioned a 138-acre “sports city,” with the ground built in phases. But the project soon ran into difficulty. In February, the Central Environmental Authority ordered the suspension of construction because no environmental impact assessment had been carried out. The Wildlife and Nature Protection Society had warned that Mandaitivu — a low-lying flood-retention zone fringed with mangroves, seagrass beds, and salt marsh — was unsuited to large-scale building. An ecologist who spoke to Jaffna Monitor said the environmental objections were not insurmountable, and could be managed with careful siting, drainage, and planning rather than abandonment of the site. The funding retreat lands almost exactly a year after the project’s most prominent champion took the idea to the highest level. During a state visit in April 2025, Sanath Jayasuriya, the former opening batsman who now coaches the national side, appealed to Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India to help build an international stadium in Jaffna, raising it as members of Sri Lanka’s victorious 1996 World Cup squad gathered to welcome the Indian leader in Colombo. Mr. Modi listened and was warm, but made no commitment. He called the appeal “a very strong thought” and said his team would try to do everything possible. In the months since, an Indian diplomatic source in Colombo told Jaffna Monitor that New Delhi did not intend to finance the stadium, taking the view that such projects were properly the business of cash-rich cricket boards rather than foreign governments. Even so, Mr. Jayasuriya’s gesture resonated in the north. For many Tamils, the sight of one of Sri Lanka’s most celebrated cricketers pressing for a world-class ground in Jaffna, a region long starved of investment after a three-decade civil war, was a rare act of recognition, and it won him admirers across the peninsula. That is partly why the latest announcement has landed so heavily. In a city where cricket runs through school rivalries more than a century old, the prospect of hosting international fixtures had been a source of pride. Its withdrawal has left players, officials, and supporters in Jaffna dismayed. Whether the scaled-down ground eventually becomes the foundation for a larger stadium remains uncertain. ### Appointed Governor Removes Two Elected Officials, Testing the Limits of Executive Power URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/appointed-governor-removes-two-elected-officials-testing-the-limits-of-executive-power/ Last updated: 2026-06-28T01:19:01.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The governor of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province has removed two elected local officials from office by executive order, an extraordinary use of administrative power that has reignited a constitutional dispute over how far an unelected official may go in unseating elected representatives in the country’s Tamil-majority north. In a notification published in the government’s official Gazette, Governor Nagalingam Vethanayahan declared that Sundaralingam Kandeepan, elected mayor of the Vavuniya Municipal Council barely a year ago, was no longer fit to hold the post, and stripped him of both the mayoralty and his seat on the council with effect from June 24\. The order was issued under Section 277 of the Municipal Councils Ordinance of 1947, read with the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act of 1989, the law that transferred to appointed governors a range of powers once exercised by central government ministers. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/appointed-governor-removes-two-cWk7UU-kix7bpdem9jql7n.jpg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/appointed-governor-removes-two-cWk7UU-kix1gpd5ujqg4kc.jpg) The Gazette notification In a companion notification, the governor also removed Gnanapragasam Kishor, the deputy chairman of the Chavakachcheri Urban Council, under a parallel provision of the Urban Councils Ordinance. Both dismissals followed inquiries conducted by a retired district judge, Kandiah Ariyanayagam, whom the governor had appointed as commissioner to examine the affairs of the two councils. The removals have drawn swift condemnation from opposition politicians and constitutional lawyers, who cast them as an unprecedented assertion of executive authority over institutions whose members are chosen by voters. Only three weeks earlier, the Supreme Court had lifted an injunction against Mr. Kandeepan and allowed him to resume office, with the bench observing that a body elected by the people could not be kept paralyzed indefinitely. The governor’s order has now accomplished by administrative fiat what the apex court had declined to do. ### **A contested mayoralty** The Vavuniya mayoralty has been contested almost since Mr. Kandeepan took office. A candidate of the Democratic Tamil National Alliance, he was elected mayor in June 2025 by a single vote, 11 to 10, defeating the nominee of the governing National People's Power. The deputy mayor, also backed by the alliance, was elected by the same narrow margin. The elections were subsequently challenged in the Court of Appeal by a National People's Power councillor and an independent councillor. The petition argued that the deputy mayor was ineligible to hold office because he resided outside the council's jurisdiction, and sought to invalidate both the mayoral and deputy mayoral elections. In October, the Court of Appeal issued interim orders preventing both officeholders from exercising their functions pending a final determination of the case. Earlier this month, however, the Supreme Court lifted the restriction on the mayor and allowed the Municipal Council to resume functioning, while leaving the interim order against the deputy mayor in place. The Court of Appeal has yet to rule on the underlying petition. The governor's decision removes Mr. Kandeepan from office through a separate statutory process under the Municipal Councils Ordinance, independent of the litigation that remains pending before the courts. Critics describe the move as a form of "political backdooring." The mayoralty rests on fragile arithmetic. In the 21-member Vavuniya Municipal Council, where the Democratic Tamil National Alliance holds only four seats, Mr. Kandeepan secured the mayoralty by assembling an 11-vote majority from a coalition of Tamil parties and independent councillors, defeating the governing National People's Power candidate by a single vote. If the governor's order ultimately results in the mayoralty becoming vacant, the council would be required to elect a new mayor from among its members. Although the alliance can fill Mr. Kandeepan's vacated seat with a nominee of its own, critics argue that such a vote could still reopen the delicate political arithmetic that produced the original result, giving the National People's Power another opportunity to assemble the 11-vote majority it narrowly failed to secure in June. They contend that the executive action could ultimately reshape control of the council without the original electoral outcome ever being set aside by a court. ### **A council seat lost over a discarded circular** The grounds for the second removal have drawn particular disbelief. Mr. Kishore, the deputy chairman of the Chavakachcheri Urban Council, was dismissed — according to accounts of the proceedings — after he criticized a circular issued by the Commissioner of Local Government during a council meeting and tossed a copy of it aside while speaking. On that basis, the governor stripped him not only of the deputy chairmanship but also of his elected seat on the council altogether. ### **A province the governing party could not win** The Vavuniya Municipal Council is one of many local bodies across Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces that the National People's Power (N.P.P.) failed to win in the 2025 local government elections. The polls marked a broad resurgence of Tamil nationalist parties, while the governing N.P.P. — which had surprised observers with significant gains in the region a year earlier — came first in only a handful of the Northern Province's local councils, winning four, most of them in the ethnically mixed Vavuniya district. Opposition politicians contend that the Northern Province governor, an appointee of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, is being used as an instrument of the central government to exert control over local authorities governed by Tamil nationalist parties that the N.P.P. was unable to defeat at the ballot box. Some opposition politicians have gone further, alleging that Governor Vethanayahan is acting on the instructions of government ministers rather than exercising independent judgment. The governor's office has maintained that the removals rested solely on independent inquiries and fell squarely within the powers the law confers on him. ### **Condemnation across party lines** The dismissals have drawn criticism well beyond the Tamil nationalist parties that control the affected councils. Namal Rajapaksa, the national organizer of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, described the removal as a "clear abuse of power" and "a grave assault on democratic principles." The criticism also reached the governing National People's Power. Karunananthan Ilankumaran, an N.P.P. member of Parliament representing the Jaffna District, wrote on Facebook that stripping an elected official of office for exercising freedom of expression was "entirely contrary to democratic principles and wholly unacceptable." Some commentators argued that the Governor's actions marked an unprecedented expansion of executive authority in the north. One political commentator said, "Even the Sinhalese who served as military officers and were later appointed as governors of the Northern Province were not such fanatical agents of the government." ### **What the Constitution says** Under the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka’s Constitution, a provincial governor is appointed by the president and holds office at the president’s pleasure. The Constitution also provides that provincial executive power is exercised by the governor, either directly or through the provincial board of ministers. But it also envisages a board of ministers, headed by an elected chief minister, to aid and advise the governor in the exercise of his functions. The Municipal Councils Ordinance gives the relevant authority power, after an inquiry by a retired judicial officer, to remove a mayor or councillor by Gazette order. It also states that when a mayor is removed under Section 277, he ceases to be a councillor. But lawyers say that such a power is exceptional and must be exercised strictly within the law. In a leading case involving the dissolution of the Jaffna Municipal Council under Section 277, the Privy Council held that the authority exercising the power was bound to observe natural justice, including the right to be heard. Critics say the concern is compounded by the prolonged absence of elected provincial councils. Provincial council elections have not been held for years, leaving the Northern Provincial Council without elected members or a board of ministers. In a functioning devolved system, critics argue, oversight of local government would be politically accountable through an elected provincial administration. In its absence, those powers are being exercised by an appointed governor alone — an arrangement they say allows an unelected official to wield authority without the democratic check the devolution framework was meant to provide. They also argue that the Gazette notification falls short of the standard expected for such a drastic step. It records that the governor was “satisfied” that Mr. Kandeepan was unfit to continue, citing two subparagraphs of Section 277, but does not set out in detail the conduct or findings said to justify the removal. ### **A governor already under scrutiny** The episode also deepens a controversy that has trailed Governor Vethanayahan for weeks. In late May, the abrupt transfer of a Jaffna High Court judge, A.G. Alexraja, barely a month after his appointment, prompted the Jaffna Bar Association to write to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, expressing alarm at what it described as possible executive interference in the judiciary. Lawyers linked the transfer to interim orders the judge had issued in a writ petition that named the governor as a respondent. The governor’s secretariat denied any connection. That petition, lawyers familiar with it have said, arose from precisely the kind of action now taken in Vavuniya and Chavakachcheri: a provincial inquiry initiated by the governor into the decisions of an elected council — in that case, the Point Pedro Urban Council. The judge had briefly halted the inquiry before later dismissing the challenge. Weeks later, he was transferred to Badulla, about 350 kilometers from Jaffna. Critics say the latest dismissals reinforce what they see as a broader pattern: the inquiry-and-removal provisions of Sri Lanka's local government laws are being used against elected councils in the Tamil-majority north, where the NPP failed to win control in the 2025 local elections. ### ### With a Signboard, Sri Lanka's Military Reinforces Its Grip on Tamil Land URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/with-a-signboard-sri-lankas-military-reinforces-its-grip-on-tamil-land/ Last updated: 2026-06-27T01:55:23.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The Sri Lankan Army has installed a signboard formally designating a military agricultural farm on privately owned Tamil land within the Valikamam North High Security Zone, underscoring the military's continued presence despite repeated government assurances that private land would be returned to its displaced owners. The signboard appeared as the Ministry of Defence prepared to discuss land release in Valikamam North at a high-level meeting expected on Thursday. Many landowners had hoped the meeting would produce at least some tangible progress toward the return of their properties. Instead, residents who have spent more than three decades petitioning for their land said the installation of the new signboard sent a starkly different message. The military has occupied private land in Valikamam North for more than three decades, since the High Security Zone was established during the armed conflict, and thousands of Tamil families were displaced in June 1990\. The army has farmed the Kurumbasiddy fields for years; what is new, residents say, is the move to formalize that occupation with a permanent name board — an act they read not as housekeeping but as a statement of intent to stay. The dispute cuts to a promise that helped bring President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to power. Dissanayake and the National People's Power campaigned on a pledge to release lands held under the High Security Zone designation, and a large share of the Tamil vote in the north in 2024 turned on the expectation that historical injustices, the land question chief among them, would at last be addressed. Earlier this year, the fisheries minister, Ramalingam Chandrasekar, announced a phased programme of releases, citing "extraordinary circumstances" during the war as the reason private land had been retained. The vast majority of it remains occupied. More than 6,000 families from Valikamam North remain displaced, with over 2,700 acres still held by the military under the High Security Zone designation. For months, affected residents have gathered every Friday outside the commander's bungalow in Myliddy to demand the return of some 651 acres of their land, a vigil that by mid-June had run for eight consecutive weeks and culminated in a larger demonstration on 15 June marking thirty-six years since the 1990 displacement. The signboard is not the only development unsettling residents. The chairman of the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha has written to the Jaffna District military commander seeking the immediate suspension of construction on a military hospital in Vasavilan and a military-run refreshment outlet along the Point Pedro–Keerimalai Road, both on privately owned Tamil land. The Pradeshiya Sabha has also issued a legal notice over the hospital, arguing that it is being built on privately owned civilian land outside the existing High Security Zone boundary. Local officials and residents say construction has continued despite the objections. "There has been no LTTE since 2009\. Continuing to invoke national security to justify holding on to Tamil-owned land amounts to theft," said K. Mayilvaganam, a resident whose family has waited decades for the return of its property. Another resident, who requested anonymity for fear of repercussions, questioned the military's rationale. "The Army defeated one of the world's most formidable insurgent groups. If the authorities believe there is still a security risk, they can address it through intelligence and surveillance. They do not need to occupy our land indefinitely," he said. The prolonged occupation has deepened frustration in Jaffna, where many residents say they initially believed President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's repeated promises to return private land. Some now question whether the government is either unable or unwilling to compel the military to relinquish territory it has held for more than three decades. Others voice a more cynical view. "Sometimes it feels like a carefully choreographed performance," one resident said. "The government says it wants to return the land, while the military appears to resist. In the end, nothing changes, and we are still waiting." ### PHỞ - VIET NAM'S CULINARY SOUL URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/pho-viet-nams-culinary-soul/ Last updated: 2026-06-28T00:55:46.000Z “If one morning dish were chosen to represent three cities across Viet Nam's three regions, Hanoi would be Phở, Hue would be Bún bò giò heo, and Ho Chi Minh City would be Hủ tiếu” - Professor Trần Quốc Vượng Deeply rooted in Viet Nam's rice-farming civilisation and passed down through centuries, phở (noodle soup) has travelled with the Vietnamese people across five continents and earned its place among the world's most beloved dishes. Though the dish has evolved and taken on countless variations over time, the secret to a truly authentic, richly flavoured bowl remains a story full of meaning. The journey of phở is, at its heart, the journey of preserving and celebrating the very soul of Vietnamese culinary culture. **Where did phở come from?** The origins of phở remain a subject of debate, with no single account yet confirmed. According to writer and researcher Nguyễn Ngọc Tiến, who has dedicated considerable time to tracing the history of Hanoi's phở, there are four prevailing theories. The first traces phở to a dish called bún xáo trâu, rice noodles served in a broth made from simmered buffalo bones, topped with spring onions, rice paddy herb, and a small amount of buffalo meat. This dish was sold along the banks of the Red River to dockworkers and porters. Over time, the seller replaced the rice noodles with thinly sliced steamed rice rolls, then swapped buffalo meat for beef, which was cheaper and more abundant as the French were raising large herds of cattle in Ba Vi. The rice rolls were later made thicker, gradually taking the form of the flat rice noodles used in phở today. ![The origin of phở](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/ph-viet-nam-s-culinary-soul-DEUnoY-kix72a7j3ppueys.png) The origin of phở The second theory links phở to the French beef stew pot-au-feu, the word feu meaning “fire”, said to have originated around 1894 at the De Lanessan Hospital, now Military Hospital 108, where cooks prepared the dish to nourish wounded French soldiers. However, this theory is not considered fully convincing, as pot-au-feu is cooked with root vegetables such as carrots and turnips, making it quite different from phở. The third theory places the origins of phở in Van Cu village, Nam Dinh, in the late 19th century. Nam Dinh was then home to Viet Nam's first textile factories, and locals from Van Cu are said to have sold a dish of softened rice paper cut into strips, simmered in bone broth with beef, to factory workers. This theory, however, does not explain how the name “phở” came about. The fourth theory suggests that phở derived from ngưu nhục phấn, a Cantonese dish of rice noodles served with beef in a broth seasoned with Chinese medicinal herbs. Street vendors selling this dish were said to call out “phấn ơ”, which over time was corrupted in pronunciation to “phở”. Researcher Nguyễn Ngọc Tiến concludes that phở most likely emerged in the late 19th century, evolving from a humble working-class food sold along the riverbank into a refined dish shaped by the tastes and creativity of Hanoi's middle class. **The many varieties of phở** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/ph-viet-nam-s-culinary-soul-DEUnoY-kixxld0zt208vlp.png) Originally, phở was served only with beef in varieties such as well-done brisket, shank and fatty cuts, before the addition of phở tái (rare beef phở). During the resistance war against France from 1947 to 1954, Hanoians who fled the city brought their phở-making traditions with them. In conditions where beef was scarce and reserved for draught purposes, phở gà (chicken phở) was born as a practical alternative, coming in many forms including whole chopped chicken, deboned chicken, sliced chicken fillet, drumstick, and various other cuts. *A bowl of phở bò (beef phở)* As Vietnamese society developed, so did the range of phở. Today, the dish is broadly divided into two categories: phở nước (soup-based phở), which includes phở bò (beef phở), phở gà (chicken phở) and phở sốt vang (red-wine braised beef phở); and phở khô (dry phở), which encompasses phở xào (stir-fried phở), phở chiên phồng (puffed fried phở), phở rán (pan-fried phở) and phở cuốn (phở rolls). Regional tastes have also shaped the dish in distinct ways. In southern Viet Nam, the broth tends to be sweeter, and bowls are served with an array of fresh garnishes including bean sprouts, Thai basil, sawtooth coriander and thinly sliced onion, alongside beef balls, hoisin sauce and chilli sauce. In mountainous regions, phở takes on local flavours entirely, with notable examples being the phở chua (sour phở) of Lang Son and the phở vịt (duck phở) of Cao Bang. **Phở beyond Viet Nam's borders** Following the Vietnamese diaspora, phở has spread across the globe, becoming a shared symbol of Vietnamese cuisine wherever Vietnamese communities have settled, from Paris's 13th arrondissement to cities across the United States, Japan and the Czech Republic. In September 2007, “phở” was officially entered into the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, becoming a proper noun in one of the world's most authoritative references in the English language. Since 2011, phở has consistently featured on CNN's list of the 50 best foods in the world alongside gỏi cuốn (fresh spring rolls). In August 2022, phở was also named among the top 50 best street foods in Asia by CNN. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/ph-viet-nam-s-culinary-soul-DEUnoY-kixsxpgt2mi48fl.png) Back home in Viet Nam, phở remains the go-to choice for millions, whether for breakfast, a meal between mealtimes, or simply a craving for something hot and comforting. In Ninh Binh province (formerly Nam Dinh), entire villages such as Van Cu and Giao Cu have kept the craft of phở-making alive across generations, with families carrying their recipes across the country and around the world. With direct flights between Viet Nam and Sri Lanka set to launch from August 2026, a steaming bowl of phở, Viet Nam's most iconic dish, is now closer than ever for Sri Lankan travellers making their first journey to Viet Nam. ### Sri Lankan Parliament Suspended After Chaotic Protest Over Judiciary Debate URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-parliament-suspended-after-chaotic-protest-over-judiciary-debate/ Last updated: 2026-06-23T15:33:32.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — Sri Lanka’s Parliament descended into disorder on Tuesday when opposition lawmakers protested the government’s refusal to allow an urgent debate on persistent judicial vacancies and a contentious proposal to extend the retirement age of senior judges, prompting the Speaker to suspend proceedings for 10 minutes. The confrontation began after opposition legislators, led by Ajith P. Perera of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya, pressed for immediate discussion of long-unfilled positions in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. In a formal letter signed by about 20 opposition MPs, they urged Speaker Jagath Wickramaratne to allocate time, warning that the vacancies were undermining the judiciary’s ability to function effectively. Government leaders rejected the request, citing the day’s fixed agenda, which included debate on Value Added Tax amendments and other scheduled legislation. Leader of the House Bimal Rathnayake stated that no provision existed to interrupt proceedings for the unscheduled matter. When Speaker Wickramaratne upheld the government’s position, opposition members rose from their seats and gathered in the center of the chamber, triggering loud protests and heated verbal exchanges with government lawmakers. The situation escalated rapidly as several opposition MPs, including Mr. Perera and Dayasiri Jayasekera, advanced toward the Speaker’s chair and attempted to seize the ceremonial mace — the traditional symbol of Parliament’s authority and sovereignty. Parliamentary security personnel, led by the Sergeant-at-Arms, swiftly intervened to block them. Government members moved to prevent further disruption, resulting in pushing and shoving on the floor of the House in scenes reminiscent of some of Sri Lanka’s more turbulent parliamentary sessions in recent years. With the order breaking down, Speaker Wickramaratne announced a 10-minute suspension and left the chair. No injuries were reported, and the House later resumed its business. ### U.S. Embassy Announces Transfer of 10 Helicopters to Sri Lanka Air Force URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-s-embassy-announces-transfer-of-10-helicopters-to-sri-lanka-air-force/ Last updated: 2026-06-23T15:09:38.000Z **RATMALANA, Sri Lanka —** The United States has transferred 10 TH-57 Sea Ranger (Bell 206) helicopters to the Sri Lanka Air Force, according to a press release issued by the U.S. Embassy in Colombo on Tuesday. The handover took place at Ratmalana Air Force Base in the presence of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander General Kevin Schneider, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Paul Kapur, the embassy said. According to the U.S. Embassy, the helicopters were transferred under the U.S. Excess Defense Articles program. The aircraft, previously operated by the U.S. Navy for pilot training and utility missions, will be used for pilot training, search-and-rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and maritime security activities. In the statement, General Schneider said the aircraft would help modernize Sri Lanka’s air capabilities and train future aviators, describing the transfer as a symbol of the partnership between the two countries. Assistant Secretary Kapur said the transfer reflected cooperation between Washington and Colombo and highlighted Sri Lanka’s location along major Indian Ocean shipping routes. ![TH-57 Sea Ranger helicopters perform a demonstration flight during a handover ceremony at Ratmalana Air Force Base on June 23, 2026.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/u-s-embassy-announces-transfer-cnGhXo-kixqrrowiogaehh.jpg) TH-57 Sea Ranger helicopters perform a demonstration flight during a handover ceremony at Ratmalana Air Force Base on June 23, 2026. The embassy noted that the Sri Lanka Air Force already has experience operating Bell helicopter platforms and said the aircraft were transferred in mission-ready condition. The ceremony included a static display and flying demonstration of the helicopters. According to the embassy, those in attendance included U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Jayne Howell, Deputy Minister of Defense Major General K.P. Aruna Jayasekara (Retd.), Secretary of Defense Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha (Retd.), Commander of the Sri Lanka Air Force Air Marshal Bandu Edirisinghe, Air Vice Marshal Lasitha Sumanaweera, Defense Attaché Lt. Col. Matthew House, and other Sri Lankan and U.S. officials. The U.S. Embassy released the statement on June 23, 2026. ### Ex-Militants in Europe Question Maulana’s Easter Bombings Claims URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/ex-militants-in-europe-question-maulanas-easter-bombings-claims/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T12:36:06.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** When Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillaiyaan was first told that his former aide Azad Maulana was planning to stir up some trouble from Europe, the former’s instant reaction was: “Really? What could it be about?” Pillaiyaan, a former chief minister of Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, could only recall the mountain of difficulties Mohammed Hanzeer Mohammed Mihilar, alias Maulana, had been in due to his own family problems. The Amparai-born Maulana had apparently married twice, not telling the second wife that he was already wedded. When the truth emerged, some members of his first wife reportedly assaulted Maulana. At one point, unable to face his angry wives and a police investigation that followed, Maulana unburdened himself to Pillaiyaan in the hope that the latter could wield his influence to get him out of trouble. Maualana may have expected this favour from Pillaiyaan since he was his personal secretary and a media spokesperson – and a confidant too. Pillaiyaan, a former Tamil Tiger who was chief minister from May 2008 to September 2012 and, much later, a minister in Colombo, however politely distanced himself from Maulana’s personal issues. But friends did suggest that Maulana could leave Sri Lanka for a while until the situation improved for him. Maulana found this a sensible idea. In 2021, he made his way to India and later to Europe. Maulana counted on sympathisers in European countries to help. Most of them were former Tamil militants who had an affinity for him since his late father, Mohammed Aliyar Mohammed Mihilar, had been with a Tamil militant group. Although a Muslim, Aliyar Mihilar joined the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) in the early 1980s. Known as Kamalan in the EPRLF, he died on June 19, 1990, when the Tamil Tigers gunned down EPRLF leader K. Pathmanabha and 12 associates in Chennai, Tamil Nadu. Maulana was around seven years old at that time. Since then, he has loathed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Both because of his father’s political past and due to his own inclinations, Maulana developed a rapport with several Tamil militants and former militants from various non-LTTE groups. It was a former EPRLF leader who is said to have introduced the multi-lingual Maulana – proficient in Tamil, Sinhala, and English – to the mono-lingual Pillaiyan. Once he became an aide to Pillaiyan, a former child soldier who rebelled against the LTTE in 2004, Maulana rose rapidly, so much so that this caused some jealousy in Pillaiyan’s Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Katchi (TMVK) party. Pillaiyaan’s fortunes swung after he ceased to be the chief minister. He was arrested in 2015 after being blamed for the 2005 murder of a Tamil MP in Batticaloa. He spent five years in prison without bail. He was elected to parliament from inside the prison in 2020, and then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa made him a state minister in his government. This was the time Maulana was battling his personal troubles. And in 2021, he left Sri Lanka. From Tamil Nadu, Maulana telephoned some Tamil friends in Europe, telling them he was headed their way and would need their help to start a new life. One such person he contacted was Gnanam Stalin (nee Gnanasekaran), a former member of the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) who is now in his 60s. Gnanam, who had quit Sri Lanka in 1990 and moved over to Europe after a brief stay in India, became close to Pillaiyaan and others in the TMVP after their split from the LTTE – because of their common eastern Sri Lankan identity. In that capacity, Gnanam developed a good relationship with Maulana, too. They met many times. Maulana, who had visited Gnanam’s house twice in France, told him that he would be getting a six-month UN project in Geneva. But the Paris-based Gnanam recalls that Maulana never contacted him in France in 2021, although he had promised to. Gnanam kept wondering what could have happened until he got a call about a month later from another former Tamil militant, who had been with the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), in Switzerland. The Swiss Tamil stunned Gnanam by saying that Maulana was preparing to say something nasty about Pillaiyaan and that he also appeared to be eager to make some money. Gnanam wasted no time. He called Pillaiyaan, who was equally astonished. Pillaiyaan, Gnanam recalls, could not think of anything beyond Maulana’s marital woes. Since Maulana had teamed up with Pillaiyaan only after the latter quit the Tigers and embraced mainstream politics, Pillaiyaan could not think of what his former aide could be scheming about. This, Gnanam said in a telephonic interview, was extremely crucial. “Later, when Maulana’s shocking statements became public knowledge, I could connect none of it to Pillaiyaan,” he said, referring to Maulana’s claims that Pillaiyaan and Sri Lankan intelligence officer Suresh Sallay were linked to the 2019 Easter bombings in Sri Lanka, which killed over 260 people and injured hundreds. “If Pillaiyaan was linked to the Eastern bombings, even indirectly, he would have shuddered the moment I told him about Maulana’s intentions. Nothing like that happened,” Gnanam said. Maulana claimed in his Channel 4 television interview that it was Pillaiyaan, while in jail, who told him in January 2019 to introduce Islamist Zahran Hashim to Sallay, who has been in detention since February this year. Maulana said he did that. And that Zahran and Sallay met at a coconut grove in February 2019\. Their meeting reportedly lasted some three hours. Maulana says he did not attend the meeting but stood outside. Sallay is said to have told him later that the Rajapaksa brothers (Mahinda and Gotabaya) wanted an “unsafe situation” in Sri Lanka so that they could return to power. Once the Eastern horror took place in April 2019, Maulana says he met Pillaiyaan again. The latter reportedly told him to keep quiet about Zahran, leader of the Sri Lankan affiliate of the Islamic State, who was among the suicide bombers killed in the bombings. While seeking asylum in Europe, Maulana said his conscience would no longer allow him to keep mum. Ex-Tamil militants scattered in Europe say Maulana’s claims are unbelievable. “Of course, Pillaiyaan knew some of these Islamists simply because he was in jail along with them. He had no sympathy for their extremist Sunni ideology,” Gnanam said. “In fact, there were clashes in the prison between these Muslims and some Tamils. Pillaiyaan has written about it in his book.” Maulana’s own account establishes that although the Easter attack took place in 2019, he did not tell the authorities in Sri Lanka what he later claimed he knew. On the contrary, Maulana only discussed his problems vis-à-vis his two wives with Pillaiyaan. The ex-militants’ surmise is simple: Pillaiyaan never told Maulana to introduce anyone to Sallay. On that basis, nothing else that Maualana claims can be true. The former militants, who themselves know well how Sri Lankan security forces operate, said it is unbelievable that Sallay, a veteran intelligence officer, needed help from Pillaiyaan or Maulana to meet Zahran – assuming he wanted to meet the Islamist. “The reality is that many of these Islamists were known to the Sri Lankan military intelligence,” said one Tamil source without wanting to be identified by name. “The military used them against the LTTE in the (island’s) east. Sallay headed the military intelligence. He wanted an introduction to one of these men? Unbelievable, completely unbelievable.” Another former militant, who was once with the EPRLF, said he could not digest the claim that an experienced intelligence officer like Sallay would blurt out to Maulana a supposed grand plan behind the Easter conspiracy. Former militants who either met or were scheduled to meet Maulana in Europe are convinced that someone, or a group of people, helped him concoct a story that would strengthen his asylum claim in Europe while at the same time implicating individuals who had long opposed or challenged the LTTE. “As a Muslim, he could not have claimed that he was ethnically oppressed,” one of them said. The ex-militants made it clear they have no love for the Islamists who unleashed terror on Easter day, or for that matter, Sallay or even Pillaiyaan. If Maulana is to be believed, there must be concrete evidence to support his assertions, they said. Until then, his account will remain a claim made in pursuit of asylum in Europe. ### The Padmanabha Massacre: The Killing That Foretold a Movement's Isolation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-padmanabha-massacre-the-killing-that-foretold-a-movements-isolation/ Last updated: 2026-06-27T01:55:27.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** When EPRLF leader K. Pathmanabha was gunned down with 12 party colleagues (and two Indians) in Chennai in 1990, it was a clear signal that the LTTE was set to take individual terrorism to a new level even as it waged an armed struggle in Sri Lanka. Most unfortunately, the red flag was mostly ignored by the Indian state, Tamil Nadu politicians, and the larger Sri Lankan Tamil society. Most people in the Indian establishment and among Tamil Nadu leaders viewed the cold-blooded June 19 massacre as another ill-fated fallout of the unending internecine war among Tamil militants. Despite realising the increasingly menacing nature of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Indian officials saw it as one more step by the group to stamp its authority on Tamils after succeeding in forcing the Indian Army to quit Sri Lanka. It is only when former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was blown up by a suicide bomber less than a year later that the Indian state – and vast sections in Tamil Nadu – woke up to the serious perils of an exclusivist Tiger ideology. If Gandhi had not been assassinated, the LTTE would not have been outlawed in India, a move which led to long-term disastrous consequences for the Tigers. In both incidents, the LTTE, for strategic reasons, did not claim responsibility although both were executed by its intelligence wing and had the sanction of its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. In Gandhi’s case, Prabhakaran and the LTTE denied their involvement more than once till the denials became self-defeating. The Sri Lankan Tamil society, the diaspora included, was mostly so overawed by the LTTE’s successful war against the Indian Army that it could not grasp the dangers emanating from a totalitarian ideology, which treated all dissent and differences as antagonistic, to be extinguished by force. Those who actively backed the LTTE quietly applauded the deaths of Pathmanabha and others as a lesson the “traitors” deserved anyway. Politics apart, Nabha, as the EPRLF founder and secretary general was known, did not deserve to die the way he was cut down. The massacre, like in the case of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) earlier, had a mafiosi stamp: “Look, you messed with me, so out you go!” One of the earliest entrants into Tamil militancy, Nabha hailed from a middle-class, upper-caste family from Jaffna who was influenced by the anti-caste movement of the 1960s even as a teenager. His gravitation towards militancy was slow, becoming a part of his thinking after the violent police crackdown on the Tamil conference in Jaffna in 1974\. His journey to London for higher studies led him to firmly embrace Marxist ideology. He was among the Tamils who underwent weapons training from Palestinians in the late 1970s after joining the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS). Nabha’s work with friends in Batticaloa and Amparai following the terrible cyclone of 1978 helped him and the EPRLF he founded in 1981 to establish a firm footing in eastern Sri Lanka. This served his outfit for a long time. Although his vision to work with secular leftists in Sri Lanka did not succeed, he believed firmly that India, with its anti-imperialist posture, had legitimate interests in South Asia. This wasn’t liked by all Sri Lankan Tamils, but he didn’t care; he was happy it matched the thinking of Palestinians, Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the African National Congress. All those Nabha interacted with found him humble, soft-spoken, a patient listener, and rooted in socialist ideas. He opposed individual terror as well as attacks on other ethnic or religious groups. This is why he denounced the massacre by the LTTE of Buddhist devotees in Anuradhapura in 1985, although the EPRLF was then in an alliance which included the Tigers, TELO and EROS. This is also why he was embarrassed when overzealous EPRLF cadres abducted an American couple in Jaffna in 1984 after branding them CIA agents. When the LTTE almost wiped out the TELO in 1986, hundreds of fleeing TELO members took refuge with the EPRLF. The EPRLF’s armed wing was then led by Douglas Devananda (who would later break away), although it was no match for the LTTE’s firepower. The EPRLF itself came under attack from the Tigers later that year. In March 1987, the LTTE shot dead scores of EPRLF members it held as prisoners after unknown men attempted to assassinate the LTTE’s Jaffna commander, Kittu. Although India first ignored the EPRLF and other groups in favour of the LTTE while trying to form an interim administration in Sri Lanka’s northeast after the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord, Nabha readily shook hands when New Delhi later turned towards his outfit after war erupted between the Indian military and the Tigers. When Indian officials urged the ERPLF to take the lead role in Provincial Council elections, he wanted the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to take that place. It is only after its leader, Appapillai Amirthalingam, refused, more because his senior colleagues did not want to offend the Tigers, that Nabha took the plunge. He argued that the Provincial Council was the first concrete political gain for the Tamils, and the opportunity should not be squandered away. Many who blasted him as an Indian stooge then are today clamouring for the same Provincial Councils! Sri Lanka’s first and last united North-Eastern provincial administration was not allowed to succeed by the Tigers and an antagonistic President Ranasinghe Premadasa. It was also the period when the EPRLF earned a negative image after some of its cadres were accused of committing crimes, including murders of real and perceived foes. Rajiv Gandhi’s defeat in Indian elections was the last straw. As the Indian military withdrew from the northeast, the provincial administration collapsed in chaos. Nabha and the EPRLF leadership retreated to India. That is where a LTTE killer squad found them. After the assaults on TELO and the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), the EPRLF remained the sole challenger to the LTTE’s political hegemony since the EROS faction led by V. Balakumar had bowed to the Tigers. So, the EPRLF had to go. Was the killing of Nabha, like that of TELO’s Sri Sabarattinam, and their supporters in such large numbers really necessary? Once the Tigers married absolute nihilism, killings over even the slightest deviation became the norm. There was no pushback from the larger Tamil society. It is not the mass murder of rival Tamils did not generate doubts in LTTE ranks. It did, but no one dared to ask questions loudly because that would have been blasphemous and dangerous. And no questions were asked when the mass of Tamil civilians in LTTE territory were put to unbearable hardships even as it became painfully clear that Eelam War IV was going to end in a catastrophe. In later times, the Rajiv Gandhi assassination became a burden. But the LTTE remained in half-hearted self-denials. Arrogance and self-criticism don’t go together. Assassinating VIPs in Sri Lanka became a routine; each killing turned into a fine art in the canvas of bloodletting. No one warned Prabhakaran that unsatiated murderous frenzy would one day consume the Tigers themselves, not even when his ex-deputy, Mahattaya, was tortured and executed as an alleged Indian spy along with scores of supporters. The final denouement came when the LTTE’s long-time eastern regional commander, Karuna, revolted in 2004\. Another massacre followed, this time of his armed supporters, male and female – who were LTTE loyalists until recently. When Prabhakaran was finally gunned down with his chosen men in 2009, the LTTE was devoid of friends, anywhere, to throw a lifeline. Those who spoke in its support vocally – in Tamil Nadu and in the diaspora – could only fret and fume. Once politics and diplomacy were submerged to the politics of the gun, Tamil Eelam became a mirage. Now, even a provincial government looks like a struggle. Yet, in 1987, it was offered on a platter – not to Nabha but to Prabhakaran. What an irony, what a tragedy. ### French Embassy Brings Global Music Festival to Colombo and Kandy URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/french-embassy-brings-global-music-festival-to-colombo-and-kandy/ Last updated: 2026-06-20T08:09:41.000Z **COLOMBO —** The Embassy of France in Sri Lanka and the Maldives will stage two free public concerts this month, in Colombo on June 21 and in Kandy on June 23, as part of the Fête de la Musique, the annual French music festival now celebrated in more than 120 countries. The French singer and writer Kelly ou moi, whose work draws on the blues, will headline both evenings, the embassy said. She will be joined by the disc jockey Chandana and the Sri Lankan band DotDotay. The Colombo concert will begin at 5 p.m. at the Port View Restaurant on Galle Road in Colombo 3\. The Kandy performance will start at 7 p.m. at the Kandy Club on Anagarika Dharmapala Mawatha. Both events are free and open to the public, and no registration is required, according to the embassy. The Fête de la Musique was created in France in 1982 by the Ministry of Culture as a free, open-air event at which musicians, amateur and professional alike, perform for the public. It has since spread to more than a thousand cities across over 120 countries. In a press release, the French Embassy said the return of the festival to Sri Lanka underscored music’s role as a universal language and a powerful means of fostering cultural exchange. The full programme and a list of partners are available on the embassy’s website and social media channels, it said. ### A Hair Ball in a Child’s Stomach: Sri Lanka’s Only Reported Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-hair-ball-in-a-childs-stomach-sri-lankas-only-reported-case/ Last updated: 2026-06-20T07:46:32.000Z A 14-year-old girl named Mali was admitted to my ward at the Sri Jayawardanapura General Hospital in Nugegoda, Sri Lanka, after months of suffering. She came from a remote district in Sri Lanka, where access to specialist medical care was limited. For nearly three months, she had struggled with persistent upper abdominal pain, repeated vomiting, poor appetite, and gradual weight loss. Her family had sought help from several doctors in her hometown, hoping the symptoms would settle with treatment. Yet nothing seemed to work. Her condition steadily worsened, eventually forcing her family to travel to Colombo in search of answers. By the time Mali was admitted to the hospital, she looked frail and exhausted. She was pale, thin, and weak. Her mother later recalled how her once-active daughter had become quiet and withdrawn, unable to eat properly or enjoy daily life. The family feared something serious was hidden behind her mysterious illness. The initial medical examination revealed dehydration and anemia. Surprisingly, examination of the abdomen did not reveal a clear cause for her distress. There was no obvious swelling or mass that could explain why she had become so unwell. A previous ultrasound scan of her abdomen had not revealed any abnormality. However, her symptoms pointed toward a blockage somewhere in the upper digestive tract. A decision was made to perform an endoscopy, a procedure in which a thin camera is passed into the stomach to examine its interior. The expectation was to identify an ulcer, inflammation, or perhaps an obstruction caused by food or a tumor. But the procedure produced an unusual and unexpected finding. The endoscope could not pass beyond the upper opening of the stomach because something blocked the passage. Through the camera, strands of hair were visible. This puzzling discovery raised suspicion that the obstruction might be caused by a tightly packed mass of swallowed hair. At this stage, surgery became necessary. During the operation, the surgeons discovered that Mali’s stomach was enlarged and severely obstructed. When they carefully opened the stomach, the cause of her illness became clear. Inside was a massive hairball, tightly packed and shaped like the stomach itself. The dark, compact mass occupied almost the entire stomach cavity. The surgeons soon realized that the problem was even more unusual than expected. The hairball extended beyond the stomach into the first sections of the small intestine in the form of a tail. This extension into the bowel made the case exceptionally rare. The entire mass was removed through an opening in the stomach. Once removed, the obstruction was relieved immediately. The stomach was then closed, and the operation was completed successfully. Fortunately, Mali recovered well after surgery. Her appetite gradually returned, she gained strength, and her symptoms disappeared. What had appeared to be a mysterious wasting illness was solved by the discovery of an unusual condition that few people, even in medicine, encounter during their careers. The case was particularly significant because it represented the only reported example of this condition in Sri Lanka. ## **Understanding the Hair Ball** ![A 700-gram hairball, measuring 75 centimeters long, removed from the stomach of 14-year-old Mali during surgery.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/a-hair-ball-in-a-child-s-stoma-3haXrU-kix1lqact9b1b54.jpg) A 700-gram hairball, measuring 75 centimeters long, removed from the stomach of 14-year-old Mali during surgery. A hairball inside the stomach is medically known as a *trichobezoar*. The word comes from two parts: “tricho,” meaning hair, and “bezoar,” meaning a compact mass trapped in the digestive system. Bezoars can form from different materials such as plant fibers, undigested food, or medications. However, hair-related bezoars are among the rarest. Hair cannot be digested by the human stomach. Unlike food, it resists the action of digestive juices. When swallowed repeatedly over time, strands of hair accumulate in the stomach because they are too slippery to be expelled through normal muscular contractions. Gradually, the hair becomes trapped, mixes with mucus and food particles, and forms a dense mass. As more hair collects, the mass enlarges and begins to take the shape of the stomach itself. In severe cases, strands may extend beyond the stomach into the small intestine, forming a long tail. This condition is known as *Rapunzel Syndrome*, named after the fairy tale character famous for her long, flowing hair. In Mali’s case, the hairball extended into the small intestine, making it an example of Rapunzel Syndrome. ### **A Hidden Psychological Condition** Many patients with trichobezoars have an underlying behavioral or psychological condition. The most common is *trichophagia*, a compulsive habit of eating hair. Often associated with this is *trichotillomania*, a disorder in which individuals repeatedly pull out their own hair. These behaviors may remain hidden for years because patients are embarrassed or unaware that they are doing it. Families may not notice the habit, especially when it occurs in private. Children and adolescents are particularly vulnerable, as emotional stress, anxiety, or underlying psychological struggles may contribute to the behavior. After surgery, it became important not only to treat the physical condition but also to prevent recurrence. Mali was therefore referred for psychiatric assessment and counseling. Her parents were advised to observe her closely and support her recovery. With appropriate guidance and family involvement, she gradually overcame the behavior that had caused the problem. ### **Rare but Potentially Dangerous** Although uncommon, hairballs in the stomach can lead to serious complications if not recognized early. Patients often develop symptoms only after the mass has grown large enough to block the digestive tract. Common symptoms include abdominal pain, vomiting, poor appetite, weight loss, weakness, and anemia. Because these symptoms are nonspecific, diagnosis may be delayed. If left untreated, a trichobezoar may cause bleeding, stomach ulceration, intestinal obstruction, or even perforation of the bowel. These complications can become life-threatening. Most reported cases occur in adolescent girls, particularly between the ages of 12 and 14\. Researchers believe that psychological and behavioral factors play an important role in this age group. Worldwide, only around 51 cases of Rapunzel Syndrome had been reported in the medical literature at the time this case was documented, with many originating from South Asian countries. ### **Life Beyond the Illness** ![Ten years later, the surgeon Gamini Goonetilleke and his wife with Mali and her family.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/a-hair-ball-in-a-child-s-stoma-3haXrU-kixhjg6sw2jawat.jpg) Ten years later, the surgeon Gamini Goonetilleke and his wife with Mali and her family. The true success of treatment lies not only in removing the physical problem but also in restoring a patient’s life. Following surgery and psychiatric support, Mali made a full recovery. Over time, she regained weight, returned to normal activities, and moved beyond the frightening illness that had once dominated her life. Today, she is a healthy adult, married, and the mother of a child. She leads an ordinary life, free from the symptoms and hidden behaviors that once threatened her health. Her story serves as a reminder that uncommon illnesses can hide behind common symptoms. It also highlights the importance of persistence in diagnosis and the need to consider both physical and psychological aspects of care. ### Physicians Question Why Sallay Was Fed Through Veins Instead of Stomach URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/physicians-question-why-sallay-was-fed-through-veins-instead-of-stomach/ Last updated: 2026-06-22T00:39:38.000Z **COLOMBO —** Several physicians have raised concerns about the nutritional management of Suresh Sallay, Sri Lanka’s former intelligence chief, who has been on a hunger strike since June 7 and was later admitted to the National Hospital of Sri Lanka. The physicians question the reported use of intravenous nutrition rather than feeding through his digestive tract, saying the approach may have exposed him to complications that might otherwise have been avoided. The physicians, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the case publicly, said Mr. Sallay has developed blood clots in his arm during treatment and has shown signs of cognitive decline, including forgetfulness and repetitive speech. Mr. Sallay, 58, a retired major general and former head of the State Intelligence Service, has been in state custody since his arrest in February in connection with the investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. After his health deteriorated while in the custody of the Criminal Investigation Department, he was transferred to the National Hospital in Colombo, where he remains under treatment. His wife is said to visit him daily. Jaffna Monitor was unable to independently review Mr. Sallay’s medical records. ## **A Fundamental Principle of Clinical Nutrition** A patient who cannot or will not eat can be fed either enterally, through the digestive system, using a nasogastric tube in the short term or a surgically placed stomach tube known as a PEG for longer periods, or parenterally, by delivering nutrients directly into a vein. Sallay is receiving the latter. Doctors commonly summarize the principle in a simple phrase: “If the gut works, use it.” A PEG, or percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy, is a tube inserted directly into the stomach through the abdominal wall. The procedure is routinely performed worldwide for patients who cannot maintain adequate nutrition by mouth but retain a functioning digestive system. Several physicians interviewed by Jaffna Monitor said that, based on the information available to them, they would ordinarily expect a patient in Mr. Sallay’s circumstances to receive enteral feeding. “Using the gastrointestinal tract is generally safer, more physiological, and associated with fewer complications,” one senior physician said. “That is what medical training and most nutrition guidelines recommend whenever it is possible.” ## **Risks of Intravenous Feeding** Parenteral nutrition can be lifesaving for patients whose digestive systems cannot be used because of intestinal obstruction, severe bowel disease, or major gastrointestinal surgery. But doctors say it also carries significant risks. The nutrient solutions administered intravenously are highly concentrated and often require long-term venous access. Medical literature has linked prolonged parenteral nutrition to bloodstream infections, liver dysfunction, electrolyte imbalances, metabolic complications, and catheter-related blood clots. Several physicians alleged that Mr. Sallay developed thrombosis, or blood clotting, in the veins of the upper limb after intravenous nutrition was initiated. “When veins are repeatedly used for prolonged nutritional support, inflammation and clot formation can occur,” one physician said. “While many factors can contribute to thrombosis, it is a recognized complication of long-term intravenous feeding.” Doctors also noted that patients recovering from prolonged fasting are at risk of developing refeeding syndrome, a potentially life-threatening condition caused by rapid shifts in electrolytes and metabolism when nutrition is reintroduced after a period of severe nutritional deprivation. The condition requires careful monitoring and gradual nutritional support, regardless of whether feeding is provided orally, enterally, or intravenously. ### **Questions Over Consent and Decision-Making** The physicians interviewed by Jaffna Monitor acknowledged that hunger strikes can complicate treatment decisions because patients may refuse feeding interventions. However, several doctors questioned whether all available options had been adequately explored. One senior physician said that when a patient declines a PEG tube or another form of enteral feeding, doctors typically assess whether the patient has the capacity to make an informed decision. If concerns arise about a patient's ability to participate fully in medical decision-making, discussions often involve close family members as part of the broader treatment process. “In many hospitals, discussions with next of kin become part of the process when major nutritional interventions are being considered,” the physician said. Several doctors who have observed Mr. Sallay described him as appearing psychologically distressed and expressed concern about his mental state. In light of those concerns, some questioned whether his decision-making capacity had been formally evaluated and whether his wife, who is understood to visit him daily, had been closely consulted regarding significant treatment decisions. Another physician expressed concern about his overall prognosis. “I am worried about his long-term recovery,” the doctor said. “Even if he survives this episode, there is a possibility that he may not fully regain his previous level of functioning.” Those assessments could not be independently verified by Jaffna Monitor. ## **Medical Ethics and Political Sensitivity** Some physicians interviewed for this article suggested that the political sensitivity of the case may have created an atmosphere of caution around clinical decision-making. Several doctors nevertheless emphasized that medical care should be guided solely by clinical considerations. “We took the Hippocratic oath,” one senior physician said. “We do not ask whether a patient is a criminal, a thief, a politician, or an intelligence officer. Every patient deserves treatment according to established medical principles.” Another physician was more blunt. “Even if every allegation against him were true, his medical care should be determined by medicine, not by politics,” ### ‘Why Have a Justice Minister Without Justice?’ Protesters Confront Minister at Chemmani URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/why-have-a-justice-minister-without-justice-protesters-confront-minister-at-chemmani/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T02:14:20.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Relatives of people who disappeared during Sri Lanka’s civil war staged a protest on Friday outside the Chemmani mass grave site, demanding an international investigation and rejecting what they described as inadequate domestic efforts to uncover the truth. The demonstration coincided with a visit by Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara and officials from the Office on Missing Persons to the excavation site at the Siththupathi Hindu cemetery in Jaffna, where forensic teams are carrying out a third phase of excavations. Protesters briefly blocked the A9 highway, the main road linking northern Sri Lanka to the rest of the island. Carrying placards and chanting slogans, the demonstrators called for international oversight of the excavation process and expressed deep mistrust of Sri Lanka’s domestic accountability mechanisms. “Why does a country without justice need a justice minister?” read one placard. Others demanded international supervision of the excavations and declared that only an international investigation could deliver justice for families who have spent decades searching for answers. The protest comes as Chemmani has emerged as the largest known mass grave site discovered in Sri Lanka. The Chemmani site first gained prominence in the late 1990s after allegations surfaced that civilians who disappeared during military operations in Jaffna had been secretly buried there. The latest excavations have uncovered an increasing number of human remains, prompting renewed calls from victims’ families, human rights groups, and activists for a transparent, internationally monitored investigation. Many of the relatives gathered outside the site said they had little faith in local investigative processes, citing years of stalled inquiries and unfulfilled promises by successive governments. The Justice Ministry has said the excavation is being conducted under judicial supervision and in accordance with established forensic procedures. Officials have maintained that the process is intended to identify the dead and determine the circumstances of their deaths. “We want truth, accountability, and justice,” one protester said. “Without international involvement, we do not believe that will happen.” The minister’s visit proceeded under tight security as excavation work continued under the supervision of court-appointed officials and forensic experts. ### Archchuna Removes Slipper-Garlanded Cutout After Heated Clash With Gajendrakumar URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/archchuna-removes-slipper-garlanded-cutout-after-heated-clash-with-gajendrakumar/ Last updated: 2026-06-21T11:55:03.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A day after a bitter confrontation with fellow Tamil lawmaker Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam at a local government coordination meeting, Member of Parliament Archchuna Ramanathan on Friday removed a protest cutout bearing his image that had been adorned with a garland of slippers. The incident followed a tense exchange on Thursday at a coordinating committee meeting in Tellippalai, where Mr. Ramanathan and Mr. Ponnambalam, leader of the Tamil National People’s Front, engaged in a heated verbal confrontation that disrupted proceedings. Video footage widely shared on social media appeared to show Mr. Ramanathan directing abusive remarks at Mr. Ponnambalam, saying “தூக்கி அடிப்பேன் நாயே” — roughly translated as, “I will beat you, dog” — drawing criticism from political opponents and members of the public. By Friday morning, a roughly 10-foot-tall cutout bearing Mr. Ramanathan’s image had been erected along a main road on the outskirts of Jaffna. The cutout replaced his surname, *Ramanathan*, with *Rajapaksa* — an apparent reference to remarks praising former President Mahinda Rajapaksa that Mr. Ramanathan had made at a recent gathering in a predominantly Sinhala area. It also carried the Tamil phrase **“ஈனப்பிறவி”** — a deeply derogatory term meaning “degenerate being” — and was adorned with a garland of slippers. While no group immediately claimed responsibility, the display was widely believed to have been erected by supporters of the Tamil National People's Front, whose members have been sharply critical of the lawmaker. Witnesses said Mr. Ramanathan arrived at the site alone in his vehicle around midday, stopped beside the cutout, removed both the slipper garland and the display, placed them in the trunk of his car, and drove away. ### Has India Lost the Tamil Street? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-15/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T12:46:46.000Z ## **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** A long time ago, numerous homes in Sri Lanka’s Tamil region proudly displayed framed photographs of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. August 15, India’s Independence Day, was also celebrated. To Tamils at large, India was as much their motherland as it was to Indians. As Tamil militancy transformed into a full-blown insurgency in the 1980s, most Tamils fleeing Sri Lanka were relieved to take refuge first in India, thanks to geographical proximity, even if their final destination was the West. This is why ordinary Tamils voiced such joy when India signed a pact with Sri Lanka in 1987 to end years of a Tamil separatist campaign. The Tamil community received its first rude shock when Indian soldiers often ran amok during the long and bloody war against the Tamil Tigers. After former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991, Sri Lankan Tamils saw a side of India that appeared hostile, even in Tamil Nadu, where they had always felt most at home. As it gradually lost Tamil Nadu as its strategic backyard, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began courting the West. The group opened offices in several countries, where it could mobilize support freely and raise funds for the war in Sri Lanka. The LTTE may be history now, but Tamil political leaders and activists in Sri Lanka say they actively lobby Western countries and Japan, and that their focus is no longer solely on India. This is more so for parties in the Tamil-majority Northern Province and the multi-racial Eastern Province, where the separatist war raged for more than a quarter century. Chinese diplomats, too, are in the game. Tamil activists make it clear that they are not ignoring India, nor will they ever do so. But India, too, has changed its priorities in recent years, and so have global political realities. A Tamil leader who has dealt with officials in New Delhi since the 1980s said many Tamils feel neglected by India because of the way the South Asian giant has softened its stance on developments in Sri Lanka that adversely affect Tamils. “We still have great affinity for India and its people,” the source, who requested anonymity, told Jaffna Monitor. “No, India hasn’t given up on the Tamil community, but we can sense that it is not the same anymore.” After years of active intervention in Tamil affairs, India took a drastic hands-off approach after the LTTE killed Rajiv Gandhi. But it played a key, even if covert, role in the later Norway-driven peace process. Western countries have always taken a keen interest in Tamil affairs – frequently hosting think tanks and activists from Sri Lanka -- but interactions between their diplomats and Tamil representatives have become more pronounced and visible. After a terrible cyclone battered Sri Lanka in November 2025, leaders of the Indian Tamil community living in the central hills and surrounding areas alleged neglect and discrimination in relief and rehabilitation. When they realised that Colombo was not listening to their concerns, they vocally took up the complaints with diplomats from Canada, Japan, France, India, the EU, Switzerland, the US, and Australia. This wasn’t about ignoring India, whose shadow always looms large on Sri Lanka and which provides special assistance for development activities in areas populated by the Tamil community. “All the other countries are also development partners of Sri Lanka. They had to be told their assistance was not reaching our people,” a community leader said. “This was a way of putting pressure on the government.” Also recently, Shanakyan Rasamanickam met EU representatives in Brussels and expressed concern over the state of freedom of expression, democracy, governance, as well as human rights in Sri Lanka. A former Tamil MP said he had stopped visiting New Delhi. “I used to regularly go there earlier. No more. I am fed up.” But he added that he visits India for personal reasons, including pilgrimages. According to him, he and some others earlier felt happy talking to Indian leaders and officials as they seemed to be concerned about the grievances of Sri Lanka’s Tamil community. “This does not seem to be so anymore,” he said. “It looks as if India is more worried now about bilateral relations (with Colombo) rather than Tamil issues. Maybe China is a reason. I will be happy if I am wrong.” A few Tamil leaders accused Indian diplomats of playing favourites when prominent dignitaries fly into Colombo from New Delhi. “Sometimes we are called to meet them, sometimes we are not invited, and we don’t know why,” said another ex-Tamil MP. “All this creates needless confusion in our minds and amongst our supporters.” Two Tamil leaders from Jaffna complained that it had become difficult to get appointments in New Delhi. “It wasn’t like this earlier,” said one of them. A section of Tamil political leaders who remain sympathetic to the ideology of the vanquished LTTE keep their distance from India, except when interacting with their counterparts in Tamil Nadu, the Indian state separated from Sri Lanka by a narrow strip of sea and once a hub for Tamil militant groups. There is tremendous disquiet over the way India has kept hanging for long decades the citizenship request of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees living in Tamil Nadu. Recently, when the Indian High Commission in Colombo hosted a farewell for a senior diplomat, only five Tamil politicians – three of them from one party – attended. “This would not have been the case earlier,” one attendee said. About a month ago, a section of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), which for long was staunchly pro-India, met Chinese diplomats in the eastern town of Batticaloa. There are also Tamils who say that the distance between them and Indian officialdom is only natural for more than one reason, and that all the blame cannot be laid at India’s door. A Tamil leader from Trincomalee said, “India is fed up with some Tamil leaders. The Indians say Tamil leaders fight with one another all the time instead of coming up with concrete proposals on issues of Tamil devolution. “The Tamil parties only seem interested in Provincial Council elections. Once and if these are held and if they win, they will only be bothered about power,” he added. “The Indians find this short-sighted.” But most Tamil activists admitted that nothing tangible can happen for the Tamils in Sri Lanka without India’s support and nod. “The LTTE itself realised this towards the end,” said one of the former MPs. “If only (LTTE chief Velupillai) Prabhakaran had not antagonized India by killing Rajiv Gandhi, who knows our history may have taken a different turn.” Even when the Norway-led peace process was underway in Sri Lanka, Western countries, as well as Japan, kept as close contact with New Delhi as they did with Colombo. Of course, there were occasions when some Western countries tried to quietly bypass India. Last year, the Swiss Embassy in Colombo tried to organise a meeting of Sri Lankan Tamils. It was called off following widespread criticism that the Swiss were encouraging a narrow stream within the Tamil leadership. ### The Boomerang War: How Israel Aimed at Iran and Hit Itself URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-14/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T00:04:06.000Z ## **By Abbi Kanthasamy** There are wars that end in victory. There are wars that end in defeat. And then there are wars that begin with a press conference, a wall of flags, and the quiet arrogance of people who believe history works for them. This one was supposed to be Israel’s grand vindication. Iran was meant to be cornered, isolated, sanctioned, lectured, inspected, and gift-wrapped for a triumphant Washington photo-op. Netanyahu was meant to stride across the stage like a regional Churchill. Trump was meant to pose as the dealmaker with thunder in one hand and a Sharpie in the other. Instead, the whole thing has come back like a badly thrown boomerang and struck Israel squarely in the forehead. Look at the shape of it. Israel starts the drama convinced it has the moral high ground, the strategic upper hand, and the American security blanket pulled up to its chin. Iran, supposedly, is on the ropes. The region is watching. Washington is growling. The headlines are obedient. Then the alleged Islamabad memorandum appears, and suddenly Iran is not being buried. Iran is being bargained with. Iran is not outside the room. Iran is at the table. It is not merely asking for a ceasefire; it is looking at language about sanctions relief, oil waivers, frozen funds, maritime arrangements, sovereignty, reconstruction, and a massive economic package. That is not defeat. That is a diplomatic rescue helicopter with leather seats. The genius of Iran’s position, if this text holds, is sequencing. Tehran seems to get the early moves: blockade relief, shipping passage, oil permissions, access to money, no new sanctions, and time. The difficult nuclear questions are pushed into the “final deal,” that magical diplomatic cupboard where hard problems are stored until everyone has had lunch. Israel gets a migraine. Iran gets oxygen. Because the more Israel escalated, the more it exposed the limits of its own strategy. The more it bombed, the more it made diplomacy urgent. The more it demanded unconditional backing, the more it forced even Donald Trump — Donald Trump, of all people — to sound like the headmaster at a war-crimes finishing school. When Trump says, in effect, that you do not bomb an entire building because there is one person inside, that is not a throwaway line. That is a loaded sentence. It is not a UN report, but it points in the direction of one. It drags proportionality, civilian harm, and accountability into the room, kicks open the door, and turns on the lights. And let us not pretend this is just theatre. Innocent people have died. Children have died. Families have been buried under decisions made by men who will later call everything regrettable, necessary, and complex. Nothing funny sits in that. No satire can wash it clean. The dead do not return because the living have discovered irony. Israel wanted the world to focus on Iran’s danger. Instead, the world is once again staring at Israel’s methods. Israel wanted to show resolve. Instead, it has shown appetite. Israel wanted America locked in behind it. Instead, America is publicly irritated, privately calculating, and visibly exhausted. Israel is not abandoned. It is worse than that. It is embarrassing its friends. There is a special panic when a patron realises its client has become expensive. Not morally inconvenient — great powers survive moral inconvenience before breakfast — but strategically expensive. Oil prices. Shipping lanes. Gulf capitals. Chinese positioning. Civilian images. Legal language. Elections. The machine starts to creak. History has seen this movie. In 1956, Britain, France, and Israel thought Suez would be a clean imperial correction. Militarily clever. Politically catastrophic. Eisenhower looked at his allies and told them to climb down. They had won the operation and lost the century. In Iraq, America believed shock and awe would rearrange the Middle East. It did, just not in the way the PowerPoint promised. Saddam was removed, Iran’s greatest enemy disappeared, and Tehran gained strategic depth courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer. Trillions spent. Iran strengthened. That is geopolitical slapstick with aircraft carriers. Now we are watching another familiar disaster: force producing the opposite of its advertised purpose. Israel wanted Iran contained. Iran has become necessary. Israel wanted America to be more committed. America has become more nervous. Israel wanted moral clarity. It got Trump accidentally discovering proportionality. Netanyahu wanted deterrence. He got a memorandum. And Trump looks ridiculous, too. One minute, he is the thunderous strongman. The next is the emergency plumber called in because the basement is flooding. He wants to be Caesar, Kissinger, and a real-estate closer all at once. Instead, he looks like a man who helped light a match, watched the curtains catch fire, then called it interior design. But the larger lesson is not about Trump, Rubio, or even Netanyahu alone. It is about impunity. Occupation corrodes judgment. Permanent domination makes states stupid. When every civilian death is explained away as unfortunate, every violation as necessary, every excess as security, the moral muscles waste away. A government starts believing that because it has been defended before, it will be defended forever. But forever is where fools go to lose money. There comes a point when even friends get tired. Not because they suddenly become saints. Because the bill arrives. Because the excuses sound thin. Because the ally becomes less a strategic asset than a diplomatic drunk uncle at a wedding, grabbing the microphone while everyone else searches for the exits. That is Israel’s problem now. Not that Iran is innocent. It is not. Iran is ruthless, repressive, calculating, and deeply cynical in its own regional game. But geopolitics is not a morality play. It is a knife fight conducted with maps, money, missiles, and memory. Iran understands survival. It knows Hormuz. It knows oil. It knows American fatigue. It knows that sometimes the side that refuses to collapse wins by remaining on the board. And that is exactly what seems to have happened. Israel tried to turn pressure into surrender. Iran turned pressure into leverage. Israel tried to make the crisis about Tehran’s danger. Tehran made it about American limits, maritime stability, sanctions fatigue, and regional fear. Netanyahu tried to look indispensable. He now looks like a man who set a trap, stepped into it, and is blaming the trap for being antisemitic. So yes, this has gone full circle. The invasion logic. The occupation arrogance. The assumption that every excess will be forgiven because the enemy is worse. At some point, karma stops sounding spiritual and starts looking procedural. Sometimes it arrives as public criticism from your closest ally. Sometimes it arrives as a sanctions waiver. Sometimes it arrives as an MoU in Islamabad. Israel began this drama expecting Iran to crawl out weakened. Instead, Iran walked back into the diplomatic room, dusted off its jacket, and asked where to sign. Netanyahu wanted Churchill. He got Mr. Bean with air cover. Trump wanted a triumph. He got a contradiction with hair. And the world learned the oldest lesson in foreign affairs: if you build your strategy on permanent impunity, do not be surprised when the bill comes back addressed to you. Signed, witnessed, and delivered by the Department of Geopolitical Karma. ### U.S. and Sri Lanka Hold Disaster Response Drill in Galle, Drawing Lessons From Cyclone Ditwah URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-s-and-sri-lanka-hold-disaster-response-drill-in-galle-drawing-lessons-from-cyclone-ditwah/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T14:20:48.000Z **GALLE, Sri Lanka —** Disaster-management officials from the United States and Sri Lanka concluded a three-day workshop in the southern coastal city of Galle on Thursday with a simulated emergency exercise aimed at strengthening coordination during major natural disasters and humanitarian crises. The workshop, held from June 16 to 18, was organized by the U.S. Embassy in Colombo in partnership with the U.S. military’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, the Montana National Guard, Montana Disaster and Emergency Services, and Sri Lanka’s Disaster Management Centre. The exercise placed participants in a realistic disaster scenario that required them to coordinate resources, manage public communications, and make critical decisions under pressure, according to the U.S. Embassy. Organizers said the drill incorporated lessons learned from recent disasters, including Cyclone Ditwah. Officials said the workshop focused on improving interagency coordination, crisis-response planning, and disaster preparedness, while providing an opportunity for Sri Lankan agencies to exchange practical approaches with U.S. emergency-management specialists. Participants included representatives from the Sri Lanka Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Police, as well as the Department of Civil Security, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Public Security and Parliamentary Affairs, and ministries responsible for health, agriculture, power and energy, the environment, and local government. The workshop builds on a 2025 memorandum of understanding between Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defense and the Montana National Guard. The agreement formalized cooperation in disaster response, maritime domain awareness, and professional military education. The Montana National Guard has been partnered with Sri Lanka since 2021 through the Pentagon’s State Partnership Program, which links U.S. National Guard units with foreign military and civilian agencies. Montana Guard personnel and state emergency-management specialists routinely respond to wildfires, floods, severe winter storms, and other disasters in the western United States. The exercise took place roughly seven months after Cyclone Ditwah, one of the deadliest weather disasters in Sri Lanka’s recent history. The storm struck the island in late November, triggering widespread flooding and landslides across the country. According to figures released by Sri Lanka’s Disaster Management Centre, more than 640 people were killed and over 100,000 homes were damaged or destroyed. A World Bank assessment estimated total losses at about $4.1 billion, equivalent to roughly 4 percent of Sri Lanka’s annual economic output. The disaster also exposed weaknesses in the country’s emergency-response system. Subsequent reviews by researchers and international agencies highlighted shortcomings in early-warning dissemination, interagency coordination, and disaster preparedness, while many rescue efforts in the immediate aftermath were carried out by local communities and volunteers. Organizers of the Galle workshop said lessons from Cyclone Ditwah informed the exercise, which focused on crisis planning, resource coordination, public communication, and decision-making during rapidly evolving emergencies. The U.S. Embassy said the program reflected broader efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and humanitarian cooperation across the Indo-Pacific region, where natural disasters frequently threaten communities, critical infrastructure, and economic activity. ### Court Leaves Door Open to Arrest of Gotabaya Rajapaksa in Easter Bombings Inquiry URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/court-leaves-door-open-to-arrest-of-gotabaya-rajapaksa-in-easter-bombings-inquiry/ Last updated: 2026-06-21T11:55:06.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s Court of Appeal on Thursday postponed until June 24 a petition by former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa seeking to prevent his arrest under the country’s anti-terrorism law in connection with the investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. The court declined to issue interim relief restraining investigators from taking action against Mr. Rajapaksa while the case is pending, leaving open the possibility of his arrest before the next hearing. Mr. Rajapaksa filed the petition as the Criminal Investigation Department widened its inquiry into the Easter attacks, a series of coordinated suicide bombings that struck churches and luxury hotels on Easter morning in 2019, killing more than 260 people and injuring hundreds. The attacks were carried out by a local Islamist group that had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Mr. Rajapaksa, who served as defense secretary during the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war against the Tamil Tiger insurgency, won the presidency later that year after campaigning on promises to restore national security in the aftermath of the bombings. He resigned and fled the country during the economic crisis of 2022 before returning weeks later. He was formally drawn into the Easter Sunday investigation this month when the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court imposed an overseas travel ban at the request of investigators. The inquiry has increasingly focused on senior security and intelligence figures linked to the former administration. Among them is Major General (Retired) Suresh Sallay, a former military intelligence officer who later headed the State Intelligence Service and became a close security aide to Mr. Rajapaksa. He has been detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, or PTA, since February over allegations that he played a role in facilitating the attacks, allegations he denies. Ananda Wijepala, the minister of public security, recently told Parliament that investigators were examining the conduct of officials who held senior positions within the state apparatus at the time of the bombings. The petition carries a notable political dimension. As defense secretary and later as president, Mr. Rajapaksa was among the strongest defenders of the PTA, which grants broad powers of arrest and detention and has long been criticized by human rights organizations, the United Nations, and the European Union. The Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear the matter again on June 24\. Until then, investigators remain free to proceed against the former president if they determine that sufficient grounds exist. ### One Country, Different Rules: A Family Card Required Only in Sri Lanka’s North. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/one-country-different-rules-a-family-card-required-only-in-sri-lankas-north/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T05:10:39.000Z **MULLAITIVU, Sri Lanka —** For many families across Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, a document known as the 'Family Card' plays a central role in their dealings with the state. Residents say it is routinely required to collect Samurdhi welfare benefits, apply for housing under government schemes, and obtain certificates from village officers. In practice, they say, the card must be carried much like a national identity card. Yet the document is largely unknown outside the former war zone. According to an investigation by the Ipen Institute, conducted under Sri Lanka’s Right to Information Act, no ministry appears to claim responsibility for it, no clear legal basis has been identified for its use, and its enforcement varies from district to district. Nevertheless, residents say it remains essential to accessing a range of government services. Introduced during the civil war for security and record-keeping purposes, the system appears to be one of several administrative practices that survived long after the fighting ended. In Mullaitivu District, it has been made compulsory for every household. ### **A document with no parent** The Family Card is not a legal document establishing citizenship, identity, or residence in the way a National Identity Card is. In Sri Lanka, official proof of identity is provided through the National Identity Card issued by the Department of Registration of Persons. The Family Card sits entirely outside that framework. It typically records the members of a household — their names, NIC numbers, occupations, and address — and functions, where it is used, as a ledger of convenience for the village-level Grama Niladhari. “To obtain government assistance, Samurdhi benefits, housing under government schemes, and certificates issued by the Grama Niladhari, a Family Card is essential,” said Padmarajah Sasikanth and Sumathi Thangarasa, residents of Jaffna. “Just like a National Identity Card or voter registration card, it must be carried. An annual fee of 50 rupees is charged to update birth and death information.” “Here, the Family Card is more important to us than the National Identity Card,” said Paramalingam, a resident of Kilinochchi. Another resident, Jasotharan Kalatharan, said the practice was once limited to communities around Mannar town but had been extended this year across the district, broadening a requirement that many residents say is difficult to avoid. ### **What the Right to Information Act revealed** Seeking to establish under whose authority and under what law the system operates, the Ipen Institute filed requests under the Right to Information Act, No. 12 of 2016 — the transparency law that obliges public authorities to answer citizens’ requests within two weeks. The replies, the Institute found, did not cohere. The Ministry of Public Administration, Home Affairs, Provincial Councils and Local Government — the central body responsible for the administrative machinery in question — answered that it did not know what a Family Card was. No such document, the ministry stated, is required for any government service. The district secretariats told a different, and internally contradictory, story. In Mullaitivu, the card is mandatory: every household is required to hold one. In Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Vavuniya, the secretariats said it was not compulsory but remained in routine, everyday use — a matter, they said, of administrative convenience. The Additional District Secretary of Mullaitivu went further still, acknowledging that the practice is not a program of the central ministry but a district-level decision, while insisting that the card is used throughout the Northern Province and that to suggest otherwise is incorrect. That the document is unknown in the south is itself telling. There is no public record of a comparable household card being demanded by village officers in the Sinhala-majority districts, where residents establish their identity, as the law provides, through the National Identity Card alone. ### **Where does the money go?** The card also generates revenue. Families pay 50 rupees annually for its renewal or printing, a charge that the Ipen Institute estimates yields about 2.37 million rupees a year in Mullaitivu District alone. While the fees are collected locally, the Ministry of Public Administration says it does not oversee the Family Card system, leaving unclear the legal basis for the collections and the mechanisms by which the funds are accounted for. ### **“Treated as a separate category”** For many residents, the grievance is not the annual 50-rupee fee but what the Family Card represents: a state that, 17 years after the war, still appears to treat the north differently. “Why should this practice be used only here?” asked Suresh, a resident of Mullaitivu. Critics argue that the continued use of a wartime-era administrative requirement, enforced in some northern districts but unknown elsewhere in the country, amounts to discrimination. The Ipen Institute's investigation found that the system operates without explicit legal authority and is implemented unevenly across districts. The findings also highlight what critics describe as a persistent inequality in Sri Lanka’s system of governance. Residents who spoke with Jaffna Monitor asked: How did a requirement that has become effectively mandatory persist without clear authorization from the Ministry of Public Administration? And what does it mean when citizens in one part of the country are expected to carry a document that many people elsewhere in Sri Lanka have never even heard of? ### Sri Lankan Monk Accused of Seeking Paid Sex in Boston Police Sting URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-monk-accused-of-seeking-paid-sex-in-boston-police-sting/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T13:41:03.000Z **BOSTON —** The Buddha taught that tanhā, the Pali word for craving, is the origin of suffering. Police in Massachusetts allege that one Sri Lankan monk may have taken an unusually hands-on approach to studying the doctrine. Mahayaye Vineetha Thero, 32, a Sri Lankan Buddhist monk who served as the Buddhist chaplain at Tufts University in Massachusetts, was among seven men arrested on Saturday during an undercover Boston police operation targeting alleged purchasers of commercial sex, according to U.S. media reports. He had held the chaplaincy since December 2024, providing spiritual care and support to students. The arrests were made under an undercover operation dubbed “Operation Red Card,” which police said was launched to disrupt human trafficking and the commercial sex trade ahead of FIFA World Cup matches scheduled in the Boston area. Major sporting events routinely draw heightened law-enforcement attention to sex trafficking. Police alleged that the monk responded to an online advertisement placed by undercover officers posing as sex workers. Investigators said the monk sought various sexual acts and offered payments ranging from US$125 to US$400\. The suspects were taken into custody at the Moxy Boston Downtown Hotel, where, police said, several were carrying the exact sums they had allegedly agreed to pay. Mahayaye Vineetha Thero was charged with paying for sexual services, a misdemeanor. He pleaded not guilty when produced before the court and is due to appear again on September 2\. His attorney had not publicly commented on the allegations at the time of reporting, and the charges remain unproven. The monk resigned from his Tufts post with immediate effect following the arrest. In a statement, the university said it was informed of the resignation on Monday. University Chaplain Rev. Elyse Nelson Winger told members of the Buddhist chaplaincy that a search for a successor would begin over the summer and that existing Buddhist programmes would continue without interruption. ### Trincomalee Site Long Linked to Wartime-Era Abductions Is Sealed URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-13/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T14:04:59.000Z ## **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — Sri Lanka’s Criminal Investigation Department has sealed an underground detention facility inside the Trincomalee Navy Camp, a site long known as the “Gun Site,” in a major development in one of the country’s most disturbing unresolved disappearance investigations. The Trincomalee magistrate is expected to visit the site for an official inspection, a step investigators believe could help preserve evidence and clarify how the facility was used during the final years of Sri Lanka’s civil war and its aftermath. The site has been linked for years to allegations that people abducted by members of a naval intelligence unit were secretly held there, tortured, and, in some cases, never seen again. Investigators now believe nearly 60 people may have been detained at the underground complex — far more than the 11 youths at the center of the best-known case. That case, often referred to as the “Navy 11” disappearance case, involves young men abducted between 2008 and 2009, many from Colombo and its suburbs. Court records and investigations have alleged that the victims were held for ransom before disappearing. The case has drawn national and international attention because of the alleged involvement of senior naval officers and the long delays in bringing accountability. The latest move suggests that the investigation is expanding beyond the 11 youths. According to reports, evidence has emerged linking the Gun Site to several other disappearances, including the case of a man named Shantha in Kegalle, now before the Polgahawela Magistrate’s Court; the cases of two Tamil youths in Colombo, being examined before Colombo Magistrate’s Court No. 3; and the disappearances of Ibbagamuwe Pradeep and two young women in Trincomalee, which have also been reported to court. Authorities say former detainees, as well as people connected to the operation of the site, have given confidential statements before magistrates. Their testimony is expected to be central to determining who was held there, who controlled the facility, and whether senior officers knew of or authorized its use. Human rights groups and families of the disappeared have long alleged that it functioned as a secret detention center inside one of the country’s most secure naval installations. The allegations have persisted despite repeated denials, delays, and procedural setbacks. ### ‘I’d Rather Die’: Ex-Spy Chief Refuses to End Hunger Strike or Return to CID Cell URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/id-rather-die-ex-spy-chief-refuses-to-end-hunger-strike-or-return-to-cid-cell/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T04:35:24.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Sri Lanka’s former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay, detailed for alleged links with Islamists who unleashed the Easter bombings in 2019, refuses to give up his indefinite hunger strike or return to CID custody, which he dubs a “hellhole”. Sallay made this clear to his lawyer, who called on him at the National Hospital in Colombo, where he was admitted on June 7, two days after he launched a fast in protest against his degrading treatment, his wife Manori said on Tuesday. “Suresh said he would rather die than go back to that hellhole,” she said over the telephone, referring to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) cell where Sallay had been held since his arrest in February under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). Manori, who visits her husband daily, said the family had also been urging Sallay, the former head of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), the country’s main intelligence agency, to end his hunger strike. “’Please stop this fast, Suresh, I keep telling him,” she said. “We tell him that he needs to live to fight this case. But he won’t give up. He has told us too.” Wednesday is the 11th day of Sallay’s hunger strike, during which he has been fed mostly saline after reaching the government-run hospital. Sallay was taken into custody on allegations by a Sri Lankan Muslim known as Azad Maulana, and not proved in any court of law, that the officer had prodded the Islamists to rain terror on Easter day in 2019. Some in the government and the Catholic clergy have dubbed Sallay the “mastermind” of the bombings in churches and hotels that day, which killed more than 260 people and wounded hundreds. The dead included foreigners. Sallay has denied the accusations as false and said he was attending a military course in India when he was supposedly meeting leaders of the Sri Lankan affiliate of the Islamic State, which claimed responsibility for the bloody attacks. A day earlier, the CID admitted for the first time that its personnel had indeed stripped Sallay naked in custody and subjected him to a deeply invasive physical search. A CID official made the submission to the Human Rights Commission, which is investigating allegations that Sallay was a victim of high-handed treatment at the hands of his captors. Sallay has alleged that he was both physically and psychologically tortured while in custody. Government leaders had denied the charge. The CID officer, however, acknowledged that the retired spymaster had been stripped in front of other prisoners. The incident reportedly occurred in March. “They were denying even this earlier,” Manori said. The CID official told the rights body that stripping and invasive searches were done randomly and on a regular basis. “This is done for the safety of the people in custody,” the official added. The official also insisted that, contrary to allegations, Sallay had been provided with good-quality food, including eggs and chicken. Sallay and his family, however, maintain that he was often served stale food and that, on June 5, he was given a dinner of rice and radish curry on a piece of paper rather than on a plate, prompting him to begin a hunger strike. When the rights official sought to see the CCTV cameras installed in the wing where Sallay had been detained, the CID officer said they had been programmed in such a way that they would automatically rewrite every 24 days. This means incidents alleged to have happened even two months earlier would not be available for viewing by anyone, including the judiciary. Manori said the good news was that Sallay’s wound on his hand was healing after surgery and that the swelling in both arms had gone down. “Otherwise, he remains weak,” she said. “He finds it difficult to sit up and talk to us. At times, he finds it difficult to breathe.” Meanwhile, Manori has urged the Catholic clergy in Sri Lanka to stop spreading the narrative, not based on any evidence that her husband had masterminded the Easter bombings in Colombo and elsewhere. In an open letter to the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Sri Lanka, she said: “We appeal to your Lordships, as the shepherds of the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka, to reflect upon whether continued public assertions identifying my husband as the alleged ‘mastermind’ before the conclusion of judicial proceedings are consistent with the Church’s enduring commitment to justice, truth, charity, mercy, and the presumption of innocence. “We humbly ask that those who possess moral authority (to) refrain from making public pronouncements that may prejudice pending judicial proceedings or contribute to the public condemnation of individuals who have not been convicted by a court of law.” The letter specifically named Father Jude Rohan Silva and Father Cyril Gamini Fernando, saying they had been repeating allegations first made by Azad Maulana, a Sri Lankan who sought asylum in Switzerland. Maulana fled Sri Lanka after the Easter attacks and has refused to return. ### A Day After His Uncle Sought Shelter From Arrest, Mahinda Rajapaksa's Son Is Detained URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/rajapaksa-son-arrested-as-legal-pressure-mounts-on-sri-lankas-former-ruling-family/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T14:05:02.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A day after former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa asked a court to block his possible arrest under Sri Lanka’s anti-terrorism law, another member of the country’s once-dominant political dynasty was taken into custody. Yoshitha Rajapaksa, the second son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, was arrested on Wednesday by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption after appearing before investigators in connection with a probe into his recruitment and training in the Sri Lanka Navy. The arrest marked the latest setback for the Rajapaksa family, whose hold on Sri Lankan politics unraveled after the economic crisis of 2022 triggered mass protests that forced Gotabaya Rajapaksa from office. Commission officials questioned Yoshitha Rajapaksa, 38, over allegations relating to his entry into the Navy in 2006 and his subsequent foreign training. The investigation, opened under Sri Lanka’s Anti-Corruption Act, centers on long-running questions about whether normal recruitment procedures were followed when he joined the service during his father’s presidency. Mr. Rajapaksa had initially been summoned to appear on Tuesday but informed the commission that he could not attend because he had a Court of Appeal hearing in a separate case. He appeared before investigators on Wednesday and was arrested after questioning. The controversy over his naval career dates back nearly two decades. Mr. Rajapaksa joined the Sri Lanka Navy as an officer cadet in 2006, when Mahinda Rajapaksa was president. He later trained at the Naval and Maritime Academy and at the Britannia Royal Naval College in Britain, and was commissioned as an acting sub-lieutenant in 2009\. He also served as an aide-de-camp to his father. Questions about his recruitment resurfaced after Mahinda Rajapaksa lost the presidency in 2015\. The incoming administration directed the Navy to examine how Yoshitha Rajapaksa entered the service, how he obtained overseas training opportunities, and whether he engaged in political activity while serving as a naval officer. In 2016, Parliament was told that more than 22 million rupees in public funds had been spent on his foreign training programs in Britain and Ukraine between 2007 and 2010\. A parliamentary review also raised questions about whether his academic qualifications met the requirements then applicable to officer cadets. His position changed again in 2019, near the end of President Maithripala Sirisena’s term, when he was reinstated in the Navy with retrospective effect. He was later promoted and appointed as an aide-de-camp to a senior naval officer. He resigned from the Navy in 2020 and became chief of staff to Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, his father. The Navy recruitment probe is not the only legal matter involving him. In January 2016, Yoshitha Rajapaksa and several others connected to Carlton Sports Network, a television channel linked to the Rajapaksa family, were arrested in a financial crimes investigation involving allegations of money laundering. That case remains before the courts. On Tuesday, the Court of Appeal concluded hearings on a petition filed by Mr. Rajapaksa challenging a conspiracy charge in the case and said its ruling would be delivered on July 3. The timing of Wednesday’s arrest drew attention because it came a day after Gotabaya Rajapaksa filed a petition in the Court of Appeal seeking an order preventing his arrest under the Prevention of Terrorism Act in connection with investigations related to the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks. The two developments have placed renewed focus on the Rajapaksas, who for years occupied the commanding heights of Sri Lanka’s state. Family members held the presidency, the premiership, cabinet ministries, and influential positions in government, especially after the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009. That dominance has since faded sharply. Gotabaya Rajapaksa was forced from office in 2022 after protesters blamed his government for the country’s economic collapse. Mahinda Rajapaksa has largely withdrawn from frontline politics. His eldest son, Namal Rajapaksa, now leads a weakened Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna. Once among the most powerful families in Asia, the Rajapaksas are now increasingly confronting the institutions they once controlled. ### Why Only Easter? Why Not Mullivaikkal? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/why-only-easter-why-not-mullivaikkal/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T02:14:23.000Z **By Kumulan** Sri Lanka is suddenly brave. The state has found courage. It has found investigators, files, witnesses, travel bans, detention orders, and dramatic whispers about former presidents and former spy chiefs. It now speaks of the Easter Sunday bombings as though justice has finally entered Colombo, barefoot and late, carrying a torch. Good. Let every room be opened. Let every liar sweat. Let every priest, widow, parent, orphan, and survivor hear the truth. If senior officials enabled, ignored, exploited, or covered up the Easter attacks, let them face the law. But do not ask us to confuse political theatre with justice. Because the question that burns through all this is simple: Why only Easter? Why is the state suddenly courageous where the evidence is politically useful, legally complicated, and dependent in part on testimony still untested in open court? Why is it so eager to parade the Rajapaksa machine through one doorway, while refusing to open the much older, bloodier door marked 2009? Because in Mullivaikkal, the evidence does not whisper. It screams. There are UN reports. There are survivor testimonies. There are hospital records, satellite images, videos, surrender accounts, names, ranks, and chains of command. There are mothers who have stood for years holding photographs of disappeared children while Colombo looked away with the calm cruelty of a state that has practiced blindness. And then there is Balachandran. A boy. Not a commander. Not a strategist. Not a battlefield threat. A 12-year-old child carrying the cursed surname of Prabhakaran. Channel 4’s reporting and the images that followed became one of the most unbearable symbols of the final days of the war. The photographs reportedly showed him alive, apparently in military custody, seated and eating a snack. Later images showed him dead. Sri Lanka denied execution and spoke of crossfire. But the visual sequence raised a question no patriotic slogan has ever answered: If he died in battle, why did the world see him alive in custody first? That question should have cracked the republic. It did not. Colombo survived it. The army survived it. The politicians survived it. The broadcasters survived it. The monks survived it. The dinner parties survived it. The south swallowed the image and went back to celebrating victory. That is the real scandal. Not that Gotabaya Rajapaksa may now fear the PTA. He should have due process. Everyone should. The Tamil boy taken under suspicion should have had it. The journalist should have had it. The student should have had it. The surrendered man should have had it. The mother searching for her disappeared son should have had it. The problem with the PTA is not that it may now affect a powerful man. The problem is that it was ever allowed to become normal. Bad law does not become good law because it finally reaches the people who once defended it. But the Easter investigation has revealed something uglier than irony. It has revealed the boundaries of Sri Lankan courage. Corruption can be prosecuted. Everyone hates a thief after the money is gone. Easter can be investigated. It gives the government grieving Catholics, angry voters and a useful monster from the old regime. But Mullivaikkal is different. Mullivaikkal is not merely a case. It is a mirror. It asks whether the state committed crimes at the very moment it claimed to be saving the nation. It asks whether “war hero” can become a shield against the law. It asks whether a flag can cover a body. It asks whether Tamil grief is evidence, or merely an inconvenience to Sinhala memory. That is why no government wants to go there. Not Mahinda. Not Gotabaya. Not Maithri. Not Ranil. And now, perhaps, not even Anura. Because prosecuting 2009 is not just prosecuting a family. It is prosecuting a national religion. It would require telling the Sinhala south that the victory it was taught to worship may also contain crimes it was trained not to see. It would require telling the army that command responsibility is not treason. It would require telling monks and television patriots that the dead do not disappear because a studio calls them propaganda. It would require telling Tamil citizens that their dead are not foreign inventions. That is the courage Sri Lanka still does not have. So the state does what it always does. It chooses the safer drama. It chases the politically useful crime and avoids the foundational one. It speaks of accountability while negotiating with impunity. It opens one file and locks the archive. The dead of Easter deserve better than a flimsy case built for applause. The dead of Mullivaikkal deserve better than eternal silence. If the Easter evidence is strong, prosecute. If it is weak, admit it. Do not manufacture justice because the crowd wants blood. Do not turn a national wound into a stage play. Do not use the PTA to pretend the rule of law has returned while the law itself remains rotten. And do not insult the dead of 2009 by acting as if Sri Lanka’s conscience was born in 2019. Justice was waiting before Easter. It was waiting in the Vanni. It was waiting near the hospitals. It was waiting at the surrender points. It was waiting in detention camps. It was waiting in the photographs of the disappeared. It was waiting in the image of a child who appeared alive in custody, and then was not. That image should haunt every minister who says “accountability” without saying “Mullivaikkal.” It should haunt every prosecutor who can find the courage to touch Easter but not 2009\. It should haunt every Sri Lankan who thinks justice is noble only when it is aimed at someone else’s wound. A country can survive the prosecution of a former president. It can survive the arrest of a spy chief. It can survive the fall of a dynasty. What Sri Lanka fears is surviving the truth about itself. That is why 2009 remains protected. Not because there is no evidence. Because there is too much. Too much footage. Too many witnesses. Too many graves. Too many mothers. Too many names. Too many commanders. Too many diplomats who heard the briefings. Too many politicians who sold the myth. Too many citizens who clapped. Easter asks who failed the state. Mullivaikkal asks what the state became. That is the question Colombo cannot bear. So yes, investigate Easter. But do not stop there. Do not pretend the hunt for justice begins only where it is politically convenient. Do not drag one spy chief into the light while leaving the war machine in holy shadow. Do not prosecute the aftershock and worship the earthquake. If this government wants to wake Sri Lanka, it must say the forbidden word. Mullivaikkal. Not as mourning. Not as ceremony. Not as diaspora noise. Not as separatist memory. As evidence. As law. As a crime scene. Until then, this is not justice. It is politics wearing a judge’s robe. And if the state has the courage to chase the Rajapaksas for Easter but not for 2009, let us say it plainly: It is not hunting impunity. It is protecting its oldest crime. ### Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Who Wielded the PTA for a Decade, Now Seeks the Court's Protection From It URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/gotabaya-rajapaksa-who-wielded-the-pta-for-a-decade-now-seeks-the-courts-protection-from-it/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T04:26:57.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, whose years as defence secretary coincided with the extensive use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, has petitioned the Court of Appeal to prevent his arrest under the same law, which became a central pillar of the security apparatus he helped shape. The petition, filed through Attorney-at-Law Sanath Wijewardena, seeks an order barring investigators from arresting Mr. Rajapaksa under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, or PTA, in connection with the ongoing investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings that killed more than 260 people. The application names the Inspector General of Police, Priyantha Weerasuriya; the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department, Shani Abeysekara; and CID investigator Madhava Gunawardena among the respondents. On June 3, a magistrate at the Colombo Fort Magistrate's Court imposed an overseas travel ban on Mr. Rajapaksa — the first time he had been formally drawn into the Easter Sunday investigation as a person of interest. That order followed a request by the Criminal Investigation Department based on evidence provided by Azad Maulana, a former insider who sought asylum abroad and whose testimony has yet to be tested in open court. The case has widened in recent months. Major General (Retired) Suresh Sallay, the former director of the State Intelligence Service and one of Mr. Rajapaksa’s closest security aides, has been detained under the PTA since February. Authorities allege that he conspired in and aided the Easter Sunday attacks, accusations he has denied. Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala told Parliament this month that investigators believe the inquiry is moving beyond operational actors and toward those who occupied senior positions within the state apparatus at the time of the bombings. Enacted in 1979 as a temporary measure but retained for decades, the PTA grants authorities extraordinary powers of arrest and detention. Human rights organizations, the United Nations, and the European Union have repeatedly criticized the legislation, arguing that it enables prolonged detention without adequate judicial oversight and creates conditions conducive to abuse. During Mr. Rajapaksa’s tenure as defense secretary between 2005 and 2015, the PTA formed a central pillar of Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency and postwar security framework. Thousands of Tamils were detained under its provisions during and after the civil war. Human rights groups argued that many detainees were never charged or convicted and that the law was frequently used against political opponents, activists, and individuals with little or no demonstrated connection to terrorism. Rights organizations also documented allegations of torture, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detention during that period, allegations successive governments have largely rejected. As president from 2019 to 2022, Mr. Rajapaksa continued to defend the law against mounting international pressure for its repeal or substantial reform, arguing that robust security powers were necessary to protect the country from terrorism. Now, as investigators examine whether senior officials bear responsibility for failures surrounding the Easter Sunday attacks, the former president finds himself seeking judicial protection from the same statute. The petition does not address the broader history of the law. Instead, it argues that any attempt to arrest Mr. Rajapaksa under the PTA would be unlawful and asks the Court of Appeal to intervene before such action can be taken. The court has yet to fix a date for hearing the application. ### Defenders of Bharatanatyam Record Say Costs Were Disclosed and Agreed in Writing URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/defenders-of-bharatanatyam-record-say-costs-were-disclosed-and-agreed-in-writing/ Last updated: 2026-06-16T05:38:37.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The organizers of a Bharatanatyam performance that set a Guinness World Record in the Sri Lankan capital recently have found defenders among people familiar with how the event was arranged, who say that the costs borne by participants and the process for obtaining official certificates were spelled out well in advance and accepted in writing. The pushback follows criticism from social activist Rajkumar Rajeevkanth, as well as several parents and activists, who argued in a series of social media posts that the thousands of students and teachers central to the achievement had been sidelined while recognition was given to private organizers and a single foreign instructor, despite participants paying registration fees. According to people with knowledge of the event’s organization, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, dancers, teachers, and participating institutions were told before the performance that they would have to cover their own expenses, and the procedure for receiving Guinness certificates was explained to them in detail. Participating institutions, these people said, signed undertakings acknowledging those terms. The certificates at the center of the complaint, they added, are sold by Guinness World Records to individual participants and are not issued free of charge by organizers — an arrangement they described as standard for record attempts of this kind, given that both the event and the record-keeping body are private. That account aligns with Guinness World Records’ own published practices. The London-based, privately held company routes mass-participation attempts through a paid consultancy division and treats attempts undertaken for commercial or promotional purposes as fee-bearing agreements quoted on a case-by-case basis. Individuals who take part in a successful mass attempt are offered the chance to buy a personalized Certificate of Participation — recently priced at roughly $29 for a printed version and about $10 for a digital one — using serialized codes that organizers are responsible for distributing. Inviting an official adjudicator to verify an attempt on site, the company says, starts at £4,500. Under that model, the people familiar with the Colombo event said, the naming of the organizing companies and the lead instructor on the record documentation, and the requirement that participants pay for their own certificates, reflected Guinness’s procedures rather than any diversion of credit or funds. They characterized the online criticism as the work of commentators unfamiliar with how such records are administered. Mr. Rajeevkanth, in his posts, had congratulated the more than 5,000 dancers who performed in unison at Galle Face Green, the seaside promenade in the capital, but questioned the event’s financing and recognition. He said participants had each been charged about 4,500 rupees, or roughly $15, and that many families from the Tamil-majority north and east, among the poorest regions in the country, still rebuilding from the long civil war,had spent considerably more on travel, board, and meals. By the participants’ own arithmetic, the registration fees alone would have exceeded 22 million rupees, about $75,000\. He called on the government to ensure that future cultural initiatives prioritized the recognition of participating students and teachers over private or commercial interests. The performance, billed as the largest Bharatanatyam dance lesson, was jointly organized by Sangamam Global Academy of India and the Sri Lankan group Sangamizh Liya, and drew dancers from Sri Lanka, India, and elsewhere. It was attended by senior officials, including the fisheries minister, Ramalingam Chandrasekar, and the deputy minister of plantation and community infrastructure, Sundaralingam Pradeep, both members of the governing National People’s Power. Their offices had promoted the record as a national triumph — a framing that, for the activist and some parents, sharpened the question of why the recognition ultimately attached to private entities and one instructor rather than to the state or to the dancers themselves. Several elements of the competing accounts could not be independently verified. They include the existence and precise terms of the written undertakings said to have been signed, and how the registration fees were spent. The organizers have not responded publicly to the activist’s allegations, and the offices of Mr. Chandrasekar and Mr. Pradeep did not immediately respond to requests for comment. The people who defended the event’s organization declined to be identified. ### CID Names Pillayan a Suspect in 2008 Killings as Easter Case Remains Uncharged URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/cid-names-pillayan-a-suspect-in-2008-killings-as-easter-case-remains-uncharged/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T12:31:17.000Z **BATTICALOA, Sri Lanka —** The Criminal Investigation Department told a magistrate’s court in eastern Sri Lanka on Monday that Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the former Eastern Province chief minister widely known as Pillayan, is one of three suspects in a string of shootings that left five people dead in Batticaloa District in 2008. According to details presented before Batticaloa Magistrate Annathurai Darshini, investigators are examining a series of fatal shootings carried out in 2008, several of them allegedly involving T-56 assault rifles. The killings span multiple locations across the district: two people, one of them a former police officer, were shot near Kallady on Jan. 9, 2008; two more were killed on the main road in Kattankudy on May 22; and a fifth man, identified as Alagathurai Dharmalingam of the Vavunatheevu area, was shot dead by an armed group at Koththiyapulai on Aug. 20. The C.I.D. named Mr. Chandrakanthan, the leader of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) party, alongside two co-suspects identified as former military intelligence informants, Rasik Mohamed Faiz and Hameed Lebbe Mohat. The suspects were produced before court under heavy security and ordered held until June 30\. Investigators told the court that another suspect is believed to be living abroad. Mr. Chandrakanthan is already in remand custody in a separate case involving the 2006 abduction and killing of Professor Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, the vice chancellor of Eastern University, who disappeared in Colombo during the civil war and whose remains have never been recovered. Neither case, however, involves the Easter Sunday bombings of April 21, 2019, in which more than 260 people were killed in coordinated suicide attacks targeting three churches and three luxury hotels. As of this week, no Easter Sunday-related charges have been presented against Mr. Chandrakanthan in court. ### **A Year of Easter Allegations** When the C.I.D. arrested Mr. Chandrakanthan at his party headquarters in Batticaloa on April 8, 2025, government officials publicly linked the arrest to the Easter Sunday attacks. Within days, Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala told Parliament that investigators had obtained substantial information connecting Mr. Chandrakanthan to the bombings. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who campaigned on a pledge to deliver accountability for the attacks, also referred to the arrest at political rallies ahead of the 2025 local government elections. In July 2025, Mr. Wijepala told Parliament that the government possessed evidence suggesting that Mr. Chandrakanthan had prior knowledge of the attacks, had met the National Thowheeth Jamaath leader Zahran Hashim, and had provided a confidential statement to a magistrate regarding the bombings. But when Mr. Chandrakanthan was produced before the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court on April 2, 2026, after nearly a year in detention under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, prosecutors did not file Easter Sunday-related charges. Instead, the case presented concerned the 2006 disappearance and killing of Professor Raveendranath. Monday’s allegations concerning the 2008 killings add another historical case to the proceedings against him. As of this week, no Easter Sunday-related charges have been filed against Mr. Chandrakanthan. Government officials have maintained that investigations into the Easter attacks remain ongoing. Authorities have not publicly explained why the allegations discussed in Parliament have not yet resulted in charges against him. ### **Justice Welcomed, Motive Questioned** Rights lawyers and opposition figures say the crimes now before the courts are serious allegations that warrant investigation. The disappearance of a university vice chancellor and a series of unresolved killings have left families seeking answers for years. But some critics question why the government publicly emphasized alleged Easter Sunday links while the cases now being pursued concern different crimes from earlier years. Udaya Gammanpila, Mr. Chandrakanthan’s lawyer and leader of the Pivithuru Hela Urumaya party, has argued that despite repeated public claims linking his client to the Easter attacks, no Easter-related charges have been filed. He has also noted that many of the allegations were made in Parliament, where lawmakers are protected by parliamentary privilege. Critics have drawn parallels with the case of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the former intelligence chief who was arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act amid allegations relating to the Easter attacks. In both cases, they argue, some of the most serious public allegations have yet to be tested before a court. Whether the Easter Sunday investigation ultimately results in charges remains unclear. For now, prosecutors are pursuing cases linked to a disappearance in 2006 and killings in 2008, while questions about the government’s earlier public assertions continue to fuel political debate. ### Tamils Rally in Jaffna for Return of Land Held by Military for 36 Years URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamils-rally-in-jaffna-for-return-of-land-held-by-military-for-36-years/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T04:38:15.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka –** Hundreds of anguished Tamils staged a noisy protest outside the Jaffna District Secretariat, demanding the immediate return of their precious land, which the military seized 36 years ago to battle the Tamil Tigers. An estimated 500 men and women picketed the office complex for around three hours from 8.30 am, asking the authorities to press the military to surrender thousands of acres of land in Valikamam North area in Jaffna. A separate vigil was organised at the Palaly Junction, near the boundary of the Valikamam North High Security Zone, attended by some 150 people. Somasundaram Sugirthan, Chairman of the Valikamam North Divisional Council (Pradeshiya Sabha), said the protestors at the main event submitted a memorandum to the Northern Province Governor. “People are really upset. This is sheer injustice,” Sugirthan told Jaffna Monitor. “The land was seized from ordinary people 36 years ago. The war (against the Tamil Tigers) ended 17 years ago. But the land is still not being returned. “Why?” he asked. “The lives of thousands are affected because of this unjustified stand. People are badly hit economically. The people have had this land for generations. It must be given back.” He said around 7,000 families felt betrayed by the military’s intransigence and that the land under occupation totaled some 2,700 acres. The government took over the land after driving away people in 1990, when the war between the military and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) resumed after a brief lull. Over the years, the military kept expanding its defence parameters. When the war ended in 2009, it was widely assumed that the land would be surrendered to the rightful legal owners, slowly at least if not immediately. But the military has adamantly refused to relinquish control of the land, even though the security concerns that once justified its occupation ended long ago. On some of the land, the military has built commercial complexes and even engages in farming. “While we are suffering, the land is being used for profit,” said one Tamil man whose land remains under the control of the military, which is overwhelmingly staffed by members of the Sinhalese majority community. Many of those who have lost their ancestral land now live in rented homes. “Our protests will continue till our demands are met,” added Sugirthan. The Mayiliddy Resettlement Development Committee is demanding the immediate release of civilian land and the full resettlement of displaced families in their places of origin. It has urged all political leaders, civil society groups, and people across the Northern Province to back the campaign, described as a struggle for land rights, livelihoods, and justice. Some Tamils say that President Anura Dissanayake appears to favour returning the land to its Tamil owners, but has been unable to overcome the military’s refusal to relinquish the vast territory it has grown accustomed to controlling. ### Doctors Fight to Keep Suresh Sallay Alive, Wife Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-12/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T04:38:18.000Z ## **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Doctors are doing everything they can to keep Sri Lanka’s former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay alive, his wife said on Monday, as the man spent his ninth day in a Colombo hospital after launching an indefinite hunger strike. “He is extremely weak,” Manori Sallay told Jaffna Monitor after visiting him. “All the doctors are going all out to keep him alive.” The former head of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), who was arrested in February on charges of conspiring with Islamist militants to carry out the 2019 Easter bombings, has undergone surgery to remove pus from his right hand. According to his wife, Manori, both of his hands became swollen due to an infection and turned red. Sallay, who has dismissed the allegations against him as fabricated, also developed a fever. The surgery, though minor otherwise, “itself made Suresh very weak”, she said. “He felt slightly better today.” However, Sallay still finds it difficult to sit up and talk even when family members visit him at the government-run National Hospital, where he was taken on June 7, two days after starting a hunger strike in protest against what he and his family said was torture in detention. The government has repeatedly insisted that he was not tortured. But it has not explained how and why his health deteriorated sharply after just two nights of fasting. “Suresh struggles to breathe,” his wife said. “He just cannot talk at length, even if he wants to. It is all very painful for all of us.” A Sri Lankan Muslim alleged while seeking asylum in Switzerland in late 2019 that Sallay, a career intelligence officer, plotted with Islamists to bomb churches and hotels on Easter day in 2019, killing over 600 people and injuring hundreds. The dead included foreigners. The massacre was claimed by the Islamic State and executed by its Sri Lankan affiliate. The allegation is that Sallay wanted to create a fear psychosis so that former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, with whom he was close, could win the next presidential battle. Gotabaya Rajapaksa did become president following the election held months later. He promptly appointed Sallay as head of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), Sri Lanka’s main intelligence agency Those close to Sallay say the aim of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) government is to ultimately arrest Gotabaya Rajapaksa, whose presidency ended abruptly in 2022 in the wake of the country’s economic collapse. While the authorities have now allowed Manori as well as their son and daughter to visit Sallay daily for 15 minutes, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) has denied similar permission to his lawyer. A June 13 communication from CID Director Shani Abeysekara said Sallay required “continuous mental rest” and so should not be disturbed by other visitors, including his legal representatives. The CID statement, however, appeared to contradict Additional Solicitor General Dileepa Peeris, who had told the court that the former spymaster was putting on an “Oscar-worthy performance” by feigning mental trauma. Asked about the CID communication, Manori said: “Well, that does prove that they have mentally tortured Suresh and that he needs rest.” On June 14, Manori questioned the justification offered to deny legal access to her husband in hospital. She said in a communication to the CID Director that her husband went on hunger strike due to “a direct consequence of the physical, psychological, and emotional suffering he has endured whilst under the custody and control of officers attached to the Crime Investigation Department. “Consequently, the responsibility for ensuring his safety, dignity, and well-being rests squarely upon your office,” she wrote. Late last week, the Sallays’ daughter finally saw her father in the hospital’s isolation row for the first time after 105 days. Manori said the daughter had been traumatised by his condition, constantly worrying that he would die. Since his admission in hospital, Sallay, detained under the notorious Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), has continued his hunger strike but has been put on saline. Government ministers claim they have enough evidence to back the charges against Sallay. This claim has been debunked by not just the former SIS chief but also some of his colleagues. A section of Sinhalese Buddhist politicians has come out openly in Sallay’s support, saying the government had relied on spurious charges to cause agony to a man who led a covert war against the once powerful Tamil Tigers. ### Activist Questions Funding and Credit for Bharatanatyam World Record in Colombo URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/activist-questions-funding-and-credit-for-bharatanatyam-world-record-in-colombo/ Last updated: 2026-06-15T09:46:12.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A social activist has challenged the way credit was assigned for a Bharatanatyam performance that set a Guinness World Record in Colombo over the weekend, arguing that the thousands of students and teachers central to the achievement were overlooked while recognition went to the event's private organizers and a single instructor. The activist, Rajkumar Rajeevkanth, laid out his objections in a series of social media posts on Monday, a day after more than 5,000 dancers performed in unison at Galle Face Green, the seaside promenade in the Sri Lankan capital. He congratulated the participants but questioned the event's organization, financing, and official recognition. The performance, billed as the largest Bharatanatyam dance lesson, was jointly organized by Sangamam Global Academy of India and the Sri Lankan group Sangamizh Liya. It drew dancers from Sri Lanka, India, and other countries and was attended by senior Sri Lankan ministers and officials. Among those taking part were the fisheries minister, Ramalingam Chandrasekar, and the deputy minister of plantation and community infrastructure, Sundaralingam Pradeep, both members of the governing National People's Power. The offices of the two ministers, along with social media accounts aligned with them, promoted the achievement as a national triumph, with their media teams highlighting the efforts the politicians had invested in helping secure the record. That, Mr. Rajeevkanth and a number of parents said, was precisely the problem. If two sitting government ministers had worked so hard to land the record, they asked, why did it belong, in the end, to a private company and a single foreign instructor rather than to the state or to the thousands who danced? Mr. Rajeevkanth said the certificate named only Sangamizh Liya Holidays (Pvt.) Ltd. of Sri Lanka, Sangamam Global Academy of India, and an Indian dance teacher, T. Venmani Selvi, as the record holders. The thousands of students and the Sri Lankan instructors who trained them, he said, went unmentioned. "The names appearing on the certificate are those of the organizations and the Indian dance teacher," he wrote. "But the students and teachers from across Sri Lanka are the true owners of this achievement." He also said parents, students, and dance teachers had lodged numerous complaints about how the event was run. Among them, he wrote, were that participants had each been charged about 4,500 rupees, or roughly $15, to take part, with families bearing additional costs. He asked how the money collected had been spent and whether regulators had adequately overseen the program. By the participants' own arithmetic, the registration fees alone — about 4,500 rupees from each of more than 5,000 dancers — would have brought in more than 22 million rupees, or roughly $75,000\. The expense did not end there. Many of the performers had traveled from the Tamil-majority north and east regions, still rebuilding from the country's long civil war, and parents said the students were left to arrange and pay for their own transport, board, and meals in the capital. Some families spent at least 20,000 rupees, about $65, per child on top of the fee, they alleged — no small sum in areas where household incomes remain among the lowest in the country. Though the event was promoted under the patronage of government ministers, Mr. Rajeevkanth argued, the recognition tied to the record had accrued to private entities and an individual rather than to the performers. "If this was a national achievement made possible by our students and teachers, why are only the organizers and one teacher named?" he wrote. He called on the government to ensure that future large-scale cultural initiatives prioritized the recognition of participating students and teachers over private or commercial interests. The organizers did not respond publicly to the allegations. The offices of Mr. Chandrasekar and Mr. Pradeep did not immediately respond to the criticism. The claims about participant fees, the use of the funds, and the precise wording of the Guinness certification could not be independently verified. ### Military Told to Stop Hospital Construction on Private Land in Vasavilan URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-11/ Last updated: 2026-06-15T00:35:25.000Z JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — The chairman of the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha has written to the military demanding a halt to the construction of a hospital on privately owned land in the Vasavilan area, warning that the council will take legal action if work continues beyond June 16. In a letter dated June 9 to the Jaffna District military commander, Maj. Gen. K.J.N.M.P.K. Nawarathna, the council chairman, S. Sugirthan, said the project was proceeding without the required legal authorization and demanded that construction stop immediately and the land be released. The council said a copy of the notice was also sent to the attorney general. The letter was issued as a final statutory notice under Sri Lanka's Urban Development Authority Law, according to the council. Mr. Sugirthan said that if the military did not comply by the deadline, the local authority would exercise its legal powers and file a case in the Mallakam Magistrate's Court under the law, which governs construction and land use. The land in question is among the privately owned plots in Valikamam North that were taken from Tamil residents after the 1990 displacement and have not been returned. The military has occupied the area for 36 years. The military had not publicly responded to the notice. ### Valikamam North Tamils Mark 36th Anniversary of Displacement With Protest URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/valikamam-north-tamils-mark-37th-anniversary-of-displacement-with-protest/ Last updated: 2026-06-16T05:25:08.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Tamil residents displaced from the Valikamam North region more than three decades ago were expected to march on the Jaffna District Secretariat on Monday to demand the return of ancestral land that remains under military control, 17 years after the end of Sri Lanka's civil war. The protest, organized by the Mayiliddy Resettlement Development Committee, marks the anniversary of the displacement, which began on June 15, 1990, when residents were ordered from their homes as fighting intensified across the Jaffna Peninsula. Large tracts of the region, including thousands of privately owned plots, were later absorbed into a military-run high-security zone. The committee is demanding the immediate release of civilian land and the full resettlement of displaced families in their places of origin. In a statement, it called on political leaders, civil society groups, and residents across the Northern Province to support the campaign, which it described as a struggle for land rights, livelihoods, and justice. Tens of thousands of Tamils were forced from Valikamam North at the height of the war between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Many have been unable to return even after the war ended in 2009 with the group's defeat, because large portions of their property remain occupied by the military. A separate vigil was scheduled at Palaly Junction, near the boundary of the Valikamam North High Security Zone, from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Monday. ### CID Refuses Daily Lawyer Visits for Hospitalized Ex-Spy Chief URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-10/ Last updated: 2026-06-14T23:48:49.000Z ## **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka’s Criminal Investigation Department has refused to allow daily visits by the lawyer of Major General (Retired) Suresh Sallay, the former director of the State Intelligence Service, who is being treated in hospital after a hunger strike in detention, according to a letter from the department obtained by Jaffna Monitor. In the letter, dated June 13 and signed by Senior Superintendent of Police Shani Abeysekara, the CID director, the agency told Sallay’s wife that her husband’s attorney would be permitted to meet him only on days he is produced before court — not daily, as the family had sought. The letter responded to a June 12 appeal from Manori Sallay, who had requested regular legal access on the grounds that her husband’s health was failing. Mr. Abeysekara wrote that Ms. Sallay, the couple’s daughter, and their son had already been granted daily access to visit the detainee in hospital to attend to his wellbeing, and that, given his medical condition, daily access for his lawyer could not be permitted “at this time.” Sallay, 58, was arrested by the CID in Peliyagoda on Feb. 25 over allegations that he aided the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday bombings, which killed 269 people, and has remained in CID custody under detention orders since. He began a hunger strike in custody, alleging inhumane treatment, and was admitted to the National Hospital of Colombo on the night of June 7 after authorities said his condition deteriorated. The police have rejected the torture allegations, stating that no assault or cruel treatment had been carried out against the suspect. ### In Colombo, 5,000 Bharatnatyam Dancers Move in Unison—and Into the Record Books URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/in-colombo-5-000-bharatnatyam-dancers-move-in-unison-and-into-the-record-books/ Last updated: 2026-06-14T14:46:47.000Z **COLOMBO –** More than 5,000 Bharatnatyam dancers from Sri Lanka, India, and other countries gave a scintillating, choreographed performance in Colombo on Sunday (June 14) to earn a Guinness World Record citation for the largest dance lesson in one of India’s oldest classical dance forms. The colourful and mesmerizing event was organised jointly by the Sangamam Global Academy of India and the Samgamizh Liya of Sri Lanka at the Galle Face Green promenade in the capital. After the performers, dressed in bright traditional attire, displayed their talent under the eyes of their guru, a Guinness World Record certificate was awarded to India’s High Commissioner, Santosh Jha, who received it on behalf of the performers and organisers. Jha said the performance would further cement people-to-people ties between India and Sri Lanka. He also congratulated the dancers and organisers for achieving global recognition. Among those who watched the show were Sri Lankan cabinet minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar and deputy ministers Sundaralingam Pradeep and Mahinda Jayasinghe, besides a large audience. Bharatnatyam is an ancient Indian classical dance form originating from the imposing temples of Tamil Nadu. The dance is renowned for its precise footwork, expressing hand gestures and attractive poses as it seeks to tell stories from Hindu scriptures. ### The Government, the Spy Chief, and the Danger of Hunting Monsters URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-government-the-spy-chief-and-the-danger-of-hunting-monsters/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T09:40:56.000Z **By Che Ran** There is a particular smell to Colombo politics after rain: diesel, wet dust, sea salt, old files, new lies, and that faint colonial rot of a state that has never really confessed to itself. The ministries dry out. The uniforms return to their posts. The priests keep waiting. The widows keep waiting. The politicians, of course, discover justice exactly when it becomes useful. Into this humidity walks the case of Suresh Sallay — soldier, intelligence man, Rajapaksa insider, spymaster, villain to some, patriot to others. Depending on whom you believe, he is either one of the darkest conspirators in modern Sri Lankan history or the most useful prisoner of a government desperate to prove the old regime was not merely corrupt, but monstrous. The allegation is almost too large to hold: that elements of the state helped enable the Easter Sunday bombings of 2019 — the churches, the hotels, the bodies, the panic — so that Gotabaya Rajapaksa could ride the smoke into power. It is the sort of allegation that either rewrites a country’s history or destroys the credibility of those who dared say it out loud. There is no middle ground. If the government proves it, it becomes the administration that finally entered the locked room of Sri Lanka’s post-war security state and found the bodies. If it fails, it becomes something uglier: a government that took the most sacred grief of a country and used it to hunt political enemies. That is a profound moral risk. The NPP government came to power promising a clean break from the rotten habits of the old order. Sri Lanka needed that rupture. But every revolution eventually finds itself standing before the same old machinery, hand hovering over the same old lever. In this case, the lever is the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The PTA is the cursed instrument that swallowed Tamil boys, Muslim men, journalists, and inconvenient bodies. It made detention easier than proof, allowing the state to say: *trust us, we know things you cannot know.* Now, the new government uses it against the old spymaster. There is dark poetry in that, but also immense danger. If you use the devil’s tools, you should not be surprised when people notice the smell of sulphur on your hands. The government’s defenders will say this is different—Sallay was a man of power who was the system itself. Perhaps. But due process exists because the state is always tempted to call its enemy guilty before proving it. Around the world, governments have tried this move before: prosecute the powerful, turn legal action into national cleansing. Sometimes it works. Sometimes it becomes a spectacular self-own. Brazil’s Operation Car Wash began as a heroic anti-corruption crusade. Presidents, contractors, and party bosses were dragged into daylight. But the investigation became entangled with politics. The halo cracked, Lula da Silva’s convictions were annulled, and the man once imprisoned returned to the presidency. That is the nightmare scenario for Sri Lanka. You aim at the old regime and miss. The old regime gets up, bleeding but smiling, and says: *See? They were never after justice. They were after us.* Failed prosecutions are resurrection machines. In the United States, the 2008 case against Senator Ted Stevens collapsed over prosecutorial misconduct. The question shifted from “What did he do?” to “What did the state do?” That shift is fatal. Once the state becomes the accused, the original crime recedes into the fog. For Sri Lanka, the trap is especially cruel because the unanswered questions about Easter Sunday are real. The Indian intelligence warnings, the failure to act, the paralysis of the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government, the extremist networks, the convenient timing—these are not small matters. But the bigger the allegation, the cleaner the proof must be. You cannot prosecute a national trauma on vibes or convict a spymaster on speeches. You cannot build the biggest case in modern Sri Lankan history on an asylum witness unless they are tied down with steel cables of corroboration: phone records, travel logs, financial trails, and independent witnesses. Something that survives cross-examination. Otherwise, the defense has only to say one word: *politics.* And in Sri Lanka, that word is never far from the table. Prosecuting the powerful is not always a mistake; history sometimes demands it. Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and South Korea’s Park Geun-hye both faced the machinery of justice. But those cases mattered because they were built with institutional discipline. No shortcuts. No revenge optics. No hero speeches. No “trust us, we have secret evidence.” That is not justice; it is theatre with handcuffs. Sallay is a uniquely dangerous defendant. He is not a politician with a bad haircut and a bank account in Dubai; he is intelligence. He is the locked drawer. Men like that know who met whom, who paid whom, and who pretended not to know. If the government has the goods, it must move with surgical precision. If it does not, it is walking into a room full of mirrors. Many Sri Lankans will not cry for Sallay. The irony of a former intelligence chief discovering the cruelty of the PTA only when it reaches his own cell will not be lost on civil liberties advocates. Fair enough. But irony is not evidence. A man can be morally compromised and still legally not guilty of the thing you most want to pin on him. That is the discipline of justice, and Sri Lanka has never been very good at discipline when politics enters the room. The worst-case scenario is easy to imagine. Ministers thunder in Parliament. Friendly media leak fragments. The Catholic community is told that truth is coming. Sallay becomes the bridge to the old regime. Then the case reaches court. Dates wobble. Records go missing. Intelligence material is ruled inadmissible. The PTA detention becomes the story. Sallay’s health and alleged mistreatment become the headlines. Slowly, horribly, the victims disappear from the center of the case. That is how governments lose the plot. First, the dead are invoked, then the accused is paraded, then the evidence disappoints. Finally, the accused becomes the victim, the old regime claims persecution, and the public shrugs and says: *all politicians are the same.* That final sentence is death. Because the NPP was elected to prove that all politicians are *not* the same. There is only one safe road. Charge him properly. Protect him physically. Remove obvious conflicts of interest from the investigation and use independent prosecutors. Stop trying the case in Parliament, respect the court, and show the evidence. If the evidence is not strong enough, do not pretend that moral certainty is the same as legal proof. The Easter dead deserve more than a failed prosecution. They deserve truth. And truth, in a country like Sri Lanka, is not found by shouting. It is found by taking the state’s dirtiest files, putting them under bright light, and refusing to blink even when the evidence cuts against your own story. The Sallay affair is about whether Sri Lanka’s new rulers can resist becoming what they replaced. That is the real trial. Not of one spymaster, but of the government itself. ### TELO Dissidents Allege Power Grab Ahead of National Convention URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/telo-dissidents-allege-power-grab-ahead-of-national-convention/ Last updated: 2026-06-14T00:40:44.000Z **JAFFNA —** A faction of senior leaders within the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) has accused the party's top leadership of subverting internal democracy by delaying the organization's national convention and manipulating district-level selections to entrench themselves in power, according to statements made at a press conference held Saturday at the Jaffna Media Centre. The dissidents said the party has suffered repeated electoral losses, administrative dysfunction, and a string of controversial political alliances under the current leadership, prompting an exodus of members and, in an unusual development, public protests by former fighters against the party's own command structure. According to the group, leadership committee meetings in Vavuniya on March 21 and in Trincomalee on April 25 ended with a decision made over their objections to postpone the national convention. The leadership also moved to discard General Council selections that had already been completed in eight districts and replace them with new appointees, a step the dissidents characterized as a violation of the party's constitution. The group further alleged that in six districts, excluding Mannar and Mullaitivu, the party leader and secretary quietly convened meetings limited to their own loyalists in order to handpick new General Council members. They said the move was aimed at influencing the party’s national convention, scheduled for June 14, and ensuring that key administrative positions remained in the hands of the current leadership. The dissidents also linked the turmoil to allegations of personal misconduct by the party leader Selvam Adaikalanathan, saying reports of an improper relationship with a former female party member had circulated on social media and damaged the organization's standing. They said the controversy triggered a protest, and that subsequent efforts by the secretary and others to shield the leader from scrutiny deepened internal divisions. The group said the party leader had previously acknowledged the matter to the deputy leader and pledged to the leadership committee that he would not seek any future position. The press conference was addressed by Jaffna District Secretary and leadership committee member Saba Kugathas, former Member of Parliament and leadership committee member S. Vinonoharathalingam, National Organizer Prasanna Indrakumar, Deputy Leader Henry Mahendran, and former Provincial Council member Bhuvaneswaran. TELO, one of the oldest Tamil militant organizations to transition into mainstream politics, has been led by Selvam Adaikalanathan since the killing of its leader, Sri Sabaratnam, in 1986\. In recent months, Mr. Adaikalanathan has faced scrutiny following the circulation of audio recordings on social media that critics say suggest an inappropriate relationship with a former female party member. The controversy deepened after the individual reported to have released the recordings was later found dead. ### Aid without accountability: Why fragile states remain fragile URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/aid-without-accountability-why-fragile-states-remain-fragile/ Last updated: 2026-06-14T00:21:18.000Z **By: Prof Mahesh Nirmalan MD, FRCA, PhD, FFICM** **University of Manchester.** The dependence on the unimpeded flow of overseas ‘aid’ runs firmly through many countries in the global south. Grants, concessionary loans, and development assistance have been presented as honourable lifelines and viewed as the *‘magic wand for poverty alleviation*’. But it is a dogma that deserves closer scrutiny in a world that treats ‘Aid’ as an extension of foreign policy. The Nobel prize winning and centre-left leaning economist Angus Deaton argues that poverty - even in the most deprived nations, is not primarily the result of a shortage of funds or resources. He refers to it as the ‘*Aid illusion*’. Deaton argues that poverty is a result of the perversion in the relationship between governments and citizens . If true, the emotive advocacy for global aid may not only fail to solve poverty but may, in some situations, aggravate it. In the words of Deaton “*far from being a prescription for eliminating poverty, the aid illusion is an obstacle in improving the lives of the poor*”. At the heart of Deaton’s argument lies the simple logic that in a healthy society, governments depend on their citizens for revenue. Through taxation, people contribute to the state, and in return they expect services creating a social covenant. Sudden flow of large volumes of donor finance distorts that symbiotic relationship. Governments become less reliant on their citizens and more responsive to donor agencies, thus shifting accountability outwards. Deaton summarises the challenge as: “*The ethical arguments for the duty to assist are surely overwhelming; the issue is (*therefore) *not the moral but the practical one: whether we (meaning the world’s non-poor) have the ability to assist them (the global poor)*”. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/aid-without-accountability-why-Z3MaCQ-kixyy8mig3z8h59-1.jpg) The Great Escape: Angus Deaton, Winner of Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2015 In countries such as Sri Lanka, Uganda and Kenya, marked by tribal, linguistic, religious or regional diversity, the uncoupling between the state and citizenry carries added risks. In such countries development is not merely about economic growth, but it is also about creating a shared sense of belonging born through loyalty to a larger nation state. Without such a foundation, economic progress becomes uneven, fragile, and unsustainable. External aid interacts with these internal divisions in subtle but powerful ways. Unlike taxation, which requires broad participation and consensus, external funds can be distributed selectively. Governments are not compelled to negotiate across communities with the same sense of purpose and the task of building inclusive institutions can be bypassed. Sri Lanka presents a powerful case study in this respect well known for its tragic consequences. The period following economic liberalisation in 1977 marked a turning point in Sri Lanka’s history. The opening of the economy brought with it a significant influx of foreign capital. International donors supported large development projects such as the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme and a chain of high-end hotels sprang up overnight around the Galle Face green. Infrastructure and luxury spending expanded, irrigation networks developed, and agricultural settlement schemes were implemented at scale. These were no doubt substantial achievements. Yet beneath this visible progress, a different yet pernicious dynamic unfolded. The availability of external capital allowed the Jayawardene government to act with impunity, detached from its own citizens and centralise political power. Instead of using the new-found capital to build an inclusive national framework the political climate moved in a more majoritarian direction - all groups did not matter equally and some groups did not matter at all. Agricultural re-settlements under the Mahaweli programme were seen to feed into a majoritarian assimilation project. The pogrom of July 1983 therefore did not emerge in isolation; it occurred within a context where the state had become insulated financially and politically from its own population. ![President J R Jayawardane, the politician who nurtured polarising forces in Sri Lanka. His legacy continues to haunt the country to this day. Image from Wikipedia](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/aid-without-accountability-why-Z3MaCQ-kixdkq5wtjlzw0k-1.jpg) President J R Jayawardane, the politician who nurtured polarising forces in Sri Lanka. His legacy continues to haunt the country to this day. Image from Wikipedia A similar pattern, though shaped by different historical forces, can be observed in Uganda and Kenya too where successive governments navigated and at times reinforced long-standing divisions between different tribes ad-lib. In Uganda for example, the predominantly Acholi population of the north and the largely Bantu communities of the south became increasingly polarised and political power, resource allocation, and developmental priorities reflected these divisions. As in Sri Lanka, alternative sources of support encouraged governments to manage/control social divisions rather than resolve them. The consequences, as in Sri Lanka, were profound. In Sri Lanka, unresolved tensions and cycles of violence lasted nearly five decades with the loss of nearly 150,000 lives across all communities. In Uganda, marginalisation of the north erupted in the prolonged conflict involving the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Government forces resulting in the loss of over 100,000 lives and one of the largest displacements of civilian populations affecting all 8 districts of the Acholi sub-region. ![The Lord’s Resistance army was originally formed in Northern Uganda in 1987 and waged a brutal war in Uganda which spilled over to neighbouring South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The war between the Ugandan forces and the LRA was known for extreme forms of violence and the abduction of thousands of children to serve as fighters and as sex slaves. Source: Google;borgenproject.org](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/aid-without-accountability-why-Z3MaCQ-kixxjt127a2ppkn-1.jpg) The Lord’s Resistance army was originally formed in Northern Uganda in 1987 and waged a brutal war in Uganda which spilled over to neighbouring South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The war between the Ugandan forces and the LRA was known for extreme forms of violence and the abduction of thousands of children to serve as fighters and as sex slaves. Source: Google;borgenproject.org Kenya too experienced several cycles of inter ethnic clashes after independence in 1963\. Though officially classified as election related inter-communal violence, the inter-tribal undertones were unmistakably evident in many of these clashes. The end of armed conflict in Uganda and Sri Lanka presented historic opportunities. In Uganda, the cessation of major hostilities around 2006 created a moment for national reconciliation, institutional reform, and economic integration. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, the end of the war in 2009 offered a rare opportunity to rebuild not only infrastructure, but trust across ethnic, linguistic, and regional lines. Yet in both contexts, these moments were not seized upon. Rather than fully recalibrating the state - citizen relationship, political systems reverted to an established myopia. In Uganda, road and infrastructure development (such as the Entebbe-Kampala and Kampala-Gulu Highways) accelerated with tangible economic benefits - funded by bilateral Chinese loans, without serious attempts at healing inter-tribal rivalries. In Sri Lanka, accelerated post-war development spearheaded by the ‘Rajapakse governments’ (such as high speed road networks in the whole country including the Northern and Eastern provinces) lacked concurrent institutional reform. Financial systems remained narrow, governance structures parochial, and the deeper project of nation-building remained ignored. These missed opportunities are not accidental. They reflected a broader pattern in which donor funding interacted with a parochial political class to prioritise short-term wins over long-term cohesion. When governments can maintain legitimacy through external funding, the incentive to undertake the more difficult work of building inclusive institutions diminishes. What emerges is a form of stability and a superficial appearance of ‘prosperity’ that is transient and fragile. A further, and often underappreciated, dynamic reinforces this pattern. Within hierarchical societies civil servants, professionals, clergy, and academics rarely operate in isolation from power. Their influence is shaped by proximity to political authority, and the incentives associated with that proximity. As a result, there is a subtle but persistent tendency to adopt positions that align with what they perceive the leaders wish to hear. ‘Moral’, ‘religious’ and even ‘scientific’ arguments can be reframed - consciously or unconsciously, to reflect prevailing political narratives. The narratives generated by the academic and clinical communities in Sri Lanka during the COVID pandemic, around the need to cremate dead bodies ignoring the traditional burial practices of certain communities, exemplifies the corrosive nature of manufactured pseudo-science. ![Elections in Kenya have a strong tribal footprint. The sentiments unleashed can spill over as inter-tribal violence whose consequences are felt long after the elections are over. Source: Google; Italian Institute for International Political Studies](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/aid-without-accountability-why-Z3MaCQ-kix5uyare9wtqvc-1.jpg) Elections in Kenya have a strong tribal footprint. The sentiments unleashed can spill over as inter-tribal violence whose consequences are felt long after the elections are over. Source: Google; Italian Institute for International Political Studies This dynamic may not necessarily arise from overt malice. More often, it reflects institutional incentives - career advancement, recognition and access to influence. Over time, it produces a body of discourse that appears intellectually grounded but is, in reality, selective and biased. In societies already shaped by ethnic or regional divisions, such narratives can become powerful polarising instruments. This helps explain why potential bifurcation points - such as the end of armed conflict, do not automatically lead to transformative change. Even when structural conditions for reconciliation exist, the narratives shaping public opinions remain divisive. Across these different contexts, a common thread - articulated by Deaton, emerges. External capital can alter incentives in ways that weaken the relationship between governments and people. It enables governments to sustain authority without investing in broad-based legitimacy. It allows divisions to be managed rather than resolved. And critically, it contributes to missed opportunities - moments in which countries might otherwise have redefined their trajectories even if it meant exaggerated suffering and suboptimal services in the short term. This does not mean that international engagement is unnecessary nor is it a call for countries to become more insular. Trade, knowledge exchange, and cooperation remain essential in an interconnected world. But it does suggest that legitimacy through external funding - particularly as a substitute for ‘domestic healing’, comes with significant risks. For Sri Lanka, one of the most significant but underutilised resources lies within its own diaspora. Across North America, Europe, and Australasia, Sri Lankan communities have established themselves successfully with considerable financial resources, professional expertise, networks, and global perspectives. In theory, diaspora capital offers a different kind of opportunity as it is primarily not driven by geopolitical considerations or framed within patronising donor–recipient relationships. Rather, it is often motivated by a passionate interest in the country’s stability and prosperity. Angus Deaton’s assessment that the value of private remittances from immigrants to their families in poor countries may be twice as large as formal ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) highlights the value-addition that may be achieved by harnessing the financial powers of diaspora communities. Yet this potential remains only partially realised in many countries due to complex socio-political constraints. Diaspora communities often mirror the divisions of their home countries and identities shaped by conflict can persist or intensify over time. Diaspora involvement/investments therefore - unless curated and managed carefully, can also have polarising consequences by being biased towards some groups. There is also a broader and bitter reality that cannot be ignored. Increasingly, major powers recognise that development assistance must serve their own strategic interests. Though this does not make such funding undesirable, it does highlight the importance of strengthening domestic foundations. Whilst poorer countries may successfully utilise their strategic strengths (access to vital sea lanes, mineral reserves, shifting loyalty to alternate power hubs etc.), in their negotiations with external funders, unresolved internal divisions leave them vulnerable. In the presence of unresolved social fractures, the powerful nations can - and will, pull on levers along these fault lines much to the disadvantage of poorer countries. ![The question “Are Aid agencies a force for good?” can only be answered by history. But their impact on countries currently dependent on aid for immediate relief need careful evaluation. Source Ubuntu rising: One Africa on Linkedin](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/aid-without-accountability-why-Z3MaCQ-kixlpwsqf91zj74-1.jpg) The question “Are Aid agencies a force for good?” can only be answered by history. But their impact on countries currently dependent on aid for immediate relief need careful evaluation. Source Ubuntu rising: One Africa on Linkedin Ultimately, the message is not that countries should turn inward, but rather that they must build outward from a stronger base. Development can neither be imported nor can it be sustained through borrowing. It must be built - brick by brick, through institutions that command trust, through policies that are perceived as fair, and by fostering a sense of belonging that transcends internal divisions. The parallel experiences of Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Kenya point to a pattern where divisions were managed rather than healed, where external capital substituted for internal accountability, and where post-conflict moments were not fully seized. Aid under these circumstances corrupts and deepens dependency. If Sri Lanka - and others like it, can begin to move beyond competing identities towards a genuinely shared national project, new forms of capital, including that of the diaspora, will begin to flow unimpeded. Until then, the search for salvation from outside will remain an illusion. The real work, as it has always been, lies closer to home. ***The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the University of Manchester.*** ### "Land Was the One Issue Raised Everywhere I Went" — Australian High Commissioner Matthew Duckworth URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/land-was-the-one-issue-raised-everywhere-i-went-australian-high-commissioner-matthew-duckworth/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T02:14:29.000Z Matthew Duckworth assumed office as Australia’s High Commissioner to Sri Lanka in the latter part of 2025\. Within his first six months in the role, he visited the Northern Province twice — first during Thai Pongal in January and again in May — travelling through Jaffna, Mullaitivu and other parts of the North. In a wide-ranging interview with *Jaffna Monitor*, he reflected on Australia’s development engagement in the North and East, land return and the military presence, transitional justice, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, political devolution, irregular migration, and the contributions of the Sri Lankan Tamil community to Australian society. **Just a couple of days ago, the Australian High Commission organised an iced-coffee dansala for Vesak, embracing one of Sri Lanka’s most cherished traditions. When you first arrived in Sri Lanka, you also made headlines for travelling in a three-wheeler and exploring Colombo in a way many diplomats would not. How important do you think these seemingly small cultural interactions are in building genuine connection and mutual understanding between countries and their peoples?** We love to do things that resonate with the community here. When we had the opportunity to participate in the Vesak festivities, we thought, why not? It’s a great concept. The team did it for the first time last year, and it was very popular, so we thought we’d do it again. It’s just a really nice way to meet people from the community and have a bit of fun. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/duckworth5-1.jpg) Matthew Duckworth serves iced coffee at a dansal organized by the Australian High Commission. **Why iced coffee? What’s the reason?** The group we were working with was Soul Coffee. Australia has contributed quite a bit of development support to growing the coffee sector here in Sri Lanka. We have a development programme called the Market Development Facility, which works across an entire supply chain to help raise the incomes of small producers. So you’ve got a farmer who produces tea, coffee beans, fruit, or whatever it may be. The question is: how do you help that person earn a higher income and enjoy a better livelihood? Instead of simply giving that person money, the programme looks at how to make improvements sustainable. We work with farmers to provide better seeds, fertilisers and other support. But we also look at other parts of the chain, such as marketing. How can you improve the packaging? How can you strengthen the supply chain to make the products more appealing to, say, the tourism sector and command a higher price? Then we work with marketers and exporters at the other end to help open up new markets for the product. All of this is aimed at improving livelihoods for farmers. We first applied this approach in the coffee sector. We’ve been working there for about six or seven years, and it’s been very successful. The sector has seen significant growth as a result, and the small farmers who dominate it are earning more income. So it’s a great thing. **So you visited the Northern Province twice within six months, I believe?** That’s correct, yes — twice. In January and then in May. My visit to Jaffna in January this year was the first time I’d been to the Northern Province. **As High Commissioner, or for the first time ever?** It was the first time I had ever been to the Northern Province in any capacity. I was really keen to understand a bit more about the province and what makes it unique — what makes it such a distinctive and important part of this country. We visited during Thai Pongal, and we were keen to learn more about the cultural history of Jaffna as well. We were also very pleased to celebrate with a civil society organisation in Jaffna that we have been working with. We attended the Jaffna Kite Festival in Valvettithurai, which was incredible. Of course, we also visited Nallur Temple and the Jaffna Public Library, and met with a range of politicians, community leaders, and civil society groups in Jaffna. Look, I really enjoyed my time in Jaffna. It struck me as a place that is uniquely Sri Lankan. The food was very Sri Lankan — it was spicier than what I’m used to down here in Colombo! There was also some really creative use of the seafood, fruits, and local produce available there. But I also really enjoyed engaging with the community. We have a large Sri Lankan Tamil community in Australia, so there are many connections between Australia and Jaffna and the Northern Province. It was fantastic to explore some of those connections. I thoroughly enjoyed my trip, and I can’t wait to go back. **Was that the first time you had taken part in a Thai Pongal festival?** Yes, it was. **And the first time you wore a veshti?** Yes — that’s right. And I can see why people wear it: it’s so much more comfortable than wearing a business suit in that climate! It felt very appropriate. But, again, it was important to me to demonstrate as much understanding of the local community as possible. I felt that wearing local attire for that festival was more fitting than wearing a Western suit. It was a small way of showing respect for the occasion and engaging with the community in a meaningful way. ![The cover of the June 2026 edition of Jaffna Monitor, featuring an exclusive interview with Australian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka Matthew Duckworth.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/-land-was-the-one-issue-raised-8e7HnQ-kix7p20xtkklcxf.png) The cover of the June 2026 edition of Jaffna Monitor, featuring an exclusive interview with Australian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka Matthew Duckworth. **You also seemed to immerse yourself fully in the cultural rituals associated with Thai Pongal, very much in the Jaffna tradition. How did you manage that?** *\[Laughs\]* I was well-trained by the Jaffna men who were there around me, showing me what to do. But I’m glad if I pass as a Jaffna native — I’ll take that as a compliment from you. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/duckworth-4.jpg) Matthew Duckworth during a visit to the historic Thirukoneswaram Temple in Trincomalee. **Australia is home to a large Sri Lankan community, including a significant number of Tamil Australians. Over the years, many Sri Lankan Australians have become prominent in fields ranging from politics and business to medicine and academia. How do you view the contribution of the Sri Lankan-Australian community — particularly Tamil Australians — to Australia’s social, cultural, and economic life? And what role do you think this community plays in strengthening the ties between Australia and Sri Lanka?** We are so proud of our Sri Lankan-Australian community. It makes such a positive contribution to Australia. We think the numbers now exceed 180,000 Sri Lankan-Australians. And you’re right — I think the population is roughly split 50-50 between Tamils and other ethnic communities from Sri Lanka. But it’s a really vibrant and significant community in Australia. What has struck me since taking up this role and learning more about our diaspora is just how successful they are. We have prominent Tamil Australians, as well as Sri Lankan Australians more broadly, succeeding in politics. Some Sri Lankan Australians are now members of our Parliament. They are succeeding in business and in key professions such as medicine. We know there is a strong tradition of education and medical training associated with Sri Lanka. On a personal level, back in Australia, my own general practitioner, Dr Arudpragasam, and my local dentist, Dr Chellappah, are both Tamil Sri Lankan-Australians. It is a community that has contributed enormously to Australian society and serves as an important bridge between our two countries. We are also seeing Sri Lankan Australians achieve remarkable success in the cultural sphere, particularly in the arts. Australia’s highest literary honour is the Miles Franklin Award. It is often compared to the Booker Prize or the Pulitzer Prize and is regarded as the country’s most prestigious award for a novel. To date, two Sri Lankan-Australian authors have won the award. Most recently, Shankari Chandran, a proud Tamil-Australian, received the honour for her novel *Chai Time at Cinnamon Gardens*. The story is centred on a Sri Lankan-run nursing home in Sydney, where elderly Sri Lankan residents share their life stories. Those stories move between their experiences in Sri Lanka and their lives in Australia. There is also a connection in the novel to the Jaffna Public Library and the history of Jaffna. I will not spoil the story for you, but it is a wonderful book, and I thoroughly recommend reading it. We also have a very prominent playwright, S. Shakthidharan, whose award-winning play *Counting and Cracking* draws on his family’s experience between Jaffna and Australia. It explores the complexities of moving between cultures and generations. The point I am making is that Tamil Australians are making a tremendous contribution to our society, and the relationship is a very positive one. You also asked how the Australian Government engages with and reaches out to these communities. I think we are gradually getting better at this. Our government and political leaders are becoming increasingly attuned to the communities they represent. In particular, Members of Parliament whose electorates include large Sri Lankan and Tamil diaspora populations are actively involved in community events and celebrations. They participate in important cultural and religious occasions such as Thai Pongal, Vesak, and other festivals. They also meet regularly with community groups and do their best to represent their concerns and perspectives within the Australian Government. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/duckworth7.jpg) Matthew Duckworth poses for a selfie in front of the historic Jaff na Clock Tower. **One of the emerging success stories from the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Australia is that of Nitesh Samuel. His father played cricket for St John’s College in Jaffna, while Nitesh, as a first-generation Australian of Sri Lankan Tamil heritage, has gone on to represent Australia at Under-19 level and has attracted considerable attention for his performances. When you see young people like Nitesh excelling in sport, the arts, politics, and other fields, what does that say about the journey of the Sri Lankan Tamil community in Australia?** Indeed. You mentioned Nitesh Samuel. We also have Nishan Velupillay, who has recently been selected for Australia's men's football team for the FIFA World Cup finals, which are set to begin in about a week's time. So yes, Sri Lankan Australians and Tamil Australians are making a wonderful contribution to our sporting teams. I do sometimes wish we could have had a young spin bowler called Muralitharan when he was around, but unfortunately, we missed out on him! But it’s great to see these first-generation Australian Tamils coming through and achieving such success. In many ways, it’s what I would expect because, as I said earlier, these communities are thriving in Australia and form an important part of our society. One of the great strengths of Australia today is that we are a genuinely multicultural society. As a result, we are increasingly seeing people from a wide range of backgrounds — whether they migrated to Australia themselves or grew up there — reaching the highest levels of politics, the arts, business, and sport. That is a very positive thing. **Australian universities host thousands of Sri Lankan students each year, and Australia also offers fully funded scholarships to Sri Lankans. The newly appointed Municipal Commissioner of Jaffna, D.C. Aravintharaj, is one such alumnus. How important are education and scholarship programmes in strengthening long-term ties between Australia and Sri Lanka?** Indeed, he was an Australia Awards recipient a few years ago, which is wonderful to hear. That is exactly the kind of outcome we hope to see. Education is a foundational part of the Australia–Sri Lanka relationship. In many ways, it sits at the bedrock of our ties. Part of that can be seen in the numbers. In any given year, around 20,000 Sri Lankan students are studying in Australia, whether at universities or other educational institutions. That has been the case for at least the past decade, with the numbers gradually increasing over time. This is beneficial for the students because they receive a world-class education and acquire skills that enhance their career prospects. But it is also beneficial for Sri Lanka, because we know the majority of these students return home after completing their studies. Of course, some remain in Australia. They find employment, build careers, start families, and become part of Australian society. Some of the doctors and dentists I mentioned earlier fall into that category. But most return, bringing with them the education, expertise, and experience they gained abroad. Those skills help strengthen Sri Lanka’s economy and institutions. The scholarship programme is an important part of that effort. This past year, the Australian Government awarded 29 fully funded Australia Awards scholarships to Sri Lankan students. These scholarships are generally for master 's-level study and above. Recipients typically spend two years studying in Australia and are then required to return to Sri Lanka and work here for at least two years. That requirement reflects our belief that scholarship recipients should contribute directly to the development of their own country. So I am delighted to hear that the Municipal Commissioner of Jaffna is an alumnus. He will have gained valuable skills and experience in Australia, and I am sure he is putting them to good use in serving the people of Jaffna. Education is, therefore, a very important pillar of the bilateral relationship, and it works both ways. We have Sri Lankan students studying in Australia, and Sri Lanka benefits from the return of highly skilled and well-trained professionals. More recently, we have also seen Australian universities and training institutions establish a presence in Sri Lanka. Today, around 50 Australian institutions — including universities and colleges — have some form of partnership or operation here. Three Australian universities currently operate full campuses in Sri Lanka: Curtin University, Edith Cowan University, and the University of Technology Sydney. Students can earn Australian qualifications without leaving Sri Lanka. Many other institutions operate through partnerships, allowing students to complete part of their studies in Sri Lanka and then continue in Australia while still graduating with an Australian qualification. These arrangements help reduce the cost of international education, make it more accessible to Sri Lankan students, and further strengthen the people-to-people links that are such an important part of the Australia–Sri Lanka relationship. **Australia has donated high-end scanning equipment to both Palaly International Airport and Kankesanthurai Port in Jaffna. Should this support be seen as part of Australia’s broader commitment to improving connectivity, security, and economic development in Northern Sri Lanka?** Yes, absolutely. When we look at border systems — whether scanners, customs facilities, or related infrastructure at an airport or port — they really serve two purposes. The first is improving connectivity. It is about making travel and trade easier, faster, and more efficient. It improves the passenger experience and facilitates movement through airports and ports. The second is security. These systems help authorities detect attempts to smuggle drugs, contraband, or other harmful goods into the country. They provide an important tool for protecting communities. So the people of Jaffna benefit in both ways. If you are travelling through Palaly Airport or Kankesanthurai Port, these systems make the process smoother and more efficient. Instead of having bags manually searched, modern equipment can complete those checks in a matter of seconds. But even for people who are not travelling, there are benefits. The community gains an additional layer of protection against illegal drugs and other harmful activities that can affect people’s lives and livelihoods. All of this contributes to development. The more we can help modernise and improve these kinds of services and infrastructure, the more we can improve the quality of life for the local community. **So can it be understood that Australia would consider participating in the future development of Kankesanthurai Port and Palaly Airport, both of which are important to the economic growth of Northern Sri Lanka? Would the Australian Government be willing to partner in these developments — whether through investment, technical assistance or other forms of support?** Australia is absolutely invested in the development of Northern Sri Lanka, and that is something we will continue to support in a variety of ways. Supporting connectivity and the services that ports and airports provide is an important part of that commitment. This is certainly an area where Australia sees value in continuing its engagement. Where Australia’s expertise and comparative advantage tend to lie, however, is more in the supporting systems and services that surround facilities like ports and airports, rather than in the construction of the infrastructure itself. So you may not necessarily see an Australian company building a new runway, terminal, or wharf. What you may well see — and what I expect we will continue to see in the years ahead — is Australian involvement in areas such as the provision of equipment, like the scanners recently supplied to Palaly Airport and Kankesanthurai Port, as well as training for customs officials, airport and port personnel, and other relevant staff. There may also be opportunities for cooperation in planning, policy development, and operational management — helping to ensure that these facilities are better positioned to facilitate trade, attract more flights and shipping services, and deliver the greatest possible benefit to the local community. I think that is where Australian involvement is most likely to be focused moving forward. **You mentioned that Australia has made significant investments in Northern Sri Lanka. Could you highlight some of the key projects Australia has supported in the region?** Certainly. One example is a programme called GROW, which we implement in partnership with the International Labour Organization. The programme focuses on improving livelihoods in rural communities and creating sustainable employment opportunities, particularly for vulnerable groups. Under that initiative, Australia has supported a mango and fruit-processing facility near Jaffna. The facility works with local mango growers and producers of groundnuts and other agricultural products. It employs around 30 people, all of them women from the surrounding communities. The facility purchases produce from local farmers at stable prices and processes it into higher-value products by drying, freezing, pulping, and packaging it. By reducing spoilage and transportation costs while increasing the value of the final product, the project provides farmers with more stable incomes while also creating employment opportunities for local women. A similar initiative has supported a crab-meat processing facility in the Kilinochchi area. It operates on much the same principle — providing steady markets for local fishing communities while creating jobs, particularly for women. Another example is Australia’s Direct Aid Program, a small-grants scheme that supports community organisations across Sri Lanka. In the North, one beneficiary has been the Centre for the Handicapped, which produces, repairs, and fits prosthetic limbs for people with disabilities. It provides a complete rehabilitation service for those who require artificial limbs. Australia also supports demining efforts in the North through the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), an international humanitarian demining organisation. A few weeks ago, I visited one of its sites in Mullaitivu District, in an area called Moondrumurippu. The objective is to identify and clear land contaminated by landmines left behind by the civil conflict. MAG works closely with local communities to locate suspected minefields and systematically remove the threat. This work is about far more than safety. In many rural communities, land remains unused because people fear the presence of landmines. Once that land is cleared, families can return to farming and communities can begin using it productively again. Earlier in my career, I worked in Cambodia, where Australia supported similar demining efforts. What we found was that even clearing relatively small areas of agricultural land could transform the prospects of an entire village. It created economic opportunities, restored confidence, and improved livelihoods. Land is fundamental to development. The more land that can be safely returned to communities, the greater the opportunities for economic growth and recovery. The long-term goal is to make Sri Lanka entirely landmine-free. We hope that may be achievable sometime in the early 2030s, although that will depend on the extent of any remaining contaminated areas yet to be identified. **Coming to humanitarian assistance: Australia recently provided support for Sri Lanka’s response to Cyclone Ditwah. Could you explain how this support was delivered, which communities benefited the most, and how Australia ensured the aid reached those in need?** Indeed. Firstly, I’d say Australia recognised very early that Cyclone Ditwah was a far more devastating disaster than I think we had expected it to be. **You mean before the landfall, or after?** After the landfall, we realised very quickly that the situation was far more serious than many had anticipated. Like a lot of people, we knew a storm was coming and expected it to be significant, but I think the sheer scale of its impact surprised many of us. Once that became clear, we were able to move rapidly. The Australian Government maintains humanitarian response funding through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra, and I was pleased that we could mobilise those resources quickly. Our immediate priority was to provide essential, life-saving assistance to affected communities. Within a day or two of the cyclone, Australia announced A$1 million in humanitarian support. Just two days later, as we gained a better understanding of the extent of the devastation, we increased that assistance to A$3.5 million. That initial support was delivered primarily through United Nations agencies and trusted local partners. The focus was on rapidly providing emergency essentials such as temporary shelter, bedding, food, and critical equipment. One example was the delivery of fortified biscuits through the World Food Programme. These are compact, nutrient-rich emergency rations that require no cooking or preparation and can provide immediate sustenance to displaced populations. We personally received some of these supplies at the airport as they arrived in the country. The assistance also included cash-transfer programmes, enabling affected families to purchase the items they most urgently needed from local markets. Much of this support was directed to the areas hardest hit by the disaster, particularly the central highlands, where severe flooding, landslides, and other storm-related impacts were concentrated. We worked closely with organisations such as the World Food Programme, which was able to source and distribute emergency food supplies extremely quickly. We also partnered with organisations including Save the Children and World Vision, both of which already have extensive networks and experience operating in Sri Lanka. Because of those existing relationships and their presence in vulnerable communities, they were able to rapidly pivot from their ongoing programmes and focus on emergency relief efforts where needs were greatest. That initial phase of assistance was concentrated on the weeks and months immediately following the cyclone, helping communities that had been displaced or severely affected. However, we also recognised that emergency relief is only the first stage of recovery. The longer-term challenge is far greater. Sri Lanka now faces the task of restoring roads, rebuilding infrastructure, rehabilitating agricultural land, and repairing housing. There is a tremendous amount of work still to be done, and Australia remains committed to supporting those recovery efforts over the longer term. As part of that commitment, we have recently announced an additional A$2 million initiative aimed at rehabilitating agricultural land damaged by the cyclone. This programme is primarily focused on food security—helping communities restore their ability to produce the food they need. The initiative will support the rehabilitation of vegetable cultivation and irrigation systems, and potentially some rice cultivation as well, although the primary focus will be on crops that can be re-established relatively quickly. The objective is to help farming communities restore production and improve access to nutritious food. This support will be concentrated in the areas where it is needed most, particularly in parts of the Central and Eastern Provinces. The focus will largely be on rural agricultural communities rather than urban centres, targeting the locations where farmland and food production systems suffered the greatest damage and where recovery efforts can have the most immediate impact. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/duckworth-3.png) Matthew Duckworth and officers from the Australian High Commission during a visit with the MAG demining team in Mullaitivu. **How did Australia ensure the aid reached those in need? Hill-country Tamil leaders have alleged that the government diverted funds to Sinhala-majority areas. How does Australia ensure aid reaches those who need it, given that the worst-affected areas after Ditwah were in the Central Highlands?** The way we ensure it gets to the communities that most need it is by working through those partners I described before. These are organisations we have long-standing partnerships with; we’ve been working with them for many years here in Sri Lanka. They’ve been delivering on-the-ground community support across a range of issues, not just related to Ditwah. Now that the cyclone has hit and left damage in its wake, when we look at how to most quickly and directly get aid to the communities that need it, we go through those partners because their networks already exist. They don’t need to build anything or set anything up — they’re there, and we’re used to working with them, and we know where they are. So if we can provide funding or goods to, say, the World Food Programme, we know they have teams in places like Nuwara Eliya or Ampara or wherever it is, and the goods or the money will get to those communities. And we do a lot of monitoring of this — we’ve already had our teams from the High Commission go to see some of these sites. Just one thing on the distribution of aid, though — and of course I can’t speak for what the Sri Lankan government is doing — but we do know that there are different impacts in different areas around the country. The whole country was affected by this, but there were very specific impacts in certain areas, like the vegetable-growing areas in the Highlands and in some of the mountainous areas, because that’s where they grow. So it isn’t entirely unusual that some of the money being provided — whether through international partners or the government — tends to get more concentrated in certain areas, because that’s where the judgment is that putting money in now can have the best impact. Again, I can’t speak for specific outcomes, but there is that dynamic at play. One of the ways we also worked to distribute some of the immediate humanitarian relief was with UNOPS. They have a civil society network called Vriddhi. A lot of the procurement was managed by UNOPS, but it was then given to civil society organizations — very local organisations that work on the ground to reach some of those marginalised communities. That was a very deliberate thing Australia did, because we’re aware that in quick-response situations like this, aid sometimes doesn’t reach those who are most affected, because they are hardest to reach. So we really drew on the local expertise of organisations in Sri Lanka that know their communities, know where they’re based, and understand what their needs were in a situation like that. It helps with that outreach. This is the “last-mile delivery” we’re talking about — it’s not just getting it to the major city; it’s actually working through very local organisation that can take it to specific villages. **Turning to migration and asylum: Australia strongly discourages irregular boat journeys — I saw some of the advertisements on the way into Colombo — and has run public-awareness campaigns in Sri Lanka warning of the dangers of sea travel. Is this policy driven primarily by humanitarian concern about preventing death at sea, and how does Australia balance that against its obligations towards people seeking international protection? And, given reports of surveillance, harassment, and detention of some returnees, how does Australia monitor the safety of individuals sent back to Sri Lanka?** The first thing I’d say is that, absolutely, Australia’s border settings are driven very largely by our humanitarian concerns about the loss of life at sea. Let’s call this what it is: it’s people smuggling. It’s a trade. There are people deliberately sending ventures, sending boats with desperate people aboard. They are selling a service that is illegal; they are making a lot of money out of this. It is a trade first and foremost, and it preys on vulnerable people. And what we saw, in particular in and around Australian waters in the early years after 2010, 2011, 2012, was many, many boats trying to enter Australia illegally being lost at sea. We set up Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013, a countrywide border operation aimed at detecting and preventing these illegal arrivals. The main reason we set it up was that, in the five years leading up to 2013, many hundreds of people died trying to make a boat crossing to Australia. So this is not something we wanted to accept. And it’s not something that partner governments — including Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others we spoke to at the time — wanted to accept either. So we knew we needed a way to prevent it. Now, Operation Sovereign Borders was just an organisation set up to detect and prevent these vessels. But we knew there also had to be messaging around it to try to stop people getting on the vessels in the first place. That was where the messaging campaign — such as the one you describe at Colombo Airport, and which has been in parts of Sri Lanka for many years now — comes in: “Zero Chance.” The message there is that if you come to Australia by this pathway, this illegal trade, you will not be able to settle in Australia. There’s no chance of that. That doesn’t mean — and I need to register this point — that we don’t accept humanitarian entry or asylum. In fact, since World War II, we’ve accepted nearly a million people through this humanitarian stream. This is an important part of our immigration. It is a fact that Australia still takes in, globally, quite a large number of humanitarian visas and asylum seekers. But they need to come through a legal pathway. And that does not include getting on a boat. So we take these measures seriously, but it is absolutely driven, fundamentally, by that humanitarian concern. Now, you also mentioned how this sits against Australia’s international obligations. What I’d say is that, first and foremost, we have continued over a very long period to implement the various international conventions on humanitarian movements and on refugees that we’ve signed up to. As I mentioned, since World War II, refugees have settled in Australia through legal, registered processes. So we take that seriously; we do continue to maintain that pathway. The other point you made was about resettlement — how Australia applies its international obligations with regard to the concerns the community raises about monitoring and surveillance. What I’d say is that, as a principle, Australia doesn’t forcibly return people to a place where they’re going to be put in harm’s way. And there are some parts of the world where this is a very complex assessment to make. In the countries where we are resettling people, which includes here in Sri Lanka, we do continue to monitor and keep tabs on the treatment and conditions for these people in the country they return to. So in the case of Sri Lanka, this is part of the reason why, when I travel — or when members of the mission here travel to other parts of the country — we talk to local civil society, local human-rights representatives, and local authorities about what they’re seeing. Within our department back in Canberra, we also have specialised teams that do this as their job. We just do it when we travel, but they look at a broad range of countries and have teams that do very in-depth assessments of conditions. So this is all about trying to understand, as best and as clearly as we can, what the real conditions on the ground are, and then we make judgments based on that. **Do you personally track returnees who were sent back from Australia?** No, we don’t personally track individuals in that way. **So, how do you make sure they are not facing harassment or detention in Sri Lanka?** We look at the broader situation in the country. We look at where there are patterns of behaviour, rather than at an individual experience. **Australia has expressed support for reconciliation and long-term stability in Sri Lanka. How is Australia engaging with the Sri Lankan government on issues such as the return of private land — a major issue in the North — and the gradual reduction of the military footprint in the North and East? I believe more than 70% of the Sri Lankan military is camped in the North and East.** Australia has been involved in Sri Lanka’s reconciliation process for a long time. We’re a supporter of the ongoing reconciliation agenda here, and we continue to work with both communities and the government to encourage steps towards reconciliation — and towards this concept of transitional justice as well, which we think is obviously very important. We know that land, and access to land, is a really foundational part of this. It’s a particularly important consideration for people in the North and East, I think, for some of the reasons you’ve outlined. These are issues raised by the communities there. When I went to Jaffna in January, travelled around the area and spoke to a range of community groups, land was raised with me consistently. When I went to Mullaitivu just a couple of weeks ago, I again met a broad range of groups. They raised many issues related to their society, but the one common point always came back to land. So I do understand that this is a real and genuine concern for the communities, and that people want a greater sense of title and security over their land. Part of that is about getting access to land that may not have been accessible to them, either because of security or other measures in past years, and part of it is about making sure they’re not inadvertently losing the land they currently access because of other state agencies taking actions in these areas. The point I make to the government when I speak on these issues is that land and access to land is really important for the reconciliation agenda. It’s important for communities to feel they have their home. But it’s also really important for the development agenda. As I was saying earlier about MAG and the demining effort, we know how connected land is with economic development. We know this government is really committed to developing the North and East of this country — we’ve heard the President speak about this. So it’s something we do talk about, encouraging that, if there are opportunities to give people greater security over their land and greater title to it, that’s going to help development, because it’s going to help investment and help them use their land to improve their own livelihoods. So we definitely want to continue work in this space. It’s always an issue that we know is difficult, but that doesn’t mean we can’t discuss it, and I think we are having some good discussions with the government here on this. **What is Australia's position on the release of land that is allegedly being unlawfully occupied by the military?** Yes. Look, we’ve been encouraged by what we’ve seen with some of the early steps from this government in releasing land in the North. We know they’ve made commitments to release more, and we’re certainly encouraging them to continue to do so. I think the best thing the government can do on land is to keep doing what it’s promised to do — what President AKD has committed to do. This is a really positive step, and we should be encouraging this government for the land releases they’ve already made, and encouraging them to continue, because we know how much benefit it gives the local community when this happens. **Is any of your aid connected to this point?** The main connection we’d have at the moment would be through the Mines Advisory Group’s work in clearing land. We also look at it through some of our development projects — things like how we improve democratic governance, which means how we help ensure that local authorities are best able to understand and respond to community needs. How can we make sure that whatever decisions they make as an authority reflect the needs of their community, that they consult their community, take input from village leaders and community leaders, and provide access to decision-makers for people who ordinarily wouldn’t have access to members of government? We work in this space too, trying to support local-level authorities, in particular, to be more responsive to their community. And that absolutely goes to this question. **17 years after the war, the Northern Province still has one of the highest military-to-civilian ratios in the country. Does Australia view this level of militarisation as compatible with genuine reconciliation?** Look, firstly, what I’d say is that I don’t think it’s really for me to judge what the right level of militarisation is, or the location of military facilities. That’s certainly an issue for the Sri Lankan community and the Sri Lankan government. What I would say, though — and to go back to the point I was just making about democratic governance — is that we know decisions best reflect what a community needs when they are consultative, when they listen to what the community is saying it needs. So we really encourage the Sri Lankan government and the Sri Lankan authorities to take this approach when they’re looking at questions such as the positioning of the military, or the activities the government may have in other parts of the country. The more consultative the government can be, and the more responsive it can be to what local communities say they need, the better the outcomes — for the people, and for the government in the long run as well. **What is Australia’s position on Sri Lanka’s transitional-justice obligations, particularly regarding the Office on Missing Persons and truth-and-reconciliation mechanisms?** Australia has been a long-term supporter of Sri Lanka, fulfilling its international human-rights obligations. A big part of that is strengthening the Office on Missing Persons and the institutions that have a mandate to look into human rights, in particular from the period of the conflict and since 2009\. We support more action in this space, more transparency, and efforts to help ensure there is a reconciliation mechanism that meets international standards. We’d very much like to see that, and that’s a view we regularly put to the Sri Lankan government here in Colombo. My personal view is that any reconciliation agenda, and any domestic human rights agenda, is going to be most effective where it’s authentic and locally led. And I think there’s an important role for the international community — for countries like Australia — to continue to encourage and to press the authorities here to be responsive on these issues, to properly implement a transitional-justice mechanism, and to demonstrate a higher level of accountability. We really support Sri Lanka doing this, and we want to see a domestic mechanism being successful here. I’ve been encouraged by what I’ve heard from the government on this. I think they’ve been very clear that they are taking a different approach to some of these long-standing human-rights concerns than perhaps previous governments did, and we should encourage them. I’ve also spoken to members of the community — groups like the families of the disappeared — and I’ve heard their concerns and the very deeply held view that measures to date have not met community expectations. So we really want to encourage the government to keep moving in this direction. The steps taken under this government are positive, but we know there’s more that needs to happen, and so we’re going to continue to support this. **Regarding the Prevention of Terrorism Act, a Tamil singer from Kilinochchi was recently arrested under it. The Act remains in force despite this NPP government’s promises of reform. How is Australia engaging Sri Lanka on legal reform in this area — particularly given its disproportionate impact on Tamils — and what does Australia propose as a rights-respecting replacement counter-terrorism framework?** First and foremost, we welcome the commitment to repeal this Act. We know that was part of the election manifesto; it’s something the government has continued to talk about, and we’ve also spoken about it publicly. We welcome that commitment. So we’re certainly looking forward to it proceeding. Now, we also know, from what we’re seeing around the world, that the government will need some form of legislation to manage terrorism risk. Australia itself has its own anti-terrorism legislation. What we are, of course, encouraging is that whatever legislation comes next reflects Sri Lanka’s international human rights obligations. Looking specifically at the PTA, it is important that the more problematic and draconian elements of that legislation don’t simply get repeated in whatever comes next. Again, it is really encouraging to see the steps this government is taking in this regard. We know it’s not done yet, and we know it’s important to keep international community engagement on these issues to help encourage the Sri Lankan government to meet the obligations and commitments it has itself made. **The NPP has promised Provincial Council elections and full implementation of the 13th Amendment. What is Australia’s position on meaningful power-sharing and political devolution for Tamil-majority regions?** I think about this issue by looking at Australia’s own experience. We are ourselves a multi-level government: we have the federal, or central, government; state and territory governments, which are equivalent to provinces here; and then local government. The issue we always face in the Australian context is: where do particular issues need to be best administered — at which level of government? And in our experience, what we always find is that the issues that most impact the daily lives of communities are best dealt with as close to those communities as they can be in the power structure. So it’s important, whenever we’re looking at the governance arrangements here in Sri Lanka, to encourage that localisation of decision-making that affects a local community. It’s really important, and we find this in Australia as well. It’s not for Australia or for any other country to dictate to Sri Lanka its governance arrangements should be. We can offer our experience, which is that placing decision-making authority as close as you can to where it’s affecting the community generally leads to better outcomes. On elections, we were really pleased to see such a peaceful, successful, and fair election take place in 2024\. That was a real milestone for Sri Lanka, and the fact that those elections were so successful should be celebrated. Inclusive democratic elections and governance always leads to better outcomes for communities. This is why we put development support into initiatives such as helping local authorities, at the provincial or the local level, to be more responsive to the communities around them, because that’s what leads to the best outcomes for people. **How does Australia’s engagement with Sri Lanka fit into its broader Indo-Pacific strategy?** Our Indo-Pacific strategy is how we look at the world now. If you think about where Australia is, we’re an island surrounded by oceans and many other islands. If you draw a big arc around Australia, you’ve got New Zealand, you’ve got the Pacific Islands, then Southeast Asia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and then you keep going, and you come through the Bay of Bengal, through India, through Sri Lanka. That’s what we’re talking about when we talk about our Indo-Pacific neighbourhood. This region is our home, and it’s the part of the world we are most invested in. And Sri Lanka is a big part of this. What we really want for this region is peace, stability, and prosperity. Our Foreign Minister speaks about this all the time, and I think that’s what many of the countries in this region, including Sri Lanka, want for our shared home as well. Sri Lanka is a really important partner for us in this region. I tend to make the point that Sri Lanka is such a close partner for Australia because we’re neighbours. We’re both islands, we have an ocean between us, but we share a border. We have a demarcation point in the middle of that ocean where our responsibilities overlap on things like search and rescue, safety of life at sea, environmental issues, and the like. So we actually have a very direct connection with Sri Lanka. And we know that what happens in Sri Lanka, and in the waters around Sri Lanka, will affect Australia, and vice versa — because we’re neighbours within this region. So if we look at Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy and how Sri Lanka fits into this strategy, we want Sri Lanka to be more resilient, more capable, and more able to make decisions in its own sovereign interest. It’s what we want for ourselves, and we want it for Sri Lanka as well, because we think the whole region is better for it when we’re all able to act in our own interest, make decisions, and cooperate on how we want to run the region. Our Foreign Minister speaks about “amplified middle-power diplomacy.” When we think of ourselves as a middle power, we’re not trying to frame this like a schoolyard situation where you’ve got the big kids in one corner and the smaller kids in another; that’s not what this is about. Rather, it’s about understanding that we have agency to do certain things, but we can’t do everything. We’re not big enough or powerful enough to simply decide we’re going to make the rules for our region or our world and impose them — nor should we want to. But we need to recognise that we do have influence and we do have agency, in particular when we work together with other partners in this region. Sri Lanka is also a middle power — and I want to explain why I see it that way. Sri Lanka has agency; it has the capability to act in its interests in this part of the world and to make decisions for itself. We’ve seen it do this; we’ve seen it exert its influence with others very successfully. A good example came a couple of months ago during the T20 World Cup, when Sri Lanka was able to persuade Pakistan and India to agree to play a game here in Colombo. Both countries had said no, they weren’t going to play each other, but Sri Lanka, as one of the hosts of the tournament, was able to use its influence with both governments to get them to agree to play that game. Now, that’s just a cricket game. But this was Sri Lanka using the levers and agency it had to convince its regional partners to do something. That’s what middle-power diplomacy is all about. One day it might be a cricket game; another day it might be an initiative or a joint operation; another day it might be something a lot more serious. But it’s important that all countries in this region think about where our agency is, where we have influence, how we want to use it, and how we can partner with other countries in this region to bring about better outcomes. **Australian companies have shown growing interest in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure and energy sectors. What steps can Sri Lanka take to become a more attractive destination for Australian investment?** Australia and Sri Lanka already have a good level of economic cooperation. We talked about education earlier — that’s one area. Another area is commodity trade, where Sri Lanka aims to become a commodity hub, and Australia is supporting that. We sell things like lentils, wheat, and oats to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka processes those, turns them into something else, or packages them, and then sells them on to the region. This is creating jobs and value in both countries. We also know there’s Australian investment in sectors such as minerals and agribusiness. These are areas where we have natural competitive advantages. It works really well — Australia working with Sri Lanka, and Australian and Sri Lankan businesses investing in each other’s markets. And we know there’s room to grow this sort of investment. The best way for Sri Lanka to secure more Australian investment, or more international investment, is by ensuring that the regulatory environment here is accessible, transparent, predictable, and conducive to business coming and operating effectively. Obviously, the government’s steps to maintain stability, and the really important work the government has been doing as it moves through its IMF programme, returning to debt sustainability — that’s vital in the long run. And that’s another factor that will help to attract more international investment. As for which sectors offer the strongest potential, I think there are a lot of areas where Sri Lanka and Australia can co-invest. I’ve talked about the commodity hub already; that’s a really prospective area. I mentioned minerals and mining — Australia obviously has a lot of expertise and capability that could be brought to bear here in Sri Lanka’s environment. There are also other areas like tourism, where there’s again interest in investment that would help bring more tourists to Sri Lanka. But there’d be a range of areas as well, if the regulatory settings were encouraging for it. So I certainly hope to see more Australian investment, and to see it continue to grow over the coming years. And, frankly, Sri Lankan investment in Australia as well — let’s not forget that that’s also very important. **Australia has reflected on its own history with Indigenous people and pursued truth-telling and reconciliation initiatives. Are there any broad lessons from Australia’s experience that might be relevant to Sri Lanka’s reconciliation journey?** It’s a great question. And you’re right that both of our countries have their own reconciliation agenda. I’m very conscious of that when I think about reconciliation processes here in Sri Lanka — that my own country has been grappling with similar issues over a long period of time. One thing I’d say is that all countries have their own unique experiences when we’re talking about reconciliation and transitional justice. So our conditions are different in that regard. Certainly, for Sri Lanka, we’re looking at dealing with the legacy of the civil conflict. In Australia’s case, we’re looking at the legacy of colonialism and of the displacement of our Indigenous communities. They are different, but at the same time, we can also see that our reconciliation processes have some similarities, and there are some things we can look to in order to understand each other’s experiences. Australia’s experience of reconciliation journey with our Indigenous population has been going on for a long time. You can trace it back certainly to 1967, when we had our constitutional amendment about recognising Indigenous peoples. That was the first time we’d had that formal legal recognition. And then, of course, you had the big landmark legal cases such as the Mabo decision, which recognised land rights for Indigenous people — again, a major change in Australia’s legal structures. These are big success stories in our reconciliation process. But we know there are many other parts of Australia’s reconciliation journey that haven’t been as successful. Take, for example, our “Closing the Gap” agenda. Closing the Gap is about trying to ensure that Indigenous Australian communities are not lagging behind the rest of Australia on things like educational outcomes, imprisonment and crime rates, economic opportunities, and even things like maternal and health outcomes. And we know, because the data is clear, that our Indigenous communities — and in particular some of the more remote communities — have not kept pace with the rest of society. That is something we need to continue to work on and improve. So we’ve had hits and misses in our own reconciliation journey, and it isn’t all straightforward. What I think is just so critical, though, is that we keep going. And even where there are elements of our community that resist some parts of the reconciliation agenda — there are always differences of opinion — it’s really critical for governments to recognise that, but not to let it determine your outcomes. The simple act of continuing to make progress and continuing to show this commitment, even when it’s hard and even when on some things it’s not politically popular, is really important for the communities we’re trying to reconcile. **A closing question: What message would you like to share with Jaffna Monitor readers in the Northern Province about Australia’s commitment to the Sri Lankan Tamil community and to strengthening ties with the people of Northern Sri Lanka?** Well, the first thing I’d say is that Australia is so invested in the Northern Province. We have long-standing community connections between the Australian–Sri Lankan community, our Tamil-Australian community, and the Northern and Eastern Provinces as well. We know there are deep historical links, deep community links, and these are just powerful, valuable, precious parts of our relationship. And certainly, for me as the High Commissioner here in Colombo, I’m constantly thinking about what more I can do to deepen and strengthen the relationship between Australia and the Northern Province, and Australia and the Eastern Province, as part of our broader connection with this country. I’d also say that this background and these community connections mean that Australia has something of an understanding of the history of the Northern Province and the Eastern Province. And I think that helps us to understand a bit more about some of the modern challenges and modern concerns that the communities in these parts of the country have. I don’t want to claim any special insider knowledge, but I will commit to being curious, and I will commit to being engaged. I intend to continue to spend time in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. And with my time here as High Commissioner, I want to do the best job I can to reflect Australia in the Northern and Eastern Provinces — but also to make sure that, when Australia thinks about Sri Lanka, we are thinking about the issues that are relevant for communities in these provinces as well. That’s certainly the commitment I’ll give to you today. ### The Suresh Sallay Affair, Explained URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-suresh-sallay-affair-explained/ Last updated: 2026-06-15T00:12:22.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** If the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) government is to be believed, it has uncovered a treacherous Kim Philby, the Cold War's most infamous double agent, in Sri Lanka, who committed a bloody horror against the country and its people. No, Suresh Sallay did not send trained agents behind the now routed Tamil Tiger lines to die; far worse, he colluded with the Islamic State to orchestrate a string of bomb attacks that killed around 260 people on Easter Day in 2019\. Some of the dead were foreigners. But unlike Philby, who escaped behind the Iron Curtain before he could be caught, Sallay, a former head of the powerful State Intelligence Service (SIS), is in custody – and condemned by the powers that be for the atrocious deed. While Sallay dismisses the allegations as a fabrication, the JVP government says it has sufficient evidence to prosecute a man who enjoyed the complete confidence of former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and was among the most influential figures in Sri Lanka's security establishment. The prosecution's case is that the April 21, 2019, bombings at luxury hotels and churches were carried out because Sallay wanted to create mass fear, enabling Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who enjoyed a macho image after crushing the Tamil Tigers a decade earlier, to sweep to power. That did happen. Gotabaya swept the elections held months later. And he promptly picked Sallay, a liberal Muslim and a former head of the Military Intelligence, to steer the SIS – the country’s main intelligence agency. Until Gotabaya was ousted from power in 2022 following mass protests triggered by the country’s economic collapse, Sallay was his most trusted official, a virtual Man Friday. Ministers from that era acknowledge this. At the heart of the current case is another Sri Lankan Muslim, Mohammed Milhilar Mohammed Hanzeer alias Azad Maulana, who claims to be a witness to secret meetings between Sallay and members of the Sri Lankan affiliate of the Islamic State, which claimed responsibility for the Easter bloodbath. Maulana also blamed his former boss, Tamil Tiger-turned-politician Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillaiyaan, a former chief minister of Sri Lanka’s eastern province and a political ally of the Rajapaksa brothers. Pillaiyaan is also behind bars, but on an unrelated murder charge. And he was in prison on the day the Islamic State struck. Maulana made the startling disclosures about Sallay and Pillaiyaan to officials in Switzerland after fleeing Sri Lanka in late 2019 and while seeking asylum in that idyllic country in Europe. The allegations remained whispers until they were broadcast by Britain's Channel 4 television network, triggering a political tsunami in Sri Lanka. The JVP, which was in political ascendency, lost no time in echoing Maulana’s narrative, which had the support of a vocal section of the Catholic church in Sri Lanka. Less than two years after the JVP formed a government, Sallay was arrested on February 25 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), a draconian legislation which the spy master had used for years both to detain and allegedly torture scores of government opponents. There are plots within plots in the Sallay story, akin to a Bollywood blockbuster. Before the Easter bombs exploded in Sri Lanka, the Indian intelligence sent multiple messages to its counterpart in Colombo warning about the impending disaster – and naming the suspects, the places which could be hit, and even the precise date when blood would be spilled. It remains a mystery how the Indians got this windfall. Coincidentally, Sallay was in New Delhi then attending a months-long military course to which foreigners from friendly countries are invited. And one of the men who reportedly ignored the intelligence warnings in 2019 was Shani Abeseykara, who headed the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) at the time of the bombings. In 2020, the Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration first demoted and then arrested Shani Abeysekara. While in custody, he suffered a heart attack and contracted COVID-19\. His supporters say it was a miracle that he survived the ordeal. After being acquitted by the courts, Abeysekara joined the National People's Power (NPP) — of which the JVP is its core— and became an active politician. When the NPP came to power in 2024, Abeysekara was reappointed as Director of the Criminal Investigation Department on a contract basis. It was, arguably, the first time in Sri Lankan history that a politician had returned to head a major state investigative agency. The CID — now headed by Abeysekara — is alleged to have subjected Sallay to such severe physical and psychological mistreatment that he launched a hunger strike on June 5. As his health rapidly deteriorated, and his family claimed he could die, the government hurriedly rushed him to the emergency wing of a leading Colombo hospital, where he is now taking only saline, while continuing his protest fast. Sallay, his family says, is okay with the case and interrogation but does not want to be in CID custody. But Abeseykara, who believed Sallay was the cause of his earlier trauma, is refusing to give up. They are now bitter foes. While Sallay has plenty of admirers in Sri Lanka for conducting covert operations against the Tamil Tigers, there are many others who intensely dislike him over his alleged high-handed treatment of government critics. But even those who are no admirers of Sallay find it difficult to believe that he could have joined hands with Islamists to kill and maim hundreds, simply to get Gotabaya re-elected. In any case, the government that preceded Gotabaya Rajapaksa was so dysfunctional — the President and the Prime Minister were barely on speaking terms — that it could have been defeated without bombs or mass-casualty attacks. In any case, the words that asylum seeker Maulana has attributed to Sallay during alleged secret meetings in Sri Lanka's east with the prospective Islamist bombers make his claims suspect in the eyes of many, including diplomats. But the government is clearly placing considerable weight on Maulana's testimony. Shani Abeysekara, the head of the CID, travelled to the Sri Lankan Embassy in France to record his statement. Yes, the Easter bombings helped Gotabaya to sweep the elections. But to allude that Gotabaya is part of the conspiracy is akin to alleging that Lyndon Johnson probably had a hand in John Kennedy’s death, so that he could be the next president of the US. It is also true that Gotabaya Rajapaksa's public announcement of his presidential candidacy within days of the Easter bombings was not a politically wise move. Then, those in the know in Colombo say that his elder brother, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa — a political animal to the core — had privately voiced disgust at Gotabaya Rajapaksa's decision to announce his presidential candidacy within days of the Easter bombings, warning that it could one day land him in trouble. Does Maulana have photographic or electronic evidence to back his claims against Sallay, Pillaiyaan, and, by extension, Gotabaya? He has said he will not return to Sri Lanka. There are other questions too. If the government does have irrefutable evidence, why doesn’t it take Sallay to court and convict him? Why should the ministers spew fire only in parliament? And even if charges are filed against Sallay, can they stand scrutiny in a court of law? When Maulana flew out of Colombo in late 2019 apparently fearing for his life, no one could have imagined that the allegations he would make in faraway Switzerland would cause a political explosion in Sri Lanka, the incumbent government treating a once-trusted intelligence chief as a national traitor. ### The Meccan Shawl: S.L.M. Hanifa’s Stories Reach the World as Jaffna Monitor Enters Publishing URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-meccan-shawl-s-l-m-hanifas-stories-reach-the-world-as-jaffna-monitor-enters-publishing/ Last updated: 2026-06-14T08:56:39.000Z After more than six decades of writing about life in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, S.L.M. Hanifa’s stories are reaching an English-speaking audience around the world. *The Meccan Shawl*, a collection of fifteen of his short stories translated from Tamil into English, will be launched on Sunday, June 14, at 4:00 p.m. at the Olympic Auditorium Hall on Independence Avenue in Colombo 7\. The book is jointly published by Jaffna Monitor and Ghazal Publications. For Jaffna Monitor, it marks a new venture. For Hanifa, it is the arrival of a lifetime’s work before a new readership. For sixty-six years, Hanifa has written about the textures of life in Sri Lanka’s East — its faiths, its frictions, its humour, its sorrows, and the humanity that endures through them all. Beyond the written words, he has long been a respected figure in the Eastern Province, particularly during periods when relations between Tamils and Muslims grew strained and uncertain. For more than four decades, he consistently argued for understanding, dialogue, and coexistence, seeking to preserve ties between communities that were at times being pulled apart by conflict, suspicion, and political upheaval. Hanifa is eighty-one now. To see his stories reach readers beyond the Tamil-speaking world, translated by people who deeply admire his work, has brought him immense happiness. It has brought us the same. ### **A Translation Built to Last** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/the-meccan-shawl-s-l-m-hanifa-_v7fds-kix76rvqyb8lqpp.jpg) The collection was translated by Prof. N. Asokan (*eḻuttukkiṉiyavaṉ*). It also includes one story in a translation previously rendered by Prof. S. Sivasegaram, reproduced with his kind permission. Pasmila Raviraj served as co-translator and editor. The work involved far more than translating words from one language to another. Much of the effort went into carrying across the regional dialect and expressions that give Hanifa’s prose its distinctive voice. Many of these words and idioms are so deeply rooted in the culture of Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province that even Tamil speakers from other parts of the island may not immediately recognise them. The challenge was to preserve that linguistic richness while producing an English text that remained faithful to the original and accessible to readers unfamiliar with the world from which the stories emerged. The book is already available worldwide through [Amazon](https://ezi.asokan.org/2026/03/11/the-meccan-shawl/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com). Early readers abroad have responded warmly, with many commenting on the quality of the translation. For those who worked on the project over many years, that response has been deeply encouraging. ### **The Beginning of a Publishing Journey** While *The Meccan Shawl* is our first book, we hope it will not be our last. Our second title, *Lines and Patterns* by Kuppilan I. Shanmugan, translated into English by eḻuttukkiṉiyavaṉ, is now available on [Amazon](https://ezi.asokan.org/2026/05/31/lines-and-patterns/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com). We will be announcing the date of its formal launch shortly. Our aim is to bring important writing from Sri Lanka’s Tamil-speaking communities to a wider readership while preserving the voices, histories, and experiences from which that writing emerges. ### **Join Us at the Launch** We would be honoured by your presence at the launch of *The Meccan Shawl*. **Date:** Sunday, June 14, 2026 **Time:** 4:00 p.m. **Venue:** Olympic Auditorium Hall, Olympic House, 3rd Floor, 100/9F, Independence Avenue, Colombo 07 **Parking:** Available at the venue **RSVP:** Sabry — 077 080 7787 (Ghazal Publications) This will also be the first event hosted by Jaffna Monitor in Colombo. All are warmly welcome. ### The Spymaster Has Discovered the PTA Is Evil. He Is Forty-Seven Years Late — but He Is Right. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-spymaster-has-discovered-the-pta-is-evil-he-is-forty-seven-years-late-but-he-is-right/ Last updated: 2026-06-15T00:12:29.000Z A few weeks before the arrest of former spy chief Suresh Sallay, an article arrived at *Jaffna Monitor* for review. It argued that a country needs sweeping laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to tackle terrorism. I did not publish it. It was, to put it plainly, bloody one-sided. As a Tamil born and raised amidst the war, I know what the PTA is. I know what it has done to people. In this issue of *Jaffna Monitor*, our Consulting Editor, M.R. Narayan Swamy, pens the agony of a pastor, [Edward (Sam) Sivalingam](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/how-sri-lankas-pta-destroyed-a-tamil-pastors-life/), who was detained for nearly two decades under the draconian PTA despite having no connection whatsoever to the LTTE or to terrorism. His story is one example. Personally, I know hundreds. The PTA is an evil law, and it has no place in a civilized country. A few days before this issue went to press, Suresh Sallay — having spent more than one hundred days in detention under the PTA without being formally charged — began a fast unto death inside a Criminal Investigation Department detention cell, refusing food, water, and medication. After meeting him, his 21-year-old son, Kushal Sallay, told reporters outside CID headquarters that his father had launched the protest after months in custody. He described the conditions of detention as inhumane and said the campaign was intended to draw attention to the sweeping powers of the PTA. Note carefully who is making this demand. Sallay is not a Kilinochchi farmer or a Batticaloa trader. He is the former head of the State Intelligence Service and, before that, of military intelligence — a man who sat at the controlling end of this country’s security apparatus, the apparatus for which the PTA has been the principal legal weapon for four decades, and which deployed that weapon against countless Tamils and Muslims over long years. His lawyers say he is being held under a detention order signed not by a court but by the President — as was the case in so many PTA detentions before his. His counsel has warned the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department in writing that officials could be held personally accountable should he die in custody. Every element of that account — detention without charge stretching beyond one hundred days, an executive rather than judicial detention order, allegations of torture in police custody, a family pleading for access to lawyers, and a man so broken by confinement that he would rather die than endure further detention — will be instantly familiar to the Tamil readers of *Jaffna Monitor*. Because this is the standard biography of a PTA detainee. The only extraordinary feature is the detainee’s former job title. As a friend of mine put it: “The machine has eaten one of its own engineers.” ### **The late conversion of the PTA’s own men** Supporters of Sallay recently staged a satyagraha in Colombo Fort, drawing a number of prominent figures. Among those present were Udaya Gammanpila, Wimal Weerawansa, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, and several individuals who had long defended the PTA. Before I forget: the author of the article I declined to publish — the one arguing that Sri Lanka needs sweeping laws such as the PTA — was also among the attendees. I do not say this to ridicule anyone, or to brand them, hypocrites or opportunists. Quite the opposite. I am genuinely pleased that, at least now, they seem to have realized that the PTA is an evil piece of legislation that can be turned against anyone. Rather than dismiss them, I respect the change of heart, even one that has arrived selectively. After all, as an old Tamil saying goes, only the hen that laid the egg knows the pain of laying it. But some hens knew the pain perfectly well — and chose to forget it the moment the coop was theirs. The JVP’s own cadres were swallowed by the state’s security machinery during the 1987–89 insurrection, many under emergency regulations and anti-terror laws. For years, the party campaigned against the PTA, denouncing it as a tool of repression. Today, it occupies the very offices from which detention orders are signed. Sallay raised no audible objection to ministerial detention orders when they were imposed on Tamil youth in the Vanni or Muslim traders in Kattankudy. Indeed, many of his critics have portrayed him as one of the leading architects of the PTA's enforcement, particularly during his years in intelligence under the administration of Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Nor was Udaya Gammanpila’s constitutional conscience much in evidence when the student leader Wasantha Mudalige spent months in detention in 2022 under a PTA order signed by the President, or when the poet Ahnaf Jazeem was jailed for more than a year over allegations linked to a collection of anti-war poetry. For decades, every Tamil mother’s testimony was dismissed as LTTE propaganda, every Human Rights Watch report as foreign interference, and every United Nations finding as part of a conspiracy against Sri Lanka’s war heroes. Sallay’s cries — and those of his family — cannot be dismissed on any of those grounds. That is what makes this moment significant. It strips away the usual excuses and exposes, once again, the fundamental cruelty of the PTA. ### **What the record already proved** The statute itself, enacted in 1979 as a “temporary” measure and made permanent in 1982, authorises warrantless arrest on suspicion of loosely defined “unlawful activity” (Section 6); seventy-two hours of police custody before production to a magistrate (Section 7); detention on a minister’s order — originally up to eighteen months, twelve after the 2022 amendment — with no judicial determination (Section 9); transfer of remand prisoners to “any authority” in “any place” (Section 15A); the admissibility of confessions made to senior police officers, with the ordinary safeguards of the Evidence Ordinance disapplied (Sections 16 and 17); and supremacy over every conflicting law (Section 28). The human consequences were documented in forensic detail. Official figures supplied to the UN Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism in 2017 showed that of eighty-one prisoners then in the judicial phase of PTA pretrial detention, seventy had been held for more than five years and twelve for more than ten. Human Rights Watch’s 2018 investigation, built on interviews with thirty-four former detainees and relatives, recorded torture or beatings in eleven of its seventeen detailed cases. The UN Human Rights Committee found in the Singarasa case that a Tamil man’s conviction — resting on a confession taken without an interpreter — violated fair-trial rights. A woman detained in 2008 solely because the police could not locate her husband spent seven years inside before acquittal. A detainee said he confessed after officers threatened to rape his sister; he was acquitted in 2014, his hearing destroyed by torture. The journalist J.S. Tissainayagam received twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment for articles about the treatment of Tamil civilians. Jeyakumari Balendran was detained in 2014 for campaigning to learn the fate of her disappeared son. After the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks — the very atrocity in connection with which Sallay is now held — the law turned on the Muslims. Human Rights Watch documented at least one hundred and twenty-five Muslims detained under the PTA in Kattankudy alone, most for between one and three years, the majority with little or no evidence ever produced. The lawyer Hejaaz Hizbullah lost nearly two years of his life to shifting allegations before being granted bail in 2022\. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared Ahnaf Jazeem’s detention arbitrary. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka found in 2025 that the PTA detention of Mohamed Rusdi — a Muslim youth arrested over anti-Israel stickers — violated his fundamental rights. Nor has the law’s appetite slackened under the present government. By Colombo’s own figures, reported to the UN human rights office, forty-nine PTA arrests were made in the first five months of 2025 — more than in all of 2024\. As of late May 2025, eighteen people sat under detention orders, twenty-two on magistrates’ remand, and forty on High Court remand. And in the very week of Sallay’s hunger strike came the Jaffna CID’s arrest of the twenty-four-year-old rapper Sangeethsan Ganeskumar, remanded under the PTA over a TikTok video of a temple-festival performance. ### **A pledge in writing, a bill that makes it worse** The National People’s Power government cannot plead ignorance of any of this. Its manifesto promised, in writing, the abolition of oppressive laws including the PTA. In office, it has reversed itself, asserting that the fault lies in the Act’s “misuse” rather than in the Act — a claim refuted by the statute’s own text, since a law whose ordinary operation permits warrantless arrest, executive detention, and police confessions is functioning as written whenever it is abused. The government’s proposed replacement, the [Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/psta-when-the-victims-rewrite-the-law-that-once-destroyed-them/), has been condemned by constitutional analysts and civil society coalitions on the documented ground that it would, in key respects, confer broader powers than the PTA — sweeping protest and dissent into terrorism’s definition while dropping the fundamental-rights exemption found in earlier drafts. In February, ITAK’s Shanakiyan Rasamanickam was reduced to tabling a private member’s repeal bill to force onto Parliament’s agenda what the governing party had promised the electorate. The European Union’s GSP+ monitors have pressed for repeal and been rebuffed. UN experts have demanded a moratorium since 2022, but have been ignored. Forty-seven years of this law have now produced a closed circle of evidence: the statute’s text, the UN’s findings, the state’s own Human Rights Commission, thousands of Tamil and Muslim case files — and, finally, the sworn anguish of the man who once commanded the system. There is no vantage point left from which the PTA can be honestly defended. The spymaster has discovered, forty-seven years late, what every Tamil mother could have told him. He is late. But he is right. Repeal it. ### Sallay Tells Court Easter Bombing Investigators Were Faulted by Official Inquiries URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-9/ Last updated: 2026-06-13T11:45:27.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Lawyers for Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the former head of Sri Lanka's State Intelligence Service, told the Court of Appeal on Thursday that the senior police officers investigating him over the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings had themselves been faulted by official inquiries for failing to prevent the attacks. The argument was made during a hearing on a writ petition filed by General Sallay, who is challenging the legality of his arrest and subsequent detention under the Prevention of Terrorism Act in connection with the coordinated suicide bombings that killed more than 260 people at churches and luxury hotels on April 21, 2019. Appearing for General Sallay, President's Counsel Sanjeeva Jayawardena told a two-judge bench that several official investigations into the attacks had recommended criminal action against Shani Abeysekera, the director of the Criminal Investigation Department, and Ravi Seneviratne, who oversaw the department as deputy inspector general at the time of the bombings. The inquiries, he said, concluded that the two officers had failed to act on intelligence warnings received before the attacks. “Shani Abeysekera, who failed to discharge his duties as C.I.D. director, has now become the investigator of Suresh Sallay,” Mr. Jayawardena told the court. Mr. Jayawardena said a succession of official investigations had found no evidence linking his client to the attacks. He cited findings from the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, a Parliamentary Select Committee, a Sectoral Oversight Committee, and committees headed by Justices A.H.M.D. Nawaz Imam, Jayaki de Alwis, and Janak de Silva, as well as proceedings before the Supreme Court. He also referred to the findings of the Janak de Silva committee, arguing that the report documented extensive evidence of efforts by the Islamic State to radicalize followers in Sri Lanka through local extremist networks, supported by numerous intelligence reports, but did not implicate General Sallay. The hearing was conducted before Justice Rohantha Abeysuriya, the President of the Court of Appeal, and Justice Priyantha Fernando. The bench fixed the matter for further hearing on July 10. Deputy Solicitor General Suharshi Herath appeared for the Attorney General. In his petition, General Sallay seeks an interim order suspending the detention order issued against him under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, as well as an order staying proceedings against him before the Colombo Fort Magistrate's Court. The respondents named in the application include Priyantha Weerasuriya, the Inspector General of Police; Mr. Abeysekera, the Colombo Fort Magistrate; and the Attorney General, among others. According to the petition, the investigation stems from a complaint lodged with the Criminal Investigation Department on Oct. 4, 2024, by the Rev. Rohan de Silva, a Catholic priest, concerning allegations aired in a Channel 4 documentary. General Sallay has denied the allegations, maintaining that he was outside Sri Lanka during the periods in which investigators allege he was in contact with Zahran Hashim, the extremist preacher who led the Easter attacks, or members of his network. The petition states that General Sallay served as minister counsellor at Sri Lanka's High Commission in Malaysia from December 2016 to December 2018 and resided there throughout that period. It further states that from Jan. 7, 2019, to Nov. 29, 2019, he was in New Delhi attending the 59th National Security and Strategic Studies Course at India's National Defence College. The Easter Sunday bombings occurred while he was in India, his lawyers told the court, arguing that the timeline undermines the allegations against him. ### How PTA Destroyed a Tamil Pastor’s Life URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-sri-lankas-pta-destroyed-a-tamil-pastors-life/ Last updated: 2026-06-16T05:25:18.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** A Tamil pastor arrested in 2006 at age 30 in Sri Lanka spent over 16 agonizing years in prisons undergoing such severe torture that even today he walks with a distinct limp and suffers from multiple body pains, presiding over a family which is physically and mentally broken both by the war and his imprisonment. Edward (Sam) Sivalingam was no Tamil Tiger sympathizer and led a mundane life far removed from a brutal war that raged between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and government troops. He was stopped on August 4, 2006, near the YMCA lodge at Vavuniya town before boarding a bus to Omanthai, which was an informal border between the Sri Lankan and the LTTE-held territory in the island nation’s north. Sivalingam, from the Methodist Church, was returning home in Kilinochchi. Security personnel were initially okay that he was from the clergy. That is when they seized from him a Travel Pass that the LTTE issued to all those living in its zone. It was in Tamil and valid for two years. The Sinhalese-knowing soldiers behaved as if they had been hit by lightning when they spotted the LTTE insignia on the small document – a roaring tiger, its paws outstretched, and its face ringed by dozens of bullets and two rifles. The soldiers refused to accept the pastor’s word that he had nothing to do with the Tigers, and this was a pass which everyone in the LTTE’s de facto state had to carry if they commuted to Sri Lankan territory. The Travel Pass carried a passport-sized photograph. The soldiers mistook the black thread around the person's neck for the type of necklace worn by Tamil guerrillas to carry a cyanide capsule, as the cross hanging from the thread was not visible in the photograph. Ignoring his cries that he was innocent, Sivalingam was dragged away and confined in an army camp in Vavuniya for two days before being handed over to the notorious Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Colombo. That is where the pastor learned what hell can be like. For nine months, the frail Sivalingam — who could barely speak Sinhala — was subjected to relentless beatings and brutal torture, day after day. His interrogators wanted him to confess to being a member of the LTTE — something he was not. He would be blindfolded before the start of the interrogation – so that, if he survived, he would not be able to identify the men tormenting him. “There would be at least three torturers every day,” Sivalingam told Jaffna Monitor on the telephone from Kilinochchi. “I couldn’t see them. But I counted the number of voices.” Almost all his interrogators were from Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhalese community, and they appeared to treat all Tamils in their custody worse than animals. The remaining but fewer interrogators were young Muslims who, traumatised by the way the LTTE had ousted the community en masse from the country’s north, seemed determined to teach a lesson no Tamil would forget. Between them, they beat and tortured Sivalingam so severely — calmly ignoring his piercing screams — that he suffered three head wounds, a fractured hand, and the loss of two teeth. The food served to him was of pathetic quality. He could hardly sleep at night. Such was the bodily pain. The more he insisted he had nothing to do with the LTTE, the more he was traumatised. The interrogators did not care for the truth; they wanted a confession. The men wanted to show their superiors that they had correctly netted a Tamil Tiger, under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). When Sivalingam could take it no more, he was asked to sign a document typed in Sinhala. The interrogators told him that he would be released if he affixed his signature, as he had indeed proved to be innocent. Unable to read the language, he complied. It was only much later that he realized he had been tricked. The document stated that Sivalingam had confessed to being a member of the LTTE. From CID custody, the pastor — who had by then begun to limp — was transferred to the high-security prison at Boosa, near the southern port city of Galle (incidentally, the city where Sivalingam was born). He remained there for about 6 to 7 months. Sivalingam spent the remainder of his prison term at Colombo's Wellikada Prison, Sri Lanka's largest jail. His incarceration lasted a total of 16 years, two months, and 21 days, during which he counted each passing day and cursed his fate. “The way I was tortured, I almost died,” Sivalingam recalled. “I repeatedly suffered all kinds of pain. I was repeatedly taken to the hospital. Believe it or not, I spent a total of four years over many visits on hospital beds.” Despite the trauma he endured, Sivalingam was unable to convince the judiciary of the truth, as both the judges and his defence lawyers changed repeatedly throughout the proceedings. When his elderly father passed away, the authorities refused to let him attend the Christian cremation. It was finally a Muslim judge at the Colombo High Court who saw through the farce Sivalingam had been subjected to and gave him belated justice. When the judge learnt that Sivalingam could not read the Sinhala language, he summoned the men who had obtained his signature and asked why they had made him sign a document he could not even understand. The judge also berated the security men for failing to differentiate between an LTTE Travel Pass and an LTTE Identity Card. On November 23, 2022 – more than 16 years after his needless and unlawful arrest and 13 years after the end of the civil war – the traumatised pastor breezed out of prison. He was 47 years old and had to use crutches to walk – thanks to his torturers. Sivalingam’s daughter was in nursery and his son in Class 1 when he was arrested. In his absence, the Church paid his family half his salary. That wasn’t enough, so the children underwent a painful, fatherless life. Although now married, their lives are beset by perennial trauma. Today, Sivalingam is back at work as a pastor but is broken within. He is a heart patient too. One of his nerves is affected. He cannot move his legs and hands freely. The family was in the wrong place when the military crushed the Tamil Tigers in 2009\. In the process, his wife suffered injuries to her head and leg, his daughter suffers from frequent ill health, and his son has unresolved liver issues. Sivalingam recalls that of the 574 prisoners who were in Wellikada when he left, “99.9 percent were Tamils, falsely accused, like me, of being with the LTTE. Take it from me, perhaps only ten of them were really Tigers. The others were completely innocent.” According to him, most prisoners came from economically battered families in Sri Lanka’s north and east, the war zone. If a Tamil had money, he would secure bail – if the demands of the CID personnel could be met. The others simply suffered and suffered. “Sir, I am half dead today,” Sivalingam says, speaking slowly — a living example of a man destroyed from within by a heartless Sri Lankan state and its draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act. ### Sri Lanka's Easter Inquiry and the Limits of Parliamentary Allegations URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/will-the-case-against-suresh-sallay-end-like-pillayans/ Last updated: 2026-06-12T15:52:06.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka’s public security minister accused the country’s detained former intelligence chief on Wednesday of trying to bury evidence in the Easter Sunday bombing investigation, telling Parliament that retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay had refused to surrender the passwords to an iPhone and a laptop seized by investigators. In a special statement to Parliament, the minister, Ananda Wijepala, said investigators had confiscated a “modern Apple mobile phone” from Mr. Sallay at the time of his arrest and recovered a laptop during a search of his residence. The former intelligence chief, he said, has so far declined to provide access to either device or to permit their forensic analysis, “thereby attempting to hide the truth.” But the minister said the refusal would not shield Mr. Sallay from scrutiny. “Through other scientific and telephone evidence, his connection to this conspiracy and its preparations has been very clearly established,” Mr. Wijepala told Parliament, according to the official record of his statement. He went further, declaring that investigators had found that Mr. Sallay had “conspired with and strategically directed Islamic extremists” in the lead-up to the attacks. The investigation, the minister said, had also concluded that Mr. Sallay identified a Catholic church as a target — the strongest official allegation to date linking the former intelligence chief to the planning and direction of the bombings. The statement was the government’s most detailed public accounting yet of the chain of events that has placed Mr. Sallay — who led the State Intelligence Service under former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa — in Ward 42 of the National Hospital of Colombo, where the minister said he is being treated under heavy security and the close supervision of psychiatrists, physicians and nutrition specialists for the effects of a hunger strike now nearing its sixth day. ### **A week of legal setbacks** Mr. Wijepala said Mr. Sallay’s conduct changed markedly after the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court, on June 3, imposed an overseas travel ban on Mr. Rajapaksa based on statements from the witness Azad Maulana, and extended for another 90 days the detention order permitting investigators to continue questioning Mr. Sallay. “It was only after these legal measures were taken that Suresh Sallay completely changed his approach to the investigation,” the minister said. “Beginning on the night of June 5, he deliberately commenced a hunger strike aimed at obstructing the investigation. He has also refused food brought to him by relatives.” After Mr. Sallay’s blood sugar levels dropped, police doctors recommended hospitalization, and he was admitted to the National Hospital under heavy guard on June 7, Mr. Wijepala said. The June 3 orders, issued by Fort Magistrate Pasan Amarasena, marked the first time Mr. Rajapaksa has been directly drawn into the Easter Sunday case. The travel restrictions also cover two former military intelligence figures — Maj. Gen. Chula Kodituwakku, a former director of Military Intelligence, and Maj. Gen. Ruwan Kulatunga, who once headed the National Intelligence Bureau. Detectives told the magistrate that the three men’s departure from the country would obstruct the continuing investigation, though the Criminal Investigation Department stopped short of naming the former president a suspect. ### **‘No luxury facilities’** The minister coupled the medical account with a political broadside. Suspects detained over the Easter Sunday attacks could not expect “luxury facilities” in custody, he said, and the government would not abandon its investigations because of hunger strikes or other forms of pressure. He accused “bankrupt political parties” of politicizing the case through a protest fast outside the Colombo Fort Railway Station. That demonstration, held in support of Mr. Sallay, was called off later in the day after the Fort Magistrate’s Court ordered an independent psychiatric evaluation into allegations that he had been tortured in detention. Those allegations have been pressed most forcefully by Mr. Sallay’s own family. His wife, Manori Sallay, has written to the Inspector General of Police, Priyantha Weerasuriya, alleging that her husband was subjected to “torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” in custody. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has recorded statements from Mr. Sallay and visited him in hospital, and has summoned the investigating officers to appear before it. “The Easter Sunday attack claimed the lives of 278 innocent civilians and injured more than 500 others,” Mr. Wijepala said. “Justice must be delivered to the victims. All those connected to this conspiracy will be brought before the courts and held accountable.” ### **Allegations under privilege — and the Pillayan precedent** Critics, including opposition lawmakers and legal commentators, note that Mr. Wijepala’s most damaging assertions, against Mr. Sallay, as against others before him, have been delivered from the floor of Parliament, where members enjoy absolute privilege and cannot be sued for defamation. The chamber, they argue, has become a venue for pronouncing guilt without the burden of proof, leaving the accused with no legal recourse to test in court allegations the government has yet to bring before one. On April 8, 2025, the C.I.D. arrested the former state minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, widely known as Pillayan, at his party headquarters in Batticaloa. Two days later, Mr. Wijepala told Parliament: “There is substantial information linking him to the Easter Sunday Terror Attacks, suggesting his involvement. The investigations are ongoing. We will never allow any crime to be covered up, nor will we permit any criminal to roam free.” In July 2025, during an adjournment debate, the minister sharpened the claim, telling lawmakers that Mr. Chandrakanthan — who was in remand custody at Batticaloa Prison at the time of the 2019 bombings — had advance knowledge of them. “We have evidence to prove that he had prior knowledge of the attacks,” Mr. Wijepala declared. Yet when Mr. Chandrakanthan was finally produced before the Mount Lavinia Magistrate on April 2, 2026, after 359 days in detention under the Prevention of Terrorism Act without being brought before a court, no Easter Sunday charges were filed against him. The case the C.I.D. placed before the magistrate concerned only the 2006 abduction and murder of Prof. Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, the vice chancellor of Eastern University, who vanished in Colombo at the height of the war. ### **The case against the former spy chief** Mr. Sallay, a close aide to former Defense Secretary and later President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, headed Sri Lanka’s Military Intelligence during the final phase of the civil war and was appointed director of the State Intelligence Service after Mr. Rajapaksa won the presidency in 2019. He was arrested by the Criminal Investigation Department on Feb. 25 in the Colombo suburb of Peliyagoda and is held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act on allegations of conspiracy and aiding and abetting the coordinated Easter Sunday suicide bombings of April 21, 2019, which struck three churches and three luxury hotels, killing more than 260 people. Mr. Sallay has denied all allegations. His arrest marked a dramatic reversal in a case in which he had previously appeared as the first witness for the prosecution. The allegations against Mr. Sallay echo claims first aired internationally in 2023, when Channel 4 in Britain broadcast testimony from Azad Maulana, a whistleblower and asylum seeker, alleging links between the former intelligence chief and the Islamist bombers and suggesting that elements within the security establishment had allowed the attacks to proceed in order to influence the 2019 presidential election in Mr. Rajapaksa’s favor. Mr. Sallay has repeatedly rejected the allegations, maintaining that he was in India undergoing military training at the time of the attacks. Mr. Wijepala concluded his statement by broadening the focus beyond Easter Sunday. Inquiries were also underway, he said, into alleged abuses of public funds, the killing and disappearance of journalists, and other unresolved crimes of previous administrations — investigations he pledged would proceed without political interference until those responsible were brought before the courts. It was a sweeping promise, delivered from the one podium in the country where promises carry no legal consequence. And so the Easter Sunday investigation arrives at its essential question — one now posed, with a certain weary irony, in Colombo’s legal circles: when the charge sheet against Mr. Sallay finally reaches a courtroom, will it concern Easter Sunday at all? Or will a year of thunderous parliamentary certainty quietly resolve itself, as it did with Pillayan, into a different crime from a different decade? ### Japan Funds Debris Removal and Service Restoration After Sri Lanka Cyclone URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/japan-funds-debris-removal-and-service-restoration-after-sri-lanka-cyclone/ Last updated: 2026-06-11T06:10:46.000Z **COLOMBO —** Japan and the United Nations Development Programme signed an agreement with the Sri Lankan government on Wednesday to fund disaster waste clearance and the rehabilitation of community facilities in areas devastated by Cyclone Ditwah, which struck the island in late November and affected an estimated 1.7 million people. The project will focus on the Central Province — the districts of Kandy, Matale, and Nuwara Eliya — where the cyclone caused some of the worst damage to infrastructure, leaving services disrupted and debris piled up in communities for more than six months. Under the initiative, formally titled the Project for Disaster Waste Clearance and Rehabilitation of Community Facilities through Participatory Approach, electric three-wheelers will be deployed to collect recyclable and light disaster waste, while multipurpose community centers that provide healthcare, education, childcare, and social services will be restored. Officials said the project would directly benefit roughly 228,500 people, with a further 700,000 expected to gain indirectly through improved services and waste management. It is also designed to create livelihood opportunities through community-based waste collection and rebuilding work, with an emphasis on employing women and vulnerable groups. The agreement was signed in Colombo by Akio Isomata, Japan's ambassador to Sri Lanka, and Azusa Kubota, the UNDP's resident representative, in the presence of S. Aloka Bandara, secretary to the Ministry of Public Administration, Provincial Councils and Local Government. Mr. Isomata said the project was guided by the principle of "Build Back Better" and would strengthen resilience by putting communities at the center of implementation. "By encouraging local communities to participate," he said, Japan hoped to "strengthen social cohesion and enhance resilience to disaster." Mr. Aloka Bandara called the agreement "an important milestone in our national recovery efforts," saying it would help affected communities "regain access to essential services and rebuild their lives with dignity." Ms. Kubota said recovery "is not merely about rebuilding what was lost," describing the partnership as a commitment to "inclusive, sustainable recovery that leaves no one behind." The signing marks a shift from emergency humanitarian relief toward longer-term recovery in the cyclone's aftermath, and officials said the project aligns with Sri Lanka's broader efforts to strengthen climate resilience and modernize its waste management systems. ### Justice Minister Says Protest Aims to Shield Easter Bombing ‘Mastermind’ URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/justice-minister-says-protest-aims-to-shield-easter-bombing-mastermind/ Last updated: 2026-06-13T11:45:31.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The opposition figures staging a sit-in for a detained former intelligence chief are not defending him out of concern for his welfare but are trying to halt the investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings before it reaches the people who planned them, Sri Lanka’s justice minister told Parliament on Tuesday. Harshana Nanayakkara, the minister of justice and national integration, said the campaign on behalf of Suresh Sallay, a retired major general and former head of the State Intelligence Service, was a calculated effort to “stop the investigations with Sallay” because his backers feared that pressing further would expose what the minister called the “principal mastermind” behind the attacks. He predicted that the truth about the bombings would emerge within “the next month or two.” “They have not united today for Suresh Sallay,” Mr. Nanayakkara said during a parliamentary debate on emergency regulations, according to a record of his remarks. “They are trying by any means necessary to stop the investigations with Sallay.” ### **Hunger strike, and a sit-in** Mr. Sallay was arrested on Feb. 25 by the Criminal Investigation Department on suspicion of conspiracy and of aiding and abetting the coordinated suicide bombings that struck three churches and three luxury hotels on Easter Sunday in April 2019\. Mr. Nanayakkara told Parliament that 278 people were killed and about 500 wounded; investigations have generally put the toll at more than 260 dead, including at least 45 foreign nationals. Mr. Sallay, who was serving in a diplomatic posting abroad when the attacks occurred and was appointed intelligence chief later in 2019 after Gotabaya Rajapaksa became president, has denied any involvement. He has been accused of maintaining links to the local Islamist network blamed for the bombings. Those allegations gained prominence after a British television documentary aired in 2023 claimed that he had helped engineer the attacks to pave the way for Mr. Rajapaksa's return to power. Mr. Sallay has repeatedly rejected those claims. His detention escalated this month. Mr. Sallay was moved to the National Hospital after beginning a hunger strike, and his wife, Manori Sallay, wrote to the inspector general of police alleging that he had been subjected to “torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” in custody. The police rejected the accusation in a statement on June 6, saying he had been held under a standard detention order and had received neither special privileges nor mistreatment, a response that also dismissed similar claims made by the former lawmaker Udaya Gammanpila. On June 8, opposition parties began a satyagraha, or sit-in protest, outside the Fort Railway Station in Colombo, demanding his release. The police dismantled the protesters’ tent the same day in tense scenes. The opposition has framed the detention as a politically driven persecution of an officer who served the state; Mr. Nanayakkara cast the protest as theatrical and belated. When Mr. Sallay was held for 90 days under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the minister said, no one staged protests, complained about his food or his cell, or threatened self-immolation, and no one came forward as his mother or wife. The agitation began only after a foreign travel ban was imposed on Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, he said. “For 90 days, Sallay received good food,” Mr. Nanayakkara said. “Did rice and radish only become available after a travel ban was imposed on Gotabaya?” He said fewer than 20 people had turned out when the Fort sit-in began. Mr. Nanayakkara also pushed back against an opposition allegation, made by the National Freedom Front leader Wimal Weerawansa, that the minister had once acted as legal counsel for Zahran Hashim, the man widely identified as the ringleader of the bombings. The minister did not address that claim directly in Tuesday’s remarks but insisted that investigators, not politicians, were driving the case. “There is no political interference in this process,” he said, adding that the C.I.D. would submit its findings to the courts. He invoked the imprisonment of Sarath Fonseka, the former army commander jailed after falling out with the Rajapaksa government, to ask why the principle of protecting security personnel had not been applied then. And he accused some news outlets of ignoring the 2019 victims while amplifying Mr. Sallay’s complaints. ### **Tamil Rapper’s arrest and a contested promise** The minister also defended the arrest of Sangeethasan Ganeskumar, a young Tamil rapper from northern Sri Lanka, whose detention has drawn criticism from rights groups and lawmakers across the political spectrum. Critics say the case has become a test of the government's commitment to its longstanding promise to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act. An opposition member had told Parliament that the artist was detained merely for singing on stage. That was “entirely false,” Mr. Nanayakkara said, asserting that the man was arrested not for the performance but for editing the songs and uploading them to social media in a way that promoted the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Freedom of expression, he said, applies equally in the north and the south and cannot be used to justify improper conduct. The artist is Sangeethsan Ganeskumar, 24, a rapper who performs as HipHop Sangee and lives in Udayanagar, Kilinochchi. He performed on May 31 at a musical event at a temple in Navatkuli, in the Chavakachcheri area of Jaffna District. The Jaffna Divisional Criminal Investigation Bureau says he later edited four songs from the event and posted them to his TikTok account in a manner glorifying the LTTE. He was arrested on June 2, produced before the Chavakachcheri Magistrate’s Court the next day under Section 3(g) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and remanded until June 17. His lawyers have argued that the material cited by the police contains no reference to the L.T.T.E. or its leadership and does not amount to a terrorism offense. M. A. Sumanthiran, a President’s Counsel and acting general secretary of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, said after meeting the rapper in Jaffna Prison that a fundamental rights petition would be filed in the Supreme Court seeking his release. Amnesty International has called for his freedom and renewed demands to scrap the terrorism law, and protests have been held in Kilinochchi, Vavuniya, and Mannar. Criticism of the arrest has not come solely from Tamil politicians. Namal Rajapaksa of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna accused the government of applying the law selectively, questioning why a young artist had been remanded under anti-terrorism legislation while members of the governing party had, during recent election campaigns, used imagery and rhetoric that he said similarly glorified the LTTE and its leader, Prabhakaran, without facing any legal consequences. Mr. Nanayakkara said the terrorism law remained in force and that no detention order had yet been issued against the rapper, meaning he could seek bail. He reiterated that the government was in the final stages of repealing the act and replacing it with new legislation, and that a repeal bill would be presented to Parliament within a month or two — a timeline the administration has cited before without acting on it. Addressing separate allegations of political interference in the judiciary, including the contested transfer of Jaffna High Court Judge Alex Raja, the minister said that neither the executive nor the government interfered in judicial transfers, promotions, or disciplinary matters, which are handled by the constitutionally established Judicial Service Commission. While previous governments may have transferred judges for political reasons, he said, his administration would not do so. Returning to the bombings, Mr. Nanayakkara repeated that those who feared the investigation were working to “preserve sympathy” for Mr. Sallay. “The truth about the bombings will emerge within the next month or two,” he said. “The people already understand clearly.” ### One Month of Vijay: Tamil Nadu's Post-Dravidian Experiment Gets Its First Report Card URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/one-month-of-vijay-tamil-nadus-post-dravidian-experiment-gets-its-first-report-card/ Last updated: 2026-06-11T06:24:37.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “One month is too short a time to be disappointed!” The comment from a middle-aged Chennai resident, who voted for cinema star-turned-politician Vijay and remains one of his loyal supporters, neatly sums up the mood on the ground as Tamil Nadu’s first coalition government in decades completes its first month in office. As Chief Minister, C Joseph Vijay retains much of his personal popularity that propelled millions in Tamil Nadu to vote for his two-year-old Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) party in a manner no political pundit anticipated. His enviable fan base and strong social media support combined to help TVK secure an impressive 108 seats in the 234-member Assembly, a result that routed Tamil Nadu’s Dravidian giants. He then quickly secured the backing of smaller parties, giving him the legislative support needed to form a government. One month after he took the oath of office on May 10, few have forgotten that Tamil Nadu — one of India’s most economically developed states — is being governed by its first non-Dravidian administration since 1967, when the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) ousted the Indian National Congress, the country’s oldest political party. Most of those who voted for Vijay remain in his camp even if the enthusiasm that marked his road to electoral victory has subsided. But no one is shedding tears for the Dravidian parties, which lost the race. On his part, Vijay has made a mark with some initial moves. For one, people in Tamil Nadu are suddenly getting used to seeing a Chief Minister in a black coat, more like a lawyer (which Vijay is not), than the traditional white associated with Indian politicians. If and when Vijay addresses a public rally, the crowd response is roaring – an indication that most people are still largely with him. Vijay further proved his political mettle when he won a vote of confidence in the Tamil Nadu Assembly with 144 votes in his favor — far more than the number of seats won by his party in the election — thanks in part to a split within the once-monolithic AIADMK. The chief minister’s decision to ensure 200 units of free power to every household has been warmly embraced, along with the farm loan waivers. He has also set up task forces to battle drug smuggling and protect women. His cabinet has outlined 436 vision statements divided into 10 key pillars, focusing on Tamil identity, agriculture, education, and transparent governance – the last an electoral pledge. This is mostly where many admirers stop patting Vijay. Randomly selected Chennai residents, including some who voted for TVK, say it is evident that most of Vijay’s ministers, with a few exceptions, lack political and administrative experience. “It is a dormant government,” one resident, Elangovan, who has seen many elections and governments in Tamil Nadu, told Jaffna Monitor. “Vijay is yet to meet the press, and there have been no major policy departures.” Admirers and critics are waiting for the start of the Assembly session later this month to learn about Vijay’s vision. This is when Tamil Nadu’s budget is expected to be passed. The widespread feeling is that most ministers, unaware of the ways of dealing with bureaucracy or the art of governance, are busy making media-savvy trips to various departments and making impromptu statements. It was certainly not a pleasant moment when a young minister heading the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department confronted a shopkeeper near the famous Srirangam temple as to why the *murukku* packets he was selling carried no manufacturing or expiry dates. “At a time when the endowment department is facing a major crisis, imagine this silly query?” asked a private sector employee. “Do *prasadam* given away in temples have manufacturing or expiry dates?” The man had an explanation for the minister’s conduct. “Vijay’s ministers have no knowledge of administration. This particular minister betrayed his immaturity,” he said. “We cannot forget that many ministers were merely Vijay’s fans. They have not changed.” A total of 34 hard drives containing sensitive records, including coal procurement and tender-related data, were stolen from the headquarters of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB) in Chennai. Although the disks were recovered from Bengaluru and arrests followed, the brazen security breach embarrassed the government. While Royal Enfield’s decision to establish a new manufacturing facility in neighboring Andhra Pradesh may have been made earlier, its announcement has dealt a blow to the Tamil Nadu government. It marks the first time in decades that the motorcycle maker has expanded its manufacturing footprint outside Tamil Nadu. That the facility will be located in Tirupati district, located just 50 km from the Tamil Nadu border, is no consolation for the loss of a unit that would have ensured many jobs. In his characteristic style, Vijay is urging patience from those who voted for him. Some agree. “I think he is on the right track, and he should be given time to show results. Some YouTube media persons are needlessly gunning for him. This is unfair,” K. Narayanan, now visiting the US, told Jaffna Monitor. A company accountant, R.S. Sampath, added: “Who knows, the government might improve in six months. Vijay, unlike politicians, doesn’t speak too much. His ministers do all the talking. Let us hope he doesn’t slip up badly.” TVK itself, however, remains upbeat. “Our first month in office has been a success,” a Vijay confidant told Jaffna Monitor. “For the first time, we have a coalition government. Around 300 to 400 office bearers from districts across the state have joined us. The DMK’s grassroots organization will begin to crumble soon.” The Chief Minister has also reportedly told senior party colleagues and ministers not to attack or criticize the AIADMK as corrupt, an indication that TVK is seeking to quietly win over the AIADMK’s support base. But it has been noted that, unlike neighbouring Kerala, where a new Chief Minister has quickly made public a White Paper on the state’s finances, Vijay is yet to make true his own promise to bring out a similar White Paper. No wonder the main opposition DMK, which Vijay defeated, is starting to make critical noises, though its leader and former Chief Minister, M.K. Stalin, had promised to keep quiet for six months. “Will this government last even three months?” Stalin asked publicly the other day. That, some residents say, may be too uncharitable an assessment. A school teacher in his 50s said, besides the Chief Minister, the one minister acting with maturity was K.A. Sengottiyan, a nine-time legislator who quit the AIADMK to join the TVK before the elections. No wonder the TVK has named him the Leader of the House in the Assembly. Far from Tamil Nadu, Vijay’s surprise victory has sent unexpected tremors through India’s national opposition alliance, after the Congress party embraced the actor-turned-politician by abandoning the DMK, its ally of several decades. A furious DMK has, after a long period, turned bitterly against the Congress and refused to sit with its MPs in parliament anymore. The DMK has also distanced itself from the opposition INDIA alliance, a development that is bound to please Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The INDIA bloc is a pale shadow of its original self. The Aam Aadmi Party has quit it. The Trinamool Congress, which recently lost power in West Bengal, has uneasy ties with the Congress. Now the DMK, one of its earliest constituents, has turned against the Congress, which is in decline in most parts of India. This is an unintended gift from Vijay to India’s national politics. If he succeeds in establishing TVK as a major force in Tamil Nadu — a state that elects 39 members to Parliament — national parties will be more than eager to court him. ### THE EASTER SUNDAY FILES Part One: What the FBI Found URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/part-one-what-the-fbi-found/ Last updated: 2026-06-13T11:45:33.000Z **Colombo —** More than seven years after eight suicide bombers tore through three churches and three hotels, killing more than 260 people, Sri Lanka is still arguing about what really happened on Easter Sunday. The country’s search for answers has produced thousands of pages of testimony, evidence, and analysis spread across seven major investigations. Yet those inquiries did not always pursue the same questions, nor did they always reach the same conclusions. The debate has now burst back into public view following former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay’s hunger strike in custody and his subsequent hospitalization. His case has once again turned national attention toward the Easter attacks, the investigations that followed, and the unresolved questions that continue to haunt them. In the heat of competing claims, political accusations, and public outrage, it is easy to lose sight of what the various investigations actually found. This series aims to return to the record. Over the coming weeks, we will examine each major inquiry separately—what it was asked to investigate, the evidence it considered, the witnesses it heard, and the conclusions it ultimately reached. Some reports overlap. Others contradict one another. Together, however, they form the most comprehensive account available of one of the darkest days in Sri Lanka’s history. There are, by any reasonable count, seven major reports. The Malalgoda Committee, appointed the day after the bombings, established the basic chronology of events and triggered the first criminal referrals. The Parliamentary Select Committee apportioned responsibility in detail and placed the heaviest share of blame on the country’s intelligence leadership. The Presidential Commission of Inquiry, the most comprehensive investigation conducted in Sri Lanka, heard evidence from more than 440 witnesses and ultimately found fault with the former president and several senior officials. The Supreme Court, in January 2023, transformed some of those findings into the only enforceable personal liability imposed on any individuals over the attacks. The Imam Committee examined — and found unproven — the allegations broadcast by Britain’s Channel 4. ![The suspected bombers behind the attacks.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/part-one-what-the-fbi-found-F5O1Es-kixc7pjezvvudre.png) The suspected bombers behind the attacks. The de Alwis Committee, the most recent and perhaps the most controversial inquiry, broke new ground by scrutinizing the conduct of the Criminal Investigation Department’s leadership in connection with a separate killing in the Eastern Province. Taken together, the reports offer not a single narrative but a series of overlapping and at times conflicting explanations for one of the deadliest episodes in Sri Lanka’s modern history. And then there is the seventh, which is unlike the others. It was not a Sri Lankan inquiry into how the state failed to stop the plot. It was an American criminal investigation into what the plot was — and into the men who built it. It is where this series begins. ## **A complaint sworn in Los Angeles** On 11 December 2020, in the Central District of California, an FBI special agent named Merrilee R. Goodwin swore out a criminal complaint before a United States magistrate judge, Charles Eick. The document it rested on — a 72-page filing — is the most granular public reconstruction of the Easter cell in any official file, Sri Lankan or foreign. The complaint charges three men: Mohamed Naufar, Mohamed Anwar Mohamed Riskan, and Ahamed Milhan Hayathu Moahmed. The charges are American ones. All three are accused of conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organisation — ISIS — under Title 18, Section 2339B of the United States Code. Two of them, Naufar and Milhan, are additionally charged with aiding and abetting the receipt of military-type training from ISIS. What gives an American court jurisdiction over a massacre in Colombo, Negombo, and Batticaloa is set out plainly in the affidavit: five of the dead were United States citizens. Three — identified in the document only by their initials, one of them an employee of the U.S. Department of Commerce working in Colombo in her official capacity — were killed at the Cinnamon Grand. Two more died at the Shangri-La. Within hours of the attacks, the affidavit records, Sri Lanka accepted Washington’s offer of help, and the FBI deployed personnel to the island to collect evidence, identify the attackers, and arrange the return of the American dead. One sentence in the document carries more weight in Colombo than any other. As of the date of filing, late 2020, more than eighteen months after the attacks, the Sri Lankan government, the affidavit states, had charged no perpetrator of the Easter attacks, including the three men the United States was now moving to charge. ## **The finding that sets the FBI apart** [FBI\_Easter\_Attack\_Report\_US\_District\_CourtRead the Full FBI AffidavitFBI\_Easter\_Attack\_Report\_US\_District\_Court.pdf902 KBdownload-circle](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/content/files/2026/06/FBI%5FEaster%5FAttack%5FReport%5FUS%5FDistrict%5FCourt.pdf "Download") On one key question, the American investigation reached a conclusion that several Sri Lankan inquiries had approached with far greater caution. The Parliamentary Select Committee recorded that investigations to that point had shown no evidence that Zahran Hashim, the attacks’ mastermind, had direct links to ISIS. The Imam committee, examining the matter four years later, said it had found no acceptable evidence before it to connect ISIS to the bombings at all. The FBI affidavit is categorical in the other direction. The attackers and their associates, it states, were members and supporters of ISIS who created a group, “ISIS in Sri Lanka”, that ISIS formally recognised as an affiliate operating on the island, with Zahran as its self-proclaimed leader. The agent lays out a chain of evidence for that recognition: a video, recorded in a Sri Lankan forest in late 2017 or early 2018, in which Zahran and his lieutenants pledged allegiance while holding firearms; the dispatch of that video to associates living in ISIS-controlled Syria; and Zahran’s subsequent claim that ISIS leaders had approved his group and were communicating with him directly over Telegram, supplying him with a training syllabus. On 23 April 2019, two days after the attacks, ISIS claimed responsibility through its Amaq news agency, declaring that its fighters had targeted citizens of “coalition states” and Christians in Sri Lanka. The same day, Amaq released a photograph and video of the attackers swearing allegiance to the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi — Zahran visible, unmasked, at the centre, in front of the group’s flag. Six days later, al-Baghdadi himself appeared on video praising the bombings as revenge for ISIS’s territorial defeat at Baghuz, in Syria, weeks earlier, and praising that among the dead were Americans and Europeans. Where the Sri Lankan inquiries weighed whether the cell was operationally commanded from Syria and largely declined to say, the American case treats the affiliation itself as established — a recognised ISIS franchise, whatever the limits of any day-to-day command from abroad. This is the FBI’s distinctive contribution to the record. ## **The morning, reconstructed from the cameras** The affidavit rebuilds the morning of 21 April 2019 minute by minute, from CCTV footage, blast-site evidence, and witness accounts. At 8:45 a.m., a bomber the FBI identifies as Ahamed Muaath Alawudeen detonated inside St Anthony’s Shrine in Colombo. Two minutes later, near-simultaneous blasts struck the Kingsbury hotel in Colombo and St Sebastian’s Church in Negombo. At 8:50, the Cinnamon Grand. At 8:54, two bombers, Zahran among them, struck the Shangri-La. At 9:05, a church in Batticaloa, Zion, on the east coast. One device failed. A bomber the FBI calls Lateef tried and failed to detonate inside the Taj Samudra in Colombo that morning; the affidavit reproduces a still of him pressing the switch. He left, and at 1:20 that afternoon, detonated successfully inside a guesthouse in a Colombo suburb. Later still, the pregnant wife of one of the Shangri-La bombers detonated a device at a house in Dematagoda as police arrived, killing herself, her three sons, and three officers. Five days after that, a raid on a house in Sainthamaruthu ended with cornered cell members detonating explosives, killing fifteen people inside — among them Zahran’s father and two brothers. ## **How the bombs were built — and what the lab confirmed** The affidavit’s most technical chapters describe what the cell built and how investigators proved it, and they matter because they tie the three charged men to the devices through physical evidence rather than just confessions. The Easter bombs, the FBI concluded, were nitrate-based devices: a metal container of explosive concealed in a cloth backpack, with an electrical fuse and ball bearings packed in as shrapnel. The principal explosive was a commercially available “water gel” — an ammonium-nitrate-based explosive the cell could buy on the open market in Sri Lanka — supplemented, the evidence suggested, by urea nitrate the group manufactured itself from fertiliser and acid at a rural estate in Puttalam. Investigators put the explosive yield of the urea nitrate produced at that one safe house at roughly the equivalent of 163 pounds of TNT. The forensic spine of the case is the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center. Its examiners detected nitrite ions, which, the affidavit notes, do not occur naturally in the environment — at several blast sites and safe houses, a chemical signature consistent with the detonation of exactly the kind of nitrate-based explosives the witnesses described. The same lab matched fingerprints lifted from the Panadura safe house to two of the men who had handled the devices. The cell’s tradecraft is documented in the same detail. Members trained across roughly eight multi-day courses held in rented houses, fifteen to twenty-five students at a time, learning to handle a Type-56 rifle and to make explosives. They were told not to bring phones, not to use real names, to swap SIM cards every few months, and to communicate only over the encrypted apps Telegram and Threema. Much of the curriculum, the FBI found, came straight from ISIS: a terabyte of the organisation’s publications and training material recovered from a hard drive belonging to one of the Shangri-La bombers, including copies of the ISIS magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah and a manual urging attacks on churches and gatherings to maximise casualties. ## **The three men, and what each is said to have done** The affidavit’s portraits of the three defendants are drawn largely from their own recorded interviews at CID headquarters in Colombo, conducted by FBI agents after the men were read their rights and signed waivers, with translators present. **Mohamed Naufar** is described as the group’s “second emir” — second only to Zahran — and its media and propaganda chief, a man who organised the training courses and lectured in them. His trajectory is one of the document’s strangest details: archived pages of his own blog show that as far back as 2014 he was writing Tamil-language criticism of ISIS, before, on his account, embracing it in 2017\. Naufar told the FBI he had broken with Zahran a month before the attacks and had no advance knowledge of them, that he would have tried to stop Zahran had he known, and described the bombings, tellingly, as a “strategic mistake” that should have been a campaign of smaller attacks the group could survive. He admitted he was warned to flee on the morning of the attacks and did. **Mohamed Anwar Mohamed Riskan** is the logistician of the affidavit. He procured safe houses, received and moved money at Zahran’s direction, transported the chemicals and fertiliser used to make the explosives, helped pack the finished devices with ball bearings, and, by his own account and the corroborating word of a hired truck driver who thought he was hauling goldsmithing supplies, drove bomb materials across the country to evade police searches. Zahran asked him to take part in the attacks themselves, framing them as revenge for the Christchurch mosque shootings; Riskan said he refused, and his fingerprints were later found at the safe house where the bombs were assembled. **Ahamed Milhan Hayathu Mohamed** is the most violent figure in the file. Described as the group’s firearms instructor, he is accused of shooting a Sri Lankan police officer in the back of the head during a raid to steal weapons and of shooting a man whom the cell suspected of being an informant. Investigators also say he conducted reconnaissance of potential targets, including a parade route at Galle Face and the Kandy Esala Perahera. He left Sri Lanka for Saudi Arabia four days before the Easter attacks. Saudi authorities later detained him and deported him to Sri Lanka in June 2019. ## **A finding that reaches into the next file** The affidavit does more than tell the story of how the attacks were planned and carried out. It also touches on one of the most contentious debates in the Easter Sunday saga, a question we will examine in depth later in this series. In November 2018, five months before Easter, two police officers were murdered at a checkpoint near Vavunathivu, in the east. For roughly four months, Sri Lankan investigators treated that killing as the work of LTTE remnants. The de Alwis committee, reporting in 2024, would later fault the CID’s leadership, naming senior officers Ravi Seneviratne and Shani Abeysekara, for that misattribution, a recommendation the Catholic Church and the government have rejected, and the officers have moved to contest in court. The FBI affidavit, written years earlier, places the Vavunathivu murders with Zahran’s group. Read together, its account of Milhan’s killing of a police officer and its separate description of the checkpoint murders describe the same event: one officer shot in the head with a Type-56 rifle, the other stabbed as he slept, the officers’ revolvers stolen — one of which was later recovered from the group’s Puttalam safe house. The American file, in other words, independently places the November killing with the same network that struck on Easter. ## **What this chapter establishes** Read on its own, the FBI affidavit answers a question the Sri Lankan inquiries mostly did not set out to answer. It is the most evidentially grounded account of the cell’s structure, financing, training, and bomb-making in any official record, and it is the one body that states without hedging that the attackers were a recognised ISIS affiliate. It is also worth pausing on an unusual fact. This was a criminal case assembled by a foreign government about crimes committed in Sri Lanka, naming Sri Lankan suspects whom Sri Lankan courts had not charged. An American magistrate in Los Angeles approved arrest warrants connected to an atrocity in Colombo, yet years later, Sri Lanka itself had brought no comparable case. That gap between the two systems is the first of several unresolved questions this series will examine. **In the next installment:** *the Malalgoda committee, the inquiry that arrived first, named the failures earliest, and was kept from the public the longest.* ***To Be Continued…*** ### With E.U. Backing, Sri Lanka Moves to Operationalise Green Finance Taxonomy URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/with-e-u-backing-sri-lanka-moves-to-operationalise-green-finance-taxonomy/ Last updated: 2026-06-09T05:21:18.000Z **COLOMBO —** More than 200 officials from Sri Lanka's central bank, licensed financial institutions, corporate entities, and public sector bodies have completed training in applying the country's Green Finance Taxonomy, part of a European Union-funded effort to direct more financing toward environmentally sustainable projects. The taxonomy, developed by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and published in May 2022, sets out a framework for classifying which economic activities count as environmentally sustainable across the public and private sectors. It is intended to guide lending and investment toward green, climate-resilient projects, but it has required supporting tools and guidance before financial institutions could apply it in practice. The latest push followed a request from the governor of the central bank to the E.U.-funded Green Recovery Facility Project. Expertise France, the French government's technical cooperation agency, took up the work in collaboration with the central bank's Macroprudential Surveillance Department. The initiative was carried out in two phases, according to the Central Bank. The first phase identified priority areas and assessed where institutions lacked the capacity to apply the taxonomy. The second phase produced practical tools, including reporting guidelines, sector-specific guidance, and a screening tool. After those reporting guidelines were validated, a series of capacity-building and awareness sessions was held in May 2026\. The sessions covered reporting requirements, guidelines for developing green financial products, and the tools created under the initiative, and drew participants from the central bank, financial institutions, corporate firms, accreditation and certification bodies, and public sector institutions. The central bank's board has approved the framework, and officials said all related materials would be made publicly available. The European Union has framed its support as part of a broader partnership with Sri Lanka under its Global Gateway and Indo-Pacific strategies, which prioritize a green economic recovery alongside governance and rule-of-law objectives. That cooperation is set out in the bloc's Multiannual Indicative Programme for the country. ### Government Wants Ex-Intelligence Chief Dead, says Lawyer URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/government-wants-ex-intelligence-chief-dead-says-lawyer/ Last updated: 2026-06-09T05:36:23.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** The Sri Lankan government wants former intelligence chief Suresh Sallay, whose health has become precarious after launching a hunger strike in custody, to die because it cannot prove that he was in any way involved in the 2019 Easter bombings that killed 269 people, one of his lawyers alleges. This is the reason the retired Major General has been forced to undergo “inhuman treatment” in CID custody so that he breaks psychologically and commits suicide, one of Sally’s lawyers and former cabinet minister Udaya Gammanpila said. Sallay, 58, was hurriedly admitted to the Colombo National Hospital for emergency treatment on Sunday after his health weakened sharply in the wake of the hunger strike, which he launched two nights earlier because of what his family says is a sadistic treatment meted out to him. "With the Catholic Church pressuring the government, he has been subjected to inhuman treatment so that he is compelled to commit suicide,” Gammanpila told *Jaffna Monitor*. “The government wants to see him dead. Only then can the government survive. According to Gammanpila, the government was by then fully aware that Sallay, the former Director of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), who has been in custody since February 25, played no part in the 2019 Easter bombings that killed 269 people and were claimed by the Sri Lankan affiliate of the Islamic State. The prosecution alleges that Sallay was complicit in the Easter bombings in order to create an atmosphere of insecurity that could help propel former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa—widely credited with crushing the Tamil Tigers—to power. Gotabaya went on to win the presidential election held months after the bombings and subsequently appointed Sallay as head of the SIS. Gammanpila alleged that if Sallay were to die, the government and those arrayed against him would be able to claim that they were unable to prove his role in the bombings because he was no more. The irony of this sordid drama was that two officers who had been accused of negligence for ignoring intelligence warnings from within and neighbouring India about the Easter attacks now held critical levers of power in the security apparatus and had acted against Sallay with a vengeance, he said. Sallay’s wife, Manori, also insisted that her husband was “completely innocent” and said the government was targeting him with a view to eventually going after former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. “They know he is not involved. They want to find a scapegoat… It is a political grudge. They are hitting Suresh because they cannot hit Gotabaya… Through Suresh, they want to get Gotabaya,” she told Jaffna Monitor hours after visiting her husband for the first time in custody on Sunday. A graduate in business administration from New Delhi’s Maitreyi College, she said she was shocked after seeing his condition in custody. “I couldn’t believe what I saw. He was very frail and extremely weak. He had become alarmingly thin, almost like a skeleton. They are not giving him proper food, and what they do serve is often spoiled,” she said. “Believe it or not, he looked malnourished. His eyesight has become weak, he has blood sugar too. They have tortured him mentally, and severely at that. Even the medical report says that,” she said. “When I saw him, he could not even walk. He had to be supported by two men. I just cannot believe what they have done to him.” The last straw was when the CID served him on Friday rice and curry on a piece of paper. The paper got torn, and the food spilled onto the floor when he touched it. That broke Sallay, forcing him to launch his protest fast. Although Manori had been speaking to him on the telephone regularly, it was their 21-year-old son who used to visit his father every Saturday. But when she heard that he had gone on a hunger strike on Friday, Manori wanted to see him, and she got ten minutes of visitation time. According to attorney-at-law Asith Siriwardena, the lead counsel representing Suresh Sallay, the former intelligence chief, has informed his family that he has refused all medication, saline, food, and water in protest against his alleged degrading treatment, and has warned that he believes his death is imminent. Sallay also sought an immediate visit from his attorney to execute his last will. In an open letter to G.S. Abesekara, Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the attorney warned that if Sallay suffered irreversible injury or death while in custody, “those responsible for decisions concerning his continued detention and medical care may be required to account personally for their actions and omissions”. Sallay’s son, Kushal, has meantime told the media that his father wants the government to immediately repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under which he is held and which he (Sallay) himself used against countless others over long years. Human rights groups and countless others in Sri Lanka and abroad have been clamouring for the repeal of the PTA, which was enacted in 1979 and has been used mostly against Tamils, as well as members of the now-ruling Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The JVP promised to repeal the PTA before coming to power, but has not kept its word. On his part, Sallay has repeatedly denied any links with the Easter bombers and pointed out that he was in Malaysia, where he was a Minister Counsellor in the Sri Lankan mission, when the horrific attacks took place in Colombo and elsewhere, killing 269 people and injuring and maiming hundreds. Manori said Sallay had thought there could be trouble for him when the JVP formed the government in 2024, as they had campaigned on the pledge of ferreting out the “truth” about the Easter bombings, which a section of the Christian clergy believes involved a political hand acting in concert with Islamist radicals. “We knew they were targeting him.” But she admitted she never thought the family would have to see such dark days. “Imagine, they have put him in a cell that is more like a cage. The light is on 24/7\. He is made to sleep on the floor. The cell is infested with rats. He is not allowed to use the toilet after a certain time. “Even a convicted prisoner has some rights. I didn’t even know that such things existed in Sri Lanka.” Manori, a Buddhist married to Sallay, a Malay Muslim, said that while their son was handling the situation with courage, their 17-year-old daughter was constantly fearful that her father “is going to die.” ### The Diaspora’s Dangerous Nostalgia URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-diasporas-dangerous-nostalgia/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T01:55:00.000Z **by Kumulan** Every time I see Khalistan rallies in Canada, the UK, Australia, or some comfortable Western suburb with clean pavements, I feel like I am watching political cosplay with a blood-soaked backstory. Flags. Slogans. Martyr posters. Angry men with microphones. Boys born in Mississauga, Southall, Surrey, or Melbourne shouting about liberation with the confidence of people who have never had to live through the consequences of the liberation they are selling. It is all very heroic when the revolution comes with central heating. Let us be clear. The Sikh story is not a joke. Operation Blue Star in 1984 was a trauma. The Indian Army's entry into the Golden Temple ripped open the Sikh soul. Then came Indira Gandhi’s assassination, followed by the anti-Sikh pogroms, where innocent Sikhs were butchered while the state looked away, or worse. Nobody should mock Sikh pain. Nobody should pretend those grievances were invented in a Canadian basement. But pain is not a political programme. Grief is not a constitution. Nostalgia is not nation-building. The Khalistan movement, in its violent phase, produced assassinations, fear, and the paralysis of Punjab. Then, in 1985, Air India Flight 182 exploded over the Atlantic, killing 329 people, mostly Canadians. That remains Canada’s worst mass killing. Not India’s. Canada’s. Punjab itself has largely moved on. The average Sikh in India is not sharpening swords, waiting for a separatist WhatsApp group from Brampton. Sikhs in India remain fiercely Sikh — faith, hair, gurdwaras, langar, Punjabi pride, business genius, swagger, all intact. But most are also Indian. This is the part the diaspora warriors cannot digest. Identity does not automatically require separation. You can honour the dead without reopening the grave. You can remember 1984 without demanding that 2026 behave like 1984. Because people who lived through fire do not romanticise fire. It is the diaspora that keeps old wars polished, framed, garlanded, and backlit. And this is where Sri Lankan Tamils are sitting in the same leaking boat. We, too, have our diaspora museums of rage. We, too, have boys in Toronto, Paris, London, Zurich, Oslo, and Sydney wearing LTTE T-shirts like the official uniform of a country that never existed. They say, “I am Tamil. I am Eelam Tamil.” Lovely. Emotional. Dramatic. But sorry, machan. Eelam is not a country. It has no passport counter. No central bank. No national airline. No customs officer stamping your arrival card. You are Sri Lankan Tamil. That is not an insult. It is not surrender. It is geography. You can say you are Sri Lankan Tamil and still condemn the Sinhala-Buddhist state. You can still speak of genocide. You can still carry Mullivaikkal in your bones. You can still refuse to bow before any government that murdered, marginalised, disappeared, bombed, starved, and humiliated our people. Truth does not become betrayal because it lacks a flag. Yes, we went through genocide. Yes, we were marginalised. Yes, our language, education, land, dignity, and lives were attacked. But we also have to be brutally honest. The armed struggle did not deliver salvation. Tamil Nadu did not come. India did not save us. The West issued statements. The UN expressed concern. The world watched, debated, delayed, and went to lunch. At the end, our people were left with the dead, the disappeared, the widows, the orphans, the wounded, and the traumatised — while the diaspora held flags in cities where the garbage is collected on schedule. So what now? Do we keep pretending a separate state is the only way to preserve identity? What exactly does that get us today? A postage stamp? A national anthem? A president with garlands? A minister for coconut development? Some fellow in white opening a roundabout while the youth still leave for Australia? Even if you drew lines on soil and called it Tamil land, then what? Could you ban others from buying land? Stop migration? Legislate memory? Protect culture with barbed wire? No. Culture is not protected by borders alone. Culture is protected by power. And in this century, power is economics. If we want to protect Tamil areas, buy land. If we want to protect schools, fund them. If we want to protect language, teach it properly. Restore old houses. Digitise manuscripts. Support writers. Build libraries. Fund museums. Create scholarships. Invest in agriculture. Create jobs. Make our people economically unignorable. Make the North and East rich. Educated. Too expensive to erase. Instead, what does the diaspora do? Too often, we send millions so every village can build another temple taller than the next village’s temple. Neon lights. Marble floors. Massive speakers. Gold paint. Committees. Ego. More ego. Very spiritual. Very loud. Meanwhile, where are the libraries? The technical colleges? The Tamil research centres? The scholarships? The mental health clinics? The archives and cultural institutions that will outlive one festival season? We keep saying, “We must protect Tamil identity.” Fine. Then let us ask the dangerous question. What is Sri Lankan Tamil identity? Is it just Tamil language? Then what makes us different from Tamil Nadu? Is it our accent? Our food? Our dry humour? Our Jaffna arrogance? Our Vanni resilience? Our Batticaloa lyricism? Our obsession with education? Do our children know paal puttu, odiyal kool, palmyrah, Kumulamunai, Mullaitivu, Jaffna, Batticaloa, Mannar, and Trincomalee? Or do they just know the flag? A flag is easy. Culture is hard. You can wave a flag with one hand while forgetting your grandmother’s language with the other. That is the hypocrisy. And now let us speak about the LTTE without turning our own history into a street fight. For many Tamils, the LTTE is not an abstract subject. It is tied to grief, protection, sacrifice, fear, pride, loss, memory, and survival. Many young men and women gave their lives believing they were defending a people who had been abandoned by the state and ignored by the world. That sacrifice cannot be dismissed cheaply. But respect does not require blindness. The armed movement came from real oppression. It also left behind difficult questions that we still struggle to discuss honestly: democracy, dissent, Muslims expelled from the North, rival Tamil movements, civilians trapped between impossible choices, and the price paid by ordinary families. We do not honour our dead by simplifying them into slogans. We honour them by telling the truth with dignity. That is why a boy born in Canada wearing an LTTE shirt as weekend fashion makes me uneasy. Not because I have forgotten. Because I remember. I remember what war does to families. I remember that symbols carry weight. I remember that mothers did not raise children so they could become posters. He inherited the symbol. He did not inherit the consequence. And that is dangerous. The Khalistan shouting in Canada is not just a Sikh problem. It is a mirror. A diaspora can become trapped in amber. It can preserve rage long after the people at home have chosen survival. It can mistake noise for power, nostalgia for strategy, martyrdom for governance, and a flag for a future. We must not become that. We do not need another war. We do not need a postage stamp to prove we exist. We do not need another generation raised only on grievance, slogans, martyr posters, and old battlefield maps. We need education. Economics. Land ownership. Serious politicians. We need families that teach culture at home, not outsource identity to dead militants and festival committees. The future of Sri Lankan Tamils will not be saved by a boy in Paris wearing a Tiger T-shirt. It will be saved by a child in Kilinochchi getting a world-class education. By a farmer in Mullaitivu owning his land. By a girl in Jaffna learning history without propaganda. By a businessman in the diaspora investing in jobs instead of another temple loudspeaker. By politicians with brains, not slogans. We must become powerful. Educated. Wealthy. Rooted. Democratic. Culturally alive. Economically dangerous. Not by asking the next generation to die for a map. But by making sure they inherit something worth living for. ### Did Sri Lanka Really Repay $8 Billion? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/did-sri-lanka-really-repay-8-billion/ Last updated: 2026-06-11T06:24:45.000Z A claim that Sri Lanka repaid $8 billion in debt during the first quarter of 2026 has spread widely across pro-government social media and political messaging in recent weeks. Supporters of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake have cited the figure as evidence that the country's economic recovery has accelerated and that the government is restoring financial stability after the crisis that culminated in the sovereign default of 2022. At first glance, the claim appears remarkable. Eight billion dollars is a vast sum for an economy the size of Sri Lanka's. It exceeds the country's gross official foreign-exchange reserves and represents a substantial share of annual government revenue. If Sri Lanka had genuinely reduced its debt burden by that amount within three months, it would rank among the most significant fiscal achievements in the country's recent history. Yet a closer examination of Sri Lanka's public-finance data suggests a very different story. The first indication comes from the country's reserves. According to Central Bank figures, Sri Lanka's gross official reserves stood at approximately $6.87 billion at the end of May 2026 and remained around that level during the first quarter. Part of those reserves consisted of assets that were not freely available for debt repayment, including a currency swap arrangement with China. If the government had transferred $8 billion in cash to foreign creditors during the quarter, the country's reserves would have been virtually exhausted. No such collapse occurred. Reserves remained broadly stable, and the country continued to meet its external obligations. This suggests that the widely circulated figure does not refer to $8 billion in cash repayments to foreign creditors. Instead, it refers largely to debt servicing — the process of settling obligations as they mature — rather than to a reduction in the overall stock of debt. Of the roughly $8 billion cited, approximately $7.56 billion consisted of domestic debt. These were primarily Treasury bills and bonds denominated in Sri Lankan rupees, held by domestic institutions such as commercial banks, pension funds, and other investors. When these securities matured, the government did not retire them using accumulated budget surpluses or excess cash reserves. Instead, it issued new Treasury bills and bonds and used the proceeds to settle the old ones. Economists refer to this process as refinancing or rolling over debt. It is a standard practice employed by governments around the world. A state rarely repays large volumes of maturing debt from current revenue alone. Instead, it replaces old liabilities with new ones, extending repayment obligations into the future. In accounting terms, the maturing debt has been repaid. In economic terms, however, the liability largely remains. The government's own financing strategy illustrates the point. Sri Lanka's borrowing programme for 2026 relies overwhelmingly on domestic financing. As Treasury securities mature, new securities are issued to replace them. The process ensures that obligations are met on schedule, but it does not substantially reduce the country's overall indebtedness. This is why the distinction between debt servicing and debt reduction matters. Debt servicing measures how much debt is settled when it falls due. Debt reduction measures whether the country's total debt burden actually declines. The first-quarter figure largely reflects the former. The overwhelming majority of the reported $8 billion consisted of debt that was refinanced rather than extinguished. Only a comparatively small portion represented actual foreign-currency repayments to external creditors. That amount, estimated at roughly $530 million, was paid using a combination of foreign-exchange reserves, government revenue, IMF-supported reforms, and benefits arising from Sri Lanka's debt-restructuring agreements. Those payments are significant. They demonstrate that Sri Lanka has remained current on its obligations and has avoided a return to the payment disruptions that accompanied the 2022 crisis. But they are not equivalent to repaying $8 billion from the country's own resources. The broader debt picture reinforces this conclusion. If Sri Lanka had genuinely reduced its debt burden by $8 billion during the quarter, one would expect to see a substantial decline in the overall stock of government debt. Instead, the government's own fiscal projections indicate continued borrowing needs. The 2026 budget anticipates a sizeable fiscal deficit, requiring additional financing even before maturing debt is refinanced. Public debt remains extraordinarily high by historical standards, and the country continues to depend on domestic borrowing and external support mechanisms to manage its obligations. Acknowledging the limits of the $8 billion claim does not require dismissing the government's broader economic progress. Sri Lanka's recovery since the crisis has been real. Inflation has fallen dramatically from its peak. Economic growth has resumed. Foreign-exchange reserves have improved from the dangerously low levels that preceded the default. The IMF programme remains in place, and confidence in macroeconomic management has strengthened compared with the turmoil of recent years. Nor is refinancing debt unusual or improper. Every major economy routinely refinances maturing obligations. Successfully rolling over debt while maintaining financial stability is itself an important part of economic management. The issue is one of public understanding. When citizens hear that a country has "repaid $8 billion in debt," many will naturally assume that the nation owes $8 billion less than before. That is not what occurred. A more accurate description would be that Sri Lanka serviced approximately $8 billion in maturing debt obligations during the first quarter of 2026, the vast majority of which were refinanced through new borrowing. The country's debts were honoured. Most were not eliminated. That may sound like a technical distinction, but it lies at the heart of the debate. One describes a government meeting its obligations as they fall due. The other describes a government substantially reducing the burden of debt carried by future generations. The available evidence suggests that, during the first quarter of 2026, Sri Lanka largely achieved the former, not the latter. ### What the Medical Report on Suresh Sallay Says — and What It Means URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/what-the-medical-report-on-suresh-sallay-says-and-what-it-means/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T01:32:10.000Z **COLOMBO —** A medico-legal report on Major General (Retired) Thuwan Suresh Sallay, the former Director of the State Intelligence Service who is detained over the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, has become a central document in proceedings before the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court. Prepared on the order of that court, it sets out Sallay’s own account of his detention, the results of his physical examination, the findings of five medical specialists, and a forensic psychiatric assessment. This article describes what the report contains and sets out how doctors explain its findings. Throughout, it distinguishes between three different kinds of statement: what Sallay told the examiners, what the examiners objectively found, and how those findings are interpreted. ### **How the report came to be** The examination was ordered by the Fort Magistrate on April 22\. Sallay was examined on April 29 at the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology in Colombo by Dr. Jeyaseelan Jeyakanthan, a Registrar in Forensic Medicine, who referred him to several specialists and certified the report. A separate forensic psychiatric assessment was carried out on May 4 at the National Institute of Mental Health in Mulleriyawa by a team led by Dr. C.T.K. Fernando, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist. Sallay has been held since February 25 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and is among the suspects being investigated in connection with the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. ### **Sallay’s account of his detention** The report records, as the detainee’s own statements, a description of his conditions. He said he was held in a cell measuring about six feet four inches by four feet; that for roughly forty days he slept on the floor without a pillow or mattress until a one-inch sleeping pad was provided; and that the cell lights remained on twenty-four hours a day. He said that four days after admission, he was moved for four nights to a punishment cell in front of a bathroom, without a fan or internal light, and with rats present. He described food delivered wrapped in paper with an unusual smell and eaten lying down; the presence of cockroaches; and weight loss that had loosened his clothing. He said he was given no pen to write with, no newspapers to read, and no contact with his family; that overnight toilet access was so restricted that he was made to use a tin to urinate and, by his account, to use his finger to defecate; and that his son had also been drawn into the investigation. He said he had recently been permitted an hour of outdoor walking. He also stated that, about a week after his arrest, he was told to undress to his underwear, was handcuffed and instructed to bend forward, and that an officer separated his buttocks and touched the anal region in the presence of thirteen other detainees. He said the procedure caused no pain. He denied any history of physical assault. These are his allegations as recorded by the examiners; the report does not establish them as fact, and it does not assess the conduct of the investigators. ### **The physical examination** On examination, the Judicial Medical Officer recorded no visible external injuries anywhere on the body. An examination of the anal region found a small skin tag at the 6 o’clock position and no injury. Medical experts consulted by the Jaffna Monitor said a skin tag in that location is a common, benign finding — frequently the residue of a previous haemorrhoid or minor local irritation — and is not in itself evidence of trauma. His blood pressure was recorded at 135/92 mmHg; doctors said this falls in the raised range that clinicians term stage 1 hypertension, while cautioning that a single reading is not diagnostic. The report notes a family history of hypertension and stroke. Medical experts consulted by the Jaffna Monitor said the absence of external injuries neither confirms nor excludes the treatment Sallay alleged. Much of what he described — continuous lighting, disrupted sleep, dietary conditions, restricted sanitation, and psychological pressure — would not be expected to leave physical marks, they said, while the search he described, by his own account, involved no pain or injury. The weight the report ultimately gives his account, they noted, rests in the psychiatric assessment rather than in physical signs. ### **The findings of five specialists** The Judicial Medical Officer referred Sallay to five clinical specialists and incorporated each of their findings. An ophthalmologist at the National Eye Hospital, Dr. K.R. Dayawansa, recorded vision corrected to 6/6 — the normal standard — in both eyes, normal eye pressure, and no need for intervention. A dermatologist at the National Hospital, Dr. Janaka Akarawita, diagnosed intertriginous dermatitis. Dermatologists consulted by the Jaffna Monitor explained that this is inflammation of skin where two surfaces meet and trap heat and moisture — here, the groin — a common condition often complicated by fungal overgrowth and encouraged by heat, sweating and limited ventilation or washing, though not specific to any single cause. He was prescribed fexofenadine, an antihistamine to reduce itching; fluconazole, an oral antifungal; a combined antifungal-and-steroid cream; and an emollient. A neurologist, Dr. Gamini Pathirana, recorded that Sallay had a prior history of migraine that had become more frequent after his detention and was now controlled on prophylactic, or preventive, medication. An MRI scan of the brain was normal. Neurologists consulted by the Jaffna Monitor said a normal scan indicates no structural cause, such as a tumour or bleed, consistent with primary migraine. The report also records, from his medical history, that Sallay is receiving treatment and assessment for a hearing impairment at an ear, nose, and throat clinic. The clinical nutrition assessment, by Dr. Nalinda Herath, was the most detailed of the physical findings. It recorded a weight loss of 6.3 kilograms over two months and a fall of more than half in his usual food intake. His body-mass index was 25.6\. Doctors consulted by the Jaffna Monitor noted that this falls within the “overweight” band on the standard scale — meaning that, despite the recent loss, he was not underweight at the time of examination. Blood tests showed marginally elevated fasting blood sugar, elevated total cholesterol, and a marginally elevated serum creatinine; physicians said the blood-sugar level fell in what is often termed the pre-diabetes range, and that a raised creatinine is a marker of kidney filtration that can rise with dehydration or reduced kidney function. The assessment also recorded vitamin D insufficiency, proximal muscle weakness, reduced hand-grip strength, bone tenderness, and mild wasting — findings that, doctors said, can follow undernutrition, low vitamin D, and reduced physical activity. He was advised on diet, three litres of fluid a day, permission to urinate at night, daily sunlight, exercise, and supplements, with follow-up blood tests recommended. The report notes that these findings were also communicated to the Director of the CID. ### **The psychiatric assessment** The forensic psychiatric assessment is the report’s most consequential section. The team diagnosed a moderate-to-severe depressive episode with prominent anxiety symptoms and features of post-traumatic stress disorder, and assessed Sallay as being at high risk of suicide after he expressed suicidal thoughts during the interview. Psychiatrists consulted by the Jaffna Monitor explained that a depressive episode of this severity denotes persistently low mood and loss of interest, together with disturbances of sleep, appetite, energy and concentration. The PTSD features the assessment described — among them derealization, a sense of unreality; an exaggerated startle response; anticipatory anxiety; and disturbed sleep with nightmares — fall within the re-experiencing, avoidance, and heightened-arousal symptoms that can follow a severely threatening experience, they said. The assessment contrasted what it called a pre-morbid personality that had been “devoted” and “ambitious” with a “massive deterioration” it recorded during the evaluation. It noted that the one anchoring point of hope Sallay expressed was seeing his daughter succeed in her upcoming examinations. The mental-state examination recorded depressed and restricted mood, tearfulness, withdrawn eye contact, slowed responses, and reported short-term memory difficulty, with no psychotic symptoms and intact orientation to time, place, and person. He was observed to weep through the assessment and to press one side of his forehead repeatedly. The assessment recorded that he was preoccupied with what it described as the agony of his situation and expressed ideas of guilt, worthlessness, and hopelessness. His insight was assessed as good, and he was recorded as willing to undergo treatment. The report states that no psychiatric medication was commenced, giving as the reason that a safe therapeutic environment was unavailable and that beginning treatment in such a setting could aggravate the risk of suicide. It records that Sallay denied any family history of mental illness, described himself as a non-smoker and occasional wine consumer, and maintained that the allegations against him were fabricated, that he had been in Malaysia at the time of the events under investigation, and that he was “completely out of the cycle” of those events. ### **‘Fit to plead’: a separate question** Notwithstanding those findings, the assessment concluded that Sallay is fit to plead and stand trial. Medical and legal experts consulted by the Jaffna Monitor said this is a distinct determination from how unwell a person is: it means he understands the nature of the charge, can distinguish between pleading guilty and not guilty, and can instruct his lawyers and follow proceedings. A person can be found seriously unwell and, at the same time, fit to plead, they said; the two assessments answer different questions. The report closes its clinical section with a recommendation that Sallay undergo a multidisciplinary assessment by the relevant medical specialties, for a comprehensive evaluation of his physical and mental well-being and further management. ### **The Istanbul Protocol and the phrase ‘typical of’** The assessment describes its findings as “typical of torture or ill-treatment. The phrase is technical. It is drawn from the Istanbul Protocol — the United Nations Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment — the international standard for the medical documentation of such allegations. Under that standard, a clinician rates how closely the medical findings match the account a person gives, on a five-point scale: not consistent, consistent with, highly consistent, typical of, and diagnostic of. “Typical of” is the fourth of the five — an appearance usually found with the type of abuse described, though other causes remain possible. The assessment applies the term to the psychological findings, stating that they are of a kind typically found as a consequence of the alleged treatment and that there are few other likely causes. Forensic specialists consulted by the Jaffna Monitor noted two qualifications. The rating is a clinical opinion about the consistency between Sallay’s account and his psychological state, they said; it is not, on its own, a legal finding that torture occurred, and a court weighs it alongside all other evidence. And because the psychiatric conclusion rests partly on the account Sallay gave of his treatment, it carries the same dependence on that account as his other statements. ### **The case and the State's position** Counsel for the victims of the attacks, President's Counsel Rienzie Arsecularatne, who appears for the Archbishop of Colombo, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, and for affected families, has opposed producing Sallay in open court while he remains under detention orders. To "produce" a detainee in open court means to bring him in person before the magistrate at a public hearing, where he appears in the courtroom in view of the public and may be able to address the court directly. Asking that he not be produced, while the detention order is in force, would keep him out of the public courtroom and defer any statement he might seek to make there. The Archdiocese has separately urged that the case not be politicised. When the medical findings were raised in court on 3 June, the magistrate directed the CID to respond. At the hearing that followed, the Attorney General's Department rejected the claims. Additional Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris submitted that Sallay had raised a mental condition only after the medical reports were obtained in May, and argued that a genuine psychiatric disorder would have surfaced earlier; he said the suspect had reportedly wept throughout the psychiatric examination yet had never behaved that way before the court and had no prior history of mental illness, and he contended that the defence was using the reports to gain an advantage in related proceedings and to divert attention from the investigation. The prosecution also noted that Sallay meets his lawyers weekly and speaks with his wife, child, and mother by telephone each Friday, and questioned why he had not raised ill-treatment with his family. Mr. Arsecularatne contended that the report had not been prepared by a Judicial Medical Officer and that distress of the kind described is common among people held in custody. The document is itself a court-ordered medico-legal report from the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, examined and certified by a Registrar in Forensic Medicine, with its specialist referrals signed by the Chief Consultant Judicial Medical Officer. The CID has issued no public statement on the specific clinical findings. ### **What happens next** The report has set several decisions in motion. The Fort Magistrate is due to rule on 10 June on whether to appoint an independent psychiatric medical board to examine Sallay afresh, and on 1 July, both on the prosecution's request not to produce him in open court and on his own request to make a statement to the court under Section 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court of Appeal is to take up his petition challenging the legality of his detention on 11 June. Separately, on 6 June, his wife, Manori Sallay, wrote to the Inspector General of Police alleging torture and degrading treatment and stating that her husband had begun a "fast unto death" in custody. His detention and the wider investigation into the Easter Sunday attacks continue. ### Suresh Sallay Begins Hunger Strike Under PTA Detention URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/suresh-sallay-begins-hunger-strike-under-pta-detention/ Last updated: 2026-06-06T14:36:37.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s former military intelligence chief, retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, has begun a hunger strike while in police custody, according to Udaya Gammanpila, a former member of Parliament who has also acted as one of his lawyers. Speaking at a news conference that he said had been convened at the request of Sallay’s wife and son, Mr. Gammanpila said the retired officer had resorted to the protest over conditions in detention. Mr. Gammanpila said Sallay’s son visited him on Saturday morning and found him in a distressed state. By that account, Sallay was served only a small portion of rice and radish curry for dinner on Friday, placed on a sheet of newspaper on the floor of his cell; the meal spilled as he tried to lift it. Distraught, Mr. Gammanpila said, Sallay refused to eat and resolved that night to begin a hunger strike, and has since declined water and medication as well. The officer told his son he was being treated "worse than a dog," Mr. Gammanpila said, and would rather die than continue to face what he called false accusations and degrading conditions. The hunger-strike claim follows weeks of escalating complaints from Sallay's camp about his confinement. His supporters have alleged that he is held in a rat- and cockroach-infested cell beside a foul-smelling toilet, and that his migraine condition has worsened for lack of consistent medication. The police have neither substantiated nor rebutted those specific claims. Sallay, who led Military Intelligence during the civil war and rose to direct the State Intelligence Service after Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the presidency in late 2019, was arrested by the Criminal Investigation Department in the Colombo suburb of Peliyagoda on Feb. 25 and is now held under a 90-day detention order issued under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Investigators accuse him of conspiracy and of aiding and abetting the coordinated suicide bombings of three churches and three hotels, which killed at least 269 people. He is the third suspect held in the case, and has consistently denied any role. In a writ petition challenging his detention, Sallay says he was posted to Sri Lanka's High Commission in Malaysia from 2016 to 2018 and was attending a defense course at India's National Defence College for most of 2019 — including on April 21, when the bombs detonated — and that he held the rank of brigadier at the time, before his later elevation to the country's top intelligence post. No investigative report into the attacks, he argues, recommended action against him. The detention has become a political flashpoint. Allies of the former Rajapaksa government — among them Mr. Gammanpila, the former lawmaker Sarath Weerasekara, and Mr. Rajapaksa's former defense adviser Rohan Gunaratne — have cast it as a politically motivated reprisal against an officer credited with helping to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, several questioning the credibility of the testimony behind it. Mr. Gammanpila has gone further, accusing the government of staging a "theatrical performance" to divert attention from an unrelated coal-procurement scandal. The most prominent of those critics has been Ali Sabry, the former foreign minister, who warned soon after the February arrest that it was a "deeply troubling day" for the Sri Lanka Army and its intelligence corps. Officers who once risked their lives to protect the country, he wrote on X, were being drawn into a "political battlefield shaped less by evidence and more by competing narratives." Accountability under the law was essential in any democracy, he said, but it had to be pursued "with fairness, restraint, and respect for institutional integrity." The tragedy deserved a professional, evidence-based inquiry; instead, he argued, it was being turned into a "public spectacle." Mr. Sabry also questioned the value of reopening the inquiry, asserting that extensive international cooperation — including by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation — had already taken place, and that external partners had signaled that further probes might yield little. Pressing the matter for partisan advantage, he warned, risked damaging Sri Lanka's credibility and its security interests. Mr. Sabry served as justice minister and later foreign minister under Mr. Rajapaksa, in whose government Sallay rose to lead the State Intelligence Service, and he had defended the officer's wartime record from within the cabinet. In 2019, in the aftermath of the bombings, he urged Muslim voters to back Mr. Rajapaksa, who won that November after promising to crush Islamist extremism. Mr. Sabry has also invoked his own authorship of the very statute now used to hold Sallay, saying he introduced an amendment granting Prevention of Terrorism Act detainees judicial access after twelve months — a reform he credits with sharply reducing the number held under it. On Saturday, as word of the hunger strike spread, Mr. Sabry returned to the matter obliquely. In a Facebook post carrying no commentary of his own, he quoted a 1935 opinion of the United States Supreme Court on the duty of a prosecutor: "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty… whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done… He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor, indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." The passage, from Justice George Sutherland's ruling in Berger v. United States, carried no name and named no target. But posted by one of the prosecution's loudest critics, on the day the hunger-strike claim surfaced, it read as an unmistakable if oblique rebuke — a reminder, in the language of another country's courts, that the state's interest is meant to lie in justice rather than in winning. The case against Sallay traces largely to a 2023 Channel 4 documentary, in which Azad Maulana — a former aide to Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the ex-eastern provincial leader known as Pillayan — alleged that Sallay had met the bombers' leader, Zahran Hashim, before the attacks and allowed them to proceed to sway that year's presidential election. Sallay has called the claim false, and Mr. Maulana has produced no documentary corroboration. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, elected in 2024 partly on a pledge to complete the Easter investigation, has made the case a priority, and Sallay's detention is the first of a senior defense figure under his administration. Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, the archbishop of Colombo, whose church bore the heaviest losses, has welcomed it as a breakthrough, and his counsel now represents the victims at hearings. Appearing for the attorney general last month, Additional Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris told a Colombo court that the bombings could not have been carried out without organized internal support and described Sallay as the principal operational force behind them — an account the defense rejects. ### JVP Sang the Same Songs. Only Tamil Rapper Went to Jail. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jvp-sang-the-same-songs-only-tamil-rapper-went-to-jail/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T01:32:12.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** ***“O land that yearned for valour*** ***O soil where Tamil pride has flourished*** ***The land where history was born*** ***And gave the nation its national leader (Prabhakaran)*** ***A bronze statue of the Tamil national leader*** ***Shall stand in the land of his birth.”*** These lyrics are not from the Tamil Tigers’ liberation songs. They are from a song — believe it or not — popularized by Sri Lanka’s incumbent ruling party, whose government has now sent a young Tamil man to prison for singing a song that praised the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Surprised? Here's more. The ruling National People's Power (NPP), whose core constituent is the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), used many such songs at campaign rallies in Tamil-majority areas during the 2025 local government elections in an effort to appeal to Tamil sentiments and win support. And another JVP/NPP song, went a step further: ***“The ideology of the Tamil national leader is communism.*** ***The ideology of the NPP is also communism.*** ***Let us unite under one shared dream.”*** Now, fast forward to June 2 this year, when the police arrested a 24-year-old Tamil rapper, Sangeethasan Ganeskumar, better known by his stage name Hiphop Sangee, on charges of belting out a pro-LTTE song at a social event two days earlier at Chavakacheri in Jaffna. The song, investigators say, has the potential to create disaffection among the people. The government found the charge so serious that it took Sangeethasan into custody under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). What is perhaps even more striking is that the JVP/NPP had repeatedly and explicitly promised, before its rise to power, to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) — a law under which the party itself was subjected to severe repression. Enacted in 1979 by the government of J.R. Jayewardene to combat Tamil militancy, the PTA has, over the decades, been used predominantly against Tamils and, at various points, against members of the JVP as well. Top JVP leaders, including President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, had also given public pledges when they wooed Tamil voters – and successfully at that -- that they won’t use the PTA until it is scrapped. As Tamil activists say, it is indeed remarkable that a party like the JVP, which killed thousands of real and perceived “class enemies” during two insurrections spread over two decades, is rattled by a Tamil song that would have gone unnoticed but for the now headline-grabbing arrest and detention. If this song did warrant such a crackdown, then, by the same logic, the PTA should also be applied — albeit belatedly — to every JVP/NPP candidate and organizer who exploited pro-LTTE lyrics and symbols during last year's local government elections in Tamil-majority areas. Since laws are made and unmade by man, a court may uphold Sangeethasan’s arrest under the PTA – as it happened in the case of the Tamil journalist, J.S. Tissainayagam, in 2008\. Tissainayagam was ultimately pardoned by President Mahinda Rajapaksa following an international outcry. Sangeethasan, from Kilinochchi, is, of course, no Tissainayagam, who was a journalist with two decades of experience when police swooped in, and he was ultimately sentenced to 20 years in prison. So, unless there is a miracle, the young poet — who spent his birthday behind bars — can expect little legal mercy. His case is scheduled to come up for hearing on June 17. The JVP was among the vocal political groups in support of the Sri Lankan military when it pursued a punishing war against the LTTE. But once it won the presidential election in 2024, President Dissanayake and his colleagues moved aggressively to court the Tamil community ahead of the subsequent parliamentary elections. The strategy, coupled with the average Tamil’s unease with established Tamil parties, gave the JVP/NPP an electoral bonanza that stunned friends and foes. When balloting took place for local bodies in 2025, the JVP/NPP took off their gloves and went the whole hog, waving the LTTE and Prabhakaran flag while simultaneously bad-mouthing the Tamil parties – only to seek votes. Even then, many Tamils warned that the JVP was taking Tamils for a ride. That assessment appears to have been borne out by events. The Dissanayake government has not only failed to repeal the PTA, but has also failed to return thousands of acres of land belonging to ordinary Tamils — whose votes it successfully courted — that have been held by the military for years. But there is widespread disquiet over the arrest of Sangeethasan. Even one of the Tamil JVP MPs, Rajeevan Jayachandramoorthy, has issued a statement that makes an oblique criticism of the poet’s detention. Surprisingly, the other day, the police let go two sons of a former legendary LTTE singer, who was among the thousands who surrendered in 2009, after questioning them aggressively, also on charges of singing Tigers songs at a public event. Irrespective of the legal and moral merits of the latest case, the fact is that a section of the Tamil diaspora is actively engaged in encouraging young Tamils in Sri Lanka to plunge deeper and deeper into pro-LTTE poetry. It is these singers and rappers who pay a heavy price. The pro-LTTE diaspora, as it happened during the prolonged war, remains unharmed. Young Tamils who were not even teenagers when the war ended in 2009 and who turn lyrics praising Prabhakaran and the LTTE into memorable musical hits are invited to perform in Western cities by diaspora elements who want Sri Lanka to remain in a state of flux. These events bring the singers accolades and welcome money. Naturally, others in Sri Lanka are induced to follow in their footsteps. None of these poets — many of whom have little personal understanding of what the LTTE achieved (and failed to achieve) — realize that pro-Tamil Tiger literature plays into the hands of an establishment that keeps whispering about a revival of the Tigers and the consequent need to maintain military camps on land belonging to Tamil people. In that sense, the pro-LTTE diaspora is the ultimate winner. In any case, the continued arrest of Tamils under the PTA only widens the gulf between ordinary Tamil people and President Dissanayake. This, as some JVP circles claim, is perhaps one reason behind an arrest that could have been avoided. After all, Sangeethasan too could have been interrogated and released with a warning. But someone decided to make a mountain out of a molehill. And so, a young Tamil remains in prison under the PTA because he sang a song. Sri Lanka’s ruling revolutionaries enjoy power despite singing many more songs of the same genre. Colombo proves yet again that the PTA will remain a weapon to be selectively used against Tamils, with or without the LTTE. Leading Tamil lawyer-cum-politician M.A. Sumanthiran, who has taken up Sangeethasan’s case, calls the JVP’s rant against the PTA when it was in the opposition and its refusal to repeal it now “a circus”. Asked specifically about the Tamil diaspora, the former MP gives a cautious response: “I won’t directly accuse them of anything, but their influence over some of these artistes is there. “So, that encouragement from people to whom the (Sri Lankan) law does not apply is unfortunate. They sit comfortably away and put the poor here to face the music.” ### The Man Who Survived the LTTE — and Saved Its Members URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-man-who-survived-the-ltte-and-saved-its-members/ Last updated: 2026-06-09T05:15:34.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “Please don’t harm me! Yes, I am a Tiger. I was told to keep a watch on you, so I came here. Please don’t have me killed!” This is how a young spy sent by the Tamil Tigers spoke in visible despair after being identified by Douglas Devananda, a sworn enemy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The incident took place a few years before the LTTE went down fighting in 2009\. A Sri Lankan minister, then, Douglas, was presiding over a camp organized by his Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) in Colombo. One of the oldest entrants into Tamil militancy, Douglas occupied a high place in the LTTE’s hit list. Eventually, he earned the dubious record of surviving the maximum number of assassination attempts by the Tigers. That day, there was no tip from anywhere that a member of the LTTE intelligence wing had sneaked into the EPDP meeting. As an EPDP veteran recalls, it was Douglas himself who, using his sixth sense, sensed the danger. As everyone prepared to leave after the event, he surprised the LTTE spy by asking him to stay behind. The LTTE agent, thinking he had been betrayed by someone, immediately broke down and admitted that he had been sent by the Tigers to conduct a recce to facilitate an assassination attempt that would have followed. Douglas told the frightened LTTE captive that he won’t be killed. “We will send you back to (Velupillai) Prabhakaran,” he told the spy, referring to the LTTE leader. “Tell him you got caught, but the EPDP let you go. Ask Prabhakaran if he would spare someone in similar circumstances.” The young man was one of the countless former LTTE cadres whom Douglas either spared or saved, both during the war and after the conflict waged by the Tigers against Sri Lanka came to an end in May 2009. Douglas, now 68, doesn’t tomtom this aspect of his controversial politico-military life and politely declines to give a specific answer when asked how many Tigers he has saved from certain death. It is one of his close associates based in Europe who says the total would be “very large”. Douglas said in a brief interview that the first lot of Tamils he saved from a murderous LTTE frenzy were members of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). This was in April-May 1986, when the LTTE, in its attempt at exterminating all rivals in militancy, launched a sudden and brutal crackdown on the TELO in Jaffna and elsewhere, leaving hundreds dead. Douglas, who then headed the EPRLF military wing, said hundreds of unarmed TELO members fleeing for their lives took refuge in EPRLF offices and camps. “The number we saved was in the hundreds,” he said. “We did something similar when the LTTE ‘banned’ PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) and cracked down on its members. He added: “The same considerations drove me to save many LTTE and pro-LTTE activists and fighters later, although the Tigers had repeatedly tried to kill me.” Towards the end of 1986, Douglas was sacked by the ERPLF amid internal squabbles as well as an unsavory incident in Madras, which led to the death of an Indian national, in which he was implicated. As the years rolled by, groups such as TELO, EPRLF, and PLOTE entered mainstream politics in Sri Lanka, ironically supporting the very LTTE that had killed many of their leaders and members. Douglas, who later formed the EPDP, however, refused to compromise with the LTTE. Once the Sri Lankan establishment provided weapons and money to his group, he became the Tigers’ Tamil enemy number one. Frustratingly for the Tigers, Douglas defeated the proverbial cat to survive around a dozen bids by the LTTE to do away with him, some more gory and more scheming than the others. Prabhakaran was desperate to see Douglas dead and gone. One huge LTTE failure occurred in October 1995 when its gunmen barged into Douglas’ residence-cum-office on Havelock Road in Colombo, firing away rockets and AK-47s. The moment he heard rapid gunfire, Douglas realised the danger. Thinking fast, he sprang out of an upper-floor window and disappeared into a nearby park with select guards – where he remained in hiding through the night. It was early in the morning when he telephoned President Chandrika Kumaratunga (who would later be partly blinded while surviving an LTTE suicide bomber) to say he was alive. “Please don’t worry. Everything is under control,” a relieved president told him, adding that the intelligence agencies had caught an LTTE spy sent to infiltrate her Colombo home to poison her drinks. Douglas remarked in a lighter vein that the LTTE chief would not attempt anything similar on him, as he would know that he (Douglas) did not consume liquor. Douglas’ colleagues credit two traits that helped him to repeatedly trip the Tigers, becoming something of an enigma and, in the eyes of his loyalists, a legend of sorts. Douglas, who was an MP for over 15 years and a minister in successive governments, says he understood that the LTTE was a murderous organisation which would never forgive its enemies, armed or unarmed. He cites the example of Maheswary Velautham, a Tamil human rights lawyer who was associated with the EPDP and whose efforts led to the release of scores of Tamil detainees, LTTE members included. “But she did not understand the LTTE. She thought that because of her work, the LTTE would not harm her. I thought differently. I always knew they would love to kill me. It is another matter that they could not succeed.” Velautham, 55, was shot dead by three masked gunmen dressed in army uniforms at her family home in Karaveddy, Jaffna, while she was visiting her ailing mother. The LTTE never claimed responsibility for the killing, possibly because of her work in the field of human rights. One front-ranking LTTE member Douglas saved after surrendering to the military in 2009 was S.G. Shanthan, among the best-known singers of pro-Tiger songs. In later years, Shanthan penned songs eulogising the EPDP chief, only to be pulled up by the pro-LTTE diaspora. According to Douglas, EROS leader Velupillai Balakumar and his son contacted him towards the end of the war and attempted to flee LTTE-controlled territory by sea. However, they were intercepted and detained by the Sea Tigers. He said several LTTE leaders also got in touch with him towards the end of the war as the military advanced rapidly. However, Douglas did not name these leaders or say whether any of them secured his assistance. But a close aide told Jaffna Monitor that Douglas “worked very hard” in saving several of the 12,000 LTTE fighters who surrendered in 2008-09. “He ensured that these Tigers were not killed... In a handful of cases, however, he did not succeed. Some of those he saved later joined the EPDP. They remain with us even today,” the aide said. One LTTE associate who conducted reconnaissance on Tamil politician and constitutional lawyer Neelan Tiruchelvam, who was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber in 1999, now lives in a Nordic country, telling those who know him that he is alive “only because of Douglas.” This is one of the biggest ironies of the Tamil armed struggle in Sri Lanka – a Tamil saved numerous members of the very same LTTE, which repeatedly tried to bump him off. But did not the EPDP also kill its rivals and LTTE supporters? The aide says, “Perhaps that’s true. But we all lived in a highly militarised society where almost every difference was being settled by the gun, primarily by the Tigers. “The LTTE and pro-LTTE media dubbed people like us ‘paramilitaries’, as if that one word gave the Tigers the right to kill those they did not like. The LTTE killed hundreds of our people, not to speak of the many other Tamils they killed. And they have no remorse for their crimes.” Not everyone in the EPDP was happy with Douglas’ generosity vis-à-vis the Tigers. Some in the EPDP had bitter differences with their leader on this issue. Indeed, one leading LTTE member who joined the EPDP after the war later quit Douglas’ party in an ugly parting of ways. Douglas says it is all about karma. “I used to say that let Prabhakaran meet me with 100 supporters. He and I will have a debate. I guarantee that when the debate is over, at least 50 of his people would join me… “Yes, the LTTE assassinated by character, threw plenty of mud at me, but they could not break my spirit, and they could not finish me off. “It is all karma. Prabhakaran’s karma led him to his death. My karma helped me to survive.” ### Why Sri Lanka Has Yet to Unlock the Indian Market URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/why-sri-lanka-has-yet-to-unlock-the-indian-market/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T01:12:18.000Z ## **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Why are India and Sri Lanka struggling to embrace a mutually beneficial trade agreement despite plenty of attempts? Why do exports to India account for only about 6 percent of Sri Lanka’s total exports? Colombo and New Delhi have long sought to upgrade the original India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) by addressing its shortcomings and expanding its scope to include services and investment provisions. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was proposed in 2003, two years after ISFTA, the first bilateral trade agreement in South Asia, was signed. But it was scuttled due to opposition from Sri Lankan businesses. Later, the renamed Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) of 2015 encountered similar resistance from Sinhalese nationalists and trade unions. Their criticism was that the pact provided disproportionate benefits for India. Negotiations for the ETCA resumed in November 2023 but were derailed again. There are renewed signs of interest under incumbent President Anura Dissanayake, but a timeline remains elusive. So, what needs to be done to salvage the situation? Mathisha Arangala, a Lead Economist at Verite Research, feels that two key issues need to be addressed if ETCA is to gain wider acceptance in Sri Lanka and genuinely expand Colombo’s exports. Giving a Sri Lankan perspective in the book, *India-Sri Lanka Relations: Convergence, Cooperation and Partnership* (Edited by P.M. Heblikar), he says that though earlier pacts granted duty-free status to many products (including apparel and tea) from the island nation, quotas and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) imposed by India constrain the full potential of these concessions to exporters. This, he says, has eroded trust among Sri Lankan businesses regarding the value of further trade accords with India and is a contributing factor in Sri Lanka’s current resistance to ETCA. At the same time, Arangala notes that Sri Lanka’s current export profile does not align with India’s needs or global supply chain demands. So, a revamped deal must create a framework to facilitate higher-value goods exports from Sri Lanka to India, more so in sectors such as electronics and vehicle manufacturing, to effectively capitalise on emerging supply chains to India. The economist believes that the steady shift of global supply chains towards South Asia, led by India, presents Sri Lanka with a major opportunity to finally integrate into global supply chains and pursue export-led growth. For three decades, Sri Lanka failed to tap into the East-West supply chains that have emerged in East Asia despite its own strategic location on shipping lines. Today, an economically resurgent India presents a key opportunity for Sri Lanka to revitalise its export sector and realise its longstanding goal of joining regional supply chains. According to him, Sri Lankan businesses can strategically position themselves to cater to India’s burgeoning consumer base and also its rapidly expanding industrial landscape. With South India attracting major foreign investments, Sri Lanka, located next door, could benefit from spill-over effects and direct access to the expanding supply chains, says Arangala, who specializes in trade policy, foreign assistance, and geo-economics in the Indian Ocean region. Although India is one of the top import sources for Sri Lanka, the island nation’s export focus remains oriented towards the United States and the European Union. As of 2023, exports to India accounted for only about 6 percent of Sri Lanka’s total exports, while New Delhi’s share of Colombo’s imports rose from 9.69 percent to 22 percent since 2000. This further expanded Sri Lanka’s trade deficit with India sixfold. Sri Lankan exports to India received a considerable boost after the India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) came into force in 2001\. However, that momentum later waned, and exports have largely plateaued since then. Arangala argues that for a country like Sri Lanka, with a limited range of exportable products, the primary benefit of a free trade agreement lies in reducing barriers to its existing exports. However, nearly half the value of three key duty-free export categories, including apparel and tea, remains subject to quotas under the ISFTA, substantially limiting Sri Lanka's effective access to the Indian market. For instance, Sri Lanka is permitted to export only 8 million pieces of ready-made apparel to India duty-free each year. Repeated calls by Sri Lanka's apparel industry to remove this quota have yet to receive a positive response. This, the author says, severely limits potential apparel exports to India. “In fact, previously, apparel exports to India were further constrained until 2013 by a rule requiring the use of Indian fabrics to gain duty-free access—a restriction that took 13 years to remove since the enactment of the ISFTA.” According to Arangala, these curbs undermine the core purpose of FTAs by constraining market access and export expansion. “They also erode the confidence of Sri Lankan businesses in further trade agreements with India, fuelling domestic opposition to deeper economic integration.” Accordingly, says the author, any revised trade pact must incorporate broader measures to remove quota barriers. Doing so would grant Sri Lankan businesses a wider immediate entry into India’s vast market, ultimately strengthening public support for further liberalisation efforts with the South Asian giant. Arangala goes on to say that even when Sri Lankan products enjoy duty-free access to India without quota restrictions, various non-tariff barriers (NTBs) still arrest the island nation’s exports. He complains that exporters of processed food encounter various procedural barriers. In some cases, discriminatory treatment by Indian officialdom has been alleged. Such constraints, coupled with strict and unclear labelling requirements, a lack of information, delays in border approvals, the resulting storage costs, and the high cost of multiple tests, impose significant compliance costs on exporters of these products. These challenges, the author says, effectively transform legitimate SPS-TBT (two sets of regulations that govern non-tariff barriers) requirements into NTBs, inflating costs and causing unpredictable times that hinder the establishment of lasting commercial partnerships in India. “As the ISFTA lacks adequate mechanism to address NTBs, and previous government initiatives have failed to mitigate these issues effectively, Sri Lankan exporters remain hesitant to pursue greater liberalization and expansion into the Indian market until these barriers are comprehensively resolved.” ### At Jaffna University, a Damaged Vesak Lantern Tests a Fragile Consensus URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/at-jaffna-university-a-damaged-vesak-lantern-tests-a-fragile-consensus/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T06:33:25.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka** — When a few Vesak lanterns erected by Sinhala Buddhist students at the University of Jaffna were vandalized this week, the damage itself was limited. What followed was more unusual: student leaders, university representatives, and even Tamil nationalist politicians quickly united to condemn the act and reject attempts to turn it into an ethnic controversy. The lanterns, displayed as part of Vesak celebrations at the university’s Faculty of Management Studies and Commerce, were damaged on Sunday night. Photographs of the vandalized decorations soon circulated on social media, where some Sinhala nationalist commentators portrayed the incident as evidence of anti-Buddhist hostility in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority Northern Province. Student representatives at the university offered a sharply different account. In a statement issued on June 2, the Faculty of Management Studies and Commerce Students’ Union said the Vesak celebration had been organized with the approval and support of the union itself and had received active cooperation from Tamil students. “The event, which included the display of Vesak lanterns, was conducted with the approval and support of the Students’ Union,” the statement said. “Tamil students actively extended their cooperation and assistance in facilitating the event and ensuring its successful implementation.” The union said every effort had been made to ensure that Sinhala Buddhist students could freely celebrate one of the most important occasions in the Buddhist calendar. While strongly condemning the destruction of the lanterns, the union stressed that responsibility should rest solely with those directly involved and not be extended to the wider student population. “We strongly condemn this act of vandalism and firmly believe that those directly responsible should be identified and subjected to the appropriate disciplinary action,” the statement said. The union also rejected attempts to portray the incident as reflective of the attitudes of Tamil students generally. “Such allegations are unfair, misleading, and do not reflect the reality of the situation,” it said. A separate statement issued by the University of Jaffna Students’ Union echoed those sentiments, condemning the vandalism, affirming the right of all students to practice and celebrate their religious beliefs, and calling for a fair investigation into the incident. The response was subsequently endorsed by Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, leader of the Tamil National People’s Front, a politician often associated with hard-line Tamil nationalist positions. “I wish to fully associate myself and my party with the sentiments of the statement issued by the Management Studies and Commerce Students’ Union,” Mr. Ponnambalam said in a statement. “All students have the right and the freedom to enjoy their religious and cultural beliefs,” he added. “As such, the Sinhala Buddhist students and others who celebrate Vesak and similar Buddhist occasions have that unfettered right.” Mr. Ponnambalam called for a full investigation and said those responsible should be dealt with appropriately. The Tamil National People’s Front, he said, condemned the vandalism “unreservedly.” The convergence of views was notable in a country where even relatively minor incidents have at times been interpreted through the lens of ethnic politics. Few institutions in Sri Lanka carry the weight of the country’s ethnic history more visibly than the University of Jaffna. Located in the cultural and political heartland of the Tamil community, the university has long been regarded as a barometer of relations between the country’s ethnic groups. Those relations have occasionally come under strain. In 2016, clashes erupted during a freshers’ event over cultural performances, leaving several students injured and prompting the temporary closure of the university. The institution itself bears the imprint of Sri Lanka’s civil war. Following the anti-Tamil violence of 1983 and the escalation of the conflict, Sinhala students largely disappeared from the campus. Their numbers began to grow again only after a government-backed reintegration program was introduced in 2011, two years after the war ended. Several political observers who spoke to Jaffna Monitor said the significance of the episode lay less in the destruction of a few lanterns than in the response that followed. Statements issued by student unions and political leaders differed in emphasis but were remarkably consistent in substance: the vandalism should be condemned, those responsible should be identified, and blame should not be assigned to an entire community. For many observers, that consensus may have prevented a local act of vandalism from becoming a wider ethnic controversy. By Monday, the damaged lanterns had become a secondary issue. The more consequential question was whether a small act of vandalism would be allowed to define relations between communities that share the same campus. Judging by the response from students and political leaders alike, there was little appetite for allowing that to happen. ### Deepthi Attygalle, Pioneer of Sri Lankan Anaesthesia, Dies at 86 URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/deepthi-attygalle-pioneer-of-sri-lankan-anaesthesia-dies-at-86/ Last updated: 2026-06-08T12:12:18.000Z Deepthi Attygalle, the Sri Lankan anaesthesiologist whose work on magnesium sulphate became an important reference point in the treatment of severe tetanus, died on June 1, 2026\. She was 86. For much of the twentieth century, severe tetanus was managed by heavily sedating patients and supporting them on mechanical ventilators for weeks at a time, a regimen that consumed intensive-care resources often unavailable in many developing countries. At the General Hospital in Colombo, Dr. Attygalle and her colleague, Dr. Nalini Rodrigo, sought to demonstrate an alternative approach: that intravenous magnesium sulphate could control the muscle spasms and dangerous fluctuations in heart rate and blood pressure associated with the disease while allowing patients to remain conscious and breathe independently. Their findings, reported in the journal *Anaesthesia* in 1997 and further examined in a prospective study of 40 patients published in the same journal in 2002, were subsequently cited widely in the medical literature. In the 2002 study, magnesium sulphate was found to be effective in controlling many of the most serious manifestations of severe tetanus, reducing the need for deep sedation and prolonged artificial ventilation in a substantial number of patients. A review article published by the authors in 2004 placed the treatment approach in a broader clinical context. Their work attracted international attention, informed subsequent research, and continues to be cited in discussions of tetanus management, particularly in settings where intensive-care resources are limited. Deepthi Attygalle was born in Colombo on April 17, 1940\. She qualified in medicine from the University of Colombo in 1964 and trained in anaesthesia, then a relatively young specialty in Sri Lanka, both locally and in the United Kingdom. She later became a Fellow of the Royal College of Anaesthetists. Upon returning to Sri Lanka, she joined the General Hospital Colombo, later renamed the National Hospital of Sri Lanka, as a Consultant Anaesthetist. She remained there throughout a distinguished career that spanned several decades. Colleagues remembered her not only for her research but also for her commitment to teaching and postgraduate medical education. As Chair of the Board of Study in Anaesthesia at the Postgraduate Institute of Medicine from 1992 to 1998, she played a leading role in shaping postgraduate training in the specialty. Her emphasis on academic rigor and clinical excellence left a lasting influence on generations of doctors. She grounded both her clinical practice and teaching in the principles of physiology, a method that many former students recalled as intellectually demanding, clinically relevant, and deeply inspiring. Anaesthetists trained under her guidance today serve in hospitals across Sri Lanka and around the world. Dr. Attygalle served as President of the College of Anaesthesiologists of Sri Lanka from 1989 to 1991 and was a founder Vice-President of the South Asian Confederation of Anaesthesiologists. She was elected to the regional board of the Asian and Australasian Section of the World Federation of Societies of Anaesthesiologists in 1990 and later to the federation’s executive committee in 1996\. She also served as a visiting examiner in anaesthesiology in Malaysia and other countries in the region. Together with Dr. Nalini Rodrigo and Dr. Anuja Abayadeera, she co-authored the *Handbook of Anaesthesia*, which became a widely used reference text for trainee and consultant anaesthesiologists in Sri Lanka. Her husband, Dr. Lakshman Attygalle, predeceased her. She is survived by her children, Priyan, Ayoma, and Amila, as well as her grandchildren. Through her contributions to clinical practice, medical education, and research, Dr. Attygalle helped shape the development of anaesthesia as a modern medical specialty in Sri Lanka. Her influence continues through the generations of doctors she trained and the work she left behind. Jaffna Monitor extends its condolences to her family, friends, colleagues, former students, and all those who mourn her passing. **Dr. (Mrs.) Deepthi Attygalle, MBBS, FRCA** **April 17, 1940 – June 1, 2026** ### A Former Tiger's Death in France Raises Questions About Unhealed Wounds URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-former-tigers-death-in-france-raises-questions-about-unhealed-wounds/ Last updated: 2026-06-07T07:33:31.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** The killing of a former Tamil Tiger in Paris by the police has brought to the fore psychological issues that still affect a huge mass of ex-combatants who mostly lead broken lives after fighting one of the world’s bloodiest insurgencies, which at one point almost broke up Sri Lanka. A large but mostly undocumented army of former guerrillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) now eke out a low-key existence in Sri Lanka, India, and several countries in the West, primarily in Canada and Europe. Their war may have ended, but not their trauma – severe in some cases. Tamil sources say many of them, now in their 30s to 50s, suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from their involvement in the conflict, which ended in the bloodbath of 2009: the rout of the Tigers and the annihilation of much of their leadership, including their supreme leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. The situation is worse for those who fled Sri Lanka just before or in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, whose final months witnessed the deaths and maiming of many thousands in the island nation’s north. Most Tigers and government soldiers witnessed hundreds of heart-wrenching deaths, including those of friends and fellow combatants who were blown up by landmines or killed in shelling, while thousands more lost limbs. Unlike in Sri Lanka, where the government and military carried out an extensive, if not perfect, rehabilitation programme for former guerrillas, many of the combatants who fled abroad have largely been left to fend for themselves. This, experts warn, is risky – both for the ex-Tigers themselves and the society in which they now live with guilt feelings, recurring nightmares, and a feeling of helplessness and bleak future. Something like this happened on Saturday to Vaithilingam Puwaneswaran alias Kutti, a former LTTE member and the younger brother of senior LTTE commander Colonel Gopith. Kutti was shot and killed by the French Police in the north-eastern Paris suburb of Bobigny after he allegedly stabbed two neighbours and then advanced with knives towards police officers who reached the scene. The Tamil man was hit in the chest and hip. He succumbed to gunshot injuries. His friends in Paris told Jaffna Monitor that although he was a quiet man, he appeared to struggle since the end of the conflict. Some suspect he may have been living with PTSD, though there has been no formal diagnosis. Around 12,000 LTTE fighters surrendered to the military in Sri Lanka in 2008-09\. Many were held in state custody for varying periods before undergoing rehabilitation programmes overseen by civilian and military officials The programme addressed some of the issues arising from post-conflict stress, although it did not resolve all the problems faced by former fighters, many of whom continue to live in poverty in a country still grappling with the effects of a severe economic crisis. Despite the rehabilitation, complications are aplenty. A senior LTTE commander who later broke away is now burdened by alcoholism. “He has lost his earlier personality. From morning to night, he seems to drink liquor,” said a source who has met him. The source added, “He is not the only one to have liquor as a companion. Many others are addicted to drinks and other substances. This is true even for many former LTTE members in the West.” Another LTTE fighter who belonged to the famed Charles Antony Brigade and fought in Mannar for years now broods that he surrendered to the military while leader Prabhakaran ended up getting killed. “I am alive, but we failed to save *Annan* (Prabhakaran). He gave up his life, but we did not bite the cyanide. He did not tell us to surrender, but we did,” the ex-guerrilla has told former buddies. Tamil sources say that many ex-LTTE fighters lead a listless life. But because of acute poverty, their economic suffering has become a far bigger headache compared to war-related stresses. One former LTTE guerrilla in Kilinochchi, who suffers from delusions, insists that he saw Indian soldiers alongside Sri Lankan troops when he surrendered. “You won’t believe what I am saying, but turbaned Sikh soldiers were there in large numbers when we gave up,” the man in his 40s told Jaffna Monitor. “They kept saying *chalo, chalo* (move, move). We all knew that bit of Hindi because the Indians fought the LTTE earlier, too.” The suffering of the erstwhile Tamil guerrillas living abroad, where none of them have been formally diagnosed and received treatment for PTSD, is much worse. What works in their favour, however, is that they live within well-knit Tamil diaspora communities, doing whatever work they can and remaining far removed from the areas where the fighting raged for nearly a quarter of a century. While some former combatants lead a relatively active life, almost everyone is hit by depression and trauma. The extent of suffering differs. The ex-fighters in the West also suffer because they lack education as well as language skills, which come in the way of better economic deals. A former non-LTTE Tamil militant now in the UK told Jaffna Monitor: "It would be wrong to generalise from the Paris incident that all ex-LTTE men in Europe are inherently dangerous. Most are broken in quieter ways. Some rebuilt their lives, some never did, and a few fell into crime, violence, alcohol, or mental collapse." It keeps hitting many of them that while they almost gave up their lives fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam, tens of thousands of fellow Tamils who fled Sri Lanka have prospered in Western societies along with their families. “Be it Sri Lanka or abroad, most militants have suffered a loss of power and prestige. When they were armed, they enjoyed respectability in the Tamil society, even if this came partly as a result of fear. All that is over now,” said a knowledgeable Tamil who has interacted with many ex-militants. Just how many former LTTE fighters now live outside Sri Lanka? The estimates range from 5,000 to 8,000, almost all of them trained in the use of arms and explosives. The first known figure came out in 1991 when Sathasivan Krishnakumar alias Kittu, the former Jaffna military commander who later shifted to the UK, said in the wake of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination that some 3,000 Tigers had quit the outfit until then. The war raged for another 18 years, and guerrillas continued to leave the Tigers and Sri Lanka for greener pastures abroad with the help of relatives and friends. But in later years, the LTTE became very strict and would not allow its fighters to exit easily. Issues related to PTSD have also traumatised one-time soldiers from the Sri Lankan armed forces. A retired military official complained that the problem was never addressed in an adequate manner by the military. "This is why, he said, so many former soldiers, including deserters, have become involved in organised and violent crime. 'Knowing how to use a weapon has come in handy for those who wanted to get rich quick. They have lost their sense of discipline.' The source, citing military hospital data, said that rising alcohol-related problems had contributed to aggression, domestic violence, and absenteeism among former soldiers. They also suffer from suicidal behaviour, moral injury, trauma, financial stress, and unspoken guilt." ### The Jaffna Bar Association's Letter the Government Did Not Want Written URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-jaffna-bar-associations-letter-the-government-did-not-want-written/ Last updated: 2026-06-07T07:41:47.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The [letter ](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/jaffna-lawyers-urge-president-to-investigate-transfer-of-high-court-judge/)ran to a few hundred words, but its message to the President of Sri Lanka was unambiguous: lawyers in Jaffna, the country's Tamil heartland, believed that the executive branch had reached into the judiciary and moved a judge who had displeased it. That document — an appeal from the Jaffna Bar Association to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake over [the abrupt transfer of High Court Judge A.G. Alexraja](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/jaffna-judge-who-took-on-drug-networks-and-political-power-is-transferred/) — was precisely the kind of accusation the governing National People’s Power, elected in late 2024 on a promise of clean institutions, could least afford. Yet within hours of its becoming public, a misleading counter-narrative began to spread across NPP-aligned media outlets and social media accounts, recasting the appeal as the work of a small section of the Jaffna Bar Association rather than the association as a whole. In that telling, the bar association was deeply divided. Only a faction of lawyers had signed on. The association’s own president had resigned in protest. And neighbouring bars across the Jaffna zone had been kept in the dark. A reconstruction of the bar’s deliberations by Jaffna Monitor, drawing on interviews with more than a dozen lawyers, several of them directly involved in the decision, found that account contradicted by the record at nearly every point. The appeal to the President was not the initiative of a small faction but the result of a recorded vote of 59 to 1\. The sole dissenter was the association’s own president. According to multiple lawyers familiar with the matter, he did not resign in protest over the letter; rather, he stepped down after declining to sign a letter the membership had overwhelmingly voted to send. Lawyers also rejected suggestions that other bar associations should have been consulted. The posting and transfer of a High Court judge, they noted, fall squarely within the professional remit of the Jaffna Bar Association, making broader consultation unnecessary. ### **The transfer, in brief** Judge A.G. Alexraja was appointed to the Jaffna High Court on April 22\. Barely a month later, he was reassigned to the Badulla High Court, some 350 kilometres away in the central highlands, effective May 31 — an unusually short tenure for a posting in which High Court judges ordinarily serve three to four years. No public explanation has been given. Lawyers who spoke with *Jaffna Monitor* have linked the move to interim orders the judge issued in a writ petition in which the Northern Province Governor was a respondent, and to his uncompromising sentencing in narcotics cases. The Judicial Service Commission, which is chaired by the Chief Justice and ordered the transfer, has not publicly addressed the matter. The Northern Province Governor's Secretariat said Monday that the governor had no connection to the transfer, issuing the statement to dispel what it described as unnecessary speculation. The clarification, however, appeared to do little to quiet the concerns circulating within Jaffna's legal community, where many lawyers said they remained unconvinced by the official denial. On May 30, the Jaffna Bar Association wrote to President Dissanayake, expressing “complete disbelief and shock” and asking him to investigate. ### **The narrative** The pro-government version rests on three claims: that the letter represented only a minority of lawyers; that the bar association’s president resigned in protest over its handling; and that other bars in the Jaffna zone — among them Mallakam and Kayts — were neither consulted nor told. Examined against the bar’s own process, each collapses. ### **Claim one: a divided bar, a handful of lawyers** The Jaffna Bar Association’s 16-member executive committee met first, virtually. According to lawyers present, every member except the president agreed that some form of action was warranted, and the committee resolved to convene the general body. That meeting took place on Friday, May 29, at the Jaffna court complex, with roughly 27 to 28 lawyers in attendance. Several members were absent, lawyers said, largely because of the short notice. The general body then put the central question — whether to write to the president — to a vote conducted through the association’s WhatsApp group, with a deadline of midnight on Saturday, May 30\. Fifty-nine lawyers voted in favour. One voted against: the association’s president. The bar association has roughly 110 members, and not all cast a ballot. But lawyers who described the process said the abstentions should not be read as support for the transfer. Some members were unfamiliar with the messaging application through which the vote was conducted. Others abstained for a procedural reason, believing the petition should have been addressed to the Chief Justice rather than the president. That preference was rejected by the majority for a reason lawyers described as plain logic. The Chief Justice chairs the Judicial Service Commission, the body that ordered the transfer. To ask him to intervene, several lawyers said, would have been to ask the architect of the decision to undo it. The membership concluded that there was little use in addressing the commission and instead turned to the head of state. A small number kept their distance from the matter altogether, out of caution. None of that, lawyers stressed, amounted to a defence of the transfer. “Apart from the president, no one raised a voice against taking some form of action,” one lawyer said. The arithmetic settles the point. The 59 votes in favour were themselves a majority of the association’s roughly 110 members — meaning support for the petition extended well beyond those who actively cast a ballot, and far beyond the handful the counter-narrative describes. ### **Claim two: a president who resigned ‘in protest’** The president did resign. The dispute is over why. By the bar’s own conventions, lawyers said, once the general body reaches a decision, the president and secretary are bound to execute it — including by signing the resulting document — whatever their private view. “He can hold his personal opinion, but he cannot act against the decision of the general committee,” one lawyer said. According to several lawyers, the president declined to sign the letter. When colleagues pressed him, noting that the membership had voted decisively in favour, he resigned rather than put his name to it. The letter was then signed by the vice president, P. Thavapalan, who was subsequently elected to succeed him. Lawyers familiar with the events said the president’s reluctance was political rather than principled. Several, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, characterised him as sympathetic to the government and said they believed he was unwilling to be seen publicly opposing it. Those claims could not be independently verified, and he has not publicly set out his reasons for resigning. ### **Claim three: the bars that were ‘never told’** The assertion that Mallakam, Kayts, and other zone associations were bypassed rests, lawyers said, on a misreading of how jurisdiction works. A High Court judge’s posting falls within the professional purview of the Jaffna Bar Association, which practices before that court. Bar associations attached to other courts have no standing to deliberate on a Jaffna High Court transfer. “On what authority would another bar take a decision on this?” asked a lawyer who has practised in the Chavakacheri Court. Consultation across bars becomes necessary only in one circumstance, lawyers said: a strike. Because a work stoppage requires coordination across courts, a decision to strike would have to be communicated to other associations — as happened in a past transfer matter involving the Mullaitivu court. But the Jaffna Bar Association took no decision to strike, so the question of coordinating with other bars did not arise. Nor, lawyers said, were the other associations in fact kept in the dark. Nagendran Parthipan, vice president for the Jaffna zone of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka — the national, or “mother,” bar — told Jaffna Monitor that in that capacity he serves as a representative and coordinating figure for all the zone’s associations, including Jaffna, Mallakam, Chavakacheri, Point Pedro, Kilinochchi, and Kayts. He said the Jaffna Bar Association had kept him informed and discussed its decisions with him throughout. Parthipan is also secretary of the Mallakam Bar Association — one of the very bodies the counter-narrative says was not consulted. The claim that the Jaffna bar acted without consulting other associations, he said, was baseless. “Within the jurisdiction of the Jaffna High Court, ninety-nine percent of lawyers are dissatisfied with this transfer and view it as a grave threat to judicial independence,” Parthipan added. ### **What the letter cost** For the lawyers who supported the move, the decision carried real personal and professional risk. To petition the President over a transfer ordered by the Judicial Service Commission is, in practice, to challenge a decision in which the Chief Justice himself took part. Several lawyers spoke candidly about what that could mean for a practitioner: the displeasure of the most powerful figure in the judiciary, the possibility of disciplinary consequences, or damage to one’s professional standing. There was a further concern. Some feared their stand might be misread as hostility toward the judge appointed to replace Alexraja — an impression that could sour relations with a bench before which they must continue to appear, and invite professional backlash of its own. They proceeded anyway. “We are prepared to risk our income and even our livelihoods,” one lawyer told Jaffna Monitor. “What we are not prepared to do is remain silent when we believe judicial independence may be at stake.” ### Mano Ganesan Seeks Inquiry Into Whether Government Diverted Election Funds Without Parliamentary Approval URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/mano-ganesan-seeks-inquiry-into-whether-government-diverted-election-funds-without-parliamentary-approval/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T05:46:27.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Mano Ganesan, leader of the Democratic People’s Front and a member of Sri Lanka’s opposition, has asked Parliament’s chief financial oversight committee to investigate whether funds allocated for long-delayed Provincial Council elections were diverted to post-cyclone reconstruction efforts without legislative approval. In a letter sent Monday to Dr. Harsha de Silva, chairman of Parliament’s Committee on Public Finance (COPF), Mr. Ganesan requested an inquiry into remarks attributed to Tilvin Silva, general secretary of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the dominant party within the governing National People’s Power coalition. Mr. Ganesan said he was acting on reports that Mr. Silva had stated that money set aside for Provincial Council elections had been used instead for disaster-relief and reconstruction work following Cyclone Ditwah. “To the best of my knowledge, Parliament has not approved any transfer or reallocation of funds earmarked for Provincial Council Elections to any other expenditure head or purpose,” Mr. Ganesan wrote. He asked the committee to determine whether any transfer, reallocation, or expenditure of election-related funds had occurred “in a manner inconsistent with parliamentary approval and financial regulations.” The request follows comments Mr. Silva reportedly made during the opening of an NPP district office in Jaffna, where he said Provincial Council elections would not be held this year because funds budgeted for the polls had been redirected to relief and rebuilding efforts after Cyclone Ditwah. The remarks have since exposed apparent inconsistencies within the government’s own messaging. Cabinet spokesman Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa later told reporters that funding was not the obstacle preventing the elections from being held, arguing that the principal issue remained unresolved electoral legislation. Separately, NPP General Secretary Dr. Nihal Abeysinghe said the necessary financial provisions for the elections had already been allocated and that the polls could proceed once ongoing electoral reform discussions were concluded. Those explanations stand in contrast to Mr. Silva’s assertion that election funds had been redirected, creating uncertainty over whether any such transfer occurred and, if so, under what legal authority. At the center of the dispute is Parliament’s constitutional authority over public expenditure. Under Sri Lanka’s public finance framework, money appropriated for one purpose cannot generally be spent on another without parliamentary authorization through approved financial procedures. Mr. Ganesan argued that even if funds were used for a legitimate public purpose, such as disaster recovery, Parliament’s approval would still be required before they could be redirected. The issue also touches on the increasingly contentious question of Provincial Council elections. The elections have not been held since 2014, and all nine Provincial Councils have remained without elected representatives since their terms expired between 2017 and 2018\. Successive governments have attributed the delays to unresolved legal and electoral reforms, while opposition parties and civil society groups have accused political leaders of lacking the will to restore the provincial institutions. The Committee on Public Finance had not publicly indicated whether it would take up Mr. Ganesan's request by the time of publication. ### Jaffna Lawyers Urge President to Investigate Transfer of High Court Judge URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-lawyers-urge-president-to-investigate-transfer-of-high-court-judge/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T01:32:15.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The Jaffna Bar Association has appealed directly to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to investigate the [sudden transfer of High Court Judge A.G. Alexraja](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/featured/jaffna-judge-who-took-on-drug-networks-and-political-power-is-transferred/), warning that the move risks undermining public confidence in the judiciary and raising concerns about interference in judicial administration. In a letter dated May 30 and addressed to the President through the Presidential Secretariat, the association expressed its "complete disbelief and shock" at the transfer of Judge Alexraja from the High Court of Jaffna to the Civil Appellate High Court of Badulla. Judge Alexraja was appointed to the Jaffna High Court on April 22\. His transfer, which is scheduled to take effect on May 31, comes little more than a month after he assumed office. The Bar Association said the timing of the transfer had "led to speculations as to the presence of extraneous reasons" behind the decision. The letter, signed by the association's vice president and secretary, pointed to a possible connection between the transfer and certain interim orders issued by the judge in proceedings involving the Governor of the Northern Province, who had been named as a respondent in writ petitions before the court. Those orders were subsequently vacated and not extended, the association noted. The association further stated that it "reliably" understood that the governor had written to, or spoken with, certain authorities, including members of the government, regarding the matter. While emphasizing that it did not dispute the Judicial Service Commission's authority to transfer judicial officers, the association said that unexplained transfers and interference by members of the executive branch in such decisions could erode public confidence in the judiciary. "Even the slightest impression of interference in the workings of the judiciary is a very serious issue," the letter said. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/image.png) The Jaffna Bar Association's letter to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake seeking an investigation into the transfer of High Court Judge A.G. Alexraja. The association urged the President, as Head of State, to ensure "zero tolerance" for any interference with the judiciary and called for an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the transfer. It also requested an opportunity to meet the President in person to discuss the matter. The Judicial Service Commission has not publicly explained the reasons for the transfer, and the President's Office has not publicly responded to the concerns raised by the Bar Association. ### The 13th Amendment and the Unfinished Business of Land in the North URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-13th-amendment-and-the-unfinished-business-of-land-in-the-north/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T03:27:33.000Z **By Sidhartha Thamby** ### **The Dividends to Reap from State Land** According to the Land Commissioner General’s Department (eSlims, as at 7 February 2022), *123,141* land use permits have been issued against a total of *401,000* families in the province. The number eligible to receive permits in 2022 stood at *40,782*, with *6,040* permits still unused.¹⁰ All permits ultimately flow through the Governor’s office for processing before titles are issued by the Director General of Lands in Colombo — a labour-intensive sequence that encompasses title settlement, land-use inspection, application verification, surveying, and document uploads. A previous Governor identified the bottleneck clearly: he recommended creating a specialised provincial cadre of development officers, trained and assigned to divisional, district, surveyor’s department, and provincial land commissioner levels respectively. He also requested the Water Board to identify reservoir locations in four of the five districts — one reservoir already exists — and the Forest Department to initiate forest cover in support of each. The Water Board identified the locations and moved papers to the Forest Department. There, progress stalled. Just over a quarter of families in the province are nominal beneficiaries of state land. Understanding the law is therefore not academic — it determines what those families can actually claim. The lot sizes matter too: none falls below an acre, which shapes what “optimal use” even means. ### **What the Governor Can — and Cannot — Do** Under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, the Provincial Council List — the 9th Schedule — assigns land settlement, land use, and land development to the province. The Governor, acting on the advice of the Board of Ministers, can assent to provincial statutes on these subjects, approve land settlement programmes, and allocate state land within the province for agricultural, housing, and industrial purposes. Under Article 154B(4), a Governor may act in individual discretion — without ministerial advice — when directed by the President to do so. Under Articles 154B(5) and (6), when a province falls under Governor’s Rule, the Governor exercises direct executive power over state land, grants, and allocations that would otherwise require a Cabinet mandate. The Land Acquisition Act and the Land Development Ordinance remain central statutes. Whatever the Governor can do, the Governor cannot override national land policy. Subject to the relevant checks and balances, there is a significant dividend to be gained from exercising the land powers available under the 13th Amendment. This was demonstrated in practice by a former Governor who not only convened meetings within the Province but also chaired discussions at the Lands Ministry, bringing together all mandated stakeholders to address land use and availability in the Province from a centrist perspective. Whether such an approach will be seen again in the near term remains an open question. The Central Subject Minister clearly held no reservations. The Governor holds protocol status equivalent to that of a Cabinet Minister. ### **Liability to the State and impact on Thesavalamai** Sri Lanka’s Land Acquisition Act No. 9 of 1950 is unambiguous: the State may acquire private land, but it must pay — market value, interest from the date of possession, and compensation for injurious affection to remaining land. These are legal obligations, not requests. What the Act scandalously omits is any solatium premium for the involuntary nature of the taking, any livelihood compensation for destroyed incomes, any penalty for deliberate non-payment, and any requirement to pay before taking possession. Practically, scores of landowners have written to numerous offices seeking answers for decades; in many instances even a basic acknowledgement has not been forthcoming. It is tardy, insensitive and arrogant . Land appropriation in the Northern Province strikes at the very core of Thesavalamai — a customary legal code codified in 1706 and still operative today as both a personal and territorial law. Unlike ordinary property, land governed by Thesavalamai carries layered entitlements rooted in succession, mudusom rights, and matrilineal inheritance that cannot simply be compensated by market-value assessments. When the State takes possession of such land — often without prior payment under Section 38A of the Land Acquisition Act — it disrupts not merely ownership but the entire web of customary inheritance, family continuity, and community identity that Thesavalamai protects. Displacement severs the evidentiary chain of title, renders oral and customary claims near-impossible to prove, and leaves families permanently outside the formal legal system they were entitled to invoke. The State’s exposure is both immediate and compounding. Taking possession before paying compensation creates an ongoing legal wrong — statutory interest accrues at inadequate rates while real value erodes, consequential economic losses go unaddressed, and affected owners retain rights to challenge valuations before the Board of Review, the Court of Appeal, and in fundamental rights applications under Articles 12(1) and 14 of the Constitution. International benchmarks, including decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, have held that delay in payment alone can independently constitute a violation of property rights. ### The Numbers on the Ground: Acquisitions and Releases The military presence did not begin with the war. The Jaffna International Airport — established at Palaly by the British Royal Air Force during the Second World War and later developed as a civilian and military base — became the nucleus of a progressively expanding security perimeter. Between 1990 and 2009, the military appropriated 11,629 acres in the northern tip of Sri Lanka to create the Palaly High Security Zone, evicting residents of Tellipallai and surrounding communities. The High Security Zone in Valikamam North gradually absorbed agricultural land, fishing settlements, and residential properties. Tens of thousands of Tamil civilians were ordered to vacate — sometimes within hours — as the security forces consolidated their hold following Operation Riviresa in 1995. According to President Sirisena’s office, at the conclusion of the civil conflict in 2009, approximately 84,675 acres of Tamil civilian land were under military control. By the end of March 2019, 71,178 acres had been released in total — leaving roughly 13,497 acres still with security forces, of which 11,039 acres were identified as state-owned. The Rajapaksa government released 5,255 acres between October 2010 and the end of 2014, while the Sirisena–Wickremesinghe Yahapalana government released 1,000 acres in just the first few months of 2015\. By December 2017, the Sri Lanka Army had released a cumulative total of 55,510.58 acres of private and state land across Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya in the Northern Province. Intent, it turns out, matters enormously. As of February 2025, Jaffna District Secretary Maruthalingam Pratheepan confirmed at the District Coordinating Committee meeting — in the presence of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake — that the Sri Lankan military continues to occupy more than 2,500 acres of civilian land in Jaffna District alone. At the same meeting, it was disclosed that the Sri Lanka Air Force continues to hold 1,009 acres of Tamil-owned land in Jaffna under the Civil Aviation Authority’s control, affecting 643 landowners. A Right to Information request to the Mullaitivu District Secretariat separately revealed that 4,859 acres of privately-owned land remain under military occupation in Mullaitivu, with the Maritimepattu division alone accounting for over 4,000 of those acres. The government reported returning only 86.24 acres of private land in the North during 2025 — a pace that, if maintained, would take generations to resolve the backlog. ### **Current Land Occupation Status (2025)** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/the-13th-amendment-and-the-unf-ez9fMA-kixf0dsna5ios6z.png) **Land Currently Occupied by Army & Air Force — To Be Released** **Total occupied: 2,514.64 Acres | To be released: details below** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/the-13th-amendment-and-the-unf-ez9fMA-kixdx59vv58h3we.png) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/the-13th-amendment-and-the-unf-ez9fMA-kix5r84466ls6vg.png) ### ### **The Palaly Corridor: A Case Study in Complexity** The Valikamam North land schedule — drawn from the Divisional Secretariat’s own records — lays bare how the appropriation was structured and why it resists easy resolution. Across 18 GN divisions in the Kankesanturai–Palaly corridor, the total occupied footprint stands at approximately 2,514 acres. Within that figure, private land, state land, army camps, air force installations, civil aviation authority land, a TB hospital, a fishermen’s housing scheme, and a women’s army corps headquarters coexist on what were once civilian fields and homesteads. In early 2024, the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Aviation called Expressions of Interest for the expansion of Jaffna International Airport, with the Ministry Secretary confirming the goal was to accommodate wide-body A330 aircraft. The current runway of 1,400 metres handles only ATR 72 regional flights; an A330-capable runway would require at least 3,200 metres plus safety overruns. If that expansion proceeds, it will require resolving land tenure over hundreds of acres in the Palaly corridor — land that is simultaneously claimed by the military, listed for release, and still subject to unrevoked gazette notifications. The gazette notification at the heart of the Valikamam North problem was issued in April and May 2013, formally acquiring 6,371 acres, 1 rood and 15 perches for a Defence Battalion Headquarters. Landowners took the state to the Supreme Court. 3575.74 acres within the acquired land was subsequently released. In January 2023, at a discussion chaired by the President, an order was issued to revoke the notification. Letters followed — from the Divisional Secretariat to the Senior Land Surveyor, from the district to the Ministry of Tourism and Lands in Battaramulla — requesting tracing maps and procedural guidance. As of 2025, the gazette has not been revoked, the surveys have not been completed, and the land has not been returned. **File No: LLD/DO(J)/LA/PAL/01-01-survey requisition to release 3575.74 Acres** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/the-13th-amendment-and-the-unf-ez9fMA-kixx9ikb274vhea.png) ### **Illegal Occupation by the Administration Itself** The land problem in Jaffna is not only about the military. The administration’s own buildings have compounded the crisis. A review of Divisional Secretariat offices in Jaffna District found that 13 out of 16 DS buildings are constructed on — or in illegal occupation of — private land. ### **Divisional Secretariat Offices: Land Occupation Status — Jaffna District (Selected)** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/06/the-13th-amendment-and-the-unf-ez9fMA-kix99h3231cngac.png) In at least one instance, a court ordered the administration to cease occupation, vacate the premises, and hand over the property. The administration did the reverse. ### **What Needs to Happen** The longer these grievances remain unaddressed, the more they calcify into structural liability. Tens of thousands of LDO permit holders and poverty-qualified families already carry legally cognisable entitlements under the 13th Amendment. Legislative reform along the lines of India’s 2013 Land Acquisition Act — mandating solatium, rehabilitation, and consent mechanisms — is increasingly the comparative benchmark courts and advocacy bodies invoke. Resolving these claims proactively is far less costly than contesting a growing body of litigation, and far less damaging than the reputational and constitutional consequences of a State seen to systematically undermine the customary rights of an entire community. The constitutional framework is, for the most part, adequate — which makes it imperative it’s used. The Governor holds genuine powers over land settlement, allocation, and development planning and must show allocation of lands for development. The landless poor have waited through multiple administrations. Old permit lands must be recycled. Land use planning — the kind that designates development sites, habitats, forests, and a provincial green agricultural and environmental land bank — must become a reality. The 2013 gazette notification was not revoked when the President ordered it in January 2023\. Revoking the gazette, completing the surveys, and publishing the results are not complex asks — they are the minimum the state owes landowners who went to the Supreme Court and won a presidential order in their favour. The tri-services and Police have legitimate tenure needs too; there is enough state land to accommodate them without keeping a single acre of private land off the table. The Palaly airbase, other tri-services detachments, Police Department facilities, the naval facility at Kankesanthurai, and a coast guard presence in the north constitute legitimate security requirements and should be accommodated from state lands. The army should be right-sized for genuine threats: a highly capable rapid reaction force; strengthened naval and coast guard capacity for maritime threat response; and an intelligence apparatus reoriented from Tamil political monitoring toward maritime domain awareness, counter-narcotics, and counter-radicalisation. Regional security cooperation — with India, the Maldives, and through multilateral frameworks — should *replace the inward-looking garrison model.* The argument that reconciliation and demilitarisation of the north are concessions to Tamil nationalism inverts the strategic logic. Political legitimacy — earned by addressing genuine grievances — is ultimately the most durable form of national security. The provincial cadre of land development officers — recommended by a previous Governor, apparently never actioned — is the kind of thing that costs very little and signals a great deal. Its absence speaks for itself. Where the state occupies private land for its own offices illegally without paying compensation, it must regularise its position — or vacate. Courts’ orders must be obeyed. Human Rights Watch and Tamil civil society organisations have repeatedly documented the gap between government promises and delivery; that gap cannot be explained away by bureaucratic complexity alone. The airport expansion ambition is legitimate and potentially transformative for Jaffna’s economy. Similar considerations would occur in Vavuniya airfield and remnants in Mannar. But it cannot be built on a foundation of unresolved land claims. If the state wants to develop Palaly into an A330-capable hub, it must first complete the business it began in 2013: survey, gazette revocation, title settlement, and compensation. In that order. The land question in the North is not unsolvable. The data exists. The legal authority exists. The administrative procedures exist. What has been missing, in too many administrations, is the sustained political will and Executive stewardship to see them through. ### Former LTTE Fighter, Brother of Commander Gopith, Killed in Police Shooting Outside Paris URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-ltte-fighter-brother-of-commander-gopith-killed-in-police-shooting-outside-paris/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T01:13:56.000Z Vaithilingam Puwaneswaran, known by the nom de guerre “Kutti,” a former member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the younger brother of senior LTTE commander Colonel Gopith, was shot and killed by French police in the northeastern Paris suburb of Bobigny on Saturday afternoon after he allegedly stabbed two neighbours and then advanced toward officers while wielding two knives, according to French authorities and community sources. The incident unfolded at approximately 2:15 p.m. on Rue Hector-Berlioz, a residential street in Bobigny, in the Seine-Saint-Denis department — a dense, multiethnic arrondissement on the outskirts of Paris long known for its large diaspora communities. The confrontation began as a violent dispute between residents of an apartment building, which escalated rapidly when the man produced a knife and stabbed a neighbour in the shoulder. Three officers from the Brigade anticriminalité (BAC) of Pantin were dispatched to the scene following reports of a neighbourhood altercation. Upon their arrival, the situation had already deteriorated further. Armed with two knives, the man charged toward the officers. One officer opened fire twice, striking him in the chest and hip. Despite emergency medical treatment administered at the scene, the man succumbed to his injuries. The Bobigny Public Prosecutor's office announced that France's national police oversight body, the Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale (IGPN) — the so-called "police des polices" — had been engaged and that a formal investigation had been opened into the use of lethal force resulting in death. The two stabbed neighbours were hospitalised and were receiving treatment, according to sources familiar with the matter. French authorities withheld the deceased's identity pending the investigation. However, sources within the Sri Lankan Tamil community in France, as well as associates who knew him personally, confirmed to Jaffna Monitor that the man was known as "Kutti" and that he was originally from Yogapuram in the Mallavi area of northern Sri Lanka's Vanni region. He was, those sources confirmed, the younger brother of Colonel Gopith — full name Vaithilingam Chandrabalan — who served as Special Commander of the LTTE's Charles Anthony Special Regiment and was killed on 30 March 2009 during the final weeks of Sri Lanka's civil war. A third brother, Kokilan, is also known to the community. ![Colonel Gopith](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/former-ltte-fighter-brother-of-p4KaWM-kix1kbq20mf9arh.png) Colonel Gopith The Charles Anthony Special Regiment was the LTTE's first and oldest conventional fighting formation, established on 10 April 1991, and among the most highly trained units the Tigers fielded — with its own military academies and officer training colleges. Colonel Gopith joined the movement as a schoolboy from Mallavi at the age of fourteen and rose to become one of its senior battlefield commanders, playing significant roles in operations at Ambagamam, Kanagarayan Kulam, and across the Relentless Waves series of offensives. His death during the Ananthapuram battle in late March 2009, alongside fellow commander Amuthaab, was widely reported at the time as a demoralising blow to LTTE cadres in the war's final phase. Kutti was himself a former LTTE member, according to multiple community sources in France who spoke to Jaffna Monitor. The circumstances of his death have prompted difficult questions within the Tamil diaspora about the long-term psychological cost of war on those who survived it. Friends who knew Kutti in Paris described him as a quiet man. They said he had appeared to struggle in the years since the end of the conflict, and some suspected he may have been living with post-traumatic stress disorder, though no formal diagnosis has been confirmed. Tens of thousands of Tamil war survivors and former combatants resettled across Western Europe after the LTTE's military defeat in May 2009, many carrying unaddressed trauma from years of armed conflict. Community welfare workers in France say access to culturally appropriate mental health support for this population remains severely limited. ### **French Media Coverage** The shooting was reported widely within hours of the incident. None of the major French outlets identified the man's Sri Lankan Tamil background, his history as a former combatant, or his connection to a prominent LTTE military figure. Coverage was framed uniformly as a police use-of-force incident arising from a neighbourhood dispute. CNews, which broke the story from a police source at 3:35 p.m. on Saturday, reported that the man had been neutralised after threatening officers with two knives and was subsequently declared deceased. Franceinfo, the public broadcaster's digital outlet, followed at 3:50 p.m. citing the Paris Police Prefecture and the AFP wire service, reporting that the officer had been compelled to "make use of his administrative weapon, striking him in the abdomen" as the man charged toward the three officers. Police & Réalités, a specialist publication covering the French security services, provided the most granular operational account — naming the BAC unit from Pantin, identifying Rue Hector-Berlioz as the location, and reporting that one neighbour had been stabbed in the trapezius area before police arrived. The Belgian outlet L'Avenir also carried the AFP wire. None of the French-language reporting mentioned the deceased man's nationality, his background, or any mental health context. ### **Reactions** The shooting drew sharply divergent responses. Within the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in France, many mourned Kutti's death and questioned whether lethal force had been necessary, with some raising concerns about whether officers had the tools or training to recognise and respond to a subject in acute psychological distress. On mainstream French social media, a significant portion of commentary endorsed the police action as proportionate, with discussion moving rapidly from the specifics of the incident toward broader generalisations about immigration — exposing, community members said, an undercurrent of sentiment that reliably surfaces whenever such incidents occur in the suburbs of Paris. The IGPN investigation is ongoing. It is standard French procedure to refer all fatal police shootings to the oversight body. Jaffna Monitor contacted the Bobigny Public Prosecutor's office and the IGPN for comment; neither had responded by the time of publication. ### “Living there while being here”: Paradoxes in the legacy of the Sri Lankan diaspora URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/living-there-while-being-here-paradoxes-in-the-legacy-of-the-sri-lankan-diaspora/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T01:13:57.000Z **Professor Mahesh Nirmalan MD, FRCA, PhD, FFICM, University of Manchester, United Kingdom** “*திரை கடல் ஓடியும் திரவியம் தேடு*” is an age-old saying by the Tamil poet Avvaiyar (*ஔவையார்*) in the collection of poetic moral statements known as “*Konrai Venthan*” (*கொன்றை வேந்தன்*). Directly translated it reads “*Acquire wealth even if you have to cross the stormy seas*”. ![Avvaiyar is a Tamil poet from the 3rd Sangam period (300 BCE - 300 AD). Her contributions to Tamil literature include works of devotion, culture, morality and prudence. The above statue commemorates her memories in Jaffna.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kixpc40vxsru8o4.jpg) Avvaiyar is a Tamil poet from the 3rd Sangam period (300 BCE - 300 AD). Her contributions to Tamil literature include works of devotion, culture, morality and prudence. The above statue commemorates her memories in Jaffna. As such the desire to travel to distant lands seeking prosperity is very much part of the South Asian psyche. It was this spirit that drove the Pallava and Chola emperors to seek, conquer and trade with new lands in the Far East leaving behind lasting legacies in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Java and Sumatra. In the colonial and post-colonial periods the trend continued unabated with many from the region moving overseas in pursuit of work, wealth and better living standards. The work ethos of these people made them the “preferred immigrants” to the colonial masters prioritising loyalty, obedience and productivity. ![‘Konrai Venthan’ is a collection of short sayings by Avvayar. Respect to parents, devotion, family life, fidelity, charity, generosity, harmony, learning and moderation are some of the core principles emphasised in Konrai Venthan. Source: Google Images.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kixnohz4qwgse4r.jpg) ‘Konrai Venthan’ is a collection of short sayings by Avvayar. Respect to parents, devotion, family life, fidelity, charity, generosity, harmony, learning and moderation are some of the core principles emphasised in Konrai Venthan. Source: Google Images. The ‘Jaffna man’ of the 19th and early 20th centuries perhaps fitted this prototype perfectly. The “*Malayan pensioners*” were a special category of people who were a common sight across the Jaffna peninsula In the 60s and 70s who, having completed their assignments in colonial Malaysia, returned to Jaffna to spend their retirement in comfort re-establishing connections with their roots. Their relative wealth made them prominent personalities in their villages and towns. The author’s grandfather belonged to this cohort who – having returned from Malaysia in the late 40s, spent his final few decades spreading the message of *‘Advaita Vedantha’* to the people of Karainagar – his native village, mostly through a network of fellow Malayan Pensioners. The hall mark of this generation of fortune seekers was that, despite their adventures their heart and soul were rooted in their native lands to which they remained unquestionably loyal. Emigration from Sri Lanka accelerated in the post-independence period driven by this inherent desire for fortune seeking and a new set of imperatives imposed by the changing political landscape. The recurrent cycles of political violence of 1958, 1970, 1977, 1981, 1983 and 1987 to 1989 and the protracted war of the 80s – 2009 were major catalysts for the largest movement of Sri Lankans - of all shades, during the past five decades. This time however, countries in Western Europe, North America and Australasia were the predominant recipients of this surging tide of humanity. Estimates in 2024 suggest that close to 1.5 million Sri Lankans may have emigrated during this period due to the civil war and associated collateral violence and persecution – real or perceived. This estimate does not include the migrant workers in West Asia who form an important sub section of the global Sri Lankan diaspora and face/present unique - albeit different, set of challenges not covered in this article. The total Sri Lankan diaspora may currently stand around 2 million (excluding the migrant workers in West Asia). This mass exodus resulted in the formation of a significant global Sri Lankan diaspora in countries such as Canada, the UK, Germany, USA, Australia and India. This new generation of diaspora, particularly those in Canada and Europe, has now established a significant presence in their adopted homes through professional and fiscal success. ### **Positive Impacts on Host Countries:** ***Economic Entrepreneurship & Labour*:** There is no doubt that the Sri Lankan diaspora has made significant contributions to local economies wherever they were. Unverifiable estimates suggest that the Tamil diaspora alone may be managing over $100 billion (USD) in global assets. In Canada and in Europe, Sri Lankans are known for running successful businesses including restaurants, supermarkets, nursing homes and real estate, while also contributing to the labor force in sectors like security, care and transportation. In Europe, they have established tens of thousands of small and medium-sized businesses, including grocery stores, nursing homes and specialized shops. ***Cultural Enrichment & Integration:*** Sri Lankan communities have enriched the multicultural mosaic in cities like Toronto, London, Paris and Sydney through cultural activities, professional associations, sporting events, temple building, and language education. ***Professional Advancement:*** High priority given to education has resulted in the presence of professionals of Srilankan heritage in fields such as medicine, engineering, accounting, and academia in disproportionately large numbers. This academic/professional success and the consequent upward social mobility is most striking amongst the children of parents who arrived in the 80s and 90s as refugees with no social capital. In this respect the achievements of the Sri Lankan diaspora stands out from immigrants from other comparable countries in the Global South. **Political Mobilization:** Sri Lankan diaspora organizations in North America (Canada in particular) and Europe (UK in particular) have engaged actively with local politics to promote human rights, justice, and accountability following the Sri Lankan civil war, often influencing foreign policy of their host nations. Whilst Tamil organisations have been more visible, other communities too have lobbied public opinions whenever circumstances demanded. The Prime Ministers of UK and Canada now release special messages to mark cultural events such as the ‘Vesak’ or ‘*Thai Pongal*’, providing a measure of the influence the Sri Lankan diaspora wields amongst the political elites. The political parties in any democracy will always respond to the power of the ‘*Block vote*’ immigrant communities bring to the table. Therefore leaders in western democracies have been more than willing to engage in issues in distant lands in order to appease these ‘block voters’ ### **Negative Impacts in Host countries:** ***Imported Conflict & Political Tension:*** The diaspora's intense focus on homeland politics has sometimes imported regional tensions into host countries, leading to public protests, disruption and disagreements between groups. This has in many instances spilled over as street violence and other forms of crime (such as disruption of traffic, credit card fraud, extortion, people-smuggling, gun-running etc.) resulting in considerable challenges in the sphere of law and order. Due to the militant sectarian elements within the diaspora, some members have faced surveillance, and the community has dealt with stigmatization and radicalization in the wake of the 2009 conflict, which complicates integration. ***Increased disease burden and demands on support services:*** The legacy of trauma, war, displacement and cultural maladjustment has created long-term mental health challenges within some sub-cohorts, with many experiencing a sense of "collective numbness" or profound loss that affects individual and community well-being. These psychological factors when coupled with the genetic/ lifestyle associated predisposition to chronic physical ailments (such as diabetes, hypertension, metabolic syndrome) may contribute to added disease burden in the community and perhaps a disproportionate demand for public services **Parallel Lives:** Despite achieving high levels of professional and economic success, many Sri Lankan immigrants lead "parallel lives" that remain largely disconnected from mainstream society. Strong emotional, financial, and political connections to Sri Lanka mean we are often "*living there while being here*". The creation of extensive, independent institutional networks such as media outlets, weekend language/religious schools and community centers ensures that life is internalised with very little cross fertilisation with cultures across ethnic divides. This, while keeping the community cohesive, also creates insular social bubbles that act as barriers to integration. Clustering along the lines of political loyalty (Sinhala Vs Tamil), regional, religious and even caste differences contributed to sub-networks breeding social tensions that are alien to the host countries. ***Cultural imposition:*** Sinhala and Tamil cultures are rich as well as ancient. This antiquity breeds pride amongst people when it comes to observing their cultural traditions. Many members of the diaspora therefore fervently adhere to these practices even in public places with noise levels that may fall within the threshold of being intrusive. Traditional wind and percussion instruments (traditionally performed in large open spaces) being performed in small enclosed spaces and/or religious observations along busy public roads - frequently blocking traffic, are examples where one’s respect to tradition may fall within the remit of cultural imposition for those not familiar with such practices ### **Impact in Sri Lanka:** The Sri Lankan diaspora has also had a profound, multifaceted, and often controversial impact in Sri Lanka, ranging from being a major funding source for post-war reconstruction to an influential, yet sometimes divisive, voice in the post-war political landscape. ### **Positive Impacts**: Diaspora remittances are a crucial economic lifeline, supporting thousands of families in the country. Post-2009, many have invested in small-scale businesses, agriculture, recreation and housing, contributing to the badly needed economic revival. Rebuilding of schools, places of worship, museums, literary organisations, and the revival of performance arts have been supported extensively through careful investments by the diaspora - Sinhala and Tamil. For example, the ‘Noolaham’ Foundation – conceived and funded almost exclusively by members of the diaspora, has successfully archived over 6.5 million pages of electronic records (180,000+ Documents) including books, newspapers, magazines and oral histories that are part of the Tamil community’s collective history. ![Noolaham Foundation is a non profit organisation creating digital archives of publications representing the intellectual and cultural life of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The anxiety created within the community by the destruction of the Jaffna library in 1981 provided the impetus to create an archive that cannot be destroyed by fire or state-sanctioned vandalism. Source: Google Images](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kix87hm4irjcsup.jpg) Noolaham Foundation is a non profit organisation creating digital archives of publications representing the intellectual and cultural life of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The anxiety created within the community by the destruction of the Jaffna library in 1981 provided the impetus to create an archive that cannot be destroyed by fire or state-sanctioned vandalism. Source: Google Images Registered Professional organisations and NGOs such as SLMDA, UK (Sri Lankan Medical and Dental Association), APSL UK (Association of Professionals of Sri Lanka, UK), IMHO (International Medical Health Organisation, USA), Manitha Neyam (UK), Hela Sarana (UK), Meththa Foundation (UK), Abayam (UK) and Vanni Hope (Australia) are some examples of Sri Lankan diaspora organisations that have positively intervened in the rebuilding of livelihoods and post war reconstruction. Many of these organisations have made notable contributions during the recent environmental and political disasters and the beneficiaries have come from all parts of Sri Lanka and across all divides. ![Prof. Thavam Thambipillai, President of International College of Surgeons and Vice President of IMHO performing the first kidney transplantation at Jaffna Teaching Hospital. Since then the IMHO has played a major role in the development of the Jaffna Hospital including a dedicated day surgery centre. IMHO’s interventions to date have benefitted all segments of the Sri Lankan society. Source: IMHO Web Page.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kixftzongdchlow.png) Prof. Thavam Thambipillai, President of International College of Surgeons and Vice President of IMHO performing the first kidney transplantation at Jaffna Teaching Hospital. Since then the IMHO has played a major role in the development of the Jaffna Hospital including a dedicated day surgery centre. IMHO’s interventions to date have benefitted all segments of the Sri Lankan society. Source: IMHO Web Page. ![Meththa Foundation UK, led by Dr B Panagamuwa, Birmingham, largely made up of the Sinhala diaspora in the UK has played a major role in the rehabilitation of people (including ex-combatants in the Vanni) who had lost limbs as a result of the war, road accidents and other natural causes. With delivery centres based in Mahawa (also called Maho, North Western Province), Mankulam (Northern Province) and Balapitiya (Southern Province), their services are available across the country. Source: Meththa Foundation Web Page.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kix74dvl9xchw72.jpg) Meththa Foundation UK, led by Dr B Panagamuwa, Birmingham, largely made up of the Sinhala diaspora in the UK has played a major role in the rehabilitation of people (including ex-combatants in the Vanni) who had lost limbs as a result of the war, road accidents and other natural causes. With delivery centres based in Mahawa (also called Maho, North Western Province), Mankulam (Northern Province) and Balapitiya (Southern Province), their services are available across the country. Source: Meththa Foundation Web Page. The diaspora has also been pivotal in keeping international attention on Sri Lanka, lobbying foreign governments and the UN for accountability and justice in the conduct of the war. By canvassing international opinion, the diaspora has in many instances dented the official position of the Sri Lankan state on many issues seen as inimical to wider society. It is fair to state that the ‘diaspora factor’ has been the single biggest reason why the exclusive ethnocentric projects and narratives initiated (and sponsored) by some previous regimes were toned down with subsequent governments adopting a more conciliatory approach. **Negative Impacts*:***For decades, segments of the diaspora provided significant funding to militant groups, enabling the prolongation of the conflict. Many of these groups had previously intimidated, coerced, or killed members of the community who challenged their ideology, creating a culture of fear among expatriates. The attack on late veteran journalist DBS Jeyaraj in Toronto stands out amongst such acts of violence and vile intimidation. Furthermore, inward remittances by the diaspora are not always evenly distributed, creating a divide that adds to socioeconomic tensions and worsening of poverty for some. A handful of diaspora organizations continue to hold on to the sectarian agenda that fuelled the war and promote narratives of a renewed nationalistic struggle. This group – scarred by the memories and losses of the past, often indulge in political narratives that do not address the pressing needs of their own people living in Sri Lanka. When it comes to reconciliation and the willingness to move forwards rectifying historical mistakes and forging a unified ‘SRI LANKAN’ brand, there exists a deep gulf between people living in Sri Lanka and the wider Sinhala and Tamil diaspora. These residual feelings - no doubt shaped by the lived experiences of the past, when amplified by diaspora funds, compels the state to move extremely cautiously making post-war reconciliation hard to materialise. ![Emotive rhetorics influencing future generations happen with regular frequency to coincide with commemoration events organised by the Tamil diaspora. These events are usually conducted at highly visible venues creating an environment of fear and paranoia. Whilst many of these fears over-estimate the abilities of the diaspora, it is clear that within such a climate, no state could accede to political settlements involving significant power devolution. Source: Wikimedia Commons](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kixeep6ypsiwmua.jpg) Emotive rhetorics influencing future generations happen with regular frequency to coincide with commemoration events organised by the Tamil diaspora. These events are usually conducted at highly visible venues creating an environment of fear and paranoia. Whilst many of these fears over-estimate the abilities of the diaspora, it is clear that within such a climate, no state could accede to political settlements involving significant power devolution. Source: Wikimedia Commons ![Demonstrations by the Tamil diaspora along a busy street in Toronto. Source: Wikimedia Commons](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kixgema8uhsdjlq.jpg) Demonstrations by the Tamil diaspora along a busy street in Toronto. Source: Wikimedia Commons ![Demonstrations by the Sinhala diaspora against Tamil attempts to seek accountability for incidents during the war. Source: Google Images](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/-living-there-while-being-here-wnwiic-kixumam97bgny8a.jpg) Demonstrations by the Sinhala diaspora against Tamil attempts to seek accountability for incidents during the war. Source: Google Images Some members of the diaspora (from both communities) have manipulated or discouraged local politicians in Sri Lanka from following the politics of moderation. By fuelling extreme narratives, these groups make it difficult for moderate voices from either side to emerge and facilitate dialogues towards meaningful reconciliation. While many groups and organisations are transitioning towards humanitarian and developmental engagement, a resistant cohort continues to engage in "exile politics" that - inadvertently or by design, hinder reconciliation. Funding provided - perhaps in good faith, to vociferous ‘social media heroes’ in the political space - on the basis that the established political parties have ‘*not solved the* *problems*’, introduces a new layer of complexity. In any political dispute, the longer the issue is allowed to fester, in search of political utopias - that do not stand up to scrutiny in an interconnected world, the more likely it is to damage the long term interests of all parties concerned. Political parties must therefore be free to seek compromises that address the basic needs and concerns of their electorates without being bound to narratives of a by-gone era. They have to balance the needs/demands of the community against the changing ground realities including the aspirations/sensitivities of major global powers. Short-sighted slogans and emotive rhetorics generated overseas add credence to an intransigent state’s unwillingness (or inability) to take bold decisions necessary for building an inclusive SRI LANKAN brand. Seeking compromise - by all parties concerned, is not betrayal. It is pragmatic politics. The diaspora has a pivotal role in shaping this politics of moderation and compromise, essential for Sri Lanka’s long term stability and the wellbeing of all its people. ***The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not represent the views of the University of Manchester on this subject.*** ### The NPP Government's Public Service Scandal That the Supreme Court Found Unconstitutional URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-npp-governments-public-service-scandal-that-the-supreme-court-found-unconstitutional/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T16:38:42.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** On the morning of Dec. 17, 2024, W.S. Sathyananda, a Special Grade officer of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service with nearly three decades of experience, sent a brief WhatsApp message to his superior. Having just reported for duty as Additional Secretary at the Ministry of Transport, Highways, Ports, and Civil Aviation, he requested an appointment to pay a courtesy call. The response he received that afternoon would lead to a Supreme Court case — W.S. Sathyananda v. Prof. Kapila Perera and Others (SC (FR) Application No. 8/2025) — a ruling that has drawn a firm constitutional line around the limits of executive authority over Sri Lanka's public service. "Regret very much that we have consented with the concurrence of the Hon. Minister to another officer who brought a request," wrote Prof. Kapila Perera, the ministry secretary and former Vice Chancellor of the University of Moratuwa, in a message later produced before the Court as evidence. "Accordingly, I shall inform the Public Administration Secretary. Apologies." Despite the message, Sathyananda reported for work the following morning. According to evidence before the Court, Prof. Perera visited his office shortly after noon and informed him that his services would not be required and that he should leave. Sathyananda described the language used as unbecoming of a senior public official. In the weeks that followed, Sathyananda returned to the so-called "officers' pool" at the Ministry of Public Administration, where senior civil servants await assignments after transfers or postings. It was the second time in less than three months that he had found himself without a substantive appointment. ### **THE RULING** ![W.S. Sathyananda](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/the-npp-government-s-public-se-O29SCI-kixbtugjhwjn3xa.png) W.S. Sathyananda On 19 May 2026, the Supreme Court found that what Perera had done was not merely improper. It was unconstitutional. In a judgment delivered by Justice Arjuna Obeyesekere, with the concurrence of Justices Janak De Silva and Dr. Sobhitha Rajakaruna, the Court held that Perera had acted arbitrarily and outside the scope of his authority by interfering with powers that are constitutionally vested in the Public Service Commission. The Court found that these actions amounted to a violation of Sathyananda's fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 12(1) of the Constitution — the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law. In its 22-page judgment, the Court grounded its ruling in the Public Trust Doctrine — the principle that power conferred on a public official is held in trust for the people and may be exercised only for the purposes for which it was conferred. The Court found that Perera's conduct violated that trust, breached the constitutional guarantee of equality, and undermined Sathyananda's dignity both as a human being and as a public officer. No compensation was awarded. The Court said, with evident deliberateness, that no amount of money could restore what had been taken: "the loss of dignity, the embarrassment and the humiliation that the Petitioner had to undergo as a result of the arbitrary actions of the 1st Respondent." ### **THE FACTS** The sequence of events, meticulously reconstructed from affidavits, official correspondence, and the WhatsApp exchange, reveals a Ministry Secretary operating well outside his constitutional lane — and, crucially, doing so with the concurrence of his minister. Sathyananda had been assigned to the officers' pool in late September 2024, following the post-election restructuring of Cabinet Ministries under the incoming NPP administration. Unable to secure a posting through passive waiting, he identified his own vacancy — an opening for Additional Secretary at the Transport Ministry — and applied for it. The Ministry of Public Administration, acting on his application, sought approval from the Public Service Commission and directed him to report on 16 December 2024, subject to the Commission's covering approval. That formal approval was granted on 19 December. By that point, however, Perera had already acted. Before the Commission had even deliberated, he had identified his own preferred candidate — an officer attached to the Irrigation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture — and, with the concurrence of Minister Bimal Rathnayake, committed to appointing her to the vacancy. He then told Sathyananda, face-to-face, to leave the building. The Court was pointed in its assessment of Perera's stated justification. In his letter to the Ministry of Public Administration dated 18 December 2024, Perera had argued that the officer he preferred possessed expertise relevant to the Ministry's subject area. The Court found that claim unsupported by the facts: the preferred candidate worked in project management within the irrigation sector, while the vacancy Sathyananda had been appointed to fill was for administration and finance. "The claim that an officer with relevant expertise had been identified to fill the vacancy does not appear to be correct," the judgment states. The preferred candidate's formal request to transfer to the Transport Ministry materialised only on 24 December — six days after Sathyananda had already been ejected from the building. ### **THE CONSTITUTIONAL STAKES** The judgment is explicit that the case is not merely about one civil servant's wounded dignity. "This application does not only concern the Petitioner," Justice Obeyesekere wrote, "but brings into play certain important Constitutional safeguards relating to the Public Service of this Country." Article 55(3) of the Constitution vests the appointment, promotion, transfer, disciplinary control, and dismissal of public officers exclusively in the Public Service Commission — not in Ministry Secretaries, and not in ministers. Article 61C(1) goes further: it makes it a criminal offence, punishable by up to seven years' imprisonment, for any person to directly or indirectly influence or attempt to influence any decision of the Commission. The Court found that by pre-selecting a candidate and then blocking the Commission's duly appointed officer from assuming duties, Perera had arrogated to himself powers the Constitution places solely with the Commission. "This conduct on the part of the 1st Respondent is clearly outside the confines of the Constitutionally recognized framework, undermines the Rule of Law and thereby contravenes the trust placed by the People in the 1st Respondent as a public officer," the judgment states. "Recruitment and appointment of persons to positions in the public sector cannot be left to be decided according to the whims and fancies of persons in authority," the Court said, applying its own prior jurisprudence — then found that Perera had done exactly that. The Court also directed pointed criticism at the Public Service Commission itself, which waited more than a month after receiving Sathyananda's formal complaint before issuing its letter upholding his appointment — by which time he had already filed the fundamental rights petition and, in what the Court described as "sheer frustration," accepted a different posting. "The delay of over a month in addressing the predicament faced by the Petitioner displays a complete lack of concern for the rights and interests of the Petitioner," the judgment states. The Commission, it added, must act not only independently but swiftly, since delay may itself amount to the denial of equal protection. ### **RESIGNATION AND WIDER CONTEXT** Days after the ruling, sources confirmed that Perera had formally informed the Ministry of Public Administration of his decision to resign, and that President Anura Kumara Dissanayake had been informed. Perera is expected to return to university service. The resignation lands at an awkward moment for Minister Bimal Rathnayake's portfolio. The Court's judgment specifically noted that Perera had acted "with the concurrence of the Hon. Minister" in blocking Sathyananda — a finding that implicates the Minister in the constitutional breach, even though Rathnayake was not separately found to have violated the petitioner's rights. The Ministry has also seen a string of other high-profile departures, including the resignation of its Media Secretary, who publicly cited an inability to work with the Minister. Rathnayake was stripped of his Ports and Civil Aviation portfolio in a Cabinet reshuffle in October 2025. The Court's final finding bound three threads together. Perera had acted arbitrarily. He had breached the public trust placed in him by the Constitution. And he had violated the dignity that Sathyananda was entitled to as a human being and as a public officer. Article 12(1), the Court held, is not an abstract guarantee — it is the instrument through which human dignity is protected against exactly this kind of conduct. The judgment declared the fundamental rights of the petitioner violated. It awarded no compensation. The Court said there was nothing money could restore. Sathyananda had the resources and legal knowledge to fight back. Most do not. Officials and administrators across multiple ministries — many of them career civil servants with no affiliation to the NPP or its parent party, the JVP — told Jaffna Monitor that the case resonated because it reflected concerns they had quietly voiced for months. They described a public service increasingly shaped, in their view, by political loyalty rather than established constitutional norms. The deeper problem, several observers argued, lies in the NPP leadership's attempt to transplant into government a culture forged within a highly disciplined party organisation. In the JVP, the centre commands and the cadre executes. That model may function within a political movement. It does not function within a constitutional order that deliberately insulates the public service from partisan control — and that has spent decades building jurisprudence to enforce that insulation. The Kapila Perera case was a single judgment concerning a single officer. But for many of those who spoke to Jaffna Monitor, it illuminated something the Supreme Court had now said plainly: that the public service belongs to the people, not to those who happen to hold power over it. ### Japan, FAO Launch $1.33 Million Project to Rebuild Eastern Province Fisheries After Cyclone Damage URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/japan-fao-launch-1-33-million-project-to-rebuild-eastern-province-fisheries-after-cyclone-damage/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T15:59:44.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — The Government of Japan and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in partnership with the Sri Lankan government, have launched a $1.33 million initiative aimed at restoring inland fisheries and strengthening the resilience of fishing communities affected by Cyclone Ditwah in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. The project, which will run from June 2026 through November 2027, will focus on the districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee, where severe flooding caused by the cyclone devastated reservoir-based fisheries and disrupted the livelihoods of thousands of families dependent on inland fishing. The agreement was signed at the Japanese Embassy in Colombo by Japan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Akio Isomata, and FAO Representative for Sri Lanka and the Maldives, Vimlendra Sharan, in the presence of Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar. Cyclone Ditwah triggered extensive flooding across the Eastern Province, damaging fisheries infrastructure, destroying fish stocks, and disrupting breeding and stocking cycles in reservoirs. According to project officials, the losses significantly reduced fish production and incomes in communities already facing economic hardship. The initiative seeks to restore production through reservoir restocking programs, the installation of barrier nets, the introduction of floating fish-rearing cages, and the procurement of breeding materials needed to rebuild fish populations. Officials said the project will directly assist 1,504 fishers across 30 reservoirs while indirectly benefiting more than 6,000 family members through improved food security and household incomes. It is expected to support the stocking of approximately 5.48 million fish fingerlings and establish community-managed cage systems capable of producing up to 16 million fingerlings annually. Speaking at the launch, Mr. Chandrasekar said inland fishing communities in the Eastern Province had suffered severe setbacks from the cyclone and required sustained support to recover. “This partnership with the Government of Japan and FAO will help rebuild fish stocks, restore incomes, and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable fishing families against future climate-related shocks,” he said. Mr. Isomata described the project as both a recovery effort and a long-term investment in climate resilience. He noted that measures such as floating rearing cages and barrier nets were intended not only to restore lost fisheries resources but also to reduce future damage from extreme weather events. He also highlighted the strategic importance of inland fisheries as a source of affordable protein at a time when marine fishing faces rising fuel costs. Mr. Sharan said the program would focus on helping communities rebuild productive capacity while creating more sustainable and climate-resilient fisheries systems. “Through reservoir restocking, improved fingerling production, protective infrastructure, and community capacity building, FAO is supporting affected fishers to restore livelihoods, improve food security, and strengthen resilience to future climate shocks,” he said. The project will be implemented by FAO in collaboration with the Ministry of Fisheries, the National Aquaculture Development Authority of Sri Lanka, and local Culture-Based Fisheries Organizations. Planned activities include technical training on fish rearing, cage management, barrier-net maintenance, and sustainable fisheries governance. ### Sritharan Urges Immediate Release of Valikamam North Lands as Weekly Protests Enter Sixth Week URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-8/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T15:40:25.000Z **MAYILIDDY, Sri Lanka —** S. Sritharan, a lawmaker representing the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), on Friday called on President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to immediately release military-held lands in Valikamam North, where displaced residents have been staging weekly protests demanding the return of their ancestral properties nearly 17 years after the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war. Mr. Sritharan made the appeal while addressing a black-flag demonstration that entered its sixth consecutive week. Organized by residents from several Grama Niladhari divisions in Valikamam North, the protest was held outside the military commander’s bungalow in the High Security Zone area of northern Jaffna. The protesters, many of whom were displaced during the conflict, are seeking the return of privately owned lands that remain under military control despite repeated pledges by successive governments to release them. Speaking to the gathering, Mr. Sritharan said families forced to leave the area in June 1990 continued to be denied the opportunity to return to their homes and rebuild their lives. “Thirty-six years after they were displaced, and seventeen years after the war ended, many of these people are still living with relatives, friends, or in rented accommodation,” he said. Mr. Sritharan accused the government of failing to fulfill promises made before coming to power. “The present administration promised to release these lands, yet nearly two years after taking office, the issue remains unresolved,” he said. He argued that much of the land was no longer being retained for legitimate security purposes and alleged that portions of it were being used for military-run agricultural activities. “If international organizations and human rights observers visit these areas, they will see that these lands are not being used solely for military camps,” he said. “The people simply want to cultivate their own lands and earn their livelihoods.” The continued occupation of private land remains one of the most sensitive post-war issues in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. Although the military has returned significant areas since the conflict ended in 2009, residents and Tamil political leaders contend that substantial tracts of ancestral land remain inaccessible to their owners. Mr. Sritharan said he had requested updated information from security authorities on the extent of land still under military control and the number of families awaiting resettlement ahead of a District Coordinating Committee meeting scheduled for June 19 at the Jaffna District Secretariat. He said the information would form the basis of further efforts to pressure the government to accelerate land releases and facilitate the resettlement of displaced families. The demonstrations have become a weekly fixture in Valikamam North, with protesters rejecting official claims that the continued military presence is necessary for security and arguing that prolonged occupation has prevented thousands of families from returning to their lands decades after their displacement. “Rather than offering empty promises and delaying tactics, the government must listen to the legitimate demands of these people and take immediate steps to resettle them on their own lands,” Mr. Sritharan said. ### Jaffna Judge Who Took On Drug Networks and Political Power Is Transferred URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-judge-who-took-on-drug-networks-and-political-power-is-transferred/ Last updated: 2026-06-06T10:40:09.000Z **By Aruliniyan Mahalingam** For six years, a woman from the Pommaveli area of Jaffna — known to police and lawyers alike as one of the district’s most persistent narcotics dealers — had walked in and out of courtrooms, exploiting successive bail hearings to remain free and, according to legal sources, continue trafficking. She had been arrested in June 2020 for possession of 1.475 grams of heroin. Six years of adjournments, applications, and legal manoeuvring produced no conviction. On May 21, 2026, that changed. A newly appointed Jaffna High Court judge, A.G. Alexraja, sentenced the woman to seven years of rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 100,000, with an additional 12 months of simple imprisonment if the fine was not paid. Seven days later, Judge Alexraja was transferred. His posting to the Jaffna High Court was terminated with immediate effect. He has been reassigned to the Badulla High Court, roughly 350 kilometers away in the island's central highlands. No public explanation has been given. High Court judges in Sri Lanka are ordinarily expected to serve at a station for three to four years before transfer. The transfer has provoked outrage within Jaffna’s legal fraternity. Lawyers who spoke with Jaffna Monitor described it as an instance of political interference in the judiciary, arguing that the move was driven not by any administrative failing on the judge’s part, but by his aggressive handling of narcotics-related cases and his willingness to scrutinise state action. Lawyers are reportedly planning a continuous strike in protest. "The judiciary exists to question the government when necessary," one lawyer told Jaffna Monitor. "Even governments can make mistakes, and it is the duty of judges to intervene and ask questions under the law." ### **THE GOVERNOR'S COMPLAINT** According to legal sources, the formal mechanism preceding the transfer was a letter sent by the Governor of the Northern Province to higher authorities, alleging that Judge Alexraja was impeding the functioning of the state machinery. The specific case cited in the complaint, according to sources familiar with the matter, involved a writ petition filed by Point Pedro Urban Council Chairman Douglas De Paul and council member Sivalingam Ponnambalam against a provincial inquiry initiated by the Governor over decisions taken by the council, including the relocation of a public market. On April 27, 2026, Judge Alexraja, after issuing notice to the respondents through counsel under Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, granted a two-week interim order temporarily halting the inquiry proceedings. During the hearings, lawyers for the petitioners argued that the inquiry was politically motivated and pointed to a social media post by Member of Parliament Rajeevan Jeyachandramoorthy, who had commented on the gazette notification before its official publication. During subsequent proceedings, however, respondents argued that the post had been based on a Sinhala-language version of the gazette notice that had already circulated online and was later translated using Google Translate, rather than on any confidential advance release of the document. On May 18, 2026, Judge Alexraja vacated the interim order and dismissed the petition, ultimately ruling in favour of the administration. Legal sources said the interim order — which temporarily halted the provincial inquiry process for roughly three weeks — nevertheless became a central point of contention and was later cited as one of the factors behind the complaint that preceded his transfer. Lawyers who spoke with *Jaffna Monitor* said that if there were concerns about the legal soundness of any of Judge Alexraja's rulings, the established remedy would ordinarily have been to challenge those decisions through the appellate courts, including the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. "The proper mechanism for addressing disagreements with judicial decisions is the appeals process," one lawyer said. "When dissatisfaction with a judgment is addressed through efforts to influence a judge's posting rather than through the courts, it raises serious concerns about judicial independence and risks creating a troubling precedent." Several lawyers stressed that judicial transfers fall within the authority of the Judicial Service Commission. However, they argued that any perception that external political or administrative pressure may have played a role in a transfer linked to a judicial decision could undermine public confidence in the independence of the judiciary. ### **MINISTER'S ALLEGED ROLE** Credible legal sources told Jaffna Monitor that Minister Bimal Rathnayake, the NPP’s coordinator for the Northern Province, was perceived by sections of the legal community as having been involved in discussions surrounding the transfer. Sources further alleged that a retired judge, whom some members of the legal community accused of having a long record of corruption, also influenced the decision behind the scenes. Jaffna Monitor could not independently verify either allegation. ### **A CRACKDOWN THAT WAS BEGINNING TO BITE** The Pommaveli conviction was not an isolated decision. In the week preceding it, Judge Alexraja sentenced several individuals convicted in narcotics cases to lengthy terms of rigorous imprisonment. Legal sources said there had been a noticeable increase in drug-related arrests and convictions during Alexraja's brief tenure of just over a month at the Jaffna High Court. They attributed the trend to his uncompromising approach to narcotics cases, including the frequent denial of bail and the imposition of stringent sentences upon conviction. His handling of criminal cases also drew praise from sections of the local media. One Tamil-language newspaper observed that, at a time when criminal prosecutions often take years to reach a conclusion, it was remarkable that cases before the Jaffna courts were being heard and decided within a comparatively short period. The newspaper argued that such firm sentencing had been widely welcomed by the public and could serve as a deterrent to repeat offending. "If he had continued for a few more months, the big cats of the drug mafia in Jaffna would have been in jail," one legal source told Jaffna Monitor. "Whatever reasons the government may offer, the primary reason for this transfer is his action against the drug lords. Everything else is secondary." Lawyers described the scale of the narcotics problem in Jaffna in stark terms. On any given day, they said, a significant proportion of those appearing before the Jaffna courts are under the age of 25 and face drug-related charges. According to several lawyers, the crisis has come to be seen as one of the defining social challenges facing the post-war generation, with narcotics increasingly ensnaring young people across the peninsula. They said Alexraja viewed the issue not merely as a criminal justice problem but as a threat to an entire generation. The judge's approach reflected that concern. Lawyers said obtaining bail in narcotics cases had become, in the words of one attorney, "nearly impossible" under his watch. Another lawyer told Jaffna Monitor that Alexraja saw himself as engaged in a broader effort to rescue young people from the grip of drug abuse. "Wherever he was posted, whether in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, or Akkaraipattu, he took a hard line against the drug trade," the lawyer said. "He was known for delivering tough judgments that drug traffickers feared." Sources told Jaffna Monitor that major narcotics figures in Jaffna had begun to feel the pressure of Judge Alexraja’s sentencing approach, and that his transfer was perceived within those networks as a relief. ### **THE VIHARA CASE: A SECOND MOTIVE** A second factor cited by legal sources concerns the Thaiyiddy Buddhist vihara in Valikamam North — a structure constructed illegally on privately owned Tamil land without the required approvals or permissions from the relevant planning authorities. Sources told Jaffna Monitor that a prominent lawyer had been compiling evidence to file a writ petition seeking a mandamus order against the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha for allegedly failing to carry out its statutory duty to act against the unauthorised structure. The anticipated case sought to compel the Pradeshiya Sabha to fulfill its legal obligations under Sri Lankan law. Structures erected without valid planning approval are subject to enforcement action, including demolition orders by the relevant authorities — a principle that courts in Jaffna have recently applied in other cases, including the removal of an unauthorised third floor at Parameswara Junction in Thirunelvely West and the demolition of unauthorised boundary walls in the Nallur area. Sources said that had Judge Alexraja remained in office, his record of adhering strictly to the law and resisting external or political pressure suggested he may have been inclined to issue an order directing the Pradeshiya Sabha to take action against the structure. Several sources identified this as one of the factors they believed contributed to the pressure surrounding his transfer. ### **A JUDGE OF UNUSUAL RECORD** Lawyers who practiced before Judge Alexraja during his tenure at the Mallakam Court described what they said was a marked transformation in the jurisdiction during his posting. “Incidents of rowdyism and violent sword attacks were once rampant in the Mallakam court jurisdiction. If you had a dispute with a youth in those days — however minor — he could return the same day with a gang armed with swords,” one lawyer told Jaffna Monitor. Such incidents, which lawyers said had once appeared before the courts on an almost daily basis, declined sharply during Alexraja’s tenure and eventually became rare. Lawyers attributed the change directly to his consistent sentencing approach, saying that offenders involved in violent crimes and gang-related intimidation were routinely sentenced to prison without exception. He also cleared a case backlog that lawyers described as one of the most intractable in the Northern Province. Among the disputes he resolved were the *Ayakkadavai Pillaiyar* Temple case, which had remained pending for approximately twenty-seven years; the *Innuvil* Theatre dispute, unresolved for more than three decades; and the *Seerani Nagapoosani* Amman Temple case, which had lingered for around sixteen years. Lawyers noted a structural problem in the judicial system whereby judges were informally assessed by the number of cases disposed of rather than their complexity or historical sensitivity, creating incentives to avoid difficult, long-pending matters. Alexraja, they said, did the opposite. “In Mallakam, he almost cleared the old backlog,” one lawyer told Jaffna Monitor. “That is extremely rare in the legal fraternity.” During the hearing of the *Seerani Nagapoosani Amman* Temple case, Alexraja, a Christian, reportedly adopted a vegetarian diet for the duration of the proceedings and immersed himself in the documentary record before delivering judgment. Lawyers who were present said the gesture reflected his understanding that courts, in cases touching on religious and community identity, carry obligations beyond legal technicality. Lawyers also recalled his intervention against alleged police misconduct within the Mallakam jurisdiction. Following complaints from families of accused persons that certain police officers were pressuring suspects to retain only a select group of lawyers — claiming that only those lawyers could secure bail or settle cases — Alexraja convened a special meeting with practicing lawyers and strongly condemned the conduct. He warned that officers engaged in such practices could face severe disciplinary action. Lawyers said the episode illustrated his view that access to independent legal representation was a fundamental safeguard, and that the judiciary had an obligation to protect ordinary citizens from coercion by state actors. One incident from his tenure at the Mallakam Court, frequently cited by lawyers as illustrative of his courtroom standards, involved a court assistant whose mobile phone rang during proceedings. Judge Alexraja ordered police to confiscate the phone and had the officer remanded and produced before him. He later dismissed the matter after issuing a severe warning. Lawyers said the episode reflected his insistence that no one within his courtroom, including his own staff, was exempt from its standards. He was, according to lawyers who worked with him, one of the few judges in the Northern Province to arrive at court by 8 a.m. and remain past 4:30 p.m. consistently. Lawyers said he would remove his shoes before stepping onto the bench, approaching the judicial seat with the reverence ordinarily reserved for a place of worship. He maintained the same practice when entering his chambers. No corruption allegation has, at any point in his career, been made against him. “He is among the rarest of rare judges,” one lawyer told Jaffna Monitor. “Honest, disciplined, and completely unafraid.” The judge himself reportedly received news of the transfer with composure. He reportedly told colleagues he was prepared to serve anywhere in the country and was not afraid of being moved. ### **CONCERNS OVER JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE** Beyond the specifics of the Alexraja transfer, lawyers told Jaffna Monitor the episode amounted to a message from the NPP government to every judge in the Northern Province and other Tamil-majority areas: decisions that displease the administration carry consequences. "This should be considered direct interference in the judicial system," one lawyer said. "The judiciary must be free of political influence." One lawyer who described himself as a supporter of the NPP government warned that the transfer could backfire politically. "This government came to power promising zero tolerance for corruption and abuse of power," he said. "But now a judge who enjoys enormous goodwill among ordinary people is being transferred under controversial circumstances. People who supported this government because of its accountability promises may begin to question whether those principles are being applied consistently." Several lawyers privately expressed concern that the transfer would discourage younger judges from delivering bold or independent decisions in sensitive matters. “The danger is not only about one transfer,” one lawyer said. “The danger is the message it sends to every other judge watching.” One senior lawyer told Jaffna Monitor that even during periods of past authoritarian governance in Sri Lanka, interference of this nature in judicial postings had not been seen at this level. The NPP government, which came to power in late 2024 explicitly on a platform of anti-corruption and institutional reform, has not publicly addressed the transfer or the grounds on which it was approved. The episode carries particular resonance in the Northern Province, where Tamil citizens have historically viewed the judiciary as one of the few institutions capable of providing protection from political interference, military overreach, and administrative excess. Among many people in Jaffna, the courts have long been regarded as one of the few institutions still capable of delivering justice when other state structures failed them. The perception that judicial postings in Tamil-majority areas may now be influenced by the preferences of a government-aligned governor and cabinet minister has deepened longstanding anxieties about institutional interference and political capture in Sri Lanka’s post-war North. ### DBS Jeyaraj: The Man Who Lifted the Cadjan Curtain URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/dbs-jeyaraj-the-man-who-lifted-the-cadjan-curtain/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T04:30:35.000Z **By Vijitha Yapa** ### **An Unlikely Recruit** Dressed in a well-ironed white shirt — unusual for a journalist — the man standing in front of me to be interviewed was a scribe working for the Tamil newspaper *Veerakesari*. D.B.S. Jeyaraj was a friend of our Features Editor, Ajith Samaranayake, and had come for an interview to join *The Island* newspaper in 1981\. I was a bit sceptical, as I soon found out that he had never worked for an English-language newspaper. But since Ajith was a good, responsible journalist, I decided to interview Jeyaraj with an open mind. I found that he was well informed about news pertaining to Tamil politics and decided to test his skills by asking him to cover the cabinet briefing by Cabinet spokesman Ananda Tissa de Alwis and write a report. He could not type, but he wrote out the report and gave it to me in the afternoon. His handwritten text was in large letters, and each foolscap page contained only about ten words. But the report was good. Mr. Upali Wijewardene had given me the authority to recruit journalists and offer them high salaries on the spot, which helped in recruiting people at short notice. I asked Jeyaraj what salary he was receiving at the time and offered him double that amount. Jeyaraj opened his eyes wide and said he would give a month’s notice and then join. I told him the offer was valid for only three hours, and that if he wanted the job, he had to make a decision immediately. That is how Jeyaraj joined *The Sunday Island*. A picture I had seen of him earlier showed him with a grown beard. But in front of me was a person on whom there was no trace of hair on his face. I didn’t question him about that, but discovered later that Ajith had advised him to cut off his beard “because Mr. Yapa does not like bearded people.” That fact was false, but anyway, Jeyaraj got the job. ### **Behind the Cadjan Curtain** At that time, I felt that the biggest problem in the South was that people did not understand what was happening in the North. I wanted someone who would write about events, personalities, and the evolving trends in the North and East, and unravel the divisions that I could see were developing. But what should his column be called? Various suggestions were made until we agreed on four words. Thus was born Jeyaraj’s “Behind the Cadjan Curtain” — similar to the term “Behind the Bamboo Curtain,” which referred to news unravelling from China at that time. The column was enthusiastically received by readers and was one of the main articles in *The Sunday Island*. The information in it was scrutinised carefully by the Government to understand what was occurring in the North, according to intelligence sources. Jeyaraj’s beard began to grow back. On a number of occasions, I sent him to Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa to write and report on developments there. ### **The Biryani Incident** Apart from politics, there is one incident involving Gamini Weerakoon, my Deputy Editor, and Jeyaraj that remains embossed in my mind. On Friday nights, we had to work on two newspapers, *The Sunday Island* and *The Daily Island*. Friday night was Biryani night, and we usually sent one of our staff members to get the food. But on that night, Gamini decided to fetch it himself and asked Jeyaraj whether he could accompany him to Lion House in Bambalapitiya. They left at about ten o’clock, but even by midnight there had been no communication from them. There were no mobile phones like today, and we did not know the reason for the delay. Finally, at about 1 a.m., there was a call from Gamini at the Fort Police Station. He had been arrested by the police for driving through the only functioning red traffic light signal in the city at the time, at the Colpetty junction. The policeman at this stage decided to grab the phone from Gamini, and I asked him what the problem was. He said this person was drunk and that he wanted him to undergo a breathalyser test. Gamini had refused and said that he could not blow into used condoms. In addition to crossing the red traffic light signal, this verbal exchange had annoyed the traffic policeman, and both Gamini and Jeyaraj were taken to the police station. Despite my pleas, he refused to release Gamini. I then had no alternative but to wake up a friend who was a DIG, explain the situation to him, and plead with him to get the two journalists released — along with our biryani packets, as we could not finish the newspapers without them. He laughed and told me to go personally to the police station, and that he would ask the police officer to release them. ### **Black July** I never found any occasion where we had to explain or clarify Jeyaraj’s writing. This was a major achievement for any journalist and demonstrated the quality of his reporting. In July 1983, during the Black July riots, Ajith and Jeyaraj came to see me in the editor’s room and said that although Jeyaraj was sleeping in the office because he could not go to his boarding house, some Sinhala people had threatened him and he feared for his safety. I was very concerned and told Jeyaraj to bring whatever clothes and other items he had and to come with me. Straight to my house in Colombo 05\. There, I explained the situation to my wife, and her mother said that she would like to give him a room for a few days. They were very worried, but agreed because of the crisis situation. I had worked in many countries around the world with Rajmohan Gandhi, the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, and knew firsthand what it was like to live in countries where there was animosity due to racial hatred. This was a realistic situation in which theories about humanity were deaf chants. What was needed was treating people as individuals and not looking at them through race-coloured spectacles. Suddenly, the situation became real. Though we all realised that there could be dangerous racial mobs, here was a real situation in which a person’s life was at stake. Even in a column he wrote last year, Jeyaraj was appreciative of the action we had taken to safeguard him. ### **The Sunday Times and the Dixit Years** When I started *The Sunday Times* as Editor in 1987, Jeyaraj was one of the first people I sought to assist us with the birth of the new newspaper. One of the first stories he wrote was about Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit burning files in gunny bags at the back of his residence on Thurstan Road. He was worried that if mobs took over his house, his confidential documents falling into the hands of enemies would create an embarrassing situation for India. The story was never contradicted by the Indian High Commission. Jeyaraj came under tremendous pressure from Mr. Dixit, who was called — by him and another *Sunday Times* staffer, Qadri Ismail — “India’s Viceroy.” After the Indian Peace Keeping Force arrived in Sri Lanka in 1987, Jeyaraj’s writings caused tremendous pressure for J.N. Dixit. An interview with LTTE deputy leader Mahattaya invoked the wrath of Dixit, who pressured the Sri Lankan government to arrest Jeyaraj and keep him on the fourth floor of the CID Building. ### **Unbowed in Toronto** After his release from custody, he ventured to Harvard University and then made his way to Canada. Jeyaraj not only raised the ire of Dixit, but also that of Prabhakaran, due to his writings on how the LTTE even got rid of Tamils who were opposed to its activities. These were spotlighted in a newspaper that Jeyaraj published in Toronto. When warnings to curb his negative criticism of the LTTE were ignored, Canadian supporters in Toronto accosted him in a car park and assaulted him, including breaking his legs. But when Jeyaraj continued his writing, they visited Tamil shops in Toronto that sold his newspaper and stopped the sale of his publications. Jeyaraj kept in touch, and we met when I visited Canada for a family function. Jeyaraj spent a lot of time with me talking about his experiences. Physically, he was down, but his spirits were sky-high. He would not be cowed down by threats and physical assaults. He said he was working on his autobiography and would like me to publish it. But it was never completed. ### **A True Journalist** In January this year, I sent him a copy of Prof. G.L. Peiris’s book on negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, which he began to read with interest. The book review was never completed because Jeyaraj became very ill and finally died last week. He was the embodiment of a true journalist who could not be intimidated. He was an example of a man who not only wrote about the Tamils, but also actively stood up for fair play, irrespective of whatever race or religion he was born into. ***Vijitha Yapa is the Founder Editor of* The Sunday Island, The Daily Island, and The Sunday Times.** **(courtesy Sunday Times)** ### Police Question Sons of Late LTTE Singer S.G. Santhan Over Song at Temple Festival in Jaffna URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/police-question-sons-of-late-ltte-singer-s-g-santhan-over-song-at-temple-festival-in-jaffna/ Last updated: 2026-05-30T00:28:29.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lankan police questioned two members of a Tamil music troupe this week after performers sang a song associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam during a temple festival in northern Sri Lanka, according to police. The two performers, identified as Gokulan and Darwin, sons of the late Tamil singer S.G. Santhan, were summoned to the Kopay Police Station following the incident at a festival in Urumpirai, in Jaffna district. Police said the song performed during the event contained Eelam-themed content associated with the LTTE, which remains banned under Sri Lankan anti-terrorism laws nearly 17 years after the end of the country’s civil war. Officers deployed for security duties at the event intervened and halted the performance midway, according to police and local reports. No charges had been announced as of Wednesday, and the government has not publicly commented on the incident. The troupe takes its name from S.G. Santhan — born Sellappa Gunaratinam Santhalingam — a singer, dramatist, and one of the LTTE’s best-known cultural figures during Sri Lanka’s civil war. Santhan, who died on Feb. 26, 2017, remained among the most recognizable Tamil musical figures to emerge from the conflict years. The troupe is now run by members of his surviving family. Santhan recorded approximately 150 songs associated with the LTTE, many of which became emblematic of the armed struggle. Among his most recognized songs are “Kallarai Meniyar Kan Thirappargale Karthigai Naalile” (“On Karthigai Day, those lying in the graves will open their eyes”) and “Ullukkulle Nerupperiyum” (“A fire burns within”). Santhan himself surrendered to Sri Lankan security forces during the final stages of the war in 2009\. According to people familiar with events at the time, Douglas Devananda — the former Tamil militant who later became a cabinet minister — intervened following Santhan’s detention and lobbied for his release. Santhan was subsequently freed. In the years that followed, Santhan publicly performed songs praising Mr. Devananda, a move that drew criticism from sections of the Tamil diaspora and pro-LTTE supporters. ### Gajendrakumar Accuses Government of Misleading Tamils on Military-Held Lands URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/gajendrakumar-accuses-government-of-misleading-tamils-on-military-held-lands/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T04:30:37.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, the leader of the Tamil National People's Front and a member of Parliament, on Wednesday accused the Sri Lankan government of creating false expectations among displaced communities in the country's north, saying military officials had rejected several requests for the return of civilian-owned land during a closed-door meeting earlier this week. Mr. Gajendrakumar's remarks directly contradicted public statements by Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar, who had suggested that the discussions had produced positive results. The meeting was held at the Northern Province Governor's Secretariat. "The meeting concluded without the military authorities providing any positive response regarding land releases," Mr. Gajendrakumar told reporters at his party's headquarters in Jaffna. He said several requests had been "categorically rejected," while others received only vague assurances that they would be "considered." The government has not publicly responded to his allegations, and no formal announcement, gazette notification, or timeline for land releases has been issued. The dispute came a day after senior defense officials — including the Deputy Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Army — toured military-held lands in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Mannar districts. Security sources had described those inspections as preliminary steps linked to possible future releases. Among the areas visited were lands near the Jaffna-Kilinochchi border at Iyakkachchi, portions of the Valikamam North High Security Zone near Palaly, and civilian-owned land adjacent to the Mullikulam Naval Base in Mannar district. Officials familiar with the inspections indicated that preparatory administrative work — including mapping and coordination with district secretariats — could proceed following the visits, but stopped short of saying releases were imminent. Mr. Gajendrakumar also criticized the government for excluding opposition lawmakers and locally elected officials from the discussions. "If the discussion concerned Valikamam North land releases, representatives of the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha should have been invited," he said. "Without inviting the genuine representatives elected by the people, the government is attempting to create false expectations among the public." Military-occupied land remains among the most contentious unresolved issues in Sri Lanka's Tamil-majority north and east. Thousands of acres seized during and after the civil war — which ended in 2009 — remain under the control of the security forces nearly 17 years later. Successive governments have announced partial releases since the war's end, but displaced families and civil society groups say the process has repeatedly stalled and lacked transparency. ### China Calls for Stronger U.N. Authority, Criticises Unilateral Actions at Security Council Session URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/china-calls-for-stronger-u-n-authority-criticises-unilateral-actions-at-security-council-session/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T12:43:28.000Z **UNITED NATIONS —** China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on the United Nations Security Council to reassert its authority over international security matters and urged member states to stop bypassing the body through unilateral military action and sanctions — remarks widely read as a pointed critique of the United States conduct in global affairs. Speaking at a high-level Security Council meeting on the theme "Upholding the Purposes and Principles of the U.N. Charter and Strengthening the U.N.-Centred International System," Wang argued that the current disorder in international affairs stems not from any deficiency in the U.N. Charter but from member states' failure to observe it. "The root cause of the chaos in today's world is not that the Charter's spirit is outdated," Wang said, "but that the international order and the basic norms governing international relations, both set out in the Charter, are not being effectively upheld and observed." ### **On Sovereignty and the Use of Force** Without naming the United States directly, Wang called any unilateral military action that bypasses the Security Council "unacceptable," and said sanctions imposed beyond the Council's explicit resolutions "lack legitimacy." He called on all states — and "major countries in particular" — to lead by example in following the rule of law and to avoid what he described as double standards, exceptionalism, and selective application of international norms. Wang also invoked the post-World War II international settlement, calling on states to "uphold the victorious outcomes of World War II" and oppose any glorification of the history of aggression — a phrase that carries resonance in the context of ongoing tensions over Japan's wartime record and Russia's conduct in Ukraine. ### **On the Security Council** Wang urged the five permanent members of the Security Council to increase communication and coordination on major proposals, seek common ground, and reduce confrontation. Membership of the Council, he said, carried responsibilities rather than privileges, and members should "rise above narrow national interests" and use international public goods responsibly. He also called for reforms to the Council's Rules of Procedure to ensure proposals are objective and inclusive, and warned against "forcing through contentious proposals." U.N. peacekeeping operations, he added, should be assessed for their value and effectiveness and reformed where necessary. ### **On Development and Economic Governance** Wang said development must remain at the centre of the international agenda, describing implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals as "woefully behind schedule." He called on the U.N. to coordinate global actions, mobilise resources, and pressure developed countries to deliver on financing pledges. He called explicitly for opposition to protectionism, the securitising of economic and trade issues, technology blockades, decoupling, and the severing of supply chains — language in direct tension with Washington's export controls on semiconductors and advanced technology, and its restrictions on Chinese firms. Wang further called for increased representation of developing countries at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and expressed support for stronger U.N. dialogue with BRICS, the G20, the New Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. ### On AI, Outer Space, and Emerging Domains On artificial intelligence, Wang called for the prompt establishment of institutional guardrails with the U.N. at the centre, citing moral and security risks posed by AI development. He announced that China is preparing to launch a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. He also called for comprehensive governance frameworks for outer space, the polar regions, and cyberspace, warning against allowing new frontiers to become "lawless domains of zero-sum competition." ### **On U.N. Reform and Financing** Wang said the U.N.'s role should be enhanced, not weakened, and criticised member states that "willfully withdraw from treaties and organizations" or establish alternatives to the multilateral system — another implicit reference to U.S. withdrawals from multilateral bodies and agreements under recent administrations. He backed early delivery of what he called the U.N. 80 Initiative, calling for streamlining of overlapping U.N. bodies and mandates, better integration of resources, and a culture of efficiency. He urged member states to fulfil their financial obligations to the U.N., noting that China is the second largest contributor to the U.N. budget. ### **On Ukraine and Hotspot Conflicts** Wang reiterated China's position on the Ukraine conflict, saying Beijing had initiated a "Group of Friends for Peace" at the U.N. platform and continued to contribute wisdom and effort to maintaining world peace. China has refused to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and has presented itself as a neutral mediator — a characterisation contested by Western governments. He expressed support for the U.N. playing a bigger role in political settlements of hotspot issues, and called for an integrated mediation model encompassing the U.N., regional organisations, stakeholders, and specialised agencies. ### **On Climate** Wang called for expedited climate action and the establishment of regular audit and accountability mechanisms to track whether financial and technology assistance commitments have been fulfilled. ### **On China's Record at the U.N.** The session fell on the 55th anniversary of the restoration of the People's Republic of China's seat in the United Nations, a milestone Wang invoked to frame China as a long-standing and responsible pillar of the multilateral system. He cited China's record of U.N. peacekeeping contributions, its Global Development Initiative — which he said had mobilised more than $23 billion in funds, supported over 1,800 cooperation projects, delivered more than 10,000 capacity-building programmes, and trained over 200,000 professionals — and its offer to assist the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda with a current Ebola outbreak. He noted that Chinese medical teams were already deployed in Africa fighting the disease alongside African health workers. Wang also cited China's establishment of the China-U.N. Peace and Development Fund, the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund, the International Organization for Mediation, and the World Data Organization, and said Beijing was actively bidding to host the secretariat of the agreement on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, known as BBNJ. He closed by framing China's forthcoming 15th Five-Year Plan as a new point of departure from which Beijing would continue to pursue "greater unity under the banner of multilateralism" and push for a more just and equitable global governance system. The meeting was attended by U.N. Secretary General António Guterres, who briefed the Council before Wang's remarks. ### Thinakaran Controversy Deepens as Minister Promises Future Merit-Based Appointments URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/thinakaran-controversy-deepens-as-minister-promises-future-merit-based-appointments/ Last updated: 2026-05-27T13:44:38.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka's Media Minister said Tuesday that future appointments to the top editorial position at the state-run Tamil daily *Thinakaran* would be made on the basis of qualifications, as the newspaper's management faces criticism over the interim appointment it made following the suspension of its Editor-in-Chief over alleged financial misconduct. The minister, Nalinda Jayatissa, made the remarks at a government media briefing held to announce Cabinet decisions, after journalists pressed him on why the acting editor chosen was more junior than other available candidates. R. Senthil Velavar, Thinakaran's Editor-in-Chief, was suspended by management at Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Limited — commonly known as Lake House, the state media conglomerate that owns the paper — following an internal investigation into allegations of financial irregularities. Management subsequently named Suresh Raj, a more junior journalist, as acting editor, a decision that drew criticism from sections of Sri Lanka's Tamil media circles, with some arguing it bypassed more senior or qualified staff. Mr. Jayatissa denied that the appointment had been made under political pressure, including claims that it followed recommendations from Deputy Minister Sundaralingam Pradeep. "That decision was not taken in accordance with the request or pressure of any minister or deputy minister," he said. He characterized the appointment as a temporary administrative measure to keep the newspaper running while the investigation proceeds, adding that it carried no implications for permanent succession. "Generally, when someone is suspended during an internal investigation, it is common practice to temporarily appoint another person to that position," Mr. Jayatissa said. "That does not mean the person appointed in an acting capacity will permanently remain in that position." Mr. Senthil Velavar is alleged to have misappropriated advertising revenue by personally collecting payments for advertisements that were never published in the newspaper's print edition. Sources familiar with the investigation told Jaffna Monitor that investigators were examining claims that fabricated newspaper pages featuring the unpublished advertisements had, in some cases, been shown to advertisers as proof of publication. Internal estimates reportedly place the amount potentially diverted at approximately 6.5 million rupees over an eight-month period, though the investigation is continuing. Lake House is also expected to file a complaint with Sri Lanka's Criminal Investigation Department, according to sources familiar with the matter. ### Write your memoirs now; tomorrow may be too late. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/write-your-memoirs-now-tomorrow-may-be-too-late/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T08:34:19.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “Sir, why don’t you talk to me at length about your early political history?” I made the plea to Appapillai Amirthalingam, leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), while he was perched on a sofa at the Tamil Nadu government guest house in Chennai. The year was 1988 when Indian troops were battling the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka’s north and east. I was on my way to Colombo, a trip I made frequently then. With no direct Delhi-to-Colombo flights, I used to take short breaks in Chennai to update myself by speaking with some of the Sri Lankan Tamil political figures based in Tamil Nadu. I had been mentally preparing myself to embark on a book about the origins and growth of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka. This eventually came out in 1994 as *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas.* I was aware that Amirthalingam had become a pale shadow of his original self, boxed in as he was between an increasingly aggressive Tamil Tigers and an uncompromising Sri Lankan government. Both were eager to see his back. Given their penchant for pulling the trigger, the Tigers shot dead Amirthalingam in July 1989. My poser to Amirthalingam was not based on any advance knowledge of his impending death. I realised that the man had played a key role in radicalising Tamil politics, but the events he wanted to be in control of soon overtook him. Many Tamils had told me about the TULF leader’s fiery past, his role in egging on young militants at one point, and how his stature rose and rose as he sold dreams of an independent Tamil homeland. I knew Amirthalingam had time to spare. He had been marginalised both by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Colombo. The Indian government still gave him respect, and some Western diplomats called on him now and then. So, I wanted him to answer in detail the many questions that were bothering me. I had already been interviewing Tamil militants who had taken up arms in the 1970s and early 1980s. The diaries were slowly piling up. Amirthalingam responded to my request with an enigmatic smile. He was ready to answer questions of the day, but he played hard to get when it came to questions about his early brush with militancy. “We will see. Maybe one day I will give you time,” he said. The day never came. I was in Colombo when I heard that the TULF leader and his colleague V. Yogeswaran had been shot dead at the latter’s house in the Sri Lankan capital. The three killers, from the LTTE, were, in turn, gunned down by the policemen meant to protect the Tamil politicians. I can’t forget the huge flutter that was caused when an Indian journalist mistook one of the slain assassins, Visu, to be Yogaratnam Yogi, a leader of the LTTE’s political wing, only to soon realise the mistake. Like in Amirthalingam’s case, I remember making a similar request to K. Pathmanabha of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). He was an early player in the militancy. I had interviewed some of his colleagues here and there. I also asked Pathmanabha to provide me with the large collection of literature they had at their Chennai office. I promised to photocopy the material and return the originals. I was desperate to lay my hands on anything and everything that would throw light on the early 1980s and beyond. I went through every issue of *The Hindu* from June 1, 1983, to July 31, 1987, as well as all issues of *The Saturday Review*, a bold English-language magazine from Jaffna whose neatly bound volumes were made over to me for research by its later editor, S. Sivanayagam. Like Amirthalingam, Nabha too promised to speak with me when he had time to spare. He would probably have done so. Unfortunately, the LTTE, determined to stamp its authority on the Tamil political scene, finished him off in 1990. Once Nabha and his mates were gunned down, the Tamil Nadu Police took away a heavy load of Tamil literature from the EPRLF’s bullet-ridden office. No one had any idea what happened to all the material. Nabha had dropped it off at my house in New Delhi, unannounced, one evening in June 1990, as I was packing my suitcase for another flight to Colombo, this time via Karachi. Soon after I reached Sri Lanka, I heard that he had been killed. ![K. Pathmanabha with a child during the years of Sri Lanka’s Tamil militant movement.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/write-your-memoirs-now-tomorro-vBeijs-kixggvany90o1el.png) K. Pathmanabha with a child during the years of Sri Lanka’s Tamil militant movement. Perhaps, just perhaps, if I had known what was going to happen, I might have spoken to the man at length that day and left for Sri Lanka a day later. Another chunk of invaluable history died with Nabha. To me, it was nothing about “good Tamil” or “bad Tamil”. I spoke to whoever I could speak to and whoever would speak to me. My interest lay in digging up layers of buried and hidden history, not to judge people or political players. Indeed, I often struck mini gold mines by talking to mid-level cadres in Tamil militant groups (I know Tamil despite being born and raised in Delhi). Often, they provided me with information that the leaders might not have shared. The last time I met EROS leader Velupillai Balakumaran was over tea in 1990 in Colombo. He knew I often visited Sri Lanka. The former banker called me over to discuss the situation in Sri Lanka. ![V. Balakumaran, surrounded by his EROS comrades in Jaffna in 1988.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/write-your-memoirs-now-tomorro-vBeijs-kixnvplr5jzcie5.png) V. Balakumaran, surrounded by his EROS comrades in Jaffna in 1988. He did not reveal that he was planning to merge EROS, his group, with the LTTE. But he did tell me something that remained etched in my mind: “You don’t know the LTTE. You don’t know them. They can go to any length to achieve their objectives.” We never met again. Balakumaran’s words came back to haunt me when an LTTE suicide bomber callously blew up former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. I regret that I did not press Balakumaran to sit down with me for a lengthy question-and-answer session that day. I made the same mistake with his confidant, Shankar Rajee, whom I met more often in Colombo and Chennai before ill health claimed his life. ![Shankar Rajee with Yasser Arafat.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/write-your-memoirs-now-tomorro-vBeijs-kix3op92lcvr7qa.png) Shankar Rajee with Yasser Arafat. Now, veteran Sri Lankan journalist and publisher Vijitha Yapa says that D.B.S. Jeyaraj had expressed a desire that Yapa, who had given him the break in English journalism, should publish his memoirs. But Jeyaraj passed away before he could complete his project. If only he had finished his autobiography, it would have made a fascinating read. After all, here was a journalist who wrote the bitter truth without minding repeated threats and even a painful physical assault. Even today, there are scores of Tamils in Sri Lanka and elsewhere who intimately know parts of the Tamil story starting from the times when politics in the north and east got radicalised – then militarized. All of them — politicians, activists, militants, former officials, and others — must put the knowledge they possess into writing, irrespective of whether they are good or not-so-good writers. It does not matter how explosive or seemingly unimportant their information may be. Postponing this for a supposedly auspicious moment may prove costly. If this is done, someone in the future will be able to weave a comprehensive and honest history of the Tamil saga in Sri Lanka. ### The Constitution They Promised to Defend URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-constitution-they-promised-to-defend/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T01:32:56.000Z ***By Sidhartha Thamby*** There is a particular cruelty in watching a party that once raged against the abuse of power quietly settle into practicing it. Sri Lanka has seen this before. What is new is that we are watching it happen to Provincial Council elections — a decade overdue — and to the constitutional architecture of devolution itself, piece by piece, coordinator by coordinator, committee by committee. We are watching the slow installation of party-aligned coordinators, the bypassing of elected structures, and the substitution of party machinery for constitutional process. We have diagnosis for this. In October 1989 — as the south of Sri Lanka convulsed under the JVP’s second insurrection and institutions buckled under the pressure of the Premadasa presidency — a Presidential Commission on Youth was appointed to understand what had driven the country’s young people to rebellion. Its findings, delivered with unusual clarity, identified the root cause not as poverty, not as unemployment, but as the abuse of political power and the collapse of institutional integrity. The Commission’s report opened with what it described as virtual unanimity among those who gave evidence: that politicisation, and the perception that political patronage had corrupted every layer of public life, lay at the heart of youth unrest. Disenchanted youth told the Commission they were not averse to hardship — hardship was the ordinary condition of a developing nation. What they would not tolerate was hardship compounded by palpable injustice. Deprivation accompanied by unfairness, they said, was what drove people to the streets. Its pre-eminent recommendation was the creation of a Nominations Commission to insulate key public appointments from political interference. That recommendation became the Constitutional Council, introduced by the Seventeenth Amendment in 2001\. The irony deserves to sit in plain sight: the institutional remedy that Sri Lanka painfully devised from the wreckage of the late 1980s — the very architecture designed to keep political parties from colonising the state — is what is now being quietly circumvented, appointment by appointment, coordinator by coordinator. The North needs no lecture on what commissars look like. The Tamil people did not endure that darkness only to watch a new aspiring state rehearse the same choreography in a different ideological costume. When MPs are appointed as district health coordinators, bypassing provincial structures that the Constitution assigned to elected bodies, it is not merely an administrative convenience. It carries the unmistakable silhouette of the commissar — the party’s man in the province, answerable upward, not outward. And then there is the Aragalaya. Whatever one’s assessment of its limitations, the uprising of 2022 was an unmistakable public verdict: that the governed are no longer willing to be managed. Sri Lanka’s people — across ethnicity, class, and province — stood in queues for fuel and then stood in the streets for something larger: the principle that power must answer to those it governs. To fiddle with elections, to subvert the Constitution, to defer democratic participation through administrative attrition — these are not bold acts of transformation. They are the oldest tricks in the playbook of those who trust themselves more than they trust the people. ### **What the Court Said — and What It Means Now** In August 2024, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled on four consolidated fundamental rights applications arising from the deliberate non-holding of the Local Authorities Elections of 2023\. The facts were stark: funds had been budgeted. The Election Commission had appointed returning officers, gazetted nominations, and announced a date. Then the executive intervened — a Cabinet circular directed district secretaries not to accept deposits. The Government Printer failed to deliver postal ballot papers. Treasury circulars declared elections non-essential expenditure. The President, doubling as Minister of Finance, never approved the funds. The Court found the executive branch liable for infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 12(1) and 14(1)(a) of the Constitution. It confirmed what earlier jurisprudence had established: that casting a vote is an exercise of freedom of speech and expression — “no less,” in the Court’s own words, “than the most eloquent speech from a political platform.” It found that the Election Commission had also failed — through poor planning and a failure to use its own powers — and it singled out one member, P.S.M. Charles, for having filed an affidavit that deliberately misrepresented facts. The machinery of obstruction had reached inside the Commission itself. The Commission was pushed to delay the elections as much as possible, fearing a NPP wave. Once the days ran out, the playbook was to denigrate the image of the Commission. The ugliness of it came out in the submissions and wrap on the knuckles by the Court. The planners included a few at the top. The quid pro quo required rewarding services rendered with high-profile removals and rewards in place for a conspirator. The Court directed that elections be held at the earliest opportunity. It awarded compensation. It established unambiguously that the franchise cannot be subordinated to fiscal preference — that a government citing financial difficulty must demonstrate genuine total incapacity, not merely competing priorities. That ruling now stands on the record. Its logic applies equally to Provincial Council elections. The party now in government knows it. The party was also a petitioner in the case. ### **The NPP’s Inconvenient Inheritance** When Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the National People’s Power came to office in late 2024, they inherited a constitutional obligation that had been deferred since 2014\. Provincial Council elections had not been held in over a decade. All nine councils had expired by 2019\. The provinces were — and remain — governed by presidential appointees, with governors functioning as transmission belts for the will of the central government. The devolution promised by the 13th Amendment, however imperfectly, had been reduced to administrative theatre. The NPP’s stated position had always been that it believed in the Constitution. It would hold elections. It would restore democratic governance at the provincial level. That position is now, by the party’s own General Secretary’s admission, no longer operative — at least not this year. Tilvin Silva, JVP General Secretary, announced that Provincial Council elections budgeted for 2025 would be deferred to 2026\. He cited two reasons: the Rs. 500 billion redirected to disaster relief following Cyclone Ditwah, and unresolved legal complications stemming from the 2017 Provincial Councils Elections (Amendment) Act. The Centre for Policy Alternatives immediately identified a structural problem: the announcement came not from a Cabinet minister accountable to Parliament, but from a party official holding no parliamentary seat and no ministerial portfolio. If the NPP genuinely believes in parliamentary accountability, its party secretary should not be the one announcing the deferral of elections. A minister should make that statement in the House, subject to scrutiny. ### **The Ditwah Precedent and Its Dangers** The cyclone argument is, on its face, more sympathetic than Ranil Wickremesinghe’s 2023 position, which was essentially that economic stabilisation was a higher priority than democratic participation. But the Supreme Court’s logic does not bend to the sympathy of the excuse. The principle established is this: franchise is a fundamental right. Fiscal decisions do not automatically override it. The state must demonstrate genuine total incapacity — not merely a competing priority, however pressing. This matters because the Ditwah argument, once accepted, opens a template. Sri Lanka is a country of cyclones, floods, droughts, and debt crises. If a natural disaster of sufficient scale justifies deferring a budgeted election, then the calendar of democratic participation becomes hostage to the meteorological and the fiscal. There will always be a reason. The question is whether the courts, the Election Commission, and the public will allow reasons to accumulate into permanent deferral. MP Nizam Kariyapper and others have proposed a simple interim solution: reverting to the old proportional representation system and holding elections now, while resolving the framework question afterward. The Government has not engaged with this proposal. The parliamentary committee announced in November 2025 did not have its members appointed until February 2026\. That is not urgency. ### **Health Coordinators and the Slow Erasure of Devolution** Against this backdrop, the appointment of Members of Parliament as District Health Coordinating Officers is not a minor administrative convenience. It is a signal — and a pattern. Health is a devolved subject under the 13th Amendment. Provincial Councils were constitutionally mandated to govern it. In the absence of elected councils, the central government has progressively filled the vacuum. The appointment of MPs as district health coordinators routes coordination through parliamentarians answerable to Colombo, not to provincial electorates — bypassing the Provincial Director of Health Services, the Regional Director, and the Provincial Health Minister, who should rightfully hold these functions. This encroachment has precedent. During the Chandrika Kumaratunga government, certain health powers were drawn back toward the centre. What we are witnessing is not a new phenomenon — it is a continuation of a decades-long pattern in which the centre finds administrative means to hollow out what it cannot repeal by law. The 13th Amendment has not been abolished. It has been quietly circumvented, committee by committee, coordinator by coordinator, gazette notification by gazette notification. Former Chief Justice C.V. Wigneswaran’s warning deserves to be heard plainly: in the north and east, where the absence of elected provincial representation intersects with ethnic marginalisation, the consequences are not abstract. People in those provinces have no say in their governance, no elected voice at the provincial level, and now see the administrative structures of devolved health governance overlaid by MPs accountable to Colombo. This is discriminatory in effect, whatever the intent. ### **The Election Commission’s Test** The Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling placed the Election Commission on notice. It found that the Commission’s own members had failed in their planning responsibilities and that at least one had misled the court. It directed the Commission to exercise its powers and authority to hold elections. The Commission has no independent budget — that structural dependency on Treasury releases is the real vulnerability. But silence, in this environment, is complicity. The Commission should be publicly, loudly communicating to Parliament and to the courts what it needs to hold Provincial Council elections and whether those resources are being provided. ### **What This Adds Up To** We are watching the accumulation of democratic debt: a decade without Provincial Council elections; governors running provinces by presidential fiat; devolved health governance bypassed through parliamentary appointment; electoral delays announced by party officials rather than ministers; and parliamentary committees appointed to study questions that already have simple interim solutions, only to be constituted months after they were promised. Each of these, individually, can be rationalised. Together, they describe a system in which the constitutional architecture of devolution and democratic participation is being eroded not through repeal, but through administrative and political attrition — and in which the current government, which won power by condemning exactly this kind of behavior, has chosen to continue it. A government that appoints MPs as district health coordinators, that defers elections through party announcements rather than parliamentary statements, that allows nine provincial councils to expire and remain vacant for over a decade — that government is not merely neglecting the Constitution. It is undoing, piece by piece, the hard-won lesson that Sri Lanka paid for with the lives of an entire generation. A country that absorbed proscription, ethnic war, economic collapse, and mass uprising deserves better than a government that treats the architecture of its democratic republic as a set of technicalities. The Supreme Court has given us the clearest possible statement of principle: the right to vote is a fundamental right, and the state cannot subordinate it to fiscal preference. That principle needs to be invoked again — and soon — before the template of deferral hardens into a precedent of a very different kind. The question is not whether Sri Lanka can afford to hold Provincial Council elections. The question is whether Sri Lanka can afford not to. A constitution honoured only when convenient is not a constitution. It is a suggestion. And a democracy in which elections are held on the executive’s schedule, not the law’s, is not a democracy. It is an arrangement — and a dangerous one, in a country that has already paid the price of arrangements masquerading as governance. ### Military Begins Assessments of Occupied Northern Lands, Raising Cautious Hopes URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/military-begins-assessments-of-occupied-northern-lands-raising-cautious-hopes/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T03:10:08.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Senior Sri Lankan defense officials traveled to the country's Northern Province on Tuesday to inspect lands that have remained under military control for years, in what security sources described as early steps in a process that could eventually return some of those parcels to their civilian owners — though the scope, timeline, and ultimate outcome of any releases remain unclear. The Deputy Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Army conducted field inspections across the Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Mannar districts, according to security sources and local officials familiar with the visit. The assessments focused on areas within former high-security zones and military-controlled land that displaced residents and civil society groups have long demanded be returned to them. No formal announcement, gazette notification, or public statement had been issued by Tuesday evening, and officials declined to specify which parcels were under active consideration or when, if ever, releases might occur. Among the areas reportedly reviewed was a roughly 20-acre plot in Iyakkachchi, straddling the border between Jaffna and Kilinochchi districts, as well as an approximately 20-acre tract east of Palaly Road within the Valikamam North High Security Zone, according to sources familiar with the discussions. In Kankesanthurai, a coconut estate of historical significance near a building currently used by the military as a holiday facility was also said to be under consideration. The inspections also extended to Mannar district, where officials examined civilian-owned land within or adjacent to the Mullikulam Naval Base, the sources said. Security officials indicated that preparatory administrative work — including the drafting of maps and coordination with district secretariats — could be accelerated in the wake of the visits. But they stopped short of characterizing the inspections as a prelude to imminent action, and the gap between field assessments and formal land releases has historically been wide. The visits come against a backdrop of sustained pressure from displaced communities across the north, many of whom have been waiting for more than a decade and a half since the end of the country's civil war in 2009 for the return of lands occupied by the military during and after the conflict. Previous governments have announced partial releases over the years, but large areas remain under security forces' control, a source of persistent grievance in a region that bore the heaviest costs of the war. ### Is the Next Pandemic Already Being Mismanaged? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/is-the-next-pandemic-already-being-mismanaged/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T05:08:13.000Z In early April, a passenger aboard the Dutch expedition cruise ship MV Hondius fell ill with fever and respiratory distress while crossing the South Atlantic. He died on April 11\. No tests were conducted. His body was removed from the vessel, and the ship continued its voyage. By early May, health authorities across three continents were scrambling to trace the movements of 147 people from 23 countries who had shared the same cabins and recirculated air. On 2 May 2026, WHO received a formal notification from the United Kingdom of a cluster of severe acute respiratory illness aboard the Dutch-flagged vessel. By 4 May, seven cases had been identified — two laboratory-confirmed — including three deaths, one critically ill patient, and three individuals with mild symptoms. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention confirmed that the outbreak was caused by the Andes strain of hantavirus, the only known hantavirus capable of spreading from person to person. Unlike the coronavirus, which spreads rapidly through airborne transmission and casual social interaction, Andes hantavirus typically requires close and prolonged contact with a symptomatic individual, making widespread transmission far less likely. By May 24, health authorities had confirmed or classified 12 cases as probable, with additional infections detected after passengers returned to France, Spain, and Canada. ![The MV Hondius expedition cruise ship, where an outbreak of the Andes strain of hantavirus triggered an international public health response involving passengers from more than 20 countries.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/is-the-next-pandemic-already-b-41MMak-kixtfcfej6rj24m.png) The MV Hondius expedition cruise ship, where an outbreak of the Andes strain of hantavirus triggered an international public health response involving passengers from more than 20 countries. That outbreak was still being mapped when something far more alarming surfaced in central Africa. On 15 May, the Congolese Ministry of Health confirmed what investigators had already feared. The index case, reconstructed retrospectively, was a health worker in Bunia, Ituri Province, who had developed fever, vomiting, and signs of haemorrhagic illness in late April. He died at a medical centre in Bunia. By early May, four more healthcare workers in the same zone had died within four days. As of 24 May 2026, the outbreak had recorded 1,010 suspected and confirmed cases and at least 231 deaths. Experts consider the true toll likely to be considerably higher. The outbreak has spread to Ituri, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu provinces within Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with confirmed cases also reported in Uganda's capital, Kampala. On 16 May, the WHO Director-General determined that the Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus in DRC and Uganda constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern — but does not meet the criteria of a pandemic emergency. Together, the two outbreaks have revived a question now being asked with growing urgency by global health authorities: Five years after Covid-19 killed millions, overwhelmed health systems and fractured international cooperation, is the world genuinely better prepared for the next pandemic — or has it merely been fortunate that no highly transmissible pathogen of similar scale has emerged again? ### **A Virus for Which No Vaccine Exists** What makes the current Ebola outbreak particularly concerning to health officials is the strain involved. The epidemic is being driven by the rare Bundibugyo strain of Ebola, for which there is no approved vaccine or specific antiviral treatment, complicating efforts to contain the disease quickly. The vaccines used during previous Ebola outbreaks, including Ervebo, which helped contain the devastating 2018-2020 epidemic in eastern Congo that killed more than 2,200 people, were developed specifically for the Zaire strain of the virus. Experts have discussed the possibility of using Ervebo in patients infected with the Bundibugyo strain, but animal studies have suggested only partial effectiveness, while concerns remain over its safety and efficacy across different Ebola strains. Dr. Anne Ancia, the W.H.O. 's representative in the Democratic Republic of Congo, warned reporters in Geneva that while a vaccine candidate could become available within two months, the outbreak itself was unlikely to be contained that quickly. Pointing to the 2018–2020 Ebola epidemic in North Kivu, which took nearly two years to bring under control, she cautioned that the current outbreak could become a prolonged public health crisis. The outbreak is unfolding against a backdrop of humanitarian crisis, remote and densely populated terrain, insecurity, and high population movement and cross-border trade. The current epicentre, Mongbwalu Health Zone in Ituri Province, is a high-traffic mining area where militant groups, including the Islamic State, operate, and where 1.9 million people are estimated to be in need of humanitarian aid. Africa is racing to contain an outbreak that is now threatening 10 countries as infections spill from eastern Congo into Uganda. Health officials stress that Ebola is unlikely to become a global pandemic — its transmission requires direct contact with bodily fluids, and it tends to burn out. But that assessment rests on a critical assumption: a functioning, coordinated international response. That assumption is no longer self-evident. ### **The Surveillance Gap** When the World Health Organization was first alerted on May 2 to the hantavirus outbreak aboard the *MV Hondius*, one absence stood out to global health officials: the United States, long regarded as the central force in international outbreak surveillance and emergency response. The CDC confirmed that 18 repatriated American passengers from the ship were placed at the Nebraska Quarantine Facility for monitoring — a response that came nearly a month after the first death aboard the vessel. In the Ebola outbreak, American officials reportedly learned of the situation nine days after the WHO had already alerted other global health authorities — a delay that would have been unthinkable under the prior architecture of U.S. global health engagement. The reason is not complex. The Trump administration withdrew the United States from the WHO and effectively dismantled USAID — the agency that for decades funded surveillance networks, laboratory capacity, and rapid-response capability across the developing world. Washington is no longer inside the information architecture that governs global outbreak alerts. It no longer has a seat at the table when the WHO emergency committee convenes. It is receiving news, not shaping the response. What observers noted in both outbreaks was not simply an absent flag, but absent expertise, absent logistics, and absent institutional memory. The CDC and its partners once coordinated the architecture that allowed the 2014-16 West Africa Ebola epidemic — which killed over 11,000 people — to be brought under control before it became a global catastrophe. That architecture depended on American funding, American laboratories, and American willingness to move fast. None of those can now be taken for granted. ### **Science Advanced. Politics Regressed.** The 79th World Health Assembly, which convened in Geneva from 18 to 23 May, presented a paradox that delegates struggled to articulate without a certain institutional despair. On one hand, the scientific tools available are genuinely better than they were in January 2020\. Pathogen sequencing that once took weeks now takes hours. Vaccine platforms developed during COVID have demonstrated the ability to compress development timelines from years to months. Surveillance data flows faster. On the other hand, the political infrastructure required to deploy those tools has visibly weakened. The Assembly concluded with member states agreeing to extend negotiations on the critical Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing annex to the WHO Pandemic Agreement, with an outcome now expected no earlier than May 2027, or at a special session later this year. Under Article 31 of the Pandemic Agreement, the treaty cannot be opened for signature until the annex is adopted. Without it, the ratification process, which itself requires 60 parties, cannot begin. The Agreement, adopted in May 2025 amid considerable fanfare, cannot come into force. The deadlock has a specific logic. Lower-income countries have agreed in principle to rapidly share pathogen samples and genetic sequences — the information that enables vaccines to be developed quickly. But they will not do so without binding guarantees that they will receive equitable access to the resulting vaccines and treatments. Wealthier nations have repeatedly resisted making such commitments legally binding. For many lower-income countries, the mpox outbreak that began in 2022 reinforced their distrust of the global health system. Vaccines reached some poorer nations nearly two years after the outbreak began, even more slowly than Covid vaccines had during the pandemic, deepening perceptions across much of the Global South that access to lifesaving treatments remains dictated more by wealth and geopolitical influence than by public health need. The Assembly convened this year under the theme "Reshaping global health: a shared responsibility" — a formulation that, in the context of a United States no longer present at the table, read to many delegates as aspirational rather than descriptive. ### **Sri Lanka: Better Than 2020, But Not Shock-Proof** For Sri Lanka, deeply integrated into global travel and trade networks and still struggling to recover from the economic collapse of 2022, the latest outbreak alerts carry particular significance. Health and economic analysts warn that the risks are compounded by mounting global economic instability following disruptions linked to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime corridor for global energy supplies and trade.. The country has genuine assets. Its public health infrastructure, built over decades, is remarkably capable relative to its income level. The network of Medical Officers of Health, Public Health Inspectors, and the national Epidemiology Unit formed the institutional backbone of Sri Lanka's early Covid-19 response, which drew international attention for its effectiveness in the pandemic's first wave. In October 2024, Sri Lanka was awarded an $18.4 million grant from the Pandemic Fund under the "One Vision, One Shield: Integrated One Health Pandemic Preparedness and Response" programme, running from January 2025 to 2028, implemented through the WHO, the World Bank, FAO, UNICEF, and the Asian Development Bank. The grant mobilised an additional $197 million in co-financing, targeting surveillance system upgrades, laboratory capacity, and a strengthened health workforce. In October 2025, Sri Lanka hosted the WHO South-East Asia Region's annual preparedness meeting in Colombo, producing a strategic roadmap for pandemic response for 2026 to 2031\. Sri Lanka also participates in the WHO South-East Asia Region's Unity Studies Network alongside Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Thailand — a regional framework for epidemic investigation and early response. Sri Lanka was recognized by the World Health Organization in 2019 for eliminating mother-to-child transmission of HIV and syphilis, a milestone public health officials often cite as evidence of the country’s historically strong preventive healthcare system. More recently, Sri Lanka has also been highlighted by regional health authorities for progress in hepatitis B control and broader “triple elimination” initiatives aimed at preventing maternal transmission of HIV, syphilis, and hepatitis B. But the economic collapse of 2022 altered Sri Lanka’s healthcare landscape in ways that have yet to be fully reversed. Acute shortages of fuel, food and medicines severely disrupted healthcare delivery across the country, while large numbers of doctors and nurses migrated overseas amid worsening economic conditions. Procurement of medical equipment and essential supplies slowed sharply, leaving many hospitals struggling to maintain services. Economists and public health specialists interviewed by *Jaffna Monitor* warned that Sri Lanka remains highly vulnerable to external economic shocks, particularly because of its dependence on imported fuel and essential goods. Several said that if disruptions to shipping and energy supplies linked to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz were to continue for a few more months, the country could once again face shortages and economic pressures resembling those seen during the 2022 crisis. Public health specialists warned that the overlapping pressures of Covid-19 and the economic crisis were exposing vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka’s disease surveillance systems. Researchers noted that dengue reporting patterns shifted significantly during the pandemic, partly because lockdowns and strained healthcare services affected routine detection and reporting mechanisms. ### **In Jaffna, Doctors Warn of a System Already Under Pressure** ![Jaffna Teaching Hospital, the largest state-run hospital in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, has faced mounting pressure since the country’s economic crisis strained staffing, medicines and medical infrastructure.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/is-the-next-pandemic-already-b-41MMak-kixbgpp2az215k5.png) Jaffna Teaching Hospital, the largest state-run hospital in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, has faced mounting pressure since the country’s economic crisis strained staffing, medicines and medical infrastructure. For Jaffna and the Northern Province, the vulnerabilities are more acute and deeply structural. The region’s healthcare system, still shaped by the long aftermath of the civil war, has historically received fewer resources than hospitals centered around Colombo and the Western Province. The nationwide shortages of medicines and medical supplies during Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic collapse hit peripheral hospitals particularly hard, exposing how fragile the North’s healthcare infrastructure remained despite years of postwar reconstruction. Doctors and health officials in the North say the pressures are especially visible at Jaffna Teaching Hospital, the region’s main tertiary-care institution. While the hospital has a consultant workforce broadly comparable in some specialties to major state hospitals in Colombo, the number of junior doctors and Medical Officers assigned to wards is often only a fraction of what is available in larger southern hospitals, according to several physicians familiar with staffing patterns. In some units, doctors said, staffing levels can be as low as one-tenth of those seen in Colombo-based institutions, leaving junior doctors to work prolonged shifts under intense pressure, sometimes continuously through day and night duty cycles. Healthcare workers interviewed by *Jaffna Monitor* said such chronic understaffing creates serious concerns about how the Northern health system would cope during a fast-moving infectious disease outbreak requiring surge capacity, isolation management, and sustained emergency response operations. Several doctors also pointed to what they see as a long-running pattern of political neglect toward Jaffna Teaching Hospital by successive Sinhala-majority governments, including the current administration led by the National People’s Power alliance. Successive governments had, at various stages, discussed elevating the hospital to national hospital status, a designation currently reserved for a limited number of major state institutions, including those in Colombo and Kandy. But officials later shifted focus toward expanding Anuradhapura Teaching Hospital instead, a decision some Northern physicians privately describe as politically discriminatory and racially motivated. Doctors said that if Jaffna Teaching Hospital were granted national hospital status even now, the institution would likely receive significantly greater allocations, staffing approvals, specialist expansion, and infrastructure investment in the years ahead, strengthening its ability to respond to future public health emergencies and large-scale outbreaks. In a future pandemic scenario, public health experts say, those disparities could carry profound consequences. The gap between Colombo’s centralized response architecture and the realities confronting hospitals in the North may determine how effectively Sri Lanka can contain a major outbreak beyond the capital. ### **The Question Hanging Over Global Health** Senior health officials leaving Geneva after the World Health Assembly last week acknowledged that while the meeting underscored the urgency of preparing for future outbreaks, many of the core political disagreements that weakened the global response during Covid-19 remain unresolved. Delegates approved resolutions and extended negotiations on the World Health Organization’s pandemic agreement, but critical disputes over pathogen sharing, vaccine access,, and long-term financing remained unresolved. The negotiations over the treaty’s Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing annex, considered central to the agreement’s implementation, are now expected to continue at least into next year. Global health experts say the uncertainty reflects a broader shift in the international system that emerged after the pandemic. The global infrastructure that helped contain the 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola epidemic and accelerated vaccine development during Covid relied heavily on assumptions of sustained American engagement, multilateral cooperation, and relatively stable financing from wealthier nations. Many of those assumptions have weakened in recent years. At the same time, scientists say the technical capacity to confront emerging diseases has improved dramatically. New pathogens can now be identified and genetically sequenced within hours, while vaccine platforms developed during COVID have significantly reduced development timelines. But health specialists caution that scientific advances alone cannot prevent a pandemic. Effective outbreak response depends on early surveillance systems, functioning laboratory networks, reliable supply chains, trained healthcare workers, and sustained cooperation between governments. Addressing reporters in Geneva, W.H.O. Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the Ebola outbreak in Congo and Uganda remained a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, while emphasizing that the organization continued to assess the global risk as low. Many epidemiologists agree with that assessment for the current outbreak. But they also warn that future pathogens may present far greater challenges, particularly as climate change, deforestation, and expanding human activity in wildlife habitats increase the likelihood of zoonotic spillovers. Public health experts say the decisive factor in the next major outbreak may depend less on scientific capability than on whether governments are able to maintain public trust, coordinate internationally, and respond quickly enough before a local epidemic escalates into a global crisis. ### No Justification for holding the Strait of Hormuz Hostage by the Iranian regime URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/no-justification-for-holding-the-strait-of-hormuz-hostage-by-the-iranian-regime-2/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T08:34:42.000Z **By Reuven Azar, Israel’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka and India.** ***The following is submitted in response to the opinion*** [***article***](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-strait-of-hormuz-legal-dimensions-of-the-new-arrangements-amid-aggression-and-fundamental-change-of-circumstances/) ***by Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs of Iran, titled "The Strait of Hormuz: New Arrangements Under International Law," published in Jaffna Monitor.*** The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most vital maritime corridors. Roughly one-fifth of global oil trade passes through this narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the wider international maritime system. Its stability is therefore not merely a regional concern; it is a matter of global economic security. For centuries, the international community has operated on a simple principle: straits used for international navigation must remain open, secure, and free from political coercion. That principle is now under challenge by the rogue regime in Tehran. Ridiculous attempts to justify restrictions on transit through the Strait of Hormuz by relying on pseudo-legal terminology, or by claiming that a single coastal state may unilaterally redefine the rules governing one of the world’s most critical waterways, are preposterous. This proposition has no basis in international law. ### **The Strait of Hormuz Was Never Threatened by Israel** Claims that recent regional tensions have caused "severe and widespread harm" to the Strait of Hormuz itself are entirely detached from reality. The physical integrity of the strait has not been compromised by Israel’s — or the United States’ — actions. Israel has conducted no operations targeting the strait, its shipping lanes, or its maritime infrastructure. No Israeli actions have obstructed civilian navigation through Hormuz. The instability surrounding the Strait today stems not from Israel, but from threats and violent extortion by Iran. The danger to Hormuz is not external aggression against the strait. The danger is the attempt to weaponise the strait itself. Israel has conducted no military operations in or around the Strait of Hormuz. Israeli vessels have not mined its waters. Israeli aircraft have not struck its shores. What the Iranian regime has constructed is a legal fiction — an invented predicate designed to cloak a political decision. ### **Transit Passage Is Non-Suspendable** The legal framework governing international navigation is clear. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation. Transit passage is continuous, unobstructed, and non-suspendable. No state has the authority to selectively interrupt that principle for political leverage. The Strait of Gibraltar remains open regardless of geopolitical tensions between states in the region. Spain and Morocco do not impose arbitrary restrictions on international transit. The Strait of Malacca continues to function as an open international passage despite competing strategic interests among regional powers. Singapore and Malaysia do not use maritime transit as a political weapon. These straits remain open because the international community recognises a fundamental truth: international waterways belong to all nations, and no single state may hold the global economy hostage to its political grievances. The same principle must apply to Hormuz. ### **Self-Defence Is Not Aggression** Much has been said in recent years about "aggression" in the Middle East. Yet any serious examination of the region's instability must confront an unavoidable reality: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, under direct command of the so-called "Supreme Leader" of Iran, has spent decades attacking Israel, building a network of terrorist armies and developing weapons of mass destruction, in contradiction to its stated commitments. It is the IRGC that has supplied missiles and means to produce them to the Houthis in Yemen, enabling attacks on international shipping. It is the IRGC that has taken over Lebanon through Hezbollah, destabilized Syria and Iraq, and supported the murderous Hamas & PIJ terrorist organisations that have ruthlessly massacred Israeli civilians on October 7. It is the Iranian regime — not Israel — that has called openly and repeatedly for the annihilation of a fellow United Nations member state, in contradiction to the UN charter. Israel's defensive actions — whether against missile launches, drone attacks, or the infrastructure of groups openly committed to our destruction — are precisely that: defensive. To characterise the exercise of self-defence as "aggression" is to strip the word of all meaning. ### **The World Will Not Accept Maritime Extortion** Iran’s attempts to impose new arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz are not a measured response to changed circumstances. Rather, they are an attempt to leverage geography into geopolitical coercion. This is why the international response has been swift and unified. The UNSC, the United States, China, India, the European Union, and practically all nations have rejected Iran's actions. They recognise that if one nation is permitted to close an international natural waterway based on unilateral grievances, no shipping lane is safe. The precedent would be catastrophic. No amount of pseudo-legal mumbo jumbo coming out of an Iranian official can transform piracy and extortion into common practice. The Strait of Hormuz will remain open. This is not merely Israel's position. It is the position of the global community, and of every nation that depends on the free flow of maritime commerce. Iran's attempt to hold the world's supplies hostage will not succeed. The international community has both the legal authority and the collective will to ensure that these critical waters remain what they have always been: open to all, controlled by none. **Editor’s Note:** The views expressed in this opinion article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Jaffna Monitor. We welcome informed responses, counterarguments, and dissenting perspectives in the form of letters to the editor. ### Drug Use Confirmed in Deadly Kilinochchi Motorcycle Crash That Killed Mother URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/drug-use-confirmed-in-deadly-kilinochchi-motorcycle-crash-that-killed-mother/ Last updated: 2026-05-27T07:47:59.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka —** A youth hospitalized after a deadly motorcycle crash that killed a 32-year-old mother in Sri Lanka's Northern Province has admitted to police that he was riding the motorcycle involved in the collision, after initially claiming he had only been traveling as a pillion passenger, police sources told Jaffna Monitor on Tuesday. The crash, which occurred Monday on the Uruthirapuram-Karadipokku road in Kilinochchi district, killed Kagitha Shanmugam, who was on her way to pick up her seven-year-old daughter from school when a speeding motorcycle allegedly performing dangerous stunts struck her head-on. Police sources said the injured youth, who remains under treatment at Kilinochchi District General Hospital, changed his statement nearly 24 hours after the crash. Investigators had earlier faced confusion over who had been operating the motorcycle. He is also the registered owner of the motorcycle involved in the crash. A forensic medical examination confirmed that the youth had consumed narcotic substances, police sources said. Authorities did not specify which substances were detected. Witnesses previously told police that a group of riders had been traveling at extremely high speeds along the road, allegedly performing stunts and dangerous maneuvers before one motorcycle lost control and veered into oncoming traffic. Residents said the riders had reportedly visited the Karadipokku fuel station shortly before the crash. Authorities are continuing investigations into the incident. The death of Ms. Kagitha Shanmugam prompted an outpouring of grief on social media and renewed criticism from residents who say authorities have failed to adequately curb reckless riding, stunt driving, and alleged narcotics use among some youths in Kilinochchi and nearby districts. ### Selective Justice and Sri Lanka’s Unfinished Republic — A Letter to the President URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/selective-justice-and-sri-lankas-unfinished-republic-a-letter-to-the-president/ Last updated: 2026-05-27T07:48:08.000Z **Mr President,** As Sri Lanka marked fifty-four years as a Republic a few days ago, it should have been a moment for honest reflection: on sovereignty, on democracy, and on whether this country has truly upheld its promise of equal dignity to all who call it home. It is in that spirit, and with deep disappointment, that I write this. I am an Attorney-at-Law. I am also one of the complainants in the ICCPR case against Ampitiye Sumanarathana Thera, now before the High Court of Batticaloa. And I am a citizen who still believes the law should mean the same thing for everyone. The case itself is straightforward. It is a criminal prosecution under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act No. 56 of 2007\. The allegation concerns a statement the Thera allegedly made, threatening Tamil families living in the South. Video evidence exists. The Attorney-General’s Department is prosecuting. The offence is non-bailable. The accused is out only under strict conditions: passport surrendered; travel banned. This is not a political quarrel or a theological debate. It is a serious criminal matter pending before a court of law. Against that backdrop, your reported meeting with Ampitiye Sumanarathana Thera becomes deeply troubling. Reports say you met him. Credited him publicly. Welcomed his shift from the Rajapaksa camp to the National People’s Power. All this while the case is active. All this while the Tamil community, whose safety gave rise to the complaint, has received no comparable audience, no acknowledgement, no dignity. Those who brought the complaint are still waiting. Those affected by the alleged threat are still waiting. So I must ask you directly: what message does this send? To many of us, the answer is clear. It says that political usefulness can soften a serious allegation. That the law moves differently when the accused has influence. That even under a government elected on promises of change, the fears of a minority community still come second to political convenience. I say this with care but also with honesty. Not because of the meeting alone, but because of what it reveals. The culture of impunity in this country runs deep, and your government seems unwilling to break it. Sri Lanka’s record on ICCPR enforcement tells a damning story. Writers and ordinary social media users have been arrested swiftly and detained for months over speech-related allegations. The machinery of law has moved fast and severely when the accused is weak. But in this matter, despite complaints from parliamentarians, civil society, and the Human Rights Commission, it took years to reach arrest and indictment. That contrast cannot be brushed aside. When the law is harsh with the powerless and patient with the powerful, people see selective justice. And selective justice is injustice wearing a legal mask. Your reported meeting raises a further constitutional concern. The case is sub judice. The Attorney-General prosecutes in the name of the people. As Head of the Executive, your public association with the accused risks creating a reasonable fear that the prosecution may not receive the independence it deserves. Even if no interference was intended, the appearance alone damages public confidence. Justice is undermined as much by perception as by action. I call on you to state clearly, without ambiguity, that the Batticaloa prosecution will proceed free of executive influence, and that all persons stand equal before the law regardless of religion, office, robe, or political allegiance. There is also a religious dimension here, and I raise it with respect for the Buddha’s teaching and for the many humble and disciplined members of the Sangha. The Dhamma does not endorse threats. It does not countenance speech that frightens a community. The first precept teaches abstention from harm. Right speech, as the tradition holds, is speech that is truthful, gentle, and not divisive. If a person in robes is accused of threatening a minority, the duty of political leaders is not to celebrate his political usefulness. The duty is to uphold the law and protect the moral integrity of the Sasana. The Buddha Sasana is not served by turning monks into political assets. It is not served when the robe shields against accountability. It is served when the State refuses to allow religion to be used as a weapon against vulnerable communities. This also touches the core of transitional justice. You came to the office after a moment when the people demanded a System Change. That demand was about more than corruption or economic collapse. It was about the abuse of power, the absence of accountability, and the long refusal of the State to face the pain of those who have suffered disappearances, torture, displacement, and violence. Have you met the families of the disappeared with the seriousness this moment demands? Have you sat with survivors of torture? Have you listened to communities in the North and East, not as voters but as victims and citizens? Have you met those connected to emblematic cases that still stand as monuments to impunity? The victims of this country did not survive all they endured only to receive another commission whose report is destined for an archive. What they ask for is simple and long overdue: truth spoken plainly, accountability that reaches those responsible, and guarantees of non-recurrence embedded in our constitutional and institutional life. These are not extra demands. They are the minimum conditions of a just peace. Economic recovery alone cannot extinguish the still-burning ember of denied constitutional rights. It cannot answer the mother who has spent decades asking where her child is. A victim-centred process means victims are not decoration in reconciliation speeches. They must have a real role in shaping truth-seeking, reparations, institutional reform, and guarantees of non-recurrence. They must be treated as rights-bearing citizens, not as people told to wait quietly until the State finds it convenient to remember them. Republic Day makes this discussion unavoidable. The 1972 Constitution did not merely change our legal status. For many minorities, it removed vital safeguards. Section 29(2) of the Soulbury Constitution, which prohibited discriminatory legislation, was deleted. The Senate was abolished. Sinhala was made the sole official language. Buddhism was elevated to the foremost place. These were not neutral adjustments. They created a hierarchy of belonging that Tamil-speaking and non-Buddhist citizens have felt for decades in daily life, in public service, and before the courts. This is not about reopening history for its own sake. It is about recognising that today’s events do not arise in a vacuum. A political culture where an accused monk can be treated as a prize while a threatened minority community waits for justice is the product of a long constitutional and social history. Ethnocentrism has been built, protected, and rewarded. It will not vanish through speeches about national unity. Your government holds a historic mandate. The NPP promised to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act. It remains. You promised Provincial Council elections. They have not been held. You promised a political solution to the ethnic question. The country still waits to hear it in concrete terms. You promised constitutional reform and a break from the old order. These promises cannot stay as campaign language. They must become time-bound commitments. Ethnic injustice is the elephant in the room. It has been there since independence. It was there in 1972\. It was there during the pogroms against Tamils. It was there when the war ended in 2009 without accountability. It is there now, when the Tamil community is again asked to wait while political leaders embrace those accused of threatening them. Every government has avoided this truth in its own way. Some ignored it. Some exploited it. The Rajapaksas made it worse. Many of us hoped the NPP would be different. That hope is now being tested. In light of all this, I respectfully call on you to do five things. First, make a clear public statement that the prosecution before the High Court of Batticaloa against Ampitiye Sumanarathana Thera will proceed without any executive interference. Second, meet the Tamil community affected by the alleged statements in this case, and meet victims and also the families connected to emblematic human rights cases, with at least the same seriousness shown to the accused. Third, provide a clear timeline for repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act, holding Provincial Council elections, and presenting a credible political solution based on meaningful power-sharing. Fourth, establish a credible, independent, and victim-centred truth and accountability process in which victims participate as principals, not as witnesses summoned to recount their suffering before another indifferent commission. Fifth, use your parliamentary majority to advance constitutional reform that addresses the structural roots of majoritarian impunity and builds a Republic based on pluralism, constitutional supremacy, enforceable rights, and equal citizenship. Sri Lanka needs more than economic recovery. It needs moral recovery. It needs constitutional honesty. It needs governance that can say to every community, without hesitation, that the law applies equally, that justice will not be sacrificed for political convenience, and that no citizen’s dignity is negotiable. Until that happens, the Republic at fifty-four remains unfinished. If you want change in Sri Lanka, you must be willing to become the change you promised. ***Dhanuka Rananjaka Kahandagamage*** ***Attorney-at-Law*** ***Sri Lanka*** **Editor’s Note:** Dhanuka Rananjaka Kahandagamage is an Attorney-at-Law of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka and one of the complainants in the ICCPR case against Ampitiye Sumanarathana Thera. He is also an activist known for advocating intercommunal understanding, protesting the alleged Sinhala-centric rebranding of state broadcasters, and authoring a book on Isai Priya, the LTTE broadcaster who was killed after surrendering to the Sri Lankan military at the end of the civil war. ### Sri Lanka Should Not Import the Middle East’s Hatreds URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-should-not-import-the-middle-easts-hatreds/ Last updated: 2026-05-27T17:05:05.000Z **By: Soraya M Deen** Sri Lanka is witnessing the rise of a dangerous ideology disguised as virtue: antizionism that increasingly spills into outright antisemitism. As a Muslim, I find it exhausting and deeply alarming. I have watched its ugly tentacles spread into my homeland thousands of miles away from the Middle East. First, there was hostility toward Israeli tourists visiting Sri Lanka. Then came campaigns against a Chabad house, as if Jewish worship itself was somehow offensive. Now Sri Lankan activists sail in flotillas toward Israel, turning one of the world’s most tragic conflicts into ideological theater. But beneath the slogans lies a disturbing truth: modern antisemitism often hides behind the language of justice, liberation, and human rights. Terrorists who massacre Jewish civilians are romanticized as “resistance.” Jewish history is erased. Jewish indigeneity is denied. Jewish trauma is dismissed as politically inconvenient. Jews alone are told they have no right to self-determination. That is not justice. That is prejudice. The war in Gaza did not begin in a vacuum. On October 7, Hamas slaughtered civilians, kidnapped families, and shattered any remaining trust Israelis had in coexistence. Today, most Jewish Israelis genuinely fear living beside another Hamas-controlled entity. Yet the global conversation demands total responsibility from Israel while asking almost nothing of Hamas or Palestinian leadership. Where is the demand for accountability from Hamas? Where is the outrage that Hamas embedded itself among civilians, built tunnels beneath neighborhoods, and prolonged a war that has devastated Palestinians themselves? Peace cannot emerge while one side is expected to guarantee security and the other is excused from responsibility. As Muslims, we should also remember something many activists conveniently ignore: Jews and Muslims are deeply connected religiously and historically. Jews are recognized in Islam as People of the Book. Islam permits Muslim men to marry Jewish women without conversion. Both faiths are rooted in uncompromising monotheism and trace themselves to Abraham. The Jewish connection to the land of Israel is not a modern political invention. It is ancient and acknowledged throughout Islamic tradition itself. Zionism, at its core, simply means the legitimate aspiration of the Jewish people to live safely in their ancestral homeland. Supporting Palestinian dignity does not require denying Jewish nationhood. In fact, much of the Arab world itself is moving beyond this endless politics of rage. Countries like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt increasingly understand that economic partnership and regional cooperation matter more than perpetual ideological warfare. The India–Middle East economic corridor could reshape global trade in the coming decades. India, Gulf nations, and Israel are building strategic partnerships for the future. Sri Lanka cannot afford to isolate itself through imported extremism and performative outrage. Over 30,000 Sri Lankans work in Israel today. They support families back home and contribute to our economy. Yet while other nations are building bridges, parts of Sri Lankan society are normalizing hostility toward Jews. It is hypocritical. Sri Lanka, above all countries, should understand the danger of collective blame. During our own ethnic conflict, tens of thousands died, and hundreds of thousands fled abroad after the 1983 riots. Imagine if Sri Lankans everywhere were treated as permanent villains because of our history. We would call that racism immediately. Yet when Jews are targeted collectively, too many remain silent. Criticizing Israeli government policies is legitimate. Demonizing Jews is not. Chanting slogans in Colombo will not liberate Palestinians. Symbolic flotillas will not bring peace. Only Israelis and Palestinians themselves — through mutual recognition, security guarantees, responsible leadership, and compromise — can end this conflict. Sri Lanka should stand for coexistence, realism, and humanity — not imported hatred masquerading as activism. **Editor’s Note:** The views expressed in this opinion article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Jaffna Monitor. We welcome informed responses, counterarguments, and dissenting perspectives in the form of letters to the editor. ### Young Mother Dies After Motorcycle Crash With Stunt Rider in Kilinochchi URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/young-mother-dies-after-motorcycle-crash-with-stunt-rider-in-kilinochchi/ Last updated: 2026-05-26T13:38:24.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka** — A 32-year-old mother was killed Sunday when a motorcycle ridden by a youth, allegedly performing dangerous stunts on a public road, struck her motorcycle head-on in Kilinochchi district, in Sri Lanka's Northern Province, police said. The victim, identified as Kagitha Shanmugam, was riding from Uruthirapuram toward Karadipokku to pick up her 7-year-old daughter from school when the crash occurred on the road connecting the two towns. Witnesses described the impact as horrific. She died at the scene. The youth whose motorcycle struck hers sustained critical injuries and was admitted to Kilinochchi District General Hospital for intensive treatment, police said. Kilinochchi Police said an investigation was underway. Witnesses said a group of young riders had been traveling at extremely high speeds along the Uruthirapuram-Karadipokku road, performing stunts in a manner residents said posed a serious danger to other road users. One of the motorcycles in the group lost control and crossed into oncoming traffic, striking Ms. Kagitha Shanmugam head-on as she rode in the opposite direction, witnesses said. The crash renewed longstanding concerns in the Northern Province about reckless riding by young men on high-powered motorcycles, which residents and local activists say authorities have failed to adequately regulate. High-end sports-style motorcycles — including the Yamaha MT-15 and Yamaha R15, models valued at more than 1.5 million Sri Lankan rupees — have become increasingly common in Kilinochchi and neighboring Mullaitivu district in recent years, residents say, in part because many families there receive remittances from relatives living abroad. Residents said some young riders regularly use public roads for dangerous speeding and stunt riding, sometimes to film videos for social media platforms, including TikTok. The death of Ms. Kagitha Shanmugam prompted widespread grief online, intensified after family members and friends shared posts from her Facebook page, which was largely devoted to photographs and messages about her daughter. Among those who mourned her publicly was Sri Lankan filmmaker Mathi Sutha, who described her as a close relative. In a Facebook post written in Tamil, he recalled carrying her as a child during wartime displacement and said the two had grown estranged in recent years. He expressed regret that they had not reconciled before her death. Mr. Mathi Sutha is the younger brother of Shanthan, a Sri Lankan Tamil who was convicted in India in connection with the 1991 assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Shanthan was released from prison after decades but died before he could return to Sri Lanka. In his post, Mr. Mathi Sutha also condemned drunk and reckless drivers. "They drink wanting to die — then why do they drive?" he wrote, accusing Sri Lanka's legal system of repeatedly failing victims of dangerous driving. Road accidents involving motorcycles are a leading cause of death in Sri Lanka, particularly among young men. Residents and activists in the Northern Province have repeatedly called for stricter enforcement of traffic laws, including against speeding and dangerous riding near schools and residential areas. ### THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-sacred-and-the-profane/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T05:08:29.000Z **ANURADHAPURA, Sri Lanka** — She was eleven years old, by her own account, when her mother first brought her to the private residential quarters inside one of the holiest Buddhist precincts in the world. She was fourteen when she told police what happened there. The man she named is Pallegama Hemarathana Thero, 71, the Atamasthanadhipathi — Chief Prelate and Custodian of the Eight Sacred Sites of Anuradhapura, and the senior-most administrative authority over the Sri Maha Bodhi: the sacred fig tree venerated as the oldest living tree documented in recorded human history, a cutting grown from the tree under which the Buddha attained enlightenment more than 2,500 years ago. He has, through a team of approximately twenty lawyers led by President's Counsel Kalinga Indatissa, denied every allegation. As of May 22, 2026, he is a free man on bail. ### **The Disclosure** On March 6, 2026, a complaint was lodged at Nittambuwa Police in Gampaha district alleging that a minor girl had been abducted and unlawfully detained. Officers arrested an initial suspect. The girl was placed in a state care centre in Ragama. On or around April 27, police located her at a lodge in the Nittambuwa police division, where she was staying with a male companion. That man was arrested. When investigators from the Gampaha Division Police Children and Women's Bureau questioned the girl, she described years of sexual abuse. She identified her primary abuser as a chief incumbent in Anuradhapura. She was produced before the Judicial Medical Officer at Gampaha General Hospital. The JMO's examination, according to submissions later made to the Anuradhapura Chief Magistrate's Court, found evidence of repeated sexual abuse extending over a significant period, in both the recent and more distant past. Police also recorded statements from three-wheeler drivers and other witnesses connected to the girl's alleged movements to and from the temple complex. On May 2, investigators travelled to Anuradhapura and recorded a statement from Hemarathana Thero. The session lasted more than three hours. A crime-scene inspection was conducted inside the Atamasthana compound. According to police submissions, the girl had subsequently been brought to the site to walk through it with investigators. She had not needed to be guided. From the VIP parking lot near the final gate, she walked directly into the residential quarters. She pointed out a room. She identified a bed. By May 4, the case was formally constituted before the Anuradhapura Chief Magistrate's Court as Case No. 22424/2026-B, with a B-report filed under Sections 364(2) and 365(b)(2)(b) of the Penal Code — rape of a minor and grave sexual abuse of a minor. The court issued orders that blood-stained clothing, allegedly belonging to the girl and recovered from where it had been buried near her home, be sent to the Government Analyst for forensic examination. Police were also granted court permission to record the victim's testimony on video through the National Child Protection Authority. ### **Twenty-Eight Days** Between the girl's disclosure in late April and Hemarathana Thero's arrest on May 8, twenty-eight days passed. During that period, no travel ban was imposed on the named suspect. At some point in those weeks, a team of Nittambuwa officers travelled to Anuradhapura. They surrounded the temple complex where Hemarathana Thero resided. They left without arresting him. Sri Lanka Police have offered no public explanation for why. The National Child Protection Authority says it contacted police repeatedly during this period — in writing and by telephone — asking why no arrest had been made. The NCPA's Director of Law Enforcement, Attorney-at-Law Sajeevani Abeykoon, told the Anuradhapura Chief Magistrate on May 8 that the authority had made multiple written and verbal requests to police. She questioned the delay explicitly, on the record. On May 8, NCPA Director Abeykoon and Assistant Director Hansi Halangoda appeared before Chief Magistrate Siyapath Sasindu Wickramarathne, acting on the direct instructions of NCPA Chairperson and retired High Court Judge Inoka Ranasinghe. A hearing was held in the magistrate's chambers. The magistrate ordered police to arrest both Hemarathana Thero and the girl's mother without delay. He imposed a foreign travel ban and directed the Controller General of Immigration and Emigration to prevent the monk from leaving the country. At approximately 11:45 p.m. that evening, Nittambuwa Police arrested Pallegama Hemarathana Thero at the emergency treatment unit of Nawaloka Hospital, a private medical facility in Colombo, where he had sought treatment. The girl's mother was arrested the same day and remanded until May 15 on charges of human trafficking under Section 360(c)(1)(a) of the Penal Code, and aiding and abetting the alleged offences. Police submissions to the court stated that the mother received 100,000 rupees in exchange for bringing the girl to the monk. ### **The Man and His Office** Pallegama Hemarathana Thero was born Karandagolla Walawwe Nandaseena on June 25, 1954, in Pallegama, Dambulla. He arrived at the Ruwanweliseya Maha Vihara in Anuradhapura at the age of fourteen, was ordained in 1968, and spent subsequent decades ascending the hierarchy of Sri Lanka's Theravada Buddhist establishment. He became Chief Incumbent of Jethavanaramaya in 1989, Chief Sanghanayaka of Nuwara Kalaviya, and Chief Incumbent of the Ruwanweliseya Chaitya in 1997. In 2022 — the same year the girl says her abuse began — he was appointed Atamasthanadhipathi upon the unanimous decision of the Atamasthana Executive Council. The position carries both spiritual authority and formal legal-administrative power over the most significant Buddhist heritage precincts in Sri Lanka. The Sri Maha Bodhi falls under the direct custody of the Atamasthanadhipathi's office. Its statutory functions, established under Sri Lankan temple ordinances, give the holder formal authority over the sacred compound's administration and access. Earlier this year, before his arrest, Hemarathana met the fourteenth Dalai Lama. He had also received heads of state, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For decades, politicians from nearly every major party had sought and publicised his blessings during election campaigns. Sri Lanka's Inspector General of Police had been photographed paying a ceremonial visit to the Atamasthana on Police Day. ### **A Different Custody** After his arrest at Nawaloka Private Hospital on the night of May 8, a Colombo additional magistrate visited the hospital, issued a remand order to May 12, and directed the accused's transfer to the Colombo National Hospital as medically appropriate for a person in state custody. When the case came before the Anuradhapura Chief Magistrate on May 12, a procedural failure emerged. The Colombo remand order had not been formally communicated to the Anuradhapura court, and the suspect had not been physically produced. The Chief Magistrate said he lacked the legal authority to extend remand under those circumstances. On May 13, Colombo Fort Magistrate Pasan Amarasena visited the hospital, issued a fresh remand order to May 22, and reordered the transfer from Nawaloka to the National Hospital. Prison authorities had argued the suspect was not fit for long-distance transport and required several specialised medical examinations. The transfer — first ordered May 9, reordered May 13 — was executed on May 14: five days and two court orders after the initial direction. At the May 15 hearing, police informed the court that investigations were complete and extracts had been forwarded to the Attorney General for legal advice. The charges were specified: Section 365(B)(2)(b), grave sexual abuse of a minor, and Section 364(2)(e), rape of a minor. The court called for a JMO report on the accused's fitness to appear in proceedings. The mother's bail application was refused. The accused was ordered produced on May 22. President's Counsel Indatissa told the court on May 15 that no bail application would be made on his client's behalf that day, requesting instead that police be directed to expedite their investigation. On May 19, the Chief Magistrate issued orders to every state and private bank in Sri Lanka to furnish records of accounts held by the girl's mother, and to every telecommunications company to submit details of calls made on mobile phones used by both the girl and the monk. On May 21, the accused was transferred from the National Hospital to the prison hospital. ### **The Bail Hearing** On May 22, Hemarathana Thero was produced before the Anuradhapura Chief Magistrate’s Court. A team of around twenty lawyers, including President’s Counsel Kalinga Indatissa, appeared for the accused. Three lawyers — Attorneys-at-Law Swarnamali Anuradhanayaka, Asith Siriwardene, and Athula Ranagala — appeared on behalf of the victim. Several senior Buddhist monks, including the Chief Incumbent of the Ruwanwelisaya, Venerable Eethalawetunawewe Gnanatileka Thero — who is also the Chancellor of Rajarata University of Sri Lanka — were present in court to observe the proceedings. Police had stepped up security across the court premises and surrounding areas. The monk was granted bail on two personal sureties of five million rupees each and a cash bail of 100,000 rupees. Chief Magistrate Siyapath Sasindu Wickramarathne imposed a foreign travel ban and warned that any attempt to influence witnesses would result in the immediate revocation of bail. The girl's mother was released on two personal sureties of 500,000 rupees each, with a foreign travel ban also imposed on her. President's Counsel Indatissa, appearing for the monk, refuted the allegations of rape and told the court his client had cooperated fully with investigators. He also denied, on the record, allegations that the Secretary to the Ministry of Public Security had interfered with the investigation. NCPA Director of Law Enforcement Sajeevani Abeykoon told the court that the monk and the girl had 84 recorded telephone conversations between them. She stated that the NCPA had been compelled to push police to arrest the suspect despite strong evidence, including the victim's statement, and that the case would have remained buried had the girl not come to light when she was found in the company of her companion. The state's prosecution interest was represented by Headquarters Chief Police Inspector P.M. Anura Gunawardena of Nittambuwa Police, HQI R.M. Jayaweera of Anuradhapura Police, and Sub-Inspector Dayananda of the Women and Children's Bureau, Anuradhapura. The monk walked out of court. ### **A Pattern of Cases** Research covering roughly a decade found that nearly 110 Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka had faced charges related to sexual or physical abuse of minors. Historical data from the National Child Protection Authority also indicated that only three Buddhist monks had been convicted for child abuse in recent history. One of those convictions offers a documented precedent. In 2005, monk Bellana Panniyaloka was convicted of grave sexual abuse of a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to the maximum twenty-year term. Immediately after sentencing, he drank insecticide concealed in his robes, collapsed in the courtroom, and died. Former Jathika Hela Urumaya Member of Parliament Aparekke Punnananda Thero, admitted in 2011 to sexually abusing five underage novice monks, appeared before Colombo Magistrate's Court. In the same weeks as Hemarathana's arrest in May 2026, twenty-two Buddhist monks were arrested at Bandaranaike International Airport after police alleged they had attempted to smuggle more than 110 kilograms of cannabis and hashish concealed in luggage — described by investigators as the largest narcotics detection involving clergy in the airport's history. The Child Protection Alliance has formally written to the Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs, charging that the ministry had not taken steps to hold institutions accountable for failing to protect children. ### **What Remains** The investigation file has been forwarded to the Attorney General's Department, which will determine whether to indict Hemarathana Thero and the co-accused for trial before the High Court. DNA analysis of the blood-stained clothing has not been returned. Bank records from state and private institutions and telecommunications data — including, according to NCPA submissions to the court, records of 84 telephone calls between the monk and the girl — had been received by investigators and were before the court at the time bail was granted. The monk is at an undisclosed location, on bail. The girl is fourteen. She is in a state protection centre. Her mother is charged with trafficking her. Whether the Attorney General ultimately indicts Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana — “Golden Jewel” in Pali — or not, the case has already left behind a troubling public record: one marked by delays, procedural lapses, and institutional accommodations that even Sri Lanka’s own child protection authorities felt compelled to place before a court. Whatever verdict eventually follows, that record is likely to endure far longer. ### Tamils Caught Between the JVP and Their Traditional Tamil Party Leadership URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-7/ Last updated: 2026-05-26T07:09:08.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “If we have to vote, who should get our vote?” a middle-aged Tamil man asked a friend at a social event in Jaffna. The innocuous query betrayed a sense of confusion that prevails in the minds of many Tamils in Sri Lanka, nearly two years after they jolted the traditional Tamil parties in parliamentary elections almost everywhere. Tamils admit they have always seen the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the country’s dominant ruling party, as a Sinhala-Buddhist entity. But a JVP magic that gripped voters in late 2024 has not totally abated. No, their main and long-standing problems — civilian land still occupied by the military, the lack of justice for those killed or disappeared after surrendering in 2008–09, and a general sense of intimidation by the state — have not gone away. And there is no sign of when the government will take meaningful action on these issues. Yet, the JVP-led government is widely seen to be doing “something”, even if the material benefits – a lane or road laid here, ensuring potable water, setting up new infrastructure – are too localised. At the same time, there has been no visible progress on some of the major projects planned for Tamil areas, including those funded by India. These include repeated promises to expand the Palaly Airport and the Kankesanthurai Harbour in northern Jaffna. Cleverly, the JVP – unlike earlier regimes – allows overt display of Tamil nationalist feelings. There is no bar if Tamil parties or others mark the day Tamil Tigers chief Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed in 2009, besides thousands of innocents. Ditto for the emotionally-charged annual display of “Martyrs’ Day” when Tamils gather in large numbers at sites where Tamil guerrillas were laid to rest. When a maverick but pro-Tamil nationalist politician publicly appealed for funds to treat his serious kidney ailment, local JVP leaders immediately called on him. The other day, one of the JVP MPs from Sri Lanka’s north gifted Rs 1 lakh of his personal money to a former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrilla who is medically in a bad way. As for President Anura Dissanayake, he continues to be popular in Tamil areas. He is the public face of the JVP, a Marxist party which once carried out two armed insurrections, leaving thousands dead. This is, without doubt, the biggest trump card for the JVP in that part of the island which always voted for Tamil parties and rejected Sinhalese-Buddhist political actors. Naturally, Tamil parties and their leaders – some more popular than the others -- are frustrated, although they don’t show their disappointment. As far as Tamil parties and sections of the more politically conscious Tamils are concerned, the JVP is no different from other outfits which draw their main strength from the majority Sinhalese community. And the Tamil leaders have enough to back their complaint. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, for example, promised during the 2024 campaign that elections to the provincial councils would be held within a year. Now, a top leader of the Marxist party has ruled out the elections in all of Sri Lanka’s nine provinces in 2026, citing a financial crunch. There is uncertainty over whether these elections will take place even in 2027, as the JVP wants to introduce reservations for women and youth — a welcome initiative, but one that is likely to take many months to complete. The idea for provincial councils was born when Sri Lanka and India signed an agreement in 1987 in a bid to end Tamil separatism. In the Tamil-majority north and the multi-racial east, where Tamils live in large numbers, the councils were seen as a democratic alternative to separatism, whose seeds were sown long ago due to what many Tamils saw as an attempt to treat them as second-grade citizens. Tamil leaders are furious over the axing of the promised elections. They are convinced the JVP fears the electorate due to unending economic hardships – the very factor which catapulted the party to power after the devastating financial crash of 2022. The Tamil political sentiment is unequivocal: They have cheated us. We have been betrayed. They are no different from others. K. Vigneswaran, who has been in politics for decades but who is a small player today, has even told Tamils to stop daydreaming that a JVP government would ever give them any meaningful concessions. The fact is that the JVP bitterly opposed the 1987 India-Sri Lanka accord, under which Indian troops came to Sri Lanka’s northeast and ended up fighting the Tamil Tigers. Since the Indian military deployment was seen as a national shame, everything from the pact is also sought to be rejected. The provincial councils were never a favorite of the JVP. But the party promised to hold their elections by September 2025\. That pledge has now been broken. Provincial councils allow elected leaders — Muslim, Tamil, or Sinhalese — to manage their own affairs within their respective regions. They represent a limited form of devolution of power and serve as a regional safety valve. But while denying the people the right to elect provincial councils, the JVP has launched Prajashakti, a government-led national programme to battle poverty. On the face of it, this is welcome. But critics say its real aim is to bypass elected leaders from other political shades with JVP-chosen representatives. This aims at building a parallel power structure so that others get pushed to the side, and all credit for whatever good happens accrues to the Marxist-led government. At the same time, the government has moved only haltingly on returning Tamil civilian land seized by the military during the war against Tamil rebels, which ended back in 2009. Even here, some Tamils say President Dissanayake wants to return the land but is unable to overcome the military’s refusal to part with what it illegally holds. To add insult to injury, the occupied land is now also being used for commercial purposes like restaurants, farming, and boutiques, or to propagate Buddhism. JVP’s powerful general secretary Tilvin Silva, the most influential person in Sri Lanka after the president, despite not having a government post, is telling Tamils to reject their traditional leadership. The JVP, he says, stands for equality, not for the superiority of one race or religion over another. Pious words, say Tamil leaders, wondering if he would dare say that to the Buddhist clergy who enjoy special privileges in the Sinhalese society. Unfortunately for the Tamils, their mainstream politicians are a bitterly divided lot, fighting one another more than the government. This ugly internecine war disgusts ordinary Tamils. All this does not mean that Tamils have fallen in love with the JVP or have irrevocably turned their backs on their traditional leaders. As a Jaffna academic points out, a bizarre phenomenon has gripped the Tamil areas. “The JVP has an office on Palaly Road (in Jaffna). Anyone can go there and lodge a complaint. Petty issues are often settled rapidly,” the academic said. “This pleases the people. So, many say, ‘Well, they are at least doing something, right?’” However, unless something dramatic happens, the JVP won’t be able to repeat its whirlwind showing in future elections in Tamil areas. For a change, the anger against the JVP in Sinhalese areas seems more intense than in the Tamil region. President Dissanayake, as a person, still enjoys a honeymoon period amongst Tamils. But this too won’t last forever. Tamils who feel cheated of their family land are unlikely to forget that the president had promised to undo historical wrongs. Women in Tamil regions still seeking answers about their disappeared husbands, brothers, and sons will not always be forgiving, even if age is not on their side. Worse, the economic collapse that struck Sri Lanka in 2022 has not fully gone away. Tamil areas, the former war zone, remain among the worst affected — even 17 years after the fighting ended. Large sections of the Tamil population are clearly caught between a well-organized and strategic JVP and Tamil political leaders of various shades and loyalties. ### The Strait of Hormuz: New Arrangements Under International Law URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-strait-of-hormuz-legal-dimensions-of-the-new-arrangements-amid-aggression-and-fundamental-change-of-circumstances/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T08:35:19.000Z **By: Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs of Iran** ### **Prelude** For a long period, maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz did not proceed on the basis of exercising an asserted right, but rather within the framework of an interaction founded upon comity and mutual good faith. Over years, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the coastal State, facilitated the passage of vessels through a continuous and peaceful practice. However, this practice was never to be understood as an acceptance of a binding legal obligation or as a relinquishment of the coastal State’s sovereignty and sovereign rights over its own waterway. Nevertheless, today, due to a fundamental change of circumstances and the substantial transformation of security, the continuation of such unilateral comity is no longer possible, and the adoption of appropriate measures based on respect for the sovereign rights of the coastal State has become an inevitable necessity. Indeed, the Strait of Hormuz has long been regarded as a sensitive and strategic waterway—a status that has now been redefined in light of the repeated acts of aggression by the Zionist regime, the United States, and certain neighboring States in the region. Some neighboring States, by placing their territory at the disposal of aggressors for commission of acts of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, have become complicit in such aggression. This conduct itself constitutes an act of aggression as defined by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) and, consequently, those States have assumed the heavy burden of responsibility for this act, which is a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the peremptory norm of “prohibition of aggression”. As a result of this aggression and these hostile acts, the security and safety of the region, and in particular of the Strait of Hormuz, have suffered severe and widespread harm. It must not be forgotten that the aggressor and its regional military bases were supplied and equipped, inter alia, through that same strait. Therefore, preventing the recurrence of such internationally wrongful acts is an undeniable imperative. In the wake of the intensification of such acts, the circumstances have fundamentally changed, giving rise to a new and irreversible situation. In this situation, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the coastal State, finds itself compelled to adopt practical and proportionate measures to manage the developments that have expanded into the maritime zones. These measures are taken with a view to preventing further risks from being imposed on vessels and seafarers in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. ### **Fundamental Change of Circumstances** Since the commencement of acts of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the security environment of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz has undergone significant transformations and has thereby become subject to a fundamental change of circumstances. In the current situation, the underlying circumstances governing the legal regime of the Strait, namely the existence of a minimum level of regional stability and security necessary to guarantee safe passage, have been severely undermined as a result of repeated threats and actions that violate Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. One of the most significant factors that has disrupted the prior order is the persistent disregard for a peremptory norm of international law: the norm that prohibits any act of aggression. In addition to this, despite repeated violations of international law, the United Nations Security Council, as the primary body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, has remained practically incapable of condemning the aggressor and has consequently failed to discharge its primary responsibility to ensure international peace and security and to restore stability to the region. Accordingly, under the international law of the sea, the regime of passage through straits used for international navigation cannot be applied in a security vacuum. The coastal State’s obligation to facilitate passage is conditional upon the existence of circumstances in which the safety of navigation and maritime public order have not been seriously disrupted. In a situation where persistent military threats pose real dangers and transform the operational environment, the adoption of necessary measures based on the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances is unavoidable. On this basis, the set of current measures and practices must be regarded as an adjustment of rights and obligations to adapt to the circumstances, in light of the fundamental change of circumstances, measures undertaken with the aim of establishing a balance between the security requirements of the coastal State and the continued safe passage of international navigation. ### **Sovereignty over the territorial sea** Under the international law of the sea, the sovereignty of coastal States over their territorial sea, including over that part which lies within an international strait, and the exercise of rights and jurisdiction derived from such sovereignty, constitutes a fundamental and well-established principle. Consequently, the arrangements for managing passage through the Strait of Hormuz are governed within the framework of the domestic laws of Iran and Oman, as well as customary and treaty-based rules and principles, including the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international judicial precedents (including the judgments of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel and Oil Platforms cases). Within this framework, one essential principle is of particular importance: no right under international law, including the right of passage, may be exercised in such a way as to result in a threat, military aggression, or violation of the security of the coastal State. Accordingly, mere reliance on classical concepts is insufficient to address the exigencies of the current unprecedented situation and does not adequately meet the requirements of security and sovereignty. This situation is also premised upon the peremptory norm prohibiting the threat or use of force, as embodied in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized in international judicial precedents and the judgments of the International Court of Justice as an intransgressible rule. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the findings of the International Court of Justice clearly indicate that any foreign military presence or action that endangers the security or sovereignty of another State, even indirectly, is contrary to that principle. Furthermore, Article 2 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea affirms the sovereignty of the coastal State over its territorial sea, seabed, and subsoil, and grants no authorization for the stationing of foreign forces. Article 30 of the same Convention confirms the right to require any military ship that fails to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State to leave the territorial sea immediately. Moreover, the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea emphasizes the right of coastal States to restrict foreign military presence in order to preserve the neutrality of regional States and the security of the waterway. While preventing the reproduction of aggressive and interventionist patterns that have led to instability and insecurity, this approach establishes a balance between the freedom of navigation and the security rights of the coastal State as affirmed in established international judicial practice. ### **Historic sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz** In formulating the arrangements for managing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, it is essential to emphasize the historic sovereignty of Iran and Oman over this waterway. This finding has been affirmed by various arbitral tribunals. Accordingly, the longstanding historic sovereignty of Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, which existed for centuries prior to the Convention and has been continuously exercised, remains valid. In the case of Qatar v. Bahrain, the International Court of Justice, upon examining historic rights in the Persian Gulf, took the view that the continuous exercise of sovereignty and historical activities by coastal States constitutes a valid basis for the recognition of a “historic title” over maritime areas. Given the similar geographic and historical situation of the Strait of Hormuz, this judicial precedent directly confirms the historic sovereignty of Iran and Oman over the strait. Both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognize the full sovereignty of the coastal State over its territorial sea and preserve the historic rights of coastal States in gulfs and semi-enclosed waterways. Therefore, in light of the continuous and historic exercise of sovereignty by Iran and Oman over the Strait of Hormuz over many centuries, this strait possesses a historic title. ### **Hierarchy of applicable rules** In this regard, the rules governing this matter must be examined at three distinct but interrelated levels, given that each level possesses a higher rank and a more fundamental character, and rules at lower levels cannot be interpreted or applied in conflict with the principles of higher levels. The first level relates to the fundamental principles of international law, including peremptory norms (jus cogens), that is the prohibition of aggression, and those enshrined in the United Nations Charter including prohibition of threat or use of force (Article 2(4)) and the inherent right of self-defence (Article 51). These principles stand at the apex of the hierarchy of international legal norms and establish the framework and limitations for all other rules. The second level refers to international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict), which governs conduct in armed hostilities and determines which conducts are permissible and which are prohibited in situations of armed conflict. This level of rules complements in hierarchical manner, the fundamental principles of the first level. At the third level, the law of the sea applies as a specialized body of law. The rules governing the regimes of passage through international straits, the rights of coastal States over their territorial sea, and other provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot be applied in a vacuum or by disregarding the higher levels. In other words, the law of the sea must not be analyzed separately from the “root causes” that have shaped the current situation (including aggression, continuous military threats, and the inability of the Security Council to maintain peace), nor separately from the fundamental principles of international law; otherwise, this branch of law would become a tool for justifying aggression and disregarding the sovereign rights of coastal States. With respect to the third level, it must be noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not acceded to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, nor to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Therefore, Iran is not bound by their provisions, except insofar as they have become part of customary international law. The regime of “transit passage” set forth in the 1982 Convention does not meet the established criteria of customary international law. The conclusions of the International Law Commission’s 2018 work on the identification of customary international law contain key elements generally considered for determining whether a practice has become customary. Two of these conclusions are particularly relevant: first, under Conclusion 5, “State practice consists of conduct of the State, whether in the exercise of its executive, legislative, judicial or other functions”. Second, Conclusion 15 provides that “Where a State has objected to a rule of customary international law while that rule was in the process of formation, the rule is not opposable to the State concerned for so long as it maintains its objection”. Through its continuous and persistent objection to the regime of “transit passage” provided for in Articles 37 to 44 of the 1982 Convention, Iran has not recognized these rules as binding under customary international law. In this regard, Iran’s consistent legislative and diplomatic practice since 1982 has established its position as a persistent objector to the binding nature of these rules and has challenged the opinio juris necessary for the formation of a customary norm. The first notable document registered in the United Nations Treaty Series is Iran’s interpretative declaration made at the time of signing the Convention, in which it explicitly stated that certain provisions, including the regime of “transit passage” in Part III (Articles 37 to 44), do not represent established customary international law. Iran’s Maritime Law of 1963 (1342), its 2012 (1391) amendment, and Iran’s Law on Maritime Zones of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman of 1993 (1372) are further evidence of this practice. The latter law makes no reference to transit passage and thus does not recognize that regime; rather, it establishes specific regulatory provisions for the strait, including the requirement to obtain prior authorization for the passage of warships, submarines, and vessels carrying dangerous or environmentally harmful substances. Consequently, the applicable legal framework for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, in the absence of a binding treaty obligation and in the absence of a customary rule of “transit passage”, is the customary right of “innocent passage” through straits used for international navigation, as recognized by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case (1949). Within this framework, the coastal State has the right to regulate passage, collect fees for maritime services, require prior notification or authorization for the passage of warships, and adopt necessary measures for the protection of its security. The measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran are consistent with this customary framework. Accordingly, any legal analysis of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz that proceeds directly to the specific provisions of the law of the sea without first examining peremptory norms, the fundamental principles of the Charter, and international humanitarian law is not only incomplete but also misleading. The law of the sea does not operate in a vacuum and cannot be used as a shield to justify aggression, extra-regional military presence, or the disregard of the historic and contemporary sovereign rights of coastal States. **Note:** Kazem Gharibabadi currently serves as Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs. In this role, he is part of Iran’s diplomatic team engaged in high-level consultations and negotiations on sensitive international and regional issues. He has also been associated with Iran’s diplomatic engagement during periods of heightened tensions, including discussions related to the recent military escalation involving the United States and Israel against Iran. Within this context, he has contributed to the legal and international dimensions of Iran’s response, particularly in framing the situation within international law and multilateral diplomatic forums. **Editor’s Note:** The views expressed in this opinion article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Jaffna Monitor. We welcome informed responses, counterarguments, and dissenting perspectives in the form of letters to the editor. ### Death Row Inmate in Vithiya Case Found Hanging in Jaffna Prison URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/death-row-inmate-in-vithiya-case-found-hanging-in-jaffna-prison/ Last updated: 2026-05-26T05:07:10.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A prisoner sentenced to death in the high-profile 2015 murder of Pungudutivu schoolgirl Sivaloganathan Vithiya died by suicide inside the Jaffna Prison, prison authorities said Monday. The Department of Prisons said the inmate, Poobalasingham Jeyakumar, 46, was found hanging inside the prison on Monday morning. Authorities said an investigation into the death was underway. Jeyakumar was among seven men sentenced to death by the Jaffna High Court in 2017 over the rape and murder of Vithiya, a case that shocked Sri Lanka and triggered widespread protests across the Northern Province. Vithiya, a schoolgirl from the island of Pungudutivu off the Jaffna peninsula, was abducted on May 13, 2015, sexually assaulted, and killed in a crime that became a symbol of growing public anger over violence against women and the breakdown of law and order in postwar northern Sri Lanka. The convictions and death sentences handed down by the Jaffna High Court were later upheld by Sri Lanka’s Court of Appeal. Sri Lanka has maintained a moratorium on executions for decades, meaning death row inmates remain imprisoned despite receiving capital punishment sentences. ### Sri Lanka’s War Ended. Its Reckoning Never Began. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-war-ended-its-reckoning-never-began/ Last updated: 2026-05-26T05:07:12.000Z **By Sidhartha Thamby** Every society that has passed through large-scale political violence carries the obligation to reckon with it honestly. That Sri Lanka shares this condition with dozens of other countries is not a reason for complacency — it is a reminder that resolution is possible because others have achieved it, and that failure is not inevitable. More than seventeen years after the Sri Lankan military crushed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in a brutal final campaign, the country has still not honestly confronted what happened — or why. No credible legal process has examined the conduct of either side. The constitutional structures that enabled decades of majoritarian discrimination remain largely intact. A generation of schoolchildren has grown up without a shared understanding of the conflict. And the families of the disappeared — mothers who filed paperwork in the 1980s and 1990s and have been waiting ever since — are older now. Some have died waiting. This is not a history of the conflict. It is an argument — organised around four demands that the record makes unavoidable. Each is grounded in specific events and specific failures. None of them is novel. All of them remain unmet. ### **I. A CONSTITUTION THAT MEANS WHAT IT SAYS** The structural roots of the Sri Lankan conflict run through its constitutional history. The Sinhala Only Act of 1956 — passed just eight years after independence — stripped Tamil civil servants of their language rights overnight and is widely regarded by scholars as a founding moment of ethnic alienation. The 1978 constitution concentrated executive power in a president elected by a majoritarian vote, leaving minority communities with virtually no structural veto over the policies that governed their lives. The All Party Representative Committee, convened in 2006 to find a negotiated political solution, produced in its Committee C report a detailed mapping of these structural exclusions — a record of minority grievances that the political class commissioned and then set aside. What is required is a constitutional framework that prevents discrimination driven by majoritarianism — one with teeth, not merely aspirations. This is not about giving one community an advantage over another. It is about building a state whose rules apply to everyone, and whose institutions are structurally incapable of weaponising the majority against the minority. Comparative constitutional scholars point to power-sharing models — Belgium's linguistic community councils, Switzerland's Federal Council, Northern Ireland's mandatory coalition — as designs that compel majorities to govern with minorities rather than over them. Sri Lanka has never adopted such mechanisms. ### **II. ACCOUNTABILITY — ALL PARTIES, ALL CRIMES** The final campaign of 2006 to 2009 produced suffering of an order that is well-documented and insufficiently acknowledged. A UN Panel of Experts estimated in 2011 that tens of thousands of civilians may have died in the war’s final months. That estimate rests on a longer evidentiary foundation: the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), whose reports documented disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and the fate of surrendered combatants across every phase of the conflict from the 1980s onward; and the 1993 volume *The Broken Palmyrah*, compiled by the Faculty of Science at the University of Jaffna, which remains among the earliest systematic accounts of civilian deaths and displacement under military occupation in the north. Accountability must be pursued through credible legal mechanisms. This accounting must encompass children conscripted who never came back; the unmarked graves; the thousands of reported disappearances that remain officially unresolved; those tortured, illegally incarcerated, or raped; those who lost their property; and the thousands who fled as stateless persons or refugees. This demand applies to all parties. The Tamil community must also reckon, within itself, with what was done by the LTTE to their own people — forced recruitment, the assassination of Tamil political opponents, the deliberate targeting of moderate Tamil leadership. Presidential Commission reports — including those convened after the assassinations of Tamil political figures in the late 1980s and 1990s — named these acts, took testimony, and produced findings that were never meaningfully acted upon. The South must undertake an equivalent reckoning with what was done in its name. Sri Lanka’s domestic accountability mechanisms — flowing from the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission of 2010 — require closure. The LLRC collected thousands of depositions from survivors, displaced persons, and witnesses across the north and east. Those depositions constitute a public record: named individuals describing specific events, specific locations, specific perpetrators. They were heard. They were transcribed. They have not been acted upon. Many public officials — in the civil service, in the humanitarian agencies, in the ICRC and the UN — performed extraordinary service under the most constrained of circumstances during the final campaign. Their contributions are part of the record. So are the crimes committed within the fog of that campaign. ### **III. A POLITICAL CULTURE FIT FOR A PLURAL SOCIETY** Perhaps most fundamentally, a political culture must be built — through education, through civic institutions, through the example of leadership — that is capable of treating pluralism not as a problem to be managed but as the constitutive condition of Sri Lankan identity. Research on post-conflict societies consistently finds that textbooks, curricula, and public commemoration shape whether the next generation inherits grievances or alternatives. Sri Lanka's school system has historically operated with separate Sinhala and Tamil-medium curricula carrying little shared civic content. The children graduating from those schools become the voters, officials, and community leaders of the next decade. The mass uprising of 2022 — what protesters called the Aragalaya — demonstrated that a cross-ethnic generation exists and is capable of solidarity across communal lines. It also demonstrated how quickly economic crisis can expose the political fault lines that pluralism reforms were supposed to address. A political order that cannot treat this generation's demands seriously risks being swept aside by forms of change it will not be able to direct. **IV. ATONEMENT — THE OBLIGATION THAT ACCUMULATES** This is the dimension of the reckoning that legal mechanisms and constitutional frameworks cannot reach alone. Our faiths — all of them — prescribe a collective atonement, an addressing of the souls of the departed. That obligation does not dissolve with time. It accumulates. The dead of this conflict — Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim; civilian and combatant; killed by the state, by the LTTE, by paramilitaries, by circumstance — belong to communities that still carry them. The mothers in the East who registered disappearances in the 1980s and 1990s are older now. Some have died without knowing what happened to their sons. The UTHR (Jaffna) reports, published at considerable personal risk to their authors over more than two decades, recorded many of these cases by name — not as statistics, but as individuals with families, histories, and unanswered fates. That is not a historical fact at a safe distance. It is a present condition of Sri Lankan life. Other societies have found their own forms for this acknowledgment. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission grounded its framework not in liberal legalism alone but in the concept of ubuntu — collective humanity — making it culturally legible in ways that purely prosecutorial mechanisms were not. Germany built its reckoning across decades through education, memorial culture, and the steady work of civic institutions. Argentina's Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo kept the question of the disappeared alive for a generation until the state could no longer ignore it. Rwanda, imperfectly and under enormous strain, attempted the gacaca community courts. None of them found a perfect form. All of them found that attempting it was better than not attempting it. **THE QUESTION THE RECORD REFUSES TO STOP POSING** We should not be complacent about what failed to be prevented. But neither should we be paralysed by it. The history of this conflict is not only a history of political failures, institutional cowardice, and atrocity. It is also a history of people — named and unnamed — who acted with courage and conscience under conditions designed to make such conduct difficult. The generation that burned the Jaffna Library in 1981 and the generation that sheltered Tamil neighbours during the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1983 were formed by the same society. That society produced both. ### “AKD Walked the Same Road”: Jaffna Protesters Reject Security Justification for Land Occupation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/akd-walked-the-same-road-jaffna-protesters-reject-security-justification-for-land-occupation/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T14:21:56.000Z **MAYILIDDY, Sri Lanka —** The chairman of a local government body in Sri Lanka's Northern Province said Sunday that there was "absolutely no justification" for the military to continue occupying civilian lands in the region, speaking at a protest demanding the return of privately owned property still under military control more than a decade and a half after the end of the country's civil war. The demonstration, organized by the Valikamam North Resettlement Development Committee, drew residents from four Grama Sevaka divisions in the Valikamam North area who say they have been unable to reclaim lands seized during the conflict between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which ended in 2009\. Organizers say roughly 3,000 acres remain under military control in the area. Thiyagarajah Nirosh, chairman of the Valikamam East Pradeshiya Sabha, accused successive governments of failing to return the land and alleged that displaced families continued to live without permanent housing while the military used portions of the occupied property for agriculture and other activities. "For 37 years, the state has held these lands at gunpoint," Mr. Nirosh said. "Even 17 years after the war, our people are still fighting for the return of their own lands." He described the continued occupation as "an ethnic-driven project" and called on the government to immediately release the lands and compensate residents for decades of military use. Mr. Nirosh also pointed to a recent visit by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to Jaffna as evidence that no genuine security rationale existed for maintaining the military presence. "When the President visited Jaffna recently, he walked alone on this very road," he said. "That itself shows there is no security threat here." Land occupation by the military has remained one of the most contentious post-war issues in Sri Lanka's Northern Province, where Tamil residents and civil society organizations have for years demanded the release of property acquired during the conflict. ### The Dangerous Journey of Sri Lankan Recruits in Ukraine URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-dangerous-journey-of-sri-lankan-recruits-in-ukraine/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T01:49:11.000Z ***Dr. Ruwan M Jayatunge, M.D. PhD*** The onset of the Ukrainian war in 2014 created significant manpower challenges, prompting both Russia and Ukraine to recruit former soldiers from various nations. This situation has led to the involvement of numerous ex-combatants and military personnel from Sri Lanka, driven largely by the country's severe economic conditions. Many veterans have unfortunately become targets for human trafficking networks and misleading social media campaigns that promote lucrative, non-combat positions. As a result, a considerable number of individuals have travelled to the conflict zone to enlist in either the Russian or Ukrainian armed forces. Initially, the agents assured recruits that their roles would be limited to non-combat positions in the rear. However, upon deployment, the reality proved starkly different. Many veterans, lured by the promise of safer jobs such as driving or cooking, found themselves thrust into the chaos of the frontlines, serving as mercenaries and facing direct enemy fire. The issue of unofficial military deployments involving former Sri Lankan combatants has escalated into a significant governmental concern. According to estimates from parliamentary inquiries and independent human rights organizations, approximately 2,000 experienced veterans have joined foreign military forces. The Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry has officially recorded 554 individuals who have enlisted in the Russian military. Furthermore, reports suggest that at least 275 Sri Lankans have lost their lives while fighting for Russia, a number that likely underrepresents the actual casualties, particularly when contrasted with the 59 fatalities acknowledged by the Sri Lankan government. While government figures previously acknowledged 59 fatalities, investigations by Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for POWs and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) have revealed that at least 275 Sri Lankans have lost their lives while fighting for Russia. Additionally, more than 120 individuals are reported missing or have lost all contact with their families, and Ukrainian forces have captured several former soldiers. They are currently being held as Prisoners of War. The combatants of Sri Lanka engaged in a prolonged conflict known as the Eelam War, which left many of them with both physical injuries and deep psychological scars. Following their retirement from active duty, numerous veterans found themselves grappling with a loss of identity and diminished social standing, as the transition to civilian life proved challenging. Understanding the motivations that lead former combatants to become mercenaries is crucial, as they extend beyond mere economic hardship. Many of these individuals are drawn back to conflict zones due to a psychological phenomenon known as trauma reenactment. This occurs when veterans, burdened by moral injury or survivor's guilt, feel an unconscious urge to reconnect with their past traumas, often leading them to engage in conflicts that are not directly related to their own experiences. For these individuals, a peaceful environment can seem unpredictable and threatening, while chaotic or dangerous settings feel familiar and manageable. This sense of familiarity compels them to recreate chaos, thereby regaining a sense of control in the face of perceived dangers. Reports have emerged indicating that that some former combatants from Sri Lanka are now aligning with their former enemies, including members of the Jeyanthan Brigade of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This complex situation underscores the lasting effects of war on personal identities and the intricate relationships within post-conflict societies. This account presents the personal experience of a Sri Lankan ex-combatant who participated in the conflict in Ukraine. The narrative offers insights into the challenges faced during the war, reflecting on the complexities of combat and the emotional toll it takes on individuals involved. Sargent GK is a combat veteran who initially served in the Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment and later in the Sri Lanka Army's special forces. He spent a number of years in Northern Sri Lanka fighting the LTTE, a separatist military organization. Throughout the course of the armed conflict, he witnessed a series of traumatic battle incidents that profoundly affected his emotional well-being. After retiring from military service, he dedicated much of his time to his family; however, the financial difficulties he faced began to weigh heavily on him. Having been a fully engaged combat soldier, the transition to civilian life proved to be monotonous and unfulfilling. It was during this period of restlessness that he learned about job opportunities available for former soldiers in Russia, which sparked a glimmer of hope. Intrigued by the prospect of a new beginning and the chance to utilize his skills in a different environment, he decided to pursue this opportunity, eager to see if fortune would favour him in this new chapter of his life. He contacted an agent and invested 750,000 Sri Lankan rupees, which is roughly equivalent to 2,278 US dollars, to secure a position abroad, enticed by the prospect of earning a monthly salary of 200,000 Russian rubles, approximately 2,748 US dollars. Sargent GK shared his experiences as he traveled to Moscow, where he was subsequently transferred to a base camp in Ukraine. There, he participated in a comprehensive 14-day training program alongside fellow recruits from various countries, including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, and several African nations. Notably, many of these individuals were not engaged in combat roles; instead, they were primarily support staff, fulfilling essential functions such as cooking and driving. Upon completing their basic training, the soldiers were informed that they would be deployed to the front lines of the war. For Sergeant GK, who had previously faced the rigors of combat, this news did not come as a shock; he resolved to embrace the challenge and prepare for the realities of battle. In contrast, many of his fellow recruits were overwhelmed by a sense of dread and disbelief at the prospect of serving in such a perilous environment. The weight of this revelation settled heavily on them, as they grappled with the fear of the unknown and the daunting responsibilities that lay ahead. Sargent GK expressed concerns regarding the inadequacy of the 14-day training program, highlighting that it failed to adequately prepare the personnel for the challenges they would face. Many soldiers completed the training without a clear understanding of the enemy they were about to confront, nor were they familiar with the types of weaponry they would encounter in combat. This lack of preparation extended to their unfamiliarity with the terrain, which impacted their operational effectiveness. Additionally, the soldiers were not briefed on the climatic conditions they would experience, which further complicated their ability to adapt and respond to the environment during their missions. Upon their arrival at the front lines, the soldiers encountered a formidable and elusive adversary, marked by the pervasive use of drone warfare, which led to substantial losses within their ranks. Sargent GK found himself deeply unsettled by the absence of organized evacuation efforts for both the deceased and the critically injured, a stark departure from his previous experiences during the Eelam War in Sri Lanka. In that conflict, he had been confident that if he sustained injuries, his comrades would promptly come to his aid and facilitate his evacuation. Furthermore, he held a firm belief that, should he fall in battle, his body would be recovered by his fellow soldiers. However, the situation in the Ukrainian war starkly contrasted this expectation, revealing a troubling lack of coordination and support for the wounded and fallen, leaving him to grapple with the harsh realities of modern warfare. The absence of unit cohesion was noticeable, leading to a pervasive atmosphere where each soldier was left to fend for himself. The grim reality was that if one were to sustain serious injuries, the likelihood of receiving assistance from comrades was virtually nonexistent; they would not be carried to the field medical units. This precarious situation fostered a deep-seated anxiety among many soldiers, who found themselves grappling with feelings of cynicism and a profound sense of helplessness. The knowledge that their survival depended solely on their own resilience, rather than the support of their peers, created a psychological burden that weighed heavily on their morale and overall effectiveness in the field. Sergeant GK noted that Russian senior officers rarely visited the front, and language barriers created confusion among the mercenaries. The team found themselves in a state of heightened alert, as there was no prior debriefing or comprehensive explanation of the mission at hand. Instead, they were compelled to respond swiftly to unexpected directives that arrived without warning. This lack of preparation created an atmosphere of uncertainty, where each member had to rely on their instincts and training to navigate the unfolding situation. The abrupt nature of the orders demanded immediate action, leaving little room for discussion or strategic planning. Amidst the chaos of the battlefield, he witnessed the harrowing toll of war as his comrades fell victim to relentless drone strikes and the merciless barrage of artillery fire. The sight of injured soldiers and the lifeless bodies strewn across the ground became a grim reality that haunted him daily. Despite the profound loss, there was a disheartening lack of acknowledgment or reverence for the fallen; their remains lay neglected, slowly succumbing to decay. In the dense forests surrounding the conflict zone, he frequently stumbled upon human remains, a stark reminder of the violence that engulfed them. Each encounter was a deeply unsettling experience, leaving an indelible mark on his psyche as he grappled with the brutality of war and the indifference it often elicited. The soldiers faced significant challenges due to the irregularity of their food rations, which compelled them to seek additional supplies from nearby shops. Their primary sustenance included staples such as rice, bread, chicken, canned goods, fish, and occasionally, vegetables. To manage their meals, they set up makeshift field kitchens, allowing them to prepare simple dishes, including soup, on occasion. Amidst these difficulties, he found solace in receiving his guaranteed monthly salary of 200,000 rubles, which was conveniently deposited into his bank account. This financial support not only provided him with a sense of relief but also enabled him to send much-needed funds to his family residing in Sri Lanka, ensuring their well-being despite the distance. In the Eelam War in Sri Lanka, Sergeant GK engaged with rebels, targeting their bankers. In contrast, during the conflict in Ukraine, he encountered a different kind of warfare, characterized by the presence of drones equipped with six bombs that struck unexpectedly. The sight of these drones prompted immediate reactions, as soldiers would scramble for cover, a response he was unaccustomed to. Additionally, he faced the relentless artillery fire from Ukrainian forces, which resulted in significant casualties. Amidst this unfamiliar battleground, he came to a stark realization: if he were to be killed or severely injured, there would be no one to recover his body, leaving it to decay in the frigid terrain. The foreign mercenaries found themselves engulfed in a climate of uncertainty and confusion, largely due to the absence of effective leadership to direct their efforts or orchestrate significant offensives. This lack of guidance left them vulnerable, as they often lived in anticipation of the deadly drones that patrolled the skies, prompting them to adopt various evasive strategies. The weaponry at their disposal proved inadequate for countering the Ukrainian drones, rendering them largely defenceless. Whenever the ominous sound of the drones approached, or they caught sight of them overhead, the soldiers instinctively sought refuge, scrambling for any available shelter to protect themselves from the imminent threat. Amidst the harsh realities of warfare and the bittersweet recollections of their homeland, Sergeant GK recounted how the foreign mercenaries sought solace through entertainment. In a bid to uplift their spirits, the soldiers gathered to sing traditional songs from their native cultures, their voices rising above the sounds of conflict. They also engaged in lively dances, captivating an audience composed of international onlookers who were drawn to the vibrant display of camaraderie and cultural expression. Ingeniously, they transformed everyday utensils into makeshift drums, creating rhythmic beats that resonated with a sense of unity and joy. These fleeting moments of celebration provided the soldiers with a much-needed respite, allowing them to experience brief intervals of happiness amidst the chaos of the battlefield. After serving for ten months, Sergeant GK made the difficult decision to request a discharge from active duty, yearning to leave the front lines behind. The weight of personal issues at home compelled him to seek resolution, and he felt an urgent desire to return to his family. However, the bureaucratic process for obtaining the necessary clearance was lengthy and fraught with delays. Once he finally received the long-awaited approval, he made his way to Moscow, where he boarded a flight to Colombo, eager to escape the turmoil of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and find solace away from the battlefield. After returning to Sri Lanka, he has taken up the life of a farmer, yet he finds himself grappling with significant financial difficulties. The weight of his past looms heavily over him as he struggles with haunting memories from the two wars he fought. These recollections not only affect his mental well-being but also serve as a constant reminder of the violence and chaos he endured. Despite the challenges he faces in his current life, he has no intention of revisiting the battlefields of Eastern Europe, firmly resolved to leave that chapter behind and seek a more peaceful existence. Although Sergeant GK's combat journey ended, many former combatants are drawn to the prospect of travelling to either Russia or Ukraine to engage in combat against an abstract adversary with whom they have no personal ties. These individuals are motivated by the potential financial rewards that accompany such perilous endeavours, fully aware of the risks involved in putting their lives on the line for a cause that remains distant and often unclear. This phenomenon raises questions about the allure of conflict and the complex motivations that drive individuals to seek out danger in foreign lands, often in pursuit of monetary gain rather than ideological conviction. The involvement of Sri Lankan soldiers in the Ukrainian conflict as mercenaries raises significant questions about their motivations and the potential consequences they face. Many of these individuals may be driven by economic hardship, seeking financial stability in a war-torn region where their skills can command higher pay. However, the ramifications of such decisions are profound and troubling. The likelihood of experiencing psychological trauma is high, as they may encounter the brutal realities of warfare, leading to a dual layer of trauma that could haunt them long after the conflict ends. Furthermore, the grim possibility of death looms large; should they perish in combat, their remains may never be returned to their families, leaving loved ones without closure. In cases where soldiers go missing in action, the absence of reliable authorities to investigate or provide answers exacerbates the anguish for their families, who are left in a state of uncertainty and despair. This complex interplay of motivations and outcomes underscores the precarious nature of mercenary work in such volatile environments. ### Tamil Journalist Alleges Police Pressure to Reveal Confidential Source URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-journalist-alleges-police-pressure-to-reveal-confidential-source/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T02:06:28.000Z **KILINOCHCHI —** A Tamil journalist based in Kilinochchi has alleged that police attempted to pressure him into revealing a confidential journalistic source after he published CCTV footage related to an incident involving a senior medical specialist at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital. In a detailed statement posted on Facebook, journalist Murukaiya Thamilselvan said he was summoned to the Jaffna Police Station following a complaint lodged by Dr. Selvaganesh Sellakkuddy, a plastic surgeon attached to the hospital and a prominent figure in the Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA) in Jaffna. According to Thamilselvan, the complaint centered on CCTV footage from the hospital premises that he had uploaded to Facebook on April 20\. The video allegedly showed Dr. Sellakkuddy violently pushing a man off a motorcycle during an altercation involving a hospital security officer, footage that later drew criticism on social media and among sections of the public. Thamilselvan said police initially instructed him to appear at the Jaffna Police Station on May 23, but later requested that he come instead at 10 a.m. on Sunday, May 24. The journalist said that after recording his personal details, police officers informed him that the complainant wanted to know how he had obtained the CCTV footage. “When they asked where I got the CCTV footage from, I told them that as a journalist I could not reveal my news source under any circumstances,” Thamilselvan wrote. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/tamil-journalist-alleges-polic-YbBZso-kixkc07gs3kl7rd.png) A police notice issued by the Jaffna Police Station requesting journalist Murukaiya Thamilselvan to appear for questioning in connection with CCTV footage he published on Facebook. According to him, police then allegedly insisted that he was obliged to disclose the source because he had come to provide a statement in relation to a complaint. Thamilselvan said he responded that there was no legal requirement compelling him to reveal a confidential journalistic source and urged police instead to investigate whether the footage itself was authentic. “I told them this is not the first time I have faced this kind of complaint. This is the third time,” he stated. According to the journalist, police also questioned what benefit he had gained from publishing the footage and what motive lay behind the post. “I said I gained no personal benefit. I published it believing it would benefit society, help ensure justice for the affected party, and prevent similar incidents from happening in the future,” he wrote. Thamilselvan said he later signed the statement provided to police and left the station. The case has renewed concerns among journalists and media freedom advocates in Sri Lanka's north over the vulnerability of reporters to legal and police pressure aimed at exposing confidential sources — protections widely regarded as foundational to independent journalism. Sri Lanka has no explicit shield law guaranteeing journalists the right to protect confidential sources, despite repeated calls from media organizations and press freedom groups for stronger legal safeguards. Media rights advocates have also warned that the Online Safety Act of 2024, which grants broad powers to a state-appointed Online Safety Commission to regulate online expression and investigate "prohibited statements," could further erode press freedom protections and deepen the chilling effect on investigative journalism. Sri Lanka ranks 134th out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders, an improvement of five places from the previous year but still placing the country in the "difficult" category for press conditions. ### Falsely implicated: India’s top court frees Sri Lankan Tamil refugee in LTTE ‘revival’ case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/falsely-implicated-indias-top-court-frees-sri-lankan-tamil-refugee-in-ltte-revival-case/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T12:26:15.000Z **NEW DELHI —** India’s Supreme Court on Tuesday acquitted a Sri Lankan Tamil refugee who spent years in custody after being wrongly identified as a fugitive LTTE suspect, in a ruling that sharply criticised Tamil Nadu’s Q Branch police for what the court described as a deeply flawed investigation built on unreliable witness testimony and defective identification procedures. The judgment, which laid bare the vulnerability of stateless Tamil refugees caught in India’s counterterrorism apparatus, overturned the conviction of the refugee, identified in court records as Ranjan, after the court found no credible evidence linking him to an absconding member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE. A bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi held that lower courts had erred in concluding that Ranjan was the same person as an absconding accused identified only as “Sri,” designated A-5 in the case. “The conviction based on this flawed identification cannot be sustained in the eyes of the law,” the bench wrote. The May 20 ruling, cited as 2026 INSC 516, set aside a July 2024 trial court order sentencing Ranjan to five years of rigorous imprisonment under India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, or UAPA, as well as a subsequent Madras High Court judgment upholding the conviction. Ordering his immediate release from the Special Camp at Trichy, the court said Ranjan remained free to pursue his long-pending request for relocation to Switzerland in accordance with the law. ### **The Conspiracy Allegation** According to the prosecution, a conspiracy was hatched in 2015 by several accused persons to revive the banned LTTE and to send cyanide capsules and poisonous chemicals to Sri Lanka to eliminate individuals allegedly responsible for the organisation’s downfall. Investigators alleged that an accused identified as “Sri” handed over 75 cyanide capsules and a chemical compound called GPS-4 to a co-conspirator, for smuggling into Sri Lanka with the aim of killing rival Tamil leaders. Several accused in the case were arrested and convicted in 2018\. But “Sri” was declared absconding, and the warrant for his arrest remained pending for more than five years. On December 16, 2021, Tamil Nadu’s Q Branch police executed a non-bailable warrant against Ranjan, claiming that he and “Sri” were the same person. Ranjan denied this from the outset. ### **The Case Collapses** The prosecution’s case against Ranjan rested almost entirely on the oral testimony of two Sri Lankan witnesses, Balachandran and Kumar Dharma Kumar. The Supreme Court subjected their evidence to close scrutiny and found it comprehensively unreliable. The bench noted that during earlier investigations and trials, neither witness had ever stated that “Sri” was also known as “Ranjan.” That link emerged only after the appellant’s arrest in 2021 — a “material improvement” in their account rather than a mere clarification, and one the court treated with deep suspicion. Both witnesses admitted in cross-examination that they had obtained Indian identity documents despite not being Indian citizens, and that they had assisted or sheltered persons allegedly connected with LTTE activities. Despite this, the court observed, no action appeared to have been taken against them by the investigating agency. The identification procedure itself was found to be irreparably defective. No Test Identification Parade was conducted despite the prosecution’s heavy reliance on witness identification. Instead, Ranjan was shown to the witnesses only after he had been taken into police custody — a practice the bench said was inconsistent with basic evidentiary standards. The court also noted the absence of any contemporaneous oral or documentary evidence linking “Sri” to “Ranjan,” even though the proceedings against “Sri” had been ongoing for years. At the same time, it took note of Ranjan’s open, lawful residence in India as a registered refugee and his efforts to obtain police clearance for resettlement abroad — conduct the judges said was inconsistent with that of someone absconding from the law. Justice Mehta, writing for the bench, concluded that the two witnesses had likely used false identities to bring relatives to India and then decided to implicate Ranjan as “Sri” in order to obtain closure for their own legal jeopardy. “It is therefore clearly a case where the appellant has been falsely implicated by being assigned the identity of another person, namely, the so-called absconding accused ‘Sri’ (A-5),” the judgment stated. ### **Court’s Rebuke to Q Branch** The bench was sharply critical of the investigating agency’s conduct in the case. It questioned how a registered refugee, who had been regularly appearing before authorities and actively seeking police clearance certificates for relocation, could simultaneously be described and pursued as an absconding terror accused. The judges described the Q Branch’s approach as marked by inaction and indolence, faulting investigators for failing to conduct basic verification and for accepting at face value an identification that was never properly tested in court. The ruling underscores, the court suggested, the responsibility of specialised anti-terror agencies to exercise greater care when dealing with stateless refugees whose liberty is already constrained by camp conditions, surveillance, and legal precarity. ### **A Broader Pattern** The judgment arrives against the backdrop of longstanding concerns about how Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are treated under India’s anti-terrorism laws. The LTTE, which waged a nearly three-decade armed campaign for a separate Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka’s north and east, was militarily crushed in May 2009 in a final offensive that killed large numbers of civilians, and has been outlawed in India since 1992. In the years since the war’s end, hundreds of Tamil refugees have faced criminal proceedings under the UAPA and related statutes, often on the basis of informant testimony, tenuous intelligence inputs, and thin forensic foundations. Rights organisations have repeatedly flagged the absence of a formal asylum framework in India and warned that stateless Tamil refugees are especially vulnerable to prolonged pre-trial detention under legislation that makes bail exceptionally difficult to secure. Ranjan’s case, in which the Supreme Court ultimately found that a man had been imprisoned for years because two compromised witnesses were allowed to assign him someone else’s identity without effective challenge from the state, is likely to intensify scrutiny of how India’s security and refugee protection regimes intersect — and of who is most at risk when they fail. ### Ailing Sivajilingam's Appeal Touches a Nerve URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/ailing-m-k-sivajilingams-appeal-touches-a-nerve-across-sri-lankas-tamil-community-and-diaspora/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T12:26:17.000Z **JAFFNA —** When former parliamentarian M.K. Sivajilingam stood before reporters recently, his voice unsteady as he appealed for financial assistance to treat kidney failure, the moment resonated far beyond a routine public plea. It triggered a deeper reckoning within sections of the Tamil community — including both those aligned with his Tamil nationalist politics and those who are not. A veteran of Sri Lanka's turbulent Tamil political landscape and the current chairman of the Valvettithurai Urban Council, the hometown of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, Sivajilingam revealed that doctors had warned his condition was critical and that a kidney transplant and related treatment could cost nearly seven million rupees. Having already spent close to 1.9 million rupees, he now faces mounting medical expenses with limited personal means. What has particularly captured public attention is not merely the appeal itself, but the disclosure that after decades in public life, including two terms in Parliament and service in the Northern Provincial Council, Sivajilingam says he owns no house, land, or vehicle. In a political culture frequently criticised for patronage networks and personal enrichment, his circumstances have been viewed by many as a rare reflection of personal austerity. "Seventy lakh rupees is barely a fraction of what some Tamil politicians may receive for helping secure a bar licence," one Tamil political activist, who requested anonymity, told Jaffna Monitor. Social media platforms have since been flooded with messages recalling Sivajilingam's years of activism, his uncompromising Tamil nationalist positions, and his presence during some of the most politically sensitive phases of post-war Tamil politics. Public response has also been swift. Small donations from ordinary citizens have been accompanied by larger contributions from organised groups. The France Tamil Traders’ Association, through the Yarl Traders’ Association, donated 2.5 million rupees toward his treatment. Members of the Nallur Pradeshiya Sabha also pledged to contribute their monthly allowances toward his medical expenses in a rare display of cross-party solidarity. President’s Counsel K.V. Thavarasa, a veteran Tamil nationalist figure and former senior ITAK office-bearer in Colombo, donated one million rupees through the Gowri Shankari Thavarasa Memorial Trust. Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar also visited Sivajilingam personally. The government has not publicly indicated whether any official financial assistance would be extended, and Chandrasekar's office did not respond to a request for comment. ### **Survival, Loyalty, and Confrontation** A member of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), Sivajilingam narrowly survived the bloody internecine violence of the 1980s, during which the LTTE decimated much of the TELO leadership and cadre. Yet in the years that followed, Sivajilingam emerged as one of the most outspoken public defenders of the very organisation that had tried to destroy his own. He described Prabhakaran openly as the leader of the Tamil nation, took personal responsibility for the care of Prabhakaran's mother, Parvathy Amma, after the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, in which Prabhakaran's entire immediate family was killed, and made himself visible at a time when most chose silence. It was a posture that brought him repeatedly into confrontation with the Sri Lankan state, and more than once to the edge of serious personal danger. Tamil political circles have long recounted an exchange between Sivajilingam and investigators after he cut a cake commemorating Prabhakaran's birthday years after the end of the war. "Why did you cut a cake?" investigators reportedly asked. "Was it because he is your relative?" "Yes, he is a relative," Sivajilingam replied. "But that is not why I cut the cake." "Then why did you cut the cake?" "Because he is the leader of the Tamil nation." When investigators challenged the basis for that description, Sivajilingam was characteristically direct: "Ranil Wickremesinghe signed the peace agreement with Prabhakaran, not with Sivajilingam." Accounts from journalists and activists further illustrate the texture of that defiance. When Parvathy Amma died in 2011, soldiers at Valvettithurai Hospital allegedly attempted to inspect photographs taken of her body. Sivajilingam intervened, demanding to know why troops needed to scrutinise images of a deceased woman, and accusing the military of fearing "not only the son, but even the mother." Supporters also credit him with sustaining remembrance practices in the Tamil homeland during years when such events faced heavy restrictions under the governments of Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Nallur Pradeshiya Sabha member Parthipan Varatharajan wrote in a Facebook post that the banana trunks Sivajilingam carried to remembrance events during years of intense military surveillance helped lay the foundation for the emotionally charged commemorations seen in the Tamil homeland today. Many regard him as one of the principal architects of post-war remembrance politics in the north. ### **Ninety-One Votes in Kurunegala** Transitioning into mainstream politics through the LTTE-backed Tamil National Alliance, Sivajilingam was elected to Parliament in 2001 and again in 2004\. In 2010, barely a year after the end of the civil war, he entered the presidential race against the powerful incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa, polling 9,662 votes — a result some critics argued helped Rajapaksa consolidate Sinhala nationalist support by lending the contest an ethnic dimension it might otherwise have lacked. Considered by many something of an eccentric figure in Tamil politics, Sivajilingam long resisted easy categorisation. To his supporters, his confrontational gestures were acts of principled defiance in an environment that often punished dissent. To his detractors, they were provocations that at times appeared to serve the interests of his political opponents more than his own cause. That tension was perhaps nowhere more visible than in his 2015 parliamentary campaign. Following Rajapaksa's defeat in that year's presidential election, Sivajilingam announced he would contest a parliamentary seat in Kurunegala, a predominantly Sinhalese district, as a protest against Rajapaksa and against President Maithripala Sirisena for allowing the former president to return to electoral politics. He received 91 votes. Rajapaksa's allies moved quickly to exploit the candidacy, framing it as a confrontation between a Sinhalese-Buddhist former president and a man they described publicly as a relative of Prabhakaran, standing in the Sinhalese heartland. The framing helped Rajapaksa's campaign in the district. Some Tamil political figures accused Sivajilingam of having handed his opponents a gift, whether intentionally or not. Sivajilingam did not appear troubled by the controversy. For him, the provocation appeared to have been the point. Today, the man who carried banana trunks through military checkpoints, contested elections he could not win, and cut a birthday cake for a dead leader while soldiers and investigators watched, is asking the public to help pay his hospital bills. For many Tamils, the appeal has become something more than a medical plea. It is a reminder of what became of a generation that gave its life to a cause shaped by war — and of what, in the end, that war left behind. **Those wishing to contribute toward Sivajilingam’s medical treatment may do so through the following bank account, the details of which were provided by him during the press conference:** **Name:** M.K. Sivajilingam **Bank:** Bank of Ceylon, Bambalapitiya Branch **Account Number:** 774688 **Account Type:** Savings Account ### Sri Lanka Needs a New Republic, Not Cosmetic Reform URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-needs-a-new-republic-not-cosmetic-reform/ Last updated: 2026-05-24T00:19:48.000Z **(Dr) Jayampathy Wickramaratne,** **President’s Counsel** Sri Lanka’s constitutional journey remains marked by unresolved dilemmas: entrenched executive dominance, fragile fundamental rights, unfulfilled reform promises, and the persistent national question. These challenges have deepened inequality, strained ethnic relations, and weakened democratic accountability. The writer argues that constitutional supremacy must be firmly secured above transient political majorities, with judicial review extending to all acts of the State, including those of Parliament. Central to this vision is the abolition of the executive presidency, whose concentration of power has undermined Parliament and diminished popular sovereignty. Equally vital is the adoption of a modern bill of rights that safeguards equality, social justice, and human dignity and is enforced by an independent judiciary. Devolution of power is presented not as a concession but as a constitutional necessity—indispensable for unity in diversity and for laying the foundations of ethnic peace. Based on the reports of the Steering Committee and the sub-committees of the 2015-2019 constitutional reform process, one could say that if a constitution had materialised, it would have been somewhere between a “reformist” and a “transformative’ constitution. On the other hand, if the 2000 Constitution Bill had been passed, the new constitution would have been a “transformative” one. On the 54th anniversary of Sri Lanka's declaration as a Republic, the writer calls for a Third Republican Constitution that should be “transformative” rather than merely “reformist”. ### **The significance of the *Aragalaya*** ![An aerial view of crowds gathered outside Sri Lanka’s Presidential Secretariat during the 2022 Aragalaya uprising, as protesters demanded the resignation of the Rajapaksa government amid the country’s worst economic crisis in decades.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sri-lanka-needs-a-new-republic-293cyw-kix186e9f5unvh8.png) An aerial view of crowds gathered outside Sri Lanka’s Presidential Secretariat during the 2022 Aragalaya uprising, as protesters demanded the resignation of the Rajapaksa government amid the country’s worst economic crisis in decades. Much has happened since 2000\. The separatist war is over, but the ethnic conflict persists. The *Aragalaya* protest of 2022 marked a historic citizen-led uprising against authoritarianism, corruption, dynastic rule, and economic mismanagement, and was a turning point in the country’s democratic struggle. It symbolised the reclaiming of public space, the demand for accountability, and the assertion that ordinary citizens—especially youth—could challenge entrenched political dynasties. How should the new constitution respond to these developments? The *Aragalaya*’s core significance lies in its role as a democratic awakening, in which ordinary citizens, transcending ethnic and class divides, reclaimed public space and demanded accountability from entrenched elites. It symbolised the rejection of corruption, nepotism, and unchecked executive power, while affirming the capacity of grassroots, youth-led mobilisation to force systemic change. As a basis for a new constitution, the *Aragalaya* underscored the urgent need to embed constitutional supremacy, end executive dominance, secure judicial independence, and strengthen institutional accountability—ensuring that sovereignty truly rests with the people and that governance cannot again be monopolised by dynastic or authoritarian rule. The *Aragalaya* fostered unprecedented solidarity among Sri Lanka’s diverse communities; it created bonds across ethnic and religious lines, making it far more difficult today for divisive forces to rekindle communal or sectarian hatred. *Aragalaya* directly shaped the 2024 elections in Sri Lanka by delegitimising dynastical rule, energising youth and civil society, and embedding demands for accountability and constitutional reform into the electoral agenda. The protests created the political climate in which voters decisively rejected continuity and sought leadership promising systemic change. ### **NPP Victory in 2024** In 2019, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) formed a coalition called the National Peoples Power (NPP) with more than twenty organisations, including political groups, youth organisations, women's groups, trade unions, and civil society organisations. Although it did not fare well in the 2019 Presidential elections and the 2020 Parliamentary elections, it was the primary beneficiary of the unprecedented protests against the political establishment in the wake of the massive economic crisis in 2022, which culminated in President Gotabhaya Rajapakse fleeing the country and resigning. In the 2024 Presidential election, Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the NPP secured 42.31% of the vote in the first round. In the second round, preference votes from candidates outside the top two—Dissanayake and Sajith Premadasa of the SJB—were redistributed, and Dissanayake secured 55.89% of the combined tally and was declared the winner. Upon assuming office, President Dissanayake promptly dissolved Parliament. The subsequent election delivered a historic outcome: the NPP captured 61.56% of the vote and 159 of 225 seats, granting the party a decisive two-thirds majority to pursue constitutional reform. In its election manifesto, the NPP pledged to introduce a new Constitution. Notably, the NPP committed to completing the 2015-19 constitutional reform process early. The main features of the Constitution would be a parliamentary form of government to replace the executive presidency, a new electoral system, fundamental rights to include economic, social, and cultural rights, rights of women, children, and the disabled, as well as “devolution of political and administrative power to provinces, districts, and local government units.” The NPP’s main rival, the SJB, also committed itself to changing the present Constitution and formulating a new Constitution that would convert the form of government to a parliamentary system, include economic, social, and cultural rights, and provide maximum devolution based on the Thirteenth Amendment within a single country. ### **A transformative, “system-changing” constitution** How should a new constitution respond to the people’s cry during the “*Aragalaya*”, reiterated at the 2024 elections? In essence, the *Aragalaya*’s cry for *“*system change*”* should translate into a constitutional framework in which sovereignty genuinely rests with the People and institutions are resilient against authoritarian capture. The new constitution must affirm that all power flows from the people and is exercised in trust, with accountability and in accordance with justice. Recognising the dangers of unchecked authority, corruption, and dynastic rule, there must be a clear commitment to a constitutional order that safeguards democracy, ensures transparency, and protects the independence of institutions. The above can be realised only through a “transformative constitution” committed to “system change”, not a mere “reformist constitution”. The essentials of such a constitution lie in recognising that it is not a static text but a dynamic, evolving framework of governance. It must enable courts to interpret constitutional provisions in ways that respond to contemporary realities and advance justice and equality. A new constitution must therefore embody a strong commitment to social justice, requiring the state to dismantle systemic discrimination and ensure fairness and dignity for marginalised communities. Its legitimacy must also rest on participatory democracy, with citizens playing an active role in shaping institutions and contributing to the ongoing development of the constitutional order. Above all, a new constitution must be understood as a living instrument—capable of adapting to changing social, political, and economic conditions while remaining faithful to democratic values and fundamental rights. In this sense, the purpose of constitutionalism is not merely to preserve constitutional order but also to promote justice, equality, inclusion, and meaningful democratic engagement in a changing society. Sri Lanka requires a modern, comprehensive bill of rights capable of addressing contemporary challenges, including equality, social justice, and human dignity. Rights must be real and enforceable rather than merely aspirational, and their protection depends on an independent and courageous judiciary. Likewise, devolution of power must be understood not as a political concession but as a constitutional necessity to empower the people at all levels. In a pluralist society, meaningful power‑sharing is indispensable for preserving national unity while respecting diversity and for laying the foundations for ethnic peace. ### **Supremacy of the Constitution** The supremacy of the Constitution should be the cornerstone of any truly transformative constitutional order. In the Sri Lankan context, it should mean that no state institution, nor any individual, family, or political party, can place itself above the law or manipulate institutions for personal gain. A transformative constitution must therefore enshrine the principle that all state power derives from and is limited by the Constitution, and that any act inconsistent with it is void. To achieve this, the new Constitution must, at a minimum, provide that any law, subordinate legislation, or conduct inconsistent with its provisions is void, thereby affirming constitutional supremacy. It should guarantee unlimited judicial review of legislation, ensuring that no enactment escapes scrutiny. All existing laws must be interpreted subject to the Constitution, including the fundamental rights, unlike under the 1972 and 1978 Constitutions. Furthermore, all actions of Parliament, whether legislative or otherwise, must remain subject to judicial review. Finally, the jurisdiction of fundamental rights should extend to all actions of the state—legislative, executive, judicial, and otherwise—as well as to conduct by non-state actors, thereby securing comprehensive accountability under the constitutional framework. ### **An unalterable basic structure** Soon after a parliamentary election, the governing party often enjoys strong prospects of winning a referendum. But does this mean that a two-thirds majority in Parliament, combined with 50% plus one of the People, can impose *any* constitution? Could it, for example, deny the freedom from torture to suspected terrorists or entrench one-party rule? In the absence of entrenched safeguards, the risk of such perilous constitutional changes remains unchecked. Sri Lanka’s constitutional reform process should pursue a carefully balanced approach to entrenchment. Provisions that safeguard foundational principles are essential to guard against abusive or opportunistic amendments. However, such protections must be drafted with precision and restraint. If entrenchment is framed too broadly, it can immobilise detailed or technical provisions, resulting in excessive rigidity and weakening the Constitution’s capacity to adapt to evolving democratic realities. The most effective protection lies in a dual framework: confining entrenchment to the Constitution’s core identity while simultaneously empowering the judiciary to scrutinise constitutional amendments against those basic principles. This approach secures permanence where it is most necessary while preserving flexibility in other areas of governance. For Sri Lanka, the central lesson is that constitutional stability should not be achieved at the cost of democratic adaptability. A thoughtfully calibrated combination of narrowly defined entrenchment and principled judicial review provides the most reliable foundation for a constitutional order that is both resilient and responsive. The writer submits that a future constitution should contain a set of basic principles that form an unalterable basic structure. On the eve of the 2024 Presidential elections, the Collective for Democracy and Rule of Law, a group of academics and professionals, proposed that a set of 'Constitutional Principles' be included in a new Constitution. They should be described as 'immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism.' These principles will embody the fundamental constitutional values that guide the new Constitution and future judicial interpretation of its clauses. The Collective proposed that the Constitution should recognise the following immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism and consociationalism: human dignity, social justice, economic justice, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms; ethnic, gender and social equality; the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law; regular, uninterrupted, free and fair elections and a multi-party system of democratic government; non-concentration of state power in one individual or institution; the assurance of accountability, responsiveness and transparency at all levels of governance; public authorities hold and exercise powers in accordance with the doctrine of public trust. The writer submits that the above principles could form the basis for an unalterable basic structure. The NPP government was entrusted with a clear mandate to dismantle authoritarian structures and deliver constitutional reform, yet its continued inaction betrays that trust. Sri Lanka cannot afford further delay, for every day without reform entrenches executive dominance and erodes public faith in democracy. What is needed now is decisive action to abolish the executive presidency, entrench constitutional supremacy, advance devolution, and pave the way for social justice, so that sovereignty genuinely resides with the people and the promise of a just, democratic republic is finally realised. ***(Excerpted from the writer’s forthcoming publication ‘Constitutional Conversations.’)*** ### Tamil Leaders Lash Out After Tilvin Silva Says Provincial Polls Will Not Be Held This Year URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-leaders-lash-out-after-tilvin-silva-signals-delay-in-provincial-polls/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T12:26:19.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** The fear of suffering electoral setbacks due to mass discontent over economic conditions is the key reason Sri Lanka’s main ruling party has decided against holding provincial council elections this year, Tamil political leaders say. Tilvin Silva, general secretary of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), said in an interview that the balloting cannot be conducted in 2026 “because of current developments in the country”. The possibility of holding the elections would be “explored” next year, said Silva, whose Sinhalese-Marxist JVP heads the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance ruling the country. M.A. Sumanthiran, acting general secretary of the Ilangai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), said the NPP’s 2024 election manifesto had stated categorically that the provincial council elections would be held within one year, by September 2025. When this issue was raised with President Dissanayake in November last year, he told opposition leaders that they would be organised “next year” – 2026. “The government, then, is no different from any previous one in terms of brazenly violating its promises,” Sumanthiran, a former MP, told *Jaffna Monitor*. The Tamil lawyer-leader was clear that Tilvin Silva’s announcement was “entirely due to the fear of losing outright in the (Tamil-majority) north and the (multi-racial) east.” “Even if they win elsewhere, it will be with much reduced majority,” he said, referring to the rest of the mostly Sinhalese-populated areas of the country. “This is clearly a denial of the franchise of the people.” Mano Ganesan, who heads the Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA) and is a prominent leader of the “Indian Tamil” community, also spoke about the JVP’s reluctance to face the Sri Lankan voters. “The impression is increasingly clear. They are not prepared to face elections at this moment. “The growing public frustration over economic conditions is only intensifying that hesitation. Yes, the reality is that Tilvin Silva fears facing the electorate today,” Ganesan, told Jaffna Monitor. Elections to all nine of Sri Lanka’s provincial councils have not been held since 2017\. Although provincial councils are to be formed across the country, the demand for polls is most acute in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the Tamil community and its leaders continue to push for greater devolution of power. Ganesan, a member of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the provincial council electoral system, said JVP/NPP leaders had been insisting on incorporating youth and women’s reservations into any new electoral system. While not opposed in principle to such reservation, Ganesan and other opposition leaders on the select committee have argued that insistence on this now will consume too much time. So, Ganesan argued that the long-overdue provincial council elections should be held under the existing and reasonably fair proportional representation system, and that these should be organised without delay in the northern, eastern, and central provinces. Later, everyone could work on reservations for youth and women. But the NPP leadership refused to accept the suggestion. Douglas Devananda, leader of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), said he feared that the JVP-led government would never hold the provincial council elections because the government was against devolution of power to the provinces. “Also, if they go for elections, they will face setbacks,” he told Jaffna Monitor, echoing a point underlined by other Tamil leaders too. Devananda, a former Sri Lankan minister, said the JVP-NPP alliance was likely to face “major setbacks” across Sri Lanka if elections were held now. This was mainly due to the economic problems that have hit Sri Lankans hard, he said. The multi-party Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA) also blasted the government over the delay of the provincial council elections, pointing out that it was a clear violation of an election promise made by the president. A dTNA statement added that the government of Anura Dissanayake was cleverly controlling the provincial councils through the governors without allowing the people to elect their representatives. It also questioned the propriety of JVP leader Tilvin Silva announcing the delay of the overdue provincial council elections when he was not part of the NPP-JVP government. ‘We condemn this announcement. Who has given Tilvin Silva the right to deny the people their franchise?’ The provincial councils are part of the India-Sri Lanka Accord signed in 1987 with a view to ending Tamil separatism. The councils were conceived as an alternative to separatism and as a means of devolving power to the provinces. The JVP, the main political force within the ruling NPP coalition, has long opposed the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord and its provisions, including the provincial council system. In 2024, the JVP stunned friends and foes alike when it swept the parliamentary elections in the Tamil-majority north, virtually eclipsing the traditional Tamil parties. But its vote share declined noticeably in local body polls in the same region in 2025. Tamil and other political sources say this worries the JVP brass, which feels that any major losses in provincial council elections will take away the sheen from the country’s centre-Left government midway through its term. ### May 21, 1991: The Day the LTTE Began to Lose the War URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/may-21-1991-the-day-the-ltte-began-to-lose-the-war/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T06:16:09.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** AFP photographer R. Raveendran and I were in a taxi in the Tamil Tigers-held zone of Sri Lanka’s Batticaloa district in the mid-1990s when a young man with an AK-47 slung over his shoulder emerged from behind a tree and waved us down. When we said we were headed to Vakarai to try to meet Vinayagamurthy Muralitharan alias Karuna, the LTTE’s powerful eastern regional commander, he let us proceed. But he told a teenager to jump into the front of our cab. After realising we were journalists from New Delhi, the 15-something chatted with us non-stop, now and then accusing India of “wrongly” accusing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of killing former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Some 15 minutes later, half a dozen LTTE guerrillas, none of them visibly armed, stopped us. When we enquired if Karuna was at his hub, they gestured us to direct the question to a stern-looking man who was obviously their in-charge. Before we were allowed to drive on, the group leader called the teenager out of the car, took him aside, and whispered something in his ear. The boy nodded. We don’t know what was conveyed, but the boy clammed up completely from then on. He would not utter a word. He refused to answer even innocuous queries. He spoke only once to direct the Tamil taxi driver to the local LTTE office. Knowing the LTTE’s paranoia, we could surmise what must have been instructed to the teenager that forced a dramatic U-turn in his talkative personality: The two men are Indians, they may be spies! It was a moment when I realized what a chilling difference the calculated and cold-blooded assassination of Rajiv Gandhi had made to the LTTE, a catastrophic killing that majorly contributed to the ultimate destruction of the Tamil Tigers and the annihilation of its top leadership. Many people have asked me: What if the Tigers had not killed Rajiv Gandhi? What if India had remained largely sympathetic to the LTTE cause? Would the LTTE’s trajectory have been very different? I am no astrologer, and I could never provide definitive answers to those questions. But I am certain that the assassination of the Indian leader at an election rally near Chennai triggered a radical change in the Indian state’s assessment of the Tamil Tigers — in a manner Velupillai Prabhakaran could never have imagined. In retrospect, there were three major fallouts of the May 21, 1991, assassination. One. Prabhakaran and his intelligence chief, Pottu Amman, may have inferred there would be consequences to pay, but they were somehow confident the killing could never be traced to them. They kept such a lid on truth that they lied about it to even Anton Balasingham, supposedly Prabhakaran’s confidant. Unfortunately for Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman, Indian investigators did a thorough job that firmly exposed the LTTE’s hand in the ghastly crime, leading to a legal ban on the group that continues to this day. Two. The most unexpected assassination brought about a complete change in the way the Indian security services handled the Tamil Tigers. From that point, the LTTE could expect no sympathy, irrespective of whichever party governed India. Three. As a result of the above two, Rajiv Gandhi’s killing, after a while, Prabhakaran’s denials of involvement had no takers, even within the outfit – eroded whatever sympathy the Tigers enjoyed in Tamil Nadu, except in the scattered ranks of Tamil radicals. The grotesque murder sparked revulsion among most Tamils in India, Sri Lanka, and beyond. The assassination led to a sweeping crackdown on the decades of carefully laid LTTE network in Tamil Nadu, destroying a vital backyard that was so important for the Tamil armed struggle. Its repercussions became evident as the LTTE’s war neared its final years, when virtually all sea links involving the Tigers were choked between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka with disastrous results. Indian security agencies played havoc with the LTTE, repeatedly infiltrating its ranks. A laptop bought by LTTE sympathisers in the UK for Prabhakaran’s exclusive use was covertly modified in such a way that every mail he received or sent in the supposedly secure system could be read in Chennai. Conversations over satellite telephones between LTTE leaders from their secret lairs in Sri Lanka and their representatives or backers abroad, including in the West, were monitored in southern India. LTTE’s secret codes based on Tamil alphabets – which were of very high quality – were frequently (but not necessarily always in time) broken by Indian agencies. When Sri Lanka asked Norway to play peacemaker, the Indian government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee was intimately, though covertly, involved in framing the ceasefire agreement. This was hinted at to the LTTE, but India refused to lift the ban on the Tigers. When Karuna split from the LTTE, and the ferocious Tigers hunted their former comrade across Sri Lanka, Indian intelligence agencies provided him sanctuary until he could safely return to the island nation. And when the LTTE’s final moment reckoning came in 2009, the most powerful person in India was Sonia Gandhi, a woman Prabhakaran had callously widowed in May 1991. In sum short, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was a monumental blunder from every angle, which an overconfident Prabhakaran ordered in the obvious mistaken notion that it would probably pass off as another killing and would soon fade into history. It was a calamitous miscalculation. This was also a result of Prabhakaran’s limited worldview, having dealt until then only with Tamil Nadu politicians and officials and with only a limited understanding of how the Indian state functioned. The one man who realized what a folly Prabhakaran had committed vis-à-vis Rajiv Gandhi was the London-based Balasingham, who told all those whom he trusted that the assassination was “an act of madness” and “a complete disaster”. Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman later confessed the truth to him. It is not without reason that Balasingham, without any authorization from the LTTE brass, unilaterally apologized for the Gandhi killing in July 2006, months before he passed away. In a now famous interview to the NDTV news channel, Balasingham said: “As far as that event (assassination) is concerned, I would say it is a great tragedy, a monumental historical tragedy for which we deeply regret and we call upon the government of India and people of India to be magnanimous to put the past behind and to approach the ethnic question in a different perspective.” The apology, however genuine, came too late. In any case, those who followed the LTTE in India knew that the statement came from Balasingham, the person, not the Tamil Tigers. Even today, there are those in Sri Lanka who believe that Prabhakaran may have died in May 2009, but the seeds of his destruction were sown in May 1991 when the LTTE’s Dhanu exploded herself while pretending to touch the feet of an unsuspecting Rajiv Gandhi. ### Sumanthiran Turns Batticaloa Library Ceremony Into Call for Power-Sharing URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sumanthiran-turns-batticaloa-library-ceremony-into-call-for-power-sharing/ Last updated: 2026-05-23T23:39:57.000Z **BATTICALOA —** President Anura Kumara Dissanayake on Wednesday inaugurated the newly constructed three-storey public library building of the Batticaloa Municipal Council, an event that became the occasion for a pointed public reminder from former MP and ITAK General Secretary M.A. Sumanthiran that meaningful power-sharing remains an unfinished obligation of the state. The library — a modern three-storey structure funded jointly by the central government and the Eastern Provincial Council — was originally initiated under the administration of Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the former Eastern Province chief minister known as Pillayan, who is now in jail. Construction of the project had been repeatedly delayed and stalled over the years. President Dissanayake, attending as chief guest at the invitation of the Municipal Council, cut the ceremonial ribbon to declare the building open for public use. He also inaugurated the library's official website, toured the building, held a discussion with council staff, and planted a sapling within the premises. Batticaloa Mayor K. Sivam Packiyanathan, who presided over the ceremony, presented the President with a memento. Among those present were Eastern Province Governor Prof. Jayantha Lal Ratnasekera; Minister of Industry and Entrepreneurship Development Sunil Handunnetti, who also chairs the Batticaloa District Coordinating Committee; MPs R. Shanakkiyan, G. Srinesan, Dr. Ilayathambi Srinath, M.L.A.M. Hizbullah, and Kandasamy Prabhu; and the Inspector General of Police. Speaking at the ceremony ahead of the President, Sumanthiran noted that the Batticaloa Municipal Council — administered by ITAK — had extended the invitation to Dissanayake and that he had fully expected the President to accept it, given Dissanayake's repeated public praise of libraries and reading culture, including a recent address at the Kamban Festival. "I thank him for accepting that invitation," Sumanthiran said. He then drew a pointed political parallel from the ceremony itself. The President, Sumanthiran noted, had asked him to unveil the commemorative plaque after cutting the ribbon. "In one sense, this is an example of how we can share responsibilities among ourselves," he said. "I think it is also a symbol and precedent for sharing power in this country." Sumanthiran invoked the President's own words from the previous day. "Even yesterday, the President stated in his speech that he would not allow war to happen again in this country. He comes from a movement that once took up arms. We come from a people who also took up arms. Both sides have now arrived at the conclusion that war should never happen again and that it is not something to be welcomed." He added: "However, if war is not to recur in this country, meaningful power-sharing must take place. On that basis, I wish to remind the President of the urgent necessity for meaningful power-sharing." Addressing the gathering, President Dissanayake said he was pleased to see the completion of a project whose construction had long been stalled. He remarked that opening a library was akin to eliminating the need for a prison, and commended the reading culture that Tamil people continue to sustain at a time when it is declining elsewhere in the country. A dedicated section within the new building aimed at introducing children to scientific and technological knowledge was noted as a special feature of the facility. ![The newly inaugurated Batticaloa Public Library](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sumanthiran-turns-batticaloa-l-TlNPPU-kixt761okt4yv8o.png) The newly inaugurated Batticaloa Public Library The ceremony, however, did not pass without controversy. Thilipkumaar Ganeshan, the JVP's Kalkudah organiser, issued a sharply worded Facebook post on Wednesday, accusing ITAK's leadership of travelling from Jaffna to Batticaloa solely for ceremonial visibility, without any genuine record of contribution to the district's development. "Apart from drawing Batticaloa's youth into armed struggle, using them for the interests of Jaffna-centric politics, bringing a politics of destruction into our district and wiping out an entire generation, and gaining political profit during elections, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) has no history whatsoever of having done anything to build up our district," Thilipkumaar wrote. He alleged the party had no record of having lifted a finger to improve education, the economy, or the living standards of the people of Batticaloa. "It was the youth of our district who moved mountains for their political interests," he said. Thilipkumaar concluded that those who had not contributed "even a single brick, a handful of soil, or even one book" to the Batticaloa Library had made the journey from Jaffna merely to be photographed at the opening. "Those who stood in front only to attach their names to it — that is a history worthy of ridicule," he wrote. Sumanthiran had not publicly responded to the criticism at the time of publication. ### May 18: The Day the Clowns Come Out URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/may-18-the-day-the-clowns-come-out/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T02:06:08.000Z **By Che Ran** Every year, on May 18, Tamils remember Mullivaikkal. And every year, like clockwork, the circus arrives. From Sri Lanka, we get the professional denialists — men who look at bombed hospitals, mass graves, disappeared families, surrendered civilians who never came home, and say, with the confidence of a man selling fake Rolexes in Pettah, “No, no, no. Nothing happened.” From India, we get the bargain-bin patriots — politicians who hear “Tamil civilian massacre” and immediately start shouting, “Rajiv Gandhi! Rajiv Gandhi!” as if they have discovered fire. It is almost impressive. Not intelligent. Not moral. But impressive in the way a goat climbing onto a roof is impressive. You don’t admire the goat’s politics. You just wonder how it got there. Now they are attacking Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Vijay for remembering May 18 and standing with Sri Lankan Tamils. Their great argument is this: “He is supporting Rajiv Gandhi’s killer.” Please. This is not political analysis. This is WhatsApp uncle logic after two bad whiskies. May 18 is not Prabhakaran Day. It is not LTTE Appreciation Night. Nobody is handing out tiger-striped cupcakes and singing revolutionary karaoke. May 18 is the day Tamils remember the civilians trapped in the final killing fields of Sri Lanka’s war: the families told to move into “No Fire Zones” that were then shelled; the hospitals hit after their coordinates were known; the children, the elderly, the injured, the starving, the surrendered, and the disappeared. But the denialists have a routine. First, they say it never happened. Then, if you show them evidence, they say it was exaggerated. Then, if you show them more evidence, they say the LTTE was there. Then, if you ask about hospitals, they change the subject. Then, if you ask about surrendered civilians, they suddenly become legal scholars. Then, if you mention Channel 4, the UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty, survivor testimony, satellite imagery, doctors, journalists, photographs, and videos, they say, “Western conspiracy.” Of course. Everything is a Western conspiracy. Shelling? Western conspiracy. Hospitals? Western conspiracy. Disappearances? Western conspiracy. Mothers still searching for children? Also, a Western conspiracy. At this point, if a crow flies over Mullivaikkal, some fellow in Colombo will say it was funded by Norway. The Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist denial industry has become one of the most embarrassing political performances in South Asia. Not Sinhala people — let us be clear. Many Sinhala people know the truth. Many are decent. Many are tired of being represented by men whose entire moral vocabulary consists of “terrorism,” “sovereignty,” and “foreign agenda.” The problem is the denial crowd. The flag-waving experts in selective memory. The people who can recall every LTTE crime in HD but suddenly develop cataracts when asked about what the state did in 2009. They are like people who burn down the kitchen, then complain that everyone keeps talking about smoke. And then we have the Indian politicians. Ah, Indian politicians. Masters of the ancient art of saying everything except the thing that matters. A Tamil leader says, “We remember the dead.” They reply, “But Rajiv Gandhi!” A Tamil family says, “Our son surrendered and vanished.” They reply, “But Prabhakaran!” A mother says, “My child was killed.” They reply, “But national security!” This is not politics. This is moral ventriloquism. They keep throwing the same dead names into the room so nobody has to look at the living wound. Yes, Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination was a crime. Yes, it was horrible. Yes, it cannot be justified. But here is the part these geniuses pretend not to understand: remembering Tamil civilians killed in 2009 is not the same as celebrating Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. This should not be difficult. A schoolchild can understand it. A Labrador can understand it. A reasonably alert coconut can understand it. But somehow, an Indian politician with three phones, four assistants, and a convoy cannot. Because the outrage is not real. It is performative. It is election-season theatre. They are not defending Rajiv Gandhi’s memory. They are using his death as a political broom to sweep Tamil grief under the carpet. And what a filthy carpet it is. Under it lies Mullivaikkal. Under it lie the No Fire Zones. Under it lie the hospitals. Under it lie the people who surrendered. Under it lie the missing. Under it lie the videos nobody wants to discuss. Under it lie the photographs that still make the stomach turn. Under it lies that terrible image of a child in custody, alive in one moment, dead soon after — a symbol so damning that the denialists would rather argue about camera angles than ask what kind of state produces such an image. This is why they want May 18 to be about Prabhakaran. Because if May 18 is about Prabhakaran, they can argue. If May 18 is about civilians, they have to answer. And they have no answer. So they perform. The Sri Lankan denialist performs sovereignty. The Indian politician performs patriotism. The Colombo apologist performs outrage. The television panelist performs balance. Everyone performs. Only the dead remain honest. Seventeen years have passed since 2009\. Long enough for politicians to hope memory would become soft. Long enough for the world to move on. Long enough for reports to gather dust, for files to disappear, for witnesses to age, for mothers to die without answers. But not long enough for Tamils to forget. How can they? How do you forget a war that ended with civilians packed into a strip of land and shelled? How do you forget hospitals hit again and again? How do you forget people waving white flags and never returning? How do you forget families who still carry photographs of the missing like passports to a country called grief? You do not forget. You remember. That is what May 18 is. It is not a security threat. It is not extremism. It is not terrorism nostalgia. It is not a secret handshake for militants hiding behind coconut trees. It is memory. And memory is dangerous only to people who built their politics on forgetting. So yes, Vijay was right to remember. Any Tamil leader with a spine should remember. Any Indian leader with a conscience should remember. Any Sinhala citizen who wants a country built on truth instead of mythology should remember too. The denialists can continue their annual circus. They can shout “Prabhakaran” until their throats collapse. They can wave flags. They can blame Norway, Channel 4, the diaspora, the West, the weather, the moon, and possibly Taylor Swift. But the truth remains. May 18 is not about worshipping one man. It is about refusing to erase a people. And if that makes the clowns uncomfortable, let them sweat under the lights. The show is theirs. The memory is ours. ### D.C. Aravintharaj Named Jaffna Municipal Commissioner URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/d-c-aravintharaj-named-jaffna-municipal-commissioner/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T12:58:00.000Z **JAFFNA —** D.C. Aravintharaj, a senior Sri Lanka Administrative Service officer, was appointed Commissioner of the Jaffna Municipal Council on Tuesday during an official appointment event held at the Governor’s Secretariat here. Northern Province Governor N. Vethanayahan handed the official letter of appointment to Mr. Aravintharaj during the event, which was also attended by the Governor's Secretary, S. Sathiyaseelan, and other senior officials. Mr. Aravintharaj entered the Sri Lanka Administrative Service in 2012\. He began his administrative career in the elections administration stream, serving successively as Assistant Commissioner of Elections in Vavuniya and then in Mannar. He subsequently served as Assistant Government Agent for Manthai West in Mannar District. A product of Jaffna Hindu College, where he was part of the 2005 Advanced Level batch, Mr. Aravintharaj went on to read for a Bachelor of Science in Agriculture Technology and Management at the University of Peradeniya. He later received an Australian Government scholarship to pursue a Master of Science in Organizational Management, a distinction that has marked him as one of the more academically credentialed officers in the Northern Province administrative cadre. He is also known as an avid reader and a regular presence at book launches and literary review gatherings in the region. The Jaffna Municipal Council is one of the most important local government bodies in the Northern Province. As the principal local authority for Sri Lanka’s fourth-largest city, it is responsible for urban infrastructure, road maintenance, public health and sanitation, waste management, market operations, building regulation, land use, and the delivery of essential municipal services. Though often described in public discourse as one of Sri Lanka’s wealthier municipal councils outside Colombo because of its tax base, commercial importance, and revenue generated during the month-long Nallur festival season, the council has also frequently faced criticism from residents over inefficiency, delays in public works, poor maintenance, bureaucratic lethargy, weak accountability, indifferent public service, poor responsiveness to complaints, and an entrenched culture of administrative complacency. The council also administers the Jaffna Public Library, one of the most symbolically important public institutions in the Tamil north. The Municipal Commissioner additionally holds ex officio responsibilities in relation to the Jaffna Cultural Centre — a facility that, despite its importance to the region's cultural life, has in recent years operated well below its intended capacity. Whether the new commissioner will move to revitalise programming and administration at the centre is likely to be an early test of his tenure. Mr. Aravintharaj’s appointment comes at a time when civic administration in Jaffna faces sustained pressure over infrastructure deficits, inadequate public services, longstanding disputes over land use in the urban core, and growing public concern over alleged political interference and influence by the National People’s Power in local administrative affairs across the Northern Province. Yet several officials and residents familiar with his previous work said they believed he had both the administrative capacity and temperament to push for long-awaited reforms in a municipal system widely seen as stagnant and resistant to change. ### Seventeen Years Without Prabhakaran URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/seventeen-years-without-prabhakaran/ Last updated: 2026-05-24T14:41:58.000Z ***By: A.* Jathindra** Thiruvengadam Velupillai Prabhakaran was a man who held Eelam Tamil politics under his control for nearly three decades. There has been no other figure in history who exercised such complete dominance over Eelam Tamil politics through the force of his own personality and authority. If the Eelam Tamil people could ever have achieved their highest political aspirations, it should have been possible during the period in which he lived and led — but that did not happen. And if responsibility for that failure can be attributed to any one individual, then Prabhakaran’s name inevitably remains at the center of it — because everything revolved around him. He was the victory — and he was the defeat. It is difficult to believe that he would have anticipated such an outcome — but as a military strategist and a man who had witnessed victories across many battlefronts, he may, at least in the final stages of the war, have sensed what was coming. Following the fall of Kilinochchi, it is hard to believe that the commanders of the Liberation Tigers did not experience a similar fear. In the end, everything came to an end as though a film had abruptly concluded. In a world of power where legitimacy is determined only through victory, the voices of the defeated carry little weight. The language of power is singular — if possible, emerge victorious; if not, surrender — otherwise, perish. This has always been the history of global power politics. As I noted in an earlier article, Prabhakaran’s final war was one that should not have been lost — but he lost it. And to lose a war that should not have been lost is, ultimately, destruction. In 2015, in remembrance of K.P. Aravindan — one of the pioneers of the EROS movement who lived and died in France — I wrote an article in which I recorded a few lines that I believe are relevant to repeat here. A struggle ends constructively only when those who began it also choose to end it. But when a struggle initiated by one party is brought to an end by another, it inevitably concludes in catastrophe. The responsibility of bringing Prabhakaran’s struggle to an end rested with him alone. But in failing to carry out that responsibility, his struggle was ultimately brought to an end by his enemies. As a student of politics, I have never supported the tendency to place blame on others or constantly fault external actors — because others will always remain others. They will inevitably view everything through the prism of their own interests. Judged according to the logic of power politics, there is nothing inherently wrong in that — because if our own interests matter most to us, then naturally their interests will matter most to them. How, then, can that be considered wrong? For that reason, there is little benefit in pointing fingers at anyone. We ourselves must think for our own future — and act accordingly. As long as Prabhakaran was alive, he remained firmly committed to the idea of an independent strength for the Eelam Tamils. He believed that military strength was the true strength of the Tamil people. Viewed through the logic of power politics and the broader course of world political history, it is difficult to argue that Prabhakaran’s thinking was entirely misplaced. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/seventeen-years-without-prabha-COvo8w-kixjqh7wy8b7gm4.png) There is a well-known observation about diplomacy, attributed to Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712–1786): diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments. Similarly, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked that diplomacy without power is like a sermon without a text. What these statements suggest is that politics is not merely about speeches, intellect, or philosophy — it is ultimately about power. Without power, even the greatest intellectual ability has little practical value. It was through armed strength that the Liberation Tigers were able to speak with confidence in Oslo. This was also the basis on which Anton Balasingham argued that disarmament was beyond negotiation, because weapons constituted the power of the Tamil people. Viewed in this context, Prabhakaran’s era can be understood as one in which he measured, interpreted, and acted upon everything through the prism of power. In that sense, Prabhakaran may be described as a Stalinist in outlook. Following the death of Lenin, the person expected to fill his place was the charismatic intellectual Leon Trotsky. But that did not happen — because Trotsky believed that ideas were what moved history forward, and therefore underestimated Stalin. Stalin, on the other hand, believed that control and power were what drove history. Prabhakaran believed in much the same way — he was firmly convinced that Eelam Tamil political history could be shaped only by keeping the entirety of power within his own grip. It was on that basis that he planned everything. Sentiment cannot help in maintaining control over power. Nor can moral tales of virtue and sin. Even after systematically pushing Trotsky out of the Soviet power structure, Stalin did not wish to leave him alive. Trotsky, who had taken refuge in Mexico, was eventually assassinated by a Stalinist agent. But before a world ultimately shaped by larger power structures, the limitations of the military strength of a small armed movement were severe — and it was the failure to fully grasp this reality that gave rise to all the complications. The greatest mistake was the inability to transform existing military strength into a lasting political force. It is difficult to believe that Prabhakaran failed to understand this entirely. A man who understood military strategy, who without the backing of any state built a formidable military structure using only his own conviction and the faith of those who believed in him, could not have been someone incapable of recognizing such realities so easily. Yet, despite all of that, everything unfolded as it did. Perhaps he had become trapped by his own convictions and experiences, imprisoning himself in a position from which he could no longer turn back. We can now do little more than speculate about what he truly thought. But history records that it was he himself who wrote the final chapter of the empire he had built. Last year, after considerable difficulty and amid numerous challenges, those who still held respect for him carried out a final tribute in his memory. That should perhaps have happened long ago — because had it happened earlier, it might have prevented his name from continuing to be used as a tool for the self-serving political interests of others. The value of a person’s actions during their lifetime is ultimately measured by the kind of impact they continue to have after they are gone. Viewed from this perspective, the manner in which Prabhakaran’s name has been used over the past seventeen years, and the things carried out in his name, have in no way preserved him with dignity or respect — rather, they have often amounted to a form of disrespect toward him. He has, in many instances, been turned into a tool serving the business and personal interests of certain individuals. Why did this happen? And why does it continue even now? The writer of this article does not have a clear answer. There is, of course, an easy explanation often offered — that intelligence agencies are behind all these developments. But if that argument is taken to its logical conclusion, one would also have to conclude that even Seeman in Tamil Nadu is being directed by some intelligence agency. It is not my intention to find comfort in such conspiracy theories, nor do I support a politics built around them. Because such politics eventually turns against even those who promote it — much like the label “traitor,” which today returns like a boomerang to strike everyone alike. If one closely observes the present political paralysis and the condition of those regarded today as the leaders of the Eelam Tamils, it becomes clear that Eelam Tamil politics has fundamentally lost its vitality. Today, Eelam Tamil politics resembles sugarcane stripped of its juice — nothing more than dry residue. The inability to navigate the post-2009 period, and the failure to arrive at a common understanding of how it should have been handled, lie at the root of everything. A people who made immense sacrifices, a people who carried out operations that even astonished their adversaries, have today reached a point where Eelam Tamil politics can be dismissed as little more than a spectacle of absurdity. The political consciousness of a people can often be measured by the quality of those who represent them. Viewed in that light, there is hardly any need to further explain the current state of Eelam Tamil political consciousness. When one examines the political developments of the past seventeen years and their negligible outcomes, one conclusion stands out clearly: just as it is true that Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers, was defeated, it is equally true that those who rejected him and denounced him during his lifetime have also failed. Because in the seventeen years since his death, no one has succeeded in creating a new political direction within Tamil politics. If Prabhakaran was wrong and you were right, then should not a new political chapter have been written? If that did not happen, then it simply means you were unable to do so. Likewise, those who continue to claim admiration for Prabhakaran while using his name as political capital should either have carried forward his path or, at the very least, succeeded in transforming democratic politics into some meaningful measure of political strength. But none of that happened. Viewed in that sense, the period following Prabhakaran’s death has only extended and reinforced the reality that we were, ultimately, a defeated people. Will we recover from this? **Editor’s Note: Translated from Tamil by Jaffna Monitor.** ### The Boy We Never Answered For URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-boy-we-never-answered-for/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T06:16:46.000Z **By Che Ran** Sri Lanka has a strange relationship with accountability. We adore the theatre of justice. The press conference. The dramatic raid. The minister standing behind a microphone, sleeves metaphorically rolled up, promising to finally hunt down the untouchables. Every election, another government arrives carrying a moral broom the size of Adam’s Peak, vowing to sweep corruption out of the republic. And every few years, we discover the same depressing truth. The truly powerful rarely get caught. Because real corruption is not amateur hour. If you think sophisticated operators move money in their own names, leave tidy paper trails, or hand over briefcases under flickering street lamps, you have been watching too many bad television dramas. The serious ones hide behind offshore entities, proxies, ghost companies, old school ties, foreign intermediaries, cousins of cousins, trusted businessmen who smile politely at charity dinners while moving mountains behind the curtain. Corruption investigations become tunnels. Then tunnels inside tunnels. Years pass. Governments fall. Files disappear. Witnesses suddenly cannot remember anything. Public anger grows tired. The headlines move on. Eventually, Sri Lanka does what Sri Lanka does best. We sigh. Shake our heads. And mutter those three national words: “Aney… this country.” But what if the greatest question of accountability staring at this island was never hidden? What if it has been sitting there in plain sight for years? A child. A war already won. And a question too uncomfortable for politicians to touch. Let me say something many are too frightened to say aloud. Ending the war was necessary. No sane person who lived through suicide bombings, assassinations, bus explosions, fear, checkpoints, extortion, and endless funerals can deny what peace gave this country. Roads reopened. Businesses returned. Families breathed again. Children grew up not knowing the sound of bombs as ordinary background noise. For that, Sri Lanka deserves recognition. But victory does not grant moral immunity. Winning a war is not a license to stop asking questions. Governments are not crime families. A nation cannot operate like some gangster-era syndicate where difficult decisions disappear into whispered conversations, everybody shrugs, and history is instructed to stay quiet. Because civilized nations are not measured only by whether they win wars. They are measured by what they are brave enough to confront afterward. And sixteen years later, one image still refuses to disappear. A small boy. Alive. Sitting quietly. Still young enough to look frightened in the way children do when adults are speaking in rooms they do not understand. For many Tamils, the image became something larger than politics. Larger than ideology. Larger than war. It became a wound. Not because everyone agrees on every allegation surrounding those final days — they do not. But because the questions never truly went away. What happened? Who knew? Was everything done lawfully? Why has there never been a process trusted enough to answer these questions with credibility? These are not dangerous questions. Avoiding them is what becomes dangerous. Because silence does not heal history. Silence ferments. It settles into memory. It travels quietly from generation to generation — over dinner tables in Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Colombo, Toronto, London, and Melbourne — until grief becomes inheritance. And inheritance becomes anger. Sri Lanka has spent years trying to outrun its ghosts. But ghosts are stubborn creatures. They wait. Sometimes history comes knocking softly. Sometimes it arrives with international scrutiny, uncomfortable headlines, leaked reports, and foreign pressure. And by then, countries no longer own their own stories. Others write it for them. That is the real tragedy. Because Sri Lanka still has a choice. We can continue pretending that accountability weakens nations. Or we can finally understand the opposite. Strong countries investigate themselves. Strong countries ask painful questions. Strong countries are confident enough to say: Yes, we ended a brutal conflict. Yes, we protected the nation. But if unlawful acts occurred, we are strong enough to face them honestly. That is not betrayal. That is maturity. Because patriotism is not blind loyalty to power. Patriotism is wanting your country to become better than its worst moments. The war ended. Thank God it did. But peace without truth is unfinished business. And perhaps history is asking Sri Lanka something uncomfortable now: Are we finally strong enough to stop being afraid? Strong enough to stop whispering? Strong enough to look backward so the next generation can finally move forward? Because nations are not judged only by how they win wars. They are judged by what they do after the cheering stops. After the speeches. After the victory parades. When the smoke clears. When the flags come down. And history, in a much quieter voice, asks one final question: *What did you do when you finally knew enough to ask harder questions?* ### Letter to the Editor: Setting the Record Straight on D.B.S. Jeyaraj’s Exile URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/letter-to-the-editor-setting-the-record-straight-on-d-b-s-jeyarajs-exile/ Last updated: 2026-05-24T14:42:00.000Z **The Editor, Jaffna Monitor** I read M.R. Narayan Swamy’s tribute to D.B.S. Jeyaraj with the respect it deserves. It was a moving remembrance of a journalist whose life and work were genuinely heroic. Precisely for that reason, it would be a disservice to his memory to allow two significant historical inaccuracies to pass without correction. ### **On the reasons for his exile** Narayan Swamy writes that LTTE extremists “forced” Jeyaraj into exile. That is not entirely accurate, and we know this because Jeyaraj himself documented the circumstances in meticulous detail in a series published in the *Daily Mirror* in 2023. In October 1987, Jeyaraj was arrested by the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department and detained on the notorious fourth floor of the Police Secretariat in Colombo. His offence was not sympathy for militancy, but reporting inconvenient truths about the war then unfolding between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE. He had also published an exclusive interview with LTTE deputy leader Mahattaya that contradicted the optimistic narrative then being promoted by the Indian High Commission. The arrest was not the work of Tamil nationalists. It was an act of the Sri Lankan state, carried out amid unmistakable Indian diplomatic pressure. In Jeyaraj’s own account, Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit had “contacted JR on your matter” the very night the newspaper carrying the interview was published. Jeyaraj was released only after N. Ram intervened personally with President J. R. Jayewardene, foreign correspondents publicly questioned the president at an international press conference, and a solidarity campaign was mounted across Tamil Nadu. He subsequently left Sri Lanka in 1988 to attend Harvard University and moved to Canada in 1989\. The reason was not LTTE intimidation. The Toronto car park attack occurred years later, long after he had settled there. He left because the Sri Lankan state, acting under intense Indian diplomatic pressure, had made it unmistakably clear that a journalist who reported honestly on Jaffna could no longer safely remain in his own country. It was only after he was already living in Toronto that LTTE supporters attacked him in a car park, leaving him seriously injured. That was a separate chapter of persecution, inflicted upon him in exile because he continued to write independently and critically. Collapsing this chronology erases the role of state power, and of Indian diplomatic influence, in driving one of Sri Lanka’s finest journalists from his homeland. That erasure does a double disservice: it misrepresents Jeyaraj’s lived experience and obscures the broader pattern through which journalists were intimidated, detained, and silenced during that period. ### **On “getting into the bad books of Dixit”** Narayan Swamy notes, without elaboration, that the Mahattaya interview got Jeyaraj “into the bad books” of Ambassador Dixit. That phrasing is too mild, and in its mildness risks obscuring the gravity of what followed. Dixit’s displeasure was not merely diplomatic irritation. According to Jeyaraj’s own account, it was followed by his arrest and detention on the fourth floor. Colleagues warned him that the Indian High Commission was “fuming.” Dixit had personally telephoned President Jayewardene. Within days, Jeyaraj was in custody. To suffer such consequences for reporting the truth, for telling readers what was actually happening in Jaffna while official briefings painted “sunshine stories,” was an act of moral courage of the highest order. Jeyaraj understood the risks perfectly well. He had been warned by colleagues, friends, and senior journalists who knew exactly what Indian diplomatic displeasure could mean in Colombo in 1987\. He published the stories anyway. That it cost him his freedom, however briefly, and ultimately his country, speaks to the price some journalists paid simply for refusing to look away. None of this diminishes the warmth or sincerity of Narayan Swamy’s tribute. D.B.S. Jeyaraj was, as he rightly writes, a complete journalist, perhaps the last of his kind. The best way to honour him now is to ensure that his story is told accurately and in full. **Yours faithfully,** ***K.S. Lakshmi*** **Editor’s Note:** Jaffna Monitor welcomes further correspondence on D.B.S. Jeyaraj’s life, work and legacy, whether in agreement or disagreement with the views expressed above. He was a journalist who believed that no account of events, including his own, should go unchallenged. We believe that is the most fitting way to remember him. ### Batticaloa Opens Long-Delayed Library as President Tours Eastern Province URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/batticaloa-opens-long-delayed-library-as-president-tours-eastern-province/ Last updated: 2026-05-19T04:03:57.000Z **BATTICALOA, Sri Lanka —** President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is scheduled to visit Batticaloa on Wednesday to inaugurate what the government describes as Sri Lanka’s second-largest public library after the Colombo Public Library, before attending a series of development and administrative events across the Eastern Province. The new Batticaloa Public Library, built at a reported cost of 435 million rupees, is scheduled to open at 9:30 a.m. The facility replaces one of the country’s oldest public libraries, founded in 1855, and is expected to serve as a major educational and cultural institution for the Eastern Province. Following the inauguration, the president is expected to attend the Batticaloa District Coordinating Committee meeting at the Old District Secretariat auditorium, where officials are to discuss regional development priorities and administrative matters. He will later travel to Nintavur in Ampara District to lay the foundation stone for a new cultural centre, a long-discussed project in the predominantly Muslim town. The president is also scheduled to participate in the “Rata Ekata” (“The Entire Nation Together”) national programme at the Weber Stadium in Batticaloa. The event is expected to focus on economic development initiatives connected to a proposed commercial complex in Ampara town. The visit will continue on Friday with a tour of Ampara District, during which the president is expected to inaugurate several additional development and construction projects before concluding the trip with the Ampara District Coordinating Committee meeting. The opening of the library also carries a layer of political symbolism in Sri Lanka’s East. Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, the former Eastern Province chief minister whose supporters credit him with helping initiate the project during his administration, remains in jail as the building is formally opened. Chandrakanthan is currently in custody in connection with the killing of a former Eastern University vice chancellor. Construction on the library began during Chandrakanthan’s tenure as chief minister and later stalled during the years he was imprisoned. The project regained momentum only after his return to political office — a trajectory that mirrors the turbulent political history of Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province itself. ### From Monument to Movement: Why the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre Needs India’s Direct Stewardship URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/from-monument-to-movement-why-the-thiruvalluvar-cultural-centre-needs-indias-direct-stewardship/ Last updated: 2026-05-24T14:42:02.000Z When a government builds a bridge, the measure of its generosity is not the span of the arch but the lives it connects. By that measure, the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre — an eleven-storey edifice standing at the waterfront of Jaffna, conceived and constructed as a government-to-government gesture of friendship between India and Sri Lanka — is among the most consequential gifts this province has ever received. This is my third submission on the subject. As Governor of the Northern Province, I set out the first in the joint management committee : a detailed accounting of how the existing provincial cadre could orient and service this facility from day one, without waiting for new appointments or fresh budgets. My second submission were directions envisaging a graduated programme of activations: the waterfront terraced and animated, a floating platform for musical performances on the water, the road in front transformed into a hawker street and exhibition ground, the building’s steps and forecourt and steps becoming a gallery where young artists could show and sell, floors inside curated upward from instruction to exhibition to personal collections on loan. This third submission, addressed to the Indian High Commissioner, proposed the architecture of permanence: what should endure for the next generation. At a moment when the long-term institutional future of the Centre remains under discussion, it may be prudent for India to directly oversee , mentor and operate the facility in accordance with the standards and vision reflected in its established cultural centres in India and elsewhere, and to develop this unique cultural centre into an iconic institution secured financially and intellectually. ### **The World’s Great Cultural Institutions: A Vision for Jaffna** Across the globe, the greatest cultural institutions — from the Metropolitan Museum and the Uffizi, to Carnegie Hall and the Sydney Opera House, to the Forbidden City’s Palace Museum and Singapore’s Esplanade — are not merely buildings. They are living declarations of a civilization’s identity, memory, and creative spirit; covenants between a community and its artists; and proof that a people’s story, told through art and performance, can move the world. The Jaffna Cultural Centre must create precisely this — a space where performing and visual arts traditions are not merely preserved but celebrated, and given a permanent home worthy of its depth. ### **A Hybrid Management Philosophy** The institutions that have shaped modern India’s intellectual and cultural life offer us three distinct archetypes, each applicable here. **PILLAR I — Learning & the Arts- Modelled on Shanti Niketan** **PILLAR II — Dialogue & Research- Modelled on the IIC** **PILLAR III — Living Ecosystem- Modelled on the IHC** Shanti Niketan’s ethos of immersive, holistic education in the arts; the India International Centre’s tradition of serious intellectual and policy discourse; and the India Habitat Centre’s genius for creating a self-sustaining organism of footfall, commerce, and culture — these three, synthesised into a single governance philosophy, give us our template. But a philosophy only lives through people. At every level of this management structure, we must make it standard practice to draw in centres and persons of excellence — from Sri Lanka, from the diaspora, and from the wider world. Renowned guest scholars should occupy the seminar rooms. Celebrated curators should shape the gallery floors. Distinguished jurists and diplomats, whether from Colombo or Cambridge, should share platforms with their Jaffna counterparts. The Governing Board and its three specialist councils must themselves reflect this aspiration: not a closed bureaucratic circle, but an open, rotating fellowship of the best minds available to us. ***Drawing on excellence: Each council seat — for Higher Learning, for Arts and Heritage, for Policy and Governance — should carry a mandate to invite at least one visiting fellow or practitioner of international standing per year, bridging local expertise with global perspective.*** ## **Anchoring with India’s Elite Institutions — and the World Beyond** ![Jeevan Thiagarajah at the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre in Jaffna during his tenure as Governor of the Northern Province.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/from-monument-to-movement-why-Z11K5w-kixpua28j4nsjkm.png) Jeevan Thiagarajah at the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre in Jaffna during his tenure as Governor of the Northern Province. The Indira Gandhi National Open University can establish a study and examination hub here, making this a gateway for Northern Province students to access Indian higher education. But the digital library and multimedia infrastructure need not serve only IGNOU’s syllabi — they become, equally, a portal through which guest lecturers from MIT OpenCourseWare, the London School of Economics, or the University of Peradeniya can teach live or on-demand to students connected from Jaffna. ***Drawing on excellence: The distance learning hub should actively commission visiting online masterclasses from distinguished Sri Lankan academics in the diaspora — economists, scientists, legal scholars, technologists — making the Centre a point of reconnection between the Northern Province and its global community.*** The IIMs can offer executive programmes and entrepreneurship incubation for civil servants and business leaders from across the North — co-facilitated by practitioners: a Sri Lankan entrepreneur who has built a regional company, a Singaporean policy architect, a Tamil Nadu agri-tech founder. The classroom comes alive when lived experience walks through the door. ***Drawing on excellence: Each executive cohort should include at least one practitioner-in-residence drawn from Sri Lanka’s private sector or its global diaspora, to ground theory in regional reality.*** The National Judicial Academy and the National Law School of India University together can transform the Centre into a serious venue for continuing legal education. Comparative constitutional law is most powerfully taught when it is genuinely comparative — jurists from South Africa, Canada, and the UK, whose constitutional settlements carry hard-won lessons on pluralism, devolution, and transitional justice, should sit alongside Sri Lankan and Indian judges in this very auditorium. ***Drawing on excellence: Annual legal dialogues should feature sitting and retired judges and constitutional scholars from at least three jurisdictions, positioning Jaffna as a serious node in the global conversation on law and governance.*** The Gujarat Forensic Sciences University fills a crying need with certificate courses in forensic science, cybersecurity, and crime scene management. Interpol training modules, visiting forensic pathologists from regional partners, and internationally certified instructors can all be drawn to a facility that signals its seriousness. ***Drawing on excellence: Forensic and technical courses should be co-delivered with visiting specialists from regional law enforcement academies and international bodies, ensuring students in Jaffna are trained to globally recognised standards.*** For the performing arts, Kalakshetra and the NCPA in Mumbai provide the institutional anchors. But the auditorium and instructional wing must pulse with a wider ambition — a residency programme drawing from Sri Lanka’s own underserved talent pool, from the Tamil diaspora in Europe, Canada, and Australia, and from the broader South and Southeast Asian arts ecology. Partner institutions in India and beyond should offer time-share arrangements on rotation — specialised faculty, curators, and practitioners cycling through the Centre on structured secondments, so that expertise is not merely visited but embedded. ***Drawing on excellence: A permanent Artist-in-Residence programme — open to local, national, and international applicants — should run year-round, ensuring the Centre is always host to at least one working artist whose practice is visible and accessible to the public.*** The Jaffna Dialogue — the recurring policy forum convened with ICWA and ORF — must resist insularity. Maritime security, development finance, climate adaptation, post-conflict reconstruction: these are global subjects. A former UN Special Rapporteur, a Pacific island climate negotiator, a World Bank economist: the Jaffna Dialogue should, over time, become a destination that serious people choose to attend. ***Drawing on excellence: Each edition of the Jaffna Dialogue should feature a keynote from a figure of international standing — signalling that this province is not a recipient of global conversations, but a participant in them.*** ## **The Sacred Link: A Fourth Pillar** There is a dimension of this Centre’s potential that no purely academic or policy framework can capture: the living civilisational inheritance of Hindu ritual, scripture, and practice — an inheritance that is simultaneously our most intimate possession and the common patrimony of tens of millions across the world. The Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre becomes the institutional home of The Sacred Link — a global broadcast and e-learning ecosystem that unites temples, Pathashalas, and universities in a single, living digital community, in formal partnership with temples. ## **FOURTH PILLAR — The Sacred Link: Global Broadcast & E-Learning Ecosystem** **TIER I — LAY:** Accessible introduction to ritual meaning, festival cycles, and devotional practice **TIER II — CLERGY:** Structured instruction for temple priests and Pathashala students in liturgy and Agamic tradition **TIER III — SCHOLARS:** Advanced engagement with Sanskrit and Tamil sacred texts and comparative theology The operational model is simple. Temples — beginning with shrines in Sri Lanka, expanding to partner institutions in Tamil Nadu, greater India, Malaysia, Singapore, Mauritius, the United Kingdom, and beyond — record their rituals using a standardised protocol. That raw footage flows to a central production team housed at the Centre itself, where it is processed: subtitled in Tamil, transliterated into accessible script, annotated with liturgical context, and formatted for broadcast. The result feeds a 24/7 channel — the sacred calendar of living Hinduism, uninterrupted, available to anyone on earth with a screen. This is not merely an archival exercise. It is an act of civilisational continuity. The Tamil diaspora in Toronto or Hamburg — a second-generation child who has never stood inside a Jaffna temple — can watch the Thiruvannamalai deepam or the Nallur chariot festival in real time, with the understanding to know what they are witnessing. A priest in training in Kuala Lumpur can follow a master officiant in Colombo. A scholar in Chicago can access a Pathashala lesson in Jaffna that would otherwise remain confined to a single courtyard. ***Drawing on excellence: The Sacred Link must actively commission contributions from the foremost living authorities in Agamic tradition, Shaiva Siddhanta, and Sanskrit scholarship — from the Dharmapuram Adheenam, from the Kashi Vidwat Parishad, from Hindu chairs at universities in the United Kingdom and North America — ensuring that the highest levels of scholarly and ritual excellence are represented alongside the everyday devotional life of ordinary temples.*** The production hub at the Centre creates skilled employment — video editors, subtitle translators, liturgical annotators, broadcast engineers — positions that are meaningful, generative, and deeply rooted in the culture they serve. In time, The Sacred Link becomes the world’s most comprehensive living archive of Hindu ritual practice — not a museum piece, but a breathing, daily-updated record of a tradition that is very much alive. ## **Sustaining the Vision: A Multi-Tiered Funding Strategy** A vision without financing is a wish. The Centre’s financial sustainability must rest on three pillars simultaneously. Federal Indian schemes — SWAYAM and NEAT for distance learning, IGNCA grants for cultural archives, ICCR funds for seminars and residencies — provide the foundation. Tamil Nadu can fund Tamil language chairs and heritage tourism initiatives. Gujarat’s Sister State MoU opens a channel for forensic sciences scholarships. The Sacred Link itself becomes a funding asset: subscription tiers, diaspora temple partnerships, and university licensing agreements generate recurring revenue that flows back into the Centre’s operations. Major Indian corporates with a Sri Lankan footprint — L&T, Tata, Lupin, Ashok Leyland — should endow specific seats, auditorium sections, or library wings. The Tata Trusts and Infosys Foundation are natural partners for a Technocrat Scholarship programme. And the Tamil diaspora — in Toronto, London, Paris, Sydney — represents an enormous, largely untapped reservoir of both philanthropic capital and human excellence. A formal Friends of Thiruvalluvar network can channel both. ***Drawing on excellence: A Diaspora Fellows scheme — bringing back Sri Lankan Tamil professionals from medicine, law, technology, and the arts for short-term teaching or curatorial residencies — would simultaneously enrich programming and begin to rebuild the human connections that decades of conflict severed.*** ## **A Sunset Clause for Self-Reliance** Every partnership agreement must carry a built-in, time-bound transfer of stewardship to Sri Lankan hands. India’s institutions are the catalyst, not the permanent engine. The provincial cadre of the Northern Province — already in post — must become the ultimate custodians of what is built here. We live in an era when almost everything we wish to offer — education, culture, dialogue, expertise, the sacred — is simultaneously global, virtual, and at arm’s reach. The visitor to Jaffna who walks into this Centre on a Saturday morning might attend a lecture delivered live from Chennai, watch a film curated by a diaspora filmmaker in Melbourne, browse an exhibition designed in collaboration with a museum in Amsterdam, and end the evening watching a Bharatanatyam recital — while upstairs, a production team processes footage of a dawn puja from a temple in Batticaloa, ready for a devotee in London to watch before breakfast. That is what is possible, if we build for it. The Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre is not a building. It is, if we choose to make it so, a living institution — restless, generative, magnetic to excellence wherever it resides, and indispensable to the life of Jaffna and its global community for decades to come. I request the Government of India’s support in deploying these partnerships and accessing these diverse funding streams. The structure stands. Now let us give it a soul. ***The author served as Governor of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. This piece draws on three formal submissions regarding the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre.*** ### ITAK’s Senior Leadership Descended Into Disorder at Central Committee Meeting URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/itaks-senior-leadership-descended-into-disorder-at-central-committee-meeting/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T03:17:46.000Z What had long been carefully cultivated as the polished public image of M.A. Sumanthiran, the gentleman politician, constitutional moderate, self-styled peace advocate within Tamil politics, and outspoken critic of violence committed in the name of Tamils, was dramatically shaken during yesterday’s explosive Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) central committee meeting in Vavuniya, according to multiple senior party sources who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor*. Behind closed doors, the meeting reportedly descended into one of the party’s most chaotic and bitter internal confrontations in recent memory, exposing not merely political divisions within ITAK, but also deepening fractures over religion, personal conduct, ideological direction, and troubling allegations of alcohol-fueled misconduct among some of the party’s senior figures. Sources present at the meeting alleged that during a heated dispute with former Northern Provincial Council member Kurukularajah over what were described as allegedly falsified meeting minutes, Mr. Sumanthiran became so enraged that he reportedly pulled back a chair and lunged toward Kurukularajah in an apparent attempt to physically assault him. If accurately described by multiple attendees, the confrontation marked a striking departure from the restrained, legally polished, and disciplined persona Mr. Sumanthiran has projected for years. S. Sritharan, Sumanthiran’s principal rival within the party and a sitting parliamentarian, was, according to senior participants, equally combative. Attendees alleged that after witnessing Sumanthiran’s aggressive advance toward Kurukularajah, Mr. Sritharan responded with highly unparliamentary and confrontational language, reportedly shouting phrases such as “மடையா, அடிடா பாப்போம்” (“You fool, hit me and let’s see”), escalating the already volatile exchange into near physical disorder. Party leadership was ultimately forced to intervene to prevent the confrontation from spiraling further. But the turmoil did not end there. ![ITAK parliamentarian S. Sritharan arrives for the party’s central committee meeting in Vavuniya on May 17](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/itak-s-senior-leadership-desce-_Hw0yU-kix6hcjnrhm4p8m.jpg) ITAK parliamentarian S. Sritharan arrives for the party’s central committee meeting in Vavuniya on May 17 A senior member from Trincomalee reportedly triggered another deeply sensitive fault line by openly accusing Sumanthiran of systematically sidelining Hindu members within the party while promoting individuals associated with the Methodist Church. The accusation carried particular symbolic and political significance given Sumanthiran’s own Methodist faith and his public role as a Methodist preacher. Though the religiously charged confrontation was eventually subdued, sources indicated that it exposed simmering anxieties within sections of the party over leadership direction and internal representation. Attendees also described troubling conduct within Sumanthiran’s immediate faction, alleging that Peter Ilancheliyan, regarded by some within party ranks as a fiercely loyal Sumanthiran ally, arrived at the critical central committee session in an intoxicated state. If substantiated, such allegations would likely intensify broader concerns regarding discipline, professionalism, and internal standards within sections of the party leadership. “We do not even allow people to attend OBA meetings, village library gatherings, or ordinary community events in an intoxicated state, yet he was permitted to attend a crucial central committee meeting of a traditional Tamil political party simply because he was a loyal foot soldier of Sumanthiran,” one attendee told *Jaffna Monitor* sharply. For many Tamil political observers, the timing of the extraordinary internal rupture has proven especially painful. The disorder unfolded precisely as Tamils worldwide marked Mullivaikkal Remembrance Week, commemorating the 16th anniversary of the mass civilian deaths that occurred during the final stages of Sri Lanka’s civil war. For many grassroots supporters, the spectacle of senior Tamil political leaders descending into near physical confrontation during a period of collective mourning represented a deeply unsettling contradiction. Rather than projecting unity, discipline, or strategic clarity during one of the Tamil community’s most emotionally significant commemorative periods, ITAK’s senior leadership instead appeared consumed by factional infighting, personal vendettas, ideological distrust, and institutional instability. The meeting ultimately resulted in the formation of a committee comprising the acting leader, administrative secretary, and treasurer to investigate allegations surrounding Sritharan’s Constitutional Council voting controversy. Sritharan was, according to multiple party sources, not without legitimate grounds for criticism from Sumanthiran’s camp, particularly over allegations that he had facilitated liquor bar permits and voted in favor of certain military-linked appointments within the Constitutional Council. Several senior sources indicated that at least some of these accusations were considered sufficiently credible within party circles to warrant serious internal scrutiny. ### Could Prabhakaran Have Ever Succeeded? URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/could-prabhakaran-have-ever-succeeded/ Last updated: 2026-05-19T16:17:43.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** When Velupillai Prabhakaran walked into Chanakya cinema in Delhi in 1985, no one packing the air-conditioned hall could have guessed that this man would soon become one of the world’s most feared and powerful insurgents. But for his stocky build, there was nothing to distinguish him from the three other Sri Lankan Tamils with him who, away from the war theatre, had decided to see an English movie. The young men were in Delhi to meet Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his officials in an Indian bid to thrash out bottlenecks in attempts to end a Tamil separatist campaign in Sri Lanka. On a lighter day in Delhi, someone suggested that they see *Lawrence of Arabia*, a 1962 Hollywood blockbuster. But at the ticket window, they learnt the movie had been taken off at the theatre only days earlier. Now that they had made it to Chanakya, located not far from the city’s diplomatic enclave, they decided to watch whatever was being screened. It turned out to be *Blue Lagoon*, the story of a boy and a girl stranded on a tropical island after a shipwreck. Prabhakaran and the others also made it to Rajghat, the quaint memorial to Mahatma Gandhi, where the Tamil Tigers chief loudly wondered whether they should all embrace Gandhism, as India was pressing them to make peace with Colombo. The Prabhakaran of that day in Delhi resembled a normal human being with routine desires. But the 31-year-old was no doubt possessed by a long-standing dream to carve out an independent Tamil state out of Sri Lanka. This remained a dream. ![A young Velupillai Prabhakaran as the groom’s companion at his elder sister’s wedding.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/could-prabhakaran-have-ever-su-CbgJCA-kixu9lul831ss5v-1.png) A young Velupillai Prabhakaran as the groom’s companion at his elder sister’s wedding. Prabhakaran had concluded that not only could he achieve his desire, but anyone deemed a roadblock on the Tamil Eelam path had to be eliminated, no question asked. This is why the very next year, the Tigers shot dead Sri Sabarattinam and, a few years later, K. Pathmanabha. The two had been closeted with Prabhakaran at Delhi’s Hotel Diplomat during the 1985 visit. And he also ordered the killing, more than once, of the EPRLF’s Annamalai Varadaraja Perumal, who was one of those with Prabhakaran at the Chanakya cinema. And just a year after doing away with Pathmanabha, Prabhakaran decided to exterminate the person he met for the first time in 1985: Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi would later play a much bitter role in Sri Lanka. ![Prabhakaran receiving funds raised by Devi magazine in Tamil Nadu during the mid-1980s, in a photograph published by the magazine that reflected the once-warm ties between Tamil Nadu and the LTTE before the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/could-prabhakaran-have-ever-su-CbgJCA-kixfit794vv3yox-1.png) Prabhakaran receiving funds raised by Devi magazine in Tamil Nadu during the mid-1980s, in a photograph published by the magazine that reflected the once-warm ties between Tamil Nadu and the LTTE before the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The targeted killings never stopped. The victims included VIPs, the not-so-prominent, as well as largely unknown entities. In many cases, it looked like revenge killing. As each person fell, taken out by a bullet or suicide bomber, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) looked more formidable, more awesome, and more indestructible -- akin to Al Qaeda on 9/11. As we mark the 17th anniversary of Prabhakaran’s death in May 2026, it is pertinent to ask: Could a man obsessed by killing anyone seen as a threat, however remote, have ever succeeded in his larger mission to form a Tamil homeland? With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said authoritatively that Prabhakaran could never have achieved his objective because he lacked a larger vision. His lack of strategic acumen made him believe that every contradiction needed to be resolved only by the gun. He failed to grasp that an uncompromising refusal to yield was not a mark of greatness, but could one day result in wholesale destruction. Only a handful of people understood this trait in Prabhakaran; most, both friends and foes, could not grasp it. ![Prabhakaran disembarks from an Indian military aircraft during his visit to meet then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/could-prabhakaran-have-ever-su-CbgJCA-kixn90u35ioi81-1.png) Prabhakaran disembarks from an Indian military aircraft during his visit to meet then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The reason was that no one paid too much attention to Prabhakaran’s personality during those turbulent early years. The pledge of silence that he extracted from his confidants also meant that much of his thinking remained secret. Those who quit the LTTE maintained an omertà-like code of silence. It was because the Indian and Sri Lankan states failed to carry out an informed and detailed personality profile of the insurgent that Rajiv Gandhi trusted him, even months before the Tigers began waging war against the Indian Army, and that President Ranasinghe Premadasa failed to fathom that a man whose armoury he was blindly enriching would one day backstab him without mercy. ![Prabhakaran](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/could-prabhakaran-have-ever-su-CbgJCA-kixg4iby7v2roe6.png) Prabhakaran The failure in Sri Lanka was evident when a senior intelligence officer met me in Colombo just months after my unauthorized biography of Prabhakaran was published in late 2003. Over black coffee, the officer told me that he had read the book more than once and that although he had been hunting for Prabhakaran for over 25 years, “I only knew a quarter of what you have written about him”. Assuming he was not exaggerating, I was happy over the compliment but shocked. Although my research spanned four countries across three continents, I earned the bulk of the knowledge from publicly available sources, including those who had known Prabhakaran for long years and spoke on the strict condition of anonymity – for their own safety. If I could unearth all this, surely the Sri Lankan state, with so much more in its command, could have done far better any day. India fared no better. Even after he had Rajiv Gandhi blown up by a suicide bomber, a section of India’s intelligence shockingly struggled to accept that Prabhakaran could have ordered the ghastly crime. The fact is that Prabhakaran always possessed a personality that could justify the worst, including the killing of perfectly innocent non-combatants, children included, just because they were of a different ethnic shade or because they did not subscribe to his thinking. Human values did not have a place in this scheme of things. Yes, he did have shades of normality – as a husband, as a father, and, at times, as a leader -- but those were exceptions. This is why he so coolly ordered the massacre of Buddhist pilgrims in the sacred city of Anuradhapura. It did not matter to him that the Tamil armed struggle lost its moral legitimacy that day in 1985. The mass killing of militants from the rival Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) the next year in Jaffna and elsewhere was a logical corollary to the Anuradhapura bloodbath. Much later, the Tigers would mow down scores of worshippers in mosques in Sri Lanka’s east. The Tigers also forcibly took away Tamil children, often from impoverished families, to fight the war, even as many of those who carried out the conscription helped their own children to flee Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran’s blind supporters cheered him wildly, further emboldening him. As cockiness – an outcome of arrogance, a belief he could never be defeated -- got the better of him, the Tiger boss spurned one opportunity after another to shake hands with Colombo. This is why Anton Balasingham, once his trusted aide, complained to anyone who would listen before passing away in December 2006 that Prabhakaran, surrounded mostly by yes men, had stopped heeding to reason. Balasingham was frustrated because he could no more influence the Tiger boss from London. In the eventuality, a man who had vowed to resurrect the Tamil community in Sri Lanka could not save himself and his own family. His own edict on biting the cyanide to avoid capture by the enemy was ignored by thousands of Tigers who surrendered to the military. All this does not mean that the Sri Lankan state committed no blunders in its conduct. It did, and in plenty. ![Prabhakaran](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/could-prabhakaran-have-ever-su-CbgJCA-kixnee53q4702cn-1.png) Prabhakaran But a revolutionary leader is one who can gauge what could be the best possible, even if not the most ideal, solution to strife and how to achieve it, even if he has to take one or two steps back. Yes, Prabhakaran died fighting, but is that something to crow about when tens of thousands of Tamil civilians had to endure hunger, humiliation, and torture for believing in the messiah? Prabhakaran may be dead, but those who still swear by him are themselves prisoners of his worldview. This is why they blame everyone, from Karuna to M.K. Stalin, for the Tamil Tigers’ debacle. The primary blame for the LTTE’s shattering military defeat and the mess the Tamils in Sri Lanka are now in should be laid at the doors of Prabhakaran and his overseas backers, who willingly funded him and also fed him false promises about Western intervention in Sri Lanka’s war. It never happened. ### D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Fearless Chronicler of Sri Lanka’s War, Dies in Exile URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/d-b-s-jeyaraj-fearless-chronicler-of-sri-lankas-war-dies-in-exile/ Last updated: 2026-05-19T16:17:47.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** The world of Sri Lankan journalism will never see another D.B.S. Jeyaraj. Forced into exile by extremists among Tamil nationalists, Jeyaraj braved death threats and persistent danger to keep the world informed about the twists and turns during the long years a horrific separatist war raged in Sri Lanka. There were many journalists at work during those turbulent years, but few enjoyed the kind of access he had to virtually all the Tamil actors, and fewer still earned the wide credibility that his voice and writings commanded. Although he lived in Canada, thousands of miles away from the country where he was born and which he left 37 years ago, his heart always beat for Sri Lanka, particularly the Tamil community. A friend who called on him at his home in Toronto just two weeks before Jeyaraj breathed his last on May 17, 2026, said he spoke only about Sri Lanka as well as the unending suffering of the ordinary Tamil people. What got Jeyaraj into trouble was that he had a mind of his own, an ability to think differently from most others, and the capacity not to be swayed by ethnic emotions, notwithstanding the fact that he was Tamil to the core. Like thousands of Tamils, his family too suffered at the hands of Sinhalese thugs during the terrible anti-Tamil violence which engulfed Colombo in 1983 after the Tamil Tigers ambushed and killed 13 soldiers in Jaffna. By then, he had six years of experience in Tamil journalism, having begun his career at the Virakesari newspaper before transitioning to English journalism in Colombo in 1981. He later became the deputy editor of the Saturday Review, a brave Jaffna-based weekly that championed the Tamil voice until it was forced to shut down, and served as the Colombo correspondent for The Hindu, the Indian newspaper widely regarded as an important window into Sri Lanka. When the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched its war against the Indian military in Sri Lanka’s northeast, Jeyaraj made waves by interviewing Gopalasamy Mahendraraja alias Mahattaya, then the de facto number two in the Tigers, who vowed to teach the Indian army a lesson it would remember. Predictably, that interview got Jeyaraj into the bad books of Jyotindra Nath Dixit, the then Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, a man who thought the Indian military would easily put the LTTE in its place. This was when senior Indian diplomat Hardeep Singh Puri, now a minister in the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, would address Jeyaraj as a “revolutionary” during the evening media briefings at the Indian mission in Colombo. Unfortunately, the LTTE, which had no respect for democracy, could not accommodate Jeyaraj’s independent views. Initial warnings to tone down soon turned into death threats. This was why Jeyaraj shifted to Canada in 1989, a year after he had left Sri Lanka for the United States to attend Harvard University. It became clear that returning to Sri Lanka would be unsafe – indeed very dangerous. In Canada or Sri Lanka, no one could kill the journalism in Jeyaraj. He kept his writings – and independence – in full flow. LTTE supporters in the West who hated his writings brutally set upon him at a car park in Toronto, leaving him seriously injured. They tried – at times successfully – to kill the Tamil journals he brought out or to which he contributed in Canada. The physical battering was painful, but it did not curb his free spirit. If anything, he became a much better journalist. The relative safety of Canada and his ability to reach out to people all across Sri Lanka, including the war theatre north and east, helped him to chronicle a story that had no witnesses, barring those who killed and got killed. This is how Jeyaraj – six months older to Velupillai Prabhakaran - became the most authentic Tamil voice for that one media outlet the world listened to know the goings on Sri Lanka: the BBC. “He not only provided information others could not but he was a rich source of information,” a former BBC Tamil journalist told Jaffna Monitor. “Day in and day out, irrespective of the distance between Canada and Sri Lanka, he had all the information the world needed on his fingertips. Very often, whatever he said or predicted turned out to be correct.” A key reason for Jeyaraj’s success as a journalist from war-torn Sri Lanka was his command of both Tamil and English. Even as he criticized the LTTE for its haughtiness and inability to accommodate other viewpoints, many Tamil Tiger supporters held a grudging respect for him and took his writings seriously. No other Sri Lankan journalist could write the way he did in Tamil and English – and have the same access to all and sundry in Sri Lanka, the VIPs and ordinary political activists across the ethnic divide. It would not be an exaggeration to say that it was Jeyaraj’s writings that brought the Tamil armed struggle, Tamil nationalist politics, and the terrible consequences of the long war to the attention of English-speaking Sinhalese society as well as the wider world. His writings in Sri Lankan English newspapers were eagerly awaited. “He wrote about the Tigers and other militants when it was a very risky thing to do,” the former BBC journalist went on. “He wrote fearlessly when so many were scared to write.” Both during and after the war, Jeyaraj remained a Tamil nationalist but one who had no hatred for the other. He warned both friends and, in his writings, that the LTTE had embraced a path that would ruin the Tamil society. When his prediction proved correct, he did not exult; if anything, he was shattered by the way the war ended, virtually destroying a once vibrant Tamil society. Among other things, Jeyaraj had a great passion for Indian Tamil movies, particularly of an earlier era. Some friends considered him an encyclopedia on the Tamil movie industry. David Buell Sabapathy Jeyaraj was indeed a complete journalist. There will never be another Jeyaraj. ### WESTERN PROVINCE GOVERNOR HANIF YUSOOF ANNOUNCES RESIGNATION URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/western-province-governor-hanif-yusoof-announces-resignation/ Last updated: 2026-05-19T02:02:03.000Z **COLOMBO** — Western Province Governor and business tycoon Hanif Yusoof has announced his resignation, submitting his letter to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, according to senior government sources. Following the submission, the President is said to have requested that he remain in office for approximately one more month to ensure administrative continuity during the transition period, according to credible sources who spoke with Jaffna Monitor. The resignation, if formally accepted, ends one of the more unconventional gubernatorial tenures in recent Sri Lankan political history and brings to a close less than two years in a post the logistics magnate had taken on with considerable public goodwill. ### Who is Hanif Yusoof Born in Kollupitiya in 1958 to Gujarati parents, Yusoof was educated at Royal College, Colombo, and went on to co-found Expolanka Holdings, which under his leadership grew to become the largest company by market capitalisation in Sri Lanka. Starting out making deliveries on a Honda motorcycle, he built what would become a global multinational with offices in 39 countries, eventually attracting a buyout from Sagawa, the Japanese logistics giant. After President Dissanayake’s election victory in September 2024, Yusoof was appointed Governor of the Western Province on 28 September 2024\. He was one of several technocratic and civil society figures the new NPP government installed as governors across the country’s nine provinces, in a deliberate break from the practice of rewarding loyalist politicians with ceremonial postings. At the time of his swearing-in, Yusoof stated that the President had appointed him “with a clear objective to bring about meaningful change to the system, uplift the poor and strengthen the public sector,” and expressed his commitment to ending corruption and bribery. ### What went wrong The official reason cited is personal, with sources describing a tension between public duty and private business. His resignation has been linked to difficulties in balancing his official responsibilities with private business interests, which sources claim became increasingly constrained after assuming public office. That tension became politically charged early this year. On 29 January 2025, allegations surfaced accusing Yusoof of being connected to the unauthorised release of 323 containers by Sri Lanka Customs without inspection. Opposition MPs and social media users alleged that his former company, Expolanka Holdings, had facilitated the clearance. Yusoof vehemently denied the accusations, calling them “malicious and fabricated,” adding: “I have been bombarded with untruths, malicious social media posts, and statements from politicians who have not even been elected by the people.” Sri Lanka Customs formally denied the allegations, confirming that the containers were released by a Screening Unit appointed in July 2024 to ease container traffic congestion, and that Expolanka containers were not among them. Yusoof himself stressed that he held no decision-making position within Expolanka, having resigned from all positions following the company’s delisting from the stock market, and was serving only as an advisor. Then, in August 2025, resignation rumours surfaced publicly for the first time. Yusoof dismissed those reports as “baseless and untrue,” reaffirming his commitment to President Dissanayake’s vision and saying he had “dedicated myself fully to the mission of rebuilding our nation, without pause or hesitation.” ### The Special Envoy appointment In October 2025, President Dissanayake appointed Yusoof as the President’s Special Envoy for Foreign Investment, in recognition of his experience in global investment partnerships — a role he was to undertake as an honorary service in addition to his duties as Governor. The dual appointment was widely read as a face-saving arrangement, one that gave the businessman a more natural role while keeping him within the government’s orbit. The dual appointment has now evidently proven insufficient to retain him in the gubernatorial post itself ### The political backdrop Yusoof’s departure raises questions about the NPP government’s ability to hold its technocratic appointees — figures brought in from outside partisan politics, whose value lies precisely in their distance from it, but who lack the ideological or political incentive to endure the pressures public office brings. The Western Province governorship is not a ceremonial footnote. It covers Sri Lanka’s most populous and economically consequential province, home to Colombo, the country’s primary port, commercial district, and administrative hub. Who fills the post, and how, carries real consequence for the government’s economic narrative as Sri Lanka continues its IMF-backed recovery. No official statement has yet been issued by the President’s office or the Governor’s office confirming the resignation. The search for a successor, if one is underway, has not been publicly acknowledged. ### Sumanthiran Invokes Mullivaikkal to Renew Calls for War Crimes Accountability URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sumanthiran-invokes-mullivaikkal-to-renew-calls-for-war-crimes-accountability/ Last updated: 2026-05-18T02:16:21.000Z **POINT PEDRO, Sri Lanka** — M.A. Sumanthiran, acting general secretary of the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, used a Mullivaikkal remembrance ceremony to renew calls for accountability over the final stages of Sri Lanka’s civil war, telling mourners that the mass killing of Tamil civilians must remain at the center of Tamil political consciousness. “We will never forget, and we will never forgive,” Mr. Sumanthiran said at the gathering in *Munai*, Point Pedro, the fifth event of ITAK’s annual Mullivaikkal Remembrance Week. Mr. Sumanthiran, a former parliamentarian, said the Sri Lankan state had falsely reported only 70,000 civilians trapped in Mullivaikkal during the war’s final offensive in 2009, when the actual number exceeded 400,000\. He described the blocking of food supplies and the shelling of civilians as constituting a war crime. “Amid shelling and siege, our people suffered from hunger and starvation,” he said. “That itself was a grave war crime.” The event included the symbolic distribution of *Mullivaikkal Kanji* — a plain rice porridge associated with the extreme deprivation civilians endured during the army’s final push against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Mr. Sumanthiran said the ritual was meant to sustain historical memory across generations. The ceremony drew former Northern Provincial Council member S. Sugirthan, local council chairpersons, representatives from Vadamarachchi South-West and Point Pedro, party activists, and members of the public. Across Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority Northern and Eastern provinces, Mullivaikkal Remembrance Week is observed through memorials, public gatherings, and acts of mourning. For many Tamils, the events of May 2009 remain a symbol of wartime loss and unresolved demands for justice. ### **A Shift in Tone** ![M.A. Sumanthiran distributes symbolic Mullivaikkal Kanji during a remembrance event in Point Pedro](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sumanthiran-invokes-mullivaikk-KwaxFs-kixaysizxx24ha.png) M.A. Sumanthiran distributes symbolic Mullivaikkal Kanji during a remembrance event in Point Pedro Mr. Sumanthiran’s rhetoric drew scrutiny from political observers, who said his posture has hardened noticeably in recent years — a shift they attributed in part to his significant electoral losses in the last parliamentary election and to an intensifying leadership contest within ITAK against rival parliamentarian S. Sritharan. He had been widely recognized for publicly addressing contentious aspects of the LTTE’s wartime conduct — including the use of Tamil civilians as human shields, the killing of Tamils who attempted to flee the conflict zone, and the forced conscription of children. Observers say he now appears less willing to revisit those positions publicly. “He is becoming just another Tamil nationalist leader — but we already have many,” one political observer told Jaffna Monitor. “He did not need to become one.” ### Rain Fails to Deter Tamil Families Protesting Decades-Long Military Occupation of Valikamam North Lands URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/rain-fails-to-deter-tamil-families-protesting-decades-long-military-occupation-of-valikamam-north-lands/ Last updated: 2026-05-17T14:56:28.000Z Braving torrential rain, displaced Tamil residents of Valikamam North gathered for the fourth consecutive Friday outside the gates of the Sri Lanka Army’s Commando bungalow in Jaffna, demanding the return of approximately 651 acres of ancestral land from which they were forcibly displaced in June 1990 and to which they have been denied access for 34 years. The demonstration, which began on April 24 as a weekly series, is being carried out by landowners belonging to Grama Sevaka divisions 248, 251, 255 and 256 of Valikamam North — families who have spent more than three decades scattered across other parts of the Northern Province and abroad while the military retains control of their properties under a High Security Zone designation that has outlasted the civil war by 17 years. "This protest will not cease until our lands are returned to us," demonstrators declared on Friday, standing in heavy rain outside the compound. ### **A ZONE THAT OUTLIVED THE WAR** In June 1990, as the Sri Lankan military expanded operations around the Palaly airbase and Kankesanthurai harbor, thousands of Tamil families were ordered out of their homes across 13 Grama Niladhari divisions under the Valikamam North Divisional Secretariat. The area was subsequently declared a High Security Zone and placed under military administration. Homes, agricultural fields, fishing grounds, schools, temples, churches, and community halls were absorbed into the zone. The war ended in May 2009\. But the High Security Zone continued. More than 6,000 families from Valikamam North remain displaced, according to figures cited by civil society organizations and local representatives. The Valikamam North Land Release Committee has stated that nearly 2,900 acres remain unreleased despite five presidential changes and four parliaments since the war's end. "Although 16 years have passed since the end of the war, our lands remain under the control of the Sri Lankan military under the continuing pretext of a High Security Zone," said Velautham, a displaced Valikamam North resident, speaking to Jaffna Monitor. ### **GOVERNMENT CLAIMS DISPUTED** ![Displaced Tamil residents of Valikamam North protest in heavy rain outside the Sri Lanka Army’s Commando bungalow in Jaffna, demanding the return of ancestral lands they say have remained under military occupation since their forced displacement in 1990.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/rain-fails-to-deter-tamil-fami-7oGjDQ-kixxevkapsu9tqh.png) Displaced Tamil residents of Valikamam North protest in heavy rain outside the Sri Lanka Army’s Commando bungalow in Jaffna, demanding the return of ancestral lands they say have remained under military occupation since their forced displacement in 1990. The administration of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, elected in late 2024 on pledges to resolve longstanding ethnic grievances, has announced fresh land releases in the Northern Province. In a defense advisory committee meeting in Parliament, the President stated that approximately 1,000 acres of private land in the North had been released during 2025. Deputy Defense Minister Major General (Retired) Arun Jayasekara provided more specific figures in April, telling Parliament that 672.24 acres — comprising 86.24 acres of private land and 586 acres of state land previously used by the military — had been released between January and October 2025\. Jayasekara told reporters that land release would not pose any threat to national security. Tamil political representatives and displaced residents dispute the government's framing. In Valikamam North alone, approximately 2,200 acres of agricultural land are said to remain unreleased. "Every government announces land releases, but the vast majority of our occupied lands remain unchanged," said Murugupillai, 72, a displaced resident, speaking to Jaffna Monitor. "We can see that this government is continuing the same pattern." ### **WHAT THE MILITARY DOES ON THE LAND** Land rights activists and affected residents say the military does not merely occupy civilian property but derives economic benefit from it. Sources familiar with land-use patterns in Valikamam North told Jaffna Monitor that military personnel have established agricultural operations on substantial portions of the occupied land within the High Security Zone, with additional areas reportedly converted into recreational and commercial facilities. Residents and advocates allege that produce cultivated on privately owned civilian lands is subsequently sold in local Tamil-majority markets — forcing original landowners to purchase goods grown on their own confiscated property. Rathinasingam Muralitharan, leader of the Northern Province People's Organization for Land Rights, said the prolonged occupation extends beyond any legitimate security justification. "While lands in other parts of the country may be acquired in the name of development, in the North and East, Tamil lands continue to be seized under the pretext of security," he said. "The continuous occupation has stripped people not only of their livelihoods, but also of their peace. Our demand is simple: the people's lands must be returned to the people." ### Inside Aravinda de Silva’s Home: Testimonies Reveal Kapila Chandrasena’s Final Night URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/inside-aravinda-de-silvas-home-testimonies-reveal-kapila-chandrasenas-final-night/ Last updated: 2026-05-18T05:09:16.000Z At around 11:30 on the night of May 7, Kapila Chandrasena telephoned his domestic worker at his Barnes Place home in Colombo. He gave her a list: nightclothes, medicines, and two pairs of spectacles. Then he called again and added a fourth item — a blue cloth belt he kept beneath his sarong and used for exercise. He told her to pack everything into a bag and have it ready. Two men arrived by vehicle and took it away. The following morning, at approximately 7:35 a.m., that same room at the Pedris Place, Kollupitiya residence of former Sri Lankan cricket captain Aravinda de Silva was opened with a master key. Inside, Attorney-at-Law Priyantha Upali Amarasinghe saw an empty, crumpled bed, a blue stool turned toward a door, a body slumped near it, and, hanging from the top of the door frame, what he described to Fort Magistrate Pasan Amarasekara as a dark green tie, part of which was also wound around the neck of Kapila Chandrasena. Mr. Chandrasena, 58, the former chief executive of SriLankan Airlines who had been fighting bribery charges tied to a multibillion-dollar Airbus procurement scandal, was dead. The object he had specifically requested be sent to him the night before, a blue exercise belt, was not the same as the object later found around his neck, a dark green tie. Investigators have asked the Government Analyst to examine both items and determine what connection, if any, exists between them. That question, along with an operational security camera system at the residence that had stored no footage for a prolonged period, a locked iPhone 16 Pro Max that police have been unable to access, and a chronology in which CID officers arrived at Mr. Chandrasena’s Barnes Place home at 7:25 a.m. on the same morning his body was discovered, has placed the inquest at the center of an intensifying forensic inquiry into one of Sri Lanka’s most significant corruption cases. ### **THE NIGHT BEFORE: THREE PHONE CALLS, A PACKED BAG** The testimony of the domestic workers who appeared before the court on May 14 established the most precise account yet of Mr. Chandrasena's movements and communications in the hours before his death. Manathunga Mudiyanselage Somadasa, a male domestic worker at the Barnes Place residence, told the magistrate that no visitors had come to the house at any point between Mr. Chandrasena's return home on bail on May 6 and his departure for Mr. de Silva's residence the following day. Another household employee, Subrahim Pramila, provided detailed testimony about the phone calls. She told the court that Mr. Chandrasena had returned home at around 5 p.m. on May 6 — one day after being released on bail following 54 days in remand. He asked after the household staff and the dogs, said he was physically exhausted, and went to sleep. The next afternoon, May 7, he departed by car. Later that evening, a driver sent by Mr. de Silva returned the vehicle to Barnes Place and handed her the key. Then, at around 11:30 p.m., Mr. Chandrasena telephoned. He asked her to prepare nightclothes. In a second call, he added two pairs of spectacles, medicines, and the blue exercise belt — specifying that it was beneath his sarong. He asked for a vehicle to collect everything. Two men arrived and collected the bag. During his calls, she testified, Mr. Chandrasena had also told her to iron a white outfit: “I have to go to court tomorrow.” When she called him the following morning at 6:40 a.m., because he had not returned and she knew he was due in court, there was no answer. ### **INSIDE THE ROOM: WHAT THE LAWYER SAW** Attorney Priyantha Upali Amarasinghe had arrived at the Pedris Place residence at around 7:15 a.m., dispatched there the previous evening by President's Counsel Rienzie Arsecularatne. A motion had been prepared in P.C. Arsecularatne's chambers to seek the recall of the arrest warrant that had been issued against Mr. Chandrasena. File it in the morning, P.C. Arsecularatne had told him at around 9:30 p.m., and keep the case down until I arrive. A second call came at around 11:00 p.m. — this time from Mr. de Silva himself. Mr. Chandrasena was with him, Mr. de Silva said. He was frightened. He kept raising a section of the law and asking whether he would be remanded. When Mr. Amarasinghe arrived the next morning, Mr. de Silva informed him that Mr. Chandrasena was not responding to calls. He and Mr. de Silva, along with members of the household, went upstairs. Attempts to open the bedroom door failed. A master key was used. Mr. Amarasinghe was the first to enter. He testified in detail before the magistrate: the bed was empty, the sheets crumpled. On the left side was a door, and something hung from its upper frame. He described it as appearing to be a dark green tie. A blue stool was positioned facing the door. Near it, slumped, was a person. Part of the cloth hung from the door was also wound around the neck. He told the magistrate: “This was my first experience of something like this, and I was frightened.” He told Mr. de Silva to call a doctor immediately. Mr. de Silva's wife, Priyangi Anushka Wijenayake — whose sister, Priyanka Neomali Wijenayake, is Mr. Chandrasena's wife — was near the door when Mr. Amarasinghe entered. He came out and asked her to call for an ambulance. She told the court she had taken just one step into the room. ### **THE DOCTOR'S FINDINGS: AN ESTIMATE OF TIME** ![The body of Kapila Chandrasena, former chief executive of SriLankan Airlines, was laid out for final respects at his family residence following his death amid an ongoing corruption investigation.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/inside-aravinda-de-silva-s-hom-LFobzY-kixryaz70pmu55m.png) The body of Kapila Chandrasena, former chief executive of SriLankan Airlines, was laid out for final respects at his family residence following his death amid an ongoing corruption investigation. Dr. Yashoda Lakshani Liyanage, a physician attached to a private hospital, arrived at the residence at around 7:50 a.m. after the hospital's emergency unit received a call for assistance. A person identifying himself as a lawyer led her to the room. She found an empty bed. Near a door on the left side of the room, a chair had been placed facing it, and a body was slumped near the chair, one side of the face pressed against it. She examined for signs of life: breathing had stopped, there was no pulse. When she lifted the right arm, she found it partially stiff. The right pupil was dilated and fixed. A piece of cloth was tightly compressed around the neck. Her clinical assessment: Mr. Chandrasena was already dead at the time of examination. Asked by investigators how long before her arrival the death may have occurred, she estimated approximately one to two hours — placing the time of death at between approximately 5:50 a.m. and 6:50 a.m. on May 8. ### **THE CAMERA THAT WAS ON BUT NOT RECORDING** Among the most significant disclosures of the May 14 proceedings was information about the CCTV security system installed at the Pedris Place residence. Presenting a progress report to Fort Magistrate Amarasekara, officers of the Colombo Crimes Division stated that although the CCTV camera system at the residence had been operational, forensic examination had established that no footage had been recorded or stored — and that this had been the case for a prolonged period prior to the death. No usable internal surveillance footage from the property was available for investigators to review. The disclosure drew pointed attention from the court. When the magistrate asked directly whether all CCTV footage from the residence had been obtained, investigators confirmed there was none. They had, however, secured footage from CCTV systems installed at two neighbouring properties, covering front and side-angle recordings of the relevant period from May 6 to May 8. Police have also confirmed that there is only one entrance to the residence. ### **A LOCKED PHONE, AND A MYSTERY CARD** The Colombo Crimes Division separately informed the court that on May 12, investigators had obtained a search warrant and searched a residence in Hyde Park registered in the name of Mr. Chandrasena's wife. The search yielded two laptop computers and several documents, all taken into custody as case productions. Mr. Chandrasena's mobile phone — described by investigators as an iPhone 16 Pro Max — remains locked. Facial recognition has failed, and investigators have sought directions from the court to have the device examined by a specialist institution. Investigators believe it contains material relevant to the inquiry. A bank card discovered inside the cover of the phone at the scene has separately prompted investigation, following an order by the Colombo Chief Magistrate's Court. Investigators have further confirmed that no visible damage was found on the upper surface of the door in the room where Mr. Chandrasena was found, though fibre samples were collected from the scene. The blue exercise belt that had been packed and sent to the residence, and the dark green tie described by the lawyer who entered the room, have both been forwarded to the Government Analyst, along with unidentified medication, blood and urine samples, and tissue recovered during the post-mortem. Fingerprints from the post-mortem examination have been sent to the state fingerprint analyst. The five-member panel of judicial medical officers that conducted the post-mortem, led by Colombo Chief Judicial Medical Officer Dr. Sriyantha Amarathna, has not yet issued its final report. The full cause of death remains pending toxicology results. ### **OFFICERS AT BARNES PLACE THAT MORNING** The warrant that precipitated Mr. Chandrasena's final hours had been issued the evening of May 7 by Colombo Chief Magistrate Asanga S. Bodharagama, after prosecutors from Sri Lanka's Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, known as CIABOC, alleged that he had violated his bail conditions by arranging fraudulent sureties following his release on May 5. Mr. Chandrasena had been released on a cash bail of Rs. 500,000, with three surety bail bonds of Rs. 1 million each. When two of the guarantors were found to have been paid individuals with no genuine connection to him, the Keselwatta Police arrested them. Both were remanded. CIABOC then sought revocation of Mr. Chandrasena's bail, and the warrant was issued. Officers went to the Barnes Place residence that evening but found it empty. According to a person familiar with the matter, Mr. Chandrasena had already gone to Mr. de Silva's residence. The following morning, at 7:25 a.m., ten minutes after Attorney Amarasinghe arrived at Pedris Place, five individuals identifying themselves as CID officers arrived at the Barnes Place residence with a search warrant. The domestic worker, Ms. Pramila, told the court they asked whether Mr. Chandrasena was inside and warned her not to lie. They left at approximately 8:15 a.m. By then, the doctor had already been at Pedris Place for twenty-five minutes. ### Reforming Healthcare in Sri Lanka for Equity and Excellence URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/reforming-healthcare-in-sri-lanka-for-equity-and-excellence/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T11:44:30.000Z **By: Dr. Gamini Goonetilleke** The Ministry of Health is the government institution responsible for governing the entire health system in Sri Lanka, playing a vital role in protecting public health, ensuring that all organizations providing health-related products and services comply with safety regulations, and guaranteeing that individuals and communities receive quality healthcare without financial hardship. Its vision is “a healthier nation that contributes to its economic, social, mental and spiritual development,” while its mission is “to contribute to the social and economic development of Sri Lanka by achieving the highest attainable health status by promoting preventive, curative and rehabilitative services of high quality that are accessible to all people.” The Ministry of Health is responsible for stewardship functions such as policy formulation and health legislation, program monitoring and technical oversight, management of health technologies, human resources, tertiary care, and other selected hospitals. The primary and secondary levels of curative care and preventive services function under the nine provincial ministries. In Sri Lanka, healthcare facilities are widely regarded as both accessible and of good quality, despite the inherent complexity of delivering effective care. Multiple factors shape the performance of the system, including infrastructure, workforce, and resource allocation. The public sector plays a dominant role, providing nearly 95% of inpatient care and about 50% of outpatient services. According to the Annual Bulletin of the Ministry of Health, Sri Lanka (2025), by mid-2022, the country had more than 1,500 healthcare institutions, including 588 hospitals and 517 primary care facilities, along with 335 Medical Officer of Health (MOH) offices. In total, 555 government hospitals deliver primary healthcare services, offering curative, preventive, and rehabilitative care to the population. These services are provided through a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach involving doctors, nurses, pharmacists, laboratory personnel, radiology staff, and others, including medical records officers working together as an integrated team. Sri Lanka’s free health service stands as one of the most remarkable achievements in the developing world. For over seven decades, it has provided universal access to healthcare, free at the point of delivery, contributing to impressive health indicators such as high life expectancy, low maternal mortality, and effective control of communicable diseases. However, the changing health landscape, economic constraints, and systemic inefficiencies have exposed gaps that threaten equity and quality. To truly embody the vision and mission of the Ministry of Health—ensuring accessible, equitable, and quality care for all—Sri Lanka must undertake thoughtful reforms that strengthen, modernize, and sustain the health system. A clear and comprehensive National Health Policy, agreed upon by all key stakeholders—including political parties, trade unions, and professional medical bodies—is essential to ensure that healthcare remains a national priority rather than a tool of political rhetoric during election cycles. Such a policy would provide continuity, stability, and long-term direction for the health sector, irrespective of changes in government. At the same time, there must be an honest and collective assessment of the sustainability of Sri Lanka’s free health service. Rising costs are driven by the expansion of healthcare institutions, increasing numbers of specialist, medical officers, nursing and paramedical staff, and rapid advances in medical technology. Modern diagnostics and treatments—such as new techniques in radiology, chemotherapy, radiotherapy, cardiac by-pass surgery, cardiac stents, and various types of grafts, organ transplantation, joint replacement, various implants, and minimally invasive or robotic surgery, a variety of new medicines, and many more have significantly improved patient outcomes but come at a high financial cost. In this context, it is necessary to consider whether a fully free health service for the entire population remains viable. Thoughtful reform may be required, such as prioritizing free care for the most vulnerable while introducing contributory mechanisms or a national health insurance scheme for others, ensuring both equity and sustainability. At its core, the Sri Lankan health system was designed during a period when infectious diseases and maternal and child health were the main priorities. Today, the burden has shifted dramatically toward non-communicable diseases (NCDs), trauma, aging populations, and complex chronic conditions. This epidemiological transition requires a fundamental reorientation of services**.** One of the most important steps toward improvement is strengthening primary healthcare. Although Sri Lanka has an extensive network of primary care institutions, these are often underutilized, with patients bypassing them to seek care at secondary and tertiary hospitals. This leads to overcrowding, inefficiency, and inequitable access to specialized services. To address this, a robust gatekeeping and referral system must be introduced. Primary care institutions should become the first point of contact, providing continuous, family-centered care, particularly for chronic diseases. Strengthening Family Medicine, improving diagnostic facilities, and ensuring the availability of essential drugs at the primary level will encourage patients to rely on these services. Such a system would not only improve efficiency and reduce cost but also promote equity by ensuring that all citizens receive appropriate care at the right level. In 2015, the World Federation for Medical Education (WFME), in its report *WFME Global Standards for Quality Improvement in Basic Medical Education*, recommended the inclusion of **Family Medicine as a subject in the Final MBBS examination,** alongside the core disciplines of Medicine, Surgery, Paediatrics, Obstetrics and Gynecology, and Psychiatry. In keeping with this important recommendation, it is encouraging to note that most medical schools in Sri Lanka have now incorporated Family Medicine into their undergraduate curricula, reflecting a growing recognition of its role in strengthening primary care. Further progress has been made at the postgraduate level. The Postgraduate Institute of Medicine (PGIM), functioning under the University of Colombo, has established structured training pathways in Family Medicine, offering both a Diploma and the MD (Family Medicine). These qualifications lead to certification as a specialist in Family Medicine by the Board of Management, on the recommendation of the Board of Study in Family Medicine. The total training duration is 5 years. Since its inception in 2000, the program has undergone several revisions to align with evolving national health priorities and ongoing primary care reforms. The establishment of the Sri Lanka College of Specialist Family Physicians (SLCSFP) in 2014 has further strengthened this specialty, providing professional leadership and contributing to the advancement of Family Medicine in Sri Lanka, in line with broader health sector reforms aimed at reinforcing primary healthcare. A gradual restructuring of Sri Lanka’s healthcare system to align with models practiced in Western nations would significantly strengthen efficiency, continuity of care, and cost-effectiveness. Central to this reform is the systematic appointment of specialists in Family Medicine across all levels of hospitals—National, Provincial, District General, Base, and Divisional institutions. These specialists would serve as the first point of contact, thereby easing the burden on tertiary-level specialist clinics, reducing unnecessary hospital admissions, and ensuring proper follow-up care. Family Medicine Units should progressively replace the existing Outpatient Departments (OPDs), which currently function as episodic care centers without continuity. In contrast, Western systems emphasize structured primary care units that maintain long-term patient records and accountability. The introduction of digital patient registration systems using barcodes or QR codes would further enhance continuity, enabling efficient record-keeping and coordinated care. These units would deliver a broad spectrum of services, including family medicine clinics, youth and antenatal care, non-communicable disease management, geriatric care, family planning, immunization, wound care, and minor surgical procedures. Basic diagnostic services such as ultrasound and endoscopy, alongside preventive care initiatives like obesity management, cancer screening, and health education, could also be integrated gradually. However, infrastructure and workforce support are critical. Adequate facilities, improved living conditions and incentives for healthcare workers in primary care settings in remote regions must be ensured; without these, such reforms are unlikely to succeed. Additionally, private general practitioners should be required to undergo formal training in Family Medicine before independent practice, ensuring uniform standards of care. Specialist consultations in the private sector could be streamlined through health insurance schemes, reducing out-of-pocket expenditure of patients. If implemented thoughtfully, this model would create a more organized, patient-centered system with improved access, reduced costs, and better health outcomes—hallmarks of successful Western healthcare systems—while still preserving Sri Lanka’s strong foundation of universal health coverage Another major challenge is the unequal distribution of resources. While urban centers often have better-equipped hospitals, specialist services and more doctors, rural and remote areas frequently suffer from shortages of doctors, nurses, and essential facilities. Decentralization, though beneficial in many ways, has contributed to disparities in resource allocation. To improve equity, there must be a comprehensive national resource mapping exercise, followed by the strategic deployment of health personnel and the development of infrastructure in underserved areas. Incentives such as financial benefits, career advancement opportunities, and improved living conditions should be provided to encourage healthcare workers to serve in remote regions. Human resource constraints represent a critical barrier to equitable healthcare. The migration of doctors and specialists, often due to better opportunities abroad, has created significant gaps in the system. Addressing this requires long-term workforce planning, merit-based appointments, and improved working conditions. Investment in training, continuous professional development, and retention strategies is essential. Additionally, expanding the roles of allied health professionals, such as nurse practitioners and community health workers, can help bridge service gaps, especially in remote primary care settings. Equity in healthcare is also closely linked to the availability of medicines and diagnostic services. Despite the policy of free healthcare, shortages of essential drugs and laboratory facilities often force patients to seek care in the private sector, leading to out-of-pocket expenditure. Strengthening the supply chain, improving procurement systems, and ensuring transparency in drug regulation are crucial steps. The adoption of digital inventory systems and improved forecasting methods can reduce stock-outs and ensure the consistent availability of medicine across all regions. The integration of health information systems is another area requiring urgent attention. Currently, fragmentation and lack of interoperability between institutions hinder efficient patient management and continuity of care. Developing a unified digital health information system would enable better tracking of patient histories, improve referral mechanisms, and support data-driven decision-making. Such systems can also enhance transparency and accountability, aligning with the Ministry’s mission of efficient and evidence-based healthcare delivery. Preventive and health promotion services, which have historically been a strength of Sri Lanka’s health system, must be further enhanced. Community-based health programs, including maternal and child health services, have contributed significantly to the country’s achievements. However, with the rise of NCDs, there is a need to expand health education, promote healthy lifestyles, and encourage early detection and self-care. Schools, workplaces, and community organizations should be actively involved in health promotion initiatives, creating a culture of wellness that reduces the burden on curative services. Another important dimension of equity is addressing the needs of vulnerable and marginalized populations. These include rural communities, the urban poor, the elderly, and those affected by conflict or displacement. Policies must prioritize improving access to healthcare for these groups, including mobile clinics, outreach programs, and targeted interventions. Special attention should also be given to mental health services, which have historically been under-resourced. Expanding community-based mental health care, reducing stigma, and integrating mental health into primary care are essential for comprehensive and equitable service delivery. Financing remains a fundamental challenge. Although Sri Lanka has achieved impressive health outcomes with relatively low expenditure, the sustainability of the free health system is under pressure due to rising costs and limited budget allocations. Increasing public investment in health, improving efficiency in resource utilization, and prioritizing cost-effective interventions are necessary. However, care must be taken to preserve the principle of free access especially to the most vulnerable, avoiding policies that may widen inequities, such as excessive reliance on private sector or insurance-based models. Good governance and leadership are critical to the success of any health system reform. Strengthening accountability mechanisms, ensuring transparency in decision-making, and involving stakeholders at all levels can enhance trust and effectiveness. The implementation of a National Health Performance Framework, which provides data on health system performance, can empower citizens and policymakers alike. Decentralized decision-making, combined with strong central oversight, can allow for context-specific solutions while maintaining national standards. Finally, innovation and research must play a central role in improving the health system. Encouraging local research, adopting new technologies, and learning from global best practices can help Sri Lanka adapt to emerging challenges. Telemedicine, for example, has the potential to improve access to specialist care in remote areas. Similarly, the use of artificial intelligence and data analytics can enhance disease surveillance, resource allocation, and clinical decision-making. In conclusion, Sri Lanka’s free health service remains a cornerstone of its social welfare system and a symbol of its commitment to equity and justice. However, to sustain and strengthen this system in the face of evolving challenges, comprehensive reforms are essential. By focusing on strengthening primary care, ensuring equitable resource distribution, addressing human resource shortages, improving access to medicines, integrating health information systems, enhancing preventive care, prioritizing vulnerable populations, ensuring sustainable financing, and promoting good governance and innovation, Sri Lanka can move closer to achieving true equity in healthcare. In doing so, it will not only uphold the vision and mission of the Ministry of Health but also reaffirm its longstanding commitment to the health and well-being of all its citizens. ### Pain URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/pain/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T03:50:50.000Z **Translated from the original Tamil short story *vali* (வலி) from the 1976 collection of short stories titled *kōṭukaḷum kōlaṅkalum* (கோடுகளும் கோலங்களும்) by**[](https://ta.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%AA%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AA%E0%AE%BF%E0%AE%B4%E0%AE%BE%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D%5F%E0%AE%90.%5F%E0%AE%9A%E0%AE%A3%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)[**Kuppilan Ai. Shanmugan**](https://ta.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%AA%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AA%E0%AE%BF%E0%AE%B4%E0%AE%BE%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D%5F%E0%AE%90.%5F%E0%AE%9A%E0%AE%A3%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)**. The original collection is available at**[ **noolaham.org**](https://noolaham.org/wiki/index.php/%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%8B%E0%AE%9F%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%B3%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%8D%5F%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%8B%E0%AE%B2%E0%AE%99%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%B3%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%8D?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)**. If you have any questions or feedback, please contact ez.iniyavan@gmail.com.** The intermittent shooting pain struck the lower right part of his chest. He could never predict when the pain would hit. It could come any time, even in the dead of night when he was fast asleep. The pulsating pain would last for about five minutes, leading him to despair at the meaninglessness of life, inducing him to want to cry out in pain, making him moan, “*Ammā, ammā…*” But his face betrayed only a faint shadow of the invisible thread of pain. His left hand would unconsciously caress the place in his chest where the pain hit him, even as he continued to work. He might be leafing through files at the office, traveling by train or bus, watching the exquisite beauty of the evening descending on the beach; or debating his friends. Sometimes he might even smile—a smile laced with a tinge of pain. It had been about three months since the pain started. He learned to grit his teeth and endure it until it became unbearable. After crossing his threshold for tolerance, he decided to seek a remedy. The very decision brought him joy. But, with his characteristic laziness, he did not get around to seeking treatment. Putting up with the pain seemed to stretch the days. His friend would scold him, “Why do you suffer needlessly in this age of science? For all your pontificating, you are just lazy. You should heal yourself first before you presume to prescribe solutions for others.” Finally, one day, all these pressures induced him to find a remedy. He remembered that it was about ten in the morning when he left home. He went on foot, walking for about a mile, the overcast sky shielding him from the harsh sun. As he walked, he observed families living in apartment buildings, children running around naked, the vegetable seller pushing his cart along, the incessant ringing of bicycle bells, the young mother on the railway station bench with a baby on her lap. These lively movements of the day filled the senses. “Why didn’t this feeling bother me until now?” He felt an intense shooting pain in the lower right part of his chest. He wanted to cry out loud. In three minutes, the pain subsided. The sky cleared and the sun shone with full ferocity; the cool- drinks factory lay behind the tall wall along the street featuring a huge advertisement showing a woman drinking soda. A lush cornfield stretched between the canal and the road, where a man in a hat stood irrigating the crops.. As he drew closer, he could see beads of sweat on the man’s face. Government offices. appeared, with notice boards in all three languages. Buses rushed past. Flowers rained down from the shady trees that lined the trees. He spotted the smartly dressed man sitting on a chair in a modest room on one side of the hospital. The man was surrounded by beakers and test tubes, and a sharp chemical odor filled the air. With a smile, he proffered the introductory letter his friend had written for him. The man glanced through the letter and launched into the customary inquiries: about his name, village, friends, and relatives. Then the man led him through the crowd of patients thronging the entrance to the doctor’s office and introduced him to the doctor. “He is my relative; works for the Department of Education.” The doctor peered at him, “What ails you?” He peered back and answered something. He sensed a sadness that pervaded the depths of the doctor’s mesmerizing eyes, along with a compassion that felt like a warm embrace. The doctor did have a rather long nose. The doctor looked at him again, this time with a stern expression. “I say, do you drink a lot? Are you into the habit of drinking moonshine?” He shook his head pitiably, “I don’t even smoke.” “So maybe you eat a lot of meat and spicy stuff?” “I am a vegetarian,” he responded softly. The doctor gazed at him with disbelief, shook his head, and asked him to leave the room, but the “relative” stayed behind. He walked out unsteadily. The shooting chest pain reappeared. A listless baby. An old man with an incessant cough, spitting out phlegm. A young man with a pencil mustache and a bandage around his head. An exhausted pregnant woman. And some others. At a distance, two construction workers standing on a wooden plank laid across bamboo scaffoldings, stacking red bricks to construct a new floor in a building. He was waiting by the entrance to the doctor’s office. The “relative” walked quietly towards him, looking tired. Even when he asked the “relative” about the doctor’s diagnosis, there was no clear answer. Perhaps it was not something he was supposed to know; perhaps the relative surmised that he would be distraught if he heard the news. Truth be told, he did not really care what the diagnosis was. Perhaps it was his laziness, or perhaps his aloofness from life, that made him indifferent to what would happen to him. The next time he went to see his “relative”, he had a bit more energy. His face was clear, the tiredness in his eyes had disappeared, and his cheeks were fuller. Even his speech was softer, more elegant, and more confident. His “relative” was surprised. Even the doctor was taken aback but tried not to show it. The doctor regarded him with those mesmerizing eyes and said, “It seems you worry a lot. Don’t worry about problems. Who doesn’t have problems?” He remained silent, a rush of thoughts flooding his mind. The listless baby, the old man spitting out phlegm, the construction workers building a yet another floor, the beads of sweat lacing the fisherman’s face…. “My dear boy,” the doctor’s voice had a certain majesty. “No one is free of problems. Don’t worry too much. Do you know that unnecessary worry can cause stomach ulcers?” He was a new man when he emerged from the hospital. The whole world shone with a certain mesmerizing magnetism. He felt that life was full of meaning. He even remembered her smiling face, after a three-month gap. He started mumbling a song, and even his gait had a certain majesty. The same street, the same path. Naked children roamed the street. The young man with frustrated eyes and a week-old stubble, held the hem of his sarong with his left hand and stared emptily onto the street. The crippled beggar. The thirty-year old spinster who stood by her front door people-watching with a certain longing in her eyes. A brightly painted poster on the wall screamed in big red letters about how the fascist rule in Chile was oppressing its people. His face darkened. The mumbled song suddenly went quiet. As the shadow of pain shrouded his eyes, the fingers of his left hand clutched the right side of his chest. He realized that the pain that had been absent for a week had decided to return. “*Chai—*how painful!’ He resolved to find a permanent remedy. 1974 ### Sri Lankan National Among 17 Foreign Citizens Held for Illegal Voting in Tamil Nadu Elections URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-national-among-17-foreign-citizens-held-for-illegal-voting-in-tamil-nadu-elections/ Last updated: 2026-05-17T03:45:39.000Z **CHENNAI —** Tamil Nadu police have registered cases against at least 17 foreign nationals, including a Sri Lankan citizen, on suspicion of casting votes in the state’s recently concluded Legislative Assembly elections despite holding foreign passports and having no legal right to vote in India, officials said. The individuals, passport holders from Sri Lanka, Canada, and Australia, were detained at Chennai and Madurai airports by immigration officers who noticed indelible election ink marks on their fingers as they attempted to depart the country in the days after polling. Fifteen were intercepted at Chennai airport; two at Madurai. All were handed over to the Tamil Nadu Police crime branches for investigation. A Sri Lankan citizen is among those under investigation. Kodungaiyur Police have registered a case against him for allegedly voting in the Perambur Assembly constituency in Chennai. His name has not been publicly released, and the investigation is continuing, police said. He was identified when immigration officials noticed the ink mark and found he was travelling on a Sri Lankan passport. A Canadian national, an information technology professional originally from the Ashok Nagar area of Chennai who had returned to India for a family function, is alleged to have voted in the T. Nagar constituency. He was arrested and subsequently released on bail. An Australian citizen from Virugambakkam is under investigation by Virugambakkam Police for voting in that constituency. Preliminary police findings indicate that at least two of the detained passengers cast votes in the Perambur and KK Nagar constituencies. Investigators say those questioned offered a consistent account: they held voter identification cards from their years as Indian residents, their names had never been removed from the electoral rolls after they acquired foreign citizenship, and polling station officials did not question their eligibility. “The primary reason for these incidents is the non-deletion of names from the electoral rolls after people acquire foreign citizenship,” a police source said. Under the Representation of the People Act, foreign nationals are ineligible to vote in Indian elections, and by law, the names of those who acquire foreign citizenship must be struck from the rolls. In practice, that removal rarely occurs automatically and depends on individuals or local officials proactively notifying authorities. The cases have drawn attention to the absence of citizenship verification at polling stations. In all reported instances, the individuals passed through without being identified as foreign nationals; their ineligibility came to light only during passport screening at airport departure gates. The airport detentions come amid a broader pattern of inadequate roll-cleansing. In a separate case predating the current election, the Enforcement Directorate had flagged that a Sri Lankan national in the custody of the National Investigation Agency retained an active voter identification card in the Virugambakkam constituency of Chennai — indicating that the failure to update electoral rolls extends even to individuals known to security agencies. Social activists have cited the Tirupattur constituency of Sivaganga district, where the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam candidate defeated a four-term Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam incumbent by a single vote, as an illustration of the potential electoral impact of illegal votes. Calls have been made for a Special Investigation Team or Criminal Investigation Department probe into all votes cast by foreign passport holders across Tamil Nadu’s 234 assembly constituencies. ### What Nordic Leaders Can Learn From Narendra Modi URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/what-nordic-leaders-can-learn-from-narendra-modi/ Last updated: 2026-05-17T15:34:06.000Z **By: Erik Solheim** On Monday, 18 May, the world’s most popular politician will visit Norway. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be received by King Harald, promote Indian business, meet with the Indian diaspora and attend an India-Nordic prime ministers’ meeting. The Nordic prime ministers should listen carefully. They have a lot to learn from their Indian counterpart. Whilst Nordic prime ministers barely enjoy a domestic approval rating of 30 per cent, Modi stands at around 70 per cent in the polls. No leader in any major country is nearly as popular at home as Modi. Modi has been in power in India for more than twelve years. Should he choose to stand again, all the signs suggest he will be re-elected. A distant dream for European leaders. His success can be attributed to rapid economic development, a winning ideology, the world’s strongest political party and his own life story. Modi’s background is almost unique in a world where almost all heads of state come from the upper middle class. Modi’s parents owned three stalls where they sold tea at the railway station in Vadnagar, a tiny provincial town that hardly any Indians have heard of. He has no one to thank for his career but himself – and the Hindu nationalist movement. He is an Indian Einar Gerhardsen – self-taught, an organiser. Einar was Norway’s former prime minister. He is fortunate to be leading a rapidly developing India, and he himself is a strong driving force behind that growth. The Indian economy is currently growing at seven per cent, faster than China’s and far outpacing any other major economy. Growth is uneven, and there is a wide gap between the richest and poorest States in India. India lacks the highly educated workforce that China has. There is still too much bureaucracy, and India has not managed to develop any major export industry for the global market. But at current growth rates, India’s economy will quadruple by 2050\. India will then be the world’s second-largest economy, rivalling the United States. I have travelled to almost every state in India and have seen signs of development everywhere — new, modern airports; better roads leading to the most remote corners of the country; the world’s largest solar park under construction in Gujarat; and the world’s largest solar-wind-hydro power plant in Andhra Pradesh. Modi is the guarantor of green growth. India is now the world’s third-largest producer of solar and wind energy; no one should be surprised if it overtakes the United States and takes second place. Last year, coal emissions in India fell for the first time. Western leaders can learn a great deal from Modi’s consistent green message. I attend many conferences where Modi is the keynote speaker. Modi almost never talks about global climate negotiations or emissions. He asks no one to make sacrifices for the environment. The message is that India can lift 1.5 billion people out of poverty through green growth. There is no longer a choice between the economy and the environment. Even if secular parties were to win the next election, India’s ideology will remain Hindu nationalism. Hindu nationalism is India’s answer to the question that all non-Western countries have faced since the Industrial Revolution. How to modernise without becoming like the West? Japan was the first to untangle that knot – becoming ultra-modern, yet remaining deeply Japanese. Korea is now richer than Japan and a major exporter of Korean culture and music. China anchors its modernity in its own roots – in Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. The BJP is currently the world’s largest political party, with over 100 million members. The party has dedicated activists in every single constituency across northern and central India. The party has achieved something truly unique and unprecedented in India: the BJP enjoys the same level of support amongst high-caste, low-caste and untouchable communities. It has the support of both India’s billionaires and tribal peoples in the country’s remotest corners. Among Western analysts, it has become something of a pastime to find fault with the BJP. The critics are right in saying that the BJP stands for the unification of Hindus. But there is little evidence to suggest that there have been more conflicts between Muslims and Hindus under the BJP. There was more violence and more pogroms when the Congress Party was in power. Millions of Muslims are crossing into India from neighbouring countries; hardly any Muslims are fleeing the other way.But the BJP’s insistence that Islam and Christianity are foreign religions, and that Muslim invasions in the Middle Ages and British colonialism can be equated, creates a sense of insecurity among many Muslims. Many of the BJP’s proposals are common sense – such as the idea that there should not be a separate marriage law under which Muslim men can divorce more easily than other men. But in the emergence of a new, strong India rooted in Hindu dharma, the real test will be whether the BJP can also find room to include the world’s largest minority: the two hundred million Muslims in India. India is the only large, poor former British colony to have chosen a democratic model. This is not down to the British. If it were to their credit, as they often claim, surely Pakistan, Myanmar and the Gulf monarchies would also be democracies? India is democratic because democracy is deeply rooted in Indian culture and tradition. In a world where Norway needs new allies for a rules-based international order and Norwegian business needs new horizons, we have much to gain from closer ties with India. But this requires us to be willing to listen, not just to lecture. Then, countless win-win opportunities could open up. ### Sri Lanka’s State Tamil Daily Editor Suspended Amid Major Fraud Probe URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-state-tamil-daily-editor-suspended-amid-major-fraud-probe/ Last updated: 2026-05-17T03:46:11.000Z R. Senthil Velavar, the Editor-in-Chief of Sri Lanka’s state-run Tamil daily *Thinakaran*, was suspended by Lake House management this week over allegations of financial misconduct, according to sources within the institution. The suspension follows an internal investigation into claims that Senthil Velavar misappropriated advertising revenue by personally collecting payments for advertisements but, instead of publishing the paid advertisements as contracted, allegedly replacing them with news content while retaining the funds outside official channels. Sources further allege that, on certain occasions, he collaborated with a layout artist to produce fabricated newspaper pages featuring advertisements that were never published in the official print edition. These pages were reportedly presented to advertisers who were unlikely to independently verify publication, enabling the alleged misappropriation of associated payments. Investigators reportedly estimate that approximately Rs. 6.5 million may have been fraudulently diverted within an eight-month period alone, while further inquiries are examining whether similar irregularities occurred over a longer timeframe. Lake House, Sri Lanka’s state-owned media institution, is also expected to file a formal complaint with the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) as the investigation progresses. The suspension has sparked sharp reactions from sections of Sri Lanka’s Tamil literary and media communities, including prominent writer and journalist N. Saravanan, who publicly claimed that complaints supported by substantial evidence had been raised with authorities more than a year ago. In a strongly worded social media statement, Saravanan alleged that Senthil Velavar’s tenure severely damaged the credibility of the national Tamil newspaper, accusing him of corruption, fostering a toxic newsroom culture, and using pressure, controversy, and institutional instability to shield himself from scrutiny. He further alleged that certain literary and political figures had exploited their relationship with Senthil Velavar to gain disproportionate media exposure. Saravanan described the suspension as long overdue and expressed hope that the move would provide relief to *Thinakaran* employees while ultimately benefiting its readership. ### Cabinet Trust for India-Funded Jaffna Cultural Center Sparks Fears of Colombo Control URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/cabinet-trust-for-india-funded-jaffna-cultural-center-sparks-fears-of-colombo-control/ Last updated: 2026-05-14T06:02:56.000Z Sri Lanka's Cabinet last Monday approved the establishment of a trust fund to manage the Jaffna Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre, an 11-storey landmark built with approximately $12 million in Indian grant assistance — a move critics say effectively places a centre intended for Tamil cultural life under the influence of a Colombo ministry responsible for Buddhist, religious and cultural affairs, while marginalising the elected local authority on whose land the facility stands. The Cabinet decision, taken on May 11 and signed off by the Minister of Buddhasasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs, was presented in official language as a technical formality: the establishment of a trust, backed by a deed already cleared by the Attorney General, to "continue the management activities" of the center once construction and handover formalities are complete. But in Jaffna, where the center has become a charged symbol of post-war promises made and promises deferred, the move has landed differently. ### **A Building With a Complicated History** The cultural center was conceived as a gesture of Indian solidarity with Sri Lanka's Tamil-majority north following the end of the country's brutal 26-year civil war. Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid the foundation stone during a visit to Jaffna in 2015\. It was virtually inaugurated in 2022 with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar presiding, and formally opened in February 2023 by President Ranil Wickremesinghe. The facility is located on land owned by the Jaffna Municipal Council, near the city's historic public library. It includes a 600-seat auditorium, a conference hall, an amphitheatre, and digital library spaces. From the outset, its political symbolism was clear: this was presented as a gift to the people of the north — a space for local culture, reconciliation, and the preservation of Tamil heritage. Under the original Memorandum of Understanding, upon completion of construction, the Sri Lankan government was obliged to transfer the center to the Jaffna Municipal Council. A Cabinet decision in February 2022 went further, providing for the establishment of a Joint Management Committee to oversee operational decisions following that handover, thereby granting the elected local authority a clearly defined management role. ### **What Monday's Decision Actually Does** ![Screenshot of the Cabinet decision approving the establishment of a trust to manage the Jaffna Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/cabinet-trust-for-india-funded-caPmUQ-kixh7bo171bca45.png) Screenshot of the Cabinet decision approving the establishment of a trust to manage the Jaffna Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre. The Cabinet's approval last week does not undo the transfer obligation, at least not formally. The official decision paper states that the trust is to be established following the handover to the Jaffna Municipal Council, not instead of it. But critics argue that the sequencing and the choice of ministry matter enormously. The proposal came from the Minister of Buddhasasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs. That ministry also formally carries the Cultural Affairs portfolio — making its involvement administratively defensible. But critics point out that the ministry's institutional culture and historical mandate have centered overwhelmingly on Buddhist religious affairs, and that a portfolio nominally covering all culture has, in practice, rarely engaged with Tamil cultural institutions in the north. That a ministry of this character would be the proposing and constituting authority for a trust governing a facility explicitly dedicated to Tamil cultural heritage has not gone unnoticed in Jaffna. More concretely, the trust deed — the document that will define who sits on the governing board, who controls expenditure, and who has day-to-day authority — has been cleared by the Attorney General, and the Cabinet has authorised the minister to formally constitute the trust under it. But the composition of that board has not been made public. An earlier proposal circulating in Colombo and leaked to civic groups in Jaffna envisaged a seven-member governing body comprising the Jaffna Municipal Commissioner, the Northern Province Governor, a representative from the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, two representatives from the Government of India, and two from the Government of Sri Lanka. Critics note that the Northern Province Governor is a Presidential appointee and the Municipal Commissioner operates within the central administrative structure — meaning that together they would represent Colombo's interests rather than those of Jaffna's elected councillors. "It looks devolutionary on paper," a Colombo-based constitutional lawyer told Jaffna Monitor. "But when you count the votes and trace who appoints whom, you find a structural majority for the central government." ### **The Jaffna Municipal Council's Silence — and an Unresolved Gap** Conspicuously absent from Monday's Cabinet decision paper is any reference to the Jaffna Municipal Council having been consulted on, or having consented to, the specific form of the trust now approved. The council owns the land on which the center stands and was meant to be the primary governance body under the original MOU. Yet a significant question precedes even the trust debate: the center was formally opened in February 2023, but the Cabinet decision paper implies that the formal handover from the Government of Sri Lanka to the Jaffna Municipal Council has not yet taken place. If that transfer — which the MOU requires — remains incomplete more than three years after inauguration, the reasons for that delay are themselves a matter of public interest that neither the Cabinet communiqué nor the ministry has explained. The council has not publicly commented on the Cabinet decision as of the time of publication. Jaffna Monitor sought a response from the Municipal Commissioner's office; no reply had been received by press time. ### **What Remains Unknown** The key facts that would allow a definitive assessment of whether the trust constitutes a governance capture or a workable compromise remain undisclosed. The full text of the trust deed approved by the Attorney General has not been published. The composition of the trust's governing board — who sits on it, how they are appointed, what quorum is required for decisions — has not been confirmed. Whether the Joint Management Committee established under the 2022 Cabinet decision will continue to function alongside the trust, or be superseded by it, is unclear. Until those documents are public, the Cabinet decision of May 11, 2026, stands as a half-visible move: consequential in what it authorises, but opaque in the details that will determine whether the Jaffna Thiruvalluvar Cultural Center ends up, in any meaningful sense, belonging to Jaffna. ### Usurping Tamil Land: The Sri Lanka Way URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/usurping-tamil-land-the-sri-lanka-way/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T15:53:58.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** S. Krishna (assumed name) is a deeply frustrated doctor in Jaffna. He feels cheated that the Sri Lankan military is refusing to give up land belonging to his family, seized in the name of a war that ended way back in 2009. The specialist doctor, like so many Tamils, had high hopes when Marxist Anura Dissanayake became president in 2024, promising to address many of the historical wrongs, including the continued occupation of land belonging to Tamil civilians, predominantly in the island’s north. And like an overwhelming majority in the Tamil community, Krishna, 52, feels let down by the system today. “We have lost hope, we are frustrated,” the doctor told Jaffna Monitor. Like others who spoke on the subject, he feels the government appears interested in giving back the land to the Tamils, but the military seems intransigent. Krishna’s wife’s family was displaced from the Kankesanthurai area in Jaffna in 1990 as the war between government troops and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) resumed after peace talks failed. The military slowly expanded its camp at Kankesanthurai, which remains a major naval base. As the complex ballooned, it submerged, among a lot more, two houses belonging to Krishna’s family. ![A military signboard in Sinhala and Tamil warns against entering restricted land in northern Sri Lanka, including privately owned Tamil property whose legal owners remain barred from access years after the civil war ended.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/usurping-tamil-land-the-sri-la-pdWHDI-kixm6jn0tzfvj7e.png) A military signboard in Sinhala and Tamil warns against entering restricted land in northern Sri Lanka, including privately owned Tamil property whose legal owners remain barred from access years after the civil war ended. It was in November 2019, a decade after the war ended, that Krishna’s wife and two sisters (who live in the UK and Australia) wrote to a top military officer at Palaly, Jaffna, seeking a return of their family land. The officer sent a junior to identify the land, one spread over 190 perches (1.188 acres) and another of 40 perches (0.25 acres). The military promised these would be vacated. But nothing happened. Krishna sent off a second letter in July 2020, and yet another in January 2023\. The military did not respond to either. When President Ranil Wickremesinghe was moved in 2024, the Ministry of Land sought proof of land ownership. The documents were submitted. Nothing happened, however. Inspired by President Dissanayake’s promises, the anguished family petitioned him. Again, the defence ministry sought the same documents and transferred the matter to the Divisional Secretariat. Another deafening silence followed. “The government keeps saying that all private land will be returned, but nothing really happens,” said Krishna, sounding hurt. “The army appears to be coming in the way. The government is reluctant to overrule them.” He went on: “This is totally illegal. A government cannot do illegal things. A government is democratically elected. They have to respect the rule of law. We are only asking for our own property, but they don’t give us. Is it fair?” Krishna is one of the thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority Northern Province who complain that the military is sitting tight over land and property belonging to them, unmindful of the legal and ethical issues. The military took over both vacant land and other areas after driving away residents during the decades of war in order to strengthen its defenses against the Tamil Tigers. The reason cited for occupying private land was “national security”. ![A once privately owned Tamil home in northern Sri Lanka now lies abandoned and deteriorating under continued military control.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/usurping-tamil-land-the-sri-la-pdWHDI-kixe5u6s6o4hkt4.png) A once privately owned Tamil home in northern Sri Lanka now lies abandoned and deteriorating under continued military control. Once the LTTE was routed in 2009, everyone felt the military would slowly give up the private land. This did not happen. Repeated government promises did not lead to changes in the situation except in patches here and there. Far from the supposed concerns of “national security,” the military now runs farms, boutiques, restaurants, and other commercial ventures within these camps, fueling the anger of those who legally own the land. Buddhist temples are also emerging in some military-occupied areas. “The military produces vegetables in these lands with soldiers providing free labour. These are sold in the market where Tamils who actually own the land buy them,” said Somasundaram Sugirthan, 53, chairman of the Pradesiya Sabha at Kankesanthurai. “This is an irony, right? It is all so brazen.” Sugirthan told Jaffna Monitor that people had begun protesting every Friday outside a huge army camp in the region. “We keep petitioning the government. We have also spoken to the (local) army commander,” he said. “The government passes the buck to the military, and the military passes the buck to the government.” Most Tamils said there may have been some logic, however flawed, in the initial takeover of the land because a bloody war was underway. It is the continued occupation of the land that has triggered massive resentment. Some time ago, Sri Lanka’s Deputy Defence Minister, Aruna Jayasekara, a retired army officer, told parliament that more than 700 acres of land in the north and east had been returned to the public. He said that as of January 1, 2025, a total of 672.24 acres of land had been given back in the north, including 86.24 acres of private land and 586 acres previously used by the military. Another 34.58 acres were let go in the east. Jayasekara said the releases were approved after the submission of relevant information to the National Security Council and the Sectoral Oversight Committee of National Security. But Tamil residents and activists say the release process is too slow, and betrays a bias against the Tamil owners who have been punished just because their land happened to be in the wrong place at a wrong time. While Tamils like Krishna can bear the economic loss accruing from the continued illegal occupation of their property, most others find the hardships very painful. Sugirthan said: “While their houses lie within the army camp, the owners live in rented property, paying at times Rs 10,000 a month. This has been going on for years.” Prominent Tamil lawyer-cum-politician M.A. Sumanthiran said he did not know for certain the total extent of Tamil land held by the military, but believed it could amount to about 3,000 acres across Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, and Mannar — the five districts that make up the Northern Province. According to him, the land under occupation totaled some 11,000 acres when the war was raging, but this has shrunk over the years. Sumanthiran said that when present President Dissanayake’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was in the opposition, “they always raised this issue along with us.” Naturally, people were very hopeful when they came to power. “But nothing major has happened in the past one-and-a-half years. We have met the president too. At one meeting, he said he needed time and he ‘cannot do everything overnight’.” Like Jaffna doctor Krishna, Sumanthiran said Dissnayake sounded genuine. “But officials tell the government all kinds of things. Naturally, there is no light at the end of the tunnel. And we are forced to go to the court time and again.” He said the government planned to seize a vast area in Vadamarachchi region in Jaffna. When a case was filed in a court, a ruling led to the withdrawal of the government gazette that permitted the land takeover. This happened in 2025. “Archaeology is another big problem,” Sumanthiran said. “Unfortunately, many official institutions in Sri Lanka have a purely Sinhalese-Buddhist worldview... The whole mindset is like that.” A young activist in Jaffna neatly summed up the mess. The activist, who did not want to be named, said it was ironic that a party like the JVP, which spoke of revolution, was afraid to take on the military brass despite the blatant illegalities surrounding the land issue. “Forget politics,” he said. “Sri Lanka follows Buddhism, right? Would Buddha allow such theft of people’s land and property? What is the point of quoting Marx if you can’t ensure justice to the people? How different is the JVP from others?” ### UNP Questions President’s Personal Congratulations to Vijay, Citing Diplomatic Protocol URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/unp-questions-presidents-personal-congratulations-to-vijay-citing-diplomatic-protocol/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T16:20:10.000Z Sri Lanka’s opposition United National Party (UNP) on Tuesday criticized President Anura Kumara Dissanayake for personally congratulating newly elected Tamil Nadu Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay, arguing that the move departed from established diplomatic convention and raised questions about political selectivity. In a statement, the UNP said it was “surprising” that Sri Lanka’s Head of State had publicly extended congratulations to a foreign state-level leader, contending that such formal gestures are traditionally reserved for fellow heads of state or national governments rather than provincial or regional leaders. “As a Head of State, protocol states that such congratulatory messages should be reserved for another Head of State and not for foreign Provincial/State leaders,” the party said. The criticism came after President Dissanayake issued a message on X welcoming Vijay’s electoral victory in Tamil Nadu, emphasizing the “deep historical, cultural, enterprise and enduring people-to-people ties” between Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu while expressing hope for closer economic and bilateral cooperation. The UNP argued that the President’s expansive language and direct outreach risked blurring diplomatic lines by elevating engagement with a sub-national Indian leader in a manner not typically seen in Sri Lankan presidential communications. The party also questioned what it described as inconsistent treatment, asking why similar public congratulations had not been extended to other recently elected Indian state leaders, including West Bengal Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari and Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma. ### What Singapore’s Economic Blueprint Means for Sri Lanka — and How to Get There URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/what-singapores-economic-blueprint-means-for-sri-lanka-and-how-to-get-there/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T11:04:27.000Z **By Jeevan Thiyagaraja** Singapore released its Economic Strategy Review on 13 May 2026 — a 32-recommendation blueprint built around three imperatives: sharpen competitive value, build agility, and embed resilience. At first glance, the two countries appear to occupy entirely different economic universes. Singapore is a mature, high-income city-state with USD 500 billion in GDP and decades of accumulated institutional capital. Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income island of 22 million people, still emerging from its worst economic crisis since independence — a 2022 sovereign default that sent inflation past 70 percent, wiped out foreign reserves, and pushed millions below the poverty line. And yet the ESR is more relevant to Sri Lanka than its authors perhaps intended. The structural forces Singapore is proactively repositioning against — geopolitical fragmentation, AI disruption, climate vulnerability, and the decoupling of growth from job creation — are already reshaping Sri Lanka’s operating environment, whether or not Colombo has a strategy to match them. The ESR is not just Singapore’s forward plan. Read carefully, it is a warning to every small open economy about what happens when strategic renewal is deferred. ### **Where Sri Lanka Stands** Sri Lanka’s economy is projected to grow at 4.6 percent in 2025, supported by a rebound in industry and steady growth in services, before slowing to 3.5 percent in 2026\. Income poverty still affects around 22 percent of the population — roughly double pre-crisis levels — and child malnutrition remains alarmingly high. More than 80 percent of government spending is tied to public sector salaries, welfare programmes, and interest payments, leaving little room for growth-enhancing investments in infrastructure, education, and health. The country faces a 30 percent US tariff on its exports, threatening apparel, tea, seafood, and rubber — sectors that account for the bulk of foreign exchange earnings, with the US absorbing 20–25 percent of total exports and nearly 40 percent of apparel shipments. This is the baseline against which Singapore’s ESR must be read: not as aspirational benchmarks Sri Lanka might one day reach, but as live strategic questions it must begin answering now, from wherever it currently stands. ### The ESR’s Four Lessons — Applied **Trust is an economic asset, not a soft concept.** The ESR’s most distinctive contribution is framing Singapore’s advantage not merely as location or infrastructure, but as accumulated credibility — the quality that makes it an indispensable node rather than simply a convenient one. The review proposes a new category of trust-based services: cybersecurity, AI governance, audits, assurance, and compliance. Sri Lanka has an underexploited version of this opportunity. Colombo Port handles a significant share of South Asian transshipment and the country sits astride major Indian Ocean shipping lanes. Sri Lanka urgently needs to operationalise its FTAs with Singapore and Thailand, conclude long-standing negotiations with India, and resume stalled negotiations with China — moves that signal to investors that the country can make and keep commitments. But connectivity without trust infrastructure is just geography. Pairing port investment with credible regulatory institutions — anti-corruption enforcement, transparent dispute resolution, reliable contract law — is what transforms location into leverage. The trust deficit from 2022 has not fully closed in investor perception, and rebuilding it is the institutional work of years, not quarters. **AI is an asymmetric opportunity.** Singapore explicitly decided not to compete on building the largest AI models or biggest data centres, recognising it cannot win that race. Its advantage lies in being the best place to deploy AI solutions at scale, in sectors where trust, governance, and human expertise remain central. This is a lesson Sri Lanka can apply almost directly. It will not build large language models or semiconductor fabs. But it has two under-leveraged assets: a large English-literate professional workforce, and a services export sector that is growing but not yet differentiated. ICT and BPM export revenue grew 8.8 percent in 2025 to USD 1.645 billion, and the sector’s potential is far higher than official data captures — with minimal input requirements beyond skilled talent and technology, it is poised to become a key driver of export earnings and high-value employment, but policy barriers and foreign exchange procedure constraints continue to hold it back. Sri Lanka’s version of the ESR’s AI thrust is to stop competing on cost for commoditised services and start competing on capability — AI-augmented legal services, financial analysis, healthcare data, and software engineering. The workforce is largely there. The policy environment needs to catch up. The ESR’s caution applies equally: AI must augment workers, not simply displace them. In Sri Lanka’s context, a deployment strategy that hollows out service jobs without creating new ones would be politically and socially destabilising. The sequencing matters enormously. **Good jobs must be designed for, not assumed.** Perhaps the ESR’s most important conceptual contribution is its insistence that good jobs do not emerge automatically from economic growth. This runs against the implicit assumption in most of Sri Lanka’s recovery commentary, which treats growth itself as the solution to unemployment and poverty. The government has targeted 5–6 percent GDP growth and aims to more than double FDI to over USD 2 billion — legitimate goals, but the ESR’s warning is that growth driven by construction, tourism, and remittances may not produce the quality of employment that reduces poverty durably or builds a skills base for the next decade. Sri Lanka needs what the ESR calls a deliberate jobs architecture. With child malnutrition alarmingly high and income poverty still at roughly double pre-crisis levels, investing in early childhood education, allied health, and social care creates jobs that are AI-resilient — requiring human judgment, physical presence, and emotional capacity — while simultaneously addressing the country’s most acute social deficits. Investing in these sectors is not welfare spending; it is labour market investment with a double return. **Resilience is a competitive capability, not an insurance policy.** The ESR frames energy diversification, supply chain risk management, and trusted partnerships as core strategic assets, not contingency planning. Sri Lanka knows this lesson viscerally. The 2022 crisis was, at its root, a resilience failure: debt overconcentration, a narrow export base, and insufficient buffers against external shocks. Cyclone Ditwah, striking in late 2025, damaged agriculture, tea exports, garment production, and infrastructure simultaneously — a reminder that a country at Sri Lanka’s income level, in a region of increasing climate volatility, cannot treat resilience as something to be pursued after growth is secured. It must be built alongside growth, or it will be repeatedly undone by it. ### The Honest Reckoning There is one structural difference that must be named plainly: Singapore is running this strategy from a position of institutional strength, deep reserves, and decades of credibility. Sri Lanka is running its equivalent from within an IMF programme, with constrained fiscal space, recovering institutions, and a population still absorbing the shock of 2022. This means Sri Lanka cannot adopt Singapore’s playbook wholesale. It must sequence differently — stabilisation and institution-building must precede bolder bets on AI deployment and enterprise internationalisation. It must prioritise differently — resilience and job quality over growth rate targets that look good in budget documents but may not materialise. And it must communicate differently — the ESR’s candour that not every strategic bet will succeed is a political statement Singapore can make from strength; Sri Lanka must first build the public trust that allows its government to take strategic risks at all. ### How to Actually Get There The answer is not to attempt everything at once but to make a small number of sequenced, high-leverage moves. First, clear the friction in the digital economy. Sri Lanka has set an ambitious target for the digital economy to reach 12 percent of GDP by 2030, with USD 5 billion from digital exports, and is rolling out the Sri Lanka Unique Digital Identity programme — foundational infrastructure that mirrors Singapore’s Singpass model. Getting the Cyber Security Bill, data protection laws, and digital identity system live and functioning on schedule would signal to global clients and investors that Sri Lanka is serious. That shift in perception accelerates the sector faster than any subsidy. The bureaucratic friction around foreign payment receipt, company registration, and talent retention is a solvable problem that costs almost nothing in fiscal terms to fix. Second, build institutional trust as an explicit programme. Anti-corruption reform must be made structurally durable — embedded in independent institutions, not dependent on any one government’s political will. Judiciary investment and contract enforcement matter concretely for foreign investors in services and infrastructure. And the FTA agenda is not just a trade matter; each agreement signed and implemented is evidence that Sri Lanka can be relied upon. That evidence compounds over time into the trust premium the ESR identifies as Singapore’s core advantage. Third, design a jobs architecture before displacement arrives. Three sectors anchor this: care and health services (AI-resilient, socially needed, exportable as talent to ageing East Asian economies); advanced niche manufacturing in apparel, rubber, and ceramics upgraded toward quality and sustainability rather than cost; and green economy roles in carbon accounting, environmental compliance, and renewable energy engineering — areas where job-ready graduates can be produced within two to three years with the right training investment. Sri Lanka needs global supply chain integration and improved factor markets to capitalise on these opportunities. Fourth, position Sri Lanka to Singapore explicitly as a complementary node. Singapore is seeking locations to extend its trusted hub, deploy AI solutions, and connect into regional supply chains. Sri Lanka — English language, common law system, Indian Ocean geography, growing digital infrastructure — is a natural candidate. The bilateral FTA needs to be operationalised urgently, but the deeper opportunity is positioning Sri Lanka as the place where Singapore-developed solutions get deployed at South Asian scale. This is a mutual relationship: Singapore’s strategy of becoming a hub nobody can afford to remove requires nodes it can trust. A credible Sri Lanka is exactly what that strategy needs. The sequencing matters most of all. Institutional reform and digital enablement come first — low cost, high leverage, foundational. Jobs architecture and skills pipeline building come second — they take years to bear results and must start well before displacement arrives. The bolder bets come third, once the foundation is stable enough to support strategic risk. What makes this achievable is that none of it requires inventing something new. Sri Lanka has the workforce, the geography, the legal traditions, and increasingly the digital infrastructure. What has been missing is the deliberate, sequenced strategy that Singapore’s ESR exemplifies — the willingness to say clearly what we are trying to become, why, and in what order. Singapore built a better ship. Sri Lanka is still repairing the hull — but the blueprints are now available, and the window to use them is not indefinitely open. **Sources: Singapore ESR (May 2026), World Bank Sri Lanka Development Updates, ODI Global, ADB Asian Development Outlook, ICTA Digital Economy Blueprint, IPS State of the Economy 2025, Export Development Board, GovInsider, East Asia Forum, Reuters.** ### The Final Hours of Kapila Chandrasena URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/one-day-out-dead-within-days-the-final-hours-of-kapila-chandrasena/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T15:53:34.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Former Sri Lankan cricket captain Aravinda de Silva told a Colombo magistrate on Tuesday that he personally arranged bail guarantors and sent Rs. 500,000 in cash to secure the release of Kapila Chandrasena, the former SriLankan Airlines chief executive found dead at his Kollupitiya residence last week, and that he repeatedly tried to reassure Mr. Chandrasena in the final hours of his life that a fresh arrest warrant was "a small matter" that could be resolved. Mr. de Silva was among eight witnesses who gave evidence before Fort Magistrate Pasan Amarasekara at the inquest into Mr. Chandrasena's death on May 12\. The Colombo Crimes Division led the proceedings and submitted a further investigative report along with post-mortem annexures. The inquiry is scheduled to continue on May 14. Mr. Chandrasena, 58, the former chief executive who faced corruption charges linked to a multibillion-dollar aircraft procurement deal, was found hanging inside an upstairs room at Mr. de Silva's Pedris Place residence in Kollupitiya on the morning of May 9\. He had been released on bail four days earlier and was facing a rearrest warrant issued the night before his death, after prosecutors alleged he had arranged fraudulent bail sureties. ### **"Do Not Be Upset. This Is a Small Matter."** Mr. de Silva, one of Sri Lanka's most celebrated cricketers, told the magistrate that Mr. Chandrasena is the husband of his wife's younger sister, making him a brother-in-law by marriage. He said he visited Mr. Chandrasena while he was in remand and later intervened directly when the original bail sureties were found to be invalid. He testified that he dispatched his office staff member, Ganesh Perumal, to the court with Rs. 500,000 in cash to facilitate alternative bail arrangements, and that he coordinated the securing of Grama Sevaka certificates and replacement guarantors through his own staff and driver. After Mr. Chandrasena was released on bail on May 5, Mr. de Silva said he brought him to the Pedris Place residence because Mr. Chandrasena had not eaten properly for several days while in remand. Mr. de Silva told the court that Mr. Chandrasena was visibly and repeatedly distressed about a fresh legal complication and kept returning to the same words: "It has only been one day since I came out, and again they are trying to put me inside." Mr. de Silva testified that he tried to calm him. "Do not be upset," he said to Mr. Chandrasena. "This is a small matter. Let us solve this." He added, in his evidence, that he told Mr. Chandrasena that the lawyers would sort everything out the following day and that he should not worry about returning to custody. He described showing Mr. Chandrasena to a separate upstairs room that evening, switching on the air conditioning, and asking him to rest for the night. He testified that even as he left Mr. Chandrasena to sleep, Mr. Chandrasena remained visibly reluctant about the prospect of going back into custody. Mr. de Silva told the magistrate he noticed nothing that led him to suspect foul play. ### **The Morning: Calls, Knocks, a Master Key** Mr. de Silva said he woke the following morning when his lawyer telephoned to say that Mr. Chandrasena was not answering. He said he tried calling Mr. Chandrasena's room twice, received no response, and then knocked on both the room door and the adjoining bathroom door. Receiving no answer, he told the court, he assumed Mr. Chandrasena might be getting ready and went downstairs to prepare to leave for his office. He then asked his wife to check on Mr. Chandrasena. Shortly afterward, his wife and the lawyer opened the room using a master key. Mr. de Silva testified that he only briefly looked inside the room and saw "something hanging." Doctors who arrived subsequently confirmed that Mr. Chandrasena had died. Mr. de Silva told the magistrate he did not suspect any foul play in relation to the death. ### **His Wife: "I Had Taken Just One Step"** Priyangi Anushka Wijenayake, who is both Mr. de Silva’s wife and the sister of Mr. Chandrasena’s wife, Priyanka Neomali Wijenayake, testified as the first witness at the inquest. She told the magistrate that she woke at around 4 a.m. that morning and that her husband subsequently called her to say the lawyer had arrived and asked her to prepare tea for Mr. Chandrasena. She said her husband tried calling Mr. Chandrasena twice, but there was no response. After that, both of them went with the lawyer to the room and called out to him, but there was no reply. She testified that she retrieved the master key — which she described as capable of opening all doors in the house — and used it together with the lawyer to open the room door. "I had taken just one step into the room when the lawyer went inside and came back out, saying Kapila appeared unwell and that we should call for an ambulance," she told the court. She said an ambulance arrived from Durdans Hospital along with a female doctor, who examined Mr. Chandrasena and informed them that he had died. Ms. Wijenayake told the magistrate she had no suspicions about the death but said she had observed that Mr. Chandrasena had been under significant stress the previous night. Asked by the court whether she had any view on what might have led to his death, she said: "Maybe because he had to appear in court. He was under a lot of stress." She said she remained downstairs during the critical moments and did not enter the room herself. ### **Forensic Inquiries Continuing** Investigators recovered a belt, believed to have been used in the hanging, along with unidentified medication and blood samples from the scene, which have been sent to the Government Analyst for examination, according to information presented in court by the Colombo Crimes Division. Police also sought the magistrate's approval to send Mr. Chandrasena's iPhone, described as a high-security model, to a specialist institution for analysis after facial recognition on the locked device failed, preventing investigators from accessing its contents. The full cause of death remains pending toxicology results and the completion of the inquest. No witness who appeared before the magistrate on Tuesday expressed suspicion of foul play. The inquiry will resume on May 14, when the remaining witnesses are scheduled to give evidence. In March, CIABOC informed the Colombo Chief Magistrate’s Court that Mr. Chandrasena had told investigators that Rs. 60 million from Airbus-linked bribe funds had been paid to former President Mahinda Rajapaksa in three installments, while an additional Rs. 20 million had allegedly been paid to former Civil Aviation Minister Priyankara Jayaratne. On the same day those submissions became public, Mr. Chandrasena’s lawyers released a sworn affidavit in which he sought to fully retract the claims. In the affidavit, dated March 18, Mr. Chandrasena alleged that he had been removed from the recording room during questioning and threatened by officials, including CIABOC’s Director General, who he claimed spoke to him in an intimidating manner. He further alleged that investigators warned him of arrest and pressured him to implicate former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, MP Namal Rajapaksa, and his wife, and that any references to those individuals did not represent his voluntary testimony. He also claimed he had been denied access to legal counsel while the statement was being recorded. CIABOC has not publicly responded to those allegations. Mr. Chandrasena’s death now leaves both the original accusations and his subsequent retraction permanently unresolved. Legal observers told Jaffna Monitor that the prosecution of Mr. Chandrasena reflected Sri Lanka’s uneven and often reluctant approach to accountability. Mr. Chandrasena and his wife were arrested on money laundering charges in February 2020 during former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s administration and remanded by the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court after the Attorney General issued arrest warrants based on material submitted by the Criminal Investigation Department. However, the arrests came only after Airbus’s $3.9 billion global corruption settlement publicly exposed allegations involving SriLankan Airlines, placing Sri Lankan authorities under significant international scrutiny. British investigators had specifically identified SriLankan Airlines as a recipient of improper payments, while authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were all parties to the multinational settlement. The case subsequently slowed across successive administrations, with numerous high-profile corruption investigations facing delays, withdrawals, or procedural setbacks. Only under later renewed anti-corruption efforts were several such cases, including the Airbus-related prosecution, significantly revived. ### Sri Lanka Opposition Takes Judicial Crisis to U.N. After President’s May Day Remarks URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-opposition-takes-judicial-crisis-to-u-n-after-presidents-may-day-remarks/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T15:54:01.000Z ***A May Day speech in which President Dissanayake told supporters they would be able to applaud a pending court ruling has triggered a formal international complaint — and exposed a constitutional provision that criminalises executive interference in judicial proceedings.*** **COLOMBO —** Twenty-four Sri Lankan opposition members of parliament have filed a formal complaint with the United Nations Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, alleging that President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's remarks at a May Day rally constitute a threat to judicial independence — and invoking a provision of Sri Lanka's own Constitution that criminalises improper influence over judicial actors. The complaint, submitted using the OHCHR Special Procedures Communication Format, was filed in the name of MP Dayasiri Jayasekara on behalf of Parliament of Sri Lanka, and carries the signatures of 24 lawmakers, including Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa, Mano Ganesan, V. Radhakrishnan, Jeevan Thondaman, Chamindrani Kiriella, Sujeewa Senasinghe, and others drawn from across the principal opposition formations. The filing is notable not only for the breadth of its signatories but for its legal architecture: it is the first time opposition parliamentarians have placed Sri Lanka's judicial independence concerns before a U.N. mandate-holder using the formal Special Procedures mechanism. ### What the President Said Addressing the National People's Power May Day rally in Maharagama on May 1, President Dissanayake stated, with regard to a pending case, that the hearing had taken place the previous day and that the judgment would be delivered on May 25\. He urged his audience to be prepared to greet the verdict with warm applause. The President also declared that 2026 would go down in Sri Lanka's history as the year when "the corrupt, the crooks, and the thieves were sent to prison," telling supporters there were ten cases before the courts that month alone. He said the government was strengthening key investigative and legal institutions, including the Criminal Investigation Department and the Bribery Commission, and warned that a significant number of individuals accused of fraud and corruption would face imprisonment in 2026. The case at issue, which the president did not name publicly, involves Udayanga Weeratunga, Sri Lanka's former Ambassador to Russia, who faces corruption charges related to alleged irregularities in the acquisition of MiG-27 aircraft from Ukraine and an Airbus procurement deal during former President Mahinda Rajapaksa's tenure. The U.S. State Department imposed travel bans on Weeratunga and a co-accused over what Washington described as significant corruption. ### The Constitutional Dimension The submission cites Article 111C(1) of Sri Lanka's Constitution, which guarantees freedom from interference in judicial functions, alongside Article 111C(2), which goes further: it criminalises acts that improperly influence judicial actors. By placing this provision at the centre of their complaint, the MPs are not merely arguing that the president's remarks were inappropriate — they are signalling that they may constitute a criminal offence under Sri Lankan law. The complaint also invokes Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, and the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985), which require that public officials refrain from actions that undermine judicial independence. The submission’s legal analysis argues that three doctrines are violated simultaneously: the objective test of perception, under which judicial independence must not only exist but also be seen to exist; the chilling effect on judges, who may feel indirect pressure when senior executive officials publicly anticipate outcomes; and the separation of powers, which requires the executive to refrain from commentary that may affect pending judicial proceedings. ### What the MPs Are Asking the U.N. to Do The complaint makes five specific requests of the Special Rapporteur: transmit an urgent communication to the Government of Sri Lanka; seek clarification regarding the president's statement; remind the State of its obligations under international law; recommend safeguards to prevent executive interference in judicial matters; and monitor ongoing developments, including the referenced May 25 verdict. The MPs have also consented to the communication being shared with the Sri Lankan government — a procedural step that puts Colombo formally on notice that the complaint exists. The urgency section of the document warns of "irreparable damage to institutional credibility" and cautions that failure to address such conduct may "normalise executive encroachment" over the judiciary. ### The Legal and Institutional Response The Bar Association of Sri Lanka expressed grave concern over the president's remarks on May 5, warning that the tenor of the statement is open to the suggestion of interference with the judicial process and that such comments may erode public confidence in the independence of the judiciary. The BASL cited constitutional provisions prohibiting external influence over judges and pledged to take all necessary steps to safeguard the Constitution. The Free Lawyers Association separately urged the Chief Justice to investigate, alleging that the president's statement went beyond a general comment on judicial processes and included specific references to timelines. A separate petition submitted directly to Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena — signed by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, Prof. G. L. Peiris and M. A. Sumanthiran, P.C., among others — described the president's statement as having "the most significant implications for the integrity of the judiciary and the separation of powers." The petitioners characterised the statement as "a contempt of court" and "a despicable attempt to bring pressure to bear on a judge in relation to a case being heard before him." Chief Opposition Whip Gayantha Karunatileka separately submitted a special resolution to Speaker Jagath Wickramaratne calling for an urgent adjournment debate in Parliament to "strongly condemn the influence and interference of the executive on the independence of the judiciary." SLPP National Organiser Namal Rajapaksa alleged that it had become evident during the May Day proceedings that key judicial decisions were being communicated from the JVP platform. ### The Government's Defence The government has pushed back hard. Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara said the opposition was attempting to misinterpret the president's remarks, declaring that the president had never interfered with the judiciary under any circumstances and that there was no need for the NPP to do so. The minister characterised opposition media briefings as evidence that they were "struggling to cope with the developing situation" — and suggested those who had done nothing wrong had nothing to fear from the courts. ### A Contested Backdrop The opposition and civil society critics have also noted that Transport Minister and House Leader Bimal Rathnayake used the same May Day occasion to name nearly ten politicians, both sitting and former lawmakers, who were to be summoned to courts beginning in May. Legal observers said the combined effect of the president's remarks and those of his minister created the impression of coordinated political messaging around pending judicial proceedings. The Free Lawyers Association argued that the NPP appeared to have used May Day to counter growing accusations over a series of domestic controversies — including the Colombo port container controversy, a coal procurement irregularity, a Rs. 13.2 billion NDB fraud, and the reported theft of USD 2.5 million from the Treasury. The episode threatens to complicate President Dissanayake's carefully constructed image as a break from the corruption of his predecessors. His NPP government swept to power in 2024 on a sweeping anti-corruption mandate and has built much of its political identity around prosecuting previous administrations. Critics now argue that the government’s prosecutorial zeal has created the appearance that it is prejudging the outcomes it seeks to secure, crossing a line that, under both Sri Lanka’s Constitution and international human rights law, the executive is not permitted to cross. The verdict in the case cited by the president is due on May 25. ### India to Fund New Four-Story Medical Complex at Mullaitivu Hospital URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-to-fund-new-four-story-medical-complex-at-mullaitivu-hospital/ Last updated: 2026-05-12T10:54:00.000Z **COLOMBO —** Sri Lanka has begun implementation of a major Indian grant-funded healthcare project in Mullaitivu, where a new four-story medical ward complex will be built at the District General Hospital under a 600 million Sri Lankan rupee assistance package from the Government of India. The project follows the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha and Sri Lanka’s Acting Health Secretary Dr. W.K. Wickremasinghe during Indian Vice President C.P. Radhakrishnan’s visit to Sri Lanka in April. The planned facility is expected to substantially strengthen healthcare capacity in one of Sri Lanka’s war-affected northern districts, where access to advanced medical infrastructure has remained limited. According to project details, the medical ward complex will include modern facilities such as elevators, air-conditioning systems, backup power generators, uninterruptible power supply systems, fire protection infrastructure, and piped medical gas systems. Sri Lankan health authorities expect the new facility to play a critical role in addressing the district’s growing burden of non-communicable diseases by expanding screening for residents over the age of 35, reducing the need for referrals to distant hospitals, and significantly improving local treatment capacity. Officials estimate that, once completed, the hospital’s bed capacity could increase by more than 150 percent. The project falls under the Indo-Sri Lankan High Impact Community Development Project framework, through which India is currently supporting 18 grant-funded initiatives across 25 districts in Sri Lanka. Those projects span sectors including healthcare, housing, education, fisheries, renewable energy, transport, and agriculture, reflecting New Delhi’s broader strategy of strengthening grassroots development partnerships across Srilanka. ### Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court Bars Professor From Academia After University Failed to Act URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-supreme-court-bars-professor-from-academia-after-university-failed-to-act/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T15:54:03.000Z When the governing council of the University of Peradeniya voted in May 2020 to discard the findings of its own formal disciplinary inquiry, which had found a senior professor guilty of cyberstalking, repeated physical touching and sustained emotional abuse of a junior colleague under his academic supervision, it may have assumed the matter was over. Dr. W. A. M. Udari L. Abeyasinghe, the junior colleague at the centre of the complaint and a dentist and lecturer at the same faculty, had already indicated that she did not wish to pursue a criminal case. The university system, it seemed, had simply waited her out. But on May 8, 2026, Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court reopened that history in extraordinary fashion. A three-judge bench comprising Justices Janak De Silva, Achala Wengappuli and K. Priyantha Fernando delivered its judgment in *Abeyasinghe v. Thilakaratne and Others* (S.C.F.R. Application No. 81/2021), a ruling that legal scholars are already describing as one of the most consequential decisions on workplace sexual harassment in the country’s judicial history. Although the court upheld a technical objection that the petition had been filed too late to qualify as a fundamental rights violation, it refused to allow procedure alone to bury the substance of what had occurred. Exercising what the Constitution describes as its 'just and equitable' jurisdiction, the Supreme Court imposed a lifetime ban on Prof. W. M. Thilakaratne from holding any paid, unpaid or honorary position at any university, educational institution or academic body in Sri Lanka. Thilakaratne, a former dean of the Faculty of Dental Sciences at the University of Peradeniya and past president of the International Association of Oral Pathologists, is currently listed by the World Dental Congress as a professor of oral pathology and senior consultant at the University of Malaya. The court also directed the University Grants Commission to enforce the ban across all institutions under its authority and ordered the University of Peradeniya to conduct mandatory annual seminars on gender-based harassment for all staff and students indefinitely. ### **A Council That Walked Away** The harassment, the court found, took place between July 2017 and April 2018\. Dr. Abeyasinghe was then an assistant lecturer and an M.Phil. student whose co-supervisor was Prof. Thilakaratne, placing her in the acutely vulnerable position of someone whose academic future depended in part on the goodwill of the person who was abusing her. In July 2018, her mother filed a written complaint with the Vice Chancellor. A preliminary inquiry followed, which recommended a full disciplinary hearing. A charge sheet was issued. Prof. Thilakaratne answered it. A three-member formal inquiry committee sat from July to September 2019. The committee found him guilty on charges covering cyberstalking through mobile phone communication; repeated unwanted physical contact, including frequent hugging, stroking her hands, and touching her back and legs despite her explicit objections over nearly ten months; causing severe distress in both her personal and professional life; violating the university's sexual harassment policy and staff code of conduct; breaching the University Grants Commission Establishments Code; inflicting mental and physical harassment; and bringing both his office and the university into disrepute. He was acquitted on four sub-charges, the specific content of which the judgment does not reproduce. The findings cited multiple violations under the UGC Establishments Code, including Sections 2:2:4 through 2:2:8. The committee’s report was submitted to the University Council, the institution’s highest governing body, at its 493rd meeting in May 2020. The Council rejected the findings, stating that the committee had failed to give adequate consideration to the delay between the alleged harassment and the filing of the formal complaint. It decided that no disciplinary action would be taken against Prof. Thilakaratne. Dr. Abeyasinghe, the Council added, was free to pursue redress through other avenues. Dr. Abeyasinghe wrote to the Chairman of the University Grants Commission. The UGC asked the Council to reconsider. The Council, at its 497th meeting in September 2020, declined. It stood by its earlier decision. In December 2020, Dr. Abeyasinghe filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission. In March 2021, she came to the Supreme Court. ### **The Procedural Trap — and the Way Around It** The case arrived at the Supreme Court carrying a formidable legal obstacle. Under Article 126 of the Constitution, fundamental rights petitions must ordinarily be filed within one month of the alleged infringement. The Council's decision had been communicated to Dr. Abeyasinghe in July 2020\. Her petition was filed in March 2021 — more than eight months later. The 28th through 66th respondents, including the chairman of the University Grants Commission, as well as multiple successive deans and council members named in the proceedings, strongly pressed this procedural objection. Justice Janak de Silva, writing for a unanimous bench, carefully examined Sri Lankan legal precedent on “continuing violations” and ultimately concluded that it could not preserve the petition. The court held that Dr. Abeyasinghe’s visits to the UGC did not constitute a legally mandated process capable of interrupting the limitation period. Her complaint to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, filed only in December 2020, also failed to overcome the time bar, as there was no evidence that the commission had conducted or even commenced an inquiry. Citing its earlier ruling in *Kandambi v. State Timber Corporation*, the court reaffirmed that Sri Lankan law requires a petitioner to demonstrate not merely that a complaint was filed with the Human Rights Commission, but that an actual inquiry had begun. Accordingly, the court held that the constitutional time limitation remained in force. Then the court took the far rarer step of looking beyond the procedural barrier altogether. Article 126(4) of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court power to grant "such relief or make such directions in the case as it may deem just and equitable" — a provision that Sri Lankan courts have long interpreted broadly. In *Noble Resources International Pte Limited v. Siyambalapitiya* (2016), then-Chief Justice Sripavan had held that this provision allows the court to issue directions "even where no infringement or imminent infringement has been found." Justice De Silva cited that ruling directly and applied it without hesitation. His rationale was specific and considered. Prof. Thilakaratne had never sought to challenge or have set aside the formal inquiry committee's findings. As a matter of law — as the court confirmed by reference to a sequence of Court of Appeal and Supreme Court decisions — an administrative order is not void or a nullity until a court formally declares it so. The committee's findings, in other words, remained on the record, uncontested, entirely valid. "These are very serious findings," the judgment stated, "which the 1st Respondent has not sought to impugn. The fact that the Council did not act upon it does not in any way make it void or a nullity." ### **A Lifetime Ban and a Systemic Mandate** The court then issued directives that extended far beyond the immediate dispute, reshaping the institutional consequences of the case. Prof. Thilakaratne was barred from accepting any paid, unpaid or honorary position at any university or educational institution in Sri Lanka. The University Grants Commission was ordered to circulate that prohibition across all institutions under its authority, ensuring that the ban would carry national force. The University of Peradeniya, along with its governing council and other relevant respondents, was also directed to take concrete steps to enforce and expand awareness of its sexual harassment policy, including mandatory annual seminars for academics, staff and students. The ruling was unanimous. Justices Achala Wengappuli and K. Priyantha Fernando joined the judgment without issuing separate opinions. ### **Why the Delay — and Why the Court Said So Plainly** One of the most striking passages in Justice De Silva's judgment is his direct engagement with the question that the University Council had used to dismiss the complaint in the first place: the delay in reporting. Rather than treat the delay as a suspicious gap, or leave it as an unexplained procedural problem, the court cited a 2016 judgment by Justice Gooneratne in Manohari Pelaketiya v. Gunasekera: that continuous abuse and sexual harassment over time causes physical and mental damage; that it is not possible for a female in such circumstances to resist unless she is a person of exceptional resilience; and that continuous threats can render a person physically and mentally unwell. "This," Justice De Silva wrote simply, "explains the delay in the making of the first complaint." The court also went further, anchoring the prohibition against harassment in Sri Lanka's constitutional and international obligations. Article 14(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom to engage in a lawful occupation — and that freedom, the court held, depends upon "the creation of an environment free from sexual harassment." Sri Lanka is a signatory to CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ratified without reservation. CEDAW's General Recommendation No. 19 specifically identifies sexual harassment in the workplace as a form of gender discrimination that can be humiliating, constitute a health and safety problem, and impair equality in employment when women have reasonable grounds to believe that objecting to it will disadvantage them professionally. ### **A Systemic Crisis With Few Institutional Answers** Sexual and gender-based violence within Sri Lanka's state university system has been documented with increasing specificity in recent years. A 2021 study by the UGC conducted jointly with UNICEF found that ragging, which frequently incorporates sexual harassment, affected significant numbers of students across state universities, and that the environment of power imbalances within academia creates particular vulnerability for junior researchers, postgraduate students, and women in junior academic posts. The relationship between a postgraduate student and a senior supervisor who also sits on hiring and promotion committees, controls publication opportunities, and shapes professional networks is one of near-total dependence. International research has consistently documented that this dependence suppresses reporting: junior academics weigh the consequences of a complaint against the possibility of losing their career trajectory entirely. Sri Lanka's legal framework on sexual harassment has also been fragmentary. Section 345 of the Penal Code criminalises the conduct, but academic environments have additional institutional mechanisms, university policies, UGC Establishments Code provisions, that were designed to handle such matters internally. The Abeyasinghe case illustrates precisely what happens when those internal mechanisms are turned in the opposite direction: a formal inquiry finds guilt, and the governing council uses its discretion not to enforce the finding, but to discard it. The Supreme Court's judgment closes that gap, at least in part. By holding that uncontested inquiry findings remain valid regardless of what a council does with them, and by invoking its just and equitable jurisdiction to impose consequences that the university would not impose on itself, the court has signalled that institutional inaction is not a shield — it is itself a form of failure that the judiciary will address. ### **What the Ruling Means Going Forward** The judgment’s sweeping remedy, while widely praised by many legal observers, also raises complex questions about the outer limits of judicial power. The Supreme Court imposed a permanent nationwide academic ban without formally finding a fundamental rights violation, relying instead on disciplinary findings that the University of Peradeniya’s own governing council had chosen not to enforce. That expansive use of the court’s just and equitable jurisdiction is likely to invite continued legal debate. The university council’s original justification was not entirely devoid of legal grounding. Its members argued that the inquiry committee had failed to adequately consider the delay between the alleged harassment and the filing of the formal complaint, an issue that disciplinary bodies often weigh when assessing credibility. Practical limitations also remain. Prof. Thilakaratne is currently listed as a professor at the University of Malaya, and the Supreme Court’s directives apply only within Sri Lanka’s jurisdiction. Yet the broader legal significance of the ruling is unmistakable. Sri Lankan courts have previously used just and equitable powers in cases involving public administration, procurement disputes and environmental governance. Their application in a workplace sexual harassment case, however, marks a striking evolution. Here, the court did not merely review institutional process. It intervened directly where an institution had declined to act on its own validated findings. In doing so, the judgment establishes several important principles. A university council’s refusal to enforce a disciplinary finding does not erase or invalidate that finding. The Supreme Court may rely on substantiated misconduct as the basis for relief even when procedural barriers prevent a conventional constitutional remedy. And the University Grants Commission can be compelled not only to oversee academic standards, but also to enforce sanctions designed to protect those standards. The court's order requiring mandatory annual sexual harassment awareness seminars at the University of Peradeniya is separately significant. By making the requirement permanent rather than symbolic, the bench transformed institutional reform into a continuing legal obligation, one that may shape how universities across Sri Lanka address harassment in the years ahead. Dr. Abeyasinghe was represented by Ermiza Tegal with Linuri Munasinghe. Prof. Thilakaratne was represented by Saliya Pieris, PC, with Jagaseesha Ranasinghe. The University Grants Commission and university respondents were represented by Senior State Counsel Sureka Ahmed. Now serving as a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya, Dr. Abeyasinghe had already called publicly for stronger legal protections against workplace sexual harassment before the judgment was delivered. In important respects, the Supreme Court’s ruling answered that demand not through legislative reform, but through the constitutional authority it already possessed. ### **The Letter That Started Everything** The formal proceedings that produced this week's Supreme Court judgment began with a mother's handwritten letter to the Vice Chancellor of the University of Peradeniya, dated July 2018. C. Abeyasinghe, Dr. Udari Abeyasinghe's mother, wrote to the university after watching her daughter deteriorate over months of escalating harassment. "My daughter has faced several unpleasant experiences and emotional abuse while she was at work," she wrote. "With time, these harassments started occurring on a daily basis. Udari was reluctant to go to work. She started to lose weight. She was unable to sleep well at night. She was not the joyful, happy, light-hearted girl she used to be." The letter acknowledged, with a precision that now reads as prophetic, the structural trap her daughter was caught in: the professor she was complaining about was simultaneously her academic supervisor, one of the gatekeepers of her M.Phil. degree, and a figure with influence over whether she would secure a permanent lectureship in the same faculty. "I am afraid that this complaint might affect her career and academic prospects," the mother wrote. She asked the university to take interim protective measures. The letter was copied to the Chairperson of the University of Peradeniya's Committee to Investigate Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence. The university's SGBV By-Laws explicitly permit third-party complaints, meaning a parent, colleague or other person may initiate a complaint on behalf of a survivor who is unable or unwilling to do so herself. It was this provision that allowed the case to begin at all. On Mother's Day, May 11, 2026, three days after the Supreme Court's judgment, Dr. Abeyasinghe posted the latter part of that letter to her Facebook page, alongside a tribute to her mother. *"Had it not been for her complaint and her courage to stand by me, my chances of surviving within the university system would have been close to zero,"* Dr. Abeyasinghe wrote. "On this Mother's Day, I wish that all mothers may have the strength to endure pressure, the wisdom to recognize abuse, and the courage to stand beside their daughters and sons when the world asks them to stay silent — just as my Amma did." She added: "I am posting the latter part of the complaint she wrote to the university in 2018, because none of what followed, including this week's judgment, would have been possible had she not taken that first step." ### Open Letter to Vijay: Tread Carefully on Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/open-letter-to-vijay-tread-carefully-on-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T15:28:32.000Z Dear Vijay, Heartiest congratulations on becoming the chief minister of Tamil Nadu! Now that you start governing one of India’s biggest and economically most developed states, plenty of problems, small and big, will crop up. You already mentioned the state’s fiscal mess after taking the oath of office. Unlike most chief ministers in India, you will be confronted now and then by matters affecting or involving a neighbouring country: Sri Lanka. This is where you need to exercise extreme caution, for more reasons than one. As someone born and raised in Tamil Nadu, it is inconceivable that you are not broadly aware of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, in particular the problems which continue to plague that country’s Tamil minority. Unfortunately, Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politicians, particularly of the Dravidian flock (whom you routed), have often conducted themselves in a manner that has done more damage to Sri Lankan Tamils. On many issues, their megaphone belligerence has, on the one hand, not helped the Tamils there and on the other given oxygen to a Sinhalese myth that Tamils on both sides of the Palk Strait are out to gobble Buddhist Sri Lanka. As someone beginning on a clean slate, the first thing you need to do is not to get entangled needlessly in Sri Lankan issues, without weighing the larger Indian government perspective. Yes, Tamils in Sri Lanka face plenty of genuine challenges, four of which can be mentioned here. Two of these are directly linked to Tamil Nadu. Despite umpteen promises by Colombo, the military has not returned thousands of acres of land belonging to Tamils that it seized during the long years of armed conflict, even though the separatist war ended in 2009. There is also no credible forward movement over the thousands of mainly young Tamils who disappeared and are widely believed to have been killed after the war ended. Tamil women in Sri Lanka’s north and east still seek justice for their missing husbands, sons, and brothers. The disappeared also include some women. A new government led by President Anura Dissanayake, a Marxist, took office in Colombo in 2024, promising to undo many of the historical wrongs that have dogged Sri Lanka. But it seems Dissanayake’s hands are suddenly fettered. Then there are an estimated 87,000 Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka who are still in Tamil Nadu, years after they fled their island to escape the war. Although the Indian and Tamil Nadu governments provide financial support to the refugees, it is limited in nature. A lot can be done to improve their living conditions. Many would like to return to Sri Lanka. They should be helped. Many have been born and raised in India and want to become Indian citizens. This issue has dragged on for decades and needs to be resolved, and fast. One of the most serious problems involving India and Sri Lanka is the unending dispute between Tamil fishermen from Tamil Nadu and the island nation. Tamil Nadu politicians have tended to give the impression that this is a row involving Indian fishermen and the Sri Lankan state. This is not the real story, at least from 2009 when the separatist war ended. The ugly truth is that environmentally destructive bottom trawlers from Tamil Nadu, after having devastated marine life on the Indian side, are now increasingly fishing in Sri Lankan waters. Not only does this amount to stealing seafood that rightfully belongs to Tamil fishermen living along Sri Lanka’s winding northwestern coast, but Tamil Nadu fishermen are also violating a Colombo law that bans bottom trawling. This frequently leads to the arrest of Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan waters. Tamil Nadu political leaders, influenced by the bottom trawler owners, demand the immediate release of those taken into custody. A frustrated Sri Lankan state is now seizing Indian trawlers and eventually disposing of them as scrap. Thousands of Tamil fishermen in Sri Lanka’s northwest are deeply frustrated that the trawler invasion from Tamil Nadu never ends, leaving them increasingly dispossessed of their valuable marine resources. If the fishing industry petitions you, tell them about Sri Lanka’s ban on bottom trawlers and ask whether they would dare to fish so brazenly in, say, Pakistani or Bangladeshi waters. The community in Sri Lanka suffering most from bottom trawling is the Tamil fishing population. Please do not view the Sri Lankan conflict through the narrow Tamil Nadu prism of a simplistic Sinhalese (bad guys) versus Tamils (good guys) narrative. In one of your campaign speeches, you eulogised Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who was killed in 2009, 18 years after he had former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi assassinated. Prabhakaran did take up arms on behalf of the Tamil community, but his Tigers also killed hundreds of Tamils, including politicians, militants, and civilians, particularly those who tried to escape from LTTE-controlled territory toward the end of the war. The LTTE also forcibly enlisted hundreds of Tamil children, including barely teenagers, mostly from impoverished families, and forced them to fight a war in which death was certain. But when the war ended, an estimated 12,000 LTTE combatants — including children, young adults, and some veterans — surrendered to the military. Some prominent Tigers waved the white flag while attempting to surrender; it is another matter that they were gunned down in what many regard as a veritable war crime. Kindly stay away from “Tamil nationalists” from Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu who remain wedded to the LTTE cause. This section has strong faith in symbolism to keep alive the memory of the vanquished Tamil Tigers. I am not surprised that one such Tamil politician from Jaffna has urged you to declare May 18 – the day Prabhakaran is said to have died, although the military insists he was killed on May 19 – as a “Mullivaikkal Genocide Remembrance Day” with an official resolution in the Tamil Nadu Assembly. Please stay away from such drama. Make it clear to all and sundry that your primary job is to work for the development of Tamil Nadu. Issues related to neighbouring countries should be taken up only in consultation with the central government. During the height of ethnic passions, the Tamil Nadu Assembly in 1987 declared financial support to the LTTE and EROS, another Tamil militant group. It was, of course, a small matter considering the larger covert support India extended to the Tamil militants. But the truth must be faced. Would Indians be happy if Pakistan’s Parliament announced financial aid to Indian Muslim groups? Or if Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, or Malaysia sermonised India over issues related to Indian Muslims? Besides the bilateral problems, India-Sri Lanka relations are today marked by wide-ranging and blossoming economic relations. A key player in this would be Tamil Nadu, which is separated from Sri Lanka by a narrow strip of sea. This is one area your government must explore for the benefit of Tamils in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. There are more and more voices in that country calling for stepped-up economic linkages with Tamil Nadu, an economic powerhouse. Yes, if and when you meet Sri Lankan leaders, you may express your concerns over issues affecting their Tamil community. Quiet diplomacy often achieves what loud, aggressive, and headline-grabbing Tamil nationalist discourse cannot. Yours faithfully, M.R. Narayan Swamy **Editor’s Note: M.R. Narayan Swamy is a senior journalist and author of several acclaimed books on South Asian politics and conflict, including *Tigers of Lanka*. He serves as the Consulting Editor of *Jaffna Monitor*.** ### Gajendrakumar Urges Vijay to Declare May 18 as Mullivaikkal Genocide Remembrance Day URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/gajendrakumar-urges-vijay-to-declare-may-18-as-mullivaikkal-genocide-remembrance-day/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T15:21:43.000Z **CHENNAI —** Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, leader of Sri Lanka’s Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF), has formally urged newly sworn-in Tamil Nadu Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay to declare May 18 as Mullivaikkal Genocide Remembrance Day through an official resolution in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. Mr. Ponnambalam sent the letter following Mr. Vijay's swearing-in on May 10 as Tamil Nadu's ninth chief minister — the first to lead a government formed by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam, the party Mr. Vijay founded in 2024 after a career as one of Tamil cinema's most prominent actors. TVK won the April 23 state assembly elections in a result that ended a 59-year unbroken hold on power by the DMK-AIADMK duopoly. In the letter, Mr. Ponnambalam called on Mr. Vijay to move the resolution during the legislature's first sitting under his government. He pointed to a 2013 Tamil Nadu Assembly resolution that unanimously recognised the atrocities committed against Sri Lankan Tamils in the final stages of the civil war as genocide and called for an independent international investigation, and urged the new government to reaffirm that commitment. "It is essential that during the very first sitting of the Assembly under your leadership, a resolution be passed declaring May 18 as Mullivaikkal Genocide Day," Mr. Ponnambalam wrote, according to the letter. May 18 marks the date in 2009 when Sri Lankan forces militarily defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, ending a decades-long civil war. Tamil communities around the world commemorate the date as a day of mourning for the tens of thousands of Tamil civilians who died during the final offensive. The Sri Lankan government has consistently rejected the characterisation of those events as genocide. Mr. Ponnambalam argued that a formal declaration by Tamil Nadu would strengthen international Tamil advocacy for criminal accountability and signal continuity with the state's historical political position on Sri Lankan Tamil rights. Legal experts, however, cautioned that the genocide characterisation remains contested under international law and may have complicated Tamil advocacy in some Western capitals. While credible allegations of mass atrocities during the final offensive are extensively documented, including indiscriminate shelling of civilian populations in designated No Fire Zones, attacks on hospitals, and enforced disappearances, several analysts said the legal threshold for genocide under international law is more difficult to establish than the threshold for war crimes or crimes against humanity. "The scale of civilian suffering and alleged violations is undeniable," said one expert familiar with international humanitarian law, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of ongoing advocacy efforts. "But when advocacy centres on terminology that remains legally disputed, it can sometimes distract from the substantial evidence of grave abuses that is more firmly grounded in established international legal frameworks." The experts stressed that calls for justice, accountability, and independent investigations remain legitimate and urgent regardless of the legal classification ultimately applied. Mr. Vijay’s office did not respond to requests for comment before publication, ahead of the first sitting of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly scheduled for today, Monday, May 11 , and Tamil Nadu government officials could not be reached. ### Vijay’s Religion Didn’t Win or Lose Tamil Nadu — Governance Will URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/vijays-religion-didnt-win-or-lose-tamil-nadu-governance-will/ Last updated: 2026-05-10T10:58:20.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** One day, dozens of children from a convent school flocked to the Kamakoti Peetam at Kanchipuram in Tamil Nadu to take the blessings of the now late Sri Chandrasekharendra Saraswati, undoubtedly one of modern India’s greatest and most revered Hindu saints. The *Mahaperiyava*, as he was addressed, gave each student, boy or girl, a banana as *prasadam* or holy offering. He later told his aides that many of the students were Christians, and it would not have been correct to offer them *vibuthi* (sacred ash) as he would normally do to devotees. Chandrasekharendra Saraswati presided over the ancient Math for 87 long years from the age of 13 until he passed away in 1994\. During this period, the saint acquired a spiritual halo few Indians have attained in modern times, and came to be widely known as *Nadamadum Kadavul* or Walking God. One reason for his immense popularity was that, despite being a pontiff and immersed in the Vedas, he never imposed his views on others, always gently guiding the millions who thronged to him to lead a good life based on values such as honesty, simplicity, and sincere, even if brief devotion to God. He did not want Hindus to shed their religion, and he was equally opposed to Muslims or Christians giving up their religion to embrace Hinduism. “Be honest to the religion you are born in,” he always maintained. Secular to the core, he respected everyone irrespective of the religious divide. This is why, when A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, an eminent scientist from Tamil Nadu’s Rameswaram and a Muslim by birth, was to become the President of India, he spent the night at the Kanchipuram Math before flying the next day to New Delhi to take the oath of office. This was after the *Mahaperiyava* had shed his mortal coil. Amid such secular ethos, it is sad to hear some sceptics point out, at times in hushed tones, that Tamil film superstar Vijay, who on Sunday became the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, is a Christian – as if it is a crime to be one. It was in 2019 or 2020 when H. Raja, a leader of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Tamil Nadu, began referring to the actor by his full name, Joseph Vijay, in a bid to highlight his Christian identity. Until then, most people, including those who knew which religion the actor was born into, simply knew him as and called him Vijay – a screen name he has had for decades. Raja, like many who share his political beliefs, seemed to think that the people of Tamil Nadu, where the overwhelming majority are Hindu, would have a problem if they knew that Vijay was a Christian. This was far from the truth. Soon after Raja got into the act, Vijay – born to a Christian father and a Hindu mother- issued a statement on a letterhead bearing the name Joseph Vijay. From then onward, he carried that name openly, almost like a personal defiance. By the time Vijay gave birth to the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) just two years ago, there was hardly anyone in Tamil Nadu (or admirers beyond) who did not know that he was a Christian. As the Tamil Nadu election results clearly showed, the masses are not bothered by his faith. For most people, his religion is a personal matter — one between him and God. On Sunday, his full name — C. Joseph Vijay — was written in bold letters in both Tamil and English at Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, where the oath-taking ceremony took place. Those close to the actor admit that Vijay is aware of the growing politico-religious fissures in India, more so in areas where the BJP is on the ascendency. He knows he needs to tread carefully on matters related to religion. Unlike some in Tamil Nadu politics who called themselves secular but constantly made fun of Sanatan Dharma, the actor has told aides that his belief in secular values is total and he won’t attack any religion. Can Vijay govern a state as large and complex as Tamil Nadu without any administrative experience and with only two years in active politics? These are valid questions. But this line of thinking presupposes that people with long political careers are unlikely to make mistakes. Nothing could be farther from reality. Muthuvel Karunanidhi was, without doubt, one of India’s most experienced politicians. He was also widely seen as a good administrator, including by officials who did not embrace his political ideology. But during the fag end of his career, he made one mistake after another as the Tamil Nadu chief minister, including by allowing the Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka a free run in the sprawling Indian state. This led to his government’s dismissal in January 1991 by New Delhi. By then, however, the LTTE had prepared a fertile terrain in the state, which it could exploit to grotesquely assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. “He is only an actor,” a disgruntled AIADMK leader remarked the other day about Vijay. True, indeed. But so was M.G. Ramachandran, or MGR. He may have been involved with the DMK for a long time and may have founded the AIADMK, but his popularity primarily stemmed from his screen image — the hero who always fought the villains and ensured justice for the masses, especially the poor. Wasn’t Jayalalithaa an actor too? If MGR ruled Tamil Nadu for a decade until his death in December 1987, Jayalalithaa’s reign lasted 14 years over six terms. During this period, the DMK could only huff and puff, although it was led by supposedly more “experienced” leaders. We don’t know if Vijay will emerge as a good administrator in Tamil Nadu. He may or may not succeed. Governance is no joke, more so if you uphold values that other powers that be may not be comfortable with. Whatever happens, Vijay should be judged by the governance he provides to a state of 85 million people, by the promises he keeps, and by what he ultimately delivers. What should not be targeted is his religion — or even his troubled personal life. ### Vijay sworn in as Tamil Nadu CM, promises “new era” in governance URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/vijay-sworn-in-as-tamil-nadu-cm-promises-new-era-in-governance/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T02:55:56.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Just 824 days after he took to politics, Tamil superstar Vijay, nee C. Joseph Vijay, on Sunday, took oath as Tamil Nadu’s new chief minister amid cheers and wild whistling by thousands of supporters, and immediately vowed to provide “a new era” to one of India’s biggest states now saddled with a huge debt. As a packed Jawaharlal Nehru stadium roared in approval, Vijay, 51, was administered the oath of office and secrecy by Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar, who, until Saturday evening, refused to let him be the chief minister until he furnished proof that he enjoyed a legislative majority. Vijay, who had founded the Tamilga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) only in 2024, and the nine ministers – the youngest being the sole woman in the ministry – took the oath in Tamil. Barring one, all did so in the name of God. “This is a new era,” the TVK leader later told the jubilant supporters in a brief speech in Tamil laced with English. And to show that he was a man who keeps his word, the first three files he signed as chief minister included one to provide 200 units of free electricity a month to every household consuming under 500 units per month, and two others to establish a Women Protection Force and an Anti-Drug Squad in every district across the sprawling state. ![Tamil Nadu Governor Rajendra Arlekar administers the oath of office to C. Joseph Vijay, the TVK leader and chief minister-elect, during his swearing-in ceremony at Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium in Chennai on Sunday.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/vijay-sworn-in-as-tamil-nadu-c-jJomDI-kixrucobjwg9dmh.png) Tamil Nadu Governor Rajendra Arlekar administers the oath of office to TVK leader C. Joseph Vijay during his swearing-in as chief minister at Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium in Chennai on Sunday. In his speech, he accused – without naming anyone – the outgoing DMK government of leaving behind a whopping debt of Rs 10 lakh crore and said his first priority would be to release a White Paper on the state of the economy. “This is the first thing I want to do.” Speaking at times in movie style, with his right hand clenched in the air, Vijay told admirers and detractors alike that he would be no pushover despite his limited political experience and lack of administrative skills. “There will be only one power centre — and that will be me,” he said, as the swaying crowds lapped it up. He made it clear that he would not allow anyone in the party to indulge in corruption, whoever they may be. “I promise the people of Tamil Nadu that I will never misuse even a single rupee of public money. I have not entered politics for wealth… I will never allow corruption.” Knowing he had made some promises during the election campaign that won’t be easy to implement, Vijay urged the people to have patience and give him time to settle down so that he can keep those pledges. The actor-turned-politician, born to a Christian father and a Hindu mother, vowed to uphold secular values and work for social justice. “Be confident,” he said towards the end of his speech. “Only good things will happen. Victory is ours!” Sunday’s event was also attended by Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, as well as Tamil Nadu heavyweights from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), including Nainar Nagendran and Dr. Tamilisai Soundararajan. Notably absent, however, were outgoing Chief Minister and DMK veteran M.K. Stalin, AIADMK leader Edappadi K. Palaniswami, and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi leader Thol. Thirumavalavan, whose party also extended legislative support to TVK. The ceremony brought to light the faultiness running through Vijay’s family. While his parents were seated prominently in the front row and became teary-eyed during the oath-taking, Vijay’s son and daughter kept away. Vijay is estranged from their mother, Sangeetha, a Jaffna Tamil now in the UK. He is now in a relationship with the well-known Tamil actor, Trisha Krishnan, who attended the event dressed in a bright blue sari and looking overjoyed. Those who took the oath as ministers were N. Anand, Aadhav Arjuna, K.G. Arunraj, K.A. Sengottaiyan, P. Venkatramanan, R. Nirmalkumar, Rajmohan, T.K. Prabhu, and S. Keerthana. After Vijay, the loudest cheering and boisterous clapping were for Sengottaiyan, a veteran politician who was formerly in the AIADMK. It was only for him that Vijay stood up from his chair and clapped lustily. Five of the ministers, including Vijay, were elected from Chennai, the state capital, which tilted heavily in favour of TVK in the April elections. Venkataramanan, also from Chennai, is the first Brahmin to serve in a Tamil Nadu cabinet since the late Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa. The portfolios of the chief minister and the ministers will be announced during the day. Vijay may be just one of India’s 28 chief ministers, but no one else in Indian state politics has received more congratulatory messages from neighbouring Sri Lanka, which is separated from India by a narrow strip of sea. “Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu are connected through history, culture, enterprise, and enduring people-to-people ties across generations,” President Anura Dissanayake said in a message to Vijay on X. “Our future holds immense economic promise and opportunity as Sri Lanka and India continue to build ever closer ties and a stronger partnership,” he added. “I look forward to working together …towards great prosperity and progress.” Tamil Nadu is still home to thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils who fled the island to escape the ethnic conflict. While many of them would like to return to their country one day, many others want to remain in India as Indian citizens. It is also bottom trawlers sailing from the Tamil Nadu, which are the heart of a dragging fishermen row involving Sri Lanka and India. Prime Minister Modi also congratulated Vijay, offering him best wishes “for a successful tenure”. He promised to work with the Tamil Nadu government for the sake of the people. At the same time, speaking in Bengaluru, Modi took a swipe at Rahul Gandhi, accusing him of unceremoniously dumping long-time ally DMK after the latter was routed in the Tamil Nadu battle and embracing the TVK. “Time and again, the alliance with the DMK pulled the Congress out of crises,” Modi pointed out. “Yet, the very DMK that consistently worked for the betterment of the Congress was betrayed the moment the political winds shifted,” said Modi, speaking in his characteristic style. Vijay’s elevation as chief minister marks the formal end of decades of Dravidian party rule in Tamil Nadu, where no non-Dravidian outfit had been able to seize power since the DMK ended Congress’s monopoly in 1967, riding the emotive winds of anti-Hindi sentiment and regional identity. ### Jay Shah, Modi, AKD Named in Alleged Behind-the-Scenes Cricket Board Overthrow URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jay-shah-modi-akd-named-in-alleged-behind-the-scenes-cricket-board-overthrow/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T15:05:22.000Z **COLOMBO —** A senior Sri Lankan opposition parliamentarian has claimed that the recent removal of the country's cricket board leadership was orchestrated through a behind-the-scenes agreement among President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and International Cricket Council Chairman Jay Shah. Dayasiri Jayasekara, a Samagi Jana Balawegaya lawmaker and former Sports Minister, made the allegation during an appearance on the political talk show *Derana 360* last week, saying he was convinced that the quiet departure of the Shammi Silva-led Sri Lanka Cricket executive committee was the product of coordination at the highest levels. “I strongly feel that the ICC had been balanced on this occasion by the President through his close connections with Indian Prime Minister Modi,” Mr. Jayasekara said, adding that under the purported arrangement, Mr. Modi would have prevailed upon Mr. Shah, who heads the Dubai-based ICC, to acquiesce to a transitional body overseeing Sri Lanka Cricket until new elections are held. Sri Lanka Cricket's executive committee, led by Mr. Silva, stepped down late last month and was replaced by a Cricket Transformation Committee, or CTC, chaired by former parliamentarian Eran Wickramaratne. Mr. Jayasekara said the absence of any legal challenge from Mr. Silva was itself evidence of a prior understanding. In November 2023, the ICC suspended Sri Lanka's membership after then-Sports Minister Roshan Ranasinghe dismissed the same executive committee following the national team's poor performance at the Men's 50-over World Cup in India — a move Mr. Silva successfully challenged in the Court of Appeal, securing a stay order that restored his administration. The ICC lifted the suspension only after Sri Lanka Cricket was reconstituted through a legally defensible process. This time, Mr. Jayasekara argued, no such legal challenge materialised precisely because Mr. Silva had received assurances from Mr. Shah that the transition would be managed in a manner protecting his interests, including the possibility of fielding a preferred candidate in future elections. "It is also obvious as to why Shammi decided to quit so quietly when asked to do so," Mr. Jayasekara said. "That is because Jay Shah, with whom he is quite close, would have also advised Shammi to step aside till an election is held." The claims have not been independently verified. Neither the President's office, the Indian High Commission in Colombo, nor the ICC responded to requests for comment at the time of publication. Sri Lanka Cricket has not issued any statement addressing the circumstances of the leadership change. Mr. Jayasekara, who served as Sports Minister from 2015 to 2018 under President Maithripala Sirisena, acknowledged that the newly constituted CTC was composed of capable individuals and described Mr. Wickramaratne as a seasoned administrator. He declined, however, to pass a definitive verdict on the committee's prospects, saying its credibility would ultimately rest on performance, both administrative and on the field. "In my opinion, areas such as discipline, fitness, and match concentration of players need urgent remedial work if Sri Lanka is to restart its journey to get back to the top across all formats," he said. "The players have to show consistency in each of these areas, or else, the so-called transformation brought about by this Government will turn out to be a false dawn in time to come." Sri Lanka's cricket administration has been a recurring source of political controversy, with successive governments accused of treating the board as a vehicle for patronage and factional maneuvering. ### Bruised Vijay Clears Final Hurdle in Tamil Nadu URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/bruised-vijay-clears-final-hurdle-in-tamil-nadu/ Last updated: 2026-05-10T07:33:52.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** After five days of tense, suspense-packed drama, Tamil superstar Vijay on Saturday was finally on the path to becoming the new chief minister of Tamil Nadu as he marshaled majority support before Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar. But Vijay supporters admitted that the 51-year-old actor-turned-politician had learnt some invaluable lessons in politics as his Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) desperately scouted for support since May 4 after falling short of a legislative majority by just ten seats. On Saturday evening, Vijay, dressed in his usual white shirt and khaki-beige trousers, met the governor at his office after Arlekar canceled a planned trip to neighboring Kerala. The actor was accompanied by leaders of all the parties that had declared their crucial support for him. There was no immediate word from either the governor or Vijay, but sources in his TVK party told Jaffna Monitor that he would, in all probability, take the oath after 4 p.m. on Sunday, as suggested by astrologers. Whenever that happens, Vijay would herald the first non-Dravidian administration in Tamil Nadu, now one of India’s most economically developed states with 85 million people, since 1967, when the DMK stormed to power for the first time, ending decades of Congress monopoly. Since then, the sprawling coastal state has been ruled by the DMK or its splinter AIADMK, barring brief periods of President’s Rule or direct federal rule. Barring the Congress, all other supporting parties have extended outside legislative support to Vijay. VCK leader Thol Thirumavalavan denied that he was staking claim to the post of deputy chief minister, saying reports to that effect were “just rumors.” Excited TVK supporters danced in the streets of Chennai and elsewhere across the state, even as a 47-year-old Vijay supporter who had earlier set himself on fire in Tirunelveli district to protest the delay in allowing TVK to take power remained hospitalised. ![VCK’s letter backing Vijay’s bid to form the government in Tamil Nadu.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/bruised-vijay-clears-final-hur-_cSMxM-kixvqyka3pibopv.jpg) VCK’s letter backing Vijay’s bid to form the government in Tamil Nadu. Soon after the TVK secured an incredible 108 seats in the 234-member Tamil Nadu Assembly, the Congress, with five members, announced its support to him. The two communist parties, each with two members, also vowed to prop up his government. Amid rumours that the defeated DMK and AIADMK might embrace and form a government, two separate legislators whose support Vijay’s aides had earlier claimed suddenly backtracked, putting a question mark on government formation and casting a pall of gloom in the actor-turned-politician’s camp. The dark clouds, however, beat a retreat on Saturday after the Viduthalai Chiruthaikal Katchi (VCK) and the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) informed Governor Arlekar that their two MLAs each would back Vijay in his efforts to provide a new administration in Tamil Nadu. The latest announcement brought the number of legislators supporting Vijay to 120, surpassing the 118 needed to form a government. ![IUML’s letter of support for Vijay’s bid to form the government in Tamil Nadu.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/bruised-vijay-clears-final-hur-_cSMxM-kixeizbum63kvtk.jpg) IUML’s letter of support for Vijay’s bid to form the government in Tamil Nadu. Arlekar ignored the established convention that a governor must invite the leader of the single largest party in a fractured verdict to form a government, with the majority to be proved in the legislature, not in the governor’s office. As the uncertainty cleared in Tamil Nadu, outgoing chief minister M.K. Stalin, whose DMK party now has 59 seats, a sharp fall from the earlier three-digit figure, conveyed his heartiest congratulations to the to-be chief minister Vijay. Although the DMK will be the main opposition in the new legislature, it was the action of its long-term allies – the VCK, IUML, and Communists – in extending legislative backing that helped Vijay to the requisite majority. In the process, the DMK and the Congress, two of India’s oldest political parties, snapped decades of political marriage as the Congress quickly embraced Vijay’s TVK after the election results. The development, political analysts say, will have long-term consequences for the already divided national opposition as it tries to unite against Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The days since the election results in Tamil Nadu became known, with Vijay’s two-year-old TVK crushing the two Dravidian giants, political inexperience and desperation to grasp power led the actor to make errors, compounded by the governor’s bizarre rules. Vijay’s main challenge will come once he becomes chief minister and attempts to run a government. His greatest drawback will be his sheer lack of administrative experience. And Tamil Nadu is one of India’s largest states. That he will be under pressure from friends and foes alike became clear when the communists made it clear – and the DMK said so too – that the “good policy decisions” of the outgoing government should not be dumped. As he governs, there will be increasing demands and pressures, along with group and community expectations, giving Vijay a much-needed realization that it is far easier to be a hero in the world of cinema than in the real world. ### How Vijay Turned Triumph Into Turmoil URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-vijay-turned-triumph-into-turmoil/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T03:29:39.000Z **CHENNAI —** Whether one supported actor-turned-politician Vijay or not, almost everyone agreed on one thing: he had done the impossible. In a state where political power had rotated between two Dravidian parties for nearly six decades, Vijay emerged out of the blue, entered the political spectrum, and led his fledgling Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam to 108 seats, making it the single largest party in Tamil Nadu’s 234-member assembly. It was, by any measure, a democratic earthquake. Even his critics acknowledged that he displayed considerable political shrewdness during the campaign, successfully mobilizing women and youth voters on a massive scale. But what followed was something else entirely. ### **The First Misstep: Walking In With the Wrong List** The first mistake was made before Vijay had even sat down with Tamil Nadu Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar. Constitutional convention in cases of a hung assembly is well established: the leader of the single largest party is typically invited by the Governor to attempt to form a government, with a floor test to follow. TVK, with 108 effective seats, was unambiguously that single largest party. When Vijay first presented his claim to the Governor, the letter submitted to Raj Bhavan reportedly included signatures not only from TVK legislators but also from Congress lawmakers. By explicitly framing the submission as a coalition claim,112 seats, comprising TVK’s 107 plus Congress’s 5, TVK inadvertently handed the Governor a straightforward counterargument: the majority mark was 118, not 112\. “Come back with the numbers,” was effectively the response. By approaching Raj Bhavan as a coalition rather than solely as the single largest party, TVK had transformed what could have been a democratic right into a numerical obligation it had not yet fulfilled. ### **The Congress Embrace: Strategically Costly, Constitutionally Premature** The decision to publicly embrace Congress before securing any invitation to form government was a political miscalculation as much as a procedural one. When counting was still being finalised, even as it became evident that TVK was short of a majority, the party's camp openly welcomed Congress's conditional support, offered with a rider that the incoming government maintain a secular character and keep the Bharatiya Janata Party at arm's length. Congress senior leader K.C. Venugopal stated the party's position publicly: it wanted a secular government in Tamil Nadu. This announcement did several things, none of them helpful. It handed the BJP, and through the BJP, New Delhi, and by extension Raj Bhavan, a ready-made ideological pretext for unease about the incoming administration. The correct sequence would have been to first establish Vijay's claim as the single largest party leader, receive the Governor's invitation, and then disclose the coalition's shape. By reversing the order, TVK gave opponents a preview of its vulnerabilities before the battle had formally started. ### **WhatsApp Politics** Perhaps the most publicly embarrassing episode in TVK’s government-formation saga was the manner in which the party initially approached its prospective allies. Multiple smaller parties, including the VCK, the CPI, the CPI(M), and others, reportedly received outreach from TVK functionaries via WhatsApp messages seeking expressions of support and asking recipients to respond in kind. In Tamil Nadu’s political culture, where personal protocol and hierarchy carry considerable weight, the approach was widely perceived as a sign of either arrogance or ignorance, or perhaps both. VCK general secretary Sinthanai Selvan gave a public voice to what several party leaders were saying in private. "Shouldn't Mr Vijay have immediately met them in person?" he demanded. "Sending a message via WhatsApp — how is one supposed to understand this?" VCK, he added, had found TVK's conduct toward it to be characteristic of a party guided by "second-rung leaders" whose advice had left Vijay poorly positioned. Left party leaders echoed the criticism, describing the approach as “Gen-Z politics.” TVK, a party that had built its campaign momentum on social media savvy and youth mobilization, had applied the same toolkit to coalition negotiations, where it proved entirely the wrong instrument. It was only after criticism over TVK’s initial outreach methods became public that the party moved to correct course. Although Vijay did visit CPI and CPI(M) leaders in person on the very day they extended their support, the earlier attempt by TVK functionaries to initiate negotiations through WhatsApp messages had already created an impression of political immaturity. ### **The Paperwork Problem: Verbal Promises at the Wrong Address** At each of his three visits to Lok Bhavan, Vijay arrived with a different documentation issue. On May 6, his team submitted a letter combining TVK and Congress signatures — 112 seats in total — which invited the Governor’s blunt counter: come back with 118. On May 7, Vijay returned. The Governor rejected the claim again, issuing a formal statement that “the requisite majority support in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, essential for forming the government, has not been established.” On May 8 — the third visit in three days — Vijay arrived with what appeared, on paper, to be a commanding coalition. The formal letter he submitted to Governor Arlekar claimed the support of 121 legislators, three above the majority threshold: TVK’s 108 seats, plus the Indian National Congress (5), the Communist Party of India (2), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (2), the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (2), the Indian Union Muslim League (1), and the AMMK (1). The Governor’s office, upon reviewing the documentation, found verifiable support for only approximately 116 legislators, two short of the majority mark. The VCK’s letter was reportedly submitted only via email rather than as a signed physical document. Meanwhile, the IUML publicly stated, after Vijay had already left Raj Bhavan, that it had not in fact extended support to TVK. The AMMK entry in that letter was the most damaging of all. Within an hour of Vijay’s departure, AMMK general secretary T.T.V. Dhinakaran arrived at the Governor’s residence with a rival letter, alleging that TVK had forged the signature of AMMK’s sole legislator, S. Kamaraj of Mannarkudi. He then returned a second time — this time with Kamaraj himself — who reportedly told the Governor in person that he had signed no such letter for TVK. TVK released video footage after midnight purportedly showing Kamaraj voluntarily writing a support letter inside a car, claiming he had done so with Dhinakaran’s approval. Dhinakaran, however, dismissed the footage as AI-generated. VCK has yet to officially announce its support, as leader Thol. Thirumavalavan’s press conference, originally scheduled for 11 a.m. today, has been postponed to 4 p.m. The historian will record that TVK broke Tamil Nadu's Dravidian order in May 2026\. The political realist will note that it spent four days doing its best to give the achievement away. ### Massive Fire Ravages Jaffna Hospital Drug Warehouse URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/massive-fire-ravages-jaffna-hospital-drug-warehouse/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T06:10:20.000Z ***Police Investigate Whether Blaze Was Accidental or Deliberate; Cancer Drugs Among the Losses*** **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka** — A major fire tore through the pharmaceutical warehouse of Jaffna Teaching Hospital in the early hours of Saturday, destroying medicines and medical equipment worth several billion rupees, including cancer treatment drugs and other critical-care pharmaceuticals, in what officials are calling one of the worst disasters in the hospital's history. The blaze began at approximately 1:30 a.m. and took more than five hours to bring under control. Firefighters from the Jaffna Municipal Council, supported by military, air force, police, and electricity board personnel, battled the fire as highly flammable liquids and chemical substances stored inside the warehouse caused the flames to spread rapidly through the building. Jaffna police have launched an investigation into the cause of the fire, with investigators examining both the possibility of an electrical fault and the possibility of deliberate sabotage. Authorities say a recently installed refrigerated unit in the warehouse, which had been set up to preserve temperature-sensitive medicines, is suspected to have triggered the blaze through an electrical short circuit, but that determination awaits a Government Analyst's report. The warehouse will remain under full police control until the analyst's examination is completed, said Member of Parliament S. Sribhavanandarajah, a former deputy director of the hospital who inspected the site Saturday. "All of these have now been destroyed in the fire," he said, referring to the high-value medicines that had been stored there. The financial toll is still being calculated. Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar, who visited the site Saturday morning, said losses could exceed several thousand crore rupees. He said he did not personally believe sabotage was the cause, but that the fire's origins could only be confirmed after a chemical analysis. "This disaster is a huge loss for our people," he said. Northern Province Governor N. Vethanayahan also toured the damaged warehouse Saturday, receiving a briefing from Hospital Director Dr. T. Sathiyamoorthy on emergency measures taken — including the relocation of salvaged medicines and coordination with the central health ministry in Colombo to arrange emergency resupply. Hospital officials said patient care would not be interrupted. Medicine distribution is continuing through the hospital's internal stores and regional health services, and authorities urged the public not to panic. Dr. Sathiyamoorthy said central health ministry officials had been immediately notified following the fire. The governor thanked the fire brigade and emergency responders for containing a disaster he said could have been far worse. Hospital officials confirmed that all personnel who fought the fire — including firefighters and military personnel — would receive medical assessments, including respiratory examinations. Jaffna Teaching Hospital is the leading government hospital in Sri Lanka's Northern Province and the only teaching hospital in the region, serving as the main clinical facility for the University of Jaffna's Faculty of Medicine. The loss of its pharmaceutical warehouse strikes at the medical infrastructure of a province that has faced decades of underinvestment following the end of the civil war. An internal hospital inquiry is running parallel to the police investigation. The Government Analyst's Department has not yet indicated when its report will be completed. ### A Majority on Paper, a Night of Crisis: Vijay’s Bid for Power Plunges Into Uncertainty URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-majority-on-paper-a-night-of-crisis-vijays-bid-for-power-plunges-into-uncertainty/ Last updated: 2026-05-09T15:00:24.000Z **CHENNAI —**On the evening of May 8, what began as an expected constitutional meeting for actor-turned-politician Vijay with the Governor to stake claim to form the government quickly turned into one of the biggest political dramas Tamil Nadu has witnessed in recent years. As of early Saturday morning, Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar had not invited Vijay, whose Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam won 108 seats in the 2026 state election and emerged as the single largest bloc in the 234-member Assembly, to take the oath of office. An 11 a.m. swearing-in ceremony that TVK and Communist Party of India (Marxist) leaders had publicly announced appeared to have been suspended. The night’s events began with confidence. Vijay met the Governor at Raj Bhavan on Friday evening for the third time, accompanied by party colleagues, the producer of his latest film *Jananayagan*, and an Andhra mining baron, submitting a formal letter claiming the support of 121 legislators, three above the majority threshold. According to documents obtained by *Jaffna Monitor*, the claimed support was drawn from TVK’s 108 seats and six coalition partners: the Indian National Congress (5), the Communist Party of India (2), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (2), the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (2), the Indian Union Muslim League (1), and the Amma Makkal Munnetra Kazhagam (1). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/image-1.png) The letter submitted by Vijay to Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar claiming majority support to form the government in Tamil Nadu. The submission did not immediately produce an invitation to govern. Sources familiar with the proceedings said the Governor’s office found verifiable documentation for only approximately 116 legislators, not the 118 required for a majority. Signed letters from the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) and the Indian Union Muslim League were either incomplete or remained unverified. The Indian Union Muslim League publicly stated after Vijay’s meeting with the Governor that it had not extended support to TVK. ### A Forgery Allegation, Then the MLA Within an hour of Vijay’s departure from Raj Bhavan, T.T.V. Dhinakaran, general secretary of the AMMK, arrived at the Governor’s residence and submitted a rival letter. He alleged that TVK had presented a forged document, purportedly bearing the signature of AMMK’s sole legislator, S. Kamaraj of Mannarkudi, as evidence of coalition support. Dhinakaran told reporters he had initially been unable to reach Kamaraj by telephone, which had heightened his suspicion of political pressure. He said Kamaraj had in fact signed a letter pledging support to AIADMK leader Edappadi K. Palaniswami, not to Vijay, and that he would file a criminal complaint that night. The allegation grew more serious when Dhinakaran returned to Raj Bhavan a second time, accompanied by Kamaraj himself. The legislator reportedly told the Governor directly that he had not provided any support letter to TVK. If the forgery allegation is substantiated, it could expose TVK functionaries to criminal charges before a government has even been formed. ### TVK Releases Video Shortly before midnight, TVK issued a counter-statement accompanied by video footage that the party said showed Kamaraj voluntarily writing a support letter for TVK inside a car. The party stated that Kamaraj had said he was extending support with Dhinakaran’s own approval, and accused Dhinakaran of spreading false information. ### CPI(M) Accuses DMK of Exploring AIADMK Path to Block Vijay The clearest public indication of the broader political struggle emerged from M.A. Baby, general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), who told *India Today* that the DMK had sought to persuade Vijay’s allies to support an AIADMK-led government instead. “The DMK wished for us to support that government,” Mr. Baby said. “But AIADMK was defeated in the elections. DMK was also defeated. We were part of the DMK alliance; we also lost. We are not forming the government now. We are only extending support to the single largest party.” Mr. Baby went further, accusing the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh of actively attempting to block Vijay’s ascent. “The BJP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh are trying to prevent the single largest party from coming to power,” he said. Mr. Baby made clear that the Left would not support any arrangement that returned the AIADMK, a constituent of the National Democratic Alliance, to power. “We are not saying that we are going to oppose DMK,” he said. “But we cannot accept the political line to support AIADMK, which was a part of the NDA.” ### Coalition Gaps and Unresolved Negotiations The AMMK dispute was not the only obstacle to Vijay’s majority claim. Negotiations with V.C.K. chief Thol. Thirumavalavan, whose party holds two seats, remained unresolved as of early Saturday. Multiple sources said Mr. Thirumavalavan was conditioning formal written support on a guarantee of the deputy chief minister’s post. TVK had not publicly agreed to that demand, and no written letter from the V.C.K. had reached the Governor’s office by Saturday midnight, according to sources familiar with the proceedings. The V.C.K. also officially announced that Mr. Thirumavalavan would declare the party’s final decision by Saturday morning. The swearing-in that TVK had scheduled for Saturday morning had not been confirmed as of this report. The Governor had not spoken publicly. ### Court Orders Arrest of Custodian of Anuradhapura’s Eight Sacred Sites in Child Abuse Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/court-orders-arrest-of-custodian-of-anuradhapuras-eight-sacred-sites-in-child-abuse-case/ Last updated: 2026-05-09T15:00:34.000Z **ANURADHAPURA, Sri Lanka** — A chief magistrate in Sri Lanka on Friday ordered the immediate arrest of one of the country’s most senior Buddhist monks over allegations of grave sexual abuse involving a 15-year-old girl, in a case that has shaken both religious and legal institutions. Chief Magistrate Siyapath Sasindu Wickramaratne of Anuradhapura directed police to arrest Ven. Pallegama Hemarathana Thera, the Chief Incumbent of the Atamasthana, which comprises the eight most sacred Buddhist sites in the ancient city of Anuradhapura, including the Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi, one of the holiest shrines in Sri Lankan Buddhism, after authorities repeatedly failed to detain him despite an active investigation. The court also barred the monk from leaving the country. ### **Police Delays Prompt Judicial Intervention** ![Ven. Pallegama Hemarathana Thera, left, the Chief Incumbent of the Atamasthana, with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake at a religious function in Anuradhapura last year.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/court-orders-arrest-of-custodi-cPQQ0c-kixql4g9n32bsf6.png) Ven. Pallegama Hemarathana Thera, left, the Chief Incumbent of the Atamasthana, with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake at a religious function in Anuradhapura last year. Court proceedings highlighted serious concerns over police inaction. According to submissions made before the court by Attorney-at-Law Sajeevani Aberathna, Director of Law Enforcement at the National Child Protection Authority, repeated written and verbal inquiries had been made to police regarding why the monk had not yet been arrested despite mounting evidence. The magistrate’s order followed increasing scrutiny over what appeared to be prolonged hesitation by law enforcement in pursuing one of the country’s most powerful clerics. ### **Allegations Emerge Through Child Protection Inquiry** The investigation began after the girl was taken into police custody in Nittambuwa while staying at a lodge. According to testimony presented in court, the girl alleged that her mother had accepted money and facilitated her sexual abuse by both the senior monk and another businessman. Authorities subsequently filed charges under provisions relating to rape and grave sexual abuse. Investigators have also recovered physical evidence, including blood-stained clothing allegedly linked to the abuse, which is being sent for forensic examination. ### **National Reverberations** The gravity of the allegations is amplified by the accused’s public stature. Ven. Hemarathana was appointed the 11th Atamasthanadhipathi in 2022 and has recently played prominent ceremonial roles in state and religious events, including engagements attended by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the Dalai Lama. His arrest, if carried out, would mark an unprecedented moment in Sri Lanka’s modern Buddhist establishment, where senior clergy have historically wielded immense political and cultural authority. #### ### Vijay Crosses Majority Threshold, Bringing Dravidian Duopoly to Historic End URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/vijay-crosses-majority-threshold-bringing-dravidian-duopoly-to-historic-end/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T16:35:23.000Z #### **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** After days of uncertainty, movie heartthrob Vijay is finally set to be Tamil Nadu’s new chief minister after securing the support of three smaller parties, which helped him cross the magic number needed to form a government in the southern state. Losing no time, Vijay, 51, one of India’s highest-paid film stars, on Friday staked claim to form a government at his third meeting in as many days with Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar, who until now refused to let him take power till he produced proof that he had the support of 118 legislators. A hung verdict in Tamil Nadu on May 4 saw Vijay’s Tamiliga Vettri Kazhagam (VTK) win as many as 108 seats, but that was ten short of the minimum needed for any party or coalition to form a government. The political uncertainty triggered by the governor’s stance led to widespread speculation, prompting the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) to announce that their two MLAs each would support a Vijay-led government. The Congress had earlier pledged the support of all five of its legislators to Vijay after breaking its decades-long political alliance with the DMK, the party of outgoing Chief Minister M.K. Stalin. The party is now widely expected to join the Vijay-led government. The Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), which holds two seats, initially announced its support for Vijay before backtracking on that declaration. Vijay, who entered politics just two years ago but in that short span has virtually rewritten Tamil Nadu’s political script, appeared notably relaxed as he met the governor on Friday, dressed in blue jeans and a white shirt — a departure from the now-iconic white shirt and khaki-beige trousers that had until now defined his political appearances and become closely associated with both his personal image and the identity of TVK. Soon after, he drove to the Chennai offices of the CPI and CPI (M) to thank them for the decision to back him, which in turn propelled the VCK to follow suit. Leaders of the CPI and CPI (M), however, made it clear that they would remain aligned with the DMK led by Stalin, and their decision to back Vijay was aimed at preventing federal rule in Tamil Nadu, which would have made Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP the backseat driver for all practical purposes. Celebrations immediately erupted all across Tamil Nadu, one of India’s economically most successful states with 85 million people, as jubilant Vijay supporters took to the streets, bursting crackers and distributing sweets. Sources within the soon-to-governing TVK party told Jaffna Monitor that VCK leader Thol Thirumavalavan could be appointed Deputy Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, despite his party holding only two legislative seats. Thirumavalavan is expected to contest one of the two constituencies Vijay must vacate after winning from two seats. If and when Congress and VCK join the Vijay government as cabinet partners, it would herald the first ruling coalition in Tamil Nadu since 1967\. Since then, when the DMK first stormed to power, the state has been ruled by the DMK or AIADMK, the two Dravidian giants which bit the dust in the latest elections. According to some political sources, Vijay could be administered the oath of office and secrecy as early as Saturday at the head of a small government. His first mission would be to secure a legislative majority in the Tamil Nadu Assembly. As of now, Vijay has the backing of 107 of his own MLAs (the actor won from two seats), plus five of the Congress and six others from the CPI, CPI (M), and VCK, taking the total to 120. This would be just hovering on the safety margin of 118, and sources close to Vijay told Jaffna Monitor that he would like at least a third of the 47 AIADMK legislators to break ranks and support his government, giving him an administrative stability without which governance would go for a toss. In any case, since the four Communist legislators have not snapped ties with the DMK, Vijay is aware that they won’t be with him on all contentious issues. The Tamil Nadu verdict cut to size India’s two national parties – the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Congress strength in the Assembly crashed from double digits to five while the BJP now has just one member, down from four legislators in the outgoing House. While the Congress quickly recalibrated its political posture in Tamil Nadu after the election by shaking hands with Vijay, the BJP remains opposed to the actor-turned-politician who has pledged not to encourage “communal forces”. ### Kapila Chandrasena Found Dead at Cricket Legend Aravinda de Silva’s Home URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/kapila-chandrasena-found-dead-at-cricket-legend-aravinda-de-silvas-home/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T02:56:05.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Kapila Chandrasena, the former chief executive of SriLankan Airlines who faced corruption charges in one of Sri Lanka’s most consequential bribery investigations, was found dead on Friday morning at the Colombo residence of his brother-in-law, the former Sri Lankan cricket star Aravinda de Silva, according to police and information obtained by Jaffna Monitor. Mr. Chandrasena, 58, was found hanging inside the residence on Pedris Place in Kollupitiya, police said. Authorities described the death as suspicious pending further investigation, and a post-mortem examination has been ordered. A Colombo magistrate visited the scene on Friday as part of the inquiry. Mr. Chandrasena’s wife, Priyanka Neomali Wijenayake, is the sister of Mr. de Silva’s wife, Anushka Wijenayake. Police said Mr. Chandrasena had arrived at the residence the previous day. Former Sri Lankan cricket captain Arjuna Ranatunga was among those seen visiting the residence after news of the death emerged. The death came hours after Colombo Chief Magistrate Asanga S. Bodharagama issued a warrant for Mr. Chandrasena’s rearrest, after prosecutors alleged that he had violated bail conditions by arranging fraudulent sureties during his release earlier this week. The warrant ordered that Mr. Chandrasena be taken into custody and produced before the court without delay. Police sources said officers went to his Barnes Place residence on Wednesday evening to execute the order but found that he was not there. According to a person familiar with the matter, Mr. Chandrasena had gone to Mr. de Silva’s Pedris Place residence, roughly two kilometers from his home, after the warrant was issued as authorities searched for him. Police have not officially confirmed that account. Mr. Chandrasena had been released on bail on May 5 in connection with allegations that he accepted millions of dollars in bribes linked to a 2013 aircraft procurement deal between SriLankan Airlines and Airbus, valued at approximately $2.3 billion. International investigators alleged that Airbus agreed to pay roughly $16.84 million in bribes tied to the transaction. Prosecutors said at least $2 million was funneled through a shell company linked to Mr. Chandrasena’s wife and later transferred into a Singapore bank account. In 2020, Airbus entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with British authorities, admitting that intermediaries had been used to improperly influence aircraft contracts in several countries, including Sri Lanka. The United States imposed sanctions on Mr. Chandrasena in 2024, accusing him of significant corruption and barring him and his immediate family from entering the country. The case drew heightened political scrutiny earlier this year when Sri Lanka’s Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, known as CIABOC, told a Colombo court that Mr. Chandrasena had initially claimed that 60 million Sri Lankan rupees from Airbus-related funds had been paid to former President Mahinda Rajapaksa in three installments, while an additional 20 million rupees had allegedly been paid to former Civil Aviation Minister Priyankara Jayaratne. Mr. Chandrasena later withdrew those allegations in a sworn affidavit, asserting that the statement had been extracted under coercion and that references to senior political figures had been made under pressure and without legal counsel present. CIABOC has not publicly addressed those claims. Police said Mr. Chandrasena was scheduled to appear in court on Friday morning. ### ITAK Chairman’s Luxury Vehicle Lease Raises Questions URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/itak-chairmans-luxury-vehicle-lease-raises-questions/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T20:54:11.000Z **VAVUNIYA, Sri Lanka —** The chairman of the Vavuniya South Tamil Pradeshiya Sabha spent more than 1.7 million rupees of public money in five months on a rented luxury pickup truck, even as residents in the area say the council repeatedly cites budget constraints to explain crumbling roads, broken drains, and unlit streets. The expenditure came to light after the Pradeshiya Sabha was compelled to release the information following a Right to Information request, prompting scrutiny from residents and civil society observers who have questioned both the scale of the spending and the process through which the contract was awarded. The chairman, who is affiliated with the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, entered into a one-year lease for a Toyota Double Cab Pickup running from November 13, 2025, to November 12, 2026\. Under the terms of the contract, the council pays 340,000 rupees per month for up to 3,000 kilometers, with an additional charge of 150 rupees per kilometer beyond that threshold. In the first five months of the agreement, the total bill came to 1,724,750 rupees. The council already has access to an official fleet that includes a single-cab vehicle, a three-wheeler, and a double-cab pickup provided by the Government Agent. Previous chairmen are reported to have managed their official duties using those vehicles. No public procurement notice or newspaper advertisement for the vehicle lease appears to have been published through standard official channels, according to residents and observers who have tracked the matter. The absence of any visible competitive bidding process has deepened concerns about transparency and governance. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/itak-chairman-s-luxury-vehicle-ZESybQ-kixz2vfznajz64y.png) ![Information released by the Vavuniya South Tamil Pradeshiya Sabha under a Right to Information request details payments made for the chairman’s rented vehicle.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/itak-chairman-s-luxury-vehicle-ZESybQ-kixtafub9ats1mi.png) Information released by the Vavuniya South Tamil Pradeshiya Sabha under a Right to Information request details payments made for the chairman’s rented vehicle. "Why is there money for an expensive vehicle when there is no money to fix the roads?" has become a refrain in the community, capturing the frustration of residents who say public infrastructure in Vavuniya South has deteriorated while administrative spending has grown. The chairman and ITAK officials did not immediately respond to requests for comment. While critics have mockingly begun referring to ITAK as “Institutionalized Taxpayer Abuse Katchi,” the controversy has also renewed broader concerns about the fiscal discipline and governance standards of Tamil political parties, particularly when entrusted even with limited administrative authority such as local Pradeshiya Sabha leadership. ### After 17 Years of Protest, Tamil Mother Dies Without Knowing Fate of Missing Sons URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/after-17-years-of-protest-tamil-mother-dies-without-knowing-fate-of-missing-sons/ Last updated: 2026-05-09T08:34:37.000Z **MULLAITIVU, Sri Lanka** — A Tamil mother who spent nearly 17 years searching for her two sons and son-in-law, who disappeared after surrendering to Sri Lankan military forces during the final days of the country’s civil war, has died without learning their fate. *Murugesupillai Sellamma*, 74, from the *Muthaiyankattu* area of Mullaitivu District, died on April 27, according to relatives and local advocacy groups. Her death comes after years of public protests, appeals, and activism demanding truth and accountability for thousands of Tamils who were forcibly disappeared at the end of the war in 2009. Sellamma became one of many symbolic figures in Sri Lanka’s long-running struggle over enforced disappearances, joining demonstrations by families across the country’s North and East who have sought answers about relatives last seen in government custody. On May 18, 2009, during the final stage of the war in *Mullivaikkal*, Ms. Sellamma and her family crossed into Sri Lankan military-controlled territory through the Mullivaikkal-Vattuvagal bridge, according to family members. Relatives said she surrendered her two sons and her daughter’s husband to Sri Lankan military personnel after being assured that former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members and affiliates would undergo rehabilitation and eventually be reunited with their families. They were never seen again. ![Sasikumar Ranjinithevi carries portraits of three missing family members](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/after-17-years-of-protest-tami-lzCWkQ-kix25bjjwb326a0.png) Sasikumar Ranjinithevi carries portraits of three missing family members For years afterward, Ms. Sellamma participated in roadside protests, hunger strikes, and advocacy campaigns organized by families of the disappeared, calling for international investigations into enforced disappearances and wartime abuses. Her daughter, Sasikumar Ranjinithevi, has continued that campaign while also caring for younger family members and elderly relatives. She now serves as secretary of the Mullaitivu Association of Relatives of Enforced Disappearances and remains active in efforts to secure justice for her missing family members. Rights groups and Tamil advocacy organizations say thousands of Tamils remain unaccounted for since the war’s conclusion, including many who witnesses say surrendered directly to Sri Lankan security forces. Despite years of demonstrations and international scrutiny, successive Sri Lankan governments have failed to provide comprehensive or credible explanations regarding the fate of many of the disappeared. ### Former SriLankan Airlines Chief Found Dead After Court Orders Rearrest in Bribery Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-srilankan-airlines-chief-found-dead-after-court-orders-rearrest-in-bribery-case/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T15:30:44.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — Kapila Chandrasena, the former chief executive of SriLankan Airlines who was facing charges in one of Sri Lanka’s most consequential corruption investigations, was found dead on Thursday at a residence in Colombo’s Kollupitiya neighborhood, police said. He was 58. The death came one day after a Colombo court ordered his rearrest over what prosecutors described as violations of his bail conditions. Police said they suspected suicide. Investigations are continuing. Mr. Chandrasena had been at the center of a sprawling bribery inquiry involving the European aircraft manufacturer Airbus and a 2013 deal in which SriLankan Airlines agreed to purchase 10 aircraft in a transaction valued at approximately $2.3 billion. International investigators alleged that Airbus agreed to pay roughly $16.84 million in bribes linked to the procurement. Court filings contended that at least $2 million had been routed through a company connected to Mr. Chandrasena's wife into a bank account in Singapore. In 2020, Airbus reached a major deferred prosecution agreement with British authorities, acknowledging that intermediaries had been used to improperly influence aircraft sales across several countries, including Sri Lanka. The scandal gained new dimensions in 2024 when the United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Mr. Chandrasena, accusing him of accepting bribes in exchange for securing aircraft purchases at inflated prices. Sri Lanka's Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, known as CIABOC, arrested Mr. Chandrasena on March 12 in connection with the $2 million payment. During court proceedings, CIABOC alleged that Mr. Chandrasena had told investigators that 60 million Sri Lankan rupees drawn from the Airbus-related funds had been delivered to former President Mahinda Rajapaksa in three installments. Mr. Chandrasena subsequently withdrew that claim in a sworn affidavit, asserting that the statement had been made under coercion and that references to Mr. Rajapaksa and his son, Namal Rajapaksa, had not been voluntary. He was granted bail on May 5 under strict conditions, including a cash deposit of 500,000 rupees and three sureties of 10 million rupees each. On Wednesday, a Colombo court ordered his rearrest after CIABOC argued that two of the sureties had been improperly obtained, constituting a breach of the bail terms. ### The Ones Who Warn Power: Why Every Nation Needs Its Brave Dissenters URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-6/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T01:27:30.000Z **By Jeevan Thiyagaraja** There is a particular species of public servant that institutions simultaneously need and resent. They are not contrarians for sport. They are not leakers or rebels. They are people who have earned, through decades of credibility and demonstrated competence, the standing to say the thing that everyone in the room has already thought but nobody will speak aloud. Call them institutional dissenters. Call them honest brokers. The label matters less than the function: they exist to interrupt the quiet slide toward groupthink that claims even the best-run governments and organizations. Singapore's Ngiam Tong Dow — a servant's son who became one of the most powerful civil servants in his country's history — is perhaps the most vivid modern example. But he is not alone. Across governments and across generations, figures like him have appeared at the moments when nations most needed someone to say: we are wrong about this, and here is why. ### SINGAPORE ## **Ngiam Tong Dow and the weight of earned trust** Ngiam rose from genuine poverty — his father having died of tuberculosis when he was nine, and his mother working as a household servant — to become the youngest permanent secretary in Singapore’s history at thirty-three. Over four decades, he led five ministries and chaired major institutions including DBS Bank, the CPF Board, and HDB. He was one of the “Eight Immortals,” a group of civil servants so widely respected that they were nicknamed after Chinese deities. What separated Ngiam from the merely accomplished was his willingness to use that standing. Lee Kuan Yew invited him to private lunches twice a year and instructed him to set rank aside. On the Certificate of Entitlement — a policy that required Singaporeans to pay tens of thousands for the right to own a car — Ngiam told Lee directly: "You're taxing Singaporeans from birth to death." Lee's retort was blunt: "What's wrong with collecting more money?" The exchange was not a triumph of persuasion. It was something rarer: a genuine conversation between two people who disagreed and said so. *"I suspect we have started to believe our own propaganda."* — Ngiam Tong Dow, on Singapore's civil service, 2003 After his retirement in 1999, Ngiam kept speaking. In 2003 he warned the civil service was running "on autopilot" and that civil servants "think we are little Lee Kuan Yews." A decade later he observed that when ministers' salaries reach into the millions, a man who might otherwise speak up will be stopped by his wife. That interview went viral. He was pressured to walk it back. He largely did not. He died in August 2020 at eighty-three. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong eulogised him as a civil servant of "intellect, empathy and willingness to speak his mind" — which is a gracious way of acknowledging that Ngiam had spent his retirement making exactly the kind of observations that polite eulogies are usually written to avoid. ### UNITED STATES ## George Marshall and the ethics of the honest briefing ![George C. Marshal](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/untitled-draft-4is1S8-kix6zudqmtle7s3.png) George C. Marshal Marshall famously interrupted President Franklin Roosevelt mid-sentence at his first White House meeting to correct a strategic error — a move that nearly ended his career before it began. Roosevelt kept him anyway. It was one of the better decisions of the war. Marshall went on to oversee the Allied victory in Europe and, as Secretary of State, authored the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. Marshall's reputation rested on a single, well-understood principle: he would not tell a superior what they wanted to hear if it conflicted with what was true. This made him uniquely useful. Commanders who surrounded themselves with agreement were making decisions in a hall of mirrors. Marshall gave Roosevelt the unfiltered picture, even when it was bad. His approach was not rudeness dressed up as honesty. It was disciplined, considered, and delivered with the full weight of his institutional knowledge. The distinction matters: the dissenter who simply enjoys conflict is a problem. The dissenter who disagrees only when the evidence compels them, and says so clearly, is indispensable. ### GERMANY ## **Kurt Biedenkopf and the long game of structural hones**ty ![Kurt Biedenkopf](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/untitled-draft-4is1S8-kixk1skfyewb0dl.png) Kurt Biedenkopf As CDU Secretary-General, Biedenkopf publicly warned that his own party's corporatist consensus with trade unions was becoming economically unsustainable — a diagnosis deeply unwelcome to the party establishment and to Helmut Kohl, who eventually forced him out. He was vindicated by the structural crises that followed in the 1980s and 1990s. After reunification he rebuilt Saxony into one of eastern Germany's most economically resilient states. Biedenkopf's career illustrates a recurring pattern: the institutional dissenter is often punished in the short term and vindicated in the long one. The difficulty is that institutions operate on short cycles — elections, quarterly reviews, the next reshuffle — while structural problems compound quietly over years. The person warning about the long term is, almost by definition, raising issues that no one currently in power has an incentive to address. ### INDIA ## **Raghuram Rajan and the inconvenient forecast** ![Raghuram Rajan](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/untitled-draft-4is1S8-kixbtd4tn922ku7.png) Raghuram Rajan In 2005, at the height of the pre-crisis financial boom, Rajan presented a paper at the Jackson Hole symposium — the most prestigious gathering in global central banking — warning that financial innovation was creating systemic risks that could produce a severe crisis. He was mocked by senior economists and dismissed as alarmist. Three years later the global financial system collapsed in roughly the manner he had described. As RBI Governor he maintained monetary independence from government pressure and was not reappointed when his term ended. Rajan's Jackson Hole moment is now taught in economics programmes as a case study in what happens when expertise confronts institutional optimism. The paper was not technically controversial — the analysis was sound. What made it unwelcome was the timing. The people in that room had built careers, reputations, and policy frameworks on assumptions Rajan was questioning. Challenging those assumptions required them to consider that they had been wrong for years. *The most dangerous thing in any institution is not the person who disagrees. It is the silence when nobody does.* — A recurring lesson across every case studied here ### **UNITED KINGDOM** ## **Robin Butler and the art of the private warning** ![Robin Butler](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/untitled-draft-4is1S8-kixt5cxfb6xgo7g.png) Robin Butler Butler served as Cabinet Secretary across three prime ministerships — Thatcher, Major, and Blair — maintaining the tradition of frank private counsel that the British civil service regards as its central function. He later chaired the 2004 Butler Review into intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which delivered a carefully worded but unmistakable institutional verdict: the machinery of government had allowed a flawed intelligence picture to go insufficiently challenged before the war decision was made. Butler's career represents a different model from Ngiam or Marshall — the dissenter who works almost entirely through private channels, whose candour is expressed in the memorandum rather than the newspaper interview. The British civil service tradition holds that ministers decide and civil servants advise, but that the advice must be honest even when it is uncomfortable. Butler embodied that tradition. His review was its posthumous application: an official account of what happens when the tradition fails. ### THE PATTERN What all of them share Across these cases — Singapore, the United States, Germany, India, the United Kingdom — several features recur consistently. Each of these figures had built enough credibility through demonstrated competence that their dissent could not be easily dismissed. Ngiam had run five ministries. Marshall had planned the Allied victory. Rajan had been Chief Economist of the IMF. The standing was not incidental to the dissent — it was what made the dissent worth having. A critic without credibility is noise. A critic with it forces a real answer. Each was ultimately tolerated, and in some cases celebrated, by the very leaders they challenged — but usually after the fact. LKY praised Ngiam after his death. Roosevelt kept Marshall despite the insubordination. The recognition tends to arrive once the cost of not listening has become clear. And in each case, the institution that benefited from their honesty also, in some way, made them pay for it. Ngiam was pressured to soften his post-retirement remarks. Rajan was not reappointed. Biedenkopf was pushed out. Butler's review was welcomed and then quietly set aside. The institutional immune system treats honest challenge as a foreign body even when it is saving the organism. The question is not how to find people willing to tell uncomfortable truths. Such people exist in most organisations. The question is whether the institution has built conditions in which honest counsel can survive the telling — where the person who says the hard thing in private is not eventually forced into silence, and where the silence that follows when they give up is recognised for what it is. Ngiam Tong Dow spent forty years inside the machine and another two decades pointing at what the machine was getting wrong. He was heard, imperfectly and incompletely, which is probably the best any institution manages. The organisations that managed even that much were the ones that lasted. ### In Jaffna Killing, Family Seeks Justice as Police Conduct Comes Under Scrutiny URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/in-jaffna-killing-family-seeks-justice-as-police-conduct-comes-under-scrutiny/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T01:00:05.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The family of Arul Payas, the youth killed in a police shooting in Jaffna’s Allaipiddy area earlier this year, publicly accused Sri Lankan authorities on Wednesday of denying them justice, alleging intimidation, institutional indifference, and political abandonment in the months following his death. Speaking through tears at a press conference held at the Jaffna Media Centre, relatives said their efforts to seek accountability, including a visit to Colombo in hopes of meeting President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, ended in humiliation. “We went seeking justice for our son, but we were not even treated with basic dignity,” family members said, accusing officials of turning them away while false information was being spread about both the deceased and his relatives. Arul Payas was shot dead by police on February 10 in Velanai’s Allaipiddy area. While security sources have alleged that the youth and his family were linked to cattle smuggling and other illicit activities, his death has intensified debate in the Northern Province over police conduct and the growing perception that sections of the local police force, including some Tamil officers, are operating like thugs. Even among those who acknowledge that some allegations may have existed, critics argue that criminal suspicion, if true, cannot justify extrajudicial violence. “The law does not grant the police the right to act as judge, jury, and executioner,” several civil society voices in Jaffna have argued, reflecting a broader sentiment that the killing bore the hallmarks of an encounter-style execution rather than lawful enforcement. Relatives further alleged that police have sought to suppress the truth surrounding the shooting while monitoring and intimidating the family. Public frustration has also been directed at local political leadership. Family members sharply criticized ruling party parliamentarian Ilankumaran, saying he initially visited their home and promised support but later became unreachable. “How can someone who ignores the suffering of his own people be called a people’s representative?” they asked. In contrast, they acknowledged that ITAK MP Sivagnanam Shritharan, though not personally visiting the family, at least raised the matter in Parliament. ### Tamil Nadu Thrown Into Political Turmoil as Governor Blocks Vijay’s Path URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-nadu-thrown-into-political-turmoil-as-governor-blocks-vijays-path/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T15:30:51.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Tamil Nadu was in a state of unexpected flux as superstar Vijay battled with the New Delhi-appointed governor to get a crucial invite to prove his legislative majority, with some political parties saying the drama was being orchestrated by the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. After leading his Tamilga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) to stunning victories in 108 seats in the 234-member Assembly, Vijay faced a sudden googly from Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar, who said the actor did not have the support of enough members to weave a majority of 118 legislators. As TVK supporters staged protests against the stand, which went against established norms that a legislative majority must be shown in the House and not in a governor’s office, the Congress and other parties blasted Arlekar, a political appointee allied with Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Congress party, which said all five of its newly elected legislators in Tamil Nadu would back Vijay, accused the governor of trying to rewrite the rules of the game under pressure from the BJP, which could win only one seat in the southern state. “Tamil Nadu voted for change,” Congress MP Manickam Tagore told the media. “The TVK has 108 members. With our support, the total is 113\. The governor, a former BJP man, is under pressure. “The BJP’s mindset is not to make Vijay the chief minister. We know the governor is delaying the decision. Although the governor is a good man, he is under pressure. This is very unfortunate.” Like other political players, Tagore said Vijay should be invited to form a government quickly and asked to face a vote of confidence in the Assembly. Sources in Vijay’s party said they had also sought support of four smaller parties: the Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Viduthalai Chiruthaigai Katchi (VCK), and the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), all of which have two members each in the Tamil Nadu legislature. Although the VCK has an alliance with the outgoing ruling DMK party, it openly came out against the governor’s refusal to allow Vijay to prove his majority in the Tamil Nadu Assembly. VCK chief Thol Thirumavalavan said the governor had no right to tell Vijay to prove his majority support before inviting him to form the government. “Vijay should first assume charge as the chief minister. This is the people’s mandate. After that, it will be his responsibility to prove his majority.” The TVK, a party source told Jaffna Monitor, was simultaneously in covert talks with a section of the AIADMK party, a BJP ally, to influence a third of its 49 MLAs to break ranks and prop up Vijay as the new chief minister of Tamil Nadu. The Governor’s office said in a terse statement that the “requisite majority support in the Tamil Nadu Assembly, essential for forming a government, has not been established.” According to political activists, the governor wants Vijay to submit a statement to him giving the names and signatures of at least 118 newly elected members. A Vijay colleague said if the governor remained adamant, the party would be forced to move the Supreme Court to secure justice. “We are the single largest party, and convention demands that we should be invited to form a government,” the source said. “We will prove our majority in the House. If we fail, we will quit. It is as simple as that.” Another TVK source told Jaffna Monitor: “We will not have any alliance with the BJP, DMK, and AIADMK. Yes, we may want some AIADMK people to switch allegiance. But we won’t embrace that party.” As if to prove that the governor was indeed acting at the BJP’s behest, the only two parties that formally came out in support of his anti-Vijay posture were the BJP and its ally, the AIADMK. Vijay, one of India’s best-paid movie stars, created a sensation when he, fighting first very first election, led the TVK to a history-making win in as many as 108 constituencies across the sprawling state of Tamil Nadu. Vijay himself won from two places. The two-year-old TVK’s performance crushed Tamil Nadu’s two established Dravidian parties, the ruling DMK and the main opposition AIADMK, which won just 59 and 47 seats. All other established parties also suffered a rout. During his election campaign, Vijay, 51, whose father is a Christian and mother a Hindu, called the BJP “fascist” and pledged that he would never give any quarter to “communalism” – a political euphemism for Hindu supremacist politics championed by Modi’s BJP. In other state elections held along with Tamil Nadu, the BJP retained power in the north-eastern state of Assam and stormed to power in West Bengal with thumping majorities. It also secured three seats in the southern state of Kerala, where the Congress dislodged the Communists from office. Tamil Nadu alone firmly rebuffed the BJP, despite the party’s hectic efforts over the past five years to make critical inroads into the state of 85 million people. Prime Minister Modi personally invested significant time and energy in trying to swing Tamil voters toward his party. But the Vijay tsunami drowned the BJP, which had four seats in the outgoing Tamil Nadu Assembly and now has just one. ### Chandrika Congratulates Vijay, Signaling Regional Interest in Tamil Nadu’s New Political Era URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/chandrika-congratulates-vijay-signaling-regional-interest-in-tamil-nadus-new-political-era/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:47:16.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Former Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga has formally congratulated Tamil film star-turned-politician C. Joseph Vijay on his election as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, praising his rise as a “remarkable achievement” and expressing hope for stronger ties between Sri Lanka and the southern Indian state. In a letter dated May 6, 2026, addressed to Vijay, Kumaratunga acknowledged his electoral victory and highlighted the longstanding relationship between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. “Please accept my congratulations on your election to the high post of Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in the recent Elections,” Kumaratunga wrote. “This is a remarkable achievement.” Recalling what she described as the “long and cordial association” between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, the former president said she looked forward to continued friendly relations under Vijay’s leadership. “I recall with pleasure the long and cordial association between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka and look forward to our continued friendly relationship under your governance,” she wrote. Kumaratunga also wished Vijay “strength, wisdom, and success” as he assumes office. The message carries significance given Tamil Nadu’s historic political, cultural, and emotional influence on Sri Lankan Tamil affairs, particularly during periods of ethnic conflict and regional diplomacy. Vijay’s political ascent, which has reshaped Tamil Nadu’s political landscape, has drawn attention across South Asia, including in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority North and East, where his popularity as an actor has long translated into substantial public appeal. Kumaratunga, who served as Sri Lanka’s president from 1994 to 2005, remains one of the country’s most internationally recognized political figures. For his part, Vijay has yet to articulate a comprehensive foreign policy vision, and Tamil Nadu's role in shaping Sri Lanka policy has always been constrained by the constitutional realities of India's federal structure, where external affairs remain firmly in New Delhi's domain. But the political symbolism of who leads Chennai — and what that leader chooses to emphasize — has never been entirely irrelevant to Tamils on either side of the water. Kumaratunga wished Vijay "strength, wisdom, and success" as he assumes office. Whether those qualities translate into a renewed engagement with the unresolved architecture of Tamil grievances in Sri Lanka will depend on choices that, for now, remain unmade. ### As Vietnam's Leader Visits Colombo, Sri Lanka Studies the Lessons of a Marxist Economic Success URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/as-vietnams-leader-visits-colombo-sri-lanka-studies-the-lessons-of-a-marxist-economic-success/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T18:14:36.000Z **COLOMBO —** Vietnam’s President and Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm is set to arrive in Sri Lanka today for a two-day state visit that officials in both countries describe as the most consequential diplomatic engagement between Hanoi and Colombo since formal ties were established more than five decades ago — a visit freighted with economic ambition, ideological affinity and the careful optimism of two nations seeking to build something more durable than goodwill. His motorcade from Bandaranaike International Airport wound through a city under a special traffic plan, roads cleared of heavy vehicles for the convoy. Nearly 200 members are expected to form part of the visiting Vietnamese delegation. The visit marks the highest-level engagement by a Vietnamese leader with Sri Lanka since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1970\. It follows a stop in New Delhi, where Mr. Tô and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to elevate bilateral ties to an enhanced comprehensive strategic partnership. Mr. Tô is scheduled to address Sri Lanka's Parliament, an unusual diplomatic gesture extended to few visiting heads of state, and one that underscores the political symbolism both Colombo and Hanoi are investing in the occasion. ### **A Warm Relationship, Modest Numbers** The foundations of the Vietnam-Sri Lanka relationship are unusually textured for two countries separated by geography and connected by limited trade. Both nations endured colonial rule and prolonged armed conflict. Both draw on Buddhism as a deep cultural anchor. President Ho Chi Minh visited Sri Lanka three times and a monument to him in Colombo remains a recurring point of reference in Vietnamese diplomatic messaging about the relationship. Annual bilateral trade stood at approximately $200 million for years before climbing to around $260 million in 2025 — a 20 percent increase from the prior year — with trade in the first quarter of 2026 reaching roughly $50 million. Officials in both capitals have set a joint target of $1 billion in annual trade, a figure that would require a near-quadrupling of current volumes. Economists and trade analysts are cautiously optimistic but note that similar targets between smaller Asian economies often founder on logistics, protectionism and implementation inertia. The economic case rests partly on complementarity: Vietnam exports electronics, garments and industrial materials; Sri Lanka supplies tea, rubber and agricultural products. Sri Lanka currently holds 34 active investment projects in Vietnam across seven sectors, with a total registered capital of $43 million. Direct air connectivity between the two countries, still under negotiation, is widely regarded as a critical missing link that could substantially accelerate both tourism and business travel. ### Agreements Across a Broad Agenda Sri Lanka's Cabinet has granted approval for the signing of several memoranda of understanding during the visit, covering culture, Buddhist religious cooperation, science and technology, police training, and information and communications. Among the agreements is a religious cooperation pact between Sri Lanka's Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs and Vietnam's Ministry of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, covering the welfare of religious students and the protection of religious practices. A separate agreement will establish police training and scientific research cooperation between the Sri Lanka National Police Training Institute and Vietnam's People's Police Training Institute — an area with strategic implications given both countries' concerns about transnational crime and maritime security. Vietnamese Ambassador to Sri Lanka Trinh Thi Tam said the visit was positioned to deliver breakthroughs in trade, investment and logistics while establishing long-term frameworks for cooperation in innovation, digital economy and energy transition. Broader cooperation in agriculture, high technology, fisheries, education and logistics is also expected to be advanced, she added. ### Sri Lanka as Both Partner and Student The visit carries particular resonance for Sri Lanka, which is still navigating the aftermath of its catastrophic 2022 economic collapse — the worst in its post-independence history — that emptied foreign exchange reserves, triggered acute fuel and medicine shortages, and ultimately forced a humiliating IMF bailout. The country has since stabilised under the IMF programme, but the process of rebuilding investor confidence and diversifying the economy remains far from complete, and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's government faces intensifying pressure to deliver visible results. Government sources say Sri Lanka's current leadership increasingly views Vietnam not only as an important diplomatic and economic partner, but as an ideologically familiar model — given the shared Marxist roots between Sri Lanka's ruling Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna-led administration and Vietnam's Communist Party. That alignment gives Mr. Tô's visit added significance beyond traditional diplomacy, offering what officials describe as both a strategic partnership and a form of political learning. Vietnam's transformation from a war-ravaged, isolated economy into one of Southeast Asia's most dynamic manufacturing and export hubs is widely attributed to a combination of political discipline, long-term planning, sustained investment in infrastructure and education, and a willingness to pragmatically embrace market mechanisms while maintaining single-party political control. For Sri Lanka, where decades of ethnic conflict and political fragmentation repeatedly obstructed economic development, the Vietnamese path represents something specific and instructive: that ideological conviction and pragmatic governance are not necessarily in tension. Critics, however, are quick to note the limits of the comparison. Vietnam's economic transformation unfolded over four decades under a unified and highly disciplined state apparatus. Sri Lanka is a plural democracy with a volatile electoral cycle, a fractious opposition, and an ethnic minority question — the grievances of Tamil and Muslim communities in the north and east — that remains unresolved and politically combustible. Whether the Dissanayake government has either the political will or the institutional capacity to replicate even the broad contours of the Vietnamese model is, analysts say, very much an open question. ### Whether the Momentum Holds State visits between smaller and mid-sized nations have a well-documented tendency to produce agreements that outpace implementation capacity. Memoranda of understanding are signed; joint committees are established; trade targets are announced. What follows, in many cases, is a period of institutional inertia that allows the goodwill generated by a high-profile visit to quietly dissipate. Both governments appear aware of this risk. Vietnamese officials have emphasised that Mr. Tô's visit is accompanied not just by diplomats but by a substantial business delegation — a signal, they say, that Hanoi is interested in commercial outcomes, not just political optics. Events such as Sri Lanka Expo 2026 and bilateral business forums are expected to create additional platforms for private-sector engagement, while streamlining trade procedures is identified by both sides as a precondition for hitting the $1 billion target. The parliamentary address will be watched closely in both capitals. Heads of state who address foreign legislatures tend to make commitments that are harder to quietly shelve than those made in bilateral communiqués. If Mr. Tô uses the occasion to announce concrete deliverables — specific investments, timelines for direct air routes, a framework for the digital economy cooperation both sides have flagged — the visit will carry more weight than the warm bilateral language suggests. What is already clear is that the visit represents a deliberate repositioning: away from a historically warm but underdeveloped friendship, and toward a partnership with structural ambitions. The question is not whether Sri Lanka and Vietnam want that partnership. Both clearly do. The question is whether the institutions, the logistics and the political will exist to build it — and whether, in the months after the motorcades have gone and the memoranda have been filed, the work actually gets done. ### Vijay’s Victory Inspires Jaffna Activist’s Satirical Broadside Against Dynastic and Caste Politics URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/vijays-victory-inspires-jaffna-activists-satirical-broadside-against-dynastic-and-caste-politics/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T19:08:04.000Z A Jaffna-based civil activist has used Tamil actor Vijay’s landmark electoral victory in Tamil Nadu as a launchpad for a biting satirical open letter that says far more about Sri Lankan Tamil political culture than it does about the film star himself — lampooning dynastic privilege, and caste hierarchy. Arun Siddharth, Jaffna District Coordinator of Sarvajana Balaya, addressed the letter to Vijay at his party’s Chennai headquarters, opening with a salutation to the “Honorable ‘Excellency’ Commander Albet Chandrasekar Joseph Vijay” — the quotation marks around Excellency doing considerable work. The inflated honorifics parody the militaristic hero worship Siddharth argues has long disfigured Tamil celebrity politics on both sides of the Palk Strait. After congratulating Vijay on following M.G. Ramachandran’s populist template “without the slightest deviation” to become Chief Minister, the letter pivots sharply. Its stated purpose, Siddharth wrote without embarrassment, is “mainly to create division” regarding two Sri Lankan Tamil politicians who have sent Vijay congratulatory letters of their own: Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, leader of the Tamil National People’s Front, and Archuna Ramanathan, a sitting parliamentarian. “Do not trust either of them,” he advised. The indictment of Gajendrakumar rests on several charges. Siddharth noted that the TNPF leader had travelled to Chennai just three or four months earlier to meet Vijay’s political rival M.K. Stalin and deliver a similarly effusive congratulatory letter — at which point he showed no interest in Vijay whatsoever. The dynastic parallel was equally pointed: the Ponnambalam family’s grandfather-to-father-to-grandson political succession, Siddharth wrote, mirrors precisely the hereditary politics Vijay had campaigned against in Tamil Nadu. Siddharth accused Gajendrakumar and his associates of coaching Seeman, the leader of Naam Tamilar Katchi. The result, he suggested, was Seeman failing to win a single seat. “Whoever they associate with ends in defeat,” Siddharth wrote, invoking a Tamil proverb about a tortoise entering a house. Archuna Ramanathan fared no better. Siddharth described him as a man who once raised a gun in a land dispute and threatened a woman, an incident he said left the parliamentarian politically “crippled.” He added that Ramanathan creates chaos wherever he goes and is widely regarded in Jaffna as mentally unstable. The warning to Vijay was blunt: maintain no connection with either man. Caste runs through the letter as its deepest preoccupation. Siddharth framed both politicians as products of dominant-caste privilege. One, he wrote, boasts that his family once owned 160 buses and claims the entire Sri Lanka CTB fleet as its legacy; the other has investments in a money-lending finance company. One has stated on video that he is a “Vellala” man — a reference to Jaffna’s historically dominant caste. Siddharth also wrote that he possesses videos of both men verbally abusing their own mothers. “These are people with arrogant caste mentality,” he wrote. “Now they may even begin subtly investigating what caste Vijay belongs to.” Against this, Siddharth drew an unlikely bond of shared identity between himself and Vijay. Both, he noted, display portraits of Ambedkar and Periyar on their walls. His own son, named Siddharth Maitreyan after the Buddha, has the religion field left blank on his birth certificate — a gesture Siddharth said he had heard Vijay’s father also made for Vijay. Siddharth further noted that his wife’s family converted to Christianity after her father was taken and shot by the LTTE in 1990, while also emphasizing that Vijay himself is a Christian. The letter’s most theatrical proposal came near its close: that Vijay register a Sri Lankan branch of his Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam, humorously suggesting that simply replacing “Tamilaga” with “Tamil Eelam” would create a “Tamil Eelam Vettri Kazhagam” powerful enough to shake Sri Lanka’s political establishment. Siddharth argued, partly in jest, that the name alone would sound “electrifying” and could help send the island’s hereditary politicians home. He further claimed that many young Sri Lankans had already celebrated Vijay’s victory with fireworks, adding that many of those enthusiastic supporters were his own friends. The letter ended with a personal wager. Siddharth’s twelve-year-old son, a devoted Vijay supporter, had challenged his father to a bet on the election outcome: if Vijay won, Siddharth would shave his head bald; if Stalin won, the boy would obey his father for a month. “Now I am in a position where I must shave my head,” Siddharth conceded. The postscript was in keeping with the letter’s register throughout. Should Vijay wish to call, Siddharth wrote, he stood ready to travel to Chennai in person to “create further division” by providing detailed accounts of other figures as well. He signed off as “Future Member of Sri Lankan Parliament in 2029.” ### Sri Lanka Court Upholds Death Sentences in Vithiya Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-court-upholds-death-sentences-in-vithiya-case/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T23:49:33.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court on Wednesday upheld the death sentences of four men convicted in the 2015 abduction, gang rape, and murder of Sivaloganathan Vithiya, an 18-year-old student from Jaffna. In a ruling delivered by a five-judge bench headed by Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena, the court dismissed appeals filed by the chief accused, Mahalingam Sasikumar — widely known as “Swiss Kumar” — and three others seeking to overturn their convictions. The court also set aside the sentences of two additional defendants. The case, which deeply traumatised the Tamil-majority Northern Province, dates back to May 2015, when Vithiya, an Advanced Level student from Pungudutivu, was abducted on her way to school. Her body was discovered the following day in an abandoned building, where investigators said she had been sexually assaulted and murdered. Her killing provoked widespread outrage across northern Sri Lanka, leading to hartals, protests, and demands for justice, while also exposing serious deficiencies in policing, particularly after officers initially dismissed her disappearance and later faced accusations of negligence and complicity. Public anger intensified when Swiss Kumar briefly escaped custody before being recaptured, a scandal that later resulted in the conviction of former Senior Deputy Inspector General Lalith Jayasinghe for aiding the suspect’s flight. The original 2017 Trial-at-Bar in Jaffna — the first of its kind in the district — sentenced seven men to death, marking a landmark judicial moment in the region. Although Sri Lanka retains capital punishment, executions have not been carried out since 1976 under a longstanding unofficial moratorium, meaning the sentences may remain symbolic unless future governments reverse that policy. Still, Wednesday’s judgment is likely to be viewed by many as a rare moment of judicial closure in a case that profoundly shaped public discourse on justice, gender violence and state accountability in post-war Sri Lanka. Vithiya's family had been displaced from Pungudutivu in 1990 as a result of the Sri Lankan Civil War. During the final months of the war in 2009, Vithiya was studying in Colombo while her family, still in the Vanni, were caught in the brutal fighting and ended up in the Menik Farm internment camps. She and her family returned to Pungudutivu in 2010. ### Thirty Kilometres That Could Change a Region URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/thirty-kilometres-that-could-change-a-region/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T08:41:12.000Z ***India and Sri Lanka are separated by a sliver of sea. The cost of leaving it uncrossed grows by the year.*** COLOMBO — On the morning of May 2, the Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka stood before an audience of businesspeople, policymakers, and diplomats at the Grand Ballroom of a Colombo hotel and said something that diplomats rarely say in public: that his host country was making a historic mistake, and that it needed to stop. Santosh Jha, India's top envoy in Colombo, did not use those words exactly. He is a career diplomat, trained in the careful grammar of statecraft. But the substance of what he delivered at the Global Innovation and Leadership Summit — organised by Z Media and WION — was unmistakably direct. He called the absence of a land link between India and Sri Lanka "an anomaly." He said the engineering was understood, the economics were compelling, and the time for wavering was "over." He drew the image of two neighbouring rooms connected only by a long corridor outside, when a door could be built right through the wall between them. "We need to open that door," Jha told his audience. Weeks earlier, during President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s December 2024 visit to New Delhi, Sri Lanka had quietly declined to advance the land bridge proposal. The project was removed from the formal agenda. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Colombo in April 2025 and referred to land connectivity during bilateral talks, it was not on Sri Lanka’s agenda. Jha’s speech was, in this context, a public argument directed not at an undecided audience but at a government that had already said no. ### **The Arithmetic of Absurdity** The closest points between India and Sri Lanka — the tip of Dhanushkodi in Tamil Nadu and the port of Talaimannar in Sri Lanka's Mannar District — are separated by approximately 30 kilometres of shallow water, in places no deeper than ten metres. By contrast, the sea route between Chennai and Colombo, the two countries' commercial capitals, spans roughly 740 kilometres. Ships must travel nearly thirty times the distance because no shorter path exists. For citizens wishing to travel between India and Sri Lanka without flying, options remain extremely limited. A passenger ferry service exists between Nagapattinam and Kankesanthurai, but it operates on a relatively modest scale and currently depends on significant Indian government financial support to remain affordable. The roughly 110-kilometre crossing takes about three to four hours. Yet despite the two countries lying just a few kilometres apart, there is still no direct road or railway connection. Nor is there an operational electricity grid linking the two countries, despite years of discussions over a submarine power cable. There is also no petroleum pipeline, even after Sri Lanka’s recent economic crisis exposed the country’s vulnerability to fuel shortages caused by foreign exchange constraints. There was, once, a connection. The Indo-Ceylon Boat Mail, a colonial-era rail and ferry service, linked Madras to Colombo through Rameswaram and Talaimannar. The 1964 cyclone destroyed the Dhanushkodi railway line and left the town largely uninhabitable, forcing major changes to the route. But the Boat Mail service itself continued through Rameswaram until 1983, when it was suspended amid the worsening ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Nothing serious has been built since. ### **What the Studies Say** A 2023 analysis by Sri Lankan economists concluded that a fixed land link — bridge, tunnel, or a combination of both — would reduce transport costs in India–Sri Lanka bilateral trade by approximately 50 percent. Thirteen of the top fifteen products India currently exports to Sri Lanka, including sugar, pharmaceuticals, cotton, vegetables, and plastics, are suited to land transport, meaning they could immediately benefit from cheaper, faster, and more reliable logistics. A fixed link would also give Sri Lanka access to a market of 1.4 billion people at drastically lower cost than today. It would create thousands of construction and operational jobs. It would allow the Northern Province to become a transit zone and growth corridor rather than a periphery. The Pathfinder Foundation, a Colombo-based think tank, has outlined what it calls an “Economic Land Corridor”: not merely a bridge, but a spine for industrial zones, logistics parks, cold chains, and tourism clusters running along the Mannar–Trincomalee–Colombo axis. A research paper by Gayasha Samarakoon and Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, published by Routledge, describes the potential as a structural game-changer for both economies, estimating that a well-designed land corridor could transform the North’s share of national GDP within a decade. “The engineering is well understood,” Jha told his audience in Colombo. “The economics are compelling. The benefits, wherever such bridges have been built, are unmistakable.” ### **The Precedents Are Overwhelming** When Denmark and Sweden opened the Øresund Fixed Link in July 2000 — a combined tunnel, artificial island, and cable-stayed bridge spanning the strait between Copenhagen and Malmö — the sceptics predicted disruption and warned of sovereignty erosion. What followed was neither. The number of daily commuters crossing the strait grew from 3,291 in 2000 to 18,000 in 2010\. Academic research found that residents of Malmö gained access to Copenhagen’s larger labour market, with total wage effects for Malmö residents rising by nearly 15 percent relative to pre-bridge levels eight years after opening. By 2024, more than 7.6 million vehicles were crossing the bridge annually. The region created around the link — 4.2 million people straddling an international border — became one of northern Europe’s most dynamic economic zones. The Øresund project’s environmental record is equally instructive. The artificial island of Peberholm, created from dredged seabed material, was left entirely unplanted. Within a few years, more than 500 plant species and 30 kinds of nesting birds had colonised it unaided. Peberholm has been a Natura 2000 protected site since 2000 and is now closed to the public to preserve its wild state. An island built for infrastructure became, without human intervention, one of the most biodiverse sites in the Øresund region. Both nations retained their passports, their legal systems, their tax regimes, their languages, and their sovereignty. The bridge did not make Sweden Danish or Denmark Swedish. It made both richer. The Channel Tunnel, which opened in 1994 beneath the English Channel, tells a similar story at a larger scale. By 2024, it was carrying nearly 19 million passengers, 2.19 million cars, and 1.2 million trucks annually between France and the United Kingdom. It carries roughly a quarter of all EU–UK export value. And crucially, it has evolved beyond a transport corridor: the same tunnel infrastructure now hosts ElecLink, a 1-gigawatt electricity interconnector between the French and British power grids. The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge, which opened in 2018 as the world’s longest sea crossing at 55 kilometres, cut travel time between Zhuhai and Hong Kong International Airport from roughly four hours to 45 minutes. It placed cities across the Pearl River Delta within a three-hour commute of Hong Kong, transforming what had been a maritime barrier into a seamless economic hinterland. None of these projects were straightforward. All faced cost overruns, political opposition, environmental concerns, and years of delay. All were built anyway. All changed the economic geography of their regions in ways their critics had said were impossible or dangerous. ### **The Energy Argument** Beyond the land bridge, Jha's speech pointed to a more urgent and much-needed dimension of connectivity: energy. Sri Lanka's 2022 economic crisis, which caused queues stretching for miles at petrol stations, hospitals running on generators, and a sitting president fleeing by ship in the night, was in its most immediate form an energy crisis. The country ran out of foreign exchange to pay for imported fuel. The structural vulnerability that made this possible has not been resolved. India has been studying an electricity interconnection with Sri Lanka since at least 1970\. The current proposal involves a High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) link running 285 kilometres from Madurai in Tamil Nadu to Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka's North Central Province, including 50 kilometres of submarine cabling through the Palk Strait. The initial phase, backed by the World Bank and targeted for completion by 2030, would transmit 500 megawatts of electricity in either direction, upgradeable to 1,000 megawatts. Sri Lanka's own power planning documents, including the Ceylon Electricity Board's 2025–2044 generation plan, explicitly include the Indian interconnection in its base-case scenario — and for a reason that is not widely understood in public debate. As Sri Lanka adds solar and wind generation to meet its target of 70 percent renewable electricity by 2030, it faces an increasingly urgent problem: what to do with surplus power on sunny and windy days, and where to find backup on cloudy, windless ones. The CEB's planning documents warn that large-scale renewable curtailments — power generated but wasted because there is nowhere to send it — are expected to begin as early as 2026. The answer, in power systems around the world, is interconnection. A grid link with India would allow Sri Lanka to export surplus renewable energy when it has too much, and import affordable power when it has too little. A joint feasibility analysis by Sri Lanka's Ministry of Energy and India's Power Grid Corporation found that in low-wind, peak-demand conditions Sri Lanka would import approximately 500 megawatts from India — but in high-wind, off-peak conditions, approximately 500 megawatts could flow in the opposite direction, from Sri Lanka to India. The South Asian precedents are instructive. For Bhutan, hydropower export revenues to India account for over 40 percent of national government revenue, according to the Asian Development Bank — making it the single largest source of state income. Nepal, after years of energy shortfall, began its first electricity exports to Bangladesh in June 2025, transiting 40 megawatts through India's grid in a landmark trilateral arrangement. Academic modelling — including a USAID-commissioned study by the Integrated Research and Action for Development — projects that Nepal's full participation in cross-border electricity trade could increase its GDP by up to 39 percent by 2045 under accelerated trade scenarios. These are sovereign nations with their own foreign policies. None of them has been absorbed into India. All of them are more energy-secure, and more economically resilient, than they were before interconnection. ### **The Fears, Examined** Sri Lanka's caution about deeper connectivity with India is not irrational. It is rooted in history, in the asymmetry of power between a nation of 22 million and a neighbour of 1.4 billion, and in a political culture that has spent decades calibrating the distance between partnership and subordination. The most persistent fear is sovereignty: that a physical link would give India leverage over Sri Lanka's domestic politics, that Indian capital and goods would overwhelm local industries, that demographic pressures would follow the roads. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who took office in late 2024, stated publicly in 2025 that Sri Lanka was "not yet ready" for a land connection. These concerns deserve to be taken seriously. They should not, however, be allowed to go unexamined. **On sovereignty:** Sri Lanka is already deeply embedded in India's economic orbit. India is already Sri Lanka's largest trading partner, its largest source of tourists, and its largest foreign direct investor, with cumulative investments exceeding $2.2 billion. The question is not whether Sri Lanka is in India's sphere of economic influence. It already is. The question is whether Sri Lanka manages that reality from a position of structural strength — as a connected hub, an energy-exporting node, a transit economy — or from a position of structural weakness, as an isolated island that pays a premium for everything it imports and has no fallback when supply chains break. **On economic domination:** The experience of Nepal and Bhutan demonstrates that smaller South Asian neighbours of India can negotiate cross-border arrangements that serve their interests without becoming client states. The critical variable is not whether connectivity is pursued, but how it is structured — what pricing formulas govern energy trade, what safeguard clauses protect sensitive industries, what dispute mechanisms exist, and what Sri Lanka extracts in return for access to its territory and infrastructure. **On environment:** the Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar are among the most ecologically rich marine environments in South Asia, with coral reefs, seagrass beds, dugong habitats, and high biodiversity recognised by UNESCO. This is a legitimate concern, and it would be irresponsible to minimise it. But it is also a design problem, not a veto. The Øresund project allocated approximately 14 percent of its total cost to environmental mitigation, and the artificial island of Peberholm has since become a managed wildlife habitat. Rigorous environmental impact assessments, careful route selection, a hybrid bridge-and-tunnel design in the most sensitive sections, and no-go ecological zones are not incompatible with the project — they are conditions for it. ### **The Northern Province: The Stakeholder No One Mentions** Mannar, the island district in Sri Lanka's Northern Province through which any Palk Strait fixed link would pass, is one of the most economically devastated areas on the island. It was heavily militarised during the civil war, its population displaced multiple times, its fishing communities restricted by military presence and by the conflict that used its waters as a transit zone for weapons, people, and desperate refugees. The land around Mannar has been the subject of military land occupation complaints. The communities there remain among the poorest in the country. Before 1983, Tamil traders, students, pilgrims, and families moved between Jaffna and Tamil Nadu as a matter of ordinary life. Boat services, trade networks, and family ties connected the communities across the strait in ways that the war, the displacement, and decades of isolation have now severed across two generations. The post-war generation in the North has grown up without the Tamil Nadu connections their grandparents regarded as natural. A land link through Mannar, if designed with genuine attention to the Northern Province's interests, could be the most transformative infrastructure project in the history of post-war Tamil Sri Lanka. It could convert Mannar from a periphery into a gateway. It could unlock religious and cultural tourism along circuits that connect Rameswaram, Mannar, Anuradhapura, and Jaffna in ways that serve Tamil and Sinhalese pilgrims alike. ### **What Sri Lanka Stands to Lose** Sri Lanka has spent the two decades since its civil war ended trying to position itself as a maritime and logistics hub — a Singapore of the Indian Ocean, a services and transshipment node that earns from geography rather than from raw materials. It is a reasonable ambition for an island at the junction of major Indian Ocean shipping lanes, with a well-educated workforce and a long tradition of openness to trade. But the strategy has a structural problem: Sri Lanka is trying to be a hub without the connectivity that hubs require. Changi Airport's supremacy rests not just on its own excellence but on Singapore's integration into the ASEAN economy and its role as a connector between Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. Rotterdam's dominance in European freight rests on its connections to the Rhine corridor, the German industrial heartland, and the European rail network. A hub that is not connected to its hinterland is not a hub. It is a very good island. Sri Lanka currently has no land connection to any of the world's major economies. It has no electricity grid connection to a larger system. It has no pipeline. It sits 30 kilometres from a country of 1.4 billion people and pays for everything it imports as if that distance were an ocean rather than a strait. This is the cost of the anomaly. ### **The Door in the Wall** Jha's metaphor — two rooms connected by a corridor when there is a door that could be built in the shared wall — is, on reflection, slightly too modest. What he is describing is not just the convenience of a shorter path. It is the difference between two rooms that remain separate, organised around their own interiors, and two rooms that become something new because of what flows between them. In the quarter-century since the Øresund Bridge opened, the cities of Copenhagen and Malmö have become, for most practical economic purposes, a single labour market, a single tourism destination, and an integrated innovation region — while remaining politically, legally, and culturally distinct nations. Denmark did not cease to be Denmark. Sweden did not become an extension of Denmark. Both became richer, more dynamic, and more resilient because of the 16 kilometres of water they chose to cross. Sri Lanka and India have not crossed 30 kilometres in 61 years. The reasons are understandable. The historical baggage is real, the political sensitivities are genuine, and the engineering challenges are non-trivial. But the evidence from every comparable project in the world points to the same conclusion: the cost of not building is higher than the cost of building, and it compounds every year. "The time for wavering is over," Santosh Jha said in Colombo. Whether Sri Lanka agrees will be one of the most consequential decisions its political leadership makes in the decade ahead. ### The Tamil Nadu Illusion: What Sri Lankan Tamils Must Understand URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-tamil-nadu-illusion-what-sri-lankan-tamils-must-understand/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:41:47.000Z ​ #### **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** This happened just days after former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in May 1991. A prominent Tamil Nadu politician, a known vocal backer of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), desperately invited me to his government-provided house in Delhi. He badly wanted to know who had killed Gandhi at Siriperumbudur near Chennai. *The Hindu* newspaper had, until then, not scooped the infamous pictures of the killer team. When I reached his house, two young aides to the politician were also present. Our friend told them to retreat into the house and not to disturb us. ![The Los Angeles Times reports on the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was killed in a suicide bombing during a campaign rally in Tamil Nadu on May 21, 1991.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/the-tamil-nadu-illusion-what-s-_jZeYY-kixgouf64gze5fg.png) The Los Angeles Times reports on the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was killed in a suicide bombing during a campaign rally in Tamil Nadu on May 21, 1991. In bizarre scenes I remember to this day, he shut both the doors of his drawing room and closed the windows too. He then moved to the sofa where I was seated and, looking very grim, asked in a low tone: “Who has killed Rajiv Gandhi?” The LTTE, I replied, without battling an eyelid. I had no hard evidence. It was my surmise. A ghastly expression gripped his face. “Are you sure?” When I replied in the affirmative, he wanted to know how I was so confident. I told him that the killing bore all the hallmarks of the Tamil Tigers. No one could have planned and executed it in this manner, that too in Tamil Nadu. After a few seconds during which I could hear his breathing, he asked a question which stunned me: “Does this mean I will be arrested?” The man’s face had gone pale. He said he feared the worst because he was an undisguised supporter of the LTTE. ![Rajiv Gandhi with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham during negotiations in New Delhi in the late 1980s](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/the-tamil-nadu-illusion-what-s-_jZeYY-kix1sejwg10rfin.png) Rajiv Gandhi with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham during negotiations in New Delhi in the late 1980s But so are thousands in Tamil Nadu, I argued. If merely supporting the LTTE cause can lead to arrests, then thousands would have to be taken into custody. My reply brought some relief to him. After another half hour, I returned home, leaving him to brood on his own. I recall this incident from 35 years ago to underline that many political leaders in Tamil Nadu, as elsewhere in the world, have two different personas — one for public consumption, and another that may be quite different. This may not be true for all politicians. Nevertheless, it is prudent not to get emotionally swayed by what politicians say in public. Sri Lankan Tamils, who often get swayed by the goings on in neighbouring Tamil Nadu, need to have a far better understanding of Tamil Nadu and the larger Indian politics. There is nothing wrong with young Tamils in Sri Lanka celebrating superstar Vijay’s electoral victory in Tamil Nadu. After all, who doesn’t like seeing their hero win? Vijay, like most Tamil Nadu political actors, has made the usual right noises about Sri Lankan Tamil aspirations. But even before taking office, he has failed to take a just position on the one issue bothering both sides of the Palk Strait: the fishermen’s dispute. Like many of his colleagues, Vijay has come out in support of Tamil Nadu fishermen’s right to fish in waters that Sri Lanka says lie within its maritime zone. One reason this row has dragged on for so long is precisely because of such positions taken by mainstream Tamil Nadu leaders. They either do not know, or do not care, about the thousands engaged in fishing in Sri Lanka’s Tamil regions who are seriously affected by intrusions from their Tamil Nadu counterparts. (In any case, the Indian government too has a role to play in ending this dispute.) Has any leading politician in Tamil Nadu condemned the recent abduction and thrashing of a Jaffna fisherman by Indian fishermen? Have Tamil Nadu politicians called for his release on humanitarian grounds? Sri Lankans need to remember that many – not all -- Tamil Nadu politicians are ignorant of the kaleidoscopic Tamil issue in the island nation. Casting away the many complexities, it is convenient for those in Tamil Nadu to still view Sri Lanka from the Tamil-versus-Sinhalese binary. To this class of politicians, the Tamil Tigers are heroes; no account is taken of the immense pain the LTTE caused to so many others, Tamils included. The perennially loud nature of Tamil Nadu politicians often harms the Tamil cause by reinforcing the long-propagated Sinhalese myth that Tamils on both sides of the Palk Strait are out to swallow Buddhist Sri Lanka. At the same time, I find it amusing to hear some Sri Lankan Tamils view Tamil Nadu politicians in terms of ‘Pure Tamil’, ‘Malayali Tamil’, and ‘Telugu Tamil’. I don’t know if there are more such classifications. So, in line with this understanding, leaders like Seeman are supposed to be ‘Pure Tamils’ while those like (the late) M. Karunanidhi and M.K. Stalin are ‘Telugu Tamils’ and so not devoted enough to the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. There can be nothing more baseless. The fact is, the class of ‘Pure Tamil’ leaders in Tamil Nadu who wave the LTTE flag and hero worship Velupillai Prabhakaran are repeatedly rejected by voters in the state. This is because the masses in Tamil Nadu got disenchanted with the LTTE’s killing spree a long time ago and, like much of the world, confuse the Tigers with the larger Tamil cause. This is why no tears were shed on the streets when Karunanidhi’s government was sacked in January 1991 for turning a blind eye to LTTE activities in the state. And this was before Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination triggered revulsion towards the Tigers and, unfortunately, even ordinary Tamils from Sri Lanka in Tamil Nadu. I never heard anyone call Karunanidhi a “Telugu Tamil” as long as he was echoing the Tigers’ voice. And who does not know that M.G. Ramachandran, who embraced Prabhakaran, was a Malayali? No one had any complaints as long as he was donating money and patronage to the LTTE. The Tigers and their supporters loved *The Hindu* newspaper as long as it gave wide space for their mission; it was dubbed a ‘Brahminical mouthpiece’ when it turned against the Tigers after Gandhi was murdered. It is not that the Tamil Nadu political class cannot be faulted. Irrespective of the rights and wrongs of the provincial government, the EPRLF formed in Sri Lanka’s north-east, Karunanidhi had no right to call for its ouster – simply because the LTTE wanted it. He had no business to lampoon A. Varadaraja Perumal, the chief minister of the province, as a *dadi karan* (bearded individual), that too in front of others, Indians and Sri Lankans. The missteps of its politicians aside, Tamil Nadu has an admirable side to it. It is among the rare states in India where outsiders, once accepted by the people at large, are put on a pedestal and worshipped. This is why the Kandy-born MGR became a mass darling. No one viewed him as a Malayali. A man who once struggled to earn Rs 5 from Tamil dramas before becoming a multi-millionaire heartthrob was considered as Tamil as was Annadurai or Kamaraj. This is also how actors like Rajanikanth and Kushboo became Tamil icons even though both have origins in Maharashtra. And who can forget that MGR’s successor, J. Jayalalithaa, was a Brahmin from Karnataka? One can criticize Karunanidhi or Stalin for many things, but people in Tamil Nadu won’t find it amusing if these men are sought to be vilified as ‘Telugu Tamils’. Tamil Nadu politicians did enormous disservice to the Sri Lankan Tamil community by blindly eulogising Prabhakaran and failing to use their stature to challenge the rebel leader when his actions harmed the Tamil cause. If only they had done so — and if Prabhakaran had heeded them — the horrific bloodbath of 2009 might have been avoided. Sri Lankan Tamils should have a better and more nuanced understanding of Tamil Nadu politics. There are no ‘Pure Tamils’ or ‘Telugu Tamils’ in the state. Please stop viewing Tamil Nadu from a narrow Sri Lankan Tamil prism. ​ ### Archchuna’s ‘Give Jaffna to Tamil Nadu’ Remark Leaves Sri Lanka Scratching Its Head URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/archchunas-give-jaffna-to-tamil-nadu-remark-leaves-sri-lanka-scratching-its-head/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T06:50:22.000Z JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — In one of his more theatrical and illogical speeches in Parliament, Jaffna District MP Ramanathan Archchuna suggested that Sri Lanka should not only hand over Katchatheevu, but also give away Jaffna itself to Tamil Nadu — a remark that observers said seemed to have little connection between tongue and brain, if any. “Not only Katchatheevu — give Jaffna to Tamil Nadu too. The people of Tamil Nadu will look after us,” Mr. Archchuna declared during a speech that quickly drew attention. Mr. Archchuna began by congratulating TVK president and Tamil Nadu’s incoming Chief Minister, Vijay, whose political rise has captivated many Tamils across the region, before pivoting sharply to local grievances. “When I recently visited Neduntheevu, I saw that nearly 50 percent of the people had no electricity,” he said. “For five out of seven days, they are without power.” Katchatheevu, ceded by India to Sri Lanka in 1974, remains a sensitive issue in Tamil Nadu politics, often resurfacing during election cycles as a symbol of Tamil identity and regional nationalism. Vijay, too, declared during one of his election rallies that he would seek to reclaim Katchatheevu if he came to power. ### How a political novice devoured goliaths in Tamil Nadu URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-a-political-novice-devoured-goliaths-in-tamil-nadu/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T08:41:14.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Fatigue with Dravidian outfits, being sick and tired of corruption, anger over poor law and order, disgust with family control of parties, and a “let-us-try-out Vijay” sentiment were the most common denominators that delivered a stunning election verdict in Tamil Nadu, sinking political giants and bringing plenty of unknowns into the corridors of power. Interviews with dozens of residents, mostly in Chennai, revealed the extent of silent outrage against an established system that spurred millions in the state to root for a 51-year-old movie superstar who formed his party just two years ago and who had never contested an election until now. Voters say what happened on April 23 when Tamil Nadu voted was a carefully hidden roar which crushed the DMK and the AIADMK, which had monopolised governance in the state for almost 60 years, besides traumatising India’s two big national parties: the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Those who have interacted with Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) after the stunning verdict say even TVK leaders and cadres did not expect such a sweep, thinking they would probably win around 60 seats in the 234-member Tamil Nadu Assembly – and then perhaps play the kingmaker. But the mass of Tamils had other ideas. And so they gave a generous 108 seats to the TVK, just ten short of the 118 needed to form a government, a deficit he can make up with support from those who have single-digit wins and become the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, India’s most urbanized and one of its best-performing states economically. This, however, is not just a vote for Vijay, one of the highest-paid stars in the country who entered politics only in 2024; the voters also gave a strong, undisguised message – “Don’t take us for granted!” -- to everyone else in the electoral field. ![Massive crowds gathered across Tamil Nadu as Vijay’s campaign rallies drew unprecedented public support, helping propel his party to a historic electoral victory and signaling a dramatic shift in the state’s political landscape.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/how-a-political-novice-devoure-Sixtsg-kixpm4gesv0frrb-1.png) Massive crowds gathered across Tamil Nadu as Vijay’s campaign rallies drew unprecedented public support, helping propel his party to a historic electoral victory and signaling a dramatic shift in the state’s political landscape. Many voters Jaffna Monitor spoke to said they had no idea who the local TVK candidate was, even as they voted for Vijay. In the process, many unknowns won across Tamil Nadu, including two Brahmins, a community long ostracized by the Dravidian parties. This is also how the iconic actor M.G. Ramachandran, or MGR, stormed to power in 1977, although he had long been a player in the political system. “When I used to talk about anti-incumbency, many did not believe it, particularly those not living in Tamil Nadu,” retired banker K.V. Narayanan told Jaffna Monitor. “Now people are simply saying ‘wow’.” Like many others, Narayanan pointed out that support for Vijay cut across Tamil Nadu in all forms. Urban and rural, traditional Dravidian voters, Hindus, Muslims, and Christians, men and women, the middle class and poor, even those who benefited from Dravidian welfare packages. Before the rivals could gauge what was happening, Vijay had turned into a Pied Piper, silently but steadily wooing large chunks of voters from every other player. In the end, the long-held Dravidian fortress was breached. In contrast to the TVK’s 34.9 percent of votes polled, the DMK and AIADMK may still have 31.4 and 26.1 percent votes respectively in their kitty, but the sheer redrawing of people’s minds gave the DMK just 59 seats (a huge plunge from 2021) and the AIADMK 47 seats. Former corporate manager K.S. Vishwanathan said, “Yes, the DMK spoke about social justice, but their leaders were mostly ensuring ‘justice’ for themselves. Their corruption is legendary. They were taking cuts in every deal. Yes, Tamil Nadu progressed, but that had nothing to do with the DMK.” Auto-rickshaw driver Selvam had always voted for the DMK, but this time he rooted for Vijay, flocking to many of his massively attended election meetings. Asked why, he said: “I just can’t take DMK politics anymore.” Muthukumar, who with friends sells South Indian snacks on the streets, also voted for Vijay, knowing the actor lacks political or administrative experience. “Let someone new take over, Sir. Tamil Nadu needs a break.” Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP may have scored stunning victories elsewhere in India, but in Tamil Nadu, its pathetic tally of four in the outgoing house was cut to 1 after it allied with a largely discredited AIADMK. In political terms, the bigger loser was the Congress, which turned down desperate invitations from Vijay ahead of the election for an alliance and remained politically married to the DMK. The result: the Congress now has just five MLAs, down from the double digits earlier. Saravanan Karthikeyan, a Chennai resident in his late 50s, said people were angry over the deteriorating law and order in Tamil Nadu, even as the DMK kept a tight grip on the local media, which some residents allege mostly refrained from reporting the dark spots in the state. “Even children in our families were urging the elders to vote for Vijay,” Karthikeyan said. “The immense popularity of this man is mind-boggling. When I returned home after voting, my niece, just 14, asked: ‘Mama, did you vote for Vijay uncle?’” Voters also disliked the fact that Chief Minister Stalin was brazenly grooming his son Udhayanidhi to take over the DMK and possibly the government one day. “We know that Stalin was groomed by his father (and chief minister) Karunanidhi, but Stalin slogged and slogged for decades,” said a former DMK supporter who didn’t want to be named. “But what right did Stalin have to promote a son who is not fit for this job?” There was also, more than one voter said, a pent-up Hindu anger against the DMK for what was widely felt as anti-Hindu postures of its leaders. “Their favorite pastime was to denounce Hindu religion and Sanatan Dharma,” said one resident. “They forgot that the earlier times are gone. The Brahminical domination is long over. No DMK leader would speak one word against other religions, but attacking Hinduism was considered a fair game.” Even those who have voted for Vijay admit the road ahead might be bumpier than what even the actor can fathom. After all, administrative acumen is critical to run an entire state. And Vijay lacks it – completely. Popular goodwill, however well earned, has an expiry date. No wonder Vijay has urged the Tamil Nadu governor to invite him to form a government and said he would prove his legislative majority within two weeks. The far bigger challenge would be administering a state of 85 million people — almost four times the population of Sri Lanka or Australia — and managing and overcoming the numerous problems that plague the state. If he embraces the Congress and gives it a seat in his government, he could court the anger of the BJP in New Delhi. Already, in his campaign speeches, the actor called the BJP “fascists” and described it as an ideological adversary. And the BJP, as has been proved repeatedly, doesn’t forget its foes easily. It is possible that Vijay will realize that winning an election is perhaps not as difficult as running an Indian state — in this case, Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu has certainly changed, but it has not turned its back on its past. Dravidian politics may not die, but its adherents will have to reinvent it. Traditional freebies are no longer enough to win people over. The voter in Tamil Nadu has quietly rewritten the state’s political script. ### Jaffna Fans Celebrate Vijay’s TVK Election Breakthrough in Tamil Nadu URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-fans-celebrate-vijays-tvk-election-breakthrough-in-tamil-nadu/ Last updated: 2026-05-05T03:08:49.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka** — Supporters of Tamil film star Vijay gathered across parts of Jaffna on Monday night to celebrate the strong electoral showing of his party, Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly elections. Groups of mostly young fans assembled in Jaffna town, Kakkaitheevu, Gurunagar, and other areas, waving TVK flags, lighting firecrackers, and staging spontaneous street celebrations as election results confirmed the party’s major gains in the southern Indian state. For many participants, the celebrations were less about politics than about the success of one of Tamil cinema’s most popular figures, whose films have maintained a devoted following among Sri Lankan Tamils for decades. TVK, founded by Vijay in February 2024 after he announced his departure from acting to enter politics, secured a major electoral breakthrough by winning 108 seats in Tamil Nadu’s 234-member assembly. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/jaffna-fans-celebrate-vijay-s-YbnU8I-kixd380t7yhr6wz.png) The result marked a significant shift in Tamil Nadu’s political landscape, weakening the dominance long held by the state’s two principal Dravidian parties — the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). In Jaffna, however, the mood remained overwhelmingly fan-driven, with celebrations resembling the kind of public enthusiasm often seen during major film releases or personal milestones involving leading Tamil actors. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/jaffna-fans-celebrate-vijay-s-YbnU8I-kixdpr0mxz7sz7.png) Tamil cinema continues to hold deep cultural influence in northern Sri Lanka, where actors such as Vijay command large and loyal fan bases. Public gatherings celebrating milestones of prominent Tamil film stars are not unusual in the region, and Monday’s events largely reflected that enduring cultural connection. ### Mannar Horror: Woman Held After Husband’s Body Found Dismembered in Toilet Pit URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/mannar-horror-woman-held-after-husbands-body-found-dismembered-in-toilet-pit/ Last updated: 2026-05-05T02:21:02.000Z **MANNAR, Sri Lanka** — A woman has been arrested in Mannar after allegedly killing her husband during a domestic dispute, dismembering his body, and concealing the remains in a toilet pit at their rented home, police said. The incident occurred in the Moor Street area of Mannar, where the couple had reportedly been living in a rented house for the past two months. According to preliminary investigations, a heated argument broke out between the husband and wife on Saturday night, during which the woman is alleged to have fatally attacked her husband. Police said the suspect later dismembered the body on Sunday, placed the remains in bags, and disposed of them in the toilet pit of the residence in an apparent attempt to conceal the crime. The case came to light after the woman surrendered to Mannar Police on Monday. Authorities subsequently escorted her to the property, where officers, in the presence of the Mannar Magistrate and Judicial Medical Officer, recovered body parts from the toilet pit. The victim was identified as a 36-year-old man from Vankalai, Mannar. Investigators also found that the couple had been residing at the property without formal registration. The remains have been transferred to Mannar District General Hospital for post-mortem examination. The killing has sent shockwaves through the local community, with residents expressing horror over the brutality of the crime. Mannar Police said further investigations are ongoing. ### Superstar Vijay Shatters Dravidian Giants in Historic Tamil Nadu Election URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/superstar-vijay-shatters-dravidian-giants-in-historic-tamil-nadu-election/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T05:19:26.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Tamil movie superstar Vijay created history on Monday by leading his two-year-old TVK to be the single largest party in the Tamil Nadu Assembly in its very first election, winning seats tantalizingly close to a half-way mark and burying six decades of Dravidian rule in one of India’s economic powerhouses. As counting of the millions of votes cast in the April 23 balloting continued across the state, election officials said the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) was set to finish most probably with 107 seats in the 234-member Assembly where a winner needs 118 seats for a simple majority. In political significance, the 51-year-old Vijay’s superb showing matched the sensational and sweeping victory of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in faraway West Bengal, one of India’s most difficult political turfs to conquer. So punishing was Vijay’s electoral tsunami that outgoing Chief Minister and DMK stalwart M.K. Stalin lost by more than 9,000 votes in Kolathur, Chennai, to TVK’s V.S. Babu — a former DMK leader who had once overseen the constituency’s ground operations when it was created in 2011 and played a key role in securing Stalin’s maiden victory there. Stalin, who had represented Kolathur since its formation, had gone on to win the seat comfortably in 2021 by nearly 70,000 votes against his AIADMK rival. According to trends from vote counting centres, the outgoing DMK led by Stalin was poised to win 72 seats and claim the second spot, pushing the present main opposition AIADMK to the third standing with 55 seats. The Naam Tamilar Katchi (NTK), led by fiery orator Seeman — Tamil Nadu’s most vocal political supporter of Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers leader Velupillai Prabhakaran — failed to win a single seat, while Seeman himself lost his deposit in his own constituency of Karaikudi. Until midday, the DMK, battered by the Vijay most unexpected electoral tsunami, was huffing and puffing at the third place, behind its traditional rival AIADMK, founded by the legendary M.G. Ramachandran and later led by J Jayalalithaa. A third place finish would have been humiliating for the DMK, one of India’s oldest political parties. Even if the TVK fails to touch the magic mark of 118 seats, Vijay, one of the country’s highest paid actors, is widely expected to garner the legislative support of some smaller parties and form a government. Vijay, born in 1974 in Chennai to a Christian father and a Hindu mother, made it clear in the run up to the elections that he was firmly opposed to the AIADMK-allied BJP, calling the DMK his political enemy and the BJP his ideological adversary. If and when Vijay stakes claim to power, it would be the first time since 1967 that Tamil Nadu, India’s most urbanized state with 85 million people, will see a non-Dravidian party in Chennai’s Fort St George where the state secretariat is located. A Vijay victory would also rekindle the way the AIADMK led by MGR, as the hugely popular actor Ramachandran was known, stormed to power in Tamil Nadu in 1977 and went on to rule the state until his death in December 1987. But in contrast to Vijay, MGR could taste victory only five years after forming his party during which time he converted his whopping fan devotion into an institutional political machine. The then undivided DMK stormed to power in Tamil Nadu, then called Madras, for the first time in 1967, ending decades of Congress rule on the strength of a powerful Dravidian movement that launched emotive campaigns against Hindi imposition as well as Brahminical domination of politics and administration. Since then, Tamil Nadu has always been ruled by either the DMK or the AIADMK, which MGR founded in 1972 after breaking away from the DMK. After Tamil Nadu voted on April 23 this year, most exit polls predicted that Vijay’s party would do pretty well on the strength of his popularity and could emerge as a kingmaker. One exit poll talked about an outright win for the TVK. But the DMK, whose overconfident cadres had been lampooning Vijay and his party for some for two years, was confident of winning a second straight five-year term in power although critics had been warning about anti-incumbency. Naturally, as the election results emerged, there were wild celebrations at TVK offices all over Tamil Nadu as well as in Vijay’s Chennai house. DMK supporters were stunned into silence, taken aback by the sheer scale of the party’s reverses. Not only Chief Minister and DMK president M.K. Stalin, but also the party’s general secretary, Durai Murugan, along with several senior DMK heavyweights — including School Education Minister Anbil Mahesh Poyyamozhi — were defeated, election officials said. For the first time in the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’s 77-year history, both its president and general secretary have lost their legislative seats in the same election The Congress, the DMK’s long-term ally, also suffered losses. It was in February 2024 that Vijay announced his retirement from films and his entry into politics with the launch of the TVK. Political analysts credited the TVK’s victory march to Vijay’s popularity bordering on frenzy, his decision to go it alone against established political giants, and a well-oiled fan base that acted as ground-level workers and social media amplifiers. In campaign speeches, he combined welfare promises with an anti-corruption message and vowed not to give space to communalism of any variety. ### Vijay Ends Six Decades of Dravidian Rule, Set to Become Tamil Nadu’s Chief Minister URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/vijay-ends-six-decades-of-dravidian-rule-set-to-become-tamil-nadus-chief-minister/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T15:58:31.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Popular Tamil film actor Vijay triggered a political tsunami in Tamil Nadu on Monday as his two-year-old TVK party was on its way to an unexpected but history-making victory in elections, burying six decades of Dravidian rule in one of India’s most economically developed states. The 51-year-old star pulled off a sensational performance as his Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) appeared set to win more than 100 seats in the 234-member Tamil Nadu Assembly, where a party or coalition needs 118 seats to achieve a simple majority. According to trends from vote-counting centers across the sprawling coastal state, the main opposition AIADMK, founded by the legendary late M.G. Ramachandran, later led by J. Jayalalithaa, was in second place, while the ruling DMK, captained by M.K. Stalin was relegated to a shocking third spot. Even if TVK fails to reach the magic mark of 118 seats, Vijay is widely expected to secure legislative support from smaller parties and form a government. Vijay has, however, made it clear that he is firmly opposed to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and refuses to ally with it. If and when Vijay stakes claim to power, it would be the first time since 1967 that Tamil Nadu, now with 85 million people, will see a non-Dravidian party in Chennai’s Fort St George, where the state secretariat is located. A Vijay victory would also rekindle the way the AIADMK, led by MGR, as the hugely popular actor Ramachandran was known, stormed to power in Tamil Nadu in 1977 and went on to rule the state until his death in December 1987. But in contrast to Vijay, MGR could taste victory only five years after forming his party, during which time he converted his whopping fan devotion into an institutional political machine. The then undivided DMK stormed to power in the state for the first time in 1967, ending decades of Congress rule on the strength of a powerful Dravidian movement that launched emotive campaigns against Hindi imposition as well as Brahminical domination of politics and administration. Since then, Tamil Nadu has always been ruled by either the DMK or the AIADMK, which MGR, as the actor Ramachandran was known, founded in 1972 after breaking away from the DMK. After Tamil Nadu voted on April 23 this year, most exit polls predicted that Vijay’s party would perform strongly on the strength of his popularity and could even emerge as a kingmaker. Only one exit poll projected that TVK would become the single largest party in the state. But the DMK, whose overconfident cadres had been lampooning Vijay and his party for some two years, was confident of winning a second straight five-year term in power. Naturally, as the election results began to emerge, there were noisy, wild celebrations at TVK offices in Chennai and across Tamil Nadu, while the DMK was in a state of shock over the sheer scale of its reverses. In a most shocking development, outgoing chief minister and DMK stalwart Stalin was trailing by over 7,000 votes in the Kolathur constituency in Chennai to V.S. Balu of the TVK. Kolathur has been Stalin’s stronghold for four decades, and he defeated the AIADMK there by almost 49,000 votes in the last election in 2021. Stalin’s son and heir apparent Udhayanidhi Stalin, however, led by some 3,000 votes over his TVK rival in the Chepauk-Thiruvallikeni seat, also in Chennai. Several bigwigs in the DMK, including ministers, were on the road to defeat in the state, election officials said. The Congress, the DMK’s long-term ally, also suffered losses. Till about 2 pm, there was no public reaction from Vijay, whose real name is Joseph Vijay Chandrasekhar. But TVK spokesman Felix Gerlad said: “The DMK was running about in a dark room. Now they know the reality. We will form a government on our own.” Vijay, born in Madras (now Chennai) on June 22, 1974, has appeared in nearly 70 films as a lead actor since making his debut as a child actor in 1984. Born to a Christian father and a Hindu mother, Vijay is one of India's highest-paid actors. He has won several awards and is addressed as *Thalapathy* or Commander by his supporters. It was in February 2024 that Vijay formally entered politics with the launch of TVK, announcing that he would retire from films after completing his final project, *Jananayagan*. Like most Tamil Nadu politicians, Vijay has spoken on issues related to Sri Lanka. In late 2025, he told an election rally that the Sri Lankan Tamils’ voices must be heard and their dreams must be respected. In the same meeting, he referred to Tamil Tigers leader Velupillai Prabhakaran as a “mother” to Sri Lankan Tamils. The statement triggered a row. But when Vijay criticized New Delhi for not protecting Tamil Nadu fishermen in the sea dividing India and Sri Lanka and called for retrieving Katchatheevu islet from Colombo, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath asserted that Katchatheevu belonged to the island nation. ### Sri Lankan President Accepts Tamil Cultural Honor, Drawing Both Praise and Sharp Criticism URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-president-accepts-tamil-cultural-honor-drawing-both-praise-and-sharp-criticism/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T05:19:20.000Z President Anura Kumara Dissanayake accepted an award from one of Sri Lanka’s leading Tamil literary organizations on Sunday, using the occasion to pledge his commitment to eradicating racism and building lasting ethnic reconciliation — but the honor also triggered immediate praise alongside sharp controversy, with critics questioning both the president’s record and the decision to confer such recognition at a time when many longstanding Tamil grievances remain unresolved. Mr. Dissanayake was presented with the *Kamban* Fame Award at the closing ceremony of the All Ceylon Kamban Kazhagam’s annual Kamban Festival, held at the Ramakrishna Mission Hall in Wellawatte, Colombo. The award, conferred by the *Kamban Kazhagam* — a body dedicated to celebrating the Tamil classical literary tradition — was framed by its organizers as a gesture of interethnic goodwill toward a president who has spoken frequently of national unity. Accepting the honor, Mr. Dissanayake offered his statement on reconciliation, describing it as the defining political mission of his administration. “In Sri Lanka, our political agenda is to defeat racism and fully establish reconciliation,” he said. “The path toward achieving that reconciliation is very long. But we will never hesitate in pursuing it. We will achieve it.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sri-lankan-president-accepts-t-WI3toY-kixfgw7d0mlc26a.png) He invoked the memory of the late Tamil political leader R. Sampanthan, recalling that Sampanthan had told him that genuine pride in Sri Lankan citizenship would come only when Tamils were treated as equals in every sphere of national life. “That is an absolutely correct view,” Mr. Dissanayake said. “We will certainly make that a reality.” He also signaled support for greater regional administrative autonomy, arguing that communities in each province should be empowered to manage their own affairs. ### **THE KAZHAGAM UNDER FIRE** Sections of the Tamil community and civil society organizations accused the *Kamban Kazhagam* of squandering its moral authority by conferring cultural recognition on a head of state who has yet to take meaningful action on any of the Tamil community’s core political demands. Several commentators described the gesture as nakedly opportunistic — a bid for government favor or institutional visibility dressed up as cultural bridge-building. A Tamil literary enthusiast, who wished not to be named, questioned the decision by one of the country’s influential — and at times controversial — Tamil cultural organizations to honor the president at this stage of his administration. ‘He has not released political prisoners, repealed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, or meaningfully addressed the issue of military-occupied Tamil lands,’ the individual said. ‘So one must ask what exactly is being recognized here — concrete progress, or rhetoric alone?’ ### **RECOGNITION AS ENCOURAGEMENT, NOT ENDORSEMENT** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sri-lankan-president-accepts-t-WI3toY-kixfg0mjbr1gzro.png) Offering a contrasting perspective, a supporter of the *Kamban Kazhagam* said the award was intended not as an endorsement of completed political achievements, but as recognition of a southern leader who, in their view, had publicly articulated a vision of equality and reconciliation that many Tamil communities have long sought. “If Tamil people are viewed not through the lens of racism, but as equal citizens of this country — if their just and legitimate aspirations and rights are recognized, accepted and embraced — then yesterday clearly demonstrated to Sinhalese leaders and the broader public how deeply Tamils are capable of respecting and honoring such southern leaders,” the supporter said. ### **TAMIL DEMANDS LEFT UNMET** The controversy surrounding the award underscored a broader and deeply rooted skepticism among many Tamil rights advocates toward reconciliation rhetoric from Colombo, regardless of who delivers it. Among the criticisms that circulated widely on social media was a Facebook post by social worker Rajkumar Rajeevkanth, who argued that symbolic recognition should follow substantive political action rather than precede it. He outlined a series of longstanding demands that remain unresolved. Those included the release of Tamil political prisoners, repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, resolution of military occupation of civilian lands in areas such as Valikamam North and Thaiyiddy, credible investigations into mass graves, including Chemmani, answers for families of the disappeared, land rights for Hill Country Tamils, removal of constitutional structures seen by critics as privileging Buddhist majoritarianism, and meaningful political power-sharing. “Only when such promises are fulfilled,” he wrote, “will we too gladly attend award ceremonies and applaud with genuine joy.” Other critics questioned whether the literary organization’s decision reflected broader Tamil public sentiment, arguing that cultural symbolism alone could not substitute for unresolved structural and political grievances. For Mr. Dissanayake, who came to power promising systemic reform, the appearance at the Kamban Festival may represent an effort to build trust across ethnic divides. But reactions from segments of Tamil civil society suggest that many remain unconvinced by rhetoric absent concrete policy changes. Key grievances remain unresolved. Thousands of Tamil families continue to seek answers about relatives who disappeared during and after the civil war. Military control over portions of civilian land in the North remains a source of anger. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, long criticized by human rights groups, remains in force despite repeated reform pledges. None of those issues was directly addressed in Mr. Dissanayake’s speech at the Ramakrishna Mission Hall. The All Ceylon Kamban Kazhagam was founded in Jaffna in 1980 by *Kambavarithi Ilankai Jeyaraj*, a prominent Tamil literary and religious orator known for his influential role in promoting Tamil language, literature, and classical cultural traditions in Sri Lanka. ### Valikamam North Council Chief Accuses Police of Threats Over Effort to Reclaim Road Occupied by Thaiyiddy Vihara URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/valikamam-north-council-chief-accuses-police-of-threats-over-effort-to-reclaim-road-occupied-by-thaiyiddy-vihara/ Last updated: 2026-05-05T04:52:32.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Tensions are escalating in Jaffna after S. Sugirthan, chairman of the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha, accused police of attempting to obstruct efforts to reclaim a public road allegedly occupied by Tissa Rajamaha Viharaya, a Buddhist shrine constructed on disputed civilian land in Thaiyiddy. Mr. Sugirthan said he was summoned by Palaly Police and warned to abandon efforts to recover Bhavani Veethi, a road legally belonging to the local council but currently enclosed within the premises of the unauthorized Buddhist vihara. According to local officials, Mr. Sugirthan had commissioned government surveyors on April 28 to formally identify and demarcate the road after confirming through official records that it falls under the jurisdiction of the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha. Following the survey, he issued a formal notice to the vihara’s chief monk, demanding that the road be released by May 11\. The notice warned that if the obstruction was not removed by the deadline, the Pradeshiya Sabha would dismantle the fence on May 12 and reclaim the public roadway, with any associated costs to be borne by the vihara administration. The move reportedly prompted the chief monk to file a complaint with Palaly Police, after which Mr. Sugirthan was called in for questioning. During that inquiry, police allegedly warned him that removing the fence could undermine ethnic harmony and advised him to abandon the effort, cautioning that legal action could follow if he proceeded. Mr. Sugirthan rejected the warning. “I am prepared to face legal action,” he said. “We possess documentary proof that this is a Pradeshiya Sabha road. If the vihara administration refuses to release it, we will remove the fence and reclaim it. If the police oppose this, they may challenge us in court.” ### Sri Lanka's Unfinished Promise on Language Rights URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-unfinished-promise-on-language-rights/ Last updated: 2026-05-03T11:58:23.000Z **By Jeevan Thiyagaraja** ***From the riots of 1958 to a Charter that awaits— the long arc of a promise made, deferred, and still owed.*** Language is never merely a tool for communication. It is the vessel through which a person experiences dignity — or its absence. It was this question, left dangerously unanswered, that ignited the riots of July 1958\. Decades of armed conflict followed. The path to healing has, in fact, been laid — in Parliament, in the Constitution, and in a Language Charter that now awaits the political will to implement it. To understand where we are, we must understand how we got here. ### **Genesis: A Crisis Made, Not Born** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sri-lanka-s-unfinished-promise-Vok0w0-kixfp3uy6l1rgzz.png) S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party won the 1956 election on an explicit promise to make Sinhala the sole official language within 24 hours of taking office, and delivered: the Sinhala Only Act was passed that year. The Tamil Federal Party, under S.J.V. Chelvanayakam responded with organised, non-violent satyagrahas. When peaceful Tamil demonstrators — including MPs — gathered at Galle Face Green in June 1956, a pro-government mob beat and stoned them and threw some into Beira Lake. Police stood aside. Bandaranaike called the injuries "honourable wounds" — a phrase that was not mere insensitivity. By 1958, with tensions mounting, Bandaranaike negotiated the B-C Pact with Chelvanayakam — proposing regional councils for the North and East and recognising Tamil in education and administration. He abrogated it on 9 April 1958, with a young parliamentarian named J.R. Jayewardene among its most prominent opponents. The irony of what followed would only become apparent two decades later. ### **The Pogrom: What Tarzie Vittachi Witnessed** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sri-lanka-s-unfinished-promise-Vok0w0-kixj3gtce509nur.png) The primary chronicle of what followed comes from Tarzie Vittachi — editor of The Ceylon Observer and recipient of the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Journalism in 1959, widely regarded as Asia's equivalent of the Nobel Prize. His book *Emergency '58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots* was written while the conflict was still smouldering. The trigger came on 22 May 1958, when a mob boarded the Yaldevi train at Polgahawela and attacked Tamil passengers. Prime Minister Bandaranaike delayed declaring a State of Emergency. When he spoke at Gampola on 24 May, he did not condemn the rioters but pleaded with Sinhalese crowds not to "destroy your good name.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sri-lanka-s-unfinished-promise-Vok0w0-kixj4vnq4d61wo3.png) Vittachi's verdict was unsparing. Writing while the embers were still warm, he observed that what had held in Ceylon was not the government, nor the institutions of the state, but the conscience of individuals — officials, clerks, police officers, soldiers — who chose to do what was right precisely when the machinery around them had ceased to function. Ceylon, he wrote, had lost its innocence in 1958. ## Those Who Stood Firm *A record of individuals who defied mob pressure and upheld the law at personal risk* ### **Government Agents** Among the district administrators, four Government Agents stood apart — refusing to bow to extremist pressure, coordinating the evacuation of Tamil refugees to government schools, and working closely with the military when police were overwhelmed. Deryck Aluwihare, Government Agent, Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa: With Polonnaruwa lacking its own GA, Aluwihare held personal charge of both districts. He led jeep patrols to locate refugees, established camps near the Parakrama Samudra, and held firm even when a mob threatened to kill him for protecting Tamil civilians. P. Navaratnarajah, Government Agent, Jaffna: Operating in the Tamil-majority North, he maintained calm while ensuring the safety of Sinhalese civilians and police officers — effectively preventing a cycle of revenge killings that would have spread the violence further. R.R. Crosette-Thambiah, Government Agent, Batticaloa: In the Eastern Province, he enforced the law impartially and contained the violence before it could escalate into the full-scale pogrom seen elsewhere. ### **The Civil Service** In the kachcheris across the country, Sinhalese clerks hid or destroyed voter-registration lists — the very documents rioters used to locate Tamil homes. Others secretly escorted Tamil families to safety or sheltered them in their own houses, knowing they risked being branded traitors. These individuals are largely unrecorded by name. Their anonymity does not diminish what they did. ### **The Police** The police force was under enormous pressure — some officers complicit in the violence, others actively heroic. DIG Sydney Soysa, Western Province: Pushed hard for the early declaration of a State of Emergency, mobilised resources, and ensured that Tamil refugee camps in Colombo — including at the Racecourse — were properly protected. SP J.F. "Bunny" Bede Johnpillai: Celebrated for physical courage — he personally dispersed mobs in the field and refused, under immense pressure, to surrender Tamil civilians sheltering in police stations to rioters demanding them. IP G.H. Perera, North-Central Province: Held out against thousands of rioters with minimal ammunition, defending Tamil enclaves alone until army reinforcements arrived. Across mixed areas, unnamed Sinhalese officers fired tear gas and warning shots into their own ethnic communities to disperse mobs, and physically guarded station doors against crowds demanding Tamil prisoners — paying a lasting social cost for doing so. ### **Non-Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks** Below the gazetted ranks, it was the sergeants, constables, and ordinary soldiers — Sinhalese men, almost all of them — who faced the mobs at ground level with no cover of rank and no guarantee of support from above. Vittachi records their actions collectively rather than by name: the station sergeant who kept his doors locked against a crowd demanding Tamil detainees; the constable who stood alone in a doorway while colleagues stood aside; the soldier who obeyed a shoot-on-sight order in his own village. These men had no career protection and no political patron. They had only their sense of what the uniform required. Vittachi's verdict on them, rendered without names, is the most damning indictment of the failure above them: that ordinary men in ordinary posts did what governments and ministers would not. ### **The Military** The military proved ultimately decisive in halting the violence, though it too faced internal discord. Rear Admiral R.K. "Robin" van Langenberg, Trincomalee: Confronted a mutiny when Sinhalese sailors refused orders to fire on rioters. He contained the mutiny, maintained naval discipline, and deployed loyal units to protect Tamil civilians — preventing a total collapse of order at one of the country's most volatile ports. Colonel F.C. de Saram: Enforced strict military discipline across his zone of operations, ordering shoot-on-sight for curfew violators and arsonists — a command carrying personal legal and political risk, but one that halted the violence wherever it was applied. Major D.S. Attygalle (later General): Organised the rapid deployment of troops to hotspots including Kurunegala, personally leading rescue convoys to extract trapped Tamil refugees from areas where mobs had cut road access. Squadron Leader Harry Goonetileke, Air Force: Commanded air evacuation operations, personally flying Dakota aircraft to lift Tamil civilians stranded in towns where every road was blocked. His flights were among the most direct acts of rescue in the entire crisis. Their names deserve to be recorded. Their example deserves to be honoured. They were, in the truest sense, the thin blue line — and the gold standard. Not because they were exceptional people, but because they chose, in an exceptional moment, to be exactly what their office and their country required: servants of all citizens, equally and without distinction. That choice, made under threat and without reward, is the measure against which governance must still be held. ### **The Long-Term Consequences** The three long-term consequences of 1958 were profound and lasting. First, a brain drain: the English-educated Tamil middle class, excluded overnight from the civil service by the Sinhala Only Act, emigrated in large numbers. Second, the gradual rise of separatism: trust in the constitutional process was fatally broken, and the Federal Party's demand for autonomy within Ceylon gave way, over a generation, to the demand for a separate state. Third, a constitutional precedent that legally encoded the marginalisation of the Tamil minority in the framework of the state itself. These grievances were cited as foundational causes of the civil war that broke out formally in 1983 and continued for twenty-six years. ### **The Irony of 1978: JRJ's Constitutional Redemption** ![J.R. Jayewardene](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/sri-lanka-s-unfinished-promise-Vok0w0-kix1e42jr7gzhxa.png) J.R. Jayewardene History offers one of its sharper ironies here. J.R. Jayewardene — the man who led opposition to the B-C Pact and thereby helped foreclose the most reasonable constitutional accommodation available in 1958 — became President and introduced the 1978 Constitution. That constitution brought parity to the two languages, with English restored as a link language. It was a meaningful step, laying the constitutional foundation for everything that followed. But the stakes had changed. By 1978, the politics of language had been overtaken by the politics of survival. What had begun as a reasonable demand — for the use of Tamil in administration and education — had escalated into the demand for a separate state. The Tamil Eelam movement was not born from nowhere. It was born from the accumulated consequence of pacts abrogated, rights denied, and violence condoned. This is the history that must not be forgotten. Not to assign permanent blame, but because the lesson is precise: the cost of deferring reasonable accommodation is not merely delay. It is escalation. What could have been settled in 1958 with a modest pact required a constitutional amendment in 1978, a civil war lasting generations, and a reconciliation process that continues today. ### **The Architecture of Repair: 1987 to 1991** The 13th Amendment of 1987 enshrined Tamil as an official language alongside Sinhala. The 16th Amendment of 1988 guaranteed Tamil speakers the right to interact with any government office in their own language. These were significant steps. Then, in 1991, something remarkable happened. The Official Languages Commission Act, No. 18 of 1991, was passed without a division. In a legislature accustomed to partisan fracture, this was a moment of quiet, principled consensus. Saumyamoorthy Thondaman — who understood better than most what it meant to live between two languages and two communities — ensured that multipartisan support held firm. Cabinet papers had been drafted under Minister U.B. Wijekoon. I was privileged to co-draft that Act alongside the late Shibly Aziz. We believed then, as I still believe, that legislation alone was insufficient — but that it was indispensable. ### **The Machinery That Followed** In the years since, the machinery has not been absent. Circulars have been issued — PA Circular 18/2020 and successive amendments through to 2025, most recently PA Circular Letter 01/2026, extending concessions for public officers to acquire second-language proficiency until October 2026\. Incentive payments have been gazetted. Examinations have been designed. The National Institute of Language Education and Training was formally established in 2007\. The Official Languages Commission conducts language audits and maintains a public complaints hotline — 1956 — for citizens whose rights are being ignored. ### **The LLRC Action Plan: A Blueprint for Integration** Running alongside this legislative architecture is the LLRC Action Plan on Language, Education and Integration, whose core goal is to build national unity through language rights, trilingual education, and ethnic integration across public life. On language policy, the plan calls for making Sinhala, Tamil, and English official in practice — not just on paper. All government offices and police stations must have Tamil-speaking and bilingual staff around the clock, with complainants guaranteed the right to give statements in their own language. The Language Commission is to receive real enforcement powers with provincial branches. Interim measures — software translation tools and retired bilingual police officers serving as interpreters — are intended to bridge the gap until permanent staffing is in place. On education reform, Tamil and Sinhala language learning is to become compulsory in schools to shift attitudes between communities. Trilingual education is to begin from early childhood, backed by dedicated budget allocations for teacher training. The university admission quota system is to be reviewed toward merit-based entry, and educational resource gaps between regions are to be systematically closed. On integration in schools and universities, schools are to be actively mixed across ethnic and religious lines through twinning programmes, student exchanges, Reconciliation Clubs, and National Youth Council exchange programmes. Universities are to maintain ethnically diverse student bodies with courses offered in all three languages. Inter-provincial and national sports competitions are identified as a practical, ground-level integration tool. The plan, in short, treats language access as a rights issue, trilingualism as a nation-building instrument, and mixed schooling as the primary mechanism for long-term attitudinal change between communities. ### **The Language Charter: Long Drafted, Long Awaited** That document exists. Drafted between 2015 and 2016 and adopted as an Official Languages Commission document in 2016, its stated purpose is to set out the obligations of institutions with respect to the official languages of Sri Lanka, giving effect to Article 18(4) of the Constitution. The Charter mandates that all public institutions — and specified private and voluntary entities — provide services and communications to the public in both Sinhala and Tamil, ensure bilingual work environments and equitable employment representation, and establish an enforcement mechanism through the Official Languages Commission with powers to investigate complaints and seek judicial redress for non-compliance. It extends these obligations to third-party service providers and regulated entities in health, safety, and security, and mandates that institutions proactively inform the public of their language rights through "active offer" measures, bilingual signage, and effective communication media. It establishes the right of public officers to use either Sinhala or Tamil as a language of work, and imposes a duty on institutions to create work environments that accommodate the effective use of both. On employment, it commits the government to ensuring that Sinhala and Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans — without regard to ethnic origin or first language learned — have equal opportunities to obtain employment and advancement, and that the composition of institutional workforces tends to reflect the presence of both official languages, subject always to merit-based selection. Three illustrative provisions from the Charter's text convey the practical character of these obligations. On citizens commuting, the Charter states that every institution providing services to the travelling public has the duty to ensure that any citizen can communicate and obtain those services in either official language from any office or facility where there is significant demand for those services in that language. On equal employment, the Charter commits the Government of Sri Lanka to ensuring that Sinhala and Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans, without regard to their ethnic origin or first language learned, have equal opportunities to obtain employment and advancement in institutions, and that the composition of the workforce tends to reflect the presence of both official languages. On the language of work, the Charter establishes the participation of Sinhala and Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans as a right, imposing on institutions a positive duty to create work environments conducive to and accommodating of the effective use of both official languages — not merely tolerating their use, but actively enabling it. Canada's experience with official bilingualism demonstrates that substantive language equality can be built deliberately over time — not as a gift from the majority, but as a justiciable entitlement, enforced through institutions and courts. The lesson is not a model to be transplanted wholesale, but a principle: where there is will, the architecture of equal dignity can be constructed. The Language Charter has now been handled by two Ministers over a period of ten years. It remains unenacted — a measure of the distance between expressed commitment and actual delivery. ### **Why We Must Not Forget** History is not an exercise in blame. It is an instruction manual — one that we ignore at collective cost. 1958 — something that must not be buried beneath the weight of what went wrong. In the Government Agents, the police officers, Military Officers, the other rankers who held the line, and the unnamed clerks who quietly destroyed the lists that would have directed mobs to Tamil homes — they were the thin blue line. They remain the gold standard of what it means to serve citizens without distinction of language, ethnicity, or faith. Governance is not a transaction between the state and an abstraction called "the public." It is a daily covenant with real people — people who today connect globally, compare experiences across borders, and know, with precision, when they are being offered less than they deserve — before the cost of deferral rises again beyond what any generation should have to pay. The lesson of 1978 remains equally instructive: repair is possible. Good work deserves acknowledgement even when it comes late. The 1978 Constitution, the 1991 Act, the circulars since, and the Charter now pending — each represents genuine effort to honour what the Constitution promises. The Charter is ready. The rights are established. The machinery, imperfect as it is, exists. What remains is the political will to make the promise real — and the collective memory to insist that it must be. ***The author drafted the Language Charter (2015–2016) for the Official Languages Commission, which was adopted as a Commission document in 2016\. He co-drafted the Official Languages Commission Act No. 18 of 1991 alongside the late Shibly Aziz, and has served twice as a Commissioner of the Official Languages Commission, later going on to serve as a Provincial Governor. This account draws on the historical record as he has been able to reconstruct it. Where individuals deserving of recognition have been inadvertently omitted, he welcomes correction — their place in this story is no less real for their absence here.*** ### A Treasury Breached, a Witness Dead URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-treasury-breached-a-witness-dead/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T23:49:45.000Z **KULIYAPITIYA, Sri Lanka —** On the afternoon of April 30, the daughter of Abeysinghe Mudiyanselage Ranga Nishantha Rajapaksa noticed her father walking toward the back of their house. He carried a knife. His wife, a schoolteacher, was at work. Sometime between that moment and 2:00 p.m., she found him near a banana tree, bleeding from severed veins in both legs and his left hand. A blood-stained knife lay nearby. By nightfall, Sri Lanka was confronting a new and deeply disturbing chapter in an already escalating national scandal: Ranga Nishantha Rajapaksa, a 49-year-old Assistant Director of the Finance Ministry’s External Resources Department — born on June 26, 1976, and suspended days earlier over his alleged links to the country’s humiliating $2.5 million cyber fraud scandal — was found dead at his residence. Following a post-mortem examination conducted by a special Judicial Medical Officer panel, police officially concluded the death was a suicide, a finding that closed one line of inquiry even as it intensified public scrutiny over the broader financial scandal engulfing the state. ### **THE HEIST** The fraud had its roots in what investigators describe as a sophisticated, if methodical, act of digital deception. Between late December 2025 and late January 2026, Sri Lanka’s External Resources Department processed a series of debt-repayment installments totaling approximately $2.5 million — funds earmarked under a larger $22.9 million bilateral loan facility from the Australian government for development projects in Sri Lanka. The money never arrived. According to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), hackers had infiltrated the email systems of the ERD and its Australian counterpart, Export Finance Australia, and replaced the legitimate payment domain —[ ](http://exportfinance.gov.au/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)[exportfinance.gov.au](http://exportfinance.gov.au/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com) — with a near-identical fraudulent one:[ ](http://exportfinance.av.com/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)[exportfinance.av.com](http://exportfinance.av.com/?ref=jaffnamonitor.com). Fake invoices and payment instructions followed. Treasury officials processed the transactions. The fraud was reportedly discovered when a similar attempt to divert funds destined for India was made. That second attempt triggered verification, which revealed the earlier diversion. By the time investigators confirmed what had happened, the money had vanished into overseas accounts. What makes the heist particularly damaging is not only the sum stolen — significant for a country still under IMF supervision — but the timeline of its disclosure. Treasury Secretary Harshana Suriyapperuma confirmed publicly that the breach had been detected in January 2026\. The government chose not to inform Parliament. It was only in late April, when the case came before the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court, that Sri Lanka’s legislators and the public learned the full extent of what had occurred. Suriyapperuma defended the delayed disclosure as necessary to protect an ongoing criminal investigation. The explanation did not satisfy critics. The most explosive detail, however, concerns what happened before the money moved at all. HSBC Bank had flagged the transaction as suspicious on at least two separate occasions before the payment was processed. On both occasions, the bank's warnings were overridden. Opposition MP Harsha de Silva, chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Public Finance, raised the question that has since haunted the case: how does a $2.5 million sovereign debt payment — roughly Rs. 798 million, or nearly 79.9 crore rupees — clear the system after a major correspondent bank has twice raised a red flag? De Silva also questioned whether such a disbursement could lawfully have been authorised without Treasury Secretary-level sign-off. The government’s characterization of the breach has shifted in ways that have only deepened public confusion. Deputy Minister of Digital Economy Eranga Weeraratne rejected descriptions of the incident as a direct systems hack, instead suggesting that the failure stemmed primarily from human procedural lapses. Deputy Finance Minister Anil Jayantha Fernando, meanwhile, warned against what he described as misleading opposition narratives, while simultaneously confirming that the breach had affected multiple transactions. This oscillation between framing the scandal as a sophisticated cyberattack and attributing it to human error has left accountability dangerously suspended somewhere in between. The CID has since charged individuals under the Computer Crimes Act, the Public Property Act, and the Penal Code. Investigators have engaged INTERPOL and the Australian Federal Police. A technical committee drawn from Sri Lanka's Computer Emergency Readiness Team, the Government Analyst's Department, and the University of Colombo's Faculty of Computer Studies has been constituted. The next court date is June 3, 2026. ### **THE MAN AT THE CENTRE** ![A memorial notice from the staff of the Finance Ministry’s External Resources Department honors Ranga Nishantha Rajapaksa after his death](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/a-treasury-breached-a-witness-03DxZA-kixbilz4ktgptjv.png) A memorial notice from the staff of the Finance Ministry’s External Resources Department honors Ranga Nishantha Rajapaksa after his death Ranga Nishantha Rajapaksa grew up in Kuliyapitiya, in Sri Lanka's North Western Province — a market town that produces civil servants, teachers, and, occasionally, leftist student politicians. He studied at Kuliyapitiya Central College and later at the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, building the credentials for a career in public finance. By the time of his death, he had risen to Assistant Director at the ERD, the Ministry of Finance unit that manages Sri Lanka's external borrowing and debt-servicing obligations. He was 50 years old. His wife teaches at a local school. They have two children. Investigators say he was among the ERD officials who responded to the fraudulent emails during the period of the fraud. He subsequently gave statements to the CID on three occasions — once while still in service, twice after his suspension. He failed to appear on two further CID summonses. Police sources indicate that preliminary findings did not characterise him as a corrupt actor, and that he had cooperated fully in the initial stages of the inquiry. His personal computer was seized. A Facebook check-in on his personal profile, verified by Jaffna Monitor, places him at the University of Queensland's St. Lucia campus in Brisbane on December 17, 2025 — less than two weeks before the first fraudulent transactions were processed through the ERD. The nature and purpose of that visit have not been established. ![Screenshot: Ranga Nishantha's Facebook check-in page, archived by Jaffna Monitor, shows a visit to the University of Queensland's St. Lucia campus in Brisbane on December 17, 2025 — less than two weeks before the first fraudulent transactions were processed through Sri Lanka's External Resources Department.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/a-treasury-breached-a-witness-03DxZA-kix3jhlec2klonm.png) Screenshot: Ranga Nishantha's Facebook check-in page, archived by Jaffna Monitor, shows a visit to the University of Queensland's St. Lucia campus in Brisbane on December 17, 2025 — less than two weeks before the first fraudulent transactions were processed through Sri Lanka's External Resources Department. Sources who studied, worked, and lived alongside him told Jaffna Monitor that he was widely regarded as a man of genuine simplicity — modest in his habits, honest in his dealings, the kind of civil servant whose lifestyle bore no trace of unexplained wealth. After his death, television cameras entered his home in Madakumburumulla, Pahala Weerambua. What Sri Lanka saw surprised many: a partially unfinished house, spare and ordinary, the residence of a man allegedly entangled in a scandal worth nearly 80 crore rupees yet seemingly untouched by any of it. That image — the unfinished walls, the modest furniture — lodged itself in public memory. On social media, it circulated alongside a question that no official statement has yet answered: if Ranga Nishantha was corrupt, where was the money? Those who knew him noted that he had roots in the leftist student politics of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — the Marxist party now in government under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Whether that history shaped his conduct within the ERD or his relationship with investigators after the fraud remains unclear. What is clear is that by the time the Colombo Fort Magistrate's Court heard the CID's submissions on April 28, the pressure on him had become acute. Two days later, he was dead. ### **THE DEATH** ![Ranga Nishantha Rajapaksa, second from left, at his master’s degree graduation ceremony.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/a-treasury-breached-a-witness-03DxZA-kixekomu91gb0um.png) Ranga Nishantha Rajapaksa, second from left, at his master’s degree graduation ceremony. The sequence of events on April 30 has been reconstructed from police reports and media accounts. His wife was at school. His daughter observed him walking toward the rear of the house with a knife. She did not immediately follow. When she found him near a banana tree, he was bleeding severely from wounds to both legs and his left hand. Police recovered a blood-stained knife at the scene. Following a post-mortem examination by a special Judicial Medical Officer panel, police officially ruled the death a suicide. Several sources told Jaffna Monitor that Ranga Nishantha was reportedly among the earliest officials to formally alert the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to the Treasury fraud. If accurate, that detail would fundamentally reframe his position in the case. Rather than simply being a suspect who succumbed to mounting pressure, he may instead have been a complainant who, after helping expose the crime, ultimately found himself treated as one of its alleged perpetrators. Those who knew him have since raised a deeply troubling question: if he was among the first to sound the alarm, why was he later summoned as a suspect — and was he ever provided adequate protection after doing so? Individuals close to him have called for a comprehensive forensic examination of his digital devices, official correspondence, and personal records. Forensic analysis of his computer and mobile devices, seized by the CID, remains ongoing. ### **TWO INVESTIGATIONS** Sri Lanka now faces two parallel inquiries whose intersection is impossible to ignore. The CID is pursuing the cyber-fraud case with international assistance. The Kuliyapitiya Police are investigating the death of a man who was simultaneously a suspect, a witness, and — by some accounts — a complainant in that same fraud. The political and institutional pressures are profound. Sri Lanka is still recovering from the catastrophic 2022 sovereign default under an International Monetary Fund program that imposed stringent fiscal discipline and sweeping economic reforms. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government came to power pledging a decisive break from the corruption, opacity, and misgovernance that defined previous administrations. The Treasury heist — and the troubling conduct surrounding it — now poses a direct challenge to that reformist political project, threatening both public trust and the credibility of the government’s anti-corruption mandate. The Treasury Secretary initially failed to appear before the Committee on Public Finance as scheduled, citing an impending Presidential statement to Parliament as justification. Opposition legislator Harsha de Silva condemned the absence as an unprecedented breach of constitutional accountability. Although the Treasury Secretary later appeared before the committee, no official transcript or detailed public record of that appearance has since been released, further intensifying concerns over transparency and institutional responsibility. Opposition leader Sajith Premadasa, of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya, described the diversion as a serious breach of financial security and called for an independent, transparent investigation into whether safeguards at the Treasury and Central Bank had been bypassed. Australia, whose export finance agency was the intended recipient of the diverted funds, acknowledged the breach and stated its commitment to continued cooperation with Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring programme. The Australian Federal Police have been engaged in the investigation. ### **THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS** The questions that remain are both highly specific and deeply systemic. How were HSBC's two explicit warnings overridden before a sovereign debt payment of this magnitude was processed? What chain of authorisation permitted $2.5 million to be disbursed on the basis of instructions pointing to a forged email domain? Were the officials who first flagged the fraud given adequate protection once the investigation commenced? And was Ranga Nishantha, as sources allege, among the original complainants — a possibility that, if true, would render his subsequent treatment as a co-suspect not merely troubling, but a potential institutional failure of the first order? Sri Lanka has a documented history of key witnesses dying before they can testify. Against that backdrop, the timing of Ranga Nishantha's death has produced a level of public suspicion that police statements alone cannot easily dispel. Investigations of this gravity demand more than an official ruling; they demand a transparent accounting of how a man who may have raised the alarm came, within months, to be treated as a criminal. For now, the broader investigation remains active. Parliamentary scrutiny is expected to continue, with key hearings scheduled for June 3\. Authorities have officially ruled the death a suicide. Forensic analysis of Ranga Nishantha's seized devices continues. His wife, a schoolteacher in Kuliyapitiya, has not made any public statement. ### The Dam They Can't Account For URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-dam-they-cant-account-for/ Last updated: 2026-05-02T02:41:50.000Z **By Sidhartha Thamby** Somewhere in the ledgers of Sri Lanka's Cabinet Office, between the fiscal crisis minutes and the debt-restructuring files, sits a two-paragraph decision that will reshape rivers, forests, and livelihoods across Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, and the wider northern dry zone. Approved quietly in January 2026, it revived the Kivul Oya Reservoir Project — suspended only two years earlier because the country had run out of money — at a cost of Rs. 23,456 million. That figure is not a typo. In 2011, the same project was approved at Rs. 4,170 million. The price has risen more than fivefold. Not one rupee of benefit has so far been recorded. The project sits inside what officials call Mahaweli System L, a vast administrative zone carved from northern dry-zone land over four decades — gazetted at roughly 199,000 hectares, formally part of Sri Lanka's celebrated Mahaweli development programme. But System L conceals a troubling gap at its centre. Of all that land, only 980 hectares have ever been formally brought under irrigation. Settlement ran decades ahead of water. Communities were moved in, promises were made, and the water never followed. Kivul Oya, its proponents say, is the answer. A dam on the Ma Oya/Kivul Oya river in Mahaweli System L will irrigate 2,400 hectares, supply drinking water to 50,000 people, and lift 6,000 farming families out of poverty. On paper, those are serious development goals. On the ground, a growing body of evidence suggests the project is being revived on stale assumptions, incomplete law, and suppressed dissent — and that the communities most affected, many of them Tamil, have never had a meaningful say. ## **THE WATER THAT ISN'T THERE** The first question any reservoir must answer is simple: where does the water come from? In the case of Kivul Oya, the answer has quietly changed — and almost no one in the public has been told. When the project was first conceived, the plan was to supply System L through the North Central Province Canal (NCPCP), which forms the northern trunk of the Asian Development Bank-funded Mahaweli Water Security Investment Program (MWSIP). Mahaweli River water, the logic went, would flow from the Moragahakanda reservoir complex northward through a network of tunnels and canals, filling the dry-zone tanks and irrigation systems that the colonial and post-independence state had long promised to the north. But recent water-balance studies found that Moragahakanda's water supply is insufficient for the anticipated command area. The Centre for Environmental Justice (CEJ), which reviewed the Kivul Oya Environmental Impact Assessment, quotes the EIA itself admitting this: the original plan was to supply water through the NCPCP, but updated modelling showed the water simply was not there. Planners were forced to turn to the local Kivul Oya catchment instead. That shift matters enormously. It means Kivul Oya cannot borrow the political grandeur of Mahaweli to justify its existence. It must stand on its own basin — its own rainfall record, its own runoff coefficients, its own dry-season yields. None of that updated hydrology is in the public domain. The government has not published the water balance studies. The ADB has not disclosed the System L supply modelling. The public, including the farming communities expected to benefit, cannot verify whether the promised water exists. ### **THE AUDIT THAT SHOULD HAVE STOPPED EVERYTHING** Kivul Oya is not the only northern water project in crisis. The wider MWSIP programme — the ADB-financed backbone of Sri Lanka's dry-zone water ambition — is in serious trouble, and the country's own Auditor General has documented it in detail. As of December 2024, MWSIP Tranches 1, 2, and 3 together showed physical progress of 19.6 percent against an expected 91 percent. That is not a delay. It is a collapse. Contracts have been cancelled. Procurement has been challenged. Land acquisition has stalled. A tunnel-boring machine working on the Bowatenna–Wemedilla connector cracked concrete rings and generated Rs. 4,543 million in expenses that the Auditor General said remained unexplained. Commitment charges — fees paid to lenders for funds that were borrowed but not spent — had already reached Rs. 232.9 million by the end of 2024. The significance of these failures goes beyond accounting. MWSIP is the infrastructure spine that was supposed to eventually connect Mahaweli water to System L. If that spine is incomplete, delayed, and technically troubled, the premise of Kivul Oya — already weakened by the water-balance problem — becomes even harder to defend. Yet the government is pressing ahead with local funding for Kivul Oya, at more than five times the original estimate, while the larger programme it was meant to complement remains a fragment. ### **1,615 ACRES AND A MEMORANDUM THE GOVERNMENT IGNORED** In 2019, a group of Tamil residents submitted a formal memorandum to authorities alleging that 1,615 acres of paddy land belonging to their communities had been confiscated for the Kivul Oya project and for the expansion of Mahaweli System L. The memorandum named twelve localities: Kokkuthoduvai, Kokkilai, Karunatkerni, Uththarayankulam, Nelunkulam, Amayan Kulam, Kiribanweva, Kulavadukkulam, Adayakaruththaankulam, Nayadichchamurippu, Sivanthamurippukulam, Thattamlai, Kunjukkulam, Tikiriweva, and Sagalaatruveli. The memorandum is not proof of title. It does not attach deeds, permit numbers, cadastral survey sheets, or compensation records. But it is primary evidence that a serious grievance was raised — and, critically, that it was raised years before the 2026 recommencement decision. There is no public record of any response. The Northern Province Governor's office has separately recorded a meeting on what it called 'civilian lands under the L-Zone of the Mahaweli Development Authority.' The record states that Tamil people had lived in these areas until 1984, that their lands were absorbed into System L during the displacement of the civil war years, and that returnees attempting to reclaim their land in 2012 found it was being offered to others. That is official acknowledgment of the dispute — not from civil society or diaspora activists, but from a provincial government body. The government's standard response is to point to System L's administrative land-alienation records: 14,774 lots gazetted, 7,025 grants and leases issued. But administrative issuance is not the same as lawful acquisition. It shows what the Mahaweli Authority gave out. It does not show what was there before, who held prior rights, whether those rights were extinguished through due process, and whether anyone was compensated. Until those lot-level records are published — in Sinhala, Tamil, and English — the land question cannot be resolved, only suppressed. ### **THE EIA THAT MAY NOT EXIST IN TAMIL** Sri Lanka's 1993 Environmental Impact Assessment regulations are clear. An EIA must be publicly noticed in all three languages. It must be available for inspection. Affected communities must be able to read it and respond to it. Their comments must be recorded. The project proponent must reply. Only then can the Central Environmental Authority issue approval. CEJ's formal submission on the Kivul Oya EIA, made in 2020, alleged that Sinhala and Tamil versions of the EIA were not available on the CEA website. Only the archaeological impact assessment existed in Sinhala. The full technical document was in English only. For a project affecting Tamil-speaking communities in Vavuniya and Mullaitivu — communities with limited English literacy, communities that had already submitted a land-rights memorandum that went unanswered — an English-only EIA is not a procedural technicality. It is a denial of participation. The 1993 regulations exist precisely because technical decisions affecting communities must be understandable to those communities. The CEA's 2021 Annual Report lists Kivul Oya as an approved EIA project. But the public record contains no approval letter, no approval conditions, no trilingual notice log, no comment-response matrix, and — critically — no record of a fresh or supplementary EIA following the project's suspension from December 2023 and recommencement in January 2026\. A project that has been suspended for two years, revised in cost by Rs. 19 billion, and restarted under new conditions may require new environmental review. No such review is publicly recorded. ### **THE FORESTS, THE ELEPHANTS, AND THE ANCIENT MONASTERY** The environmental stakes are not abstract. The Kivul Oya EIA, as reported at the time of its submission, projected the loss of approximately 2,500 hectares of forest and 1,500 hectares of elephant habitat. CEJ identified 47 archaeological sites within the project area, including ancient tank structures and a monastery at Vediwettukallu South that would need to be dismantled and relocated — into an elephant corridor. Sri Lanka's human-elephant conflict is already among the most acute in Asia. CEJ's formal comments noted that the government's standard response — electric fencing — has consistently failed at the national level, and that building a large reservoir in core elephant movement territory, then fencing the affected communities in, is not a mitigation measure. It is a transfer of the conflict to future generations. The EIA also did not adequately address reservoir methane emissions, forest-carbon loss, downstream flow changes to Kokilai Lagoon, or climate-scenario analysis. These are not optional refinements. In an era of accelerating drought cycles and intensifying rainfall variability, a reservoir that cannot account for its own dry-year yield, its downstream effects, or its contribution to atmospheric warming is not a climate solution. It is a climate risk. ### **RIVER FOR JAFFNA: DREAM, SLOGAN, OR VIABLE PLAN?** While Kivul Oya moves toward construction in the south of the northern dry zone, a different water vision dominates political rhetoric in Jaffna itself. The concept known as 'River for Jaffna' envisions channelling seasonal freshwater from the Kanagarayan Aru and other Vanni streams into Elephant Pass Lagoon, and from there into the Vadamarachchi and Upparu lagoon systems, to reduce salinity, recharge the limestone aquifer, and support agriculture and domestic water security across the peninsula. President Ranil Wickremesinghe announced the immediate initiation of River for Jaffna in 2024, while simultaneously opening the Thalaiyady seawater desalination plant. The political optics were generous. The technical substance was thin. There is no public EIA for River for Jaffna. There is no hydrodynamic model in the public domain. There is no costed feasibility study. The ADB, which evaluated the concept while planning Jaffna's water supply, assessed it as unproven and environmentally uncertain, and chose desalination instead. Jaffna's water problem is structurally different from the dry-zone irrigation deficit. The peninsula has no perennial rivers. Its limestone aquifer is shallow, over-extracted, and increasingly saline. The Iranamadu reservoir to the south, once proposed as a drinking-water source for Jaffna, became socially unavailable when farmers in Kilinochchi mounted sustained resistance to water sharing — a reminder that water allocation is a social and political question before it is a technical one. River for Jaffna, Kivul Oya, MWSIP, and the Jaffna desalination plant are not one connected system. They are parallel responses to parallel crises, being managed by different agencies with different budgets, different lenders, and different political sponsors. None of them has been assessed against the others. None of them has been evaluated for double-counting of water sources, beneficiary populations, or downstream effects. This is the core failure this investigation documents. ### **WHAT THE NORTH ACTUALLY NEEDS** The argument of this investigation is not that Kivul Oya should be cancelled. It is that Kivul Oya cannot be responsibly recommended in its current state — with a stale EIA, suppressed land claims, unverified hydrology, a fivefold cost increase, and no published plan showing how it fits with the broader northern water portfolio. There are alternatives. Sri Lanka's ancient tank-cascade systems — minor interconnected reservoirs managing seasonal runoff at village scale — represent centuries of distributed water knowledge. Many have fallen into disrepair. Rehabilitating them would cost less, displace fewer people, destroy less forest, and build resilience from the ground up. They are not romantic nostalgia. They are infrastructure. A serious northern water programme would assess Kivul Oya against at least five alternatives: a smaller or phased reservoir, tank-cascade rehabilitation, conjunctive groundwater recharge, MWSIP completion and future extension where the hydrology supports it, and hybrid packages combining targeted storage with demand management and productivity investment. None of that comparison has happened. None of it is in the public record. The Mahaweli Authority, the Irrigation Department, the Central Environmental Authority, the ADB, the Cabinet Office, and the Northern Provincial Council all hold fragments of the evidence needed to assess the northern water question fairly. None of them has assembled those fragments into a single, accountable, trilingual public account. Until they do, the communities most affected — Tamil farmers and fishing families in Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Kilinochchi, and Jaffna — will continue to be planned for rather than planned with. ### **WHAT MUST HAPPEN BEFORE THE SPADE TURNS** The minimum standard for a project of this scale is not complicated. The government must publish the complete Kivul Oya EIA approval file — the terms of reference, public notices, the Sinhala and Tamil versions of the report, the inspection-location records, the comment register, the proponent's responses to objections, the CEA concurrence, the approval letter, the approval conditions, and any post-suspension renewal or supplementary assessment. If those documents exist, produce them. If they do not, the approval chain is legally exposed. The government must publish a lot-level land ledger for Kivul Oya and System L — not aggregate alienation statistics, but parcel-by-parcel records identifying each affected person, their legal status, their prior claim, the compensation offered, and the outcome of any dispute. Affected communities must be able to check their own names and plots. The government must publish the updated water-balance studies that led planners to abandon the NCPCP supply premise for System L. Those studies are the foundation of the revised project. They belong in the public domain. No irreversible construction — no land acquisition, no forest clearance, no dam foundation work, no inundation of any inhabited or cultivated area — should proceed until those three things are in place. Surveys, modelling, consultation, and procurement preparation can continue. But the point of no return must not be crossed on the basis of a 2020 EIA, a 2011 cost estimate scaled up by five, and a land dispute that has been officially recognised but never officially resolved. ### **A FINAL NOTE ON ACCOUNTABILITY** This investigation draws on official Cabinet decisions, Auditor General reports, ADB project documentation, Mahaweli Authority statistical publications, CEA guidance, CEJ formal submissions, community memoranda, and Northern Province Governor records. Every factual claim is grounded in those sources. Where the record is incomplete — where documents have not been published, where approvals cannot be traced, where claims remain at the level of allegation — this investigation says so explicitly. The gaps are as important as the evidence. What the available record proves is this: a project worth Rs. 23 billion is being restarted in a post-conflict, water-stressed, Tamil-majority area on the basis of a procedurally vulnerable EIA, unresolved land disputes that have been raised through official channels and not answered, unverified hydrology, and no published plan showing how it fits with the rest of Sri Lanka's northern water infrastructure. That is not development. That is a decision waiting to become a crisis. Sri Lanka has an opportunity to do this differently. The North has waited long enough — for water, for land justice, for honest accounting, and for plans that are built with communities rather than imposed upon them. The question is whether the institutions that hold the evidence will choose transparency before irreversibility, or silence until the concrete is poured. **Editor’s Note:** **This article is an opinion and investigative analysis by the author. The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of *Jaffna Monitor*. *Jaffna Monitor* remains committed to fostering informed public discourse and welcomes diverse perspectives, counterarguments, and evidence-based debate on matters of public importance.** ### Tamil Families Displaced Since 1990 Vow Weekly Protests Until Military-Held Lands Are Returned URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-families-displaced-since-1990-vow-weekly-protests-until-military-held-lands-are-returned/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T09:20:15.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Holding faded land deeds — some preserved for more than three decades as the last legal proof of ownership — displaced Tamil residents of Valikamam North gathered Friday outside the gates of the military’s Commando bungalow in Sri Lanka’s Jaffna Peninsula, demanding the return of ancestral lands they have been barred from entering since their forced displacement in June 1990. The demonstration, organized by landowners and their families, marked the start of what participants said would become a sustained weekly protest every Friday until the government takes meaningful steps toward land release. At the edge of a barbed-wire-enclosed High Security Zone, residents raised property documents, family records and placards as symbols of both ownership and endurance, confronting the military boundaries that for nearly 36 years have kept them from homes, farmland and religious sites once central to their communities. Tamil National People’s Front Member of Parliament Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam joined the protest, expressed support for the displaced families and pledged to elevate their demands to national leadership, as frustration deepens over the prolonged failure of successive governments to fully resolve one of post-war northern Sri Lanka’s most enduring land disputes. “We want our land back,” protesters chanted outside the compound. “Enough of 36 years of occupation.” ![Displaced Tamil landowners protest outside the gates of the military’s Commando bungalow in Valikamam North, built on land taken from local Tamil families, as they demand the return of ancestral properties they have been denied access to for nearly 36 years.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/tamil-families-displaced-since-CTSYZU-kix2i75yee9blbo.png) Displaced Tamil landowners protest outside the gates of the military’s Commando bungalow in Valikamam North, built on land taken from local Tamil families, as they demand the return of ancestral properties they have been denied access to for nearly 36 years. The Valikamam North Land Release Committee has noted that nearly 2,900 acres remain unreleased despite five presidential changes and four parliaments since the war's end — and eight presidents since the original displacement in 1990. The government of President Dissanayake, elected in late 2024 on a platform of systemic accountability and pledges to resolve longstanding ethnic grievances, has announced fresh land releases. Tamil politicians and displaced residents say the releases, measured against the full scale of what remains occupied, amount to far less than what is being claimed. ### **The High Security Zone and How It Was Created** ![A protest banner displayed outside the military-controlled High Security Zone in Valikamam North calls for the liberation of lands belonging to the people of Myliddy, declaring that even after 36 years, thousands of displaced Tamil families remain denied access to their ancestral homes and farmlands.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/tamil-families-displaced-since-CTSYZU-kixnklejg8sg113.png) A protest banner displayed outside the military-controlled High Security Zone in Valikamam North calls for the liberation of lands belonging to the people of Myliddy, declaring that even after 36 years, thousands of displaced Tamil families remain denied access to their ancestral homes and farmlands. In June 1990, as Sri Lanka’s civil war intensified, the Sri Lankan military expanded operations around the Palaly airbase and Kankesanthurai harbor on the northern tip of the Jaffna Peninsula. Thousands of Tamil families from thirteen Grama Niladhari divisions under the Valikamam North Divisional Secretariat were ordered to leave their homes, displaced by the expansion of the Palaly military base and the shelling of surrounding villages. The area was subsequently declared a High Security Zone under emergency security regulations and placed entirely under military administration. Entire villages were cleared. Homes, agricultural fields, fishing grounds, schools, temples, churches, and community halls were absorbed into the zone. The zone, at its peak, encompassed approximately 30 villages. Of those originally displaced in 1990, villages including Myliddy, Palaly, Vasavilan, Katkovalam, Kurumbasiddy, Urani, Tholakaddy, Keerimalai, Kankesanthurai and Thaiyiddy remain fully or substantially under military control as of 2025, according to a parliamentary statement by M.P. Sivagnanam Shritharan and accounts from affected residents. Some areas, including parts of Maviddapuram, were formally returned following a 2011 ceremony, though civil society organisations document continued military encroachments even in nominally released zones. The war ended in May 2009\. The High Security Zone did not. More than 6,000 families from Valikamam North remain displaced, scattered across other parts of the Northern Province and abroad, according to figures cited by civil society organizations and local representatives. The barbed-wire fences remain in place. “Although 16 years have passed since the end of the war, our lands remain under the control of the Sri Lankan military under the continuing pretext of a High Security Zone,” said Velautham, a displaced resident of Valikamam North, speaking to Jaffna Monitor. ### **What the Government Says It Has Done** The administration of President Dissanayake has identified land release in the Northern Province as a priority. In a defense advisory committee meeting in Parliament, the President stated that the government had taken steps to release approximately 1,000 acres of private land in the North during 2025 alone. In early April, Deputy Defense Minister Major General (Retired) Arun Jayasekara provided more specific figures to Parliament. According to his submission, a total of 672.24 acres had been released between January 1 and October 2025, comprising 86.24 acres of private land and 586 acres of state land previously used by the military. He also cited the release in March of two acres in Jaffna’s Vasavilan area, noting that those acres had been under military control for 36 years. Jayasekara told reporters that land release would not pose any threat to national security and that special attention was being given to lands belonging to religious institutions. Fisheries Minister Ramalingam Chandrasekar, in a separate announcement earlier this year, said a phased program had been initiated to return privately owned lands in Valikamam North to their rightful owners, in line with directives from the President. ### **The Gap Between Announcements and Delivery** Tamil political representatives and displaced residents dispute the government’s framing of the situation. In Valikamam North alone, residents and Tamil representatives say approximately 2,200 acres of agricultural land remain unreleased, despite repeated promises from successive governments. “Every government announces land releases, but the vast majority of our occupied lands remain unchanged,” said Murugupillai, 72, a displaced resident, speaking to Jaffna Monitor. “We can see that this government is continuing the same pattern.” ## **Beyond Valikamam: A Dispute That Spans the Entire North and East** ![Displaced Tamil landowners protest outside the gates of the military’s Commando bungalow in Valikamam North, built on land taken from local Tamil families, as they demand the return of ancestral properties they have been denied access to for nearly 36 years](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/tamil-families-displaced-since-CTSYZU-kixe2avai3wj68-1.png) Displaced Tamil landowners protest outside the gates of the military’s Commando bungalow in Valikamam North, built on land taken from local Tamil families, as they demand the return of ancestral properties they have been denied access to for nearly 36 years The land occupation that brought residents to the gates of the Commando bungalow on Friday is not a problem confined to Valikamam North. From the lagoons of Mullaitivu to the naval coastline of Mannar to the fishing villages of Trincomalee, military occupation of civilian land is a condition that Tamil communities across the North and East have lived under for decades. ### **Keppapulavu, Mullaitivu** In Keppapulavu, a village in Mullaitivu District, residents fled their homes in December 2008 as the final phase of the civil war engulfed the area. The Sri Lankan Army and Air Force subsequently established camps on more than 200 hectares of Tamil-owned residential land. The military did not leave when the war ended in May 2009\. Tamil National Alliance MP Thurairasa Ravikaran has stated that approximately 160 acres remain under military occupation as of 2025, disrupting access to Nandikadal Lagoon — the body of water adjacent to Mullivaikkal, site of the war's final battle — and cutting off fishing families from livelihoods tied to the lagoon for generations. In December 2017, following sustained pressure, the Army released a portion of the land it had occupied. But the centre of the village, including homes, a school, a primary health centre, places of worship, and a community hall belonging to the original residents, remained inside the military perimeter. Families who had spent years in the Menik Farm displacement camp were transported in September 2012 to Sooripuram, a plot of land adjacent to but not on their original properties, according to Human Rights Watch documentation of the resettlement process. The families of Keppapulavu began a continuous day-and-night protest on March 1, 2017, outside the military headquarters in Mullaitivu — a demonstration that lasted more than 700 days and was described at the time as the longest community-led continuous protest for land in Sri Lanka. In April 2025, residents who attended a meeting at the Presidential Secretariat in Colombo were told by officials that the government had no information about their land issue. In November 2024, residents presented a petition directly to Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya at a National People's Power event in the area. Amarasuriya received the petition but made no public commitment on it. ### **Mullikulam, Mannar** In Mullikulam, a Tamil Catholic village on the Mannar coastline bordering Wilpattu National Park, the Sri Lanka Navy evacuated approximately 307 families in September 2007 and told them they would be permitted to return within three days. They were not permitted to return in full. The Navy subsequently established its North Western Command Headquarters — SLNS Barana — on the land. Before the Navy arrived, Mullikulam was a self-sufficient village with paddy fields, four streams, sea and shore fishing grounds, a school, a post office, a cooperative outlet, and the Church of Our Lady of Assumption. All of that now sits inside a naval base. The 307 displaced families are currently scattered across at least three separate locations — Kayakkuli, Malankaadu, and Mannar town — having reluctantly accepted alternate housing built by the Navy that residents say has already begun to deteriorate. The Catholic Diocese of Mannar owns a substantial portion of Mullikulam's land. In December 2012, the Bishop of Mannar met with then-Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa at a meeting also attended by Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, and received a commitment that land within 750 meters of the church would be returned. That commitment was not honoured. In July 2018, President Sirisena made a public commitment at Madhu Shrine to expedite land release in Mullikulam. That commitment was not honoured either. Those who remain in temporary settlements near Mullikulam are required to obtain a pass from the Navy to fish in waters they once used without restriction. ### **Sampur, Trincomalee** In Sampur, a coastal Tamil village in Trincomalee District, the Sri Lanka Navy established Camp Vidura on land from which Tamil families had been displaced. According to villagers' testimonies, the Navy occupied at least 176 acres of residential and agricultural land, as well as over 1,000 acres of coastal area traditionally used for fishing. Paddy fields and water tanks were enclosed within naval property. Fishing families lost direct access to the coast. A partial release occurred under President Sirisena, with 818 acres handed over to original residents in August 2015 and a further 177 acres in March 2016, according to Human Rights Watch. When Human Rights Watch visited in August 2017, multiple disputes remained unresolved. Some returning families found plots occupied or boundaries shifted. The Navy still occupies 207.52 acres of land belonging to approximately 110 families in Sampur, according to a petition submitted by displaced residents to the Governor of the Eastern Province in April 2025. The land question in Sampur took a new turn on April 4, 2025, when President Dissanayake and visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi jointly inaugurated the Sampur Solar Power Plant — a 120-megawatt joint project between India's NTPC and Sri Lanka's Ceylon Electricity Board built on approximately 500 acres of land in Sampur. Tamil residents of Sampur West, Sampur East, and Katakaraichenai staged a protest the same day, timed to coincide with Modi's arrival. In a petition submitted to the Governor of the Eastern Province, the displaced residents demanded the return of 1,658 acres of land expropriated without legal process by successive governments. ### **The Scale of the Problem** The Human Rights Watch report "Why Can't We Go Home?", published in 2018 and still cited by Tamil civil society, documented military land occupation across Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, and Trincomalee. It found that in multiple cases, the military occupied civilian land for agriculture, tourism, and commercial purposes while blocking the return of original owners under the stated justification of national security. Right to Information data for four Northern Province districts — Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya — documents more than 5,700 acres of privately owned land under military or police control. Mannar District has a further 28 separate military, naval, and police-occupied locations for which total acreage has not been made public. Although the government of President Dissanayake claims that approximately 1,000 acres of private land were released in the Northern Province during 2025, Tamil representatives say significant uncertainty remains over where and when those releases occurred. ### **The Scale of Military Land Occupation: RTI Data** Data obtained through Sri Lanka’s Right to Information Act provides a district-by-district accounting of privately owned land across the Northern Province that remains under the control of the military and police: ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/tamil-families-displaced-since-CTSYZU-kixv4lhsoe9dr7c.png) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/tamil-families-displaced-since-CTSYZU-kixbr618km19u0m.png) ### **What Happens on Occupied Land** Land rights activists and affected residents say the military does not merely occupy civilian property but derives economic benefit from it. Vivekananthan Indradevi, a landowner from Keppapulavu in Mullaitivu district who has been pressing separately for the release of her land, described the situation in terms that were echoed by Valikamam North residents on Friday. “The military is benefiting from my land,” she told journalists. “They are cultivating our lands, but I, the rightful owner, cannot even enter my own home.” Sources familiar with land use patterns in Valikamam North told *Jaffna Monitor* that military personnel have established agricultural operations on substantial portions of the occupied lands within the High Security Zone, with additional areas reportedly converted into recreational and commercial facilities, including shops and playgrounds. Residents and land rights advocates allege that produce cultivated on these privately owned civilian lands is subsequently sold in local Tamil-majority markets, creating what many displaced families describe as the deeply painful reality of original landowners being forced to purchase goods grown on their own confiscated property. Rathinasingam Muralitharan, leader of the Northern Province People’s Organization for Land Rights, said the prolonged occupation of civilian lands in the North and East increasingly extends beyond conventional security justifications. “While lands in other parts of the country may be acquired in the name of development, in the North and East Tamil lands continue to be seized under the pretext of security,” he said, arguing that state institutions, including archaeology and coastal conservation authorities, have at times been used to reinforce or legitimize land control that might otherwise be subject to civilian return. “The continuous occupation has stripped people not only of their livelihoods, but also of their peace,” he said. “Our demand is simple: the people’s lands must be returned to the people.” ### **Security, the Government’s Recurring Justification** Across every administration since 2009, the primary justification for continued military land holdings in the North has been national security. Deputy Defense Minister Jayasekara reaffirmed this position in his parliamentary statement, saying that while land release is a priority, all decisions will remain subject to security considerations and that “national security” will be prioritized above all other factors in future land release determinations. Fisheries Minister Chandrasekar, in his announcement earlier this year, justified the years of occupation by stating that “extraordinary circumstances” during the war had required the retention of private lands. Tamil political representatives and civil society groups note that the war ended 16 years ago. ### **A Record of Promises Across Five Presidents** The land dispute in Valikamam North predates the current government by many administrations. Under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who oversaw the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009, phased land releases were announced, and partial returns were conducted as public ceremonies. Large portions of the High Security Zone remained untouched. Under President Sirisena, 500 acres across Kankesanthurai, Myliddy**,** and Palaly were formally approved for release. A decade later, 450 of those acres have not been returned. Under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, no meaningful release occurred, and militarization expanded in the North-East. Under President Ranil Wickremesinghe, Keppapulavu residents who submitted petitions to the district secretariat were told authorities were gathering information. The Valikamam North Land Release Committee summarized the record in a statement earlier this year: despite five presidential changes and four parliaments, nearly 2,900 acres of land remain unreleased in the area, against repeated promises. President Dissanayake’s National People’s Power party included land release in its presidential and parliamentary election manifestos. The partial release of 40 acres on May 1 was welcomed by some as a signal. Tamil political representatives, reviewing the arithmetic — 40 acres against 2,900 still occupied in Valikamam North alone — described it as insufficient. ### **The Residents Who Keep Coming Back** The landowners who returned to the Commando bungalow gate on Friday were not holding photographs of their homes as artifacts of the past. They were holding them as evidence of present ownership — of a legal right to property that the state has not honoured. Some of those who were displaced in 1990 as young adults are now elderly. Their children have grown up as displaced persons. A number of original landowners have died without returning to their land. The landowners said they would be back next Friday. ### Sri Lankan Think Tank Seeks Closer Ties With Indonesia in Indian Ocean Push URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-think-tank-seeks-closer-ties-with-indonesia-in-indian-ocean-push/ Last updated: 2026-05-01T04:55:34.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Milinda Moragoda, founder of the Colombo-based Pathfinder Foundation, met this week with Indonesia’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, Dewi Gustina Tobing, to explore avenues for collaboration as Sri Lanka seeks to strengthen strategic ties with Southeast Asia’s largest economy. According to a statement released by the foundation, discussions focused on Indonesia’s growing geopolitical and economic influence in the Indo-Pacific, including its status as the world’s fourth most populous nation, the largest economy in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and a key participant in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Ambassador Dewi Gustina Tobing, who has served as Indonesia's envoy to Sri Lanka since presenting her credentials on December 21, 2021 — more than four years ago — also holds the ceremonial role of Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, a position conventionally held by the longest-serving accredited ambassador in the country. Together with Mr. Moragoda, she discussed potential joint conferences, policy dialogues, and knowledge-sharing initiatives focused on strengthening cooperation across the Indian Ocean region. The Pathfinder Foundation, founded in 2008, has increasingly positioned itself as a platform for strategic dialogue on maritime affairs, regional connectivity, and geopolitical developments across the Indian Ocean. While no formal agreements were announced, the meeting underscored growing strategic interest in deeper institutional cooperation. Sri Lanka’s strategic location along critical Indian Ocean shipping routes has heightened its importance in Indo-Pacific policy calculations, prompting greater engagement with countries beyond its traditional partners. For Indonesia, whose regional influence continues to expand through ASEAN leadership and maritime strategy, closer institutional links with Sri Lanka could complement wider efforts to strengthen connectivity and cooperation across the Indian Ocean community. Mr. Moragoda, a former cabinet minister and diplomat, has used the Pathfinder Foundation to advance track-two diplomacy and regional policy engagement, particularly at a time when smaller Indian Ocean states are seeking greater strategic relevance amid intensifying global power competition. ### Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Enough Promises, Time for Proof URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/reconciliation-in-sri-lanka-enough-promises-time-for-proof/ Last updated: 2026-05-02T14:06:27.000Z Seventeen years after the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war, reconciliation remains more slogan than substance. It is invoked in speeches, embedded in policy frameworks, and repeated in international forums, but for many citizens, particularly in the North and East, it has yet to translate into meaningful, lived change. The uncomfortable truth is this: Sri Lanka does not suffer from a lack of reconciliation mechanisms. It suffers from a lack of political will, consistency, and sustained execution. Reconciliation has been reduced to a familiar cycle: announce, delay, dilute, repeat. Meanwhile, communities continue to live with unresolved grievances, economic marginalization, and a lingering sense of exclusion. If reconciliation is to mean anything, this cycle must be broken. ### **Reconciliation cannot Be Engineered from a Distance.** Too often, reconciliation is conceptualized in Colombo and delivered to the periphery as a finished product. This top-down approach has consistently failed to build trust. Policies crafted without meaningful engagement with affected communities risk becoming detached from reality. For people in Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi, and other war-affected areas, reconciliation is not about statements or symbolic gestures. It is about land, livelihoods, dignity, and equal opportunity. It is about whether the state is seen as fair, responsive, and inclusive. Reconciliation that is not felt at the grassroots level is not reconciliation at all, it is political branding. ### **Moments of Crisis Expose Underlying Fault Lines** Sri Lanka’s social fractures do not disappear with time; they resurface during moments of national stress. This was clearly evident after the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, when fear and suspicion once again threatened to divide communities along ethnic and religious lines. As a military officer engaged in ground-level operations during this period, I had the opportunity to interact closely with both Sinhala and Muslim communities. Through a series of security awareness programmes and public engagements conducted across nearly 50 schools in Colombo and Puttalam, the focus extended beyond maintaining security. These engagements became platforms for dialogue. They addressed fear, countered misinformation, and, most importantly, helped restore a sense of reassurance among communities that had begun to view each other with mistrust. The experience reinforced a critical insight: when given the opportunity to engage openly, communities are far more willing to coexist than often assumed. What hinders reconciliation is not an inherent unwillingness among people; it is the absence of sustained, structured opportunities for interaction, and the inconsistency of institutional support. ### **Economic Inequality Undermines Social Cohesion** Reconciliation cannot take root in conditions of economic disparity. War-affected regions, particularly in the North and East, continue to face structural disadvantages, higher unemployment, limited investment, and restricted access to economic opportunities. Development, in this context, must go beyond visible infrastructure. While roads and buildings are important, they do not, in themselves, reconcile communities. What matters is whether individuals have access to livelihoods, whether youth see a future within their own regions, and whether economic systems are inclusive. Economic marginalization fuels resentment and reinforces perceptions of inequality. Addressing this imbalance is not simply a matter of development policy; it is central to reconciliation and long-term national stability. ### **The Deficit of Courage in Leadership** Sri Lanka does not lack leaders who speak about unity and reconciliation. What it lacks is leadership willing to move beyond safe, politically convenient language and take decisive, sometimes uncomfortable, action. Reconciliation requires honesty, acknowledging the suffering experienced by all communities without defensiveness or denial. It requires consistency, ensuring that commitments are followed through with measurable outcomes. And above all, it requires courage, the willingness to confront entrenched narratives and challenge divisive rhetoric. This responsibility does not rest solely with political leaders. Professionals, educators, media institutions, and civil society actors all play a role in shaping public discourse. Silence in the face of division is not neutrality; it is a failure of responsibility. ### **Building a Shared National Identity** Sri Lanka often speaks of unity in diversity. Yet, unity cannot be built on unequal ground. A shared national identity requires more than coexistence; it requires inclusion, fairness, and mutual respect. Language rights, cultural recognition, and equal access to opportunity must be treated as fundamental rights, not political concessions. When communities feel equally valued, the idea of nationhood becomes stronger and more resilient. Reconciliation, in this sense, is not only about addressing the past, butit is also about shaping a future where divisions are not reproduced. ### **From Process to Outcomes** One of the fundamental weaknesses in Sri Lanka’s reconciliation efforts has been an overemphasis on process rather than outcomes. Commissions are established, reports are produced, and discussions are held, but the translation of these into tangible improvements in people’s lives remains limited. Communities do not measure reconciliation by the number of initiatives launched. They measure it by results, whether land disputes are resolved, whether economic opportunities improve, whether justice mechanisms function effectively, and whether institutions treat all citizens equally. Without visible progress, even well-intentioned initiatives lose credibility. ### **A Narrowing Window of Opportunity** Sri Lanka is now at a critical juncture. The passage of time has not erased the need for reconciliation; in many ways, it has made it more urgent. Each delay deepens mistrust and risks entrenching divisions further. The lessons from both conflict and crisis are clear: unresolved tensions do not disappear; they evolve, often in unpredictable ways. The cost of inaction is not static; it grows over time. The country therefore, faces a clear choice. It can continue to manage reconciliation as a recurring political narrative, or it can commit to it as a national priority with clear benchmarks, accountability, and sustained effort. ### **Conclusion: The Demand for Results** Reconciliation in Sri Lanka cannot remain an aspiration. It must become a reality that is visible, measurable, and consistent across all regions and communities. The experience of engaging communities during times of tension demonstrates that the foundation for reconciliation already exists among the people. What is required is leadership and institutional commitment to build upon that foundation. Sri Lanka does not need another reconciliation framework, another commission, or another statement of intent. It needs results. ### India-Sri Lanka Fishing Row Risks Dangerous New Escalation After Violent Sea Assault URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-sri-lanka-fishing-row-risks-dangerous-new-escalation-after-violent-sea-assault/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T09:20:18.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** “The fishermen issue is an unnecessary irritant that has been allowed to fester for too long,” says Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha, a former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, hitting the nail on the head. A diplomat who has studied the dispute from close quarters, Sinha made the comment in a just-released book on India-Sri Lanka relations. Like many other Indians, Sinha is aghast that bottom trawlers from Tamil Nadu are causing enormous and lasting environmental destruction on both sides of the Palk Strait, dividing India and Sri Lanka, and are at the root of illegal intrusions into Sri Lankan waters. Calling the dragging row a “festering wound”, he warns that it has the potential to bedevil blossoming bilateral relations. ![Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/india-sri-lanka-fishing-row-ri-znJmrc-kix8dnqeu8db4zw.png) Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha What happened on April 26 off the coast of Nagapattinam in Tamil Nadu is the latest and ugliest flashpoint in the quarrel involving fishermen from India and Sri Lanka, which has dragged on for long years with no resolution in sight. The audacious abduction of a Jaffna fisherman to Tamil Nadu and his thrashing by his counterparts in the Indian state has predictably triggered disgust and anger in Sri Lanka, particularly among the fishing communities along the island nation’s winding northern coast. Sri Lanka’s Fisheries Minister, Ramalingam Chandrasekar, has warned that the unprecedented incident was a brazen violation of human rights and could impact bilateral relations. He called for exemplary punishment for the Indian fishermen who seized and attacked the 29-year-old Sri Lankan, who is now hospitalized in Tamil Nadu with multiple injuries. Media reports quoted Indian authorities and Sri Lankan fishermen groups as saying that the fisherman needed as many as 15 stitches for injuries to his head, nose, limbs, and ankles. Indian accounts allege that at least two Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen boarded an Indian fishing vessel in the sea and indulged in violence. According to this version, the Tamil Nadu fishermen fought back and overpowered one of them while his associate escaped. A video showing the Sri Lankan, badly injured, seated uncomfortably in a colourful stationary Indian boat on the Indian coast, surrounded by Tamil Nadu fishermen, has only added fuel to the fire. Fishermen communities in Sri Lanka dispute this rendition, saying it was highly unlikely that two of their compatriots would have dared to take on a larger group of Indians in the sea, fully knowing it would be an unequal fight. ![A Tamil fisherman from Jaffna was severely beaten after being detained at sea by a group of Indian fishermen, in an incident that has intensified tensions over the long-running Palk Strait fishing dispute.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/05/india-sri-lanka-fishing-row-ri-znJmrc-kix4vtf8wlw3e83.png) A Tamil fisherman from Jaffna was severely beaten after being detained at sea by a group of Indian fishermen, in an incident that has intensified tensions over the long-running Palk Strait fishing dispute. Former Sri Lankan fisheries minister Douglas Devananda said there was mounting anger among the island’s Tamil fishermen over the high-handedness in Tamil Nadu, including the unending use of bottom trawlers in Sri Lankan waters in violation of Colombo’s laws. “Our people cannot understand why this Indian aggression cannot stop,” said Devananda, a former Tamil militant. “It is because of these long years of frustration in this country that so many Tamil fishermen voted for the JVP in the last parliamentary election.” Authorities on both sides admit that the main reason why fishing communities in the two countries have been at loggerheads for years is due to the depletion of precious marine life in the narrow sea between Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. More important, however, is the widespread use of bottom trawlers, each costing at least 5 million Indian rupees, which have wreaked havoc on marine life in the Palk Strait — first on the Indian side and now increasingly closer to Sri Lanka’s coast. Devananda, who served as the fisheries minister from 2019 to 2024, said Indian authorities have failed to stop the Tamil Nadu bottom trawlers probably because their owners are politically well-connected. “Whenever we have spoken to Indian leaders, (External Affairs Minister S) Jaishankar included, they say this needs to be discussed with the Tamil Nadu government and that they (New Delhi) can facilitate a dialogue,” he said in an interview. “I myself have spoken many times to Tamil Nadu leaders, including TR Baalu, Kanimozhi… even (Chief Minister M.K.) Stalin. But nothing happens.” Sri Lankan officials estimate that Indian trawlers poaching in Sri Lankan territorial waters cause losses of up to $50 million annually, placing roughly 30,000 fishermen in northern Sri Lanka at a major disadvantage. The trawlers deplete marine resources and prevent locals from fishing, causing severe economic hardship. In comparison to Indian fishing vessel owners, their Tamil counterparts in Sri Lanka — from Mannar to Mullaitivu districts — are far less well off. For many years, while civil war raged in Sri Lanka, authorities in Colombo banned fishing activities along the northern coast. When the war ended in 2009, local fishermen rejoiced. Unfortunately, hundreds of mechanized trawlers from Tamil Nadu soon began encroaching into Sri Lankan waters, scraping the seabed and capturing everything in their path. Since then, despite many rounds of talks between the two countries, the problem has assumed major and serious proportions. Experts say the slow-moving trawlers destroy coral reefs and seagrass beds, which serve as fish nurseries, causing long-term damage to marine ecosystems. Indian trawlers are also known to frequently operate at night, cutting through local fishermen’s nets. The continuing fight for the increasingly depleting marine life leads to clashes between Tamil Nadu fishermen and Sri Lanka’s Navy (which frequently arrests Indian intruders) on the one hand, as well as between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan fishermen, both Tamils, on the other. Every time arrests are made, Tamil Nadu politicians put pressure on the central Indian government to have them released. Frustrated Sri Lankan authorities have started disposing of Indian trawlers seized in Sri Lankan waters. Some years back, Devananda, as the fisheries minister, asked India to compensate Sri Lankan fishermen to the tune of Rs 500 million. India rejected the demand. Fishermen leader Jason Figurado has warned in Mannar that the use of violence by Indian fishermen could force some of his colleagues to resort to similar measures. Francis Ithayaraja, a leader of fishermen in Jaffna, admitted that some Sri Lankan fishing boats occasionally drifted into Indian waters due to mechanical failures or water currents. “But fishermen from India routinely cross into our waters to engage in bottom trawling, knowing they are violating Sri Lanka’s laws and causing terrible environmental damage,” he added. Another fisherman in Jaffna said, “Would Indian trawlers dare do such things in Pakistani waters? Would they have been so brazen if the LTTE had been in control of the north-east of Sri Lanka?” “This is a serious problem, but it is not being tackled the way it should be,” said Devananda. “It seems to show no signs of ending.” He said the owners of the bottom trawlers in Tamil Nadu force their employees not to return from the sea without a minimum catch. “Since quality catch is hardly available in Indian waters due to the destruction already caused there by the trawlers, they enter Sri Lankan waters,” he explained. “Other Tamil Nadu fishermen copy them. Our people resist them. This is the reality.” Like fishing leaders, Devananda also said that Tamil Nadu fishermen should not have assaulted the Jaffna fisherman, even if he had done something wrong. “He could have been punished according to law,” he said. “But they have tortured him. Is this right? What if our people do the same? Where will all this end?” On his part, retired Indian diplomat Sinha has called for concerted efforts by the Indian as well as Tamil Nadu and Puducherry state governments to find a permanent solution to the escalating row. “Moreover, Indian fishermen are being arrested well inside Sri Lankan waters near Delft Island and even closer to Sri Lanka’s northern coastline,” he said, in an honest admission of where the problem lies. India, more than Sri Lanka, needs to act fast. The seizure and brutal assault of a Sri Lankan fisherman has ignited passions that will not fade easily, while also damaging India’s image. Unless Indian officials show the political will to end this dispute, it could take a dangerous turn for the worse one unexpected day. ### Chemmani Mass Grave Probe Hinges on Fresh Forensic Evidence URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/chemmani-mass-grave-probe-hinges-on-fresh-forensic-evidence/ Last updated: 2026-05-02T14:01:33.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The future of ongoing excavations at the Chemmani mass grave site in northern Sri Lanka will depend on the results of a fresh round of ground-penetrating radar (GPR) scans after currently identified human skeletal remains are fully exhumed, according to a lawyer representing families of the disappeared. Attorney Ranitha Gnanarajah, who appears on behalf of relatives in the long-running Chemmani mass grave case, said investigators are presently focused on excavating areas within the Siddhupathi Hindu cemetery where earlier scans indicated the likely presence of human remains. The excavation, now in its third phase, follows GPR surveys conducted in August last year with technical assistance from the University of Sri Jayewardenepura. “Only after all skeletal remains currently identified through the scans are fully excavated can authorities determine whether additional human remains may exist elsewhere in the area,” Ms. Gnanarajah told reporters. She said a new round of GPR testing would be essential to confirm whether further burial sites remain undiscovered. “The future course of excavation will be decided based on the findings of that new examination,” she said. The Chemmani site has long been associated with allegations of wartime disappearances and extrajudicial killings dating back to Sri Lanka’s civil conflict, making the excavation process highly significant for families seeking truth and accountability decades after the war. The renewed forensic investigation is being closely watched by human rights advocates, legal observers, and affected communities, who see it as a crucial test of Sri Lanka’s willingness to address unresolved atrocities from its violent past. ### Sri Lanka Moves to Create a Tobacco-Free Generation, Joining a Growing Global Push URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-moves-to-create-a-tobacco-free-generation-joining-a-growing-global-push/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T09:20:21.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol (NATA) has formally presented the country’s Health Minister with a concept paper proposing that all citizens born after 2010 be permanently prohibited from purchasing tobacco products — a sweeping generational policy that would align Sri Lanka with a growing global movement gaining legislative momentum from London to the Maldives. The proposal was presented to Health Minister Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa by NATA Chairman Dr. Ananda Ratnayake and LL Amila Isuru of the Faculty of Medicine at Rajarata University, who led the preparation of the document. Backed by scientific research, it also includes recommendations to amend and strengthen the existing NATA Act. The announcement came on April 30, 2026, one day after the United Kingdom’s Tobacco and Vapes Act received Royal Assent, making Britain the first country in Europe to pass legislation phasing out tobacco sales for future generations. Under the British law, it will become illegal to sell tobacco products to anyone born on or after January 1, 2009, with the age-based restrictions set to take effect on January 1, 2027. ### **A Gathering Global Consensus** ![Officials from Sri Lanka’s National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol presenting a generational tobacco control proposal to Health Minister Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa in Colombo.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/sri-lanka-moves-to-create-a-to-ZewdPY-kixofzgjn9jkg2e.png) Officials from Sri Lanka’s National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol presenting a generational tobacco control proposal to Health Minister Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa in Colombo. Sri Lanka's proposal places it within a rapidly expanding cohort of nations rethinking the long-term future of tobacco sales. New Zealand pioneered generational tobacco ban legislation when it passed a similar law in 2022, though after a more conservative government came into power in 2023, that law was repealed. The Maldives was the first country globally to introduce a smoke-free generation policy, which came into force in late 2025\. Canada has also entertained the idea, and in the United States, similar generational tobacco ban bills have been filed in Hawaii and Massachusetts. European governments have also tightened controls on tobacco and nicotine products in recent years as part of a broader push to reduce smoking rates among youth, with Belgium and Latvia banning the sale of disposable vapes in January 2025 and Spain and France introducing new restrictions on outdoor smoking in public spaces. The convergence of these efforts reflects a shared recognition among public health authorities that the most effective way to end tobacco use is not to persuade current smokers to quit but to prevent the next generation from starting at all. Research cited by advocates in the UK found that over four in five smokers became addicted before the age of 20, most as children, and that two in three people who try a single cigarette go on to become daily smokers. ### **The Scale of the Problem in Sri Lanka** For Sri Lanka, the urgency of the proposal is grounded in data that health officials describe as alarming. Dr. Ratnayake noted that nearly 80 percent of deaths in the country stem from non-communicable diseases, with tobacco and alcohol identified as leading causes. The country records an estimated 22,000 deaths each year attributable to both substances. LL Amila Isuru warned of a particularly troubling trend: rising cigarette use among schoolchildren, and the disproportionate burden that tobacco-related illness places on public health expenditure. According to the Alcohol and Drugs Information Centre, alcohol and tobacco consumption in Sri Lanka results in an estimated annual economic loss of 241 billion rupees — equivalent to roughly 40 percent of the public health budget and approximately 1.5 percent of gross domestic product. Globally, smoking is responsible for more than 7 million deaths each year, according to the World Health Organization, a figure the NATA concept paper also cites, noting that approximately 10 percent of tobacco-related deaths result from passive exposure. ### **The Tax Revenue Dilemma** The proposal's most significant hurdle may not be political will but fiscal arithmetic — a tension that has bedeviled tobacco control efforts in Sri Lanka for years, and one that puts the Health Ministry on a collision course with the Finance Ministry. Ceylon Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of British American Tobacco that holds a near-monopoly on cigarette manufacturing and sales in Sri Lanka, contributed 173.8 billion rupees to the Treasury in 2025 — around 4 percent of total tax revenue — making it one of the state's most reliable fiscal pillars at a time when Sri Lanka is under intense pressure from the International Monetary Fund to sustain revenue gains as part of its ongoing economic recovery programme. Reflecting the sector's importance to the exchequer, the government increased the income tax rate on tobacco manufacturers from 40 percent to 45 percent effective April 2025. The dependency is not new. Research has long noted that even though there is a heavy social cost of tobacco use, being a lower-middle-income country, the government depends on tax revenue from tobacco to manage annual government expenditure — a calculation that successive administrations have been reluctant to disturb. A generational ban, by its nature, would gradually extinguish that revenue stream over decades. The situation is further complicated by an emerging structural risk. Ceylon Tobacco Company has warned that repeated excise hikes are accelerating a shift toward illicit cigarettes, potentially undermining government revenue even as the sector remains a major fiscal pillar. "The persistent threat posed by the illicit market, driven by the widening price gap between legal cigarettes and their illicit counterparts, remained a challenge during the year," the company's chairman said. A generational sales ban could intensify that dynamic, pushing demand underground rather than eliminating it. ### **What a Single Cigarette Actually Costs — and Who Gets the Money** The arithmetic of a single cigarette in Sri Lanka tells a story that neither the government nor Ceylon Tobacco Company has any particular interest in advertising. A Gold Leaf cigarette — the country's most popular brand — retails for approximately Rs. 160 per stick following the January 2025 price increase. Ceylon Tobacco Company raised prices by Rs. 10 per stick on the 83mm Gold Leaf after the government announced a fresh excise duty hike effective January 11, 2025. The typical manufacturing cost of a cigarette globally is roughly two to twelve US cents — often toward the lower end — covering tobacco leaf, paper, filter, and labour. In Sri Lanka's case, with lower labour costs and a captive domestic supply chain, that translates to somewhere in the range of Rs. 3 to Rs. 8 per stick in actual production cost — a conservative estimate based on global industry benchmarks. The rest of what the smoker pays is divided between the government, the company's profit margin, and the retailer. A detailed breakdown of Philip Morris's global financials — the world's largest cigarette manufacturer — found that of every unit's retail price, excise taxes alone accounted for 6.2 cents out of a total 9.8 cents, meaning the government's cut dwarfs the actual cost of production, which came to just 1.3 cents per cigarette. Applied to Sri Lanka's context, the proportions are similarly stark: of the Rs. 160 a smoker pays for a Gold Leaf, the state collects the dominant share through layered excise duties and VAT, with Ceylon Tobacco Company contributing Rs. 173.8 billion to the Treasury in 2025 — around 4 percent of total tax revenue. What this means, in plain terms, is that both the government and CTC profit enormously from an addicted population. The smoker, who is statistically most likely to be male, lower-income, and to have started before the age of 20, pays a price that is inflated by roughly twenty to forty times its actual cost of production, with the surplus divided between a state hungry for revenue and a multinational company booking healthy profits. CTC recorded a 10 percent rise in profit before tax in 2025 even as health advocates warned of rising smoking rates among schoolchildren and the country registered an estimated 22,000 tobacco- and alcohol-related deaths per year. Industry reports indicate that cigarette manufacturing plants globally operate with gross profit margins of 55 to 60 percent before taxes are even factored in — meaning the product is not just taxed heavily, it is also sold at a substantial markup by the manufacturer before the state takes its cut. The smoker, in effect, subsidises both. It is this arrangement — mutually profitable for the government and CTC, and lethal for the consumer — that NATA's generational ban proposal would begin, slowly and over decades, to dismantle. Whether a government that collected Rs. 173.8 billion from tobacco last year is prepared to do so remains the central and unanswered question. The Alcohol and Drugs Information Centre has raised concerns that no new taxes were introduced in 2026 to discourage youth from starting to use tobacco products or to encourage smokers to quit, describing the government's tax policy as lax. The Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index, updated in 2025, placed Sri Lanka 45th out of 100 countries assessed — with a declining score since 2023 — finding that Ceylon Tobacco Company wields increasing influence that weakens public health protection mechanisms. ### **Will the Government Act?** Minister Jayatissa welcomed the concept paper and instructed NATA to prepare detailed provisions for legislative amendment — the next formal step before any bill could be drafted and introduced to Parliament. But the minister did not set a timeline, and no commitment to legislation has been made. Sri Lanka already prohibits the sale of tobacco to individuals under 21 and has implemented several other global best-practice measures under the NATA Act and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which the country ratified in 2003\. The generational ban, however, would represent a categorically different and more permanent intervention — one that, once enacted, would be politically difficult to reverse. The precedent from New Zealand, where such a law was passed and then repealed after a change of government, serves as a cautionary note. After New Zealand's more conservative government came into power in 2023, it scrapped the generational ban — demonstrating that even enacted legislation is not immune to political reversal when fiscal and ideological pressures combine. Sri Lanka's current government, led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's National People's Power coalition, has positioned itself as reform-minded on public health. But it is also navigating one of the most constrained fiscal environments in the country's post-independence history, with IMF programme conditions limiting its room for manoeuvre. Whether it is willing to absorb a long-term erosion of tobacco tax revenues in exchange for generational public health gains remains an open question. ### Indian Lawmaker Seeks to Bar Perarivalan From Legal Practice URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indian-lawmaker-seeks-to-bar-perarivalan-from-legal-practice/ Last updated: 2026-05-01T14:48:24.000Z **CHENNAI, India —** A sitting Member of Parliament from Tamil Nadu has written to President Droupadi Murmu demanding that A.G. Perarivalan — convicted in the 1991 assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and released by India’s Supreme Court in 2022 after more than three decades in custody — be barred from practicing law, days after he was enrolled as an advocate by the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. The seven-page letter, dated April 29, 2026, was written by Adv. R. Sudha, who represents the Mayiladuthurai constituency in the Lok Sabha and is a member of the Indian National Congress. A practicing lawyer herself for 26 years at the Madras High Court, she called April 27, 2026 — the date of Mr. Perarivalan's enrollment — a "Black Day in the judicial history of our great nation." "I pen this letter not with ink, but with the blood and rage of every right-thinking lawyer and a conscientious person from every corner of this nation," Ms. Sudha wrote. ### **A Conviction That Defined an Era** Mr. Perarivalan, now 54, was 19 years old when he was arrested in connection with the suicide bombing carried out by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, near Chennai, on May 21, 1991, that killed Mr. Gandhi and 15 others, including police personnel. Prosecutors said he had procured components — specifically, two nine-volt batteries — used in the explosive device. He maintained that he had no knowledge of their intended use. His death sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1999\. He spent much of his incarceration on death row before his sentence was commuted and, in May 2022, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to order his release, citing what it described as inordinate and unexplained delays in the disposal of his mercy petition by the Governor under Article 161. During his imprisonment, Mr. Perarivalan completed diploma and degree programs in computer applications and literature. After his release, he enrolled in a law course at a college in Karnataka, completing it before his registration as an advocate in April 2026. ### **The Legal Challenge** ![A.G. Perarivalan, recently enrolled as an advocate, paying tribute at the statue of social reformer Periyar E.V. Ramasamy in Chennai after his registration with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/indian-lawmaker-seeks-to-bar-p-LrypY8-kixi3gu9cipyjtq.png) A.G. Perarivalan, recently enrolled as an advocate, paying tribute at the statue of social reformer Periyar E.V. Ramasamy in Chennai after his registration with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. Ms. Sudha's letter raises several substantive legal objections to the enrollment. She cited Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961, which disqualifies any person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude from being enrolled as an advocate for a period of two years following release. While Mr. Perarivalan's enrollment occurred approximately four years after his release — technically beyond the statutory bar period — Ms. Sudha argued that applying the provision's letter while ignoring its spirit amounts to a subversion of the law's intent. "Allowing the convict to be enrolled as a law student and then allowing him to be enrolled as an advocate, saying it is beyond the statutory bar period, is like cocking a snook at the prohibitory provision," she wrote. She also raised a procedural question with significant implications: the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, she contended, is currently without valid office-bearers, as elections for a new set of office-bearers have already been held and vote-counting is in progress. She questioned whether the outgoing office-bearers had the authority to conduct any enrollment ceremony on April 27. "While the Bar Council itself is yet to be elected, how can a team which has ceased to be office-bearers conduct the enrolment function?" she asked. "What is the tearing hurry? Is it to benefit this one convict?" Her letter further noted that a Division Bench of the Madras High Court — comprising Justice G.R. Swaminathan and Justice R. Kalaimathi — had already referred a related question, concerning the enrollment of persons with pending cases, to a larger bench. She demanded that Mr. Perarivalan's case be taken up suo motu by that larger bench, and that his enrollment be kept in abeyance pending its verdict. ### **Seven Demands to the President** Ms. Sudha made seven specific requests to the President, the Prime Minister, the Union Home Ministry, and other authorities. They include: suspending Mr. Perarivalan's enrollment immediately; prohibiting him from appearing before any court, tribunal, commission, or quasi-judicial proceeding; directing an inquiry into why his enrollment application was held for more than six months before being cleared in a hurried manner; and ascertaining whether the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, was aware at the time that Mr. Perarivalan was among those being administered the oath of enrollment. She also cited findings of India's Law Commission, which had previously examined whether Section 24A of the Advocates Act adequately protects the integrity of the legal profession, noting that the Commission had recommended substituting the relevant provisions to better address the admission of persons convicted of serious offences. ### **A Question of Symbolism and Precedent** Beyond the legal objections, Ms. Sudha framed her intervention in terms of institutional symbolism. She noted that the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry is located approximately 50 kilometres from Sriperumbudur, where the assassination occurred — and that Mr. Perarivalan's enrollment as an officer of the court took place within the very legal system that once tried and condemned him. "The legal profession has seen such jailed and convicted freedom fighters as V.O. Chidambaram Pillai and Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari," she wrote, invoking luminaries of India's independence movement who were also lawyers. "Allowing Perarivalan this exclusive access to state and societal resources will be disastrous as well as demoralising for youngsters entering the profession. It will be a rude shock to the families of those who were killed along with the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi." She also separately published her objections on social media in Tamil, writing that the enrollment amounted to “digging a grave for India’s sovereignty” and questioning whether the Bar Council had become complicit in what she described as a dishonor to the legal profession. Mr. Perarivalan's enrollment drew no immediate public response from the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry or from the Madras High Court as of the time of publication. His supporters have long maintained that his release by the Supreme Court — after more than three decades of incarceration and a prolonged campaign led by his mother, Arputham Ammal — represents a recognition of the extraordinary circumstances of his case, including questions about the completeness of his confession as recorded by the Central Bureau of Investigation. ### Sri Lankan Fisherman Taken Hostage and Assaulted by Indian Fishermen, Renewing Palk Strait Tensions URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-fisherman-taken-hostage-and-assaulted-by-indian-fishermen-renewing-palk-strait-tensions/ Last updated: 2026-05-01T02:20:21.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A Tamil fisherman from Jaffna was severely beaten after being detained at sea by a group of Indian fishermen, according to Sri Lankan fishing associations, Indian police accounts and widely circulated video footage, in an episode that has once again exposed the volatile maritime tensions of the Palk Strait. The fisherman, a 29-year-old man from Vallai in Sri Lanka’s Jaffna District, is being treated at Nagapattinam Government Medical College Hospital in Tamil Nadu, where doctors said he required 15 stitches for injuries to his head, nose, limbs and ankles. Indian authorities confirmed the incident but did not publicly release his identity. Police in Vedaranyam, India, said the confrontation occurred late Sunday off the Nagapattinam coast after Indian fishermen alleged that two Sri Lankan men had boarded their vessel. Members of the Indian crew reportedly described the Sri Lankan fisherman as a “pirate,” a characterization strongly disputed by Sri Lankan fishing organizations and community leaders. Representatives of Tamil fishing cooperatives in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province said there was no credible evidence of organized piracy in the Palk Strait and argued that such accusations obscure the deeper conflict over illegal bottom trawling by Indian vessels in Sri Lankan waters. They said northern Sri Lankan fishermen have for years been forced into defensive measures to protect their nets, fishing grounds and livelihoods from repeated incursions. “I am 60 years old, and I have been fishing since childhood,” said Francis Ithayaraja, president of the Annai Velankanni fishing village in Mayiliddy, in an interview with Jaffna Monitor. “In all my years at sea, I have never heard of Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen being described as pirates.” Mr. Ithayaraja said Sri Lankan fishermen may occasionally drift beyond the maritime boundary only because of *neerpaadu* — traditional ocean current patterns — or mechanical failures. He accused Indian fishermen of routinely crossing into Sri Lankan waters to engage in bottom trawling, a destructive fishing practice banned in Sri Lanka because of its severe ecological impact. “But Indian fishermen regularly cross into our waters,” he said. “As Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen, we do not have the heart to damage another man’s net or engine, let alone act like pirates. This narrative is being manufactured by sections of Indian fishermen to falsely portray us as sea pirates, so that their own unethical activities in our waters can be concealed.” Bottom trawling has long been one of the central grievances of northern Sri Lankan fishing communities, many of whom are small-scale fishermen still rebuilding after the country’s decades-long civil war. Local associations say repeated incursions by Tamil Nadu trawlers damage coral ecosystems, destroy breeding grounds and rip apart fishing gear, making the issue not merely a border dispute but a matter of economic survival. A senior source within the northern fishing community, speaking to Jaffna Monitor on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that isolated incidents involving Sri Lankan fishermen may occasionally occur, including the theft of catch from Indian vessels. However, he stressed that such acts were not representative of the broader Sri Lankan Tamil fishing population and should not be conflated with organized criminality or piracy. Multiple local sources also maintained that the latest assault took place within Sri Lankan waters, renewing concerns over maritime boundary violations and the continued presence of Indian fishing vessels in contested areas. The assault has triggered widespread anger in northern Sri Lanka. Notably, while many Tamil nationalist politicians remained publicly silent, Namal Rajapaksa, an opposition lawmaker and member of Parliament, sharply condemned the violence and called for stronger state intervention. He described the incident as deeply alarming and urged the government to ensure the fisherman’s safety and secure his return, while criticizing Tamil Nadu politicians for frequently invoking solidarity with Sri Lankan Tamils on political rights issues while remaining silent when Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen face violence on Tamil Nadu’s shores. Neither the Indian nor Sri Lankan governments immediately issued substantive responses. Previous diplomatic efforts and bilateral working groups have repeatedly failed to produce a durable solution to the long-running fisheries conflict. ### Jaffna’s Legendary Teacher Questions Tamil Youths’ Support for Vijay’s TVK URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffnas-legendary-teacher-questions-tamil-youths-support-for-vijays-tvk/ Last updated: 2026-04-30T11:15:56.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** R. Kumaran, a veteran physics teacher from Jaffna who has taught generations of students in northern Sri Lanka, has publicly questioned the political maturity of young Sri Lankan Tamils supporting actor-turned-politician Vijay and his Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) movement in neighboring Tamil Nadu. In a video widely circulated online, reportedly from a Zoom session with his advanced-level students, Mr. Kumaran — widely regarded in Jaffna as one of the region’s most influential educators, having taught more than 100,000 students over several years — contrasted the wartime experiences of Sri Lankan Tamils with the emotional political enthusiasm some young Tamils now show toward celebrity-driven politics. Addressing students born after the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, Mr. Kumaran said many lacked direct understanding of the devastation endured by Tamils during the conflict. “You were born after the war,” Mr. Kumaran told his students, according to video footage circulated online. Drawing comparisons to contemporary conflicts such as Iran, he recalled how aerial bombardment and shelling had become an almost routine part of life for civilians in northern Sri Lanka during the civil war. He said shells fired from military positions, including from Jaffna Fort, would sometimes kill civilians in Jaffna town even as buses continued to run and daily life pressed on under constant danger. “When bombs came, people would hear the sound and rush to bunkers,” he said. “Some who could not make it would die. This was ordinary life for us.” Recalling the final stages of the war in the Vanni region, where tens of thousands of civilians were trapped, Mr. Kumaran described scenes in which parents, unable even to grieve, were forced to leave behind dead children in order to save those still living. “This is our history,” he said. “There was not even time to cry.” Mr. Kumaran argued that such historical suffering was being forgotten by some younger Tamils who now enthusiastically back Mr. Vijay’s political rise in Tamil Nadu. While acknowledging Vijay’s popularity as an actor, Mr. Kumaran questioned his political credentials and practical contributions. “He is a good actor. Watching his films is fine,” he said. “But politics is different.” He also challenged the logic of supporting a politician based largely on future promises, asking what meaningful political action Vijay had undertaken prior to seeking office. Mr. Kumaran further referenced allegations from the final months of Sri Lanka’s war, claiming that Vijay had declined to endorse a memorandum intended for the United Nations that called for international intervention to halt civilian killings. According to Mr. Kumaran, Vijay’s refusal at the time reflected his political proximity to the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), which was then allied with India’s ruling Congress party. “Now he says he opposes the DMK government,” Mr. Kumaran said, suggesting inconsistency in Vijay’s political positioning. The remarks have sparked discussion online, particularly among Tamil audiences in Sri Lanka. where Vijay’s political ambitions have drawn both enthusiasm and skepticism. Mr. Vijay, one of Tamil cinema’s biggest stars, formally entered politics in recent years, positioning himself as an alternative force in Tamil Nadu’s political landscape. His rise has generated significant enthusiasm among younger supporters, including in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority north, where his films have long commanded a devoted following. Mr. Vijay is married to Sangeetha Sornalingam, who traces her roots to Chunnakam in Sri Lanka’s Jaffna peninsula before her family later settled in Britain. Their personal life has recently drawn public scrutiny amid widely reported legal proceedings and allegations surrounding their marriage, though such matters remain separate from his political ambitions. In Sri Lanka, particularly in Jaffna, Mr. Vijay’s popularity has translated into visible political symbolism. Supportive banners have appeared in parts of the north, and a Sri Lankan wing aligned with Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam has reportedly been formally recognized by his movement, despite Sri Lankan supporters having no electoral role in Tamil Nadu politics. His celebrity status and cross-border appeal have made him a uniquely influential figure among sections of Tamil youth, though critics continue to question both his political experience and ideological consistency. ### U.S. Embassy Marks 15 Years of American Corner in Jaffna, Unveils “Freedom 250” Pavilion URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-s-embassy-marks-15-years-of-american-corner-in-jaffna-unveils-freedom-250-pavilion/ Last updated: 2026-04-28T14:53:14.000Z **JAFFNA —** The U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka on April 26 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the American Corner Jaffna at its premises on Athiyady Road in Nallur, and inaugurated a new outdoor structure it has named the “Freedom 250 Pavilion.” The pavilion forms part of a global State Department initiative built around the 250th anniversary of American independence, which falls on July 4, 2026. The American Corner Jaffna was established in 2011 in partnership with the Jaffna Social Action Center, in the years immediately after the end of the armed conflict in the Northern Province. It is one of five American Spaces operated by the U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka, alongside facilities in Colombo, Kandy, Matara, and Batticaloa. The April 26 event was attended by U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Officer Menaka Nayyar, Regional Public Engagement Specialist Miquela Burke, and a group of alumni from the Embassy's Youth Forum programme. Attendees signed a "Wishing Wall" installed at the new pavilion. Jaffna Monitor was not among the outlets invited to the inauguration, and the Embassy has not published a list of media organisations invited to cover the event. No Sri Lankan government officials were listed among the attendees in the Embassy's own readout, and no senior Embassy figure beyond the Public Affairs section is recorded as having travelled to Jaffna for the occasion. ## **What the Corner reports** ![Public Affairs Officer Menaka Nayyar and Regional Public Engagement Specialist Miquela Burke with U.S. Embassy Sri Lanka Youth Forum alumni during the 15th anniversary celebration of American Corner Jaffna in Nallur on April 26.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/u-s-embassy-marks-15-years-of-1VX8R0-kixvn5d3ir4mta5.png) Public Affairs Officer Menaka Nayyar and Regional Public Engagement Specialist Miquela Burke with U.S. Embassy Sri Lanka Youth Forum alumni during the 15th anniversary celebration of American Corner Jaffna in Nallur on April 26. According to figures released by the Embassy, the Corner hosted nearly 400 programmes in 2025 and recorded more than 10,000 participants over the year. The Embassy has not published a breakdown of those figures by programme type or audience segment, and the participant count is not independently audited. The Corner offers free English-language sessions, EducationUSA advising for students considering U.S. universities, and skills-based programming that the Embassy describes as including coding, photography, and MakerSpace activities. Its premises at No. 23, Athiyady Road, Nallur, hold laptops, tablets, audiovisual equipment, and a library of more than a thousand books, according to the Embassy’s own listings. Speaking at the inauguration, Ms. Nayyar described the Corner as a reflection of “the United States’ commitment to sharing American values, culture, and ideas with the people of Northern Sri Lanka.” She tied the pavilion explicitly to the upcoming July 4 anniversary. ## **Part of a worldwide rollout** The Freedom 250 Pavilion in Jaffna is one component of a State Department campaign that has been underway throughout 2025 and 2026\. Comparable Freedom 250 events have been staged this year by U.S. missions in Indonesia and Cabo Verde, among others, and the broader programme is built around what the Department has publicly described as the “great American road trip” motif. In Jakarta, the Embassy convened roughly 400 alumni of U.S. universities and U.S. government-funded exchange programmes at an “Alumni United” conference on April 11\. In Makassar, the Indonesia mission has hosted American hip-hop artists, food tastings and a Freedom 250 expo. The Jaffna inauguration sits at the smaller end of that spectrum: a single outdoor pavilion, a wishing wall, and an alumni gathering. The Embassy has not published the cost of the pavilion, the source of its funding within the State Department’s public diplomacy budget, or the duration for which the Freedom 250 branding will remain on the structure after the July 4 anniversary. ## **“Freedom” in the Northern Province** The choice of “freedom” as the campaign’s organizing theme arrives in Jaffna against a particularly complex local backdrop. More than fifteen years after the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war, military-held lands in parts of the Northern Province remain only partially released, while longstanding concerns persist over Tamil-language access to state services and official communications — criticisms renewed during the government’s response to Cyclone Ditwah. The continued detention of some Tamil political prisoners under the Prevention of Terrorism Act has further sustained debate over the meaning of justice, civil liberties and reconciliation in the postwar North. The American Spaces network is, by design, a cultural and educational programme rather than a vehicle for political advocacy, and the Embassy has not framed the Jaffna pavilion as a comment on local conditions. The juxtaposition is nonetheless visible to those reading the inauguration as a piece of public diplomacy. ### **Continuity across administrations** The Corner has operated through five Sri Lankan administrations since opening in 2011: the second Mahinda Rajapaksa government, the Sirisena–Wickremesinghe coalition, the Gotabaya Rajapaksa presidency, the Wickremesinghe interim presidency, and the current National People’s Power government led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Its remit, as described in successive Embassy communications, has remained largely unchanged across that period. ### **Access** The American Corner Jaffna is open to members of the public free of charge. Registration and programme details are available at its premises at **No. 23, Athiyady Road, Nallur**, by telephone at **021 222 0665**, by email at **info@americancornerjaffna.com**, and through the Corner’s Facebook page at **facebook.com/amcornerjaffna**. ### A.G. Perarivalan, Once Convicted in Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case, Enrolls as a Lawyer URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-g-perarivalan-once-convicted-in-rajiv-gandhi-assassination-case-enrolls-as-a-lawyer/ Last updated: 2026-05-02T19:25:59.000Z **CHENNAI, India** — A.G. Perarivalan, who spent 31 years in prison in connection with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi before being released by India’s Supreme Court in 2022, has enrolled as a lawyer, returning to the legal system where he once fought for his freedom. Mr. Perarivalan, 54, was registered as an advocate with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry at the Madras High Court complex this week, according to officials. The enrollment marks a notable turn in a case that for decades drew legal, political and public attention across India. He was 19 when he was arrested in 1991 after a suicide bombing carried out by the LTTE at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, near Chennai, killed Mr. Gandhi and 15 others. Prosecutors accused him of procuring components used in the explosive device, including two nine-volt batteries. Mr. Perarivalan maintained that he had no knowledge of their intended use. He spent much of his imprisonment on death row before his sentence was commuted, and ultimately served more than three decades in custody. In May 2022, the Supreme Court ordered his release, invoking its constitutional powers under Article 142, citing prolonged delays in deciding his mercy petition and other factors. Over the years, Mr. Perarivalan repeatedly challenged his conviction in court. His case took a significant turn in 2017, when V. Thiagarajan, a former Central Bureau of Investigation officer involved in the inquiry, submitted an affidavit stating that Mr. Perarivalan’s claim — that he did not know the purpose of the batteries — had not been fully recorded in his confessional statement. The disclosure became part of the legal arguments that eventually led to his release. His long incarceration also became closely associated with the efforts of his mother, Arputham Ammal, who campaigned for decades for his freedom. She appeared regularly at court hearings, protests and public forums, keeping attention on the case as it moved slowly through the legal system. During his time in prison, Mr. Perarivalan pursued his education, completing diploma and degree programs in fields including computer applications and literature. After his release, he completed his legal studies, leading to his enrollment as an advocate. His entry into the legal profession places him within the same system that once prosecuted him and later ordered his release. For supporters, the moment carries symbolic weight, reflecting a transition from a prolonged legal struggle to participation in the administration of justice. ### Sowing the Future URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sowing-the-future/ Last updated: 2026-04-27T15:01:16.000Z ***A policy framework for agricultural revival in Sri Lanka's Northern Province — and the case for treating it not as a welfare programme, but as an economic system designed to win.*** **By Jeevan Thiagarajah** The Northern Province of Sri Lanka holds more than 100,000 hectares of paddy land, some of South Asia's most productive onion soil, and a coastline that ranks among the country's richest fishing grounds. Revitalising it is not merely a regional ambition — it is a national opportunity. This piece sets out a coordinated framework for that revival. It moves through eight connected areas: attracting the right investors, mastering water and soil, choosing the right crops and production methods, adding processing value, feeding the province first, building markets from village to export, deploying technology intelligently, and creating the institution that holds it all together. The province that turns climate adversity into the country's most sophisticated agricultural system becomes the national model — and the preferred destination for serious investment. ### **1\. Unlock the land — and invite the right investors** Three distinct sources of capital can bring idle Northern land into production. Each brings something the others cannot. ***Indian agribusiness*** Tamil Nadu sits 64 kilometres across the Palk Strait. Its seed companies, cooperative mills, contract farming enterprises, and food manufacturers already work in the same crops, climates, and languages that the North is proposing. Indian agribusiness brings agronomic knowledge, processing technology, and established market access — alongside capital. The Jaffna-Rameswaram corridor should be actively promoted to Tamil Nadu investors as a joint-venture highway, not merely a shipping route. The Board of Investment and the Provincial Council should run a standing Tamil Nadu investment programme — a permanent facilitation desk. ***Diaspora capital*** Tamil landowners in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany hold substantial agricultural land in the North that lies fallow because ownership is abroad, tenancy is informal, and no clear pathway to productive use exists. A structured mechanism — special agricultural investment zones, streamlined approvals, and tax incentives — allows diaspora owners to formally lease, co-invest, or transfer land to cooperatives or agribusiness partners. Diaspora investors also carry something no domestic institution possesses: direct knowledge of the London, Toronto, and Melbourne consumer communities that are the natural premium buyers of certified Northern Province produce. ***Domestic block farming*** State land in Mullaitivu and Vavuniya sits under low-yield shifting cultivation or scrub. Consolidating fragmented plots into larger units managed by farmer cooperatives with professional agronomic support creates the scale needed for commercial production — including sugarcane cultivation that could begin to address Sri Lanka's annual sugar import bill of roughly USD 200–250 million. Across all investor categories, livestock and cropping must be reconnected. Cattle, goats, and poultry are currently raised separately from crop operations. Integrating them — with organised manure collection and composting — builds a self-replenishing fertility cycle that reduces imported fertiliser costs and strengthens the organic certification case that premium export markets require. *"The Jaffna-Rameswaram corridor should be actively promoted as a joint-venture highway, not merely a shipping route."* ### **2\. Master water and soil** Climate change is the Northern Province's most urgent structural challenge. Rainfall is becoming less predictable, dry seasons longer, and the peninsula's aquifers are already showing saline intrusion from over-extraction. The response must be offensive: the province should set a clear goal — to become the most water-efficient agricultural region in Sri Lanka, and the national demonstration model for climate-adaptive farming. ***Close the efficiency gap*** Conventional flood irrigation loses most of its water to evaporation and runoff before it reaches the root zone. During the Yala dry season, only 30 to 40 percent of paddy land can be irrigated at all. Subsurface drip irrigation — perforated pipes delivering water directly to roots — cuts water use by up to 70 percent. On the Jaffna peninsula, where every litre over-extracted risks pulling saltwater in its place, drip irrigation is not an upgrade. It is the condition for continued cultivation. Combined with soil moisture sensors, automated controls, mulching with paddy straw or coconut husks, and sequenced planting to allow soil recovery between harvests, this technology could double or triple the cultivable acreage that existing water sources support — without any additional extraction. Modern farming methods including vertical planting and tower cultivation make productive use of limited space and water, particularly relevant near urban centres where land is constrained but demand is high. ***Restore what has been lost*** Water efficiency is necessary but not sufficient. The aquifer systems and ancient tank networks of the interior must be actively recharged. Percolation ponds, check dams, and managed recharge structures — placed to capture monsoon rainfall and return it to groundwater rather than losing it to runoff — are infrastructure the province urgently needs. The cascading tank systems of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Mannar require desilting and must be operated as integrated catchment units. The Iranamadu reservoir, Giant's Tank, and Akkarayankulam need technically coordinated management covering releases, recharge timing, and irrigation allocation across the cascade. The investment case is commercial, not environmental. Every hectare of restored aquifer capacity is a hectare of future cultivation secured against the longer dry seasons climate projections confirm are coming. Indian agribusiness investors — who understand aquifer depletion from their own Tamil Nadu experience — should see the recharge programme as part of the investment proposition. It is the long-term productivity guarantee that makes a 20-year agricultural commitment viable. ***Build soil fertility from local inputs*** The province already generates everything needed to maintain productive soil. Dairy cattle produce slurry rich in nitrogen and potassium. Poultry droppings deliver fast-release nitrogen. Fishing communities across the coast generate fish waste — frames, offal, unsaleable catch — that currently poses a disposal problem. Solar-dried and ground into fishbone meal, it becomes a phosphorus-rich fertiliser for root crops, onions, and fruiting vegetables. These three organic streams — dairy slurry, poultry droppings, fishbone meal — together cover the primary nutritional needs of most Northern crops. They build organic matter, improve water retention, and meet the certification standards that organic export markets require. The inputs are already being produced. What is needed is collection systems, simple processing infrastructure, and cooperative distribution — not import budgets. Where chemical fertiliser remains necessary, it should be applied with precision — targeted by soil tests and combined with organic inputs to achieve maximum effect at minimum cost. #### **3\. Grow the Right Things** Crop selection must be driven by three realities together: agro-ecological conditions, climate resilience, and market demand. **Paddy (Maha season)** serves as the backbone of national food security, with its primary market being domestic consumption. **Black gram, green gram, and finger millet** play a critical role in drought rotation and nutrition, with demand spanning both domestic and export markets. **Jaffna red onion** stands out as an off-season premium crop, with a key market in the Tamil Nadu corridor. **Moringa (pods, powder, oil)** represents a high-value superfood export with full-plant utilisation, targeting international and diaspora markets. **Mango, banana, and jackfruit** are positioned for both fresh and processed export, serving regional and diaspora markets. **Palmyrah products** occupy a niche in artisanal premium goods, catering primarily to diaspora communities and high-end retail markets. **Sugarcane** is strategically important for import substitution, with its primary role in serving the national market. **Cassava (manioc)** contributes as a drought-hardy crop suited for starch processing, supplying the food industry. **Ayurvedic plants** are cultivated for herbal products, with export potential in both regional and international markets. Rice anchors the Maha season and food security. But paddy monoculture must give way to planned seasonal rotation: during the Yala season, with limited irrigation available, drought-tolerant crops including black gram, green gram, finger millet, and sorghum make better use of the land and carry growing demand both domestically and internationally. Fodder cultivation — Napier grass, Guinea grass, stylosanthes — must be treated as a planned crop in its own right. Better fodder produces healthier livestock, which generates more milk income and richer manure, which raises yields in the following season. The Palmyrah palm is a climate-resilience asset as much as a commercial crop. Among the most drought-tolerant, saline-resistant, and heat-hardy trees in the world, restoring Palmyrah density across the peninsula simultaneously provides climate adaptation, soil stabilisation, and long-term income. Moringa is similarly versatile: pods sell fresh at premium prices, leaves are dried and powdered for the international superfood market, and oil commands specialty prices. Full-plant utilisation of moringa and Palmyrah — both in Sri Lanka and for export — represents some of the highest-value opportunities available. Pollinators are not a minor detail. Healthy production of fruits, vegetables, and flowering crops depends on bees, companion planting, and maintaining the fauna and flora that support natural pollination. Establishing managed bee colonies alongside agricultural plots — and designing farm layouts that support pollinators — is a practical investment in yields, not an environmental gesture. The home garden — fruit trees, leafy vegetables, small poultry — must be treated as distributed food security infrastructure. A province-wide programme to establish productive home gardens creates a food system that no supply chain disruption can shut down. ### **4\. Process, store, and add value** Production without preservation and processing is a poverty trap. Processing infrastructure is where a farming province becomes an agricultural economy. Solar-powered cold storage at village level — compact three-to-five tonne units serving a cluster of farms — eliminates distressed selling. These units are in commercial use across Gujarat and Tamil Nadu at costs cooperative models can support. Modern par-boiling and colour-sorting mills produce premium-grade branded Northern rice. A central processing unit in Vavuniya converts surplus manioc, banana, and jackfruit into dehydrated chips, purees, and starches. Sugarcane from the interior, processed in a cooperative mill, produces raw sugar, molasses, and bagasse usable as biomass fuel — making the processing system partially energy self-sufficient. Indian agribusiness partners are the natural investors here. Tamil Nadu cooperative mills and food manufacturers bring established processing technology, quality management systems, and buyer relationships that would take a decade to build from scratch. Joint-venture processing facilities — owned partly by Northern farmer cooperatives, partly by Indian agribusiness partners — align incentives in a way that purely contract arrangements cannot. *"Joint-venture processing facilities align incentives in a way that purely contract arrangements cannot."* ### **5\. Feed the province first — then the nation** Before the first export container is loaded, there is a prior obligation. A network of community dining halls — anchored in temples, community centres, and local authority premises — serving affordable or free meals sourced from local farms connects agricultural surplus directly to social need. Tamil Nadu's Amma Canteen model shows this works at scale, with dignity, and at modest cost. Procurement should flow through local farmer producer organisations, guaranteeing a demand floor for smallholder produce. School feeding programmes, sourced the same way, teach children where food comes from while sustaining the farmers who grew it. The Northern Province should also reframe its relationship with central government: from recipient of post-conflict spending to strategic contributor to national food security. The tank-irrigated flatlands of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Mannar, restored and managed with block farming discipline, can become a major national paddy source. Organised cold chain infrastructure connecting landing sites to national distribution transforms fish catch currently lost to spoilage. With consistent production and cold storage, the North can supply Colombo and Kandy with onions, chillies, leafy greens, tropical fruits, and pulses that currently come from other provinces or from import. This reframes the case to central government. Investment in irrigation, cold chain, roads, and rail freight is national food security spending — not regional charity. The distinction matters for budget allocation, for political will, and for the seriousness with which the programme is designed and executed. ### **6\. Build markets — from village to export** Markets must be built at every level simultaneously. A farmer with no local buyer, no storage, and no price transparency cannot benefit from export ambitions. At the local level, rural weekly markets — at village, town, and district level — give smallholders a reliable cash outlet and consumers access to fresh produce. Dedicated agricultural retail spaces in Colombo, modelled on the Diyatha Uyana concept where tree plants, flower plants, seedlings, and bulk produce are available to both retail and wholesale buyers, create direct urban sales channels that put cash directly in farmers' hands. At the national level, branded positioning matters. Northern Province Organic stalls in Colombo and Kandy, branded Jaffna onion packaging, Palmyrah syrup as an artisanal product, and heritage millet varieties as premium health foods build an identity that commands a price premium. The night rail service from Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Vavuniya to Colombo, with refrigerated cargo capacity, moves bulk produce at low cost. A digital marketplace connecting Northern farmer producer organisations directly to Colombo wholesale buyers and restaurant chains reduces exploitative margins. For export, the Jaffna-Rameswaram sea corridor is the primary route — 64 kilometres to a Tamil Nadu market of 80 million people who share the culinary traditions of Northern Sri Lanka. Jaffna onions during India's off-season, Northern chilli, dried vegetables, moringa powder, Palmyrah products, certified organic produce, mangoes, and bananas all have natural buyers. The ferry route requires refrigerated cargo capacity and phytosanitary inspection facilities at both ends. A target of at least 25 percent of agricultural household income from export earnings within a decade is achievable — and should be set explicitly. The Tamil diaspora is an underused channel. Diaspora consumers in London, Toronto, and Melbourne currently purchase inferior substitutes from Indian suppliers because Northern Province produce has not been organised for consistent export. Given diaspora loyalty to authentic origin products — and willingness to pay a premium — this market is within reach. It requires consistent quality, reliable supply, and certified origin labelling. ### **7\. Deploy knowledge and technology** The Northern Province's Agricultural Instructor network is its most underused institutional asset. These are trained, Tamil-speaking, field-deployed officers present in every division, currently reduced by policy neglect to form-fillers and subsidy distributors. Retrained and redeployed as frontline educators, certification assessors, and technical problem-solvers — each carrying a defined portfolio of farmer organisations to mentor and demonstration plots to manage — they become the backbone of knowledge transfer. Performance must be measured on farmer outcomes, not paperwork. A provincial digital platform — algorithm-driven and built for Tamil-speaking smartphone users — should deliver real-time services to every connected farmer: soil moisture data, satellite-based crop advisories, geo-tagged pest alerts, live market prices from Colombo, Jaffna, and Chennai, and back-office services including crop insurance, lease registration, and export documentation. Critically, this platform must work offline, since connectivity across the province remains patchy. Technology should drive scientific water distribution — sensors, automated irrigation controls, and weather-linked scheduling reduce waste and protect aquifers. Smart seed selection, climate-resilient varieties, and sequenced planting calendars that prevent harvest gluts and give soil time to recover between seasons should all be informed by data, not habit. Women must be centred throughout. They already perform the majority of transplanting, post-harvest sorting, and home garden cultivation across the North, yet remain systematically excluded from land titles, credit, and cooperative membership. Certification programmes, digital platforms, and cooperative governance rules should all be designed with active female participation as a requirement, not an afterthought. ### **8\. The institutional engine — the Northern Province Growers Federation** Every element of this framework can be delivered in isolation. It functions as a system only if one institution coordinates the whole. That institution is the Northern Province Growers Federation: a market-driven, farmer-majority enterprise that holds the digital platform, coordinates block farming policy, manages the certification programme, administers the cold chain network, governs export access, and leads investment promotion. The Federation is not a government agency. It is a commercial company — registered under the Companies Act — in which farmer cooperatives hold the majority shareholding bloc, private local and Indian agribusiness partners hold equity stakes, diaspora investors contribute capital and market intelligence, and the Provincial Council holds a defined minority public stake as governance anchor. No single external investor can outvote the cooperative bloc. **The Farmer Cooperatives**, which hold the majority stake, are positioned as dividend shareholders rather than grant beneficiaries. They carry both rights and accountability within the system. **Local private agribusinesses** contribute operational capital and on-ground market knowledge, with their returns directly tied to the efficiency of the overall system. **Indian agribusiness partners** bring in processing technology, established buyer relationships, and strategic access to the Rameswaram corridor. **Diaspora investors** provide market intelligence from diaspora consumer communities, along with capital derived from converted land equity. **The Provincial Council**, holding a minority stake, ensures governance legitimacy and serves as the liaison with the central government for infrastructure development and regulatory approvals. Two practitioner councils advise the board without holding equity. The Farmer Knowledge Council brings experienced local farmers — including women with deep post-harvest and soil knowledge — into crop planning, varietal selection, and water management decisions. The Diaspora Advisory Network brings professionals in food retail, export compliance, logistics, and food technology from the UK, Canada, Australia, and Germany. A diaspora food technologist working for a supermarket chain in Toronto knows exactly what that buyer requires from a certified organic supplier. That knowledge is current, market-tested, and available — the Federation simply needs a structured channel to receive it. The commercial logic is straightforward. Private investors earn returns only if the system produces, processes, certifies, and sells at volume and quality. Farmer cooperatives earn dividends only if the Federation is profitable. The Provincial Council's stake is justified only if the system delivers measurable food security and export outcomes. Every shareholder's interest points in the same direction — and that alignment is what grant-funded development programmes, however well-intentioned, structurally cannot provide. The Northern Province faces the most severe climate pressures of any region in Sri Lanka. Rainfall variability, aquifer depletion, saline intrusion, and longer dry seasons are not future risks — they are present conditions. The question is only how. A province that masters water efficiency and groundwater recharge, produces rice and fish that meaningfully anchor national food supply, exports through a sea corridor 64 kilometres from one of the world's great food markets, certifies its farmers, closes its fertility loop, processes its own produce, and governs itself through a Growers Federation that Indian agribusiness and diaspora capital choose to invest in — that province is not a development problem. It is a development model. The land is here. The water, managed intelligently, is here. The organic fertility inputs are already being generated. The crops have identified buyers. The sea corridor is 64 kilometres. What remains is the institutional will to build a Federation worthy of that coalition — and to treat Northern agriculture not as a welfare programme, but as an economic system designed to win. ***Jeevan Thiagarajah is a former Governor of the Northern Province.*** ### Jaffna M.P. Archchuna Ramanathan Arrested After Brandishing Gun in Land Dispute URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-m-p-archchuna-ramanathan-arrested-after-brandishing-gun-in-land-dispute/ Last updated: 2026-04-28T14:43:20.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Ramanathan Archchuna, a controversial Jaffna District M.P., was arrested on Monday after he was accused of brandishing a firearm during a land dispute in Periyavilaan, the police said. The arrest follows the circulation of video footage, reviewed by Jaffna Monitor, that appears to show Mr. Archchuna pointing a handgun during a confrontation with a group of residents, including women. Police said one of the women involved in the dispute was also arrested and remanded by court order. She remains in custody with her one-year-old child, as she is a breastfeeding mother, according to officials. Authorities did not provide further details on the charges against her. According to the police, the confrontation occurred when Mr. Archchuna visited a plot of land he claims to own and began clearing it. Judicial sources said the Mallakam Magistrate’s Court had previously issued an order recognizing his claim and permitting construction work. Another party disputed the ownership, leading to a confrontation. Witnesses said the dispute escalated when a group of women confronted the lawmaker at the site. Video footage that has since circulated appears to show objects being thrown during the altercation. During the exchange, Mr. Archchuna, appearing agitated, is seen producing a firearm and directing it toward those present. Police officials said he was arrested on charges related to the public display and alleged misuse of a firearm. Sources familiar with the investigation said the arrested woman, a member of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), had previously raised concerns about the condition of the land, including overgrowth and the presence of snakes. They said she returned to the site with others when Mr. Archchuna began clearing it after a court order recognized his ownership, and asserted a competing claim to part of the property. Mr. Archchuna, speaking in a live video on Facebook after the incident, said a group had entered the property and disrupted his work, and that stones had been thrown at him. He said he used his firearm — which he described as having been issued by the Defence Ministry — because he believed his safety was under threat, adding that he had no intention of harming anyone. Legal experts say that even in cases involving perceived threats, the public display of a firearm in a civilian dispute may constitute a criminal offense under Sri Lankan law. The episode has also renewed scrutiny of the long-standing practice of issuing firearms to elected representatives for personal protection. Under Sri Lanka’s Firearms Ordinance, authorities have the power to suspend or revoke such licenses if possession is deemed a risk to public safety. Residents said the use of a firearm during what is typically a civil land dispute had unsettled the community. Mr. Archchuna is expected to be produced before the Mallakam Magistrate’s Court on Monday. Police said further investigations are ongoing. ### The ‘High’ Road to Enlightenment URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-high-road-to-enlightenment/ Last updated: 2026-05-01T02:20:37.000Z **Colombo** — Shortly after 10 p.m. on a Saturday in late April, a Thai AirAsia jet from Bangkok touched down at Bandaranaike International Airport. Among the passengers, twenty-two young men in saffron robes filed quietly toward the arrivals hall, the way Buddhist monks in transit have moved through this airport for decades — without much notice, and almost without question. They did not get that far. By dawn on Sunday, officers of the Police Narcotics Bureau had laid out the contents of their suitcases on inspection tables: vacuum-sealed packets of high-potency cannabis and hashish, tucked beneath schoolbooks, soap, toothpaste, and bags of sweets. The total weight, officials said, came to more than 110 kilograms, with a street value the police placed at over 1.1 billion rupees — about 3.6 million U.S. dollars. It was the largest narcotics seizure in the history of Sri Lanka’s main international airport. It was also, officials said, the first time Buddhist monks had been caught carrying a consignment of this scale. In the days since, the case has widened beyond the men in robes. The Police Narcotics Bureau has arrested an additional monk in Meegahawatta, in the Gampaha District, whom officers have identified as the principal organizer of the Thailand trip. Investigators say that at least three other monks, allegedly operating from a temple in the Jamburaliya area, helped recruit the couriers — in some cases through Facebook and WhatsApp groups — and had traveled to Bangkok on multiple earlier occasions. ## **A Trip Arranged Elsewhere** ![Monks detained in a narcotics case at Bandaranaike International Airport, where authorities say more than 110 kilograms of drugs were seized from arriving passengers.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-high-road-to-enlightenment-q7lZY0-kixn6kgzt1i8gtq.png) Monks detained in a narcotics case at Bandaranaike International Airport, where authorities say more than 110 kilograms of drugs were seized from arriving passengers. The men arrested on the night of April 25 came from across the country: from Ampara in the east, Horana, Boralesgamuwa, and Wadduwa in the west, and from towns as scattered as Warakapola, Athuraliya, Ambalangoda, Madapatha, and Balangoda. They were between 19 and 28 years old, according to the police, and many were said to be pursuing higher education at religious institutes. According to police accounts, the group flew to Bangkok on April 22, on tickets paid for by a sponsor whom the authorities have so far declined to name. They returned together four days later, on Thai AirAsia flight FD-140, arriving around 10:10 p.m. Some of the suspects, the police say, have told investigators they understood the trip as a religious or educational visit, and believed they were transporting school supplies and confectionery for children at temples in Sri Lanka. The contents of their phones, recovered after the arrests, suggest a different kind of trip. According to officers familiar with the investigation, the devices contained photographs and videos of some of the men in civilian clothes during their stay in Bangkok, in settings that were neither religious nor austere. A police source told Jaffna Monitor that some had disrobed entirely and engaged in leisure activities, including what he described as “deeply worldly interactions” with women — a temporary return to samsara. Police now say that at least three members of the arrested group had traveled to Bangkok on earlier occasions. Three more monks — the alleged organizers from a temple in the Jamburaliya area — are reported to have made the trip multiple times. The pattern points away from a single, opportunistic smuggling attempt and toward a route that had been tested, refined, and repeatedly used. ## **How the Drugs Travelled** The contraband seized at the airport was not ordinary cannabis. Police identified the bulk of the haul — roughly 101 kilograms — as Kush, a synthetic-laced strain that has spread through South Asia in the past two years. The remaining 10 kilograms or so was hashish. Kush first emerged in Sierra Leone, where it has driven what may be the most lethal drug crisis in West Africa in recent memory. By April 2024, the public health impact was severe enough that President Julius Maada Bio declared a national emergency on substance abuse, a step shortly mirrored by Liberia. Chemical testing led by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, published in 2024, identified Kush's active ingredients as a combination of nitazenes — synthetic opioids that researchers describe as being as much as twenty-five times more powerful than fentanyl — and synthetic cannabinoids. In Sri Lanka, where customs officials have stated that a single gram of Kush sells on the street for about 10,000 rupees, the economics of moving it have become difficult to ignore. Each suitcase recovered at the airport, the police said, contained roughly five kilograms of narcotics, packed beneath consumer goods inside false-bottom compartments. The concealment was uniform across the group's luggage — identical methods, identical disguises — a level of coordination investigators say is consistent with an established trafficking network rather than a series of independent decisions. The arrests followed a tip received by the Police Narcotics Bureau and were not the result of a routine inspection. In the days since, officials have acknowledged what the scale of the seizure had already suggested: that a smuggling route, built in part on the perceived sanctity of religious travelers — particularly Buddhist monks — had, until that night, operated largely undetected. ## **A Pattern, Not an Anomaly** The Bangkok-to-Colombo corridor has been on the radar of Sri Lankan customs for some time. In May 2025, Charlotte May Lee, a 21-year-old former British flight attendant, was arrested at the same airport after arriving from Bangkok with 46 kilograms of Kush hidden in vacuum-sealed packets in her luggage. Customs officials at the time called it the largest Kush seizure in the airport's history. Within days, separate cases involving an Indian and a Thai national, both also arriving from Bangkok, were uncovered. Sri Lankan customs officials have publicly traced part of the surge to Thailand's 2022 decision to decriminalise cannabis — a policy now under partial reversal — which transformed the country into a regional supply point. The young women caught at airports across the world earlier in 2025 had, in several cases, been recruited by men they had met in Thailand. What distinguishes the April 25 arrests is the apparent use of religious identity as a layer of protection. In Sri Lanka, where roughly 70 percent of the population is Buddhist, the saffron robe carries both social and bureaucratic weight. Monks are often afforded discounted travel, designated front-row seating on public transport — privileges that are not always extended even to pregnant women — and, by long-standing convention, a measure of deference at security checkpoints. These practices are deeply embedded in everyday life, which is precisely what makes them useful, from a smuggler’s point of view. "This is not just a drug case," a senior security official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about an active investigation. "It is about how networks identify and use social blind spots." ## **The Recruiters and the Recruited** In the early hours of Sunday, while the 22 men were being processed at the airport, police officers in the Meegahawatta area of Gampaha arrested a monk whom investigators have identified as the principal organiser of the Thailand trip. He is alleged to have planned the logistics of the journey, sourced the airline tickets, and coordinated with the men once they reached Bangkok. Investigators believe he did not act alone. According to police accounts, three monks based at a temple in the Jamburaliya area of Gampaha district allegedly recruited 19 of the couriers, several of them through Facebook, and presented the trip as a sponsored religious visit. By the time of writing, the police had described a network of roughly 25 monks under detention or active investigation, including the alleged organisers. On April 26, the 22 men arrested at the airport were produced before the Negombo Magistrate’s Court, which ordered them held for seven days for further questioning. Police officials have indicated that more arrests are likely as the investigation expands. What has not yet emerged publicly is the identity of the sponsor — the person or persons who paid for the airline tickets and, in all probability, supplied the drugs in Thailand. A Sri Lankan customs spokesman described the trip as a four-day holiday funded by a businessman. The financial trail, the Thai end of the supply chain, and the question of whether other groups may still be in the pipeline remain, for now, the central unresolved threads of the case. ## **A Reckoning Inside the Sangha** By Sunday evening, the case had reached the highest levels of Sri Lanka’s Buddhist establishment. The Mahanayake Theros of the three Nikayas — the senior prelates of the country’s main monastic orders — issued a joint statement condemning what they described as the anti-Sasana, anti-social and unlawful conduct of those who had misused the robe to traffic narcotics. They called on the state to introduce legal mechanisms to identify and remove impostors from the order — a proposal that, if pursued without exception, could remove a significant number of monks — and urged senior monks to keep closer watch over their younger charges. The statement was notable less for what it condemned than for what it appeared to concede. By framing the suspects as impostors rather than as monks who had gone astray, the prelates seemed to seek to preserve the institutional credibility of the Sangha. Police have not yet publicly confirmed how many of the 22 men were fully ordained, how many were novices, and how many, if any, had simply donned robes for the journey. The legal status of each suspect — and the question of whether some were knowing participants while others were unwitting couriers — remains among the issues investigators say they are still working to establish. ## **What the Case Has Not Yet Answered** Sri Lanka has long grappled with a narcotics problem that far exceeds its size. Heroin moves along its southern coast, ferried by fishing vessels from staging points off Iran and Pakistan; cocaine has surfaced periodically in container shipments through the Colombo port; and synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine and now Kush, have arrived increasingly by air, often via Bangkok. Each new pattern tends to expose a different vulnerability in the country’s enforcement architecture. The April 25 case has done more than most. It has raised questions that the police investigation, however thorough, may not be able to answer on its own: Who, in Bangkok, prepared and handed over the consignment, and whether the same network is continuing to move couriers through other airports. How many earlier trips — including a reported journey involving twelve monks in the previous months — succeeded, and what became of the drugs that may have entered the country undetected. Whether the recruiters were acting on behalf of an established Sri Lankan trafficking syndicate, or whether they had begun to build a network of their own, organized around the specific cover that monastic identity provides. And what duty of care, if any, the country’s temples owe to the young — often economically vulnerable — novices in their charge, particularly when those novices are approached by older monks offering travel abroad and small sums of money. At the center of it all lies a more difficult question: whether the men in robes were merely couriers for a network operating beyond them, or whether elements within the monastic sphere had themselves begun to organize and sustain a trafficking operation. ## ### The Double-Edged Sword: Navigating the Human and Social Paradoxes of the Bhagavad Gita URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-5/ Last updated: 2026-04-27T14:25:17.000Z **Mahesh Nirmalan MD, FRCA, PhD, FFICM, University of Manchester, United Kingdom** Human life is defined by a deep-seated paradox which at times may seem unsurmountable. On the one hand we are biological organisms subject to the rules of physics and chemistry and therefore subject to entropy, decay and dissolution. We get hungry, tired, we age and ultimately, we all cease to function. Yet within this fragile and time limited existence there remains a sense of ‘I’ or ‘me’ that feels constant. Despite the majority of cells in the body being replaced many times over, we perceive a continuity - memories, personal qualities and traits that flow seamlessly despite the structural changes that invariably accompany renewal of all bodily cells. We have a hunger for purpose that transcends mere survival, a capacity for love and hatred that defies logic and an inner witness that remains strangely constant through these experiences. This tension between our status as changing ‘objects’ in the world and our experience as unchanging ‘subjects’ of the world is referred to as the Human Paradox. No ancient text - anywhere in the world, has addressed this paradox with clarity, precision and depth as the Bhagavad Gita. Written (probably) over two millennia ago, the Gita does not merely provide an explanation, but also goes on to describe how peace and reconciliation is possible within this paradox. *What are we*?: To grasp the Gita’s solution it is first necessary to look at the structural basis of this paradox. Most people view themselves as a mind-body duality. Gita however presents the view that this duality may be an oversimplification and proposes a hierarchy that extends from the physical to the spiritual. In Chapter 3 Verse 42, Gita explicitly presents a four – layered model to define the human condition: The body and senses (*Kaya*): The outer most layer The mind (*Manas*): The processor of the sensory input and the source of emotions and therefore an extension of the body and the sense organs. The intellect (*Buddhi*): The source of reason, judgement and memory. The self (*Atman*): The pure and unchanging observer. The human paradox arises because ‘science’ dictates that we are the body and/or our thoughts, which are defined through our sensory inputs with a limited bandwidth. This implies that when our body fails and the mind is clouded ‘we’ are being destroyed. Gita’s primary purpose is to teach us to shift our sense of ‘I’ from the first three layers to the fourth and in doing so Gita assumes a unique position amongst all spiritual and religious texts. A sceptic rooted in hard reductionistic science may argue that once you strip away the body, the senses and the resulting emotions what remains is ‘nothingness’. Gita - taking a more integrated approach, argues that this ‘nothingness’ is the ‘everything’ that matters and hence the object of focus in resolving the human paradox. **Realities of existence:** The Gita frames existence as an intersection between two distinct realms – Nature and Consciousness. The ever-changing nature – both internal and external, is referred to as ‘*Prakriti*’ and includes everything material that we know of including our DNA, neural pathways, sensory experiences, memories, objects that we own and the environment we live in. Beyond this everchanging nature lies an unchanging and eternal consciousness or ‘*Purusha*’ acting as the knower of this ever changing internal and external landscape. All of creation is an intersection between these two realms and, according to Gita, the human paradox arises because of the ignorance of this interplay between nature and consciousness. The Gita’s position is that when the ‘Knower’ (or the ‘Purusha’) - out of ignorance, gets entangled in the transient manifestations of the Prakriti (or the ‘Field’) and mistakenly identifies his or her reality as that of the ever-changing ‘Field’ suffering is inevitable. It is akin to actors who have played their roles for so long that they have forgotten their real names and endure the sufferings of the characters they are playing. Gita firmly articulates the view that the tragedy of the human condition is not that we are subject to decay or that we are mortal but that we think we are only the part of us that is subject to decay and is therefore mortal. In suggesting that existence is a ‘field’ (or *Kshetra*) and we the ‘*knowers of the field*’ (or *Kshetrajna*) can act in the field without being bound by it (or bound to it) - effectively aligning their individual existence with a cosmic whole, Gita is offering a practical recipe to overcome the grief and suffering. This world view was expanded further and better articulated by subsequent generations of ‘Advaita Vedanthies’ such as Adi Shankara in 8th century CE. ![At the battlefield of Kurushestra - faced with the direct consequences of war, Arujuna surrenders to Krishna wanting guidance on the morality of war. The conversation between the two evolves into one of the most profound religious texts that influenced human thinking for over two millennia. It includes discussions on human existence, suffering and the role of an ordinary human being amidst the contradictions that are inherent in life. Image Obtained from Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons License](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/untitled-draft-FG7AsY-kixkwd8r01s49h0.jpg) At the battlefield of Kurushestra - faced with the direct consequences of war, Arujuna surrenders to Krishna wanting guidance on the morality of war. The conversation between the two evolves into one of the most profound religious texts that influenced human thinking for over two millennia. It includes discussions on human existence, suffering and the role of an ordinary human being amidst the contradictions that are inherent in life. Image Obtained from Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons License **Action without attachment:** In this context it would not be unreasonable to question if we are truly an ‘unchanging observer’ why should we be concerned over the comings and goings in the mundane world? Why cannot we isolate ourselves in a cave immune to the sufferings and challenges around us? It is in its response to this question that Gita becomes a practical manual for the living by promoting the idea of selfless action (or ‘*Nishkama Karma*’). Gita argues that as we are all part of the ‘Field’ it is in our nature to act. Hence inaction, goes against our very nature and cannot lead to happiness or contentment. The paradox of living according to Gita is therefore that we must be fully engaged in our duties while being internally detached from the outcome of our actions. Clearly Gita’s position is that the outcome in any situation is determined by a multitude of factors over which the ‘doer’ has little control. Most of the stress in daily life arises from the ‘future self’ – the part of us that agonises over the outcome of our actions. By identifying ourselves as the ‘silent witness’ we are able to commit fully to any action because our sense of worth is no longer tied to whether we win or lose. We act appropriately in all situations because it is the right thing to do rather than to feed an ever-hungry ego craving for success. ![In this 16th century painting the gods look down upon the hero Arjuna (far right) who is directed and assisted by Krishna who is his personal charioteer and god incarnate. Krishna fortifies the wavering will of Arjuna at the prospect of war between two sets of closely related clans - the Pandavas and the Kauravas, and the destruction that would follow. The moral of the discourse is that at certain times in history war becomes inevitable and the morality of such a war cannot be judged on the basis of the number of lives lost or the extent of the destruction that followed alone - the purpose and objectives count. This teaching is also a double-edged sword open to abuse by corrupt war mongers as are some of the other social issues addressed in this article. Image obtained from Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons License.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/untitled-draft-FG7AsY-kix2stupt1ktg5.jpg) In this 16th century painting the gods look down upon the hero Arjuna (far right) who is directed and assisted by Krishna who is his personal charioteer and god incarnate. Krishna fortifies the wavering will of Arjuna at the prospect of war between two sets of closely related clans - the Pandavas and the Kauravas, and the destruction that would follow. The moral of the discourse is that at certain times in history war becomes inevitable and the morality of such a war cannot be judged on the basis of the number of lives lost or the extent of the destruction that followed alone - the purpose and objectives count. This teaching is also a double-edged sword open to abuse by corrupt war mongers as are some of the other social issues addressed in this article. Image obtained from Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons License. The Gita resolves the human paradox by articulating the view that we are not a human being having a spiritual experience but rather a spiritual entity having a human experience. By understanding the layers of our own existence we live our lives with a double vision which enables us to experience all the changes – the ageing, the loss and the disintegration, but yet rest in the knowledge that there is a part of us and every other living being that is eternal. Within such a double – visioned world view compassion, love and understanding towards all life forms - born and unborn, become inevitable outcomes. **The social paradox of Gita:** When reflecting on the above analyses, it is hard not to be amazed by the fact that a person or persons, living almost 2 millenia ago, in a harsh and untamed world where day to day survival was at stake; had the time, patience and intellect to ponder upon such intricate issues. These were no doubt very sophisticated minds that contemplated deeply and came up with ‘solutions’ that may or may not be in agreement with our current understandings of creation. But clearly, they saw human suffering and proposed a recipe that fostered internal harmony and social co-existence thereby mitigating against the root causes for strife. But the paradox that needs further consideration is how such an inclusive and forward-looking text could also form the basis of arguments that have nurtured (or been used to justify) the highly detrimental and divisive caste system widely prevalent in the sub-continent and Sri Lanka. Bhagavad Gita explicitly reinforces the four-fold order (or Varna) in society but rejects the rigid birth-based caste system that has come to plague these societies. Despite 40 years of war and destruction, there is no doubt that caste based discrimination is strongly embedded within Tamil/Hindu communities in Sri Lanka and within the Tamil diaspora. Similar thinking also prevails amongst the Sinhala (and Buddhist) communities albeit to a significantly lesser extent. Even though the issue was largely silenced through the power of the gun during the war, it resurfaced with a vengeance amongst many segments of the Tamil community as soon as guns fell silent in 2009\. The deep entrenchment of the caste system within the Tamil community is attributable - at least partly, to the endorsement it seemingly received in sacred Hindu texts such as the Rig Veda and the Bhagavad Gita. This reality cannot be swept under the carpet or merely wished away and needs to be confronted as a major evil within these communities. The suffering it evokes is very real and the community cannot move forwards without addressing the evil of caste based discrimination. In this context the views of the Bhagavad Gita are relevant and need further exploration. The caste system is the modern and perhaps perverse extension of the Four-Varna system acknowledged and referenced very extensively in the Vedas and in the Bhagavad Gita. In fact the Gita frames it as a divine law of nature. Krishna famously says it is better to do one's own duties (Dharma) poorly rather than to do someone else’s duty (Dharma) perfectly (BG 18:47). The exact quote is as follows: “*śhreyān swa-dharmo viguṇaḥ para-dharmāt sv-anuṣhṭhitāt svabhāva-niyataṁ karma kurvan nāpnoti kilbiṣham” meaning “*It is better to do one’s own dharma, even though imperfectly, than to do another’s dharma, even though perfectly. By doing one’s innate duties, a person does not incur sin**”.** The story of Ekalavya and the struggles of Karna in Mahabharata – the larger umbrella text within which the Bhagavad Gita sits, also reinforce that birth rather than qualities or merit as the basis of the four – varna system. There are however many examples in the Bhagavad Gita where a counter narrative places the basis of the four-Varna system on acquired qualities and character rather than birth. In Chapter 4 verse 13 Krishna states “*The four-fold system was created by me according to the divisions of ‘Guna’ (aptitude/qualities) and Karma (actions)*”. In saying this, clearly the Gita is taking the position that a person’s inner nature and the work they do was the basis of the Varna classification. The emphasis placed on birth in the Rig Veda (the part of the cosmic body from which each Varna is supposed to have originated from) does not receive the same level of credence in the Gita. The focus on moral principles, discipline and character is further reinforced in Chapter 9 Verse 32 which states “*All those who take refuge in Me, whatever their birth, race, gender, or caste, even those whom society scorns, will attain the supreme destination* **”** and in Chapter 5 Verse 18 which states “*The truly learned, with the eyes of divine knowledge, see with equal vision a Brahmin, a cow, an elephant, a dog, and a dog-eater* **”.** These counter narratives have been used by many commentators, who rejected the caste system - due to their education and social upbringing, to argue that linking Gita’s teachings to a birth-based social hierarchy was in fact a perverse distortion of Gita’s message. For example, In his commentary on the Gita Dr. S. Radhakrishnan – the former President of India, interprets the caste system not as a rigid, birth-based hierarchy, but as a flexible social organization based on function, temperament, and quality. He argues that the Gita supports a functional division of labor designed to promote social harmony and individual spiritual growth, rather than a hereditary caste system**.** ![Bhagavad Gita by Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Former president of India and one of the foremost authorities of Hindu philosophy in post-independence India.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/untitled-draft-FG7AsY-kixl8k47cc1y508.jpg) Bhagavad Gita by Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Former president of India and one of the foremost authorities of Hindu philosophy in post-independence India. The Bhagavad Gita, unlike the Torah, Bible or the Quran, is not claimed to be a ‘revealed text’ – revealed to man by a divine and omnipotent god. It therefore needs to be viewed as the product of human thought and spiritual seeking conditioned by society with room for interpretation. It is a living and dynamic response of an advanced mind (or minds) seeking ways to end human suffering and contradictions within a given social context at a particular period in history. It must never be used as a ‘trophy of piety’ – to be proudly displayed in living rooms. It is indisputable that – at the very least, statements in the Gita have been used (or misused) to propagate a social evil amongst us. Whether the Gita was misinterpreted and misused to support a detrimental social structure already present at the time of writing will never be known. The fact that it can be used as a double-edged sword in this respect must be acknowledged by all of us who value Hinduism and have chosen to live by its profound teachings. On balance, the Gita, if viewed as a guide, is a profound inclusive and inspiring spiritual text. On the other hand, if the Gita and its parent source – the Mahabharata, are viewed as a historical social chronicle there is no doubt that they represent a primitive society where caste boundaries were powerful, discriminatory and often unforgiving. Such an interpretation of humanity is irrelevant, outdated and deserves to be rejected by all right-thinking people. Proselytism - a frequent complaint amongst Hindu and Buddhist groups, does not take place in a vacuum and cannot be curtailed if such orthodoxies - even when rooted in sacred texts, are not rejected categorically. ***The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the University of Manchester on the subject*** ### G.L. Peiris, in Jaffna, Revisits Federalism and Says Sri Lanka’s Slide Into War Was Avoidable URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-4/ Last updated: 2026-04-30T12:20:52.000Z ***Delivering the S.J.V. Chelvanayakam Memorial Oration at Jaffna Central College, the legal scholar and former minister traced decades of missed opportunities for political accommodation. The full text of his address is published below.*** **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** On the forty-ninth anniversary of the death of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam — the lawyer who founded the Federal Party and gave the Tamil demand for self-rule its modern political form — G. L. Peiris on Sunday delivered the S.J.V. Chelvanayakam Memorial Oration at Jaffna Central College, telling an audience of Tamil political leaders, lawyers and members of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi that Sri Lanka’s descent into nearly three decades of war had not been inevitable. Prof. Peiris — a former minister of foreign affairs, education and constitutional affairs — opened his address by invoking the words of the Sangam-era poet Kaniyan Pungundranar: “Yaadhum Oore, Yaavarum Kelir,” which translates to, “Every place is my homeland; everyone is my kin.” He said the trajectory toward armed conflict had been “gradual and potentially reversible,” shaped by a series of political choices rather than historical inevitability. At several critical moments, he said, there had been opportunities to change course, but “these windows of opportunity” were not taken. The lecture, organized jointly by the Thanthai Selva Memorial Trust and ITAK, offered a detailed account of successive efforts at constitutional accommodation that failed to take hold. These included the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 and the Dudley Senanayake–Chelvanayakam Pact of 1965, both of which sought forms of regional autonomy but were either abandoned under political pressure or left unimplemented. He also pointed to later initiatives — including the District Development Councils Act of 1980 and the Mangala Moonesinghe Committee of 1991 — as limited attempts that did not command sufficient consensus to address underlying grievances. Prof. Peiris, who was closely involved in drafting constitutional reform proposals in the 1990s, referred to the Constitution Bill of August 2000 as the most far-reaching effort to restructure the state along devolved lines. The bill was ultimately withdrawn during its parliamentary debate. “It was the nation’s misfortune,” he said, “that the culture of adversarial politics trumped a national initiative.” Reflecting on that period, he paid tribute to Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, a key collaborator in the reform process who was later assassinated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. He also recounted a private exchange with the LTTE’s chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham, who, he said, had acknowledged the limits of persuasion within the group’s leadership. According to Prof. Peiris, Balasingham had conveyed that he had attempted to present the realities of the situation to Velupillai Prabhakaran, but that further efforts carried risks to his own safety. Prof. Peiris rejected the interpretation that the LTTE had, during the Norwegian-facilitated peace talks, accepted the principle of internal self-determination within a united Sri Lanka. That reading, he said, was “a total delusion,” arguing that the organization had consistently retained the option of secession. He concluded on a more cautious note, drawing on his years in academia to suggest that younger generations may be less constrained by communal divisions than political narratives often assume. “The youth of our country are not prey to narrow communal attitudes,” he said, pointing to patterns of interaction among students across ethnic lines. **The full text of Prof. Peiris’s address follows.** ### **S.J.V. CHELVANAYAKAM: VISIONARY AND STATESMAN** ### **FEDERALISM AND PATHS TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/untitled-draft-tkhre0-kixieuo0m9c91jl-1.png) ### **I. Life and Career** Had Mr. Chelvanayakam been with us today, he would no doubt be profoundly unhappy with the state of our country and the world. Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayakam was born on 31 March 1898 in the town of Ipoh in Malaya. When he was four years of age, he was sent by his father, along with his mother, for the purpose of his education to Tellippalai, a traditional village at the northern tip of Sri Lanka, or Ceylon as the country was then called, in close proximity to the port of Kankesanturai. He attended three schools, Union College in Tellippalai, St John's College Jaffna and S. Thomas' College Mount Lavinia, where he was a contemporary of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, with whom he was later destined to sign the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. He graduated in Science as an external student of the University of London in 1918\. In 1927, he married Emily Grace Barr-Kumarakulasinghe, daughter of the Maniyagar, or administrative chief for the area appointed by the colonial government. He had four sons and a daughter. His son, S. C. Chandrahasan, worked closely with me during my time as Foreign Minister on the subject of repatriation of refugees from India. Chandrahasan's wife, Nirmala, daughter of Dr. E. M. V. Naganathan, was a colleague of mine on the academic staff of the University of Colombo. Mr. Chelvanayakam first contested the Kankesanturai constituency at the parliamentary election of 1947\. His was a long parliamentary career. He resigned from his parliamentary seat in opposition to the first Republican Constitution of 1972, but was re-elected overwhelmingly at a by-election in 1975\. He died on 26 April 1977. There are many strong attributes which shine through his life and career. He consistently showed courage and capacity for endurance. He had no hesitation in resigning from employment, which gave him comfort and security, to look after a younger brother who was seriously ill. As his son-in-law, Professor A.J. Wilson remarked, he learned to move in two worlds: a product of missionary schools, he was a devout Christian who never changed his religion for political gain. He was, quite definitely, a Hindu by culture, and never wished to own a house in Colombo for fear that his children would be alienated from their roots. Gentle and self-effacing by disposition, he manifested the steel in his character by not flinching from tough decisions. Never giving in to expediency, differences of principle with Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam, the leader of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, of which Mr. Chelvanayakam was a principal organizer, led him to break away from the Congress and to form a new party, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, or the Federal Party. During the disturbances in March and April 1958, he was charged in the Magistrate's Court in Batticaloa and sentenced to a week's imprisonment. He was also subject to house arrest, but he never resorted to violence and used satyagraha to make his voice heard. When, in 1961, he was medically advised to travel to the United Kingdom for surgical treatment, he had to be escorted to the airport by the police because he was still under detention. Although physically frail and ailing in health during his final years, he lost none of the indomitable spirit which typified his entire life. ### **II. Advocacy of Federalism: Origins and Context** At the core of political convictions he held sacrosanct was his unremitting commitment to federalism. A moment of fruition in his life was the formation of the Federal Party, Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, on 18 December 1949. Contrary to popular belief, however, federalism in our country had its origin in issues which were not connected with ethnicity. At its inception, this had to do with the aspirations not of the Tamils, but of the Kandyan Sinhalese. The Kandyan National Assembly, in its representations to the Donoughmore Commission, in November 1927, declared: "Ours is not a communal claim or a claim for the aggrandizement of a few. It is the claim of a nation to live its own life and realize its own destiny". Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, soon after his return from Oxford, as a prominent member of the Ceylon National Congress, was an ardent advocate of federalism. He went so far as to characterize federalism as "the only solution to our political problems". With Thomas Hobbes in his famous work, The Leviathan, he conceived of liberty as "political power broken into fragments". Bandaranaike went on to state in a letter published in The Morning Leader on 19 May 1926: "The two clashing forces of cooperation and individualism, like that thread of golden light which Walter Pater observed in the works of the painters of the Italian Renaissance, run through the fabric of civilization, sometimes one predominating, sometimes the other. To try and harmonize the two has been the problem of the modern world. The only satisfactory solution yet discovered is the federal system". Federalism had a strong ideological appeal, from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. The constitutional proposals, addressed by the Communist Party of Ceylon to the Ceylon National Congress on 18 October 1944, go very far indeed. They envisioned the Sinhalese and the Tamils as two distinct "nations" or "historically evolved nationalities". The high watermark of the proposals was the assertion that "Both nationalities have their right to self-determination, including the right, if they so desire, to form their own separate independent state". These proposals received further elaboration in a memorandum submitted to the Working Committee of the Ceylon National Congress by two leading members of the Communist Party, Mr. Pieter Keuneman and Mr. A. Vaidialingam. Their premise was set out pithily as follows: "We regard a nation as a historical, as opposed to an ethnographical, concept. It is a historically evolved, stable community of people living in a contiguous territory as their traditional homeland". The Soulbury Commission, which arrived in the country in December 1944, had no hesitation in recognising that "The relations of the minorities - the Ceylon Tamils, the Indian Tamils, Muslims, Burghers and Europeans, with the Sinhalese majority - present the most difficult of the many problems involved in the reform of the Constitution of Ceylon". They took fully into account the apprehension expressed by the All Ceylon Tamil Congress that "The near approach of the complete transfer of power and authority from neutral British hands to the people of this country is causing, in the minds of the Tamil people, in common with other minorities, much misgiving and fear". ### **III. Constitutional Provisions at Independence** The Souldbury Commission, like the Donoughmore Commission before it, was not friendly to the idea of federalism, principally because of their commitment to the unity of the body politic. Opting for a solution falling short of federalism, they adopted the approach that, if the underlying fear related to encroachment on seminal rights by capricious legislative action, this anxiety could be convincingly assuaged by enshrining in the Constitution a nucleus of rights placed beyond the reach of the legislature. The essence of the solution which commended itself to the Soulbury Commission was a carefully crafted constitutional limitation on the legislative competence of Parliament, encapsulated in Article 29(2) of the Independence Constitution. The gist of this was incorporation of the principle of non-discrimination against racial or religious communities by explicit acknowledgement of equal protection under the law. The assumption fortifying this expectation was the attribution of an imaginative role to the judiciary in respect of interpretation. It was lack of fulfillment in this regard that precipitated a setback which time could not heal. Judicial attitudes, including those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which constituted at the time the highest tier of the judicial hierarchy, were timid and diffident. When the Citizenship Act of 1948, by means of a new definition, sought to deprive Tamils of Indian origin of the suffrage, no protection was forthcoming from the courts on the ground of impermissible discrimination. This refusal of intervention was premised on an implausibly narrow construction of the word "community", in that, according to the Courts' reasoning, in the landmark case of Kodakkan Pillai v. Madanayake, Indian Tamils were not identifiable as a community distinct from the larger community of the Tamils of Ceylon. It is hard to disguise the reality that this was, at bottom, a refusal to deal with the substantive issues candidly and frontally. The resulting vulnerability of minority rights, which judicial evasion laid bare, was a major contributory cause of the erosion of confidence on the part of minority groups. This mood of suspicion and despair, arising from an ostensibly weak method of protection of human rights, presaged ensuing developments. ### **IV. Further Quest for a Constitutional Solution** The central theme of this lecture, in honour of a statesman who was an epitome of restraint and moderation, is that the deterioration of ethnic relations, which culminated in a war of unrivalled savagery over a span of three decades, was progressive and incremental. There was no inevitability about the denouement. It was gradual and potentially reversible. At several crucial points, there was opportunity to arrest a disastrous trend. These windows of opportunity, however, were not utilized: extremist attitudes asserted themselves, and polarization became the outcome. This trajectory was no doubt met with dismay by far-sighted leaders of the calibre of Mr. Chelvanayakam. The formation of the Federal Party was a turning point. With Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, King's Counsel, as founder-president, and Dr. E.M.V. Naganathan and Mr. V. Navaratnam as joint secretaries, the party embarked on a journey which marked a radical departure from the conventional thinking of the past. This was plain from the text of seven resolutions adopted at the national convention of the party held in Trincomalee in April 1951\. The foundation of these resolutions was the call to establish a Tamil state within the Union of Ceylon, and the uncompromising assertion that no other solution was feasible. The path was now becoming manifest. The demand up to now had been for substantial power sharing within a unitary state. This was now giving way to a strident demand for the emergence of a federal structure, destined to be expanded in the fullness of time to advocacy of secession. Although standing out boldly as a landmark in constitutional evolution, the Federal Party resolutions did not carry on their face the hallmark of finality or immutability. The call of the Tamil leadership for secession yet being some years away, the ensuing decades saw further attempts by different governments to resolve the vexed issues around power sharing. The first of these was the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, signed by the Prime Minister and the leader of the Federal Party on 26 July 1957\. There was an air of uneasy compromise surrounding the entire transaction. This was evident from the structure of the pact, which, as one of its integral parts, contained a section not reduced to writing in any form, but consisting of a series of informal understandings. The essence of the pact was the proposed system of regional councils which were envisaged as an intermediary tier between the central government and local government institutions. This did break new ground. Not only did the pact confer on the people of the North and East a substantial measure of self-governance through these innovative councils, including in such inherently controversial areas as colonization, irrigation and local management, but territorial units were conceived of as the recipients of devolved powers. Of particular significance, the regional councils were to be invested with some measure of financial autonomy. The blowback, however, was so intense as to compel the government to abrogate the pact. The next attempt, eight years later, was by the United National Party, which had vehemently opposed the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact. This was the Dudley Senanayake–Chelvanayakam Pact, signed between the leader of the United National Party, at the time Leader of the Opposition, and the leader of the Federal Party. It differed from the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact both contextually and substantively. As to context, it was signed on 24 March 1965, on the eve of a parliamentary election, to ensure for the United National Party the support of the Federal Party. A disheartening feature was the plainly evident element of duplicity. Once in government, the Prime Minister’s party showed little interest in implementing the pact. Within three years, the Federal Party left the government, and its representative in the cabinet, Mr M. Tiruchelvam QC, Minister of Local Government, relinquished his portfolio. Substantively, the lynchpin of the pact was a system of district councils, but there was entrenched control of these bodies by the central government, even in regard to action within their vires. This was almost universally seen as a sleight of hand. Despite the collapse of these efforts, room for resilience and accommodation had by no means disappeared. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the events which led up to the drafting and adoption of the "autochthonous" Constitution of 1972\. This involved the historic task of severing the centuries-old bond with the British Crown and bringing into being the Republic of Sri Lanka. One of the Basic Resolutions, which eventually found expression as Article 2 of the new Constitution, characterized Sri Lanka as a unitary state. The Federal Party proposed an amendment that the word "federal" should be substituted for "unitary". Mr. V. Dharmalingam, the spokesman for the party on this subject, in his address to the Constituent Assembly on 16 March 1971, showed flexibility by declaring that the powers of the federating units and their relationship to the centre were negotiable, once the principle of federalism was accepted. Indivisibility of the Republic was emphatically articulated, self-determination in its external aspect being firmly ruled out. There was no reciprocity, however. Mr. Sarath Muttettuwegama, administering a sharp rebuke, declared: "Federalism has become something of a dirty word in the southern parts of this country". The last opportunity to halt the inexorable march of events was spurned. The pushback came briskly, and with singular ferocity. This was in the form of the Vaddukoddai Resolution adopted by the Tamil United Liberation Front at its first national convention held on 14 May 1976\. The historic significance of this document is that it set out for the first time, in the most unambiguous terms, the blueprint for an independent state for the Tamil nation, embracing the merged Northern and Eastern Provinces. The second part of the Resolution contained the nucleus of Tamil Eelam, its scope extending beyond the shores of the Island. The state of Tamil Eelam was to be home not only to the people of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but to "all Tamil-speaking people living in any part of Ceylon and to Tamils of Eelam origin living in any part of the world who may opt for citizenship of Tamil Eelam". The most discouraging element of this sequence of events was the timid and evasive approach adopted by prominent actors at crucial moments. The District Development Councils Act of 1980 presented a unique opportunity. Disappointingly, however, the Presidential Commission presided over by Mr. Victor Tennekoon QC, a former Chief Justice and Attorney General, lacked the courage even to interpret the terms of reference as permitting allusion to the ethnic conflict. Despite the persevering efforts of Professor A.J. Wilson, son-in-law of Mr.Chelvanayakam, and a confidant of President J.R. Jayewardene, and Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, the majority of the members were inclined to adopt a narrow, technical interpretation of the terms of reference. The setting of the legislation was one in which Tamil formations, such as the Tamil United Liberation Front, were struggling to maintain their moderate postures in an increasingly polarized environment, with pressure from radical elements proving almost irresistible. The whole initiative paled into insignificance in comparison with a series of tragic events, including the burning of the Jaffna library during the run-up to the District Development Council elections in the North and the calamitous events of Black July 1983\. Policymakers at a critical juncture had once again let a limited opportunity slip through their fingers. The next intervention occurred in the sunset years of the United National Party administration. This was the Parliamentary Select Committee on the ethnic conflict, known after its chairman as the Mangala Moonesinghe Committee, appointed in August 1991. The Majority Report made a detailed proposal which was intended to serve as the basis of a compromise between two schools of thought—one stoutly resisting any idea of merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and the other demanding such merger as the indispensable basis of a viable solution. An imaginative via media was the concept of the Apex Council, which formed the centrepiece of the Majority Report. It adopted as a point of departure two separate Provincial Councils for the North and the East. This dichotomy would characterise the provincial executive as well: each Provincial Council would have an Executive Minister as the head of the Board of Ministers. However, over and above these, the two Provincial Councils together would constitute a Regional Council for the entire North-East region. Although presenting several features of interest as a pragmatic mediating mechanism, the proposal did not enjoy a sufficiently broad support base for implementation. ### **V. Subsequent Initiatives** Federalism, integral as it was to the value system which anchored the political life of Mr. Chelavanayakam, defies easy definition. Indeed, as the facilitators of the Sri Lanka peace process, when it was pursued at the international level, the Royal Norwegian government considered it central to their function to inculcate in the LTTE an understanding of the nuances of federal systems of government in practice in order to overcome inherent inhibitions. To this end, they arranged extensive travels for the political affairs committee of the LTTE in Nordic countries. Subsequent to his defection with almost the entirety of the cadres in the Eastern Province, arguably the greatest blow sustained by the LTTE in its entire history, Karuna was to declare that it was this exposure which opened his eyes to a world outside the jungles of the Vanni. Federalism, as a concept, represents a spectrum rather than a split. This is brought out clearly in three sets of constitutional proposals by the Chandrika Kumaratunga administration during the period 1995 to 1997\. They oscillated from one end of the spectrum to the other in establishing the line of demarcation between the functions of the central government and the periphery, in a coherent constitutional scheme. I would like, at this point, to pay tribute to the legacy of a valued friend and colleague, Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, who co-authored with me, as Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Ethnic Affairs, and National Integration, with the support of many others, including Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratna, the proposals of 1995, 1996, and 1997\. Neelan, who had been a fellow undergraduate in the University of Sri Lanka, had proceeded to Harvard University while I was the recipient of a Rhodes Scholarship at Oxford. A further coincidence was the entry of both of us together into the Parliament of Sri Lanka in August 1994\. He was brutally assassinated because he stood in the way of the LTTE’s claim to exclusivity of representation of the interests and aspirations of the Tamil people. The future might well have been different, had he lived. The Constitution Proposals of 1995 embodied strong features of federalism, and indeed went well beyond. Regional Councils, forming the gist of the proposals, were vested with executive, legislative and judicial competence in the subjects assigned to them. In all key areas, these powers were to be protected against encroachment by the centre. With regard to finance, Regional Councils were to have powers of taxation, including international borrowings and the power to promote foreign investment, international grants and development assistance. In the crucial area of law and order and policing, provision was to be made for a regional police service headed by a regional police commissioner appointed by the Chief Minister. Land was clearly identified as a devolved subject, and state land within a region was to be vested in the Regional Council, with limited reservations in respect of requirements by the central government. This document represents the strongest movement towards a federal structure in the entire evolutionary process in Sri Lanka. The Proposals of 1995 were modified by a more detailed draft in 1996, which represented a regressive development. The basic weakness consisted of conferment of awesome powers on the Presidency, fundamentally altering the balance of power between the Centre and the regions, and making the latter vulnerable to capricious exercise of discretion which could strike at the very root of the regions' authority. The mere ipse dixit of the President was to prevail in a situation where the entire sweep of the regions' powers, entrenched by constitutional provisions, was sought to be negated by executive action at the Centre, no recourse being available to the region for access to the courts. This was hardly likely to inspire confidence. A corrective trend then set in, resulting in a further set of Proposals published in 1997\. The solution chosen this time was conferment on the regions of a power, to veto proposed constitutional amendments to the content of the chapter on devolution of power to the regions and the two schedules to the draft constitution which dealt with the scope of the regions' powers and the division of powers between the centre and the regions. A drastic curtailment of Parliament's powers, this was movement from one extreme to the other. Invitation to arbitrary action was shifted from centre to periphery. It is scarcely surprising that these Proposals were seen to contain within them the seeds of their own destruction. The most elaborate and thorough response to the widely acknowledged imperative of constitutional reform was contained in the Constitution Bill which, as Minister for Constitutional Affairs, I presented on behalf of President Kumaratunga on 3 August 2000. While the nomenclature of federalism was not specifically invoked, its essence was captured in the provision that the Republic of Sri Lanka shall consist of "the institutions of the centre and the regions". The legislative power of the people was to be exercised "by Parliament and by Regional Councils", while the executive power of the people was to be exercised not only by the President, but also by "the Governors acting on the advice of the respective Chief Ministers and Regional Boards of Ministers". Governors of regions were to be appointed by the President "in consultation with the Prime Minister and with the concurrence of the Chief Minister of the region". Exclusivity of legislative power in respect of devolved subjects was explicitly conferred on the regions. No element of equivocation characterised treatment of the controversial subjects of land and police powers. With regard to the former, the applicable provision was that "Every region shall succeed to all state land within the region and be at the disposal of the regional administration of that region for the purposes set out in the regional list". As for the latter, there was to be "a regional police service for each region, headed by a regional police commissioner who shall be appointed by the regional police commission with the concurrence of the Board of Ministers of the region". Equally striking on the subject of finance was the amplitude of authority conferred through the Consolidated Fund of the region. Robust hostility of the LTTE to implementation of these proposals as the core of a constitutional settlement had its gruesome manifestation in the brutal killing of Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam. The chilling effect on the major Tamil formation in Parliament, the Tamil National Alliance, of which Dr. Tiruchelvam had been an active member, was overbearing. Compounding the problems was the attitude of the main opposition party, the United National Party, which was disinclined to cooperate after their narrow defeat in the presidential election of December 1999\. It was the nation's misfortune that the culture of adversarial politics trumped a national initiative, compelling the government to withdraw the Bill during the debate in Parliament. ### **VI. Elevation to an International Profile** It was against the backdrop of failure of the constitutional process that direct negotiations were embarked upon between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, with Norwegian facilitation in September 2002\. The insuperable obstacle, it soon became evident, was the ethos of the LTTE. Dominant in their mindset was the unshakable conviction of military invincibility. In light of this, Prabhakaran saw no necessity to make any significant concession and believed fervently that the state of Tamil Eelam was well within reach. Anton Balasingham, who represented Prabhakaran in six rounds of direct discussions across the world, was the only member of the LTTE delegation with a grasp of underlying issues. As my relationship with him grew less formal, I decided to put to him a candid question outside the conference floor. I told him that I saw events moving relentlessly, much in the manner of a Greek tragedy, from the LTTE's point of view, towards the climax. There was nevertheless a narrow window of opportunity, and I asked him why they were intractably resolved to make no use of it. His response remains indelibly etched in my mind. He told me that he had nothing to reproach himself with: he had done his best to present the reality of the situation to his leader, but the latter, intransigent in his convictions, resisted reason to the point where Balasingham was convinced that further attempts at persuasion involved peril to his own life. Erik Solheim, who had a conversation with him a few days before his death in London, told me that Balasingham died, dispirited and disillusioned. The theory that the LTTE, at a decisive phase of the peace negotiations, deliberately jettisoned the option of external self-determination, is total delusion. This was a myth around what came to be known as the "Oslo Declaration" during the third session of talks in the Norwegian capital. At the end of this session, the official communique by the facilitators declared: "The parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principles of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka". The LTTE's understanding of "internal self-determination", however, was set out with clarity in the following statement: "We are prepared to consider favourably a political framework that offers substantial regional autonomy and self-government in our homeland on the basis of our right to internal self-determination". But the sword of Damocles was ever present. The caveat was added, with unrelenting emphasis, that "If this internal element of self-determination is blocked and denied, and the demand for regional self-rule is rejected, we have no alternative other than to secede and form an independent state". The LTTE, then, left wide open the option of external self-determination. They purported to derive authority for their position from the United Nations Declaration in 1970 on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States and from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1998 in the Quebec Secession case. The LTTE's rigid stance was expressed with precision in their proposal for the establishment of an Interim Self-Governing Authority and the conferment of all-encompassing jurisdiction upon it: "The ISGA shall have plenary power for the governance of the North-East, including powers in relation to resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, including improvement and upgrading of existing services and facilities, raising revenue, including imposition of taxes, revenue, levies and duties, law and order, and over land". It was added for good measure that "These powers shall include all powers and functions in relation to regional administration exercised by the government of Sri Lanka in and for the North-East". This was, in all but name, the blueprint of a separate state. This went well beyond the solution which Mr. Chelvanayakam, in his mature judgment, deemed feasible in the political and economic context of our country. ### **VII. A Final Opportunity** Events, then, seemed to be moving rapidly towards an impasse incapable of resolution through dialogue. One final opportunity, albeit in uniquely distressing circumstances, appeared to present a lifeline. This was the tsunami which struck Sri Lanka on Boxing Day, 26 December 2004\. Since much of the destruction, especially on the east coast, was in areas controlled by the LTTE, there was the urgent need for a collaborative mechanism between the government and the LTTE to deliver relief and undertake immediate reconstruction. Consequently, a painstaking attempt was made to formulate a pragmatic framework for collaboration, its parameters strictly confined to the matter in hand and devoid of political controversy to the maximum extent possible. President Kumaratunga attached great importance to the resulting P-TOMS mechanism, which, in her judgment, held out the last chance for a successful peace negotiation. However, the Supreme Court, in an Interim Order, struck down vital portions of the Agreement dealing with control of resources for urgently required construction and rehabilitation work. The ensuing message was unfortunate, in that serious doubt was cast on the capability of structures of the Sri Lankan state to evolve an appropriate mechanism, even in the face of as excruciating a disaster as the tsunami which claimed more than 35,000 lives. ### **VIII. Conclusion** Despite this unprepossessing trajectory of events, I would make bold to suggest that a sanguine outlook is not entirely unrealistic. The basis of my confidence in this regard is my experience, over the span of 26 years, as a teacher, Dean of the Faculty of Law, and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Colombo. It is my firm conviction that the youth of our country are not prey to narrow communal attitudes and prejudices. Relations among the different ethnic communities in the environment of the country's universities are typified by camaraderie rather than mutual acrimony or suspicion. Language, certainly, is a barrier. In my own undergraduate days in Peradeniya and Colombo, we made friendships on the basis of shared interests and values and were able to communicate comfortably in the English language. Stratification and compartmentalization are the implacable enemy of the forging of a national consciousness, especially in sentient minds. When as Minister of Education and Higher Education, I was invited to preside over the annual prize-giving at the oldest girls' schools in Sri Lanka and even South Asia, situated in Uduvil, I drew attention to the need for greater interaction with peers in the South through activities such as sports, debating, drama, and cultural pursuits. Reciprocally, I spoke to the leadership of schools in the South, urging them to reach out with enhanced vigour to the North to forge bonds which could potentially last a lifetime. These are the values which informed the bedrock of the life and career of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam. The tempests of politics, in substance if not in style, were just as intense then as they are now, but the unwavering strength of what he held sacred, never succumbing to expediency, formed the wellsprings of the fortitude which sustained him through these tempests. He made his tryst with destiny in a fulfilling and inspiring career of dedicated service, which stands out today as a beacon of light, all the more redeeming amid the cynicism and apathy so sadly evident around us. It is my privilege this evening to honour a Colossus whose influence survives long after him. ### Controversial Jaffna MP Ramanathan Archchuna Brandishes Handgun in Land Dispute URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/controversial-jaffna-mp-ramanathan-archchuna-brandishes-handgun-in-land-dispute/ Last updated: 2026-04-27T05:45:11.000Z JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — Ramanathan Archchuna, a controversial Member of Parliament from Jaffna, is again facing scrutiny after he was seen brandishing a handgun during a land dispute, according to video reviewed by Jaffna Monitor and interviews with witnesses — an episode that has also raised fresh questions about the authorities who authorized him to carry a firearm. The episode occurred on Saturday in the Periyavilaan area of Jaffna, where the property at the center of the confrontation is currently the subject of litigation before the Mallakam Magistrate’s Court. Mr. Archchuna has asserted ownership of the land, while another party has filed a competing claim. According to accounts corroborated by residents present at the scene, Mr. Archchuna was overseeing clearing work on the disputed plot when a group arrived and objected, saying that part of the land belonged to them. The disagreement escalated into a verbal confrontation. Video reviewed by Jaffna Monitor appears to show Mr. Archchuna producing a handgun and pointing it toward individuals involved in the dispute. The Sri Lanka Police did not say whether an investigation had been opened, and there was no official confirmation regarding the status of the firearm in his possession. The incident has renewed attention on the longstanding practice of issuing firearms to elected representatives in Sri Lanka for personal protection. Under Sri Lanka’s Firearms Ordinance, the Secretary to the Ministry of Public Security has broad authority to grant or revoke firearm licenses, including in cases where possession is deemed a threat to public safety. Legal experts note that authorities may withdraw a firearm without a criminal conviction if they determine that its continued possession could endanger others or disrupt public order. Following the circulation of the video, Mr. Archchuna, speaking in a live video on Facebook, said that a group had entered the property and disrupted his work, and that stones had been thrown at him during the incident. He said he used his firearm — which he described as having been issued by the Defence Ministry — because he believed his safety was under threat, adding that he had no intention of harming anyone. Residents said the use of a firearm during what is typically a civil land dispute had unsettled the community. Officials from the Ministry of Public Security did not respond to requests for comment. ### Air Force Denies Radar Plan at Trincomalee Temple Site URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/air-force-denies-radar-plan-at-trincomalee-temple-site/ Last updated: 2026-04-27T03:53:34.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — The Sri Lanka Air Force has denied that it plans to install a radar system within the Fort Frederick precinct in Trincomalee, rejecting concerns raised by trustees of the Thirukoneswaram Temple, who had urged the public to oppose what they called a fresh encroachment on sacred land. Air Force officials, speaking to *Jaffna Monitor* on condition of anonymity in line with service protocols, said no proposal had been advanced to place radar equipment within the temple grounds or on land claimed by the trustees. They added that the Air Force was not pursuing any installation that would affect the shrine or its immediate surroundings. The denial follows remarks by a member of the temple’s Board of Trustees, Mr. Jeyasankar, who called on the public on Friday to resist what he said was a planned radar installation. He added that successive security deployments over the years had reduced the extent of land under temple control. “If land is now allocated for the Air Force as well, we will be left asking what remains of our land,” Mr. Jeyasankar said. Perched on a rocky promontory overlooking the Indian Ocean, the temple is among Sri Lanka’s most prominent Hindu shrines and is revered as one of the Pancha Ishwarams — the island’s five ancient abodes of Lord Shiva. It draws thousands of devotees from across Sri Lanka and India and remains central to the religious and cultural life of the region. Mr. Jeyasankar said the temple’s holdings extend to about 247 acres, citing a copper plate grant from the British colonial period as evidence of longstanding land rights. He said earlier security installations had progressively reduced those holdings, citing the closure of a traditional tank at the temple’s entrance, the establishment of a nearby police headquarters, and the construction of a naval facility on Swami Rock, locally known as Nandi Malai. He questioned why the temple precinct would be considered for such an installation when other locations in the region, including China Bay, could accommodate radar infrastructure without affecting a place of worship. “There is a need to understand the intention behind choosing this location,” he said. Air Force officials said reports suggesting otherwise were inaccurate and risked creating unnecessary concern. They said no formal request had been made for land within the Fort Frederick area and that any official position would be communicated through the service’s media directorate if required. Trincomalee, home to one of the world’s deepest natural harbors, has long hosted a significant military presence, with facilities operated by the army, navy, police and air force across the district. Civil society groups and religious organizations have, over the years, raised concerns about access restrictions and the impact of security infrastructure on historically and religiously significant sites in the area. It could not be independently established how temple trustees came to believe that a radar installation was planned within the precinct. Officials have not publicly detailed any installation plans in the wider area. ### From Sinlung to Zion: The Long Journey of a Lost Tribe URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/from-sinlung-to-zion-the-long-journey-of-a-lost-tribe/ Last updated: 2026-04-27T15:55:18.000Z They came through the doors shortly after ten at night, a small procession of exhausted travellers shuffling beneath an arch of blue-and-white balloons. A red carpet had been unrolled across the polished floor of Terminal 1\. In the distance, a loudspeaker played “Oseh Shalom,” the old peace song that has become a runway anthem for Israeli homecomings. The men wore knitted kippot or hats. The married women wore head coverings, as is customary in Orthodox Judaism. Many were weeping. There were more than two hundred and fifty of them, all Indian nationals, all claiming descent from a tribe that the Assyrian Empire had deported from the northern Kingdom of Israel more than twenty‑seven centuries ago. They had flown in from Manipur and Mizoram, two restive states in India’s far northeast. In the self‑understanding of the cheering crowd behind the security rope, they had flown in from the long exile described in the Book of Kings. They were the first Bnei Menashe to land in Israel since the Israeli cabinet approved, in November, a programme to bring the remaining six thousand members of the community to the country by 2030\. The plan carries the official title ‘Operation Wings of Dawn’. For the arrivals themselves, the airport was an emotional ambush. Dagan Zolat, seventy‑one, who made his own journey two decades ago and lost his eldest son, Gary, to a Hamas rocket in Jabalia during the Gaza war, stood pressing his forehead against a man he had not seen in nine years. “This man is like a brother to me,” he said softly. “He used to carry my boy in his arms when we still lived in India.” A short walk away, a seventeen‑year‑old named Amos Namte, who arrived in Israel as a four‑year‑old. His Hebrew was quick and unaccented. His parents, once farmers in the hills who rose before dawn to walk to family fields, now work in a factory in the industrial zone of Nof HaGalil. They will soon be joined, the Israeli government promises, by nearly everyone they left behind. The scene at Ben Gurion was by any measure moving. It was also, beneath the balloons, a small chapter in one of the strangest stories of religious return in the modern world. Who, exactly, are the Bnei Menashe, and why are they considered Jewish? ### **The People From the Caves** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-sinlung-to-zion-the-long-lWe6TY-kixcey8zsao19p2.png) The community now called the Bnei Menashe—Hebrew for “Children of Manasseh”—is drawn almost entirely from the Kuki‑Chin‑Mizo cluster of Tibeto‑Burman‑speaking peoples who live along the jagged, forested border between India and Myanmar. They are sometimes known locally as the “Shinlung” or “Sinlung,” after a word in their own lore meaning “the great cave,” the place in southwestern China where their ancestors are said to have hidden from persecution before moving west into Burma and the hills of what is now the Indian state of Mizoram. They are, in ordinary terms, hill people: cultivators of rice and maize on terraced slopes, organised into close kinship networks, historically animist, and then, under British and American missionaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, overwhelmingly Christian. Today, Mizoram has one of the highest proportions of Baptists in Asia. Manipur, which has been convulsed for nearly three years by ethnic violence between its mostly Hindu Meitei majority and the mostly Christian Kuki minority, is considerably more mixed. It is out of this world, and not out of any historically recognised Jewish community, that the Bnei Menashe have emerged. Estimates of their number vary, but the figure cited by most researchers and by the Israeli organisations that advocate for them is around ten thousand worldwide. Roughly half are now in Israel. The rest—somewhere between five and six thousand, depending on the source—remain scattered across Manipur, Mizoram, and the Myanmar borderlands. Shavei Israel, the Jerusalem‑based organisation that has midwifed the movement for three decades, places the number of Bnei Menashe already in Israel at roughly four thousand, with about seven thousand still in India. These numbers matter because the Bnei Menashe are easy to confuse with the much older, better documented Jewish communities of the Indian subcontinent—the Cochin Jews of Kerala, the Bene Israel of Maharashtra, the Baghdadi Jews of Bombay and Calcutta—whose historical presence in India is a matter of centuries, in the case of the Bene Israel, perhaps millennia, and entirely uncontested. The Bnei Menashe are something different. They are a community whose Jewish identity is, in recorded terms, new. Their synagogues are new. Their conversions are new. Everything old about them is oral. ### **The Memory of an Exile** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-sinlung-to-zion-the-long-lWe6TY-kix2lj6efu4v1hh.png) The founding claim of the Bnei Menashe is simple, and, in its way, extraordinary. They say they are the descendants of Manasseh, the elder son of Joseph, whose name was given to one of the Twelve Tribes of Israel, and whose people, along with nine others, were carried off by the Assyrian king in the eighth century before the Common Era—the exile from which, famously, they never returned. They are, on this telling, a fragment of the Ten Lost Tribes. They have simply been lost in a place nobody thought to look. The route they describe is long. Their oral tradition carries them out of ancient Samaria into the territories of the Assyrian Empire in what is now northern Iraq and western Iran; then eastward, over centuries, through Afghanistan, across the high plateaus of Tibet, and down into central and southern China; then in flight from some further persecution into caves—Sinlung—from which they eventually descended into Burma and the hills of northeast India. The migration narrative survives in scattered songs and place names, in the names parents gave their children, and in a recurring ancestral figure called “Manmasi,” whom Bnei Menashe writers identify, without hesitation, as Manasseh, son of Joseph. Its defenders point to textures of ritual that are at least suggestive. Bnei Menashe elders describe ancestral practices that included a weekly day of rest on Saturday; the draining of blood from slaughtered animals; avoidance of pork in certain groups; a form of levirate marriage, in which a widow is taken in by her deceased husband’s brother; mourning rites with parallels to biblical practice; and animal sacrifices offered to a single high god, with prayers that later chroniclers compared to the prayers of ancient Israel. The Hmar harvest song known as “Sikpui Hla,” which some versions of the tradition say was composed in the distant past, contains verses that its advocates read as a coded memory of the crossing of the Red Sea and the wandering in the wilderness, complete with a cloud by day, a fire by night, and a bread that fell from heaven. Set against this oral edifice is a more sceptical scholarly consensus. Most historians and anthropologists who have looked closely at the material argue that the overlaps between hill‑tribe ritual and biblical narrative are best explained not by a lineal descent from ancient Israel but by a process of reinterpretation that took place largely after the arrival of Christian missionaries in the region. The missionaries brought the Hebrew Bible, often translated into local Kuki‑Chin languages; the hill communities read those texts; and over time, as converts absorbed the stories of the Old Testament, older local traditions were reread through a biblical lens. Resemblances were noticed, sharpened, and, eventually, narrated back as proof of descent. A song about a crossing became a song about the Red Sea. An ancestor named Manmasi became Manasseh. A cave in the old country became Sinlung as a lost Israelite refuge. There is no archival document linking any Kuki‑Chin‑Mizo community to the Assyrian deportations. There is also no archival document excluding it. What exists is an oral tradition of undeniable intensity and internal consistency, layered over a century and a half of missionary contact, layered in turn over three decades of deliberate rabbinical instruction. The Bnei Menashe themselves tend to experience the sceptics’ arguments as beside the point. For them, the question is not whether a historian would convict on the evidence. It is whether they remember themselves as Israel. ## **Missionaries, Dreams, and the Turn** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-sinlung-to-zion-the-long-lWe6TY-kixrxvfpr1rtm8k.png) The modern movement dates to the middle of the twentieth century. Its triggering event, as the community tells it, was a dream. In the early 1950s, a tribal figure in Mizoram reported a vision in which he was told that the true homeland of his people was not Aizawl or Churachandpur, but a small country on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean that he had never seen. Word of the dream spread. Small groups began to study the Hebrew Bible with more than ordinary interest. Some quietly stopped attending Baptist or Presbyterian services. A few began to keep a form of Sabbath. The real institutional build‑up came in the 1970s. Rabbi Chaim Yehezkel Lhungdim, a local figure who had travelled outside India to study Judaism, returned to the northeast carrying the tools of religious practice: a Torah scroll, a pair of tefillin, a set of tzitzit, and a library of halachic texts. He began teaching. At the same time, on the other side of the world, an Israeli rabbi named Eliyahu Avichail, founder of the organisation Amishav, had made it his life’s work to track down the remnants of the Ten Lost Tribes. Avichail visited the hills, recognised what he saw, and gave the community a Hebrew name that would eventually appear in Israeli cabinet papers: Bnei Menashe. By the 1980s, small synagogues had appeared in Mizoram and Manipur. Hebrew classes were being taught. Children were being circumcised on the eighth day. Prayers were being directed toward Jerusalem. None of this amounted, in the strict rabbinic sense, to a formal conversion, and the community was not considered Jewish under halakha. But it had become, in its own eyes, something more than a waiting room. It is worth pausing here, because this is one of the rare stories in modern religious history that runs against the usual current. The standard narrative of twentieth‑century conversion in the Global South runs from indigenous religion into Christianity, and occasionally from Christianity into Islam. The Bnei Menashe run the other way. They moved from animism to Protestant Christianity, then to Orthodox Judaism. It is a reverse arrow, and an uncomfortable one for some of the missionary denominations that still operate in the same hills. ### **Recognition, and Its Fine Print** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-sinlung-to-zion-the-long-lWe6TY-kixvndom3ojrtzl.png) The decisive intervention came in 2005\. In a ruling that remains the legal and theological foundation of everything that has happened since, Sephardi Chief Rabbi Shlomo Amar formally recognised the Bnei Menashe as “descendants of Israel,” ‘zera Yisrael’, the seed of Israel. It was a generous statement. It was also, read carefully, a limited one. What Rabbi Amar did not do was declare the Bnei Menashe Jews. Under Orthodox halakhic reasoning, Jewishness passes through the mother. Because it was impossible, after twenty‑seven centuries of movement and intermarriage, to establish an unbroken matrilineal line from any individual Bnei Menashe woman back to an ancient Israelite mother, the community could not simply be folded into the Jewish people by fiat. What the ruling did was open a door. It said, in effect, that there was enough seed of Israel in these people to warrant bringing them in, provided they underwent formal Orthodox conversion upon arrival, and provided the state of Israel agreed to help organise the process. This is the arrangement that remains in force today. The Bnei Menashe are not covered automatically by Israel’s Law of Return in the ordinary way. They arrive under a special administrative track. Mikvaot, the ritual baths required for conversion, have been built in Manipur and Mizoram. Rabbinical courts sent from Israel have overseen the immersion of hundreds, and by some counts thousands, of candidates. Upon landing in Israel, the new arrivals enter absorption centres, continue their instruction, and complete the formal steps that make them, halachically, Jews. ## **Operation Wings of Dawn** For most of the last three decades, the movement of Bnei Menashe into Israel was a slow trickle—a few dozen here, a few hundred there, each group requiring years of administrative negotiation. Successive Israeli governments were cautious. Cabinet positions on large‑scale aliyah of newly recognised communities have always been politically delicate, not least because they touch on questions of cost, of conversion standards, and of demography. That caution was set aside in November. The Israeli cabinet, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, approved an operation to relocate every remaining Bnei Menashe in India to Israel by 2030—roughly five thousand eight hundred to six thousand people, depending on the count. The first wave, of twelve hundred arrivals, is budgeted at approximately ninety million shekels. The full programme will cost a multiple of that. Its name—Operation Wings of Dawn—deliberately echoes earlier rescue missions such as Operation Solomon, which airlifted fourteen thousand Ethiopian Jews out of Addis Ababa over thirty‑six hours in 1991. The chosen landing zone is the Galilee. New arrivals will be settled first in the absorption centre at Nof HaGalil, a hilltop city overlooking Nazareth, which already hosts a substantial and established Bnei Menashe community. ## **What the DNA Said, and Did Not Say** In 2003 and 2004, two genetic studies—one conducted by researchers at the Technion–Israel Institute of Technology, another by a laboratory in Kolkata—set out to test the lost‑tribe claim directly. Their results have been frequently mischaracterised, by advocates and critics alike, and are worth stating carefully. On the paternal side, the Y‑chromosome DNA of Bnei Menashe men showed no meaningful signal of Middle Eastern ancestry. The haplotypes clustered firmly with East and Southeast Asian populations, which is, on reflection, what one would expect of a Tibeto‑Burman‑speaking hill people. On the maternal side, the mitochondrial DNA results were more ambiguous. A subset of Bnei Menashe women carried mitochondrial lineages that bore limited resemblance to Middle Eastern maternal populations, though the signal was faint and the pathways by which it might have arrived—through some ancient intermarriage along a trading route, for instance—impossible to reconstruct from the data alone. The honest reading of the genetic evidence is that it does not vindicate the lost‑tribe claim and does not, on its own, disprove it either. What it does is remove genetics as a foundation for the community’s Jewish identity. Whatever the Bnei Menashe are, they are not a people whose Jewishness can be settled in a laboratory. Their belonging, such as it is, will have to rest on practice, on rabbinic recognition, and on the willingness of the state of Israel to receive them. It is also, for those who find the identity politics of the movement troubling, the weakest point in the architecture. A sceptic is entitled to observe that a community whose case for ancient descent has no archival and no genetic confirmation, and which is being relocated en masse into a geographically sensitive corner of a contested country, deserves a harder set of questions than it is generally asked. A defender is entitled to answer that Jewishness has never been, in the end, a matter of DNA; that converts of every background have been absorbed throughout Jewish history; and that the ritual life of the Bnei Menashe, whatever its origins, is real. ## **Between Aizawl and Ashdod** Life in Israel, for the Bnei Menashe who have already made the crossing, has not been easy, and honest accounts of the community tend to say so. The new arrivals come overwhelmingly from rural backgrounds and land in a country whose economy runs on Hebrew, on credentials, and on a degree of urban fluency that takes years to acquire. Many of the first generation have settled into low‑wage work: factories in Nof HaGalil’s industrial zone, agricultural labour, caregiving, the unglamorous underlayer of the Israeli economy. Against this backdrop, the second generation has pushed forward with remarkable determination. Bnei Menashe teenagers are conspicuous in Israeli high schools for their academic focus. Cultural integration is more complicated. Namte himself, standing beside the balloons at Ben Gurion, put it with almost diplomatic precision. He has grown up in Israel. He considers himself Israeli. And yet he still feels, he said, a gap between himself and those born to Israeli parents, a gap he described as being about “values.” His people, he said, have “‘Asian’ sort of values—we’re super polite, humble.” Israelis, he went on, gently, “love to talk, to express their opinions. We don’t like to talk as much. We’re a bit more shy on the whole.” He said he had learned, over time, to talk more. It was, he added with a half‑smile, still a challenge. That gentle observation from a seventeen‑year‑old captures something that the more triumphal coverage of the movement tends to skip. The Bnei Menashe are not simply being slotted into Israeli society. They are negotiating, as every immigrant group eventually does, the terms on which they will be absorbed, and the parts of themselves they will preserve. A distinctive hybrid liturgy is emerging in Bnei Menashe synagogues in the Galilee, weaving Hebrew prayer with the musical modes of the hills. Families cook the foods of Churachandpur on the Sabbath. Weddings in Nof HaGalil feature Kuki textiles beneath the huppah. A generation of Hebrew‑speaking children carries the dialect of the old country as a second or third language at home, and some linguists have begun, half‑seriously, to speak of an emergent “Judeo‑Zo.” ### **The Politics Nobody Wants to Name** No honest account of Operation Wings of Dawn can avoid the politics in which it is embedded, and they are not always flattering. The Bnei Menashe have been brought to Israel, over the years, in a pattern of waves whose timing tracks more closely with the needs of Israeli demographic policy than with any particular crisis in India. Earlier cohorts were settled, at times, in contested areas of the West Bank, where housing was cheaper and where adding visibly religious, visibly loyal new residents served a purpose that the Israeli state did not always publicly articulate. More recent cohorts have been steered toward the Galilee, where the strategic calculation is different but no less real. Critics, including some within the Israeli left and within the community itself, have argued for years that the Bnei Menashe are being instrumentalised—welcomed in part because they are politically convenient, and shaped on arrival into a constituency whose votes and whose children’s military service reliably reinforce the religious right. The critique is overstated when it implies that the Bnei Menashe themselves are naive about this. They are not. They know why they are wanted. Many of them reply that they would rather be wanted for complicated reasons than not wanted at all. There is also the Indian side of the ledger, which receives too little attention. The relocation of an entire community out of Manipur and Mizoram is not a neutral event in Indian federalism. It alters the fragile ethnic calculus of two border states already convulsed by violence. It raises questions that New Delhi has been notably reluctant to ask in public—about the role of foreign religious organisations in the organised emigration of Indian citizens; about whether conversions to Judaism conducted under the supervision of rabbinical courts flown in from abroad sit easily within the spirit of Indian anti‑conversion legislation; and about what it means for the Kuki community, already under pressure in Manipur, to lose a visible and internationally connected subgroup of its own population. For the Kuki left behind, the departure of the Bnei Menashe can feel like a subtraction at precisely the wrong moment. The violence in Manipur has, paradoxically, sharpened the community’s desire to leave and weakened the capacity of those who remain to protect themselves. ### **Faith and Evidence** To stand at Ben Gurion on Thursday night, watching exhausted arrivals embrace relatives they had not seen in a decade, was to encounter a kind of religious experience that does not yield easily to secular analysis. Whatever a geneticist or a historian might say, the men and women shuffling down that red carpet believed themselves to be completing a journey begun in 722 BCE. They had travelled, spiritually if not literally, out of Samaria and into the Galilee by way of the Assyrian plains, the Silk Road, the caves of Sinlung, the jungles of Manipur, and the fluorescent gates of Terminal 1\. They had been met, at the end, by the Minister of Aliyah and Integration, Ofir Sofer, who called the moment “historic.” They had, it is fair to say, been met also by history itself, in several of its less reconcilable forms. ### Charith: The Cost of War, Carried for Life URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/charith-the-cost-of-war-carried-for-life/ Last updated: 2026-04-25T04:18:11.000Z By: Dr. **Gamini Goonetilleke** I first met Charith in the early hours of 19th November 2008, in Ward 8 of Sri Jayewardenepura General Hospital. He arrived as a wounded soldier from the war front, bearing injuries that would change the course of his life forever. For three months he remained under my care, during which time our relationship grew beyond that of surgeon and patient. Years later, Charith recognizes me not by sight but by the sound of my voice. Sadly, he lives in permanent darkness. Charith lost his vision completely and underwent amputation of his right arm below the shoulder following injuries sustained on 18th November 2008\. At that time, his future seemed uncertain, overshadowed by pain, disability, and the long road of rehabilitation ahead. Yet his story did not end within the walls of a hospital ward. Instead, it marked the beginning of a remarkable journey of resilience and renewal. Today, Charith is no longer defined by his injuries. Following medical retirement from the army, he rebuilt his life with extraordinary determination. Married with three children, he has discovered and nurtured a deep talent for music, performing at festivals, producing musical DVDs, running his own YouTube channel and operating his smart phone. Despite profound disability, he has become a source of inspiration to fellow soldiers and civilians alike. His life is not merely a story of survival, but a testament to courage, dignity, and the human spirit’s capacity to rise above adversity. Charith is, in every sense, truly unique. ### **Charith’s Journey to the Army, his Training, and the Battlefield Operation that Changed his Life Forever.** Charith was an eighteen-year-old unemployed youth from a remote village in Mihintale, in the North Central Province of Sri Lanka. He was the third of four children and the only son of poor farming parents. Seeking a better future and a sense of purpose, he enlisted in the Sri Lanka Army in 2007\. After completing three and a half months of intense military training at the Army camp in Puttalam, he joined the 5th Battalion of the Vijayabahu Regiment as a Lance Corporal. The regiment was actively engaged in operations on the Northern war front during the civil conflict. On 25th May 2007, together with other newly trained recruits, Charith was deployed to active military service. Following his initial training, Charith underwent further specialised preparation for high-risk assignments. His duties involved reconnaissance missions, gathering intelligence on enemy bunker positions, and relaying vital information to commanding officers during the planning of attacks. He was also trained in “bunker blasting,” a dangerous role that required infiltrating enemy lines, creating confusion within defensive positions, and assisting troops in capturing forward enemy defences. It was a task demanding courage, precision, and constant awareness of danger. On 18th November 2008, Charith embarked on one such mission. The target was an enemy bunker at Kilali, near the Jaffna lagoon. As darkness fell, an eight-man squad led by an instructor set out quietly toward the objective, located nearly five kilometres away. Charith led the group, carrying his weapon, wearing a helmet and body armour, and bearing a backpack that contained a two-kilogram explosive intended for the bunker. The mission depended on secrecy. Every effort was made to avoid detection as the team moved silently through shrub jungle terrain known to be heavily mined. Equipped with night-vision goggles, Charith crept forward in darkness, carefully scanning the ground. His task was to identify hidden mines, defuse them where possible, and clear a safe path for the soldiers following behind. Around 11 p.m., after nearly one and a half hours of crawling toward the target, tragedy struck. Charith detected what appeared to be a buried mine and attempted to remove and defuse it. Unbeknown to him, it was an unusual device known as an “Earth Mine.” The mine exploded directly in front of him. The blast severely injured his right arm and face. He later recalled seeing a sudden flash of bright light — the last light he would ever see. His body armour saved his life. Writhing in pain, he cried out as the soldier behind him, his friend Lance Corporal Ratnayake, rushed to his aid. Ratnayake carried Charith to safer ground, where the full extent of his injuries became apparent. His right arm had been blown off below the shoulder, one eye was severely damaged, the other was hanging out and his face had sustained devastating injuries. Surrounded by darkness, unable to see, and in severe pain, Charith received preliminary first aid before being evacuated by van to hospital. The mission was abandoned. ### **Initial Treatment and Rehabilitation** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/charith-the-cost-of-war-carrie-nzxhbs-kix2gjf8w1o2n4c.jpg) Charith was first taken to the Base Hospital at Palaly, located within the Military High-Security Zone. After initial resuscitation and stabilization, he was airlifted to Colombo along with several other injured soldiers for further treatment. From Ratmalana Airport, he was transported by ambulance to my ward at Sri Jayewardenepura General Hospital (SJGH), Nugegoda, where he was admitted in the early hours of 19th November 2008\. From that point onward, his care became my responsibility. Following the principles of war surgery, I performed a formal amputation of his right arm below the shoulder joint. His facial wounds were extensively cleaned and irrigated with normal saline to remove debris and contamination from the blast, thereby reducing the risk of infection. The wounds were left open initially for delayed suturing. His face was swollen beyond recognition. Unfortunately, the damage to both eyes was irreversible. After assessment, the ophthalmic surgeon confirmed that his vision could not be restored and that he would remain permanently blind. Charith remained in the surgical ward for nearly three months, receiving intensive medical care and treatment. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Military Hospital for rest, psychological evaluation, and the early stages of rehabilitation. His next destination was the Ranaviru Rehabilitation Centre in Ragama, north of Colombo, a facility established by the Sri Lanka Army to provide long-term rehabilitation for war-injured personnel. Charith spent approximately one year at the centre, and this period proved invaluable. Rehabilitation specialists introduced him to Information Technology using a software package specially designed for the visually impaired. He also learned to use a mobile phone through this accessible technology. In addition, he began training in music. These rehabilitation programs not only restored his confidence but also equipped him with skills that would greatly support him in the years ahead. He was allowed to visit his home in Mihintale time and again. ### **Charith Meets His Sweetheart: “Love Has No Barriers”** Charith regularly travelled by bus from his home in Mihintale to Ranaviru Sevana, accompanied by his father. The 11th of September 2011 became a lucky and unforgettable day in his life. On that journey, an 18-year-old girl named Suvini Sewwandi sat beside the 23-year-old Charith. Sewwandi, a nursing student, was travelling to her nursing school. During the journey, she noticed the young blind man gazing upward toward the sky and felt compelled to speak with him. A simple conversation led to an exchange of phone numbers, and soon regular telephone conversations became part of their daily lives. Through these conversations, they came to understand one another deeply. Friendship gradually blossomed into love, and they eventually decided to marry. It was a courageous decision on Sewwandi’s part. Although her parents initially objected to her marrying a blind soldier, they could not stand in the way of their daughter’s determination and, in time, gave the couple their blessings. ### **Further Rehabilitation** Meanwhile, Charith continued his rehabilitation and was later transferred to Abimansala in Anuradhapura, a centre established by the Sri Lanka Army to provide lifelong medical care and support for battle-injured veterans living with permanent disabilities. Charith was one among many soldiers whose lives had been permanently altered by war. A recipient of nine medals for bravery, Charith gradually discovered a new direction in life through music. His interest in singing and musical performance led to his transfer to the Abimansala facility in Dehiwala, known as Mihindu Seth Madura, where he could receive specialised training. There, he attended classes and workshops conducted by several distinguished Sri Lankan musicians, including the legendary Pandith W. D. Amaradeva. As his skills developed, Charith joined a musical group made up of disabled soldiers and began performing at concerts and public events. His talent flourished quickly, and his passion for singing deepened. Over time, he gained recognition not only within the local music community but also among audiences overseas. He went on to produce his own songs, distributing them through DVDs and social media, while building a growing following through his personal YouTube channel, which became popular among Sinhala music lovers. ### **The Wedding** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/charith-the-cost-of-war-carrie-nzxhbs-kixivfs8zbb0dob.png) Six months after their first meeting, a grand wedding was held at Abimansala, Anuradhapura. The ceremony took place on 25th March 2012 and marked a historic occasion, as it was the first wedding of a disabled soldier to be celebrated at the facility. In recognition of its significance, the authorities organised the event on a grand scale, inviting nearly 500 guests, including senior Army officers and the Army Commander. At the auspicious time of 9.21 a.m. on 25th March 2012, Suvini Sewwandi lovingly said “I do” as she stood beside Charith on a beautifully decorated Poruwa, in the presence of a distinguished gathering. Their union was not only a celebration of love, but also a powerful testament to resilience, hope, and commitment beyond adversity. Today, fourteen years later, they are blessed with three children and continue to share a life built on courage, devotion, and enduring love. ### Charith’s Ambition Today, Charith’s greatest ambition is to care for his family, especially his aging and unwell parents, while continuing to progress in life and inspire others. Despite the hardships he has endured, he remains focused on helping those facing similar challenges. He says, “Sir, my mission and vision today is to inspire those who are similarly disabled, give them mental strength and courage, and guide them to move forward rather than lament what has been lost.” Charith has become a source of hope and motivation, with many disabled soldiers looking up to him as a respected role model and symbol of resilience. ### **The Futility of War and the Plight of the Soldie**r The war in Sri Lanka ended in 2009, yet its consequences continue to shape countless lives. Many young men and women on both sides of the conflict remain permanently disabled, carrying physical and emotional scars long after the guns fell silent. While some, like Charith, have found pathways to rehabilitation and regained purpose through family, community, and meaningful work, others continue to struggle in poverty and isolation. Their stories remind us that the true cost of war extends far beyond the battlefield, leaving lasting wounds on individuals, families, and society. As this story concludes, the words of General Douglas MacArthur remain deeply relevant: “The soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.” ### Air Force Radar Plan Near Thirukoneswaram Temple Draws Opposition URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/air-force-radar-plan-near-thirukoneswaram-temple-draws-opposition/ Last updated: 2026-04-26T02:15:14.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka** — A proposal by the Sri Lanka Air Force to install a radar system on land within the historic Fort Frederick precinct in Trincomalee has drawn opposition from trustees of the Thirukoneswaram Temple, who say the move threatens the sanctity of the site and extends a decades-long pattern of military encroachment. The temple, which is associated in local tradition with King Ravana, is a Hindu shrine perched on a rocky promontory overlooking the Indian Ocean in eastern Sri Lanka. It is among the country’s most visited religious and cultural landmarks. It is also revered as one of the *Pancha Ishwarams* — the five ancient abodes of Lord Shiva on the island — and holds deep spiritual significance in Hindu religious life, attracting thousands of devotees from Sri Lanka and India. A member of the temple's Board of Trustees, Mr. Jeyasankar, urged the public on Friday to resist the proposed installation, saying that successive security deployments in the area had steadily eroded the grounds surrounding the shrine. He has served the temple for more than four decades and is a founding member of its current trustee board. "If land is now allocated for the Air Force as well, we will be left asking what remains of our land," Mr. Jeyasankar said. The temple's holdings extend to approximately 247 acres, he said, citing a copper plate grant issued during British rule and preserved at a religious institution in India as evidence of long-established land rights. Mr. Jeyasankar said the proposed radar site was the latest in a series of state security installations that have reduced temple-controlled land over the years. The Sri Lanka Army had earlier closed off a traditional small tank at the temple's entrance, he said. A police headquarters was subsequently established nearby, and a naval base was later built on Swami Rock, the cliff known locally as Nandi Malai. He questioned why the Air Force had selected the temple precinct when other sites in the region, including the China Bay area, could accommodate radar infrastructure without affecting a place of worship. "There is a need to understand the intention behind choosing this location," he said. Beyond the religious concerns, Mr. Jeyasankar warned that further military construction could deter visitors to Trincomalee, where the temple — dramatic in its cliffside setting — anchors the city's tourism economy. Officials have not publicly detailed the scope or rationale of the proposed installation. The Air Force has not publicly responded to the concerns raised. Further details about the project are expected to emerge in the coming days. ### Death of Tamil Man in Canada Draws Scrutiny of Police Response URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/death-of-tamil-man-in-canada-draws-scrutiny-of-police-response/ Last updated: 2026-05-02T19:26:05.000Z **BRAMPTON, Ontario —** A 30-year-old Tamil man from Jaffna has died in this Toronto-area city under circumstances that have drawn allegations of police negligence and calls for an independent investigation from within the Tamil community in Canada and Sri Lanka. The man, Robert Kennedy, a native of Palaly in Jaffna and an alumnus of St. Patrick’s College, collapsed on a street in Brampton on April 13, according to family members and community sources familiar with the case. He was taken to hospital, where he was found to have suffered a brain hemorrhage, and died after being admitted to an intensive care unit. Those accounts allege that officers with the Peel Regional Police, who were the first to reach Mr. Kennedy after he fell ill, initially treated him as though he were intoxicated. Officers issued him a ticket before summoning an ambulance and did not administer first aid at the scene, according to the same accounts. Community members said the officers’ initial assessment may have contributed to a delay in the provision of emergency medical care after Mr. Kennedy arrived at the hospital. Subsequent medical findings, relayed to the family, indicated that there was no alcohol in his system. The sequence of events described by family members and community sources could not be independently verified. The Peel Regional Police have not publicly addressed the allegations, and Canadian authorities have issued no detailed account of the response. Before his death, Mr. Kennedy had consented to organ donation, and six recipients are said to have benefited, according to people close to the family. His death has resonated across Tamil networks in Canada and Sri Lanka, where friends, former classmates and civic figures have called for a transparent investigation into the actions of the responding officers. The case has also been complicated by Mr. Kennedy’s immigration status. He had obtained Canadian citizenship only weeks earlier and had not yet been issued a passport, people familiar with the matter said, raising legal and administrative hurdles in repatriating his body to Sri Lanka or facilitating travel to Canada for relatives. Mr. Kennedy’s body remains in Brampton, those close to the family said, as discussions continue over next steps. ### Balangoda Kassapa Thero’s Remarks Draw Contempt Plea as Chavakachcheri Court Weighs Next Step URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/balangoda-kassapa-theros-remarks-draw-contempt-plea-as-chavakachcheri-court-weighs-next-step/ Last updated: 2026-04-26T12:04:12.000Z **CHAVAKACHCHERI, Sri Lanka** — The Chavakachcheri Magistrate’s Court is to decide next week whether to initiate contempt of court proceedings against Balangoda Kassapa Thero, following submissions by a group of lawyers who allege that statements he made at a press conference in Colombo amount to contempt. The issue arises in connection with an ongoing case involving a Buddhist monk accused of attempting to sexually assault a minor at the Navatkuli Vihara. The accused monk was arrested, remanded, and subsequently released on bail, subject to conditions imposed by court. Appearing for the lawyers, M. A. Sumanthiran made detailed submissions inviting court to consider whether the remarks attributed to Kassapa Thero constituted contempt by scandalizing the court and undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. Counsel submitted that Kassapa Thero had publicly alleged that the Chavakachcheri Magistrate’s Court acted pursuant to a conspiracy and with ulterior motives, thereby bringing the court and its proceedings into disrepute. “We, as officers of court, place this matter before Your Honour and respectfully seek that appropriate proceedings for contempt be considered,” counsel submitted. He further argued that the statements complained of went beyond permissible criticism and amounted to a misrepresentation of judicial proceedings, with the potential to create public confusion. Counsel also drew attention to remarks attributed to Kassapa Thero calling for the accused monk to be permitted to return to the vihara and continue activities, notwithstanding restrictions imposed by the court in light of the allegations. The application was supported by several lawyers present in court. The matter was brought before the court by way of a motion filed by Attorney-at-Law Kesavan Sayanthan, seeking that the court consider whether the threshold for contempt of court has been met. Magistrate M. I. Rismina stated that an order would be delivered next week on whether to take further steps in respect of the alleged contempt. While differing accounts have emerged, Buddhist monks told *Jaffna Monitor* that the girl — who resides in Colombo — had come to her home in Navatkuli and later visited the vihara, and that the incident was mischaracterized after she was admonished over her attire. However, other sources familiar with the matter said the monk is alleged to have attempted to sexually assault the girl. The case is ongoing, and no findings of guilt have been made by the court. The claims from both sides could not be independently verified, and the matter remains before court. Balangoda Kassapa Thero is a Buddhist monk who gained prominence during the 2022 Aragalaya protests that led to the resignation of former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. He was among the saffron-robed participants at the “GotaGoGama” protest site on Galle Face Green. Since then, he has remained a controversial figure. Critics have accused him of espousing hardline Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist views and of taking positions perceived as hostile to minority communities. Earlier this year, he was remanded in connection with a dispute over a Buddha statue site in Trincomalee, in a case involving alleged violations of coastal conservation regulations. Some critics have also drawn parallels between his rhetoric and that of other outspoken Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist monks, including Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero. ### A Guest List, Not a Policy Signal URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-guest-list-not-a-policy-signal/ Last updated: 2026-04-24T11:19:27.000Z **By: K. Selvarathnam** In a recent commentary for *Jaffna Monitor*, the veteran Indian journalist M. R. Narayan Swamy argued that the exclusion of Douglas Devananda from India’s Vice President C. P. Radhakrishnan’s April 19 meeting with Sri Lankan Tamil leaders at the Taj Samudra was more than an oversight. It was, he suggested, a slight to the Eelam People’s Democratic Party leader and, by extension, evidence of a “gaping hole” in New Delhi’s Sri Lanka policy. With due respect to the writer, however, a closer look at how the Colombo meeting was actually convened suggests a more prosaic explanation. We should understand that the Vice President’s engagement on Sunday was not billed as an all-party Tamil consultation. Instead, it was designed as a narrower meeting with representatives of Tamil parties currently holding seats in Parliament. ### **A PARLIAMENTARY GUEST LIST** The seven Tamil figures who met Mr. Radhakrishnan came from three parties: the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK); the Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA), represented by its parliamentarian Selvam Adaikalanathan of TELO and senior figure Dharmalingam Siddharthan of PLOTE; and the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF). The TNPF’s leader, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, was abroad at the time and proposed that the party’s general secretary, Selvarajah Kajendran, attend in his place. ITAK, with eight Members of Parliament in the current 17th Parliament — the largest Tamil bloc by a distance — was given the most places at the table. Four of the seven seats went to the party: its acting president C. V. K. Sivagnanam; acting general secretary M. A. Sumanthiran; parliamentary group leader and Batticaloa MP Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, the lone representative of ITAK’s eastern strength at the meeting; and Jaffna District parliamentarian Sivagnanam Sritharan, whose separate standing within the party. **NOT A SNUB AIMED AT ONE MAN** The heart of Narayan Swamy’s argument is that Mr. Devananda’s absence was singular, symbolic, and political — an Indian policy failure dressed up as a guest-list decision. Several of the most prominent Tamil leaders outside Parliament were also not invited. Among them: V. Anandasangaree, the veteran leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front, whose credentials as an India-friendly, anti-LTTE Tamil voice are at least as long as Mr. Devananda’s; C. V. Wigneswaran, the former Chief Minister of the Northern Province and a sitting political figure of considerable profile; Suresh Premachandran of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front; and Annamalai Varadaraja Perumal, the former Chief Minister of the briefly constituted North-Eastern Provincial Council under the 13th Amendment — a figure whose personal history is inseparable from the 1987 Accord that Narayan Swamy’s piece invokes at length. None of these leaders is in the current Parliament. None was invited. Read together with Mr. Devananda’s absence, the pattern points away from a bespoke exclusion and toward a straightforward rule of admission: a seat in the House, or a direct party line to one. ### **A Matter of Design** Diplomatic engagements of this kind are often tightly structured — shaped by time constraints, protocol, and the intended scope of discussion. In that context, selectivity is not unusual. But in a fragmented political landscape, selectivity can easily be interpreted as exclusion. Sri Lanka’s Tamil polity today reflects precisely such fragmentation, making any representative gathering inherently incomplete. Seen in that light, the April 19 meeting appears less an exercise in political signaling than one of design — an attempt to engage a manageable set of parliamentary actors within limited time and format. The questions it has raised may ultimately say as much about the complexities of Tamil political representation as they do about the workings of diplomacy. ### Measles Returns to Sri Lanka, Testing a Hard-Won Public Health Victory URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/measles-returns-to-sri-lanka-testing-a-hard-won-public-health-victory/ Last updated: 2026-04-26T02:15:25.000Z **April 24, 2026** **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** Measles, a disease Sri Lanka declared eliminated six years ago, has reappeared, with health authorities confirming this week that two children in the Colombo District have contracted the virus — the first reported cases since January and a sign that the island’s immunization shield may be weakening. The Ministry of Health said laboratory analysis conducted in India determined that at least one of the infections was imported. Sri Lanka was certified measles-free by the World Health Organization in 2019, becoming the fifth country in its South-East Asia Region to achieve the milestone — a success built on decades of near-universal childhood vaccination and a highly disciplined disease surveillance system. Maintaining that status, officials now acknowledge, has grown increasingly challenging. The country’s defenses were tested once before. A 2023 outbreak resulted in more than 1,000 cases, largely among unvaccinated populations and concentrated in the Western Province. In response, the Health Ministry launched nationwide catch-up immunization campaigns in January and again in November 2024 to close immunity gaps. The two cases detected this week are the first since that recovery, renewing concerns among public health officials that even small lapses in vaccination coverage could allow the virus to regain a foothold. ## ### **A COVERAGE RATE THAT USED TO HOLD** ## For years, Sri Lanka kept measles at bay through vaccination coverage of roughly 95 percent, the threshold epidemiologists consider necessary for herd immunity. That margin has narrowed. Disruptions from the Covid-19 pandemic interrupted routine schedules, and pockets of hesitancy — fuelled in part by social media misinformation — have emerged in urban and semi-urban neighborhoods. Migrant workers and communities living at the margins of the health system have remained undervaccinated, creating clusters of susceptibility that officials say are difficult to map in real time. In response, the Health Ministry launched a nationwide catch-up campaign last year, offering the combined measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine to children aged nine months to 15 years who had missed one or both doses. Officials reiterated on Thursday that a single dose is not considered sufficient protection. ### **AN UNFORGIVING PATHOGEN** Measles is among the most contagious diseases known to medicine. As many as nine in 10 unvaccinated people exposed to the virus will fall ill. It spreads through airborne droplets from coughing and sneezing and can linger in the air for up to two hours after an infected person has left the room — a characteristic that makes schools, buses, and clinics especially vulnerable. The early symptoms — fever, cough, runny nose, red and watery eyes — are easily mistaken for a common cold, allowing the virus to spread for days before the distinctive rash appears. Complications develop in up to a third of cases, particularly among young children and people with compromised immunity. They include pneumonia, encephalitis, and severe dehydration, any of which can require hospitalization. ### **WHY RECOVERY IS NOT THE END OF THE STORY** Public health specialists are at pains to dispel the notion that measles is a routine childhood illness that children simply outgrow. Research published in recent years has shown that the virus can induce what immunologists call “immune amnesia,” erasing the body’s learned defenses against other pathogens and leaving survivors vulnerable to secondary infections for months, sometimes years. A rarer but devastating consequence is subacute sclerosing panencephalitis, a degenerative brain disorder that can appear years after the initial infection — overwhelmingly in those infected as infants — and is almost invariably fatal. ### **STRAIN ON A STRETCHED SYSTEM** Even a limited cluster of cases could test Sri Lanka’s pediatric wards, which have absorbed successive shocks since the economic crisis of 2022 reduced the state’s capacity to import medicines and maintain equipment. Health authorities said they had intensified surveillance across Colombo and its outskirts, begun contact tracing, isolated confirmed cases, and dispatched targeted vaccination teams. Officials indicated that tighter measures — reinforced vaccination checks at school entry and screening at Bandaranaike International Airport among them — would be considered if additional infections surfaced. ### **A GLOBAL BACKSLIDE** Sri Lanka’s setback is not unique. Measles has been resurgent worldwide since 2023, with outbreaks documented from Punjab to Romania to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The WHO and UNICEF have warned that a generation of children who missed doses during the pandemic now constitutes a combustible reservoir for the virus. Countries that once celebrated elimination — including Britain and several Latin American nations — have since seen that status threatened or revoked. Epidemiologists describe the current moment as one of the most perilous for measles control in a generation. ### **A NARROW WINDOW** For Sri Lanka, the reappearance of measles is less an indictment of its health system than a reminder of how fragile even its most hard-won public health gains can be. The country’s immunization program remains, by most measures, among the most effective in South Asia. But preserving that standing, officials acknowledge, will require not only vaccines, but renewed public trust and sustained vigilance. “The virus exploits every gap,” said Dr. Athula Liyanapathirana of the Epidemiology Unit. “If we act early, we can prevent this from becoming an outbreak. If we delay, the consequences could be far more serious.” ### Rhetoric and Reality Collide in Jaffna During Minister’s Visit URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/rhetoric-and-reality-collide-in-jaffna-during-ministers-visit/ Last updated: 2026-04-25T03:36:39.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s minister of transport, highways, and urban development, Bimal Rathnayake, declared on Wednesday that his government had no place for “racism” and would not indulge what he called demands from southern voters for an anti-Tamil administration — even as journalists invited to cover one of his own meetings in the northern capital were ordered out of the room. Critics said the two episodes — unfolding just hours apart during the same ministerial visit to the Northern Province — underscored what they described as a widening gap between the rhetoric of the National People’s Power government and the lived experience of communities in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority north. Bimal Rathnayake, who also serves as the NPP’s northern coordinator and Leader of the House of Parliament, used a ceremonial launch at the Kurikattuwan jetty — the gateway to Jaffna’s outlying islands — to accuse his political opponents of trading in ethnic division for electoral gain. “Defeated parties in the North want there to be an anti-Tamil government in the South,” Mr. Rathnayake told the crowd. “We will not act in such a manner. There is no racism within us. The National People’s Power is a party for all Sri Lankans.” The event marked the formal launch of the second phase of a 984.73 million-rupee, or roughly $3 million, rehabilitation of the Kurikattuwan jetty, a vital transport link connecting the Jaffna peninsula with Nainativu, Neduntheevu, and other northern islands. Officials said the first phase, which includes improvements to the road access to the jetty, is nearing completion, and the full project is scheduled to be completed by October 2027. Mr. Rathnayake framed the work as overdue redress for a region long overlooked by successive administrations in Colombo. He described transport as the “choking” constraint on development in Neduntheevu, where roughly 1,400 families live and where, he said, the absence of reliable connections means that “even schools cannot start on time, and government offices close by mid-afternoon.” A contract has been signed to establish a fuel station on the island, he added, and additional public buses are planned for the peninsula and for Point Pedro and Nainativu. “We operate on policy, not racism,” he said. “But there are groups on both sides that continue to practice politics rooted in ethnic division.” ### **A meeting closed to the press.** Earlier that day, at the Jaffna District Secretariat, the minister chaired a separate discussion on a proposed development plan for Jaffna city, attended by members of Parliament, the district secretary, the mayor of Jaffna, and other government officials. According to journalists present, they had been invited to cover the meeting by the minister’s own coordinating office and had begun recording video footage before the discussion began. Shortly afterward, an official from the District Secretariat’s media division told them they would not be permitted to remain and should return after the meeting concluded. When the journalists protested that they had been specifically invited, the official told them the invitation applied only to other events on the minister’s itinerary, not to the planning discussion itself. The reporters left the hall. The ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on why the press had been excluded. The episode has drawn frustration among local journalists, who noted that the NPP came to power promising a sharp break from the opacity of previous administrations and has repeatedly cited transparency as a defining feature of its governance. ### **A fraught portfolio** Mr. Rathnayake’s appearance in Jaffna comes against a politically sensitive backdrop. Until a cabinet reshuffle last October, he held the Ports and Civil Aviation portfolio as well — a combination that placed the NPP’s most prominent northern organizer in charge of two projects widely seen in the North as indispensable to the region’s economic recovery: the reopening of Palaly Airport and the redevelopment of Kankesanthurai, or KKS, Harbour. Tamil political parties had for months accused him of personally obstructing both projects, which are underwritten in part by an Indian government grant valued at roughly $61 million and carry no repayment obligation. Mr. Rathnayake stated on the record that his government would not develop KKS Harbour — a position that drew sharp condemnation from ITAK, the TNPF and other Tamil parties. After his removal from the ports brief, the ITAK parliamentarian Shanakiyan Rasamanickam publicly welcomed the reshuffle. Associates of other Tamil legislators said privately that the decision reflected unease within the government itself over Mr. Rathnayake’s handling of the Indian-backed projects. The ports portfolio was reassigned to Anura Karunathilaka. The minister has rejected that characterization, describing the reshuffle as a routine redistribution of responsibilities and casting his new portfolio — which, unlike ports, involves direct engagement with the public — as the more demanding of the two. ### **Small projects, large silences** A person familiar with regional infrastructure planning said the pattern of Mr. Rathnayake’s engagement with the North had become hard to ignore: the government appeared willing to advance smaller, highly visible projects — local road improvements, the Kurikattuwan jetty upgrade, expanded bus services — while showing persistent reluctance toward the larger initiatives that would most reshape the region’s economy. Fully operational, the Kankesanthurai Harbour and a reopened Jaffna International Airport would reduce the North’s dependence on Colombo-based hubs, including Bandaranaike International Airport and the Port of Colombo, while opening direct trade and passenger links across the Palk Strait to southern India. They could also allow members of the Tamil diaspora to travel directly to Jaffna from abroad, bypassing the capital. “They are comfortable with schemes that create the appearance of progress,” the person said. “But when it comes to projects that could shift economic power toward the North, there is hesitation. That hesitation, the person argued, carries its own implication. To oppose the KKS and Palaly projects on the grounds that they might draw activity away from facilities in predominantly Sinhala regions is, in effect, to treat the North’s development as a threat rather than a national gain — a posture indistinguishable, in outcome, from the ethnic politics Mr. Rathnayake says his party rejects. For residents and reporters in Jaffna, the day’s two events offered a study in contrast. A minister long accused of blocking the North’s most consequential infrastructure projects was inaugurating a smaller one while denouncing ethnic politics. And a government that has made openness a centerpiece of its identity was, at the same moment, asking journalists to wait outside. ### Black holes in India’s Sri Lanka Tamil policy URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/black-holes-in-indias-sri-lanka-tamil-policy/ Last updated: 2026-04-24T12:52:53.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** When Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi prepared to fly to Colombo in July 1987, Tamil politicians and militants from Sri Lanka were invited to New Delhi to approve a proposed bilateral pact that sought to end Tamil separatism. Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founder leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and his team were put up in the five-star Hotel Ashok, no doubt because the Tigers were the most formidable force in the military arena, even if they were a shadow of what they ultimately became. Everyone else, including veteran politicians like Appapillai Amirthalingam, was put up in the nearby lesser-known Hotel Samrat, which too was a luxury hotel until a year earlier, when it turned into a government office complex. Herein lay the irony in hospitality. Prabhakaran was a nay-sayer who, after giving conflicting signals, ultimately sabotaged the India-Sri Lanka Agreement, waged war against the Indian Army deployed in Sri Lanka’s northeast, and eventually assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, who had earlier given him a bullet-proof jacket as a sign of goodwill. The others, even if reluctantly, agreed to accept the accord because they thought it was a first decisive step which, if successful, would bring the curtains down on years of Tamil militancy that was drowning the Tamil region in blood and agony. A few Tamils noted, even then, that this was a hallmark of official India: placate those who are intransigent and unreasonable, and take for granted those who are cooperative and amenable. Now fast forward to 2026. When Tamil leaders from Sri Lanka’s north and east were invited to meet India’s Tamil-speaking Vice-President C.P. Radhakrishnan in Colombo on April 19, there was one notable absentee: many-times MP and minister Douglas Devananda, who heads the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP). Puzzled, I telephoned Devananda. “I don’t know,” he said in Tamil when I asked him why he had been excluded from the discussion at the Taj Samudra hotel. There was no rancour in his voice. I posed the query to other Tamil leaders, including a handful who had the invite, and some Indian officials who have dealt with Sri Lanka. One speculation was that Douglas was no longer a member of Parliament. That was silly because most of those who met Radhakrishna were not MPs either. Another source alluded to Douglas’ recent arrest and jailing over a weapon that went missing from a lot provided by the Sri Lankan government. This was equally bizarre. If criminality was a factor, most Tamil public representatives would fall into the same net. And so would numerous MPs from Sri Lanka’s dominant ruling party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Who would the Indian government then interact with? Without doubt, Douglas is one of the most colourful, even if controversial, personalities thrown up by Sri Lanka’s Tamil community. One of the earliest Tamils to take military training from Palestinian guerrillas in the Middle East, Douglas threw his lot with the Left-leaning Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). When he headed the EPRLF’s military wing, Douglas had a projectile flung into the Dutch-built Jaffna Fort with a message in Sinhalese scrawled for the soldiers inside: Go back to your villages! We are not against the Sinhalese per se! We are against Sinhalese hegemony! The message may not have induced the soldiers to flee. But it showed the distinct difference between one section of Tamil militants from the Tigers, who had no compunction in mowing down more than 100 Buddhist pilgrims in Anuradhapura. Like all Tamil militant groups, the EPRLF too suffered convulsions. Douglas was ousted after being linked to an incident of firing that killed an Indian in Madras. He maintains his innocence in the matter. The expulsion from the EPRLF led to difficult times for Douglas, who was left with only a small group of loyalists. Money was in short supply. But he somehow survived in Tamil Nadu. As the LTTE resumed its war after Indian troops went home, Douglas returned to Sri Lanka and threw his lot with the government at the head of the EPDP. He was clear that the Tigers would never win, that Sri Lanka would not split up, and that Prabhakaran’s uncompromising attitude would only cause more death and destruction for the Tamil community. Douglas was ridiculed. He was famously dubbed a “traitor” to the Tamil cause. But his assessment proved devastatingly accurate. Prabhakaran wanted Douglas dead. But Douglas proved to be the proverbial cat with nine lives. The LTTE became frustrated because this was one “traitor” it just could not do away with. Once, when visiting New Delhi when he was not a minister, Douglas hurriedly vacated his hotel near the heart of the city after spotting a man who looked like a Sri Lankan Tamil, perhaps keeping a watch on him. When Prabhakaran eventually went down in May 2009, Douglas did something unthinkable: he saved several junior-ranking Tigers, convincing the military that they should not be exterminated or needlessly punished. Today, scores of ex-LTTE members owe their lives to him. But Douglas did all this quietly, without any drum beating, almost as if it was his duty. And he famously declared many times that he had no problem with any of the LTTE cadres; he had a problem only with Prabhakaran and his fratricidal killings. Sections of the Tamil diaspora, which remained enamoured of the Tigers, accused Douglas of multiple crimes. Very few knew that many incidents blamed on EPDP cadres were committed without his knowledge, with the Sri Lankan state getting its dirty work done through men it directly controlled; and, as Douglas acknowledged, he could not escape the moral responsibility for that, if any. No, Douglas is no innocent. If he has blood on his hands, so do many others on the Tamil side, including some who met the Indian vice-president. Yet, Douglas was kept away from the visiting Indian leader. When some Tamil fishermen, reportedly linked to the northern leadership of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), staged a noisy rally recently, demanding that the Indian consulate be ousted from Jaffna, Douglas sent his party colleagues to the Indian mission to assure that the protesters did not reflect the thinking of the larger India-friendly Tamil society. Yet, India chose not to call Douglas to the Taj Samudra. Douglas is perhaps the only prominent Tamil leader who has always backed the 13th amendment to the constitution that flowed from the 1987 India-Sri Lanka accord as an interim solution to the Tamil grievances. Some Tamils who supported it did a U-turn when they came under the protective umbrella of the LTTE. Yet, it is Douglas who could not meet Radhakrishnan while one Tamil political party which did is a bitter foe of the 13th amendment which India is committed to. Douglas, like all Tamils, has remained steadfastly opposed to the intrusions by Indian bottom trawlers into Sri Lankan waters, a thievery which majorly affects the impoverished Tamil fishing community in the island nation’s north. Yes, Douglas still has a criminal case going against him in Chennai. But there is no way this could have affected Radhakrishnan because Douglas has met dozens of top Indian officials, including then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The tragedy with India’s Sri Lanka policy is that key decisions are often taken by small minds lacking institutional memory. Not extending an invite to Douglas is not just a slap to him or the Tamils he represents, but it also blows a gaping hole in India’s Sri Lanka policy. Way back in 1987, Sri Lankan Tamils friendly to India were thrust into Samrat Hotel. The man who would eventually kill Rajiv Gandhi was not only royally treated but also given a special appointment with the Indian leader. Everyone noticed it then, and everyone has now seen how the Indian side dumped Douglas. Some of those who met Radhakrishnan will surely wonder: Will this happen to us too one day? **Editor’s Note: The author, M. R. Narayan Swamy, has closely followed the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict since 1983\. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of Jaffna Monitor.** ### Douglas Devananda Slams Tamil Leaders for “Wasting” Meeting With Indian Vice President URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/douglas-devananda-slams-tamil-leaders-for-wasting-meeting-with-indian-vice-president/ Last updated: 2026-04-23T03:02:13.000Z **COLOMBO —** Douglas Devananda, a former minister and leader of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party, has sharply criticized fellow Tamil leaders for what he described as a missed opportunity during a recent meeting with C. P. Radhakrishnan, saying they failed to effectively press the needs of the Tamil people. Mr. Douglas Devananda said the discussions appeared to focus more on internal disagreements among Tamil politicians than on substantive demands affecting their constituents. Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, he said the meeting — held during the Indian Vice President’s recent visit to Sri Lanka — had left both him and the public “disappointed,” arguing that Tamil representatives had not used the opportunity to advance key political and economic concerns. “Instead of raising the needs and aspirations of the Tamil people, it appears they took their internal disputes to him and sought solutions,” he said. Mr. Douglas Devananda acknowledged that the visit itself was “welcome,” but said the failure to articulate clear demands reflected a broader pattern of fragmentation within Tamil politics. He contrasted the episode with his own past engagements with Indian leaders. Recalling a 2010 visit to India as part of a delegation led by former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, he said he had helped secure development initiatives, including a 50,000-house program, agricultural assistance, and the Jaffna Cultural Centre. He also reiterated his longstanding position that Sri Lanka’s 13th Amendment — which provides for limited devolution of power to provinces — should be viewed as a starting point for resolving the ethnic question, though not a final solution. Mr. Douglas Devananda further accused some Tamil politicians of prioritizing “self-serving political interests,” a charge likely to deepen divisions within an already fragmented political landscape. There was no immediate response from the Tamil parties involved in the meeting. Mr. Douglas Devananda, a party general secretary, an early figure in Tamil militancy, and a long-serving Tamil minister, was not invited to the meeting with Mr. Radhakrishnan. Political observers say he has not been included in Indian diplomatic engagements in recent months following his loss of both his parliamentary seat and ministerial portfolio in the last election. Some analysts note that such exclusions risk reinforcing perceptions of selective outreach by Indian officials, potentially narrowing the range of Tamil political voices engaged at a time when broader representation may be critical. ### Prabhakaran’s Nephew Urges Tamil Nadu Voters to Reject Seeman URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/prabhakarans-nephew-urges-tamil-nadu-voters-to-reject-seeman/ Last updated: 2026-04-24T03:07:04.000Z ***Karthic Manoharan, a nephew of the slain LTTE founder, accuses the Naam Tamilar Katchi leader of fabricating his ties to the rebel chief and profiting from his name.*** **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — April 22, 2026** A nephew of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the slain founder of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, has issued a blistering public appeal to voters in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, urging them to reject Seeman, the Tamil nationalist politician, days before a round of polling in the state assembly elections. The statement was issued this week by Karthic Manoharan, a son of Mr. Prabhakaran’s elder brother, Manoharan, who lives in Denmark. In it, he accuses Seeman, leader of the Naam Tamilar Katchi party, of fabricating his closeness to the LTTE leader and of building a political career on the symbolism of the Sri Lankan Tamil struggle without meaningfully advancing it. Mr. Prabhakaran’s wife, Mathivathani, and their three children were killed in the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war, which ended in May 2009 with the military’s offensive in the northeast. Surviving members of his extended family have, for the most part, kept out of public life. Mr. Karthic Manoharan casts the election as a test of political judgment for Tamil Nadu voters, arguing that only residents of the state can discern which candidates will serve them. He urges voters not to be “misled” by political figures who, in his telling, trade on the memory of the Sri Lankan Tamil struggle without producing meaningful results for anyone. He invokes the years between 1983 and 1998, when tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils fled to Tamil Nadu to escape the island’s ethnic violence and civil war. Those who crossed the Palk Strait, he writes, “never felt like migrants from another country.” Mr. Karthic Manoharan reserves his sharpest language for Seeman. He claims that the politician traveled to LTTE-held territory in Sri Lanka in 2008, in the months before the group’s military collapse, and that he was initially refused a meeting with Mr. Prabhakaran because of concerns within the organization about his conduct. Seeman was eventually granted only a brief group audience, the statement says. In the years since the war’s end, Mr. Karthic Manoharan alleges, Seeman has built a political career on “fabricated” narratives about the LTTE and on divisive rhetoric, and has raised funds in the name of Sri Lankan Tamils without delivering tangible benefits to them or to the people of Tamil Nadu. A pointed passage contrasts his uncle's austere life with Seeman’s present-day lifestyle. Seeman, a former film director, founded Naam Tamilar Katchi in 2010 and has positioned himself as an uncompromising voice for Tamil nationalism. He has repeatedly defended Mr. Prabhakaran in public speeches, a stance that has drawn a fervent youth following in Tamil Nadu. Naam Tamilar Katchi has fielded candidates across Tamil Nadu but has yet to win a seat in the state legislature. Its performance in the current election cycle is being closely watched as a measure of how durable Seeman’s brand of Tamil nationalism remains against the entrenched Dravidian parties. Seeman had not publicly addressed the statement by Wednesday evening. A request for comment sent to the Naam Tamilar Katchi did not receive an immediate response. ![One of several banners that have appeared in Jaffna expressing support for Seeman in the lead-up to the Tamil Nadu elections.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/prabhakaran-s-nephew-urges-tam-n6ieQU-kixnme9qqst8hyv.png) One of several banners that have appeared in Jaffna expressing support for Seeman in the lead-up to the Tamil Nadu elections. The statement comes even as small signs of support for Seeman have surfaced in parts of northern Sri Lanka. Banners backing Mr. Seeman have appeared in several areas of Jaffna in recent days, and on Wednesday, a small group of youths organized a modest bullock cart procession in his support in the Manipay area. Sources said the displays may have been backed by a handful of diaspora-linked individuals, though this could not be independently verified. Tamil Nadu is set to go to the polls on Thursday, April 23. ### Vijay’s TVK Turns Tamil Nadu Race Into Three-Way Contest, Analyst Says URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/vijays-tvk-turns-tamil-nadu-race-into-three-way-contest-analyst-says/ Last updated: 2026-04-25T03:36:42.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** On the eve of a Tamil Nadu election that could reshape the southern Indian state’s political landscape, one of the most closely followed Tamil-language commentators has described the contest as a volatile three-way race with no clear frontrunner, as the entry of actor Vijay’s new party challenges the long-standing dominance of the state’s two Dravidian heavyweights. The assessment, first aired in a televised interview and later distilled into a social media post by Samas, editor in chief of the Tamil news channel Puthiya Thalaimurai, comes hours before an estimated 63 million voters are set to go to the polls on Thursday to elect all 234 members of the state’s Legislative Assembly. Votes are scheduled to be counted on May 4. Samas, whose ground-reporting series “Payanangal” tracked electoral trends in Delhi in early 2025 and in Bihar last November, wrote that no single party currently held a decisive advantage and that the election posed risks for all three major formations. The familiar rivalry between the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, led by Chief Minister M. K. Stalin, and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, led by former chief minister Edappadi K. Palaniswami, remains at the centre of the contest. The DMK is seeking to retain its advantage after winning 159 seats in 2021, while the AIADMK, which secured 66, has regrouped in opposition and returned to the campaign with renewed momentum. What has altered the electoral arithmetic, Samas argued, is the emergence of the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam, founded in February 2024 by Mr. Vijay, one of Tamil cinema’s biggest box-office figures. The party is contesting all 234 seats independently after ruling out alliances, and has campaigned on promises including a drug-free state, job guarantees for young people, collateral-free education and startup loans, and monthly stipends for students. Samas described the party as a potential “disrupter,” capable of reshaping entrenched voting patterns. Since Tamil Nadu’s formation as a linguistic state in 1956, he noted, only two parties have secured double-digit vote shares in their debut elections — the DMK in 1957 and the AIADMK in 1977\. TVK, he suggested, could approach or exceed that benchmark, and may enter “challenger” territory if it crosses 20 percent of the vote in key constituencies. Regionally, the analysis points to an advantage for the DMK-led alliance in the Chola and Pandya belts of central and southern Tamil Nadu, while the AIADMK is seen as stronger in the Kongu region in the west. Chennai and the northern districts — the Tondai belt — are described as the most unpredictable battleground, and likely to prove decisive. Samas also highlighted demographic shifts that established parties may have underestimated. TVK’s appeal, he wrote, extends beyond first-time voters to the broader under-50 electorate, which forms a majority of the state’s roll. Women — whose support has historically anchored the AIADMK and, more recently, the DMK — could emerge as a decisive and increasingly fluid voting bloc. The rise of a new party, he argued, reflects not only Mr. Vijay’s personal appeal but a deeper public frustration — with unemployment, concerns over law and order, including drug use, and a growing perception of dynastic politics within both Dravidian parties. Mr. Stalin’s son, Udhayanidhi Stalin, serves as deputy chief minister, while the AIADMK has faced internal succession struggles since the death of J. Jayalalithaa in 2016. At the same time, Samas noted that the DMK retains significant institutional advantages, including welfare and cash-transfer programmes targeting women and students, as well as a political posture toward the Bharatiya Janata Party-led central government that many Tamil voters view as assertive. “When a new entrant disrupts the field in this manner,” Samas wrote, “it becomes difficult to predict who will fragment and who will consolidate.” The outcome, he suggested, may hinge less on entrenched loyalties than on how decisively voters choose to break from the past ### Tamil Leader Says Indian Vice President Raised Concerns Over Political Fragmentation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-leader-says-indian-vice-president-raised-concerns-over-political-fragmentation/ Last updated: 2026-04-23T07:28:32.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** India's vice president has privately voiced concern about the proliferation of Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces, urging that the crowded field be brought to "some level of order," a senior Tamil leader said on Tuesday. C. V. K. Sivagnanam, the acting president of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) , said Vice President C. P. Radhakrishnan made the remarks during a meeting with seven Tamil party representatives in Colombo on Sunday, on the first day of a two-day official visit to Sri Lanka. Speaking to reporters in Jaffna, Mr. Sivagnanam said the observation merited “serious reflection,” given that it came from a figure with decades of experience in Indian politics, including two terms in the Lok Sabha and senior roles in the Bharatiya Janata Party. However, he incorrectly suggested that C. P. Radhakrishnan had served as a minister; Mr. Radhakrishnan has not held a ministerial post. "Political parties have increased significantly," Mr. Sivagnanam said, recounting Mr. Radhakrishnan's words. "He told us that this situation should be brought to some level of order. We must understand the deeper meaning behind that observation." Tamil politics in the north and east has grown increasingly fragmented in the years since the end of Sri Lanka's civil war in 2009, with new parties, breakaway factions, and independent groups competing for a shrinking pool of voters. Mr. Sivagnanam said parties were now emerging "from house to house" across districts and provinces, and that even the total number of registered outfits was no longer clear. "When such a view comes from a person with political experience and insight, it suggests that the current situation is not healthy," he said. "It is something we must carefully examine and also explain to the people." The Colombo meeting brought together a delegation dominated by ITAK — four of its seven participants were drawn from the party — alongside representatives of the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization and the Tamil National People's Front. The discussions, Mr. Sivagnanam said, were "constructive," and covered constitutional reform, the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka's Constitution, and the long-delayed Provincial Council elections, which have not been held in the north and east for years. Mr. Sivagnanam said Tamil leaders pressed Mr. Radhakrishnan on the need for the elections to be conducted without further delay, and that the vice president indicated he had already raised the matter with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Participants in earlier briefings had said the Sri Lankan side did not offer a clear response on the question during Mr. Radhakrishnan's meeting with the president. Mr. Radhakrishnan, who hails from Tiruppur and was sworn in as India’s 15th vice president in September 2025, was meeting Sri Lankan Tamil leaders for the first time since taking office. His Tamil linguistic and cultural background has drawn quiet attention in the North and East, where such shared roots have long carried symbolic weight. "As a Tamil, he has a good understanding of our issues," Mr. Sivagnanam said. Tamil leaders also used the meeting to reiterate their longstanding constitutional position. "We clearly emphasized that our political solution remains a federal system," Mr. Sivagnanam said. There was no immediate official comment on the vice president’s reported remarks. Public readouts of the visit issued by India’s Ministry of External Affairs made no reference to any discussion on Tamil political fragmentation, and statements from the Indian High Commission did not mention the issue. ### Sumanthiran Shares Kamal Haasan Video Criticizing India’s Central Government and Backing DMK, Stirring Debate URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sumanthiran-shares-kamal-haasan-video-criticizing-indias-central-government-and-backing-dmk-stirring-debate/ Last updated: 2026-04-23T03:02:24.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** A video by actor-turned-politician Kamal Haasan sharply criticizing India’s central government and calling for the re-election of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu was shared on social media by M. A. Sumanthiran, prompting debate over whether the move constitutes an official endorsement or simply a personal post. In the video, Mr. Kamal Haasan frames the Tamil Nadu election as a choice between decisions being made in Chennai or in New Delhi — a critique of the central government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). He urges voters to support the DMK alliance led by Chief Minister M. K. Stalin, arguing that the party’s governance model has delivered welfare and social progress. Mr. Kamal Haasan’s remarks draw on the legacy of Dravidian politics, emphasizing federalism and regional autonomy, and implicitly criticizing what he portrays as centralizing tendencies in New Delhi. Mr. Sumanthiran, the acting general secretary of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), shared the video without additional comment, but the move has sparked mixed reactions among party supporters and observers. ![A screenshot of a social media post shared by M. A. Sumanthiran featuring a video by Kamal Haasan backing the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and criticizing India’s central government. The post has since been deleted.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/sumanthiran-shares-kamal-haasa-rspAYQ-kixzbc3ngixyh7z.png) A screenshot of a social media post shared by M. A. Sumanthiran featuring a video by Kamal Haasan backing the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and criticizing India’s central government. The post has since been deleted. Some members and affiliates, speaking to *Jaffna Monitor*, said the post could be interpreted as a political endorsement of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam alliance in a neighboring country’s election — a move they described as inappropriate and potentially counterproductive for a Sri Lankan party. Others, however, said the post should not be overinterpreted. Neither M. A. Sumanthiran nor the ITAK has issued an official clarification on why he chose to share a video critical of India’s central government. Sivapatham, 62, a retired teacher in Jaffna and a long-time ITAK supporter, told *Jaffna Monitor* that, ultimately, it is India’s central government that has the ability to influence outcomes affecting Sri Lankan Tamils. “Whether one agrees with it or not, only the central government in New Delhi has the power to act,” he said. “Governments in Tamil Nadu — whether led by the DMK or any other party — can voice concerns, but they do not have the authority to act in another country.” He questioned the political judgment behind the move. “Mr. Sumanthiran, as the acting general secretary and a leading figure in the party, is widely seen as shaping its direction. Why, then, take a step that could be seen as antagonizing the central government?” he said. **Editor’s Note:** **After the publication of this report, the social media post shared by M. A. Sumanthiran was removed from his page. There is no indication that the removal was related to this report, and it is not immediately clear when or why the post was taken down.** ### Court Orders Chemmani Mass Grave Excavation to Resume as E.U. Delays Visit URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/court-orders-chemmani-mass-grave-excavation-to-resume-as-e-u-delays-visit/ Last updated: 2026-04-24T11:44:58.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka** — Excavation at the Chemmani mass grave site in northern Sri Lanka will resume on April 27 after the Ministry of Justice released funding for an estimated eight-week dig, the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court confirmed on Tuesday, reopening an investigation that has become a test of the government’s willingness to confront civil-war-era atrocities. Magistrate S. Lenin Kumar, presiding over proceedings on Tuesday, said the ministry had approved the budget submitted by the Judicial Medical Officer for the third phase of work at the site. The court ordered that excavations begin on the same day the case is next taken up, and scheduled a coordination meeting of all parties for Wednesday to finalise logistics. A delegation from the European Union, which had been granted prior court permission to inspect the site, postponed a planned visit on Tuesday after determining there was little to observe while work remained suspended, lawyers for the affected families said. The delegation is now expected to travel to Chemmani after excavation resumes, with the date to be announced later. “The European Union representatives were not interested in visiting the site when excavation work was suspended,” V.S. Niranjan, a lawyer representing relatives of the disappeared, told reporters outside the court, adding that observing active forensic work would be “more appropriate.” Ranitha Gnanaraja, who also represents the families, said the court’s permission for the visit remained valid. The Chemmani site, located just off the crucial A9 highway on the outskirts of Jaffna town, has loomed over Sri Lanka’s postwar reckoning since 1998, when a soldier convicted in the rape and murder of the Tamil schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy told a court that hundreds of bodies had been buried there during the military’s occupation of the peninsula in the mid-1990s. For decades, families of the missing have waited for answers. Investigators have so far conducted 54 days of excavation across two earlier phases — nine days in the first and 45 in the second — according to official data presented in court on Tuesday. From two identified forensic zones, authorities have documented 240 sets of human skeletal remains, of which 239 have been exhumed. Forensic analysis to establish the identities, ages, and causes of death of those buried has been slow, and no prosecutions have followed. The resumption comes at a politically delicate moment for the National People’s Power government, which took office pledging accountability for past abuses but has faced mounting criticism from Tamil families and human rights groups over the pace of transitional justice. The release of funding, after months of delay, will be read by many in the north as a signal of the administration’s intent, even as scepticism remains over whether the process will reach those responsible. Human rights observers say the third phase could prove pivotal. A larger excavation window, combined with improved forensic capacity and international scrutiny, offers the best opportunity yet to establish the scale of the site and begin matching remains to the thousands of Tamils who disappeared during the period of heavy military deployment in Jaffna. For the relatives who have gathered at the court for each hearing, many now elderly, the announcement was received with cautious relief. Several have attended proceedings for years without learning the fate of sons, husbands, or brothers last seen in military custody. “The court’s order is welcome, but we have heard promises before,” said one family member, who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor* on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals. “What matters now is whether the excavations actually begin on the 27th, and whether anyone is ultimately held accountable for what is found.” Another relative was more direct in their criticism. “Excavation alone is not enough,” the person said. “What matters is bringing those responsible to justice. Instead, we see a system that continues to promote individuals who were in positions of responsibility at the time these graves were created.” ### Blinded in War, a Former LTTE Fighter Now Guides Others in Sri Lanka’s North URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/blinded-in-war-a-former-ltte-fighter-now-guides-others-in-sri-lankas-north/ Last updated: 2026-04-23T07:27:12.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** At 37, Vijayalathan leads an active life that appears, in many ways, no different from that of others in Sri Lanka. But he is completely blind, the result of a severe injury he sustained as a Tamil Tiger guerrilla in the final stages of the war. Yet he stands as a rare example of someone who has overcome profound adversity and now helps lead a nongovernmental organization working to rebuild the lives of those affected by the separatist conflict that ended in 2009. “I don’t worry anymore about anything. I do everything others do,” Vijaya Kumar Vijayalathan said over the telephone from the northern town of Jaffna, betraying a confidence few former Tamil Tigers fighters display. Vijayalathan had just turned a teenager when he quit his studies and joined the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2002, the year when the Tigers and Colombo signed a Norway-brokered peace pact. The amity didn’t last long. Amid growing strains, fighting resumed in 2006\. As the war intensified, the young man found himself in the thick of intense fighting. The military rapidly gained territory, choking the seemingly invincible Tigers. On the evening of March 30, 2009, Vijayalathan was with some other armed guerrillas at a frontline in Mullaitivu when a shell fired by the military exploded near him, catching the Tigers unawares. One guerrilla died instantly while three others were seriously injured. One of them was Vijayalathan, whose left eye popped out of the socket while splinters tore into his right eye, besides causing horrific injuries elsewhere. As Vijayalathan collapsed in wrenching pain, he believed he was going to die. He begged his surviving comrades to shoot him, rather than let him endure further agony or risk capture. Fellow LTTE cadres reassured him that he would survive and tried to move him to a safer location. But medicines were in critically short supply. Unable to withstand the pain, Vijayalathan eventually slipped into a coma. “My eyes slowly closed… The pain was terrible… I thought I was dying… I vividly remember those moments.” When he regained consciousness on April 9, his father had taken charge of him as the once formidable LTTE showed signs of rapid disintegration. That was when he learned that he had become completely blind — a realization both shocking and painful. When the quarter-century-long conflict finally ended in May 2009, Vijayalathan was among the thousands who came under military custody. Although he was in civilian clothes, soldiers concluded from his physical condition that he had been an LTTE fighter. He was not detained. Instead, he was sent to a sprawling camp for civilians at Omanthai, a site that for years had served as a key crossing point between government- and LTTE-controlled areas in Sri Lanka’s north. Also in the camp were his equally distraught father, a younger sister, and a wheelchair-bound younger brother. Some time later, a teacher from Mannar helped him learn Braille, the tactile reading and writing system used by the visually impaired, giving him literacy, independence, and access to written materials. He went on to sit for the G.C.E. Ordinary Level examination and later joined a college to pursue higher studies in sociology, preparing himself for the challenges he believed lay ahead. In 2017, Vijayalathan, who is from Kankesanthurai in Jaffna, married a woman from the Wanni region. They have three children — a son and two daughters. It was two years later, when he wrote a slim volume of about 50 poems, many reflecting on Tamil identity and pride, that he came into contact with a nongovernmental organization — a turning point that would reshape his life. The organization, in turn, later approached Vijayalathan while seeking a capable and reliable person to oversee its work in Sri Lanka. It proved to be a natural fit: the nonprofit gained a local coordinator, and Vijayalathan found a renewed sense of purpose. He was appointed project coordinator. Today, Vijayalathan — guided by determination in the absence of sight — carefully monitors activities on the ground whenever the organization takes on a new case in Sri Lanka. On his part, Vijayalathan is modest about what he does. “Night and day may be the same to me. But I am happy I am able to do useful work.” Vijayalathan admitted that scores of former LTTE guerrillas were leading a miserable life in Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces, mainly due to lack of work opportunities because they don’t have the required education. “Many are very intelligent, but they don’t even possess a school certificate,” he said. “The only thing they learnt is how to fight a war.” He added, “Believe it or not, some ex-fighters are today begging in Jaffna.” Vijayalathan is now preparing for a government school teacher’s job. But even if he gets it, he will continue to work for the NGO. Vijayalathan distinctly remembers one episode from the last months of the war. It was on January 23, 2009, when he suddenly came in contact with LTTE founder-leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. This was at Iranaipalai, a small village in Mullaitivu district. A cocky Prabhakaran, perhaps still confident of reversing the fortunes of the military conflict, made a claim whose significance Vijayalathan did not immediately grasp. “They (military) are coming to catch the Tigers, eh?” the Tigers' boss remarked. “Well, they may catch the ‘vaal’ (tail), but the tiger will never be caught.” It was the last time Vijayalathan saw the LTTE chief, who was killed in May 2009, bringing the curtains down on one of the longest-running armed conflicts. “I didn’t understand then what he meant,” Vijayalathan said, recalling those tense times. “It was only later I realised that he meant that some fighters (tail) may get caught, but not he himself.” ### The Strait of Malacca: The First Trade War That Shaped Asia URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-strait-of-malacca-the-first-trade-war-that-shaped-asia/ Last updated: 2026-04-21T05:45:36.000Z **By Abbi Kanthasamy** Stand on the bridge of a ship crossing the Strait of Malacca at night, and you will see the modern world moving past you. Oil tankers carrying Middle Eastern crude glide east toward China, Japan, and Korea. Container ships loaded with Asian exports head west toward the Indian Ocean and eventually the Suez Canal on their way to Europe. Somewhere between Singapore and Sumatra, nearly a third of the world’s maritime trade squeezes through a channel barely wide enough in places for two ships to pass comfortably. Today, strategists in Washington talk about it constantly. Chinese analysts worry about it openly. Singapore’s leaders, with characteristic calm, remind everyone that the strait must remain open, neutral, and governed by international law. For many observers, this sounds like a modern geopolitical dilemma. It isn’t. More than a thousand years ago, another struggle unfolded across these same waters. It may well have been the first trade war in the Strait of Malacca. ## **The Gate to China** Long before global supply chains and supertankers, the Indian Ocean was already the world’s busiest commercial highway. Arab merchants sailed from the Red Sea. Indian traders crossed the Bay of Bengal. Chinese ships came south carrying silk, ceramics, and silver. And between them all sat one crucial passage: the Strait of Malacca. Whoever controlled it controlled access to the markets of China. In the early medieval period, the gatekeeper was the Srivijaya Empire, a powerful maritime kingdom based in Sumatra. Srivijaya was less a traditional land empire than a network of strategic ports and harbours spread across Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. Ships moving between India and China had little choice but to pass through its waters. Stop in its ports. Pay its duties. Trade on its terms. For centuries, that system worked. Then the Cholas arrived. ## **The Empire of the Bay of Bengal** By the late tenth century, a new power was rising on the southeastern coast of India. The Chola Empire, under kings such as Rajaraja Chola and, later, his son Rajendra Chola I, built one of the most formidable states in medieval Asia. Their capital in the fertile Kaveri delta commanded thriving ports on the Coromandel Coast. Their armies conquered most of southern India and Sri Lanka. But the Cholas were not just conquerors of land. They were masters of the sea. Tamil merchant guilds — the Ayyavole, Manigramam, and Anjuvannam — had already spread across Southeast Asia, establishing trading communities from Sumatra to China. Their ships rode the monsoon winds across the Bay of Bengal carrying textiles, spices, precious stones, and metals. Trade was the lifeblood of the empire. And Srivijaya stood directly in the way. ## **The Raid That Shocked Asia** In 1025 AD, Rajendra Chola launched something unprecedented in Indian history. A naval fleet crossed the Bay of Bengal and struck directly at the ports of Srivijaya. The Chola ships attacked key harbour cities across Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula — including Kadaram, widely believed to be modern Kedah. Ports that had once enforced Srivijaya’s control of the strait suddenly found themselves under assault from a navy arriving from across the ocean. The goal was not conquest. The Cholas did not try to colonise Southeast Asia. Instead, they did something far more strategic. They broke the monopoly. By striking the ports that regulated trade through the Strait of Malacca, the Cholas weakened Srivijaya’s ability to control maritime traffic and opened routes for Tamil merchants to reach China directly. In modern language, it looked remarkably like a trade war. ## **A Global Economy — a Millennium Ago** What makes this episode remarkable is not just the violence of the raid, but the scale of the system in which it occurred. The eleventh-century Indian Ocean was already a globalized world. Three powerful regions dominated its trade routes: Song dynasty China, the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, and the Chola Empire in India. Between them stood Southeast Asia, whose ports connected these great economies. Ships carried spices from the Indonesian archipelago, cotton textiles from India, ceramics from China, and silver from the Middle East. Ports from Aden to Guangzhou were linked by merchants, navigators, and seasonal winds. Control the chokepoints, and you control the flow of wealth. The Cholas understood that. So did Srivijaya. ## **The Strait That Empires Always Notice** Fast forward a thousand years. Today, the Strait of Malacca remains one of the most important maritime corridors on Earth. Nearly 100,000 ships pass through it every year. For China, it is the artery through which much of its oil supply flows — what strategists call the “Malacca dilemma.” For the United States, it is a strategic chokepoint that could become critical in any future conflict in Asia. For Singapore, sitting at the southern mouth of the strait, it is both a blessing and a responsibility: a global trade artery that must remain open to all. The same conversation — about chokepoints, access, and control — echoes again in modern geopolitics. ## **The Other Strait** Look westward, and you will find another narrow gateway under constant tension: the Strait of Hormuz. In recent weeks, tensions between Iran and the United States have once again pushed the region to the brink. Markets reacted instantly. Oil prices jumped sharply as traders feared the possibility of disruptions to shipping through the strait. Nearly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes through Hormuz. Any threat to that narrow waterway sends shockwaves through global energy markets — from New York to Tokyo. The geography is different. But the strategic logic is identical to Malacca. The world’s vast oceans are often controlled by very small pieces of water. ## **The Sea Remembers** History rarely repeats itself neatly, but it does echo. The Cholas could raid Srivijaya’s ports, but they could not permanently dominate Southeast Asia. The Portuguese later seized Malacca in 1511, only to watch Asian trade networks adapt and survive. Empires rise. Empires fall. But the ships keep sailing. And every generation eventually rediscovers the same uncomfortable reality — that global commerce depends on fragile maritime corridors that have been contested for centuries. Tonight, somewhere in the dark waters between Sumatra and Singapore, another convoy of ships will glide through the strait. Most of their crews will be thinking about cargo, weather, and schedules. But the water beneath them carries the memory of a much older story. The first trade war in the Strait of Malacca happened a thousand years ago. The argument over who controls the world’s chokepoints never really ended. ### Sri Lankan Muslim Leader Backs DMK Alliance in Tamil Nadu, Drawing Questions at Home URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-muslim-leader-backs-dmk-alliance-in-tamil-nadu-drawing-questions-at-home/ Last updated: 2026-04-21T15:29:34.000Z **COLOMBO** — Rauff Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, has publicly expressed confidence that the alliance led by M. K. Stalin and his Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) will secure a decisive victory in Tamil Nadu’s state assembly elections, extending advance congratulations to candidates contesting under the coalition. In letters sent to leaders of parties aligned with the DMK-led Secular Progressive Alliance — including the Indian Union Muslim League — Mr. Hakeem cited opinion polls suggesting that Mr. Stalin would return to office when results are announced. He also pointed to longstanding ties between his party and the DMK and its allies, describing them as “friendly parties” in neighboring India. Campaigning in Tamil Nadu has entered its final phase, with the DMK contesting 164 constituencies and its allies fielding candidates in roughly 70 others. Mr. Hakeem said he expected a sweeping victory across both segments and named several candidates from allied parties whom he anticipated would win. While expressions of political solidarity across South Asia are not uncommon, Mr. Hakeem’s remarks have drawn scrutiny in Sri Lanka over the propriety of a senior political figure — particularly one representing a minority community — commenting on electoral outcomes in another sovereign country. Political analysts say such statements, even when framed as goodwill, can blur the line between maintaining fraternal ties and appearing to engage, however indirectly, in another country’s domestic political process. “There is a distinction between longstanding political relationships and public commentary that may be perceived as endorsing a particular electoral outcome,” said a Colombo-based analyst familiar with regional political dynamics. Critics argue that, as leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, Mr. Hakeem’s primary mandate is to represent the interests of Sri Lankan Muslims, and that visible engagement in a foreign election risks being viewed as a distraction from domestic responsibilities. Others, however, view Mr. Hakeem’s comments within the context of enduring political and cultural linkages across the Palk Strait, noting that parties in Tamil Nadu have historically maintained close ties with minority communities in Sri Lanka. ### Mother of Singapore’s President, With Roots in Jaffna, Dies at 99 URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/mother-of-singapores-president-with-roots-in-jaffna-dies-at-99/ Last updated: 2026-04-26T12:04:17.000Z ***Sarvambikai Shanmugaratnam, daughter of a Jaffna physician and wife of Singapore’s “father of pathology,” is remembered as a quiet iconoclast who chose her own path.*** **JAFFNA —** Sarvambikai Shanmugaratnam — known to her family as Ambikai, and to the Singaporean public as the mother of President Tharman Shanmugaratnam — died on Sunday afternoon at her home in Singapore. She was 99. Though she was born in Kuala Lumpur and never lived in Sri Lanka, her roots were firmly in Jaffna, and, according to family members who spoke with *Jaffna Monitor*, she could read, write and speak Tamil fluently. Her father’s ancestral village, Urelu, lay in the peninsula’s agrarian interior, and its ethos shaped the moral grammar of the household in which she was raised. The family recalled on Monday that the patriarch would distribute the harvest “in equal measure to the temple priest, the carpenter and the washerman alike” — a principle she carried into her own life. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/mother-of-singapore-s-presiden-EeMsGw-kix5xgvszx5ah4f.png) Her death was confirmed by the Singapore President’s Office on Monday in response to queries from Singaporean news outlets. No cause was given. In keeping with her wishes, she was cremated soon after in a private observance, the office said, adding, “We ask that the family’s privacy be respected during this time.” A notice posted on the Singaporean memorial site Obits.sg, written in the family’s own voice, recorded that she “drew her last in the comfort of home” in the late afternoon, and was cremated soon after, respecting her preference in tradition.” It described her as “a quiet iconoclast” who “always kept her own counsel in holding to a different path, and stood on the side of adventure and independence in life.” ### **A village called Urelu** Mrs. Shanmugaratnam was born in Kuala Lumpur on July 5, 1926, the fourth of 11 children — ten daughters and one son — of Dr. Arumugam Viswalingam and Rathnammal Ayathurai. Both parents were natives of Jaffna. Dr. Viswalingam, who was born in 1890 in Urelu, was raised largely by his grandparents in what those who knew him described as an orthodox Saiva tradition, steeped in the agrarian rhythms of the peninsula. He left for Malaya as a young man to practice medicine, but, according to family accounts, he never left Urelu behind. As a physician in Malaya, and later as a father, he insisted that his children “deal with royalty and commoners with the same measure of respect and dignity.” Ambikai, who absorbed that lesson early and never departed from it, became its living example. Dr. Viswalingam was also a reformer. In 1941, he founded the Sivan (Adheswaran) Temple in Kuala Lumpur. According to people who knew him and spoke with *Jaffna Monitor*, he envisioned it not as a conventional place of ritual but as a deliberate turning away from the worship of minor deities toward Siva, regarded as the formless Supreme. He wanted, they recalled, a temple that taught enlightenment and equality rather than hierarchy, and he navigated the legal and political thickets of wartime Malaya to have it protected by special state enactment so its social message would outlive him. He died in 1985. ### **War, and what it forged** Ambikai’s formative schooling unfolded under Japanese occupation. It was, by every account in the family, harrowing. Her father was stripped of his home and his professional standing; the family was pushed into destitution. In that collapse, it was Ambikai and her sisters — the elder daughters of a house of ten girls — who held things together. She watched her father refuse, even then, to compromise his principles, and she seems to have decided young that dignity was not contingent on circumstance. The resilience forged in those years sat underneath the surface of her later life. Those who knew her describe a woman of grace, poise, and elegance — soft-spoken, almost reticent — with what the family calls “an unwavering inner core.” ### **A partnership** She married Kanagaratnam Shanmugaratnam, a Sri Lankan Tamil pathologist of international standing who would become known in Singapore as the country’s “father of pathology.” Family members describe him as “phenomenally erudite, sagacious, and a gentleman to the core,” a man who carried into his own career the same insistence on equal regard for every person that had defined his father-in-law’s household in Kuala Lumpur. Like Dr. Viswalingam, Professor Shanmugaratnam was an institution-builder. As a medical student, he helped persuade a Royal Commission to establish the University of Malaya; he later became Chair of Pathology and Dean of the Faculty of Medicine. In 1950, he founded the Singapore Cancer Registry, one of the earliest population-based cancer registries in Asia, conceived explicitly as a tool of public health for the ordinary citizen. He authored the World Health Organization’s classification of tumours of the upper respiratory tract, a reference text used in pathology laboratories around the world. He died in 2018, aged 97. The partnership was, in the family’s telling, one in which Ambikai’s quieter authority and the Professor’s formidable intellect operated as counterparts rather than opposites. She was, they say, the stable foundation on which a family of high achievers was raised. ### **A son in the Istana** ![Tharman Shanmugaratnam and Jane Ittogi at their wedding ceremony in 1990 at a Hindu temple in Singapore. Mrs. Sarvambikai Shanmugaratnam is at far left.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/mother-of-singapore-s-presiden-EeMsGw-kixr5j2tg9bxop4-1.png) Tharman Shanmugaratnam and Jane Ittogi at their wedding ceremony in 1990 at a Hindu temple in Singapore. Mrs. Sarvambikai Shanmugaratnam is at far left. In September 2023, her son Tharman became the ninth president of Singapore, winning more than 70 percent of the vote in the first contested presidential election the country had held in more than a decade. A former deputy prime minister and central bank chairman, he is the first person of non-Chinese descent to win a contested Singaporean presidency, and has spoken often of his family’s Sri Lankan Tamil heritage. Ambikai guarded her privacy through both her husband’s public stature and her son’s political ascent. The obituary her family composed this week — understated, unhurried, attentive to her own preferences down to the form of her cremation — reads as a portrait calibrated to exactly the life she had chosen. ### **The Sum of Many Influences** Jeevan Thiagarajah, former Governor of the Northern Province and a former member of the Election Commission, and a nephew of Mrs. Sarvambikai Shanmugaratnam, said in an interview with *Jaffna Monitor* that she “was the epitome of grace, poise and elegance — attributes instilled by her parents.” “Her mother was an angel,” he said. “Her father, who straddled rural Jaffna at the turn of the last century, was academically brilliant, utterly disciplined, and at ease across the breadth of society, regardless of rank or circumstance. Tempered by wartime and the Japanese occupation, and by the hardships that followed, she was shaped by those influences. Her husband was the ideal foil — wise, sagacious and an absolute gentleman. She was, in many ways, the sum of all these influences.” Mrs. Sarvambikai Shanmugaratnam is survived by her three children — a daughter, Vani, and two sons, Santhan and President Tharman — along with their spouses, Carol and Jane Yumiko Ittogi; four grandchildren, Aran, Akilan, Arivan, and Maya; her grandchildren’s partners, Mattie, Rachel, and Imran; and two sisters, Shivananthy Thiagarajah, of Colombo, and Dr. Nirmala Rappolt, of London. Her death marks the passing of another link to an early 20th-century Jaffna — a peninsula that sent its doctors, lawyers, and teachers across the British imperial world, and whose descendants now work in laboratories and universities and, in her son’s case, serve in a presidential palace. ### India Expands Footprint in Sri Lanka as Radhakrishnan Announces OCI Plan for Tamils URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-expands-footprint-in-sri-lanka-as-radhakrishnan-announces-oci-plan-for-tamils/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T02:39:20.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** India has taken a strategic decision to help tens of thousands of Sri Lankans obtain Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) status during a packed two-day visit to the island nation by Vice President C. P. Radhakrishnan, a move that Tamil leaders across the political spectrum described as positive and emotionally fulfilling. Although the visit saw India and Sri Lanka deepen their growing bilateral ties, Tamil leaders from the country’s North and East, along with representatives of the Indian-origin Tamil community, gave a thumbs up following their interaction with C. P. Radhakrishnan. Radhakrishnan, who assumed the vice-presidency in September 2025, is the most senior Tamil from the Indian establishment to visit Sri Lanka after the 2015 journey by then President APJ Abdul Kalam. But unlike Kalam, Radhakrishnan has been in politics for decades in Tamil Nadu, where Sri Lankan issues always cast a shadow. One of the most significant Indian government decisions, which Radhakrishnan announced to applause at a community gathering in Colombo on Sunday evening, was to simplify the process of granting OCI status — extending eligibility to sixth-generation descendants of Indian-origin Tamils, in line with similar measures introduced for Indian-origin communities in countries such as Mauritius. He had announced this earlier at a closed-door meeting with Indian Tamil leaders, including Mano Ganesan of the Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA) and Senthil Thondaman of the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC). TPA Vice President Barath Arullsamy, who also attended the meeting, said the Indian decision would make some 1.5 million Tamils of Indian origin eligible for OCI status if they met the conditions. He added that he expected at least 500,000 to apply immediately. An OCI card, issued after strict vetting, helps members of the Indian diaspora who are citizens of other countries visit India without obtaining a visa each time and enjoy other benefits available to Indian citizens. “The only bar is we cannot vote or contest Indian elections, and we cannot buy agricultural land,” said Arullsamy, whose great-grandparents made Sri Lanka their home in the early part of the last century. Tamil leaders said the decision, which New Delhi unveiled as part of a larger bilateral package, would greatly expand India’s strategic footprint in Sri Lanka, with tens of thousands receiving OCI status across 12 districts, including Nuwara Eliya, Kandy, Badulla, and the capital, Colombo. “This opens a new chapter in our relations with India even as we remain Sri Lankan citizens,” said Arullsamy. “It is an extremely important development.” As of early 2026, India has issued more than 5.35 million OCI cards globally. The OCI programme, which began in 2005, has seen a rapid growth in the last decade. The Indian diaspora population totals around 35 million, and many amongst them yearn for deeper ties with their home country. Until Sunday’s announcement, getting an OCI card was strenuous for the Indian Tamil community that has had an uneasy existence in Sri Lanka since the British brought them as indentured labourers from India from the 1820s. Sri Lanka declared the Indian Tamil community, which at one time worked exclusively in plantations, stateless upon independence in 1948\. It took many years of intense negotiations with the Indian government to resolve the issue, even as tens of thousands were repatriated back to India. Tamil sources say that, had the repatriation not taken place, the Tamil community as a whole would today have been able to elect more than 50 MPs in Sri Lanka, including those from the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Radhakrishnan also announced enhanced educational scholarships to children from the Indian Tamil community to study in India. This was another long-pending demand. Earlier on Sunday, Radhakrishnan and Sri Lankan President Anura Dissanayake discussed a wide range of issues, including the economy, energy, education, health, tourism, investment, and trade. This includes efforts to build an energy hub in the eastern port city of Trincomalee involving both India and the United Arab Emirates. The matter has gained heightened interest in the wake of the Iran-US-Israel conflict and the resultant turmoil in the global energy sector. Radhakrishnan, who was accompanied by Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, also discussed the unending row involving Indian trawlers fishing illegally in Sri Lankan waters, frequently leading to the arrest of Indian fishermen. The Indian leader also urged Dissanayake to hold provincial council elections without further delay. The elections, a fallout of the 1987 India–Sri Lanka Accord, which sought to end Tamil separatism, seek to grant limited autonomy to the country’s nine provinces, including the North and East, where Tamils live in large numbers. Citing different reasons, Colombo has repeatedly postponed the elections, although Dissanayake had pledged before winning parliamentary elections in 2024 that they would be held within a year of his taking power. The need for provincial councils and for a more equitable distribution of power-sharing among different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka came up during talks Tamil leaders from the north and east had with Radhakrishnan on Sunday. MA Sumanthiran, a leader of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi, the main Tamil party in Sri Lanka, quoted Radhakrishnan as saying: “Our position is clear. India’s stand has not changed on the (1987) accord.” Tamil leaders also raised the persistent failure of the military to vacate civilian land and property occupied during the war against the Tamil Tigers and to restore ownership to Tamil civilians, primarily in the North. Radhakrishnan expressed his sympathy for the thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils living as refugees in Tamil Nadu for decades and promised to share the concerns of the Tamil leaders with the Indian government leadership. “It was a very good and productive meeting,” Sumanthiran told the Jaffna Monitor. Five-time MP Dharmalingam Siddharthan of the Democratic Tamil National Alliance echoed the sentiment, saying the Tamil leaders felt at home and “very comfortable” while discussing issues with Radhakrishnan. “It became quickly clear to all of us that he (Radhakrishnan) knows the Sri Lankan realities,” Siddharthan said. Indeed, the Indian Vice President stunned Siddharthan and his colleague Selvam Adaikalanathan by recalling the now late leaders of their respective Tamil groups, who had met him in Tamil Nadu in the 1980s. The TPA’s Arullsamy said Radhakrishnan became emotional at one point while discussing the plight of Indian Tamils who came as indentured labourers to Sri Lanka. “He got emotional, and we also became emotional,” Arullsamy said. “We really didn’t expect this. We felt very comfortable talking in Tamil.” Separately, Foreign Secretary Misri announced that the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) would be given the status of an international organisation with an Indian national as its first secretary general. The CSC is a regional maritime security grouping set up in 2020 and includes India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius, Bangladesh, and Seychelles. ### A Refugee’s Protest Exposes the Long Shadow of Sri Lanka’s Conflict in India URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-refugees-protest-exposes-the-long-shadow-of-sri-lankas-conflict-in-india/ Last updated: 2026-04-21T13:49:47.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** A Sri Lankan Tamil man in penury staged an emotive protest in Tamil Nadu demanding that he be sent back to his country, at a time when Indian Vice President CP Radhakrishnan was discussing in Colombo the fate of thousands of Tamil refugees from the island nation in India. Policemen took away the weeping man shortly after he told the media and curious bystanders that he decided to squat outside the office of the Collector in Mayiladuthurai district on Sunday because he had no job and no income, and he had nothing to look forward to. “I am 37 years old, and I am broken,” said the man amid tears. Wearing dark trousers and a deep blue T-shirt, he said he had no earnings, he was not getting any work, and he did not have a home despite spending 25 years in India. “If I sleep on the pavement, policemen come and thrash me,” he said. “Is it a crime to sleep on the pavement? They let even beggars sleep, but they don’t let me sleep (on the pavement).” The short video of his protest triggered a mini storm in Sri Lanka, from where tens of thousands of Tamils have fled since the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom, giving birth ultimately to a powerful Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. The crisis also sent thousands to Tamil Nadu after dangerous sea crossings. While many took off to the West at the first opportunity, thousands remained in India, where they are now estimated to number some 89,000. Even before Radhakrishnan ended his two-day visit to Sri Lanka on Monday, Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) leader MA Sumanthiran shot off a letter to the vice-president pointing out the Sri Lankan man’s agony in Tamil Nadu. He urged Radhakrishnan to speed up efforts to send back to Sri Lanka all those Tamils who had taken refuge in India and who want to return. ![The letter sent by M.A. Sumanthiran, ITAK’s acting general secretary, to Indian Vice President C.P. Radhakrishnan on the protest and the condition of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/a-refugee-s-protest-exposes-th-syhD_U-kixz1d0ek9noyic.png) The letter sent by M.A. Sumanthiran, ITAK’s acting general secretary, to Indian Vice President C.P. Radhakrishnan on the protest and the condition of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India. Indian authorities have not released the man's identity or clarified his current status. He, too, did not give his name to those who witnessed his protest. The India-based Organisation for Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation (OfERR), meanwhile, said on Monday that the man was not a resident of any of the 105 camps set up for refugees and functional in 29 districts of Tamil Nadu. According to S. Sooriyakumary, one of the founders of OfERR, the man was seemingly widely travelled in India and spoke, besides Tamil, Marathi, and Hindi too. She quoted her sources as saying that he had come to India by boat at a young age and did not remember his father or mother. The man reportedly lived near Colombo before reaching Tamil Nadu. The OfERR provides assistance to an estimated 58,000 inmates in the refugee camps in Tamil Nadu. She said her organisation would not be taking up this man’s case because of its unusual background. Tamil sources say the man’s plight has again thrown light on the enormous suffering Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka continue to endure in India, with no sign of when their lives will improve. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin has pressed the central Indian government to provide the refugees with Indian citizenship or some travel document, underlining that thousands of them were born in India and have no links to Sri Lanka. Some of the refugees who spoke to this writer recently said that while the central and Tamil Nadu governments provide them with some subsidy to live on, their lives are marked by hardship. At the same time, some among the younger generation have been able to pursue education in Tamil Nadu with government assistance and have found livelihoods in various vocations. Yet, economic adversity continues to hold many of them back. The man who protested in Mayiladuthurai is one such case — all of them victims of a brutal ethnic conflict they neither asked for nor took part in. ### A Cultural Centre Without a Living Culture: Jaffna’s Silent Promise URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-cultural-centre-without-a-living-culture-jaffnas-silent-promise/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T17:20:26.000Z **By** **Sidhartha Thamby** This is a USD 12 million gift from the Government of India. But let us be clear about what a gift of this scale actually is: it is not merely money transmuted into concrete. It is an act of civilisational faith. India looked at Jaffna — a city that has survived what few cities in the world have been asked to survive — and said: we believe you are worth building for. The only adequate response to that faith is activation. And activation, so far, has not come. There is a particular kind of grief that attaches itself to wasted consecrated things. Not the grief of loss — for the thing still stands — but the grief of desecration by neglect: the temple whose lamps have not been lit, the tank whose sluices have not been opened, the threshold over which no pilgrim has yet crossed. It is this grief, quiet and accumulated, that I carry when I think of the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre standing in Jaffna — eleven storeys of unrealised intention, a 600-seat auditorium in silence, a digital library whose doors have not swung open to the students they were built to receive. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/a-cultural-centre-without-a-li-ryJSwI-kixbhwfk4x7g4rr.png) The crisis is not financial. It is not logistical. It is, at its root, a failure of imagination — a collective inability to see what this building could be if we stopped treating it as infrastructure and began treating it as what it truly is: a living institution waiting to be born. The transition required is not administrative. It is spiritual. We must move, without delay and without further excuse, from a maintenance mindset to an activation mindset. One tends what already exists. The other calls into being what has not yet arrived. ### **What we are actually building** To understand what the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre must become, it helps to look at what India has already built for itself — and then to ask, with seriousness, what an equivalent institution would look like on this side of the Palk Strait. The India International Centre in New Delhi is one of the great intellectual gathering places of the postcolonial world: a club of the mind, where diplomats, scholars, judges, artists, and civil servants have, for sixty years, met to think aloud together about the country and the world. The India Habitat Centre, also in Delhi, demonstrated that cultural infrastructure could sustain itself financially without surrendering its soul — that a centre can generate revenue from its food courts, its galleries, its event spaces, and use that revenue to fund the very intellectual and artistic programmes that give it meaning. And Shanti Niketan, Tagore’s great experiment in West Bengal, proved something more radical still: that the deepest education is immersive, that it happens not in classrooms alone but in the spaces between — in the garden, in the performance, in the conversation between a master and a student sitting under a tree. What India built across three institutions, Jaffna must build in one. Not as imitation — imitation would diminish both the model and the copy — but as synthesis. A place that has the intellectual gravity of the IIC, the financial self-sufficiency of the IHC, and the living, breathing pedagogical warmth of Shanti Niketan. A place where thought and beauty and commerce are not in tension but in continuous, productive conversation. This is not an impossible combination. It is, in fact, the only combination worth attempting. “What India built across three institutions, Jaffna must build in one — not as imitation, but as synthesis. The intellectual gravity of the IIC. The financial vitality of the IHC. The living warmth of Shanti Niketan.” ### **The sacred geography that connects us** But there is a dimension to this centre that goes beyond anything Delhi has built — a dimension that is uniquely available to Jaffna and to no other city in the world. It is the dimension of the sacred. The Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre must become the permanent institutional home of this sacred geography. Not a museum of it — not a glass-case commemoration of something that happened in the past — but a living, continuous celebration of something that is happening right now, every day, in the fire of every lamp lit in every shrine along this corridor. A permanent exhibition, yes — but one that breathes, that changes with the liturgical calendar, that brings the priests and the musicians and the scholars and the dancers together in the same space so that the tradition can teach itself, can encounter itself, can be witnessed and transmitted and transformed in public view. This is what no other institution in South Asia is doing. This is Jaffna’s unique contribution to the intellectual and spiritual map of the region. And it is precisely because this contribution is rooted in something living — not archived, not commemorated, but actively practised — that it demands a medium capable of carrying it beyond the building’s walls to the world. ### **The channel that never sleeps** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/a-cultural-centre-without-a-li-ryJSwI-kixqs7lkzriecol.png) Permanence of this kind requires a medium commensurate with its ambition. A 24-hour broadcast channel — streaming continuously from the centre, reaching the global Tamil and South Asian diaspora wherever they have settled — is not a luxury supplement to the physical institution. It is its nervous system. Its voice. The means by which a building in Jaffna becomes a presence in Melbourne, in Toronto, in London, in Singapore, in the living rooms and prayer rooms of the ten million people who carry this civilisation with them wherever they go. Imagine what this channel carries: live coverage of the great temple festivals as they unfold along the sacred corridor; master classes in Carnatic music and Bharatanatyam taught by the finest practitioners alive; lectures from the visiting scholars and jurists and diplomats passing through the centre’s fellowship programme; debates from the Jaffna Dialogue forums on maritime security and Blue Economy strategy; the performances of young artists from the Northern Province on the 600-seat stage, beamed in real time to audiences who would never otherwise have access to them. A signal of culture and intellect and spiritual life, continuous and uninterrupted — the way a river runs, the way a lamp in a sanctum is never allowed to go out. This is what Classic FM did for classical music in Britain: it did not create new audiences from nothing, but it reached the audiences who already existed and had simply never been given a channel worthy of their attention. The global Tamil diaspora is that audience. It is vast, it is educated, it is financially capable, and it is — as anyone who has spent time among it knows — profoundly hungry for a cultural institution it can be proud of. The channel is the bridge between the building and that hunger. “The channel is not a supplement to the physical institution. It is its nervous system — the way a lamp in a sanctum is never allowed to go out.” ### **Three councils, one meeting point** Governance without capacity is theory. The structure proposed here — three Councils of Management, each led by technocrats and domain experts rather than career administrators — is designed around a single animating principle: this centre must be the meeting point of everything the region most desires to exchange. The Council for Higher Learning and Research answers the region’s hunger for knowledge and professional formation. Through IGNOU, the centre becomes an Open University hub that democratises access to higher education across the Northern Province. Through IIM Bangalore or Ahmedabad, it hosts Executive MBA programmes oriented toward the Blue Economy — connecting Sri Lankan entrepreneurs directly to the venture capital networks of Bengaluru. Through the Gujarat Forensic Sciences University, it builds a Digital Policing laboratory whose graduates will be equipped for the cyber-crime challenges that no South Asian police force currently has the tools to address. Through the National Judicial Academy and the National Law School, it brings international commercial arbitration and cyber-jurisprudence training to practitioners who have had to travel abroad for these skills. The tower is open around the clock — because knowledge does not keep office hours, and neither should the institution that serves it. The Council for Arts and Heritage answers the region’s hunger for beauty, for continuity, for the sense that the civilisation it has built over millennia is not merely surviving but flourishing. In partnership with the Kalakshetra Foundation and the National Centre for the Performing Arts, this council curates the museum, manages the auditorium, runs the instructional wings in classical dance and music and sculpture, and animates the sacred corridor exhibition that is the centre’s most distinctive offering. The Young Talent Incubator — identifying gifted young artists from the North, training them with masters, placing them on the main stage — is how the tradition renews itself rather than merely perpetuates itself. The Winter Season extension of the Chennai Margazhi festival is how Jaffna asserts its place on the international cultural calendar rather than watching from the margins. The Council for Policy and Governance answers the region’s hunger for serious, consequential dialogue about its own future. In partnership with the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation, the Jaffna Dialogue series becomes the premier forum for Track 1.5 and Track 2 exchange on the questions that will define the Indo-Lanka relationship for the next half century: maritime security, climate resilience, the Blue Economy, energy grid connectivity, the political economy of the Palk Strait. Jaffna sits at the geographic intersection of all these interests. It is the only logical place from which to anchor this conversation — and the only city whose particular history gives it the moral authority to do so. “Three councils. One meeting point. The intellectual, the beautiful, and the consequential — not in competition, but in continuous conversation.” ### **The people and the money** A hybrid staffing model addresses the question of human capacity without pretending that the Provincial cadre alone can carry this weight — or that it should have to. A core of Provincial service officers provides administrative continuity and institutional memory. Around this core, a rotating stream of Executives in Residence — experts from the Indian bureaucracy, Ivy League universities, global think tanks, seconded for three to six months at a time — injects global best practice, mentors the Young Talent Incubator, and creates the revolving door of excellence that keeps an institution alive and self-renewing rather than gradually calcifying. The funding architecture is multi-tiered and largely already in place, waiting to be assembled with coherent intent. Federal Indian schemes — SWAYAM, NEAT, IGNCA grants, ICCR seminar funding — constitute an untapped resource pool. Tamil Nadu’s interest in language chairs and heritage tourism, Gujarat’s Sister State MOU, provide targeted state-level entry points. Indian corporates with Sri Lankan exposure — L&T, Tata, Lupin, Ashok Leyland — have CSR mandates that have not been strategically courted for specific endowments. Most importantly, a fixed percentage of all commercial revenues must be ring-fenced into a Sovereign Endowment Corpus, governed by an independent Trusteeship of global Tamil jurists and philanthropists — the structure that will finally give the diaspora the credible, transparent channel its generosity has always been waiting for. The interest funds bursaries. The principal funds permanence. The recently expanded Indian scholarship schemes provide the launch vehicle: earmark a significant quota specifically for programmes hosted at the Thiruvalluvar Centre, and the institution has its founding cohort, its initial revenue, and its academic legitimacy from the first day of operation. ### **What we owe the flame** In the great shrines of South India and Sri Lanka, there is a specific role — the deeparchaka, the keeper of the lamp — whose sole responsibility is to ensure that the sacred flame is never extinguished. Not to perform the elaborate rituals of the major festivals. Not to manage the temple’s finances or settle its disputes. Simply to tend the light. To be there, in the hours before dawn and after midnight, ensuring that the continuity of the sacred is not broken by inattention. We have been absent from that role for too long. The Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre is the lamp. It was lit by an act of friendship and civilisational generosity from India. It has been allowed to dim, not because of any catastrophe, not because of any external force, but because the deeparchakas assigned to it have not shown up. That failure is ours to own and ours to correct. What the IIC, the IHC, and Shanti Niketan are to India — a place of thought, of gathering, of continuous and luminous becoming — the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre must become to this region. Not a monument. Not a storage facility. Not a bureaucratic asset awaiting its next maintenance cycle. A flame. Continuous, unextinguished, beaming outward across the water and across the world, at every hour of every day, for as long as the civilisation it serves endures. The blueprint is drawn. The hour is late. Let us begin. **Editor’s Note: *This article is authored by Sidhartha Thamby, an observer of South Asian geopolitics and cultural policy. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Jaffna Monitor. The publication welcomes alternative viewpoints and encourages constructive public discourse.*** ### India’s Vice President Calls for Unity as Tamil Leaders’ Divisions Spill Into the Open URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indias-vice-president-calls-for-unity-as-tamil-leaders-divisions-spill-into-the-open/ Last updated: 2026-04-21T13:49:51.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** A meeting between India’s Vice President, C. P. Radhakrishnan, and Sri Lankan Tamil political leaders in Colombo on Sunday highlighted internal tensions within ITAK, with participants describing moments that strained political decorum. At the outset of the meeting, the seven representatives of Tamil political parties introduced themselves. During the introductions, Sivagnanam Sritharan, who is engaged in an ongoing leadership dispute with M. A. Sumanthiran, said he had been elected president of the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) but had been prevented from assuming office due to a court case. Participants said the remark appeared to reflect internal infighting within the ITAK at a meeting convened to discuss broader political issues, including devolution and governance. After the discussions concluded, the interaction moved to a customary group photograph. On one side of the Vice President stood Dharmalingam Siddharthan and Selvam Adaikalanathan, alongside M. A. Sumanthiran, while the other side of the group was more crowded. As participants arranged themselves, Jaffna Monitor learned that Sivagnanam Sritharan was asked to move to the opposite side — a position that would have placed him next to Mr. Sumanthiran — but, according to sources, he declined. Participants subsequently posed for individual photographs with the Vice President. During a brief interaction with Mr. Sivagnanam and Mr. Sritharan, the Vice President held both men by the hand and urged unity, asking, “Is it necessary for you to remain so divided? You should work together,” a source briefed on the exchange said. During the broader discussion — which covered Sri Lanka’s ethnic question, the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, and long-delayed provincial council elections — the Vice President indicated that he had an additional matter to raise later in the meeting. However, participants, focused on presenting their respective positions, did not return to the issue, and it was not raised again before the meeting concluded. Its substance remains unclear. ### India’s Vice President Urges Sri Lanka to Hold Provincial Elections Without Delay URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indias-vice-president-urges-sri-lanka-to-hold-provincial-elections-without-delay/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T13:25:06.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** India’s Vice President, C. P. Radhakrishnan, said he had personally urged Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to hold long-delayed provincial council elections without further postponement, during a meeting between the two leaders on Sunday. Mr. Radhakrishnan disclosed this during a subsequent discussion with representatives of Tamil political parties at the Taj Samudra in Colombo on Monday afternoon, a source who participated in the meeting told *Jaffna Monitor*. The meeting brought together key figures from Tamil political parties, including C. V. K. Sivagnanam, acting president of the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK); M. A. Sumanthiran, its acting general secretary; R. Shanakiyan, the party’s parliamentary group leader; and Sivagnanam Sritharan. Also in attendance were Dharmalingam Siddharthan of the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam, Selvam Adaikalanathan of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, and Selvarajah Gajendran of the Tamil National People's Front. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/india-s-vice-president-urges-s-qh9BkM-kixqtk7e064ywdy.png) Notably, four of the seven participants were from ITAK, underscoring the party’s dominant representation. The composition of the delegation is also likely to reinforce ITAK’s position as a principal interlocutor for Sri Lankan Tamil political concerns in India’s engagement. However, despite ITAK having five Members of Parliament from the Eastern Province, only Mr. Shanakiyan was included in the delegation representing the region. Notably, just three of the seven participants were elected Members of Parliament. According to a source familiar with the discussion, the Vice President, noting the delegation’s strong Northern representation, at one point asked Mr. Shanakiyan whether he was the only Tamil Member of Parliament from the East. For reasons that were not immediately clear, the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front — which is part of the re-emerging Tamil National Alliance — was not invited to the meeting. During the talks, Tamil representatives reiterated that a federal arrangement would offer the most just, durable, and sustainable solution to Sri Lanka’s long-standing ethnic conflict. Mr. Radhakrishnan also held detailed discussions with the Tamil leaders on the possible return of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees currently residing in India’s Tamil Nadu state, should they choose to repatriate. Officials said the discussions explored practical steps that could facilitate a voluntary and safe return process. The Indian vice president further reviewed ongoing and proposed development initiatives in Sri Lanka — particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces — under India-funded assistance programs. Both sides also discussed issues related to the implementation of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, under which the provincial council system was established. Tamil party representatives raised concerns about the continued delay in holding provincial council elections, arguing that the prolonged absence of elected bodies has weakened democratic governance in the regions. Mr. Radhakrishnan said he had directly conveyed these concerns during his earlier meeting with President Dissanayake. However, according to participants, the Sri Lankan side did not provide a clear response — either for or against the request — in what has become a recurring feature of such engagements. ### Accountability delayed is accountability denied. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/accountability-delayed-is-accountability-denied/ Last updated: 2026-04-19T06:45:30.000Z **By: Lankan** The resignations of Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody and Ministry Secretary Prof. Udayanga Hemapala are a welcome — if belated — step toward accountability. In a political culture where public office is often treated as a shield against scrutiny, stepping down to allow an unimpeded investigation is the appropriate course of action. The National People’s Power (NPP) government, elected on a platform of uncompromising integrity, could scarcely have done otherwise. But let us be clear: resignation is merely the opening act. It is neither an admission of guilt nor a remedy for the estimated Rs. 7.7 billion in direct losses allegedly caused by the procurement of substandard coal. The real test for the Dissanayake administration begins now. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has appointed a Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry to investigate coal imports dating back to 2009\. While this sounds sweeping and decisive on paper, history offers a grim warning. In Sri Lanka, broad mandates are where truth goes to die. A commission tasked with investigating 17 years of coal procurement—encompassing over 460 shipments, shifting global markets, and complex technical specifications—risks collapsing under its own weight. If the goal is a dusty, multi-volume report delivered years from now, a sprawling mandate is the perfect vehicle. If the goal is rapid accountability, the current approach is fundamentally flawed. This inquiry requires a dual-track strategy to be credible. First, the Commission must issue a focused interim report within 45 days addressing the immediate crisis: the contested South African coal shipments, the ignored quality failures, the capacity reductions at Norochcholai, and the specific officials who authorized these payments. The public deserves to know who signed off on gross calorific values that fell below required thresholds — and why the warnings of the Public Utilities Commission were seemingly ignored. Second, this cannot be a purely judicial exercise. A panel of esteemed judges, no matter how capable, cannot independently assess combustion efficiency, international shipping standards, or complex energy forensics. The Commission must be explicitly supported by technical assessors — procurement specialists, forensic auditors, and coal engineers. Without them, the inquiry risks being outmaneuvered by bureaucrats fluent in the dark arts of procurement loopholes. Furthermore, we must look beyond the Commission model. Sri Lanka underutilizes its Auditor General. While the Auditor General’s constitutional role is not to conduct public, courtroom-style trials, the office possesses immense authority to carry out rapid, forensic value-for-money audits. A simultaneous, aggressive audit — tracking the money trail, identifying control failures, and naming responsible accounting officers — would provide actionable insights far more quickly than a formal commission. Other nations do this better. In South Africa, the Auditor-General actively enforces "consequence management," directly targeting accounting officers who fail to correct material irregularities. In the UK, audit findings trigger immediate parliamentary grilling. We must move past the archaic habit of appointing a commission and going to sleep. Early detection of such massive bleeding of public funds shouldn't require a political crisis. Red flags—sudden changes to technical specifications, unusual advance payments, waivers of quality testing, or overriding technical objections—should trigger automatic, independent reviews. In the digital age, a system that cannot instantly reconcile a ship's manifest with a lab result and a payment voucher is a system designed for theft. The NPP built its mandate on the assertion that it possessed a higher moral calibre than the traditional political establishment. Minister Jayakody’s prior indictment over a Rs. 8.8 million loss at the Ceylon Fertiliser Company was a glaring red flag — one that was inexplicably ignored when he was entrusted with the critical energy portfolio. The government cannot preach sanctimony while practising the same defensive politics of the past. The delayed resignations are a step forward. Now, the administration must ensure that this inquiry produces rapid, expert-driven findings and prosecutable evidence — rather than becoming a slow, comfortable burial of the truth. Accountability delayed is accountability denied. **Editor’s Note:** **The author is a well-known diaspora leader who has chosen to write for *Jaffna Monitor* under the pseudonym “Lankan.” The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of *Jaffna Monitor*.** ### India–Sri Lanka Ties: Partnership in Practice, Distrust in Memory URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-sri-lanka-ties-partnership-in-practice-distrust-in-memory/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T11:00:17.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Relations between India and Sri Lanka have depth and are blossoming. But all is not hunky-dory, notwithstanding the generous multi-faceted help India has provided during crises, more so in recent times. Yes, more and more Sinhalese, the community most cross with India for more than one reason, have begun to view India sympathetically but it will take a long time for bitter memories to fade and the irritants in overall bilateral ties to dissipate. Indeed, if Sri Lanka’s economy had not collapsed in 2022 and if India had not come to its rescue, the state of bilateral affairs could have been grim even today. The overt reasons are not difficult to identify. The average Sri Lankan — not just the Sinhalese — feels let down by India’s decision in the 1980s to provide weapons training, arms, ammunition and sanctuary to Tamil militant groups, which enabled the rebels (later the Tamil Tigers) to confront the Sri Lankan state. India’s reluctance to eliminate LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, despite having precise intelligence on his whereabouts during the war, did not help matters. Moreover, New Delhi’s hesitation to supply the heavy weaponry that proved crucial during the decisive phase of the war against the Tigers was a setback for Colombo, which ultimately had no choice but to procure such support from other countries, including China and Pakistan. Many Indians feel upset that Sri Lankans are holding on to a grudge over a decision pertaining to Tamil militants taken by a previous government in New Delhi. But the memories over the bloodbath the island nation endured due to the Indian misstep are not going to fade away easily despite the passage of four decades, just as sections of Hindus and Sikhs do not stop recalling the horrors of partition though it took place almost eight decades earlier. One hopes that the situation will change for the better with the passage of time. This is why the collection of some very well-researched essays that make up the book under review is so important. The contributors, Indians and Sri Lankans, are mostly those who have studied India-Sri Lanka relations from various angles for long decades and, in the case of some including the editor, served in Colombo as diplomats and gathered immense knowledge. All of them have seen the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship trajectory from close quarters. It is not a coincidence that both Bernard Goonetilleke, one of Sri Lanka’s most respected diplomats, and Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha, a former Indian high commissioner in Colombo, underline the lingering row over fishing in the narrow sea dividing the two countries as one of the most serious issues straining bilateral ties. As Goonetilleke rightly says, India needs to urgently address the repeated infringements by Indian bottom trawlers (in particular) since these illegal activities massively harm the environment and derail the livelihood of tens of thousands of fishermen, overwhelmingly Tamil, in Sri Lanka’s north-eastern coast. Sinha is more to the point when he says that the fishermen issue is an unnecessary irritant that has been allowed to fester for too long. Until India imposes clear restraint on bottom trawling by a moneyed and politically connected class in Tamil Nadu, Sri Lanka will continue to feel cheated by India. Similarly, economist Mathisha Arangala provides valuable insight into the problems confronting India-Sri Lanka economic ties which have hit repeated roadblocks despite their potential to expand massively. Although the economic partnership has evolved into one of the most significant bilateral relationships in South Asia, Sri Lankan businessmen complain how quotas and non-tariff barriers imposed by India have killed the advantage of duty-free access provided to their goods. Arangala explains in details the issues due to which the Sri Lankan business community’s confidence has eroded in furthering trade pacts and deepening economic integration with India. His essay is one of the finest in this collection. Unless and until Indian policy makers make decisive moves on both these fronts, India-Sri Lanka relations will progress at a pace but lose its stream every now and then. No amount of generosity New Delhi shows will take away the irritants notwithstanding a most unexpected U-turn by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), Sri Lanka’s dominant ruling party which from being once passionately anti-India has now become a votary of strong ties with Sri Lanka’s giant neighbour. The importance of this change is not just diplomatic, it is vitally ideological. Let us not forget that the JVP was the most organized anti-India force Sri Lankan society ever produced. This caution, even if lengthy, is necessary because the India-Sri Lanka relationship needs to be preserved and bettered but it is not an easy task amid the global tremors. It is another matter that the book’s focus is on areas that shape lives every day: climate resilience, water and maritime cooperation, public health, education, culture, and the vital role of women and youth. The volume emphasises that non-traditional issues demand a central place in foreign policy thinking. This is certainly true, more so when it concerns two countries as culturally and otherwise entwined as Sri Lanka and India. While examining the current state of connectivity between India and Sri Lanka as well as potential new forms, Prof Rohan Samarajiva finds fault with India on the issue of cross-border electricity trading. Balasubramanian Chandrashekar points out that Sri Lanka’s ability to manage the complexities of global power dynamics will determine its trajectory over the coming decades; at the same time, strategic deliberation from New Delhi is needed to translate intent into action – through investments, connectivity enhancements or diplomatic initiatives – to ensure a partnership that fosters mutual benefit and regional stability amidst China’s enduring presence. Some scholars delve into water management, with Omar Rajarathnam and Dr Uditha Devapriya suggesting that India should seriously consider repairing existing infrastructure including tanks in the irrigation-starved Northern Province. Dr Dhanasree Jayaram and Varun Mohan warn that the changing climate and its impact were affecting and will further strain India-Sri Lanka bilateral relations. Retired Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai NM says India and Sri Lanka can transform shared maritime challenges into opportunities for regional leadership while Dr Satheesh Chandra Shenoi is optimistic that the two countries are well positioned to lead the transformation of the blue economy in the Indian Ocean by embracing regional and global cooperation. The blue economy indeed offers a pathway for India and Sri Lanka to achieve sustainable growth while safeguarding their respective vital marine resources. For a variety of reasons that do not apply to other countries, India and Sri Lanka can tremendously expand and boost their multi-faceted partnership for their own best interests. But as diplomat Sinha warns, India continues to bear the cross for its past actions; “the anger has largely dissipated but the memory still rankles”. Sinha comes out with some enduring tips on how India can take forward its bilateral relationship smoothly. One, eschew the temptation to play the ‘Big Brother’; New Delhi must refrain from a prescriptive approach on Sri Lankan domestic developments and allow concerned parties within that country to reach a modus vivendi; India must seek to resolve the genuine grievances of the Sri Lankan business community; at the same time, New Delhi must be clear what its security red lines are and these must be clearly communicated to the Sri Lankan leadership. **India–Sri Lanka Relations: Convergence, Cooperation and Partnership** **Edited by P. M. Heblikar** **Published by Vivekananda International Foundation and Pentagon Press** **xviii + 398 pages | Price: Rs. 1,095** ### Sri Lanka’s Reform Government Struggles to Deliver on Its Promises URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-reform-government-struggles-to-deliver-on-its-promises/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T13:25:15.000Z **COLOMBO —** Eighteen months after a landslide election victory that swept away Sri Lanka’s discredited political dynasties and promised a new era of transparent, accountable governance, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and his National People's Power government are struggling to deliver on the sweeping changes they rode to power on, according to a new report by the International Crisis Group titled *“Sri Lanka’s Bumpy Road to a Political Reset.”* The findings, drawn from dozens of interviews with politicians, lawyers, diplomats, activists and business leaders conducted between late 2024 and February 2026, offer the most detailed independent assessment yet of the NPP’s tenure — and the picture they paint is of a government that has kept the lights on economically, arrested a handful of powerful figures, and occasionally said the right things, while failing to make decisive progress on any of the core reforms it promised: from ending impunity for wartime atrocities, to reining in the national security apparatus, to offering Tamils and Muslims a meaningful share of political power. “The window has already begun to narrow,” the report warns, cautioning that failure to act boldly risks a return to “ethnic tensions and political authoritarianism.” ### **THE CRITICS SPEAK** Perhaps the sharpest edge of the Crisis Group report is its documentation of what reform advocates — including some inside the NPP itself — described as a growing gulf between the government’s rhetoric and its actions. Tamil and Muslim communities in the north and east, who helped deliver the NPP’s historic sweep of every one of Sri Lanka’s 22 electoral districts, say they have seen little in return. Counter-terrorism police and military intelligence units continue to surveil, question and intimidate Tamil activists, survivors’ groups and journalists in the north and east, the report documents — a pattern it calls “a deliberate strategy to prevent accountability.” The government, for its part, insists these tactics are not occurring. All nine provincial councils have remained dormant since 2019\. The NPP promised to hold provincial elections within a year of taking office. That deadline passed without elections being scheduled. Now a parliamentary committee has been appointed to study a new electoral system for provincial polls — a move critics warn is designed to delay further. “For many people outside the north and east, the only reason they give for voting NPP is that there is no alternative,” a journalist told Crisis Group researchers in May 2025. Women’s groups, who mobilised heavily for the NPP’s campaign and celebrated the appointment of feminist academic Harini Amarasuriya as prime minister, also report disillusionment. The first chair of the newly established National Women’s Commission resigned after four months, citing the government’s failure to provide funding or resources. An all-male committee was appointed to manage post-cyclone reconstruction funds. And the government has yet to act on longstanding demands — backed by the UN and Muslim women’s rights activists — to reform the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act. Anti-corruption campaigners and legal professionals warn that some of the independent oversight institutions the NPP promised to strengthen are instead being weakened. The position of auditor general sat vacant for most of 2025 after the Constitutional Council rejected four consecutive presidential nominees as unqualified; critics alleged that Dissanayake was seeking a loyalist. The Right to Information Commission issued a public statement in November 2025 saying it was forced to operate with “a skeleton staff” despite an “increasing caseload” because the government refused to provide the dedicated funding the law requires. “There is a real risk of JVP ruining the NPP,” one discouraged supporter told researchers. ### **A TEST OF POLITICAL WILL** Few issues have exposed the gap between promise and delivery as starkly as the government’s handling of the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, which left 270 dead and more than 500 injured. Dissanayake made justice for the bombings a central plank of his presidential campaign. On coming to office he reappointed senior police investigators who had been sacked by former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and in October 2024 he removed Suresh Sallay, the former intelligence chief long suspected of links to the attacks, from his post. In February 2026, police arrested Sallay, charging him with allegedly conspiring with and assisting the Islamist network responsible for the bombings. But the arrest came after more than a year of government pledges that breakthroughs were “imminent.” Those pledges often came in response to public pressure from the powerful Catholic archbishop of Colombo, Malcolm Ranjith, most of whose diocesans were among the victims. Sallay has not yet been indicted, and the Crisis Group report documents significant resistance within the national security apparatus to the broader investigation. In September 2025, Dissanayake told parliament that a number of military officers would “soon” be arrested in connection with the bombings. Months later, no such arrests have been made. The report notes that in at least one emblematic case — the abduction of cartoonist Prageeth Eknaligoda in 2009 — proceedings have stalled, and the victim’s wife has appealed directly to the president for protection after receiving threats. The report attributes some of the delay to obstruction: evidence was destroyed and manipulated under previous governments, and criminal networks within the state, the president has acknowledged, are actively resisting accountability. But analysts also point to what they describe as the NPP’s own links to the military as an additional complicating factor — a charge the government rejects. ### **THE HARDER ROAD** If accountability for the Easter bombings has proven difficult, accountability for atrocities committed during Sri Lanka’s three-decade civil war — which ended in a catastrophically bloody government military offensive in 2009, with an estimated 150,000 or more killed — remains almost entirely absent. The NPP government, like its predecessors, has rejected the Sri Lanka Accountability Project operated by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, calling it “counterproductive.” In October 2025, Colombo voted against a UN Human Rights Council resolution that included a two-year extension for the project. Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath told the Council in September that the government was “committed to advancing accountability through credible domestic processes.” Tamil and human rights organisations, both in Sri Lanka and internationally, greeted this language with scepticism. Successive governments have issued similar assurances. In the meantime, families of the forcibly disappeared in the north wait for answers, the Office on Missing Persons remains underfunded and widely viewed as ineffective, and not a single member of the Sri Lankan military has been prosecuted for war crimes. The Crisis Group report does note one area of cautious hope: a mass grave in the northern town of Chemmani is being exhumed, and Dissanayake reportedly promised the UN Secretary-General in September that his government would formally invite UN technical assistance for the process. But Tamil families, the report notes, will be watching closely to see whether the government provides the resources, expertise and political backing necessary to bring evidence to the point of prosecution. On the question of the Prevention of Terrorism Act — which allows indefinite detention without charge and which human rights organisations have long documented as a driver of custodial torture — the NPP’s record is worse than its rhetoric suggested. The government used the PTA to detain 49 people in just its first five months in office. In December 2025, the justice ministry released draft replacement legislation — the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act — which critics say is as draconian as the law it purports to replace, with provisions for detention of up to two years without full judicial review at special police sites outside the normal prison system. ### **STABILITY WITHOUT JUSTICE** On the economy, the picture is mixed in a different way. The NPP was elected, in large part, on a platform of relief for millions of Sri Lankans devastated by the country’s 2022 economic collapse. It also campaigned against the austerity imposed by the International Monetary Fund as a condition of a $2.9 billion bailout. In power, it embraced that same program without fundamental revision. The results, by conventional macroeconomic measures, have been respectable. Growth reached 5 percent in 2025\. Foreign currency reserves are up. Inflation is under control. The IMF commended the government for staying within the “guardrails” of the 2023 bailout, and in February 2025 released another $334 million tranche of the loan. But nearly a quarter of the population remains in poverty — double the pre-pandemic rate. Real wages are still well below pre-crisis levels. Three quarters of the government’s increased tax revenue comes from indirect taxes, especially VAT, which falls disproportionately on lower-income households. Total social protection spending remains at just 0.7 percent of GDP, the lowest in South Asia. And interest payments alone are projected to absorb 49 percent of total government revenues in 2026 — one of the highest ratios in the world. The government’s fiscal position was further strained by Cyclone Ditwah, which struck in late November 2025, killing more than 800 people and causing an estimated $4.1 billion in damage. The government faced widespread criticism for its response: life-saving alerts were issued only in Sinhala and English, endangering Tamil-speaking communities in the worst-affected areas of the central hills. District officials reportedly hesitated to authorise emergency relief spending, fearing later corruption investigations. In mid-March 2026, with oil and gas shortages resulting from war in the Middle East adding to the economic strain, the government imposed fuel rationing and a four-day working week for state institutions. ### **A GOVERNMENT LEARNING ON THE JOB** Much of the Crisis Group report is devoted to understanding why a government with a two-thirds parliamentary majority — enough to amend the constitution outright — has accomplished so little on its legislative agenda. The answer it offers is partly structural and partly political. Structurally, the NPP simply had little experience of governing. Ministers find it difficult to delegate. The party’s distrust of senior bureaucrats, many of whom retain loyalties to the Rajapaksa era, has led it to rely on inexperienced officials with personal ties to ministers, limiting the government’s capacity to move quickly on complex policy reforms. No serious outside experts have been invited in to help drive the reform agenda, departing sharply from the approach of previous reform-oriented governments. Politically, the tension between the NPP’s two faces — the liberal, pluralist coalition the party presented to voters, and the tightly hierarchical, Sinhala-nationalist JVP that forms its core — has not been resolved in power. JVP leaders hold most of the key cabinet positions. Professionals and community activists who joined the NPP hoping to contribute to policymaking say they have been systematically sidelined. The NPP manifesto’s promises of devolution, ethnic inclusion and constitutional reform reflected the priorities of the coalition’s non-JVP members; the failure to deliver on those promises reflects the JVP’s continued dominance. There have also been incidents that critics say betray the NPP’s claims to operate differently from its predecessors. The president warned voters in local election campaigning that central government funding would be more carefully scrutinised in councils won by opposition parties. NPP leaders complained it was “undemocratic” for smaller opposition parties to form working majorities in councils where the NPP had won the most seats but fell short of a majority. Ministers bypassed established media complaints procedures to instruct police to investigate sources of news coverage they deemed unfavourable. JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva publicly praised the “democratic” qualities of China’s one-party system and suggested the NPP might need to remain in power for “fifteen, twenty or 25 years” to achieve its goals. The August 2025 arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe on charges of misusing public funds for a foreign trip was celebrated by the NPP as proof that “no one is above the law.” Opposition parties and many in civil society called it a political witch hunt designed to humiliate a six-time prime minister. The case remains unresolved. ### **THE ROAD AHEAD** The Crisis Group report stops well short of writing off the NPP. It notes that the government remains broadly popular and that the opposition remains fragmented. At the local elections of May 2025, the NPP won twice as many votes as its nearest rivals, even as its support fell sharply from the parliamentary peak. The report’s recommendations are direct. The government should pursue prosecutions of security officials implicated in the Easter bombings and in Rajapaksa-era political killings. It should back the exhumation of mass graves and end military intimidation of Tamil rights activists and families of the disappeared. It should either repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act outright, or ensure that any replacement legislation conforms to international human rights norms. It should hold provincial elections without further delay. It should pursue progressive taxation, including property taxes and wealth levies, to shift the burden of economic recovery away from the poor. And it should conduct its own independent assessment of Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability, which the IMF’s own models acknowledge remains dangerously high for many years to come. International actors urged to press Colombo to end surveillance and harassment of civil society and to remain open to further debt restructuring given the combined damage of Cyclone Ditwah and the Middle East war. Above all, the report calls on Dissanayake to return to the spirit of his early speeches as president, in which he acknowledged that the country’s “profound crisis” could not be resolved by “a single government, political party or individual” and stressed the importance of “constructive criticism” and “public scrutiny.” ### Xi Presses China’s Case as Middle East Peace Broker in Talks With Emirati Crown Prince URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/xi-presses-chinas-case-as-middle-east-peace-broker-in-talks-with-emirati-crown-prince-2/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T06:30:52.000Z ***With the Gulf reeling from a U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran, Beijing advances a four-point framework positioning itself as a steady, alternative diplomatic voice.*** **BEIJING —** President Xi Jinping of China used a high-profile meeting at the Great Hall of the People this week to outline China’s approach to peace in the Middle East, presenting a four-point framework that underscores Beijing’s growing diplomatic ambitions in a region unsettled by war. Receiving Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on April 14, Mr. Xi set out proposals centered on peaceful coexistence, national sovereignty, the authority of international law and a balance between development and security. The meeting came as oil markets remain volatile following a joint United States–Israeli military operation against Iran, a crisis that has heightened anxieties across the Gulf and renewed competition among global powers for influence. Mr. Xi’s remarks reflected a consistent theme in Chinese diplomacy: that stability is best achieved through dialogue and respect for state sovereignty rather than coercion. At the same time, his emphasis on the consistent application of international norms appeared to signal a broader critique of how global rules are enforced. “The authority of the international rule of law should be upheld and cannot be used when convenient and discarded when not,” Mr. Xi said, according to China’s state news agency, warning against a return to what he described as “the law of the jungle.” #### **A Framework for a Fractured Region** At the core of Mr. Xi’s message was a call for regional coexistence. Describing Gulf states as neighbors that “cannot move away from one another,” he urged efforts to build what he termed a “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable” security architecture — language that points to a preference for collective arrangements over bloc-based alignments. His second proposition elevated national sovereignty as a central pillar of order, arguing that territorial integrity and political independence must be respected, particularly for developing nations. The principle, long emphasized by Beijing, resonates strongly in a region where external intervention has shaped decades of conflict. On international governance, Mr. Xi placed the United Nations at the center of any durable settlement, calling for a rules-based order grounded in international law and applied consistently across all conflicts. The fourth element of his framework linked peace to economic progress. Stability, he argued, depends not only on security arrangements but also on development, with China offering to expand cooperation and share opportunities tied to its own modernization. #### **Gulf Reception and Strategic Calculus** Sheikh Khaled welcomed China’s role, describing it as constructive and expressing support for continued coordination to promote a ceasefire, stabilize the region and safeguard global shipping routes — a critical concern as tensions threaten key energy corridors. The visit also underscored deepening economic ties. China remains the United Arab Emirates’ largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $100 billion last year, while Emirati investment in Chinese sectors has expanded steadily. For Gulf states, engagement with China reflects a broader strategy of diversifying partnerships amid an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment. Beijing’s emphasis on dialogue, sovereignty and development offers an approach that contrasts with more security-driven frameworks, even as its direct influence over military dynamics in the region remains limited. #### ### Colombo Eyes Control of Jaffna’s Cultural Centre URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/colombo-eyes-control-of-jaffnas-cultural-centre/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T03:18:26.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Sri Lanka’s Cabinet is expected to consider a proposal to place the Jaffna Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre under a new seven-member governing body dominated by central government representatives, according to officials familiar with the plan. If approved, the move would formalize national oversight of a complex built with Indian grant funding on land owned by the Jaffna Municipal Council — and presented, repeatedly, as a gift to the people of the North. The proposal has not been made public. But its details have circulated among civic leaders and local officials in Jaffna, reviving a long-standing concern: that a project intended to signal postwar reconciliation may, in practice, follow the same centralizing logic that has long shaped Colombo’s relationship with the Tamil-majority North. “The land belongs to the Jaffna Municipal Council,” said one local official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because Cabinet deliberations are ongoing. “The funding came from India, as a gift to this city. The question people are asking is: who ultimately decides what happens inside that building?” ### **A Landmark Born of Diplomacy** The origins of the cultural centre trace back to March 2015, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Jaffna — the first Indian leader to do so in decades — and laid its foundation stone. The visit carried symbolic weight, marking New Delhi’s effort to reposition itself as a partner in Sri Lanka’s postwar recovery. Funded through an Indian government grant of approximately $11 to $12 million, the centre was constructed on municipal land and conceived as a space for cultural exchange between two countries linked by a shared Tamil heritage. It includes a two-level museum, a 600-seat auditorium, a multistory learning tower and an open public square designed for performances and community gatherings. Construction was largely completed by 2020, but the facility remained unused as Sri Lanka moved through a period of political uncertainty and economic crisis. It was formally inaugurated in March 2022 in a virtual ceremony attended by then Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. The centre opened to the public nearly a year later, in February 2023, in a ceremony attended by President Ranil Wickremesinghe and India’s Minister of State L. Murugan. ### **The Architecture of Control** According to officials briefed on the Cabinet paper, the proposed governing body would include seven members: the Jaffna Municipal Commissioner, the Northern Province Governor, a representative from Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Cultural Affairs, two representatives from the Government of India and two from the Government of Sri Lanka. On paper, the structure appears balanced. In practice, critics say, it is not. The Northern Province Governor is appointed by the president, not elected locally. The Municipal Commissioner, while based in Jaffna, operates within a national administrative framework. Together, officials aligned with the central government would hold a structural majority, with no directly elected representatives from Jaffna included in the body. ### **A Familiar Pattern in the Postwar North** The dispute reflects a broader tension that has defined governance in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province since the end of the civil war in 2009\. While successive governments have invested in reconstruction, they have also retained firm control over how that reconstruction is administered — often at the expense of elected provincial institutions. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution provides for a degree of provincial autonomy, including over cultural affairs. But its implementation in the North has remained uneven and contested. The Northern Provincial Council has repeatedly accused the central government of bypassing its authority on issues ranging from land to development planning. The cultural centre sits squarely within that pattern. For many in Jaffna, it has become a symbol of a larger, unresolved question: what devolution means in practice, and who ultimately exercises authority in the region. “This is not about one building,” said a Jaffna-based civil society leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “It is about whether institutions in the North have real authority over what is placed in their midst. So far, that answer has largely been no.” ### The Tamil Renaissance URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-tamil-renaissance/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T02:09:50.000Z **By Jeevan Thiyagaraja** Generations have scattered across the globe while others remained, tending to the soil of their ancestors through the unimaginable. Though separated by oceans and time, all share the same roots. The time has come for the North to reclaim its narrative—a Tamil Renaissance where a smart, confident, and contented North acts as catalyst for a proud, cultured, and developed community found around the world. ## **I. The Ancient Maritime Spirit: A Legacy of Global Connection** Long before the modern "Ceylonese" identity emerged, the North was a thriving international hub. Jaffna's history is not one of isolation but of profound cosmopolitanism. The islands of the Jaffna Peninsula—particularly Orra-tota (modern Kayts, historically Ooraththurai)—served as vital nodes of maritime commerce. The Nainativu Tamil inscription, datable to Parakramabahu I, records foreign vessels arriving at Uraturai under a royal edict guaranteeing protection to traders and regulating wrecked ships—an early testament to the region's sophisticated legal and commercial framework. A Chola inscription from 1178 A.D. cites the assembling of troops and ships at Uraturai for South Indian campaigns. Ports like Jambukolapattana (Kankesanturai) connected Jaffna intimately to South India and the world beyond the Palk Bay. Nearby, Varaatimunai served as a specialized export hub for elephants and horses, with Chetty traders operating from Maavadaikkaadu—the horse forest. The Portuguese, recognizing this strategic value, built Fort Eyrie and Fort Hammenhiel to guard the sea approach, naming the area "Cais"—pier—the origin of Kayts itself. By the British era, Kayts had become a bustling port trading with India, Bengal, and Burma—its customs revenue second only to Colombo's. Its mariners weathered seasons and foreign cultures, making villages like Karampon prestigious settlements of affluence. It was only the upheaval of World War II that finally silenced this harbour. This history proves that a revival built on international engagement is not an anomaly; it is a return to our historical default. ## **II. The Golden Era: Prosperity and the Ceylonese Identity** Prior to the 1980s, the North enjoyed a modern Golden Era defined by intellectual and economic vibrancy. Agriculture and fisheries anchored over 50% of regional output, and the Northern Province contributed nearly 40% of the national fish catch. Jaffna was a knowledge powerhouse—home to prestigious schools, the University of Jaffna, and the Jaffna Public Library, which housed nearly 100,000 rare volumes before its tragic burning in 1981\. Scholar Father Xavier S. Thaninayagam globalized Tamil identity, connecting Jaffna Tamils to a heritage spanning continents. In a society where Hindu Temples and Christian Churches coexisted without rigid barriers, many identified proudly as "Ceylonese"—contributors to a pluralistic nation where Tamil skills in administration and law were national assets. ## **III. The Descent: Broken Promises and Structural Trauma** This prosperity coexisted with deepening political disillusionment. The failures of the 1956, 1958, and 1965 pacts—each abandoned under extremist pressure—established a pattern of broken promises on devolution that would define the decades to come. The 1981 District Development Council Elections, intended as a gesture of devolution, descended into state-sponsored terror. The burning of the Jaffna Library was not mere vandalism; it was a deliberate assault on the Tamil soul, destroying nearly 100,000 irreplaceable volumes and declaring that Tamil civilization itself was a target. Black July 1983 then proved beyond doubt that the state could not—or would not—protect its citizens. The Ceylonese dream died, and the desire for a separate state became not an aspiration but a grim call for survival. The subsequent failure of the LTTE to transition from a militant movement to a viable political entity—noted here not to assign blame but to understand the structural vacuum it created—left the community without diplomatic leverage or representation when the final military offensive arrived in 2009\. The cumulative wound has been deep-seated cynicism across generations. Yet we must, and we will, find the rhythm to rebuild. ## **IV. The Southern Connection: A Mirror Across the Strait** Healing requires looking to our kin across the water—not as an act of dependency but as a revival of the ancient ties that once made Kayts the island's second-busiest port. While we burned, South India built; while we lost youth to war, they sent theirs to the world. The Palk Strait is not a barrier; it is a mirror. The same ancient blood, language, and resilience that runs through a Jaffna farmer runs through a Tamil Nadu entrepreneur. South India offers a proven blueprint for marrying ancient culture with modern prosperity, demonstrating that Dravidian identity is an asset, not a hindrance. By anchoring our recovery to South India's trillion-dollar economy, we seek more than investment—we seek a reconnection with family, a shared future, and a bridge from trauma to triumph. ## **V. The Northern Gateway Initiative: An Economic Renaissance** We propose the Northern Gateway Initiative—a multi-year blueprint to transform the Northern Province into a strategic economic powerhouse. The North must be reimagined as a "Frontier Province," a living laboratory for Growth-Led Development pioneering a Subnational Economic Corridor with India. ### **Smart Regulation & the Northern EntrePass** A Northern Single-Window Authority (NSWA), modelled on the Colombo Port City Economic Commission, will grant licenses within 30 days, supported by a Specialized Labor Code and Digital Professional Visas. Crucially, the Northern EntrePass—a bespoke Golden Visa for our own diaspora—offers a streamlined pathway to permanent residency for members who establish startups, invest in infrastructure, or bring specialized expertise to the North. This transforms the diaspora from a distant support network into resident stakeholders who anchor revival with global experience. ### **Multi-Modal Connectivity** Physical revival demands infrastructure at scale: deepening the draft at the Port of Kankesanturai (KKS) into a deep-water terminal; lengthening the Palaly runway into a secondary international aerotropolis; optimising the Vavuniya airfield as a regional cargo hub; and reviving the historic Mannar-Talaimannar route to re-establish the physical tether to India. A Palk Strait Customs Corridor with a Green Channel at KKS for goods from Chennai and Thoothukudi, and formal Indian Rupee settlement mechanisms, will eliminate exchange rate friction. The vision: the islands of Jaffna as a Natural Singapore to India—delivering high-end financial, logistical, and maritime services. ### **The Diaspora Dividend & Fiscal Incentives** Diaspora Infrastructure Bonds will fund ports, energy grids, and digital infrastructure, giving the diaspora a tangible stake in the North's recovery. A Global Tamil Mentorship Network enables professionals abroad to virtually guide startups and students in Jaffna. A Sector-Specific Tax Holiday (2026–2036) covering Technology, ICT, and Export-Oriented Manufacturing will attract patient capital, anchored by an Indo-Lanka Northern Venture Capital Fund—a USD 150M evergreen vehicle co-anchored by India EXIM Bank—supporting Agri-Tech and FinTech startups. ## **VI. The Export Imperative: Trading in Excellence** The North must evolve from a recipient of investment into a confident exporter of value. This mental shift is as important as any infrastructure upgrade. We already possess the seeds of viable export industries; what is required is deliberate cultivation and global market linkage across four domains: • Agri-Export with Denomination: Jaffna palmyrah products, red onions, dried chilies, and tobacco should be positioned as certified geographical indicators—heritage products commanding premium markets. A Northern Agricultural Export Cooperative (NAEC), modelled on Amul, will aggregate smallholder production, handle cold-chain logistics, and market directly to Tamil diaspora retail networks in the UK, Canada, and Germany, transforming diaspora consumers into distribution channels. • Maritime Services Export: A Maritime Training Academy, partnered with the Coimbatore Marine College and the IMO, will certify and export marine officers and port logistics specialists to the Gulf, Southeast Asia, and East Africa—markets with chronic shortages of certified maritime labour. • Digital & Knowledge Process Outsourcing: A Northern Digital Export Zone (NDEZ), with guaranteed fiber connectivity and NSWA fast-track licensing, will attract BPO firms in software, legal process outsourcing, and healthcare transcription. The North's English-Tamil bilingual workforce is a structural competitive advantage. • Creative and Cultural Export: The Thiruvalluvar Centre, in partnership with Kalakshetra, will establish a certified performance and pedagogy export programme, training teachers who serve Tamil cultural academies in London, Toronto, Melbourne, and Kuala Lumpur—soft power with a revenue model. ## **VII. The Silver Economy: Caring for Our Elders** Any renaissance that neglects its elders is building on sand. The North holds a distinct demographic asset: a significant population of elderly Tamils—resident and diaspora—who are long-lived, often educated, and deserving of dignified care. Addressing this is both moral obligation and economic opportunity. We propose a Northern Silver Economy Framework built on three pillars. First, community care hubs—architecturally Tamil spaces with open courtyards and temple-adjacent gardens, integrated with the rhythms of daily life rather than sterile in the Western clinical tradition—providing assisted living, memory care, physiotherapy, and palliative support, staffed under an Indo-Lanka Healthcare Skills Protocol with clinical partnerships from CMC Vellore and the Tamil Nadu Government Hospital network, enabling specialist telemedicine rotations. Second, a Silver Residency Tier within the Northern EntrePass, enabling diaspora seniors from the UK, Canada, Germany, and Australia to live part-time in the North, deterred no longer by inadequate healthcare, legal ambiguity, or the absence of a social ecosystem designed for them. Conservative modelling suggests even 2,000 such residents spending eight months annually would inject USD 15–20 million into the local economy through accommodation, healthcare, and daily consumption—with zero infrastructure subsidy required. Third, a Northern Elder Welfare Compact: a guaranteed minimum support package combining government funding, diaspora remittance pooling, and temple and church welfare networks, administered through a single digital registry ensuring that a widow in Chavakacheri and a returnee in Tellippalai are equally visible to the system and equally protected by it. ## **VIII. The Knowledge Harvest: Voluntary Expertise as Civic Asset** The diaspora is not merely a source of capital. It is a repository of accumulated professional excellence—decades of experience in medicine, engineering, finance, law, and diplomacy that currently flows outward and is lost to the North. The Seiyal (Action) Volunteer Corps formalizes this. Unlike ad hoc charitable visits, Seiyal creates institutional continuity: a retired NHS surgeon joins a six-month mentorship rotation with the Jaffna Teaching Hospital's surgical team; a former Goldman Sachs analyst co-designs a structured finance curriculum with the University of Jaffna. Volunteers receive a Nattu Sevai (National Service) Citation from the Northern Provincial Administration, logged in a public knowledge register that dignifies giving back and builds institutional memory. Critically, every visiting expert is paired with a local counterpart whose growth—not the expert's output—is the measure of success. ## **IX. The Operational Heart: The Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre** The naming of the Jaffna Cultural Centre as the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre in January 2025 was a landmark. This USD 12 million facility—comprising an 11-storey tower, auditorium, digital library, and museum—must not remain a static monument. It must become the operational engine of our cultural renaissance, transitioning from a maintenance mindset to an activation mindset, modelled on three Indian archetypes: Shanti Niketan for immersive arts education, the India International Centre for intellectual dialogue, and the India Habitat Centre for a bustling, revenue-generating ecosystem. The Centre will host elite Indian partnerships: IGNOU for 24/7 distance learning; IIM Bangalore or Ahmedabad for Executive MBAs and incubation; the National Judicial Academy for legal training; Gujarat Forensic Sciences University for cyber security; and Kalakshetra Foundation for cultural curation. Financial sustainability will come through Central Indian schemes (SWAYAM, ICCR), State partnerships with Tamil Nadu Tourism, and CSR endowments from L&T, Tata, and Infosys. Human capital development is anchored here through the Naan Mudhalvan (I am First) model: industry-aligned courses in AI, Robotics, and STEM; Vetri Nichayam Finishing Schools for construction and hospitality; and TNAPEx Apex Skill Centres for Logistics, Healthcare, and BFSI. ## **X. The Gold Standard Administration: No One Left Behind** A renaissance without institutional integrity is a façade. The North has an obligation—and a historic opportunity—to demonstrate that ethical, efficient, inclusive governance is possible in Sri Lanka, becoming the benchmark against which every other province in the country measures itself. The goal is not merely good administration. It is the Gold Standard. Every programme in this blueprint is subject to a mandatory inclusion audit at the design stage: who might be left behind, and what is the specific mechanism ensuring they are not? This applies across every axis of vulnerability—the elderly widow with no digital access, the person with a disability, the single mother in a remote lagoon village, the former combatant reintegrating into civilian life, the estate Tamil worker at the intersection of ethnic and economic marginalisation, the young person whose school was destroyed by war. No programme launches without a documented Last Mile Plan that names the most vulnerable cohort and guarantees their pathway in. The Open Ledger Compact publishes all provincial expenditure above LKR 500,000 in real time on a publicly accessible digital portal, in Tamil, Sinhala, and English—procurement decisions, contractor awards, and project milestones tracked openly. This is not merely transparency; it is a declaration that this administration governs for its people. Every public-facing service carries a published Service Level Commitment with a clear, accessible escalation pathway. A Northern Administrative Fellowship—a competitive two-year placement drawing graduates from the University of Jaffna and Indian partner institutions including NLSIU and the IIMs—builds a civil service of vocation rather than fallback, creating a cadre of administrators with both global standards and deep local roots. An independent Northern Ombudsman Office, reporting to the Provincial Council, provides every citizen a consequence-free mechanism to report failure or exclusion; its annual report is tabled publicly and its recommendations are binding within 90 days. This is the Gold Standard—an enforceable commitment, and a replicable model for every province in Sri Lanka. ## **XI. Conclusion: A Confident, Contented Future** This Renaissance is about more than economics; it is about dignity restored. It is about seeing Tamils once more as a proud, cultured, and developed community—not defined by the trauma of the past four decades but by the five centuries of maritime excellence, intellectual distinction, and cosmopolitan openness that preceded them. By embedding the Northern Province in India's growth trajectory, mobilising the diaspora through the Northern EntrePass and the Seiyal Volunteer Corps, honouring our elders through the Silver Economy and the Silver Residency Tier, building an export identity across agriculture, maritime services, digital industries, and cultural pedagogy, and operationalising the Thiruvalluvar Cultural Centre as a premier hub of learning and creative exchange, we transform from a regional outlier into the primary Human Capital Reservoir for Indo-Lanka trade. We are reawakening the ancient ports of Uraturai and Varaatimunai. The vision of the Jaffna islands as a Natural Singapore—delivering high-end financial, logistical, and maritime services to India's southern coast—is within reach. A thriving North is not a source of friction but an engine of national cohesion and growth. Our targets by 2031 are ambitious but necessary: skilled labour rising from 22% to 55%; the North's share of National GDP from 4.5% to 8.0%; 10,000+ annual vocational graduates; and a Gold Standard provincial administration that becomes the governance benchmark for every province in Sri Lanka, one where no citizen—regardless of age, ability, or circumstance—is left behind. Let the North rise once more—smart, confident, and contented—spurring the rest of the country toward a shared, prosperous future. ### Iluppai Tree and the Young Generation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/iluppai-tree-and-the-young-generation/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T16:38:09.000Z **Translated from the original Tamil short story *iluppai maramum iḷanñcantatiyum* (இலுப்பை மரமும் இளஞ்சந்ததியும்) from the 1976 collection of short stories titled *kōṭukaḷum kōlaṅkalum* (கோடுகளும் கோலங்களும்) by**[](https://ta.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%AA%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AA%E0%AE%BF%E0%AE%B4%E0%AE%BE%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D%5F%E0%AE%90.%5F%E0%AE%9A%E0%AE%A3%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)[**Kuppilan Ai. Shanmugan**](https://ta.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%AE%95%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%AA%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AA%E0%AE%BF%E0%AE%B4%E0%AE%BE%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D%5F%E0%AE%90.%5F%E0%AE%9A%E0%AE%A3%E0%AF%8D%E0%AE%AE%E0%AF%81%E0%AE%95%E0%AE%A9%E0%AF%8D?ref=jaffnamonitor.com)**.** He woke up at around seven in the morning, when it was already rather bright. His little sister shook him awake, calling out, “*aṇṇai*, *aṇṇai*.” He stretched lazily, rolled up the reed mat and stood it next to the wall. The house was buzzing with activity. His siblings were bustling about getting ready for school. “*Ammā*, the seven-fifteen bus is about to leave; please get me my lunch parcel quickly.” “*Aṇṇai*, *aṇṇai*, I’ll take your pen to school today.” “Geetha, how many days has it been since you had a bath? Today, you cannot go to school until you have had a bath.” “*Aṇṇai*, Vathaṉi wants you to give her a bath.” “All of you stay in bed for too long in the morning. Now you are all scrambling at the same time.” A mist enveloped the sky. Morning rays drew smoky lines on the front verandah. A gentle cool breeze drifted by. He broke off a twig from the neem tree and started chewing it. He fetched his little sister and gave her a bath. “*Aṇṇai*, when did you arrive?” the little girl next door asked. She was his little sister’s friend. “I came already yesterday. Didn’t you see?” he said. “Liar, liar,” she grabbed his hands and shook them vigorously. The bustle within the house dissipated away. Everyone had gone their respective ways. *Ammā* relaxed on the floor, cutting arecanuts noisily using a nutcracker. The calf came galloping towards him, frowned at him from a distance, and galloped away. A crow sat on top of the chimney and cawed. *Ammā* got up to shoo it away. “The first thing in the morning – we get the crow cawing.” As the morning advanced, the sun rose higher, and its heat started to prickle. He was looking at the flower bushes in the front yard as he brushed. The lush white-and-red night-blooming jasmine that sways in full bloom was missing. In its place a royal jasmine creeper was rising up, sprouting green buds. Tender green fruits dangled from the guava tree. Some insects had devoured the leaves of the Indian gooseberry tree. The queen-of-the-night was shedding leaves. “It is getting rather late in the morning! Wash up, won’t you? I do have to get on with my chores, don’t I? He silently went to wash up wondering how he was going to spend the day. ‘*Chee*.. it is really boring to spend my vacation here. At least if there was a bicycle, I could go somewhere. But then the boys won’t be around either. They would have all gone to work…!” After breakfast, he took the book of Bhārathiyār short stories, leaned against a wall and started to read. Gñāṉaratham, The Story of Little Saṅkaran, The Weighing Scale, … his eyes glanced through the story titles. The dark print irritated his eyes. He had the urge to close his eyes, as if he wanted to just lean over and sleep. ‘I am not going to sleep now. I spend all my vacation sleeping in late, and then sleeping through the day.’ He peered at a distance through the treeless space in the garden. The large *iluppai* tree that stood on the northeast corner of the yard had been cut down. They sold it when he was still a tot, not wise to the ways of the world. They said they were taking the trunk to build a wooden boat. His *appāchchi*, paternal grandmother, used to live in a thatched hut under that tree. She would secretly make him *roti* from raw wheat flour. Her life was deeply intertwined with the tree. Flowers will bloom on the tree when it is the right season; the time when the flowers start to shed, falling down with their characteristic smell, was a magical time. Buds would sprout; buds would be shed; fruits would ripen; bats and birds would chatter; having shed the leaves, the bald tree would stand erect; the jauntiness of spring would make it sprout fresh green leaf buds. *Appāchchi*’s hut would smell of *iluppai* flowers. Up front *iluppai* fruit would dry in the sun, looking like pearls. Women who come to buy them would bargain noisily. “I swear on your head *āchchi*! I will not give you a cent more than one and a quarter rupees.” “Old woman, how much do you want for your garbage?” “Forty-five rupees.” “Ok, ok, I will give you forty rupees. Don’t quibble.” A double-oxen cart would show up to collect the old woman’s garbage, collected over the previous year within a fenced off square in the yard. They would disengage the oxen while the garbage was being loaded onto the cart and tie them to the coralbush tree. The oxen would graze while swinging their tails to shoo away the flies on their backs, making their cowbells jingle. For two months after selling her garbage, the golden necklace will adorn *appāchchi*’s neck. *Appāchchi* would be the embodiment of happiness during those months. Thereafter, it would make its way back to the pawn shop. One morning in the rainy season, *appāchchi* died. “When did *thambi return*?” Startled, he looked up. Periyān stood obsequiously, yellow teeth grinning through the white beard. He had crossed his hands, holding his palms tightly on the sides of his belly above his waist. “I came by the mail train yesterday, Periyān.” “That is what I heard over there.” He wanted to ask where, but once he could guess where, he just stared silently at Periyān. Thoughts rushed into his head and started sprouting. A certain sadness engulfed his chest. He bowed his head towards the ground. He collected himself and looked up, his eyes settling on Periyān. He could not help noticing the sense of pity in Periyān’s eyes. Periyān had watched over their childhood links and dreams with limitless fondness and had silently blessed them in his heart. When they met their unexpected demise, he silently conveyed his limitless condolences and comforted him. He knew everything but pretended not to know anything. “Periyān you know everything.” “*Thambi* seems to be mulling over bygones.” “No, Periyān,” he rested his cheek on his palm and remained silent for a while. Periyān stood staring at him with his back bent and pleading eyes. “What is the going rate now, Periyān?” “Fifty cents, *thambi*.” He silently stood up, walked inside, returned with a one rupee coin, placed it in Periyān.s outstretched palm, and sat back down leaning against the wall. “So, I guess I’ll get going.” “*Thambi*… tell Periyān to wait a little,” *ammā* yelled from the kitchen. “No *piḷḷai*; *thambi* gave me a rupee; I am going to leave.” “Oh, so you won’t have tea now! Then come back later.” “I’ll see you later *thambi*.” He saw Periyān leave with long strides, stooping, arms folded across his belly, palms on hips, and cross the gate in the southern fence. He was utterly bored. “*Thambi,*do you want some tea?” “Not now, *ammā*.” “Then shall I mix some lemon juice for you?” “Nothing for now.” His mind kept straying. ‘What would I be doing now if I were at the office? I would be sitting in that dark corner reading something. Or perhaps I would be at the canteen having tea with my friend discussing politics or literature.’ ‘The girls who sit at the desks across the aisle from me would be chattering gaily as usual, throwing bits of paper at one another.’ ‘I have the urge to see her once. To somehow find a reason to chat with her in my half-broken Sinhala. I feel like I want to see that dazzling, meaningful, eager gaze and smile and return her smile!” His maternal grandmother was walking along the edge of the yard, under the tamarind tree. She was swinging her arms rhythmically as she walked, balancing a huge palmyra leaf basket on her head. She put the basket down on the veranda, nodded towards him and smiled brightly. He smiled back emptily. “When did you come back, *thambi*?” “Yesterday; How is your health *ammammā*?” “Nothing wrong with our health!” She sat down next to him and leaned against the wall. “How is the food in Colombo? You look like you have lost weight.” “I have always been like this,” he smiled sheepishly and continued, “The heart has to be content for the body to flourish.” “Why? What is wrong with your heart?” “I don’t like this job; in order to be content one has to have a job that matches one’s education.” “Why, how much are they paying you?” “About three hundred. I am not complaining about the salary, *ammammā*.” He was silent for a few moments, pondering how he could convey his complex feelings and sorrows to her. “People can be happy only if they like their jobs.” *Ammammā* did not say anything. Once again, he immersed himself silently into his own thoughts. How wonderful life is! How many different dreams, how many kinds of captivating beauties; how many types of sorrows; how much naivete; how many pretensions; how many guileless innocences. He looked at *ammammā*. She had stretched her legs along the floor and was busy cutting arecanuts with a nutcracker on the betel leaf tray. “*Ammā*, *ammammā* is here!” He yelled. “My dear! The betel leaf tray is over there. Keep talking to *thambi*. I will finish my chores and come to chat with you,”*ammā* stepped out of the kitchen and announced. “He is not saying anything *piḷḷai*, just merely responding to questions.” “What do you want me to say?” *Ammammā* went into the kitchen with *ammā*. He was left alone. It was already ten o’clock. The sun had already started to scorch outside. The lush leaves of the jackfruit tree in the yard swayed noisily in the wind. Underneath the tree, spots of light drew beautiful lines and shapes. He looked through the eastern fence that was not fully covered. At a distance, he could see the coconut trees by the well in her aunt’s yard. Some woman was washing clothes on the wash stone by the well. She was lifting the saree she was washing above her head and brought it down to beat against the wash stone. Sleep clouded his eyes. He rubbed them. ‘If I go to aunt’s house, I might find Rāṇi or Baby. Perhaps I can chat with them.’ “*Ammā,* I am going to visit Gnana aunty.” 1974 ### Indian Vice President to Visit Sri Lanka as Bilateral Ties Deepen URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indian-vice-president-to-visit-sri-lanka-as-bilateral-ties-deepen/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T00:46:42.000Z **COLOMBO —** India’s Vice President, C. P. Radhakrishnan, will undertake a two-day official visit to Sri Lanka from April 19 to 20, in a trip expected to highlight expanding cooperation between the two countries across energy, infrastructure and regional development. The visit, made at the invitation of the Sri Lankan government, is being coordinated through the Presidential Secretariat and the High Commission of India in Colombo, officials said. Mr. Radhakrishnan is scheduled to hold formal talks with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, and is also expected to meet Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa. In addition, he will hold discussions with representatives of Tamil political parties. According to Foreign Affairs Minister Vijitha Herath, the visit will include a broader assessment of Indian-backed projects across sectors such as health, infrastructure, energy and community development, covering both completed initiatives and those in progress. Several new bilateral agreements are expected to be signed during the visit, Mr. Herath said, as the two countries seek to consolidate cooperation in priority areas. The trip comes amid a period of deepening engagement between New Delhi and Colombo, following a series of recent high-level agreements on defense cooperation, energy connectivity, health and digital partnerships. Officials have also emphasized ongoing collaboration to develop Trincomalee as a regional energy and industrial hub. Preparatory discussions for the visit were held at the Presidential Secretariat, where the President’s Chief of Staff, Prabath Chandrakeerthi, met with India’s Deputy High Commissioner, Dr. Satyanjal Pandey, to review arrangements for the visit and ongoing development projects. The visit is expected to reinforce India’s role as a key development partner to Sri Lanka, particularly in regions where large-scale infrastructure and social sector investments are underway. Mr. Radhakrishnan, who hails from Tiruppur in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and is regarded as a close associate of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, brings a dimension to the visit that is likely to resonate in Sri Lanka’s north and east. While he is a national political figure, his Tamil linguistic and cultural background may draw quiet attention among Sri Lankan Tamils, for whom engagement by leaders with shared cultural roots has often carried a degree of symbolic significance. ### Accountability for Others, Immunity for One’s Own URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/accountability-for-others-immunity-for-ones-own-2/ Last updated: 2026-04-19T06:49:39.000Z On March 27, Kumara Jayakody walked into the Colombo High Court, was formally indicted on corruption charges, posted bail, and had his fingerprints taken. Then he returned to his ministerial office. On April 10, 153 Members of Parliament from the National People's Power voted to keep him there. He remains Sri Lanka's Energy Minister today — attending Cabinet, drawing a public salary, governing a portfolio that just lost seven billion rupees of public money. If this had happened under Mahinda Rajapaksa, or Ranil Wickremesinghe, or Gotabaya, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna would have been in the streets before nightfall. ### **The friendship the government will not name** Kumara Jayakody is not in Cabinet because he is the most qualified man in Sri Lanka for the energy portfolio. He is there because he is one of President Dissanayake's closest personal associates. Their relationship was cemented in 2004, when Dissanayake briefly served as Agriculture Minister and facilitated Jayakody's entry into the Ceylon Fertilizer Company — the very institution at which the CIABOC indictment originates. By 2024, Jayakody was not merely a political ally. He was something closer. A senior JVP insider told this publication that Jayakody shares a strong bond with the president. When the NPP secured its historic parliamentary majority, Jayakody entered through the National List and was handed one of the most powerful and corruption-prone portfolios in the state. Sources within the party are clear: that appointment was not routine. It was personal, made directly by the president. ### **Two failures. One minister.** The case against Jayakody has two distinct threads. The first thread is legal. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption has indicted Jayakody under Section 70 of the Bribery Act for conduct in 2014 and 2016, when he served as Procurement and Imports Manager at the Ceylon Fertilizer Company. The specific charge: that he released a 20 percent advance payment of Rs. 8.8 million to a private contractor without the required bank guarantee or performance bond, providing undue financial advantage to that contractor at the state's expense. The case carries 21 witnesses, 29 court productions, and a pre-trial conference set for May 6. The second thread is administrative — and it is more immediately damaging to the government's position, because it happened entirely on Jayakody's watch. On April 2, the National Audit Office released a special report on coal procurement for the Lakvijaya Power Plant at Norochcholai, Sri Lanka's only coal-fired station, supplying between 30 and 40 percent of the national grid. There is no backup for it. When it underperforms, the country pays. The audit found 19 irregularities. They are worth reading in full: The winning supplier, Trident Chemphar Limited, had not completed its registration when tender documents were issued. Documents went by email on August 18, 2025\. The company applied for registration the following day. The contract was signed on November 19\. The Attorney General's clearance arrived on November 20\. The contract was executed before it was legally cleared. A laboratory certifying coal quality at the loading port had its licence revoked in late December 2025\. The Lanka Coal Company continued accepting its reports for twelve subsequent shipments. Nobody stopped it. Coal arriving at Norochcholai recorded calorific values as low as 5,520 kcal/kg against a contractual minimum of 6,150\. The plant burned more coal than planned to generate the same electricity — an overrun estimated at over 114 million kilowatt-hours. Between November 13 and December 30, a critical window before peak demand season, not a single coal shipment arrived. Forty days. Zero deliveries. When the crisis became unavoidable, the ministry authorised emergency procurement from a supplier that had previously failed to meet quality standards. The audit's financial tally: Rs. 2.237 billion in direct losses from burning substandard coal. Rs. 2.332 billion in penalties theoretically recoverable from Trident for specification failures. President Dissanayake himself told Parliament on April 7 that total losses could reach Rs. 7 billion. ### **The defence that does not defend** "The procedure was not the problem. The coal quality was the problem." — President Dissanayake, Parliament, April 7, 2026 If the procedure was not the problem, who authorised procurement from an unregistered supplier? Who signed a contract before the Attorney General cleared it? Who accepted quality reports from a laboratory whose licence had been revoked? Who missed forty consecutive days of imports into the country's only coal plant — and then, when the crisis broke, bought emergency coal from a company that had already failed once? Procedure is precisely what protects a country from these outcomes. The government's formal position reduces to two sentences. First: the CIABOC charges relate to conduct before Jayakody became minister, so they do not bear on his fitness for office. Second: the presumption of innocence means he cannot be removed on the basis of an allegation alone. The presumption of innocence is a courtroom standard. It was designed to protect citizens from the coercive power of the state in criminal proceedings. It was never designed to settle the question of who should hold executive authority over a seven-billion-rupee energy portfolio. Those are two entirely distinct questions, and conflating them is not legal sophistication — it is legal camouflage for a political calculation. In every functioning democracy, the standard for ministerial fitness has never been the same as the standard for criminal conviction. Ministers resign at the point of serious allegation — not at the point of proven guilt — because they hold a different kind of trust. Public trust is not governed by rules of evidence. It is governed by whether citizens believe that the people exercising power over their lives are doing so with clean hands and sound judgment. ### **What 153 votes actually bought** The no-confidence motion was defeated on April 10 by 153 votes to 49\. The government will record this as a victory. A no-confidence motion is a parliamentary event. It has a date, a vote, a result — and then it is over. What does not end is the underlying reality it was called about: a minister with a High Court indictment, a ministry with Rs. 7 billion in losses, and a procurement system the Auditor General found broken in nineteen distinct ways. By voting 153 to 49, the NPP did not defeat that story. It wrote it. Every one of those 153 MPs now owns a sentence that will be read back to them: they kept an indicted minister in Cabinet, deployed their parliamentary supermajority to kill the accountability vote, absorbed Rs. 7 billion in losses from his ministry, and called it due process. The government holds 159 seats. It does not need Jayakody to pass a budget, implement a reform, or govern anything. The only thing his continued presence in Cabinet now provides is evidence — evidence that this government, when it comes to its own, behaves exactly like the governments it replaced. ### **What Changed: The Man, or the Position?** The NPP did not win in 2024 because Sri Lankans were seized by enthusiasm for the JVP’s political economy. It won because the country had been run to ruin by a political class that treated state resources as personal inheritance, and the people were exhausted. The 2022 Aragalaya was not an ideological event. It was a cry of pain from citizens who had run out of gas, run out of medicine, run out of patience. At that moment, the NPP — and its leader, Anura Kumara Dissanayake — offered something different. A political movement, and a man at its helm, that had spent years in opposition doing what Sri Lankan politicians almost never do: using evidence. Holding up procurement files, audit reports and tender documents in Parliament, and saying, line by line: this is how the money was stolen, and here is who stole it. Together, they built their political reputation on specificity — on naming exact figures, exposing exact failures, and demanding exact accountability. The National Audit Office's report on Norochcholai coal procurement is, in its structure, precisely the document that Dissanayake would once have held up from the opposition benches. An unregistered supplier handed a billion-rupee contract. A testing laboratory with a revoked licence certifying coal quality for twelve shipments. Forty days without a single delivery to the plant that keeps the national grid alive. Seven billion rupees in losses. Under a previous government, he would have called it what it is. Under his own government, his Cabinet spokesperson says the minister stays and the courts will decide. Those who voted for the NPP are not naive. They have seen this pattern before — from the SLFP, the UNP and the SLPP: the language of ‘due process’ invoked to shield a political ally, even as the same system moves swiftly against others. It is a pattern Sri Lankans recognise not because it was explained to them, but because they have lived through it, repeatedly. The standard now in question is not an abstract one. It is the standard the NPP and Anura Kumara Dissanayake claimed for themselves — clarity, consistency and accountability. Sri Lanka is watching to see whether that standard will be upheld in power, or quietly set aside in the language of power. ### After Assurances, Thaiyiddy Landowners Agree to Survey in Temple Dispute URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/after-assurances-thaiyiddy-landowners-agree-to-survey-in-temple-dispute/ Last updated: 2026-04-19T06:08:15.000Z **THAIYIDDY, Sri Lanka** — For more than three decades, Sarujan Sukumari and many others were unable to set foot on their family lands. Seized by the military and designated a High Security Zone, the area remained inaccessible even after the war ended in 2009\. Years later, as the country settled into an uneasy peace, a Buddhist temple rose on what had once been their ancestral property. Recently, she and other landowners sat in a government conference room in Jaffna as a cabinet minister and senior survey officials explained that the state intended to measure their land as a step toward returning it. Ms. Sukumari said she and others agreed to the survey, but remained wary. “We agreed only after being assured that this is not for acquisition, but to return the lands to the people,” she said, speaking to reporters outside the Jaffna District Secretariat. “We have strong suspicions that surveying the land could be a hidden attempt to acquire it.” The meeting, attended by the Minister of Fisheries, senior administrative officials and representatives of the Survey Department, was the latest development in a prolonged dispute over land in Thaiyiddy, a small village near Kankesanthurai on Sri Lanka’s northern tip, where a Buddhist temple was constructed on private land with the involvement of the military. ### **A Temple, a High-Security Zone and a Disappeared Boundary** The dispute centers on a prominent new Buddhist complex — the Tissa Raja Maha Vihara — that has expanded substantially in the years since the war ended. Local residents and civil society groups say the new structures were built on privately owned Tamil land that was absorbed into a military High Security Zone during the conflict and later repurposed, without the knowledge or consent of the original owners. Supporters of the temple say it represents the restoration of an ancient Buddhist site, citing references in historical chronicles. Some Sinhala-Buddhist narratives point to the *Mahavamsa*, a 5th-century chronicle of Sri Lanka, which describes King Devanampiya Tissa — who ruled in the 3rd century B.C. and is regarded as the first Sri Lankan ruler to formally embrace Buddhism — as having established monasteries in different parts of the island following the religion’s introduction. “It has been 36 years since we left our lands,” said Bhaskaran, another landowner who attended Saturday’s meeting and, like many in the area. “Identifying the exact boundaries is a major challenge.” ### **Promises Made, Suspicions Unresolved** The Saturday meeting was convened, officials said, to address those practical difficulties. The survey, they maintained, was a technical step — a way to map plots and establish legal boundaries before returning them to their original owners. They gave explicit assurances that the exercise was not a prelude to acquisition. Government officials said the lands could be released to residents within two weeks of completing the survey — a timeline that, if met, would allow families to return before Vesak, the most important Buddhist festival in Sri Lanka, which commemorates the birth, enlightenment and death of the Buddha and falls in early May. But suspicion ran alongside cautious hope. Residents noted a disparity they found troubling: they were asked to furnish documents proving their ownership of the land, while those connected to the temple were not subjected to equivalent scrutiny. “Authorities requested documents from residents while not requiring similar proof from those linked to the temple,” Ms. Sukumari said. Officials did not directly respond to that characterization. ### **Where War’s End Did Not Mean Return** Sixteen years after the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war, the question of land remains unresolved across the Tamil-majority North and East. In Jaffna district alone, officials acknowledge that more than 2,600 acres of privately owned land remain under the control of the military and other security forces. Activists and local residents have also alleged that entire villages near the Palaly military headquarters, within areas designated as High Security Zones, were completely cleared and demolished in the years after the war, with homes, temples and churches removed, erasing visible traces of what had once been Tamil settlements and making it difficult for former residents to return or substantiate land claims. ### After Delays, Sri Lankan Government Releases Funds for Chemmani Mass Grave Investigation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/after-delays-sri-lankan-government-releases-funds-for-chemmani-mass-grave-investigation/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T03:18:31.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** The Sri Lankan government has allocated 21 million rupees for the third phase of excavations at the Chemmani mass grave site, officials said. The release of funds follows repeated postponements caused by a lack of financial approval and adverse weather conditions that left the site waterlogged. The case is scheduled to be taken up again at the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court on April 21, when authorities are expected to indicate when excavation work will resume. Chemmani, a village on the outskirts of Jaffna, has long been associated with allegations of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings during the final years of the civil war in the north. The site first drew widespread attention in 1998, when a Sri Lankan Army soldier, testifying in a murder case, told a court that hundreds of bodies of detainees who had disappeared in the mid-1990s had been buried in the area. His account aligned with longstanding claims by families and human rights groups that large numbers of civilians went missing during military operations to retake the Jaffna peninsula in 1995 and 1996. Court-ordered excavations in 1999 uncovered human remains, but the investigation did not lead to comprehensive identification of victims or prosecutions of senior officials, leaving many questions unresolved. Interest in the site resurfaced in February 2025, when construction work at a nearby Hindu cremation ground uncovered skeletal remains, prompting a renewed, court-supervised excavation. Since then, investigators have identified around 240 sets of remains, including those believed to be of children and infants, making Chemmani one of the largest officially documented mass grave sites in Sri Lanka . Despite the renewed effort, progress has been uneven. Excavations have been halted multiple times, including in recent months amid delays in the release of funds, drawing criticism from lawyers representing victims’ families and from rights groups, who say such interruptions risk compromising both evidence and public confidence. The site is currently secured as a crime scene, with forensic work continuing under judicial oversight. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has previously noted broader administrative delays in the disbursement of funds for such investigations, while international organizations have called for greater transparency and independent monitoring. ### The War That Reopened What Was Already Open URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-war-that-reopened-what-was-already-open/ Last updated: 2026-04-19T06:08:26.000Z **By Abbi Kanthasamy** The real winners of this war were not the Iranian people, not the Lebanese, not the Gulf Arabs, not the Americans, and certainly not the poor fools told to clap every time a missile takes off on television. The winners were the people who always win. The weapons manufacturers. The oil traders. The consultants in expensive suits using phrases like maritime de-risking and regional deterrence posture. The lobbyists. The think-tank parasites. The men who can turn blood into billing hours and rubble into shareholder value. While civilians counted bodies, someone in Washington, Virginia, Texas and London was counting margins. And for all that death, what was the grand achievement? The Strait of Hormuz. That famous strip of water now spoken of in such trembling, Churchillian tones by men who probably could not have found it on a map six months ago. The great objective, after all the sermons, aircraft, threats, retaliation and primetime moral theatre, appears to be reopening shipping through the Strait. Which would be stirring stuff, were it not for one tiny flaw: it was open before the war. Then traffic collapsed. And now the world is congratulating itself for trying to restore the condition that existed before the idiots arrived with matches. Donald Trump, naturally, has handled this with the subtlety of a drunk casino owner screaming at valet staff. He has been raging at NATO over Hormuz. Mark Rutte has been scrambling. Keir Starmer is speaking in grave little phrases about “practical options.” Friedrich Merz wants conditions and sequencing and probably three committees before Germany does anything. So now the Atlantic alliance, that magnificent cathedral of bureaucracy, is locked in an argument over who should help reopen a waterway that was functioning before this latest outbreak of strategic genius. Then there is Iran. We were told Iran would be taught a lesson. Brought to heel. Corrected. Weakened. Perhaps even modernized by force, which is always a lovely idea if one enjoys setting museums on fire in order to improve the gift shop. And yet here we are. The Islamic Republic still stands. The clerical machine still stands. Ali Khamenei’s system, so often described as brittle and doomed, once again proves astonishingly durable when faced with foreign threats. In effect, the West has pulled off its favourite magic trick: threaten a civilization with annihilation, stop short of full annihilation, and then declare that not fully destroying it counts as liberation. So congratulations to Iran. It has been saved from total destruction by the people who spent the week threatening to destroy it. You’re welcome, Persia. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-war-that-reopened-what-was-WKPNqM-kixhd00dr9t8n1x.png) And then, of course, came the supporting cast from the region’s perpetual travelling circus. The Houthis — those cheerful little anarchists of the Red Sea, armed with theology, attitude and an upsetting level of competence — have once again demonstrated that a man in sandals with a missile can make a superpower look faintly stupid. Reuters reported that they have shot down multiple U.S. MQ-9 drones, each costing tens of millions of dollars. There is something wonderfully obscene about that image: America arrives with aircraft carriers, satellites, destroyers, fighter jets and enough hardware to invade Neptune; the Houthis reply with budget air defence and a grin. Even the hardware seems exhausted by the farce. An American F/A-18 ended up in the Red Sea after a failed carrier landing. Another U.S. carrier suffered a fire. The imperial armada now occasionally gives the impression of an expensive luxury hotel chain stumbling through a war zone with a broken minibar and no functioning sense of dignity. The Pentagon will call this repositioning, recalibration, operational adaptation — anything except what it sometimes looks like, which is very costly machines fleeing angry men who absolutely do not care how much the machines cost. Then we arrive, inevitably, at Hezbollah, Lebanon’s permanent answer to the question: “Can this get more complicated?” Benjamin Netanyahu says Israel wants talks with Lebanon as soon as possible. Hezbollah’s Ali Fayyad rejects direct negotiations. Lebanon asks for a ceasefire first. UN peacekeepers get attacked. Civilians keep dying. Infrastructure keeps crumbling. Which means that after all the war talk, all the deterrence talk, all the cleansing fire and strategic chest-beating, Lebanon remains what it has been for years: damaged, armed, fractured and held together by trauma, improvisation and cigarettes. And that is the joke at the heart of all this. We were told this was about peace. But the Gulf had more peace before the war than after it. We were told this was about navigation. But the Strait was navigating just fine before the world’s great statesmen and television gladiators started pretending they were saving it. We were told this was about deterrence. Yet the Houthis are still launching, Hezbollah is still armed, Iran is still standing, and the region is still one insult away from another round of men in suits explaining why incineration is actually a pathway to stability. So let us at least be honest. This was not about freedom. Not really. Not democracy. Not really. Not peace. Certainly not. And not the poor oppressed masses, whose liberation always seems to involve them getting bombed, sanctioned, starved, lectured and then forgotten. It was about money. Oil prices moved. Defense stocks smiled. Contracts were signed. Consultants billed. Politicians strutted around podiums pretending to be Churchill with better dental work. Generals got more toys. News channels got their dramatic graphics. And the dead, as ever, got flags and speeches. By any humane standard, this was filth. By the standards of the war industry, however, it was a masterpiece. The Strait that was open may one day reopen fully. The peace that existed before may one day return. The same old men may survive to deliver new sermons. And the same experts who got everything wrong will return to television to explain why the next war is absolutely necessary. A spectacular success. For everyone who got paid. ### A Tale of Two Energy Landscapes: Trincomalee Oil Tanks and Jurong Island URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-tale-of-two-energy-landscapes-trincomalee-oil-tanks-and-jurong-island/ Last updated: 2026-04-12T11:53:37.000Z **By: Dr. Gamini Goonetilleke** The contrasting stories of the oil tank farm in Trincomalee and the development of Jurong Island, located to the southwest of mainland Singapore, provide a powerful example of how vision, planning, and governance can shape the destiny of strategic assets. Both locations possess significant geographical advantages and lie along major maritime routes. Yet, while Jurong Island has grown into a global energy and petrochemical hub, the Trincomalee oil tanks have remained largely underdeveloped since their construction during the colonial era. The oil tank farm in Trincomalee dates back to World War II, when the British recognized the strategic importance of Trincomalee’s deep natural harbor. Widely regarded as one of the finest natural harbors in the world, it provided an ideal base for naval operations in the Indian Ocean. To support these operations, nearly one hundred large oil storage tanks were constructed in the China Bay area. These tanks ensured a steady fuel supply for military vessels across the region. However, after Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, this valuable infrastructure did not receive sustained investment or strategic attention. Over time, many tanks fell into disuse, and despite periodic attempts at revival through foreign partnerships and bilateral agreements, progress has remained slow and fragmented. In contrast, Jurong Island represents a deliberate and forward-looking development strategy. Unlike Trincomalee, it did not begin with existing infrastructure. Instead, it was created in the late twentieth century by merging several small offshore islands—once fishing villages—through large-scale land reclamation. This ambitious transformation was guided by a clear national vision: to position Singapore as a leading global hub for oil refining, petrochemicals, and energy-related industries. From the beginning, the government implemented a comprehensive master plan, ensuring that infrastructure, investment policy, and industrial growth were closely coordinated. ![Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm in Sri Lanka](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/a-tale-of-two-energy-landscape-C5FgMs-kix9soi1wf006kv.png) Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm in Sri Lanka Geographically, both Trincomalee and Jurong Island are well positioned. Trincomalee lies along key shipping routes in the Indian Ocean, making it ideal for oil storage and distribution. Its natural harbor requires minimal modification to accommodate large vessels, offering a clear advantage. Jurong Island, although lacking such a natural harbor, benefits from its proximity to the Strait of Malacca—often called the “jugular vein of Asian trade.” This vital corridor carries over 20 million barrels of oil daily and serves as a major route connecting Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Recognizing this advantage, Singapore invested heavily in deep-water berths, storage facilities, and extensive pipeline networks, effectively compensating for its natural limitations. The most striking difference between the two lies in long-term vision and planning. Singapore’s approach to Jurong Island has been marked by consistency and strategic foresight. The government created a stable and investor-friendly environment that attracted leading multinational corporations in energy and petrochemicals. The island was developed as an integrated industrial ecosystem, where refineries, chemical plants, and storage facilities are interconnected. This integration allows by-products from one process to serve as inputs for another, reducing waste and increasing efficiency. In Trincomalee, however, the absence of a sustained long-term strategy has been a major constraint. Although the strategic value of the oil tank farm is widely recognized, development efforts have often been hindered by changing political priorities, concerns over national sovereignty, and bureaucratic delays. Successive governments have proposed plans, but few have been implemented consistently. As a result, much of the infrastructure remains underutilized, and opportunities for economic growth have been lost. Investment patterns further highlight this contrast. Jurong Island has benefited from massive and continuous financial investment from both the Singaporean government and global investors. Billions of dollars have been spent on land reclamation, advanced infrastructure, and technological innovation. What began as a group of small fishing islands has evolved into a 3,000-hectare integrated energy and chemical hub, hosting over 100 leading international companies. Despite having no domestic crude oil resources, Singapore processes more than 1.5 million barrels of oil per day and operates the world’s largest bunkering port. Today, Jurong Island is the third-largest oil refining centre globally and a cornerstone of Singapore’s industrial economy, contributing about 3% to national GDP. Its activities extend beyond oil refining to include petrochemical production, energy trading, and extensive gas storage and distribution networks, including pipelines linked to regional suppliers. Importantly, Jurong Island is not static—it is evolving to meet future energy needs. Around 300 hectares, nearly 10% of its land area, have been set aside for green transformation initiatives. These include solar energy projects, carbon capture technologies, hydrogen fuel development, and specialty chemicals aimed at supporting low-carbon innovation. This reflects Singapore’s long-term focus on sustainability, energy security, and decarbonization. The island is supported by world-class infrastructure, including integrated utilities, desalination systems for reliable water supply, and efficient logistics networks. It also promotes innovation through research and development collaborations, ensuring that it remains at the forefront of global energy advancements. The economic impact of these differing approaches is clear. Jurong Island provides employment for around 27,000 people and generates substantial national revenue. It has strengthened Singapore’s position as a global energy hub and contributed significantly to its economic resilience. In contrast, the Trincomalee oil tanks have yet to make a comparable contribution to Sri Lanka’s economy. If fully developed, they could generate significant revenue, stimulate regional growth, and create employment opportunities. Ironically, Trincomalee required far less initial investment, as the oil tanks were already in place. However, the lack of sustained funding for maintenance, modernization, and expansion has led to gradual deterioration. Although some tanks have been refurbished through joint ventures, many remain unused. Furthermore, the absence of supporting infrastructure—such as refineries, pipelines, and industrial networks—has prevented the development of an integrated energy hub. Governance and policy frameworks have also played a decisive role. Singapore is known for efficient governance, transparency, and strong policy implementation. This has created high investor confidence and encouraged long-term commitments. In Sri Lanka, governance has been more complex, with policy shifts and administrative challenges affecting continuity. Concerns over foreign involvement in strategic assets like Trincomalee have further complicated decision-making, leading to delays. Despite these challenges, Trincomalee retains significant potential. Its natural harbor, strategic location, and existing infrastructure provide a strong foundation for future development. With growing global demand for energy storage and distribution, particularly in the Indian Ocean region, Trincomalee could still become an important player in regional energy security. However, this will require a clear national vision, consistent policies, and sustained investment. The comparison between Trincomalee and Jurong Island offers important lessons. It highlights the value of long-term planning, policy consistency, and effective governance. It also demonstrates the importance of infrastructure investment and integrated industrial development. While Sri Lanka’s context differs from Singapore’s, these principles can still be adapted to local conditions. In conclusion, the story of the Trincomalee oil tanks and Jurong Island is not simply a comparison of two locations, but a reflection of two different approaches to development. Jurong Island stands as a testament to what can be achieved through vision, planning, and commitment. Trincomalee, by contrast, represents untapped potential—a reminder of missed opportunities, but also of possibilities for the future. With the right direction and determination, it is still possible for Trincomalee to evolve into a dynamic energy hub, contributing meaningfully to Sri Lanka’s economic progress. ### The Batalanda Report Was Tabled. A Year Later, Justice Was Not URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-batalanda-report-was-tabled-a-year-later-justice-was-not/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T03:18:35.000Z **COLOMBO —** One year after Sri Lanka’s Attorney General received the Batalanda Commission report — detailing torture chambers, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances during the government’s suppression of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurrection — no one has been charged, no prosecutorial update has been issued, and the parliamentary debate that was promised has yet to be scheduled. The silence that has followed, political analysts say, reflects not only legal complexity but a deeper unease within the political establishment — a recognition that any serious pursuit of accountability could expose uncomfortable truths, including the JVP’s violence and killings of innocents during the same period. The silence has drawn pointed criticism from legal observers. “The Batalanda report went to the Attorney General a year ago. Any action?” wrote Aingkaran Kugathasan, an attorney affiliated with the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi, in a post on social media, adding, “The JVP knows where the skeletons are buried. The report would expose them, so it will stay buried. The ‘people-friendly’ government is pure theatre. JVP comrades know; the rest will soon find out.” ![Two officers from Sri Lanka’s Department of Government Analyst examining bloodstains at the Batalanda Housing Scheme.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-batalanda-report-was-table-htwMcI-kixasw9i0wsuoem.png) Two officers from Sri Lanka’s Department of Government Analyst examining bloodstains at the Batalanda Housing Scheme. The report — compiled in 1998 after a three-year commission established by then-President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga — documented how the Batalanda Housing Scheme in Biyagama was converted into an unofficial detention and torture site during the 1988–1990 crackdown on the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. The Counter Subversive Unit of the Kelaniya Police used the complex to hold, torture and kill suspected insurgents. Survivors described electric shocks, waterboarding and beatings that shattered bones. Many detainees were never seen again. ![A scene at the Batalanda Housing Scheme in 1989](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-batalanda-report-was-table-htwMcI-kix4ulq2l2wlceo.png) A scene at the Batalanda Housing Scheme in 1989 The report implicated senior police officers and, most controversially, then-Minister of Industries Ranil Wickremesinghe, finding that he had directed the allocation of the houses to police and that he "must have known" of what took place within them. It stopped short of recommending criminal prosecution, but called for further legal action. Kumaratunga received the report in 1998, published it as a Sessional Paper in 2000 and acted on none of its findings. Wickremesinghe went on to serve as Prime Minister six times and as President from 2022 to 2024. ## What Changed — and What Didn't In an interview on Al Jazeera’s *Head to Head* programme in early March 2025, former President Ranil Wickremesinghe was pressed about the Batalanda Commission report. He initially denied its existence and, when challenged, argued that it lacked validity because it had not been formally tabled in Parliament. During the exchange, a copy of the report — obtained by the International Truth and Justice Project — was held up by the former BBC correspondent Frances Harrison, bringing renewed attention to a document that had long remained in obscurity. In the days and weeks that followed, the report returned to the center of political debate. Bimal Rathnayake, the Leader of the House, tabled it in Parliament on March 14, 2025, and the government indicated that it would be referred to the Attorney General for possible legal action. During the session, several members of the ruling party appeared visibly emotional, including the Speaker, as Mr. Rathnayake read excerpts from the report detailing enforced disappearances and killings. On April 29, 2025, the Presidential Secretariat formally handed the 208-page report to the Attorney General. By mid-May, the AG's Department had constituted a five-member legal committee, chaired by a President's Counsel, to assess whether the evidence was sufficient to initiate criminal prosecutions. The committee was asked to identify statute-barred offences and determine whether further investigations were warranted. The committee has produced no public findings in the ten months since. ### **Structural Hurdles — and Political Ones** ![The old tires that were left after the youths killed in the Batalanda torture camp were burnt on the road.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-batalanda-report-was-table-htwMcI-kixycdscca5bv84.png) The old tires that were left after the youths killed in the Batalanda torture camp were burnt on the road. Legal analysts say the delay has both procedural and political dimensions. Under Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948, bodies such as the Batalanda Commission function as fact-finding mechanisms: they may summon witnesses and receive evidence, but they do not have the authority to indict or try offenders. Any criminal prosecution arising from their findings rests with the Attorney General's Department of Sri Lanka, which exercises wide discretion over whether and when to file charges. While that discretion is not entirely unfettered, courts have recognized that no specific statutory deadline governs action in such cases, including those involving alleged state crimes. More than three decades on, practical obstacles further complicate the task. Witnesses are difficult to trace, and any surviving evidence must meet the standards required in a criminal court — a threshold that is often hard to satisfy in cases of this age. There is also a structural limitation specific to the Batalanda Commission. It was appointed under the 1948 law, rather than the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law No. 7 of 1978, which has in the past been used to support legislation imposing civic disabilities on individuals named in commission findings. As a result, the Batalanda report cannot, on its own, serve as a legal basis for stripping civic rights; any such move would require separate legislative or constitutional action. “Tabling the report was procedurally significant but legally limited as far as civic-rights consequences are concerned,” said a Colombo-based constitutional lawyer, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “If the government intended to pursue that route, it could have moved quickly to establish a new special presidential commission after the referral to the Attorney General. It has not.” ### **The Question the Government Cannot Easily Answer** President Dissanayake leads the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, the party whose members were tortured at Batalanda — but also the party whose military wing killed thousands of civilians, politicians, academics and trade unionists during the same 1987–1990 period. Estimates of the total death toll from the insurrection range from 35,000 to more than 60,000, with the majority attributed to state forces and state-backed death squads, but a substantial and documented portion to the JVP itself. JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe acknowledged publicly that the party killed approximately 6,000 people during that era, including Vijaya Kumaratunga, the prominent politician and entertainer who was the husband of President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The disappearances commissions convened in 1994 received 27,526 complaints and found credible evidence of responsibility in more than 1,600 cases, implicating military officers, police, politicians — and JVP actors. The JVP has never formally apologised, acknowledged specific crimes, or engaged with any accountability mechanism for the period. A vigorous prosecution of Batalanda — any prosecution serious enough to reach a courtroom — would open the evidentiary record of 1987 to 1990 in its entirety. That record does not only name state actors. “The other governments — we understood,” said Priyani, whose only brother disappeared during that period and is believed to have been killed in Batalanda. “They were the perpetrators. But this government is ours. Its inaction is nauseating.” ### China Assures Sri Lanka of Stable Fuel Supply Amid Middle East Tensions URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/china-assures-sri-lanka-of-stable-fuel-supply-amid-middle-east-tensions/ Last updated: 2026-04-12T02:27:35.000Z **KANDY, Sri Lanka —** China’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, Qi Zhenhong, said on Saturday that Sri Lanka would not face a fuel shortage despite mounting global uncertainty linked to the conflict in the Middle East, offering strong assurances of continued Chinese support. Speaking to reporters after attending a program to distribute dry rations to 350 low-income families at Sri Chandananda Buddhist College in Kandy, the ambassador said that while several countries were experiencing disruptions to fuel supply, Sri Lanka’s position remained secure. “Some countries are facing challenges due to the evolving situation in the Middle East,” he said. “However, we can firmly assure that such a situation will not arise in Sri Lanka.” He added that China stood ready to provide assistance at any time, and that in the event of supply pressures, operations could be supported through Sinopec, the Chinese energy company currently operating in Sri Lanka, to ensure continuity in fuel distribution. The remarks come as concerns grow worldwide over the potential impact of instability in the Middle East — a region central to global energy supplies — on fuel availability and prices. Reaffirming Beijing’s position, Ambassador Qi said China remained committed to supporting Sri Lanka through any economic challenges, citing the long-standing relationship between the two countries. “Based on our enduring friendship, China will continue to stand with Sri Lanka in difficult times,” he said, adding that the public should not be alarmed about fuel supply. In a broader reflection on the regional crisis, the ambassador also called for a permanent ceasefire in the Middle East, urging all parties to move beyond temporary truces toward sustained peace. He pointed to a recently proposed five-point initiative by China and Pakistan calling for a ceasefire, renewed dialogue and broader measures to stabilize the region. “The ceasefire is a beginning; it is good,” he said. “But it must lead to something lasting.” China, he added, hoped that all parties would honor their commitments and ensure that ceasefire arrangements become the foundation for long-term stability rather than short-lived pauses in hostilities. The ambassador reiterated that China would continue to support Sri Lanka’s economic stability and development, while remaining prepared to respond to any further fallout from the Middle East crisis. ### Dispute Grows as Government Moves to Formalise Buddhist Claim at Vedukkunari Hill URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/dispute-grows-as-government-moves-to-formalise-buddhist-claim-at-vedukkunari-hill/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T12:20:21.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka —** The Sri Lankan government is moving to designate *Vedukunari* Hill, a contested site in the Nedunkerny area of Vavuniya, as a protected forest zone, a step officials say is necessary to preserve an ancient Buddhist heritage site but one that has deepened unease among Tamil political leaders over how the island’s past is being officially defined. The issue resurfaced after the Minister of Buddhasasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs, Dr. Hiniduma Sunil Senevi, told Parliament on April 10 that religious markers found at Vedukunari Hill had been confirmed as belonging to the Buddhist faith and that a gazette notification would soon be issued as part of moves to bring the area under state protection. “The monuments identified at Vedukunari Hill have been confirmed as belonging to Buddhism,” the minister said during a parliamentary debate. “This has been scientifically established based on cave inscriptions dating back to the 2nd century B.C.” He also said that unauthorized construction at the site had caused significant damage to the archaeological landscape, and that the Department of Archaeology had already initiated legal proceedings over damage to antiquities and the erection of unlawful structures. Under Sri Lanka’s Antiquities Ordinance, altering, damaging or removing historical monuments is a serious offense. Government officials have said there is no bar on religious worship at the site, so long as such activity does not damage archaeological remains. But the decision to move ahead with formal protection has alarmed critics, who say the state is treating a contested historical interpretation as settled fact. Among those raising objections is Douglas Devananda, the former minister and secretary general of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party, who in a press release called for a fresh archaeological inquiry that would include Tamil and Muslim researchers, not only Sinhala scholars and officials. ![Douglas Devananda at the disputed Vedukkunari Hill site in Vavuniya during his tenure as a cabinet minister.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/dispute-grows-as-government-mo-ZVKRHE-kix7vl4i2g6uplo.png) Douglas Devananda at the disputed Vedukkunari Hill site in Vavuniya during his tenure as a cabinet minister. Mr. Douglas Devananda challenged the government’s characterization of the inscriptions at the site, citing Tamil historical scholarship to argue that the Brahmi cave inscriptions at *Vedukunari* Hill — three among fifty-four identified across the Vanni region — cannot be assigned so simply to a single religious or ethnic tradition. Mr. Douglas Devananda also told a Jaffna Monitor reporter that he had written to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake expressing his concerns. Drawing on the work of the Tamil historian C. Pathmanathan, Mr. Devananda said the Brahmi inscriptions found in Vavuniya District show some of the strongest evidence of Tamil linguistic influence among such inscriptions discovered in Sri Lanka. He noted that words such as *“Vel,” “Velu,” “Parumakan”* and *“Abi”* appear in these inscriptions. He quoted one such inscription as reading: *“Parumaka Asa Atheka Velasa Jaayaa Thisaaya Lene,” ('பருமக அஸ அதேக வேளஸ ஜாயா திஸாய லெணெ')* which he rendered as meaning: “The cave of Thisa, the wife of Vel, who was a chief and lord of horses.” In Sangam-era Tamil society, Mr. Douglas Devananda noted, minor rulers were referred to as *“Vel”* or *“Velir,”* and he said the same usage appears to have existed among Sri Lankan Tamils. On that basis, he argued that the inscription points to the presence of local Tamil-speaking or Naga-linked communities in the region, complicating any attempt to present the site as exclusively Buddhist in civilizational ownership. His statement also argued that Brahmi script, first used in North India under Emperor Ashoka, later mixed with Dravidian linguistic forms and evolved in ways that resembled early Tamil writing used by communities on the island. Because of that overlap, he said, inscriptions from the period can sometimes appear at first glance to support a Sinhala reading while also containing strong Dravidian features. Mr. Douglas Devananda further said Tamil historical writing identifies the region as part of the ancient Naga country and notes the existence of several small principalities in the Vanni in that period. In his telling, the inscriptions are not merely archaeological fragments but part of a broader and more layered history than the government’s account allows. In his statement, he urged the authorities to reopen the archaeological inquiry into *Vedukunari* Hill and to do so in a manner that respects the sentiments of the majority communities living in the area. “As I have already pointed out, when such archaeological studies are carried out, it is important to include archaeologists and historians belonging to the communities living in that area, in a way that respects their feelings,” he said. “That will help remove bitterness between communities.” He added that issues of this kind are bound up with public emotion and identity and therefore should be handled with particular caution. Mr. Douglas Devananda also asked the government to postpone the planned gazette notification, noting that the *Vedukunari* Hill dispute is currently before the courts and arguing that the need for a renewed study makes immediate state action inappropriate. The dispute over Vedukkunari Hill is the latest in a series of tensions in Sri Lanka’s north and east, where archaeology, religion and state authority have become intertwined in competing narratives of the past. For many Tamils, the issue is not only about inscriptions or ancient monuments, but about who has the authority to interpret history — and whose heritage the state ultimately chooses to recognize. The intervention by Douglas Devananda carries particular significance. Long seen as a Tamil political figure who has operated within Sri Lanka’s national political framework, his call for a re-examination suggests that concern over Vedukkunari Hill extends beyond traditionally nationalist constituencies, pointing to a broader unease over how such sites are being defined. ### ITAK Backs No-Confidence Motion but Balks at Confronting Government URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/itak-backs-no-confidence-motion-but-balks-at-confronting-government/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T12:20:48.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka — April 11, 2026** — Lawmakers from the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) unanimously agreed to support a no-confidence motion against Power and Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody on Friday, but several members hesitated to take a leading role in publicly confronting the government, according to multiple party sources familiar with internal discussions. The motion, taken up in Parliament on Friday, prompted an online meeting of ITAK’s political committee and parliamentary group a day earlier to determine the party’s position. Participants agreed without dissent to back the motion and vote against the minister, presenting a united formal stance, a party source who attended the meeting told *Jaffna Monitor*. But when it came to assigning speakers to articulate that position during the parliamentary debate, hesitation emerged. “There was complete agreement on supporting the motion,” said a senior party source who took part in the discussions. “But when the question of who would speak against the minister — and by extension the government — came up, there was clear reluctance.” According to party officials, speaking responsibilities had already been allocated under an internal rotation system to national list MP Dr. Sathiyalingam and Trincomalee district lawmaker Kugathasan. However, shortly after the meeting concluded, Kugathasan began contacting fellow members in an apparent effort to transfer the responsibility, the sources said. His reluctance, insiders suggest, reflects political calculations. Kugathasan has recently drawn praise from government figures, including Chief Government Whip Bimal Ratnayake, who described him as one of the few opposition lawmakers to offer constructive contributions in Parliament rather than direct attacks. “That perception matters,” another ITAK insider said. “There is an effort to maintain working relationships with the government, and directly attacking it could jeopardize those ties.” Kugathasan ultimately did not attend the parliamentary session, leaving Dr. Sathiyalingam to present the party’s position alone during the debate. However, he stopped short of a full-throated attack on the government, choosing instead to moderate his remarks, according to political observers. “This is how the principal Tamil party behaves, assuming the people will simply accept it,” said a political observer and longtime supporter of ITAK, expressing frustration with the party’s conduct. The no-confidence motion, brought over allegations related to coal procurement failures and an ongoing corruption case against Minister Kumara Jayakody, was defeated by a wide margin, with 153 lawmakers voting against and 49 in favor. The result was widely anticipated, given the government’s commanding parliamentary majority. ### Hindu Groups Urge Official Recognition of Ancient Kathirgamam Pilgrimage Routeaft URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-3/ Last updated: 2026-04-12T03:14:43.000Z **KARAITHIVU, Sri Lanka —** Hindu organizations from Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern provinces have called on the government to formally recognize the historic Kathirgamam (Kataragama) pilgrimage route as a sacred pilgrimage, urging authorities to issue a gazette notification granting it official status. The appeal was made during a meeting held on Saturday at the Swami Vipulananda Memorial Hall in Karaithivu, where government officials and religious representatives gathered to discuss the future of the route. Participants included regional administrators, local government representatives and members of Hindu religious organizations, reflecting broad institutional support for the proposal. Representatives from temples and Hindu groups stretching from Selva Sannithi Murugan in the north to Ugantai in the south attended the discussion, presenting their views on the cultural and spiritual significance of the pilgrimage path. The participants unanimously endorsed the proposal, calling for immediate steps to formalize its status through an official government gazette. Officials said the recommendations would be forwarded through the Ampara District Secretariat to the Department of Hindu Religious and Cultural Affairs, before being submitted to the Cabinet for consideration. Sri Lanka has formally regulated major pilgrimage traditions such as the Sri Pada route through government gazettes, while sacred sites like Anuradhapura receive protection and international recognition as heritage and religious centers. However, formal recognition of Hindu pilgrimage routes within the country remains limited. Experts say that granting official status to the Kataragama route could bring a range of benefits, including improved infrastructure for pilgrims, legal safeguards against encroachment, and greater state support for preservation. It could also enhance the route’s visibility and attract both domestic and international visitors. The meeting was chaired by S. Jegarajan, the Additional Government Agent of Ampara District, and coordinated by K. Jeyaraji, the district’s Hindu Cultural Affairs Officer. ### Former LTTE Fighter Backs Sumanthiran for Northern Chief Minister URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-ltte-fighter-backs-sumanthiran-for-northern-chief-minister/ Last updated: 2026-04-13T04:03:28.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka —** A former member of the LTTE has publicly endorsed M. A. Sumanthiran as a candidate for Chief Minister of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, urging Tamils to rally behind him and challenging critics to propose a more suitable alternative. The endorsement came from Tharan Sri, a former fighter of the LTTE’s Charles Anthony Brigade who now leads a regional civil group, the *Vanni Tamil People’s Union*, in a Facebook post. He said M. A. Sumanthiran had invited former militants to take part in democratic politics through the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), describing the outreach as a significant shift in Tamil political engagement. Tharan Sri said he and a group of former fighters met Sumanthiran at his residence for nearly two hours, after which, he said, their long-held criticisms of the Tamil legislator had changed. He described Sumanthiran as “an indispensable figure” for the Tamil community and called for his nomination as Chief Minister in a future provincial council election. “If there is someone more capable, let them be identified,” he said, framing his endorsement as both a declaration and a challenge to political rivals. Tharan Sri, who now lives in Sweden and is originally from Kilinochchi — a political stronghold of S. Sritharan, a key rival of M. A. Sumanthiran within the party — has been critical of Sritharan despite earlier associations. During the conflict, he fought under Brigadier Theepan, who was Sritharan’s brother-in-law. Political observers say the endorsement signals a convergence of interests between M. A. Sumanthiran and sections of former militant networks, including figures once aligned with other regional actors. Tharan Sri had previously been associated with Murugesu Chandrakumar, a former Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) heavyweight and ex-member of Parliament who now serves as general secretary of the Samaththuva Katchi, a Kilinochchi-based regional party. Murugesu Chandrakumar, a longtime rival of S. Sritharan who draws from a similar voter base, is now seen as aligning with M. A. Sumanthiran, whose principal rival within the party is Sritharan. While Sumanthiran has often faced criticism from nationalist sections of Tamil society, Tharan Sri said those perceptions did not fully reflect the legislator’s role. He argued that Sumanthiran had consistently supported the inclusion of former fighters in mainstream politics. The Northern Provincial Council elections have yet to be scheduled, and political observers say the government may be hesitant to proceed after setbacks in recent local body polls. Early positioning within Tamil parties suggests that internal rivalries, as much as electoral competition, could shape leadership choices — potentially at the expense of addressing key issues affecting Tamil communities. ### Indian Tamils Who Built Sri Lanka’s Tea Economy Are Now Leaving It URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/indian-tamils-who-built-sri-lankas-tea-economy-are-now-leaving-it/ Last updated: 2026-04-12T07:18:07.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Indian-origin Tamils, descendants of indentured labourers brought to Sri Lanka in the 19th century, are steadily moving away from the tea plantations that once defined their existence. After generations of living a hand-to-mouth existence, many are finding success in new fields emerging as a more empowered ethnic group. Yet, for the tens of thousands who still toil in the tea estates poverty and entrenched racism remain daily realities. Community leaders speak about significant changes in the socio-economic profile of the once exclusively plantation workers, treated for over a century almost like slaves despite the tea industry being one of the largest earners of foreign exchange in Sri Lanka. In recent years, members of the community, whose forefathers hailed from south India, have branched out to become teachers, doctors, engineers, accountants, traders and industrialists, creating a new corps of Sri Lankans and breaking free from a vicious cycle of debts and penury. “We are no more just a labour segment in Sri Lanka,” Mano Ganesan, one of the most popular leaders of the Tamil plantation community, said in a telephonic interview, days after holding extensive talks with President Anura Dissanayake over issues confronting the ethnic group. “New successful layers have emerged in different fields. Today, just about 100,000 Tamils work in the tea estates compared to one million earlier although much of the community still lives within the tea-producing region,” said the four-time MP who heads the Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA). “Ninety per cent of the Tamils are out of it (tea industry).” The British began shipping poverty-stricken indentured labourers from south India to Ceylon in the 1820s to work on initially coffee – and later tea and rubber – plantations as Sinhalese peasants were unwilling to take up the harsh, low-paid manual work in the country’s central highlands. Also called “Malaiyaha (Hill) Tamils”, they worked for long decades under harsh and restrictive conditions widely seen as a form of bondage rather than free labour. Many died due to malnutrition, diseases and displacement. The Sinhalese, Sri Lanka’s majority population, traditionally looked down upon the “Indian Tamils”. Even elite leaders of the indigenous Tamils populating the country’s north and east did not treat them as equals notwithstanding a linguistic affinity. Paid a pittance despite doing backbreaking work in the money-spinning tea estates, the ‘Indian Tamils’ suffered from acute poverty, never-ending debts, terrible working conditions and ill health besides low level of education. Ganesan said that schools serving the community came under the national grid only in 1977 – almost three decades after independence. Many ‘Indian Tamils’ lacked citizenship for decades, the disgrace not changing even after Sri Lanka became a free country. Although they largely kept away from the blood-soaked Tamil separatist campaign that raged in Sri Lanka’s northeast for a quarter century, the ‘Indian Tamils’ were attacked by Sinhalese thugs for being Tamils. Many in Sri Lanka saw them as an underclass of the more successful indigenous Tamils. No more, asserts Ganesan, 66, who like his parents was born and raised in Sri Lanka but whose ancestors were never indentured workers. He says many in his community have given up the drudgery of their parents and grandparents to be professionals, entrepreneurs and more. In the process, most ‘Indian Tamils’ outside of the tea estates are now tri-lingual speaking English, Sinhalese and Tamil. Ganesan calls them the fourth ethnic group in Sri Lanka after the Sinhalese, indigenous Tamils and Muslims. “There is a call within the community to identify themselves more as Sri Lankans to be recognized as a core part of the country,” he added. “It helps that there is gradual change in outlook towards India in the Sinhalese society.” However, the estimated 100,000 Tamil workers, mostly women, who continue to slog in the tea estates, still encounter daunting problems. Firstly, wages remain low, despite being increased only this year to SLR 1,750 a day from Rs 1,350\. The hike has taken place in tea estates run by large as well as state-owned companies but not in privately held small tea estates. At the same time, the workers have been told to pluck a minimum of 25 kg of tea leaves a day, up from 18 kg until recently. “Even if they fall short by one kilo, the wages are cut by half,” said Ganesan, also a trade unionist. “I conveyed this to the (Sri Lankan) president. How can people cope with such meagre income?” He pointed out that while the ongoing Iran war had severely impacted foreign exchange earnings from tourism and garment industries besides reduction in remittances from the Gulf, the tea industry was keeping the national economy afloat. Tea exports alone generate $1.2 to 1.3 billion in foreign exchange annually. But very little of this wealth percolates to those who make it happen, forcing more and more workers to quit the arduous part of the industry for good. Like the Sinhalese in earlier times, younger ‘Indian Tamils’ aware of better opportunities outside of the estates refuse to do this work. Ganesan and his colleagues complain that decades of underinvestment in infrastructure, housing and early warning systems led to colossal deaths and destruction when the November 2025 cyclone ravaged Sri Lanka, disproportionately affecting the ‘Indian Tamil’ community. Ganesan has urged the government to ensure that land rights are given to the community besides legal ownership of the houses where they live. Both are long-term demands reiterated regularly by Tamil leaders but ignored by successive Sinhalese-dominated governments. While proud to be Sri Lankans, Ganesan says the community’s Indian identity cannot be ignored. So, he wants New Delhi to give the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) status to all eligible Indian origin Tamils, on the lines of its rollout in Mauritius where the process was made easier. “OCI status will be very useful,” said Ganesan, who presented a memorandum to Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he last visited Colombo. “While we are Sri Lankan citizens, we want the OCI status.” This, he added, will make it easier for the community to travel to and from India. Most ‘Indian Tamils’ enjoy familial links with Tamil Nadu, in particular the districts of Tiruneveli, Tuticorin, Virudhunagar, Madurai, Salem, Tirichirapalli and Thanjavur. “Poverty for the tea workers is not just about money,” he said. “It also relates to education, housing, health and food issues. The tea workers need dignity and respect. They deserve it.” The economics apart, caste remains a sore factor. The ‘Indian Tamils’ who migrated to caste-conscious Tamil regions of Sri Lanka’s north after violence by the Sinhalese are not generally considered as equals although many, over time, joined the Tamil Tigers. In the process, many of them died in the final battles between the Sri Lankan military and the Tigers in 2008-09. **Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by *The Federal* and is reproduced here by *Jaffna Monitor* with permission, with due acknowledgment to the original publication.** ### India Helps Restore Sri Lanka’s Northern Railway, but Questions Over Its Fragility Persist URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-helps-restore-sri-lankas-northern-railway-but-questions-over-its-fragility-persist/ Last updated: 2026-04-12T02:32:17.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — April 10, 2026 —** After months of disruption caused by Cyclone Ditwah, passenger trains resumed full service on Thursday between Colombo and Kankesanthurai, restoring Sri Lanka’s most important north–south rail link just days before the Sinhala and Tamil New Year. For thousands of travelers in the Northern Province, the reopening offered immediate relief — and a familiar sense of uncertainty. “We can travel again, but we don’t know for how long,” said S. Tharmalingam, a small trader in Jaffna who relies on the railway to transport goods to Colombo. “Every time it stops, our costs go up.” The restoration, completed on April 9, was funded through a $5 million grant from the Government of India, part of a broader $450 million assistance package announced after the cyclone — an effort aligned with New Delhi’s “Neighbourhood First” approach to regional engagement. Engineering teams from IRCON International, an Indian state-owned company, repaired track, bridges, and embankments at more than a dozen damaged sites, allowing uninterrupted service to resume along the Northern Line. But even as trains began running again, the reopening has revived a question that government officials have yet to address publicly: why does Sri Lanka’s most vital rail corridor continue to suffer repeated, prolonged disruptions? ### **A Line That Rarely Stays Open** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/india-helps-restore-sri-lanka-Z8x_34-kix5jt8kzu3d3mm.jpg) The Northern Line, linking Colombo with Jaffna, has spent much of the past two years either closed or operating under severe limitations. In early 2024, Sri Lanka Railways suspended services for several months to carry out a major modernization project between Maho and Anuradhapura. The line only fully reopened late that year after nearly eight months of closures and partial operations. Less than a year later, Cyclone Ditwah struck, damaging key sections between Maho and Jaffna, including bridges and embankments. Emergency repairs allowed limited services to resume in some sections, often at reduced speeds, before further shutdowns followed in early 2026 to facilitate permanent reconstruction. Taken together, these disruptions have left the country’s primary north–south railway either closed or restricted for a significant portion of the past 18 months. Sri Lanka Railways has not released consolidated data on the total duration of these closures or the economic losses incurred — gaps that analysts say hinder public accountability. ### **India Steps In — Again** The latest restoration underscores India’s expanding role in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure, particularly in the north. Following the cyclone, New Delhi deployed engineering teams and financial assistance across multiple sectors, with railway reconstruction emerging as one of the most visible efforts. India has rebuilt this line before. After the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, Indian funding and contractors were instrumental in restoring rail connectivity to the Northern Province. The current effort marks the second major reconstruction of key sections of the same corridor in just over a decade. Indian funding and engineers have repeatedly helped bring the line back; what remains unresolved is Sri Lanka’s own long‑term strategy to make that infrastructure withstand future shocks. ### **The Cost of Disruption** Rail travel remains the most affordable long-distance transport option in Sri Lanka, particularly for residents of the north, where incomes are generally lower**,** and alternatives are limited. When services are suspended, passengers turn to private buses and vans, often paying several times the rail fare. Traders face rising logistics costs, while access to services in Colombo — including specialized medical care — becomes more difficult. For students and daily commuters, the impact is immediate. “When trains stop, everything becomes uncertain — classes, exams, even basic travel,” said K. Niranjani, a university student who travels regularly between Vavuniya and Colombo. Despite these widespread effects, authorities have not published detailed assessments of the economic or social costs associated with the repeated disruptions. ### **From Repair to Resilience** Infrastructure experts say rebuilding damaged sections, while necessary, does little to address underlying vulnerabilities. They point to the need for long-term measures, including reinforcing embankments in flood-prone areas, improving drainage systems, strengthening landslide protection, and better coordinating maintenance with modernization work. Equally important, they say, is transparency — including clear timelines, public reporting of disruptions, and contingency planning. ### **A Line That Carries More Than Passengers** The Northern Railway Line holds significance beyond its economic role. Built during the colonial era, severed during decades of civil conflict, and restored in the postwar years, it has come to symbolize the physical and political connection between the Northern Province and the rest of the country. On Wednesday, stations across the north filled with travelers carrying bags, gifts**,** and luggage as they prepared to journey home for the New Year. Among the trains running again was the Yal Devi, a service long associated with the route and the region it serves. For passengers, the priority was simple: the trains were moving again. For policymakers, the challenge is more complex — ensuring that this time, they keep moving. ### A Minister’s House — and the Questions It Built URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-ministers-house-and-the-questions-it-built/ Last updated: 2026-04-12T02:32:17.000Z The photographs were clearly intended to project an image of simplicity. There was the President, the Prime Minister, and cabinet ministers — seated on ordinary plastic chairs, eating from simple plates like ordinary citizens at an almsgiving ceremony hosted by a senior government minister at his residence in Kaduwela. The images circulated widely on social media, amplified by the ruling National People's Power party's supporters. For a moment, they achieved their intended effect, drawing admiration for the government's apparent humility. "You might think at first glance that these are just villagers," read one widely circulated post, "but they are the President and the Prime Minister." ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/image.png) President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (center) and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya (right) share a meal at the residence of Agriculture Minister K. D. Lal Kantha in Kaduwela, Sri Lanka. Within hours, however, the conversation turned. The public's attention shifted — not to the modesty of the guests, but to the scale of their host's home. The host is Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha: a veteran Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna organiser who spent decades in full-time politics without private-sector employment, was arrested and tortured during the 1987–89 insurrection, escaped from a detention camp, and built his political identity around the image of the committed, self-sacrificing revolutionary. He is a Politburo member and the JVP's Administrative Secretary — one of the party's most senior figures. His official parliamentary address is listed not as a private residence but as the JVP headquarters in Pelawatta, Battaramulla. His three-storey Kaduwela home — fitted with air-conditioning, solar panels, a piano and high-end furnishings — has since triggered formal complaints to the country's anti-bribery commission, a police hotline report, and a question that now sits uncomfortably at the heart of the NPP's governing identity: how did one of its most prominent ministers, a lifelong political worker with no known private income, finance such a residence? ### **'Social Capital'** ![The House](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/a-minister-s-house-and-the-que-9GfFsw-kixbcf1i4hc7ugg.png) The House The minister's explanation, offered in a YouTube interview, rests on several pillars. He said the house was built by combining two plots of land — totalling thirteen perches, he maintains, though critics claim thirty — purchased using proceeds from the sale of a family property near Kandy Road at Matale Junction. His wife's employment covered household expenses during years when he drew no salary. He moved into the finished house in late 2024, he said, and the gathering that ignited the controversy was not a housewarming but an almsgiving organised in memory of his deceased parents. On the piano — which had become, in social media discussions, a particular symbol of perceived hypocrisy for a party that has long presented itself as the voice of the underprivileged — he offered a mundane explanation: his daughter had been studying music since childhood, and the instrument had been in the family for fifteen years. "Having a set of chairs in a house nowadays is not a magic trick," he added. He also offered a defence of his evolving lifestyle that broke with JVP orthodoxy. Capitalism, he argued, was defined not by the consumption of goods but by the ownership of capital and the exploitation of labour. Living standards change as society changes, he said, and it is natural for them to rise. But it was his invocation of "social capital" that most consequentially changed the terms of the debate. He described having accumulated, over nearly four decades in politics, a network of trusted associates across the country — in Kandy, Anuradhapura, Colombo and elsewhere — who would give him money on nothing more than a telephone call, with no expectation of return. If necessary, he said, he could raise Rs. 500,000 each from one hundred such people within a single week. "That is Rs. 50 million," he said, "and many people do not know how to measure that kind of value." ### **A Defence That Contradicts Itself** The government’s response has done little to clarify matters. Defending the Agriculture Minister on April 7, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath said, “Minister Lal Kantha built his house before he became a minister. He financed it by selling his properties in Anuradhapura and his wife’s properties in Kandy.” He also urged journalists with concerns about ministers’ assets to file complaints with the Bribery Commission. Key details remain undisclosed. The total construction cost of the house has not been revealed, nor has the sale price of the ancestral property. The nature and extent of the minister’s wife’s income have also not been specified. Whether the Kaduwela property is listed in the minister’s annual asset and liability declarations to the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) remains unclear. The minister has confirmed that his 2025 declaration was submitted, and CIABOC officials have acknowledged receiving it. However, the document has not been made public, and no explanation has been provided for the delay. This is not Lal Kantha’s first encounter with such questions. In September 2025, responding to Deputy Minister Nalin Hewage’s remark that people with money are thieves, Lal Kantha made a striking declaration: “I have been asked that question all my life, and I have said that I have assets — that I have land, that I have houses.” He insisted that all of it was legally acquired and challenged those who could not justify their wealth to face prosecution. ## **What the Law Assumes** What Lal Kantha calls social capital is, in substance, a minister using his political status and loyalist network to finance a private luxury asset. A network built through public office is not a neutral, private resource; it is created in a context where the state controls land, licences, tenders and regulatory discretion. A senior political scientist at a leading Sri Lankan university drew a sharp distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uses of such networks. Mobilising supporters for a public or community purpose falls within acceptable bounds, she said. Financing a private dwelling does not. "Using social capital for personal benefit is illegal. It can only be used for public purposes." She raised a further concern rooted in the asymmetry of power. When a sitting minister solicits money from individuals, those individuals operate in a context where the state controls licences, approvals, contracts and a hundred other levers of daily life. What appears on the surface as voluntary generosity may, in practice, carry an implicit expectation of return. That, she said, edges into the legal territory of bribery. A prominent academic who has written extensively on Sri Lankan democratic governance put the threshold plainly: "Where did the money come from? That must be explained. He is accountable to his voters — how much was spent, where the land came from, whether there was extortion. These are important questions." In most jurisdictions with robust integrity systems, the mechanism the minister describes is not treated as a charming cultural trait. Political scientists distinguish between bridging social capital — open, outward-facing networks that strengthen civic participation — and bonding social capital: tight, inward-looking elite networks that convert relationships into private gain. Research has consistently linked the latter to higher corruption risk, clientelism and in-group favouritism. What Lal Kantha describes fits the second category closely. ## **A Record of Controversy** Lal Kantha’s public statements have generated a consistent pattern of controversy since the NPP took office. In late 2024, he was criticised for telling farmers they could “take any action” against wild animals damaging crops — remarks widely seen as undermining wildlife protection laws. In January 2026, he sparked a political and religious backlash after referring to the Chief Incumbent of the Mihintale Rajamaha Viharaya, Ven. Walawahengunawe Dhammarathana Thera, as a “Mihintale savage.” while defending Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya. He has also called Sri Lanka's public service a "den of thieves" and alleged that maize importers attempted to bribe him — claims he did not substantiate with formal complaints. Most consequentially, at a “Reading Lenin” event organised by his trade union federation in January 2026, he threatened to strike back at critics “whether they are in black robes, national suits or the saffron” — a direct reference to the legal profession, the political class and the Buddhist clergy. The National Sangha Council demanded a retraction and urged President Dissanayake to restrain him. But government sources and insiders within the JVP told *Jaffna Monitor* that Lal Kantha “cannot be restrained by anyone,” including the President. ### **Three Sources of Power** As Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, Land and Irrigation, Lal Kantha commands one of the government's most politically sensitive portfolios. Land policy, food security and rural livelihoods are not abstract bureaucratic concerns in Sri Lanka; they are vote-bank realities that reach into every electorate outside the Western Province. Beyond the portfolio, he sits on the JVP Politburo — the party's highest decision-making body — and serves as its Administrative Secretary. Within the JVP's rigidly hierarchical structure, that position means a direct hand in candidate selection, internal discipline and strategic direction. Individuals familiar with the party's internal dynamics say he enjoys the support — and, in some quarters, the veneration — of a majority within the Politburo. The NPP may present a plural face to the electorate, but it is the JVP that supplies its cadres, its ground machinery and its ideological coherence. Third is his command of organised labour. As president of the National Trade Union Centre, the JVP-aligned trade union federation, he has a demonstrated capacity to mobilise workers, call stoppages and sustain public pressure campaigns. That capacity does not diminish when a party enters government; if anything, it acquires a sharper edge. His political roots underpin all of this. Lal Kantha joined the JVP as a student, completed its full five-stage ideological formation programme and was already an active organiser during the 1987–89 insurrection. He was arrested, tortured and detained, escaped from custody and continued organising. In a party that prizes sacrifice, discipline and long service above almost everything else, someone who paid that price commands a form of internal legitimacy that no appointment can manufacture and no reshuffle can revoke. In the 2024 parliamentary election, he led the NPP's candidate list in Kandy and received 316,951 preferential votes — far ahead of any other NPP candidate in the district. A senior JVP insider, speaking to Jaffna Monitor on condition of anonymity, said Lal Kantha's entrenched position makes him effectively immune to challenge — even from the party's top leadership. Any move against him, the source said, would not be a straightforward disciplinary decision but one constrained by factional alignments, with the potential to trigger wider instability. He is not Ashoka Ranwala. The NPP's former Speaker was removed with relative ease once the cost of retaining him grew too high — a figure the president could dispense with when the political calculus demanded it. Lal Kantha represents an entirely different equation. He is not someone you remove. He is someone the party must bear — even, the insider implied, if it were proven that he had misused his social capital. ### Kneeling, Beaten: Tamil Fisherman Accuses Navy Intelligence of Abuse in Batticaloa URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/kneel-beaten-silenced-fisherman-accuses-navy-intelligence-of-abuse-in-batticaloa/ Last updated: 2026-04-08T16:04:46.000Z **April 8, 2026** BATTICALOA, Sri Lanka — A fisherman in eastern Sri Lanka has filed a formal complaint with the Human Rights Commission, accusing Navy intelligence personnel of subjecting him to prolonged physical abuse and public humiliation following his arrest over the alleged use of a banned fishing net, according to documents submitted to the commission on Wednesday. The fisherman, identified as Nandheesan, said he was detained on April 5 while fishing off Chettipalayam beach in Batticaloa by a team of five intelligence officers affiliated with the Kallady naval camp who were dressed in civilian clothing. The officers, he said, found him in possession of lead weights used for a “surukku” net — a type of net banned under Sri Lankan fisheries regulations. Nandheesan said he acknowledged having the net and surrendered it at the scene without resistance. What followed, he alleged, was a prolonged episode of abuse: he was forced to remain kneeling on the ground for nearly two hours and was beaten by the officers during that time. He also said he was denied access to medication, despite informing the officers that he has diabetes. The incident took a further turn when his wife arrived at the scene and attempted to document the alleged abuse using her mobile phone. According to the complaint, the officers confiscated her device, deleted the footage, subjected her to verbal abuse, and threatened her with arrest. Nandheesan was subsequently taken to the Kaluthavalai naval camp before being handed over to officials from the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources in Batticaloa. In his complaint, Nandheesan described lasting physical and psychological effects from the episode. He said the public character of the alleged punishment compounded the harm: his children and hundreds of local residents witnessed him being made to kneel in the street, an experience he described as a source of profound humiliation. In its aftermath, he said, his children have been reluctant to attend school. Nandheesan also questioned why he had been singled out for enforcement action, saying that more than a hundred others in the area use similar fishing methods without facing consequences. He has called on the authorities to pursue legal action against the officers he named in the complaint. The Sri Lanka Navy had not responded to the allegations as of Wednesday evening. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has not yet issued a public statement on the complaint. The use of the surukku net, which functions by drawing a weighted enclosure tight around a catch, is prohibited under national fisheries law owing to concerns about its impact on fish populations and sea-floor habitats. Enforcement of the ban has been uneven along the eastern coast, and fishing communities have long complained of selective and at times abusive application of the regulations. ### The Leader Prabhakaran Was Not — But Laldenga Was URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-leader-prabhakaran-was-not-but-laldenga-was/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T03:18:43.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** It was in 1966 that the Mizo National Front (MNF) launched its guerrilla war against the Indian state. This was nine years before Velupillai Prabhakaran shot dead the Mayor of Jaffna, and a decade before Sri Lanka witnessed the birth of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The comparison is striking not only in timeline but also in scale: Prabhakaran’s envisioned Tamil Eelam spanned roughly 18,000 to 19,000 square kilometres, not far off from Mizoram’s approximately 21,000 square kilometres. After two decades of violence and terror, the MNF signed a peace accord with New Delhi, transforming Mizoram from one of the most disturbed regions into one of India’s most peaceful states. In contrast, the LTTE, after spearheading a bloody and eye-popping war for over a quarter century, was crushed beyond redemption. MNF leader Zoramthanga’s gripping book, *From Guerrilla Fighter to Chief Minister* (Penguin/Black), offers some valuable lessons on why the two insurgencies – no doubt in different settings and eras -- took widely different trajectories and ended with dramatically opposite outcomes. The first coordinated military salvo by the MNF in 1966 jolted the Indian state, although there was suspicion that something was about to happen. The well-planned attacks were a success, and several police/military posts across Mizoram fell to the rebels. But the biggest of them all, in capital Aizawl, remained in Indian government hands despite bitter fighting. Zoramthanga viewed the Aizawl failure differently. A devout Christian, he in fact thanks God for the setback. In his reading, had the fighters taken Aizawl, they would have come into possession of millions of rupees from the treasury, along with a vast arsenal of weapons. This, he believed, would have humiliated the Indian state, triggered retaliatory reprisals, and led to terrible bloodshed. Instead of despairing, he expresses gratitude to God for averting such a possibility. “If Aizawl had fallen and the MNF had ruled all of Mizoram, even briefly, opportunities for error and abuse might have arisen. In the heat of triumph, political vendettas or personal grievances could have led to regrettable acts,” he says. “It would have been difficult to protect the staff and officials from other parts of India living in Mizoram.” The admission is a rare tribute to the way Mizo leaders consistently placed the utmost importance on the welfare of the people they claimed to represent. This principle lay at the core of their two-decade-long struggle, which saw many ups and downs. In contrast, the LTTE repeatedly engaged the enemy even when victory was not in sight, calculating that any military retaliation would fuel greater anger among the people and, perhaps, lead to increased recruitment for the Tigers. ![Laldenga, who led the Mizo insurgency before signing a historic peace accord with India.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-leader-prabhakaran-was-not-pv1nks-kixyyocatjo5axf.png) Laldenga, who led the Mizo insurgency before signing a historic peace accord with India. ![Laldenga (centre), founder of the MNF, with his close aide Zoramthanga (right).](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-leader-prabhakaran-was-not-pv1nks-kixhdv753q0wuns-1.png) Laldenga (centre), founder of the MNF, with his close aide Zoramthanga (right). Now 81 years old, Zoramthanga served for long periods as a trusted deputy to MNF founder leader Laldenga. He became Laldenga’s secretary in 1969\. Laldenga, a former Indian Army soldier, went on to become the first Chief Minister of Mizoram after it was granted full statehood in the wake of the 1986 peace accord. Eight years after Laldenga’s death in 1990, Zoramthanga became Chief Minister of Mizoram, serving for 15 years across three terms. Although the MNF established early ties with both Pakistan and China and secured weapons and money from both countries, its leadership concluded early on that it would be impossible for Mizoram to secede from the Indian union. Pakistan, which, along with China, also trained MNF fighters, hosted Laldenga for many years – first in Dhaka, when it was a part of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and later in Islamabad. Even from Pakistani soil, the MNF quietly pursued peace efforts with India, without the knowledge of the Pakistani intelligence. This took Zoramthanga and his comrades on covert missions to Kabul, Bangkok, and Geneva. ![Zoramthanga in China in 1970 (left) and later as a rebel leader in battle fatigues (right).](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-leader-prabhakaran-was-not-pv1nks-kix4l6e8w2ptc5b-1.png) Zoramthanga in China in 1970 (left) and later as a rebel leader in battle fatigues (right). LTTE founder-leader Prabhakaran lived in India continuously for more than three years; he too, like Laldenga, did not come under the control or influence of his host government. But unlike Laldenga, Prabhakaran believed he could never be defeated. He brushed aside even friendly warnings to the contrary from well-meaning confidants such as Anton Balasingham. Laldenga, by contrast, did not allow early military successes to go to his head. Of course, there is no comparison between what the MNF and the LTTE achieved militarily. Unfortunately, Prabhakaran failed to realise that what is won by force can also be undone. When Zoromthanga and his Mizo friends wanted to abandon their studies and join the MNF, he was advised by its leaders to first finish their graduation. It is this attitude that has made Mizoram, although overwhelmingly tribal, one of the most literate states in India today. In Sri Lanka’s Tamil areas, hundreds of emotionally-charged Tamils quit schools – and were encouraged to do so – to sign up with militant groups in the 1980s without caring for the future. The disastrous consequences are seen now because most former LTTE fighters who survived the war lack the basic educational skills to acquire jobs. Zoramthanga makes a telling comment even as the MNF was putting down strong roots in Mizoram in the late 1960s: “Freedom cannot be won through arms alone — it must rest on the consent and confidence of the people. One cannot govern rightly with a gun in hand.” Such thinking would have been anathema to the LTTE, whose leadership was wedded to the dogma that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun — always, at all times. India was as harsh vis-à-vis the MNF and its supporters — real or perceived — as any state could be. Indeed, some of the punitive measures unleashed by the Indian government were so heavy-handed that they have not been repeated anywhere in later years. Naturally, this affected the morale of MNF cadres, many of whom surrendered to the security forces. The MNF, however, did not brand such individuals as “traitors.” If anything, the MNF leadership understood the harsh realities. “We could not blame the parents and their children who surrendered — not because they betrayed the MNF’s principles of the freedom movement, but simply because of poverty, as parents needed help, or, in some cases, because of poor health and the need for rest,” writes Zoramthanga. In Sri Lanka, during the final phase of the war, even child fighters who had been forcibly recruited by the LTTE’s notorious abduction and enlistment units, and who later tried to escape, were tracked down, beaten — their parents too were assaulted — and dragged back into Tiger ranks to fight and die. Most of these children came from impoverished families. The peace talks between the Indian government and the MNF were not smooth. Both sides had different agendas, and there had to be give and take between the two parties. “The MNF sought to secure as much as possible; the government sought to give as little as it could. The process was long and required patience and perseverance.” To the frustration of the MNF, the Indian government made unexpected U-turns during the peace process, seriously straining ties with the insurgents. One Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, bluntly told Laldenga: “I don’t trust you.” Indira Gandhi was initially conciliatory but later backtracked. Yet Laldenga held on, believing that a new dawn was possible — and he was proved right. Finally, Rajiv Gandhi, after succeeding his mother as Prime Minister, signed the peace pact with Laldenga. It has since remained one of the most successful peace accords in the country. There were fissures within the MNF, too, and some internal killings. Mizo society was not monolithic either. But overall, despite infighting and leadership crackdowns on dissenters, the MNF did not descend into a bloodbath, even though its members were heavily armed. Zoramthanga writes: “I believe such restraint would be hard to find in any armed insurgency anywhere.” One need not delve into the horrific internecine warfare among Tamil militant groups, in which the LTTE emerged with the worst track record. Even after the peace accord was signed, the MNF had pessimists. There were misgivings that the government could suddenly go back on its promises, and the MNF cadres would be left in the lurch. Some commanders told the leaders that 40 to 50 of the best weapons should be held back – “just in case”. The MNF brass held firm, telling the fighters that one should never go back on a promise. The group had pledged to give up every single weapon. And that was done. Yes, Mizoram did not secure independence from India. But today’s Mizoram is not only one of India’s most peaceful states, it also has many economic and social achievements to its credit. This would not have been possible but for the visionary leadership that the Mizo insurgency produced — a quality less evident in the LTTE’s trajectory. ### Sri Lanka Sells Seized Indian Fishing Equipment in Jaffna Amid Ongoing Maritime Strain URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lanka-sells-seized-indian-fishing-equipment-in-jaffna-amid-ongoing-maritime-strain/ Last updated: 2026-04-07T15:49:31.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — April 7, 2026 —** The Sri Lankan government auctioned gas cylinders, cooking stoves and batteries seized from Indian fishing boats on Tuesday, drawing large crowds to a public sale in Jaffna that offered a rare glimpse into how the state disposes of assets taken during maritime enforcement operations in the Palk Strait. The auction, organized by the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, featured equipment confiscated from both Sri Lankan and Indian vessels — some of it held in official custody for years as legal proceedings over maritime violations moved slowly through the courts. Officials declined to disclose the total revenue raised but described the proceeds as “significant,” saying the sale helped clear long-held inventory. Buyers from across the Jaffna peninsula gathered early, many bidding competitively for equipment they said would otherwise be unaffordable at market prices. “Even a used cylinder is useful for us,” one bidder said, clutching a receipt — a small moment that reflected the economic strain in a region still rebuilding after decades of conflict. Under Sri Lankan law, boats and gear confiscated following rulings on illegal fishing or maritime boundary violations can be vested in the state and later auctioned. The practice has become more visible in recent years as arrests in northern waters have increased. More than 500 Indian fishermen were detained in 2024 alone, according to Sri Lankan government data, as naval patrols intensified in the Palk Bay and Palk Strait — narrow, fish-rich waters separating the island’s Northern Province from the Tamil Nadu coast, sustaining fishing communities on both sides of a maritime boundary formally demarcated in the 1970s. The dispute has emerged as one of the most persistent irritants in relations between New Delhi and Colombo, featuring regularly in high-level diplomatic exchanges. Rights groups and fishing unions in Tamil Nadu have raised concerns about the treatment of detained fishermen, citing allegations of assault, prolonged detention and heavy fines. Sri Lankan authorities maintain that enforcement measures are necessary to protect marine resources and safeguard local livelihoods. For Tamil fishing communities in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar and Mullaitivu, the consequences run deeper than occasional auctions of seized equipment. Field studies in northern Sri Lanka indicate that more than 95 percent of local fishers believe incursions by Indian mechanised trawlers have directly reduced catches, damaged nets and eroded incomes — forcing some families to abandon fishing or fall into debt. At the centre of the dispute is bottom trawling, a method widely used by segments of the Tamil Nadu fleet that drags weighted nets along the seabed. Northern Sri Lankan fishers say it devastates coral ecosystems, marine habitats and breeding grounds critical to small-scale coastal fishing. To avoid confrontation, many restrict themselves to near-shore waters, intensifying pressure on already depleted stocks. Researchers who have studied the conflict caution that it reflects deeper structural asymmetries than the familiar framing of “big India versus small Sri Lanka” suggests. Northern Tamil fishers often struggle to secure consistent enforcement against foreign trawlers or obtain compensation for damaged gear — reinforcing a sense of marginalisation among communities still recovering from war. Fishing communities in Tamil Nadu, in turn, argue that declining catches, climate pressures and decades of dependence on trawling have made crossing the maritime boundary a necessity rather than a choice. Without a negotiated, time-bound transition away from bottom trawling — supported by alternative gear, economic assistance and sustained dialogue between communities on both sides — seizures, arrests and auctions like the one held in Jaffna on Tuesday are likely to continue, not as solutions, but as recurring symptoms of a crisis neither country has yet meaningfully resolved. ### How Oil Writes History in Blood URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/how-oil-writes-history-in-blood/ Last updated: 2026-04-07T07:21:46.000Z **By Nilantha Ilangamuwa** Never forget: the Iran–Iraq war raged for eight brutal years. Iran survived. Saddam Hussein, once courted by the West for strategic gain, was dragged from his hideout near Tikrit and executed after a deeply flawed Iraqi tribunal. Today, Trump toys with another reckless scheme to destabilise Iran, a continuation of his “decapitation project,” even as Tehran struggles with fractures demanding the immediate redesigning and re‑engineering of its governing structure in the style of Deng Xiaoping. This is no anomaly. History punishes the Blackwater; chaos haunts every land where outsiders play king, and the curse never forgives. In 1911, Winston Churchill faced a choice historians seldom recount in detail. Britain’s Royal Navy, historically reliant on Welsh coal, was being converted to oil. In his archives, he acknowledged that committing “the Navy irrevocably to oil was indeed ‘to take arms against a sea of troubles’,” as Daniel Yergin writes in The Prize. The decision was strategic, not technical. Coal had once been the backbone of the empire; oil became the artery. This pivot ensured Britain’s military and industrial capacity would be dependent on foreign reserves. Within decades, that reliance would drag Persia, the Arabian Peninsula, and other regions into geopolitical entanglement. Every barrel became a strategic asset, every human life a variable in calculations of control. Main actors recognised that mastery over oil was mastery over life and death. The earliest derricks in Pennsylvania, Baku, and beyond were not symbols of industrial progress; they were instruments of accumulation. John D. Rockefeller, whose empire rose with ruthless efficiency, stated, “The day of combination is here to stay. Individualism has gone, never to return,” as Daniel Yergin notes. Edward White, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, observed that corporate consolidation had “an intent and purpose to exclude others… and thus accomplish the mastery which was the end in view.” The pursuit of dominance was not incidental or accidental; it was deliberate, structural, and enforced through legal and economic mechanisms. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil did not aim to serve society. It aimed to control it. Empires followed the scent of hydrocarbons. Following World War I, British diplomats arbitrarily carved Iraq, Jordan, and other territories from the former Ottoman provinces. David Fromkin, in A Peace to End All Peace, notes that these were “British inventions, lines drawn on an empty map by British politicians after the First World War.” Control of territory was inseparable from control of its resources, yet officials operated in what Fromkin calls “staggering ignorance,” lacking basic maps and data about the lands they claimed to govern. That ignorance was not accidental; it was a tool. Power requires narrative control, not nuanced understanding. The map, not the land, became the instrument of strategy. The Shah of Iran internalised the mechanics of power and oil. Armin Meyer writes in The Oil Kings that his ambition was “to make Iran a modern major power before he died… ‘Japan of West Asia.’” But ambition collided with structural dependency. The United States armed Iran with advanced weapons and political cover. Nixon’s instruction, “You can push \[us\] as much as you want \[on oil prices\]… I will back you,” and Kissinger’s assurance that “Iran will get all available sophisticated weapons short of the atomic bomb,” reveal a transactional logic in which loyalty and oil were interchangeable. Weapons, finance, and diplomacy were deployed to reinforce dependency; human costs were irrelevant. Saudi Arabia pursued a variant of this calculus. As Bradley Hope and Justin Scheck write in Blood and Oil, “The Saudi royal family has always understood that petropower is about more than creating wealth... Oil is also the Saudis’ primary weapon of national self‑defence.” When Iran attempted to raise prices, Riyadh’s response was not negotiation but deliberate oversupply: “It exceed\[ed\] its production quota, pumping surplus oil onto the market… Iran lost billions.” Economic warfare was standard practice, with barrels as instruments and markets as battlefields. The Shah’s miscalculation demonstrates that power through oil is inseparable from control over strategy, timing, and perception. Mohammed bin Salman epitomises the operationalisation of petro-hegemony. At twenty-one, he stated, “My plan is to be richer than Alwaleed bin Talal in two years.” Wealth was not measured in prosperity but in dominance. He declared Machiavelli as his role model, according to Blood and Oil, operationally rather than philosophically, and enforced his vision by detaining princes at the Ritz-Carlton, subordinating traditional elites to his authority. Hostage-taking, wealth extraction, and elite purging are not anomalies but systemic instruments of state control. Death is neither accidental nor secondary in this theatre. Jamal Khashoggi’s final hours revealed meticulous orchestration: “Has the sacrificial animal arrived yet?” asked one of his killers, while Khashoggi himself queried, “Are you going to give me drugs?” MBS later framed responsibility as circumstantial: “I may bear some guilt, but not because I authorised the heinous act… but because I may have caused some of our people to love our Kingdom too much.” Strategic evasion masks moral accountability; it reduces murder to a calculable variable in governance. The populations of the Middle East have long been subordinated to external agendas. Kim Ghattas, in Black Wave, observes that “the left in its various shades… was being beaten into oblivion” and that “sectarianism had been weaponized.” These were deliberate constructions, funded and orchestrated by local and foreign powers seeking leverage. Militias, ideological suppression, and sectarian conflict became strategic tools, not unintended consequences. In Pakistan, the first overtly sectarian militias were trained and equipped to serve foreign agendas, their purpose tactical rather than ideological. Western powers openly acknowledged this logic. John Foster Dulles stated in 1950 that “American policy must be to assure the free flow of oil from the Middle East.” The CIA memorandum on the 1953 Iranian coup notes plainly: “The principal purpose of the operation is to prevent the further consolidation of nationalist control over Iran’s oil resources.” Armin Meyer writes of Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s early concessions: “We have been granted privileges over which the Persian government has almost no control. The development of the country’s oil is in our hands.” Access to oil dictated policy; human cost was irrelevant. Corporations, states, and empires coalesced in pursuit of this singular imperative. Industry consolidation, military intervention, and diplomatic pressure were instruments of a single logic: secure oil at any cost. Churchill called oil “the blood of war”; Rockefeller and White demonstrated its commercial ruthlessness; Dulles and the CIA operationalised it in foreign capitals. From Baku to Abadan, from Texas to Dhahran, control over oil fields determined who lived, who died, and who ruled. The modern iteration of this logic is no less brutal. Economic warfare, proxy conflict, elite purges, and state-sanctioned violence are routine. Saudi Arabia’s oil strategy against Iran in the 1970s prefigured today’s market manipulations. Western administrations continue to broker alliances that prioritise barrels over ethics. The populations affected are treated as variables in an equation they cannot influence, their futures measured in the displacement, scarcity, and violence generated by decisions made thousands of miles away. The oil industry persists not because energy is inherently scarce or nations lack skill, but because a constellation of elites—state actors, financiers, multinational corporations—has engineered a system that optimises for self-preservation and leverage. They manipulate supply, engineer scarcity, and reward loyalty, ensuring that any disruption reinforces dependence. Human lives, societal stability, and local governance are secondary; the architecture of influence has been designed to absorb consequence and evade accountability. Across a century, oil has been more than a commodity. Those who are behind the game operate under a single principle: those who control oil, control the rules. Populations live, die, and labour within these structures without participation in their design. Beneath the bombs exploding across Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, we are forced to revisit this bitter history and witness how ambition, avarice, and ruthless power collide with lives treated as expendable — and yet history repeats, while those who claim to learn from it do so with the same ruthless irony. ### The Pallava Shadow: How South India Reshaped Southeast Asia URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-pallava-shadow-how-south-india-reshaped-southeast-asia/ Last updated: 2026-04-07T05:57:10.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** How did Hindu temples come to dot the skyline in parts of Southeast Asia at a time when Buddhism too was spreading its wings? To answer this, we need to turn to the visionary Pallava kings, who ruled a sprawling region in southern India with Kanchipuram as their capital, overcoming military defeats with patience, confidence, and bravery. And who better to unveil this story than William Dalrymple, one of Scotland’s foremost historians, who has made Delhi his home and has the ability to weave complex historical facts into an engaging and accessible narrative. Our saga begins with Mahendravarman Pallava (571 to 630 CE), the third monarch and the most creative of all kings in the great Pallava dynasty, which ruled much of Southeast Asia from the third to the ninth century. In his celebrated work *The Golden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World* (Bloomsbury Publishing), Dalrymple says it was under his rule that an intellectual and artistic renaissance swept the Tamil country. He was the first to bring the traditions of rock-cut cave architecture to the scenic Coromandel Coast. Mahendravarman was also probably the first of the Pallavas to embrace devotional Puranic Hinduism, after the celebrated poet-saint Appar converted him from Jainism to Shaivism. ![The Varaha Cave Temple, a rock-cut shrine at Mamallapuram on India’s Coromandel Coast, reflects the architectural innovations of the Pallava era, when South Indian artistic traditions began to travel across the seas to Southeast Asia.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-pallava-shadow-how-south-i-3CD-tI-kixnhikg9d0pqa8.png) The Varaha Cave Temple, a rock-cut shrine at Mamallapuram on India’s Coromandel Coast, reflects the architectural innovations of the Pallava era, when South Indian artistic traditions began to travel across the seas to Southeast Asia. Before it became a major center of Shaivism, Kanchipuram was also one of the main Buddhist hubs in India, second in fame only to the iconic Nalanda. Mahendravarman, the author tells us, may also have been the first ruler to patronise the casting of bronzes, which eventually became South India’s most distinctive art form. Mahendravarman’s son, Narasimhavarman (630–668 CE), turned the Pallavas into a major trading power, aiming to dominate the lucrative overseas trade with countries to the east—present-day Southeast Asia. Narasimhavarman (also known as Mamalla) named the port of Mamallapuram, south of Chennai, after himself. It soon blossomed into one of the world’s great centers of trade and the arts. It was from here that he dispatched two military expeditions against Sri Lanka. Fleets of trading ships loaded with wealth then followed to Southeast Asia. Indian traders carried cargoes full of textiles, metal goods, and other manufactured products, which they exchanged for spices, camphor, resin, and other raw materials. They were also drawn by the rich gold deposits in Sumatra and Sarawak, as well as the small gold mines scattered across the region. Many of the sailors and merchants from the Pallava kingdom were initially non-Brahmins, as Brahminical injunctions on seafaring did not apply to them. However, Brahmins too began journeying to Southeast Asia in increasing numbers. Predictably, over time, people in Southeast Asia who spoke different languages, both on the mainland and in maritime centers, began to adopt Sanskrit. Indian epics and books were read, copied, and recited across the region. It is no wonder that Shiva lingams, Vishnu images, and freestanding Buddhas have been discovered during excavations in many of these countries. The lost-wax technique mastered by the Pallavas was used in the region to make hand-held statuettes. By the third century, a script based on a form of South Indian *Brahmi* was in widespread use in Southeast Asia. There was also wholesale adoption of the Indic religion, languages, art, and culture. It helped that there was a free mixing of Hinduism and Buddhism then. Some 400 Pallava-style shrines and temples were built between 675 and 725 in central Java. Hindu temples had earlier come up in the Mekong Delta, and more were later constructed across the sprawling Khmer region, now Cambodia. ![The towering spires of the Prambanan temple complex in central Java reflect the deep imprint of Indian—particularly Pallava—architectural and religious traditions that spread across Southeast Asia through trade, faith, and cultural exchange.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-pallava-shadow-how-south-i-3CD-tI-kixgfe9x05ogidx.png) The towering spires of the Prambanan temple complex in central Java reflect the deep imprint of Indian—particularly Pallava—architectural and religious traditions that spread across Southeast Asia through trade, faith, and cultural exchange. Most of these temples were strikingly similar to the Shore Temple at Mamallapuram and featured the same saints and deities favoured in the Pallava heartlands. But they were not mere copies. The small steps eventually led to one of the biggest and most imposing of Hindu temples at Angkor Wat in Cambodia. Khmer Prince Jayavarman II was a committed Hindu who looked to Lord Shiva as his personal deity. Many Khmer kings chose the daughters of Brahmins who had arrived from India to be their queens. Says Darlymple: “Behind this imported mythology lay a verifiable historical truth: from around the fourth and fifth centuries CE, the nascent city states across the breadth of monsoon Asia all began to look to Indian political and religious models, and started to adopt, to different extents, many of the ideas of statecraft brought by the Indian Brahmins who were docking in increasing numbers at their ports.” By the fifth century, almost all chiefs and kings of Southeast Asia began adopting the names of Hindu gods – such as Rudravarman and Jayavarman. ![The cover of The Golden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World by William Dalrymple, which traces the far-reaching cultural and political influence of ancient India across Asia.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/the-pallava-shadow-how-south-i-3CD-tI-kixx58lso5f57gm.jpg) The cover of The Golden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World by William Dalrymple, which traces the far-reaching cultural and political influence of ancient India across Asia. But despite the influx of Indian ideas, some things in Southeast Asia didn't change. Caste hierarchies so peculiar to Hinduism did not pollute the region; most Southeast Asians rejected vegetarianism, and women enjoyed high status. At the same time, non-Vedic, non-Brahminical Tamil folk and village guardian deities, such as Aiyanar, also appeared in Southeast Asian temples. According to the book, sometime in the 6th century, a wayward group of Shavia ascetics, known as the *Pashupatas*, arrived in Cambodia from India. They spearheaded a new wave of Shaivism, which gradually became the dominant faith in the region. By the close of the 8th century, the entire landscape of Southeast Asia was dotted with newly built Hindu and Buddhist temples and shrines for gods and religions imported from South Asia. The book also speaks about the political and economic alliance formed between the Khmers and the Pallavas’ successors, the great Cholas of Thanjavur. The two kingdoms realised that their interests coalesced. But that is another story. ### Former LTTE guerrillas battle hardships, trauma and taunts. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/former-ltte-guerrillas-battle-hardships-trauma-and-taunts/ Last updated: 2026-04-12T02:32:24.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** With a weather-beaten face, SR looks older than his years. By his own admission, he is a ‘coolie’ near Paranthan in northern Sri Lanka — a life of drudgery far removed from the time when he was a Tamil Tiger, fighting a protracted and determined war to carve out an independent Tamil homeland. Ever since he surrendered to the military in 2009, along with thousands of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrillas, SR has led a difficult life, struggling to adjust to a post-war Tamil society that appears to have given up on him and others who once embraced militancy. “A member of the Tamil diaspora promised some 10 years back to help build a toilet in my house,” he told me over a cup of plain tea. “I am still waiting for that pledge to be fulfilled… When I hear the diaspora and Tamil Nadu politicians talk about Tamil aspirations and so on, I get furious. They have all let us down.” SR’s anger is justified. It was way back in 1985 that he signed up with the LTTE and was recruited personally by its founder leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. He fought both the Indian and Sri Lankan armies, suffering multiple wounds. But what pains him most is the way his dreams have been shattered. ![LTTE fighters who took part in counterattacks during Operation Jayasikurui — a Sri Lankan military campaign launched on May 13, 1997, whose name means “Certain Victory” in Sinhala.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/former-ltte-guerrillas-battle-fH59Dg-kix849ad6r47zpu-1.jpg) LTTE fighters who took part in counterattacks during Operation Jayasikurui — a Sri Lankan military campaign launched on May 13, 1997, whose name means “Certain Victory” in Sinhala. “If I work hard, Sir, I can make a few thousand rupees to feed my family,” he says, describing his daily grind. “With a family, I find it difficult to survive. And I feel bad that no one really wants to help us.” SR’s is not a unique story in Sri Lanka’s north and east, home to hundreds of former LTTE fighters – male and female, now mostly in their 40s and 50s – who battle great odds just to survive. And this was the corps of fighters who waged a bloody war for a quarter century, a conflict that almost broke up Sri Lanka before the tide turned and the Tigers were militarily routed in May 2009. The conflict, one of the bloodiest in the world, left an estimated 100,000 people dead in Sri Lanka. Most fatalities and maimed were innocent Tamils, although Sinhalese and Muslims also died in large numbers. When the war ended, an estimated 12,000 guerrillas surrendered to the military. While some of them reportedly disappeared without a trace, the majority were jailed for varying periods before being officially “rehabilitated”. By then, tens of thousands of Tamils, including the educated and professional class, had fled Sri Lanka and settled mainly in the West, becoming one of the most vocal and successful diaspora groups. It was this diaspora that heavily funded the LTTE’s brutal war, which saw innovative military tactics, classical guerrilla warfare, as well as cold-blooded assassinations of Sri Lankan and Indian leaders and Tamils dubbed ‘traitors.’ Many diaspora members financed the Tigers willingly; others did so under duress. Former LTTE guerrillas say that even a portion of what the diaspora regularly contributed to the war machinery would have been enough to sustain them now. That, most unfortunately, is missing. As the years have rolled by since 2009, vast sections of the Tamil diaspora have turned their back to the former rebels. This naturally saddens Isai Amudan, who, at 44, drives an auto-rickshaw in Kilinochchi with a Jaipur foot (an artificial leg), having lost his right leg during years of fighting as an LTTE guerrilla. Like many former LTTE fighters, he works long hours each day to pay off debts and meet his family’s basic needs. Even a day’s rest — voluntary or otherwise — brings added misery. No wonder he broods: How long can he cope with life in this manner? Is this why he quit school at 13 to join the LTTE and fight for an independent Tamil Eelam? “Our life is an unending struggle, Sir,” he said over the telephone from Kilinochchi, a small but bustling town which served as the LTTE’s administrative capital before the war ended in 2009\. His voice betrays distress and trauma. ![LTTE fighters in the late 1990s, during the height of the Sri Lankan civil war.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/former-ltte-guerrillas-battle-fH59Dg-kixhslilfi14n4i-2.jpg) LTTE fighters in the late 1990s, during the height of the Sri Lankan civil war. By the time he surrendered in 2009 to the army, Amudan had taken shrapnel wounds in the head and waist and also lost a leg, preventing him from taking up hard manual work. He was jailed for three years. Today, he is a diabetic too. With a Jaipur foot fitted in 2014, he found it difficult to secure a job. He had not completed his schooling when he became a teenage guerrilla. He tried his hand at carpentry and other odd jobs before taking a loan to lease an auto-rickshaw. He must pay the financier nearly Rs. 30,000 a month for another one and a half years before the vehicle becomes his. As a result, he has to earn significantly more to support his family, which includes his wife — also a former LTTE fighter — and their young, school-going son. With Sri Lanka sliding from one economic crisis to another since 2022, whatever he earns is quickly exhausted after he meets his loan repayments and basic needs. “We have got used to this tough post-war life, Sir,” Amudan says. “What we can never get over is that the Tamil society seems to have simply forgotten us, besides the taunts we face at times.” Indeed, the overwhelming bulk of the former LTTE guerrillas now lead a life far removed from what they had dreamt of when they embraced militancy. And the worst part is that their harrowing story is largely hidden from the world at large. Another such Tamil, known by his *nom de guerre* Rangan, started selling kerosene and engine oil in Kilinochchi in January this year, after somehow doing painful physical labour for years despite eight war wounds. For a while, he ran a cloth store, but it closed during the COVID-19 epidemic. Now 55, Rangan had taken part in innumerable battles against the Sri Lankan military during the two decades he spent with the Tigers. After surrendering in 2009, he spent 63 long months in different prisons. ![A member of the Sea Tigers’ specialized underwater unit, the “Sulojan Neeradi Neecchal Pirivu” (Sulojan Underwater Swimming Unit), undergoes training.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/former-ltte-guerrillas-battle-fH59Dg-kixckpa0hgqu400-1.jpg) A member of the Sea Tigers’ specialized underwater unit, the “Sulojan Neeradi Neecchal Pirivu” (Sulojan Underwater Swimming Unit), undergoes training. Freedom did not mean peace. Intelligence personnel hounded him for a few years, repeatedly asking what he was up to. “Remember, we could have killed you,” one officer would say. The words brought pain. Rangan, who lost his first wife to artillery shelling during the war, undergoes severe physical distress every now and then due to shrapnel pieces embedded in his head and hand. “I get splitting headaches,” said the man who joined the LTTE just after the Indian army deployed in Sri Lanka in 1987, returned home in March 1990\. “I get needlessly angry. When I worked as a mason earlier, I could not cope due to the physical torment.” The lack of education and skills beyond guerrilla warfare prevents former fighters from finding gainful employment. This has forced many to take up whatever manual work they can find to make a living. Some sell vegetables or take on odd jobs. ![An LTTE fighter during the Sri Lankan civil war.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/former-ltte-guerrillas-battle-fH59Dg-kixawi9vzt7128i.png) An LTTE fighter during the Sri Lankan civil war. “There have been days when we could afford only a little rice, buttermilk, and salt as food,” said Rangan, who married another ex-guerrilla after walking out of prison. “It is thanks to my wife’s small job with the government that I got into the oil business on a small scale this year.” The LTTE’s military defeat turned the world upside down for those who survived decades of bloodbath. “Today, we lack dignity,” said Rangan, sounding bitter. “The same Tamil people for whom we fought now look down upon us. Nobody gives us decent jobs, either in the government or the private sector.” After a pause, he added: “Sir, I ‘died’ in 2009 when I surrendered. Now, I ‘die’ every day due to the way people shame us as a defeated lot. Believe it or not, I have even been told on my face: ‘Why didn’t you die?’” Rangan was born and brought up in the northwestern district of Mannar, where he held a senior position for the LTTE. He shifted to Kilinochchi, about 80 km away, after the war because Tamils he knew well made fun of him in Mannar. “The same men who once addressed us with respect when we were armed would now look at me and taunt whenever I raised my voice over even the smallest issue — whether it was my mistake or theirs — saying, ‘So, you got your (Tamil) Eelam?’ They knew that question itself was meant to humiliate me. I couldn’t take it anymore. So, I left Mannar for good.” Tamil sources in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Batticaloa insisted that up to 60 percent of all those who surrendered in 2009 continued to face terrible hardships, although the war ended almost 17 years ago. A woman from Mullaitivu said on the condition of anonymity that she does not allow her husband, a LTTE fighter for many years, to leave the house because he gets into a fight if someone makes fun of him. According to one Tamil source, life is most harsh and painful for those who were severely wounded, suffer from multiple health issues, who have lost limbs or partial or full eyesight, or are completely bedridden. Fortunately, some Tamils, based in the West and in Sri Lanka, including former LTTE members, regularly care for those who cannot even live on their own due to physical constraints or health-related problems. Notably, Colombo provides modest financial support to disabled guerrillas and some former rebels, ‘Imagine, we now take money from a government we fought for so long,’ said a former female Tamil Tiger. This financial support extends to members of the LTTE’s intelligence wing — some of whom, ironically, now serve as the government’s eyes and ears. However, the majority of former fighters struggle to make ends meet. What will become of these men and women when they are no longer able to work? Rangan wondered why erstwhile Tigers had been made outcasts, when governments and societies in Nepal and India had embraced their own former insurgents. “The Naxalites who surrender in India receive financial support to begin life anew. Even Nagas and Mizos, who fought for separation for decades, are now part of the Indian Army. This is also true of Maoists in Nepal,” he said, demonstrating his knowledge. “Why are we deprived of dignity and respect?” A former decorated fighter of the LTTE’s Charles Antony Regiment also does physical work for a living in a northern Sri Lankan town. Another, who used to work for the LTTE’s Voice of Tigers radio, now gives his voice over to private companies for advertisement campaigns on television. Former militants and Tamil sources said that while a section of the Tamil diaspora does help, unscrupulous middlemen in the Tamil society, at times, steal a part of the monetary support provided. One ex-LTTE member in Mullaitivu said, “If someone sends, say, 100 pounds, we get 40 or 50\. We know we are being cheated, but we can’t do anything. Those who know the diaspora members take our signatures or ask us to record a video presentation thanking them. All this is very disgusting.” Another Tamil added: “Many in the diaspora generously funded the LTTE war while they and their children lived peacefully in the West. But many among them now don’t care for those who actually fought the war.” “At least in the North, some support from the diaspora is extended — though it is far less than what is needed for former LTTE cadres”, Devika, an ex-Tigress from Kaluwanchikudy in Batticaloa, said. “But the real stepmotherly treatment is toward the Eastern Province, which has been largely neglected, as the majority of the diaspora is from the North. Some sections of the Tamil diaspora tend to view all former LTTE cadres from the East as part of Karuna’s faction: — referring to Karuna, one of the LTTE’s most decorated military commanders in the Batticaloa-Ampara district, who broke away from the LTTE in 2004\. But many former fighters, including those like me who took part in the final phase of the war, now live in abject poverty,” Devika said. Some time ago, a social activist — himself a former LTTE cadre from the Charles Antony Brigade — noted on social media that a former female guerrilla, crushed by poverty, had quietly moved to the Sinhalese-majority Anuradhapura District and entered prostitution. Fortunately, a well-meaning former LTTE activist later helped her leave the sex trade and arranged her marriage to an ex-guerrilla living in Europe. Another former Tigress in Mannar – a single mother with children -- recently sold one of her kidneys to pay off her mounting debts. Tamil sources said professional Tamil moneylenders exploit the former Tigers, knowing well their desperation for money and their inability to access the banking system due to lack of knowledge and professional skills. The best placed among the ex-guerrillas are those who were senior in the Tiger ranks but did not get killed or those who were with the LTTE’s ancillary units. “There is one former LTTE leader who is known to own three houses in Jaffna and Kilinochchi,” said a journalist in the eastern town of Batticaloa. “Some 10 per cent of ex-fighters lead comfortable lives. The majority battles penury.” “It is a terrible life, Sir,” added Amudan. “Since I have diabetes, I keep getting boils on my legs, making even walking a daunting task some days. But what can I do? Where can I go?” Some former rebels complained that they were thought of only during the LTTE’s annual “Heroes’ Day” in November. An ex-Tiger in Jaffna, who did not want to be named, said, “There are politicians who invite us on such occasions and gift us a sarong and a shirt. With no choice, we accept them. Once the event is over, we are forgotten until the next November.” Recently, Tamil political leader M.A. Sumanthiran called upon former LTTE fighters to join his Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), the main Tamil political force in Sri Lanka. It is not clear how many will be enthused by his invitation. One former Tiger poured scorn on politicians. “They use us on emotive nationalist issues. If they win elections, they forget us. If they lose elections, they simply say: ‘I could have helped had I won. What can I do now?” he said. “We know we are being exploited.” Two well-informed Tamils in Jaffna and Kilinochchi said it was a monumental tragedy that tens of thousands of dollars and pounds collected in the West in the LTTE’s name during the war years appear to have disappeared — in all probability pocketed by some of the fundraisers. ‘The Tamil diaspora too has failed,’ said one of them. ‘Instead of focusing solely on issues like federalism and self-determination, at least some should have joined hands to do something concrete for former Tigers.’ “They could have set up small-scale industries here and there and provided technical training to these people,” he added. “So many years have passed. The diaspora acts when it wants to. They build temples and churches and donate to many causes. But when it comes to genuinely rehabilitating former Tigers, there has been a collective failure.” A middle-aged former Tiger said, “It is not that the diaspora completely ignores us. Some Tigers are funded generously — perhaps because they are high-profile. But no one sincerely cares for people like us. We are not among the privileged.” **Editor’s Note:** **All photographs used in this article are for reference purposes and are sourced from the Jaffna Monitor photo library.** ### A Dark Date in the Contemporary Calendar of Humanity URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/a-dark-date-in-the-contemporary-calendar-of-humanity/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T13:38:02.000Z February 28, 2026, marks a dark date in the contemporary calendar of humanity; a day when the hands of the clocks went on strike in a state of protest and profound shock. On this day, the unlawful attacks by the Zionist regime and the United States against the territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran dealt a finishing blow to the discourse of international law regarding the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations. From this date onward, who can still regard the United Nations Charter as the foundation of lawful and civilized conduct in international relations? On this dark day, 168 schoolgirls in the city of Minab were martyred by American missiles while in their classrooms. What answer do the four Geneva Conventions have to offer for this? ![Thousands of mourners, including grieving families and local residents, gather to pay their respects to schoolgirls who were killed in a reported U.S. airstrike.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/a-dark-date-in-the-contemporar-1oeuVk-kixk6gt73xf5ija.png) Thousands of mourners, including grieving families and local residents, gather to pay their respects to schoolgirls who were killed in a reported U.S. airstrike. On this same day, the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran was targeted in his office, alongside his family, in what constitutes state terrorism by the United States; it is deeply regrettable that the delusional President of this regime continues, even now, to speak with pride of the assassination of a political leader of a country. What, truly, response or instruments does international law possess to halt the machinery of war crimes of the United States and the Zionist regime? Forty days have passed since the renewed operation of the machinery of terror and crimes against humanity by the Zionist regime and the United States. Every day and night, the people of Iran have been subjected to attacks by these two regimes against urban buildings, infrastructure, bridges, power plants, and even Iran’s nuclear facilities. The bodies of Iran’s martyrs—men, women, and children alike—are brought out daily from beneath the rubble of their homes. Tragically, the President of the terrorist regime of the United States and the Zionists insist on continuing the killing of the Iranian people, setting daily deadlines to turn Iran’s squares and streets into "hell!" The law-breaking and delusional President of the United States explicitly speaks of "returning Iran to the Stone Age!" while the international community maintains its silence! Yes, forty days have passed; forty days during which Iran has been the target of comprehensive attacks by two war-mongering and rogue regimes. The tragedy is that the costs of these demonic adventures of the Zionist regime are paid by the peoples of America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and everywhere else on this planet. The desired and ideal world of the child-killing U.S. regime and the Zionists is a world of bombs, missiles, intimidation, and terror. Today, ancient Iran stands tall and steadfast in the face of the all-out onslaught by the Zionist regime and its proxy government in the United States. Its Leader has been assassinated; its commanders massacred; its civilized people drenched in blood; yet, the Iranian youth stand resolutely engaged in defending themselves and their seven-thousand-year history. Amid all this, what is truly lamentable is the complicity of certain Muslim countries in the region with these criminals. Some neighboring governments have turned their homes into launch pads for attacks against Iran, placing their territories at the disposal of Iran’s enemies to assault, kill, and commit atrocities. Those who have participated in the war crimes and assassinations of the terrorist regime now raise their voices in protest when Iran responds, in retaliation, with dignity, honor, and strength to the attacks of its enemies, asking why Iran targets the bases of the criminal enemy! The displacement of the roles of "perpetrator" and "victim" is no longer confined to theaters and books; these bitter scenes are now unfolding in the Persian Gulf. ![A grief-stricken mother weeps over the coffin of her daughter during a funeral procession.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/a-dark-date-in-the-contemporar-1oeuVk-kixt1qige161khv.png) A grief-stricken mother weeps over the coffin of her daughter during a funeral procession. And Iran, a country where the trees lining its streets have a longer history than the aggressors, stands powerfully present in the Persian Gulf, reminding all criminals and their companions in the region that though you assassinated Iran’s Leader, the young Leader of Iran stands mightily in the trenches of defending the Islamic homeland, and the heroic Iranian nation continues to fill the pages of history with courage and valiant resistance, while whispering this poem: *O schoolgirls of Minab!* *Daughters of the Seven Seas,* *Why did you come to the Planet of the Crimson Rose?* *Here, in the darkness, the Devil* *Has seized your silence* *And your fate.* *The night-worshipping Devil knows not* *That with the keen blade of the morning sun* *From your thousand-shattered bodies* *You shall rise from the Persian Gulf* *And banish sleep from the night of the “Blind Whale.”* **Editor’s Note:** **This article is authored by Dr. Alireza Delkhosh, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Sri Lanka.** ### From Remittances to Investment: Rethinking the Tamil Diaspora’s Role URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/evolving-diaspora-engagement-supporting-jaffnas-development-in-a-changing-context/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T11:58:45.000Z The Tamil diaspora has long been an integral part of Jaffna’s social, economic, and cultural landscape. Spread across countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and parts of Europe, this global community has maintained strong and enduring ties with Northern Sri Lanka. These connections have been expressed through family relationships, financial support, cultural exchange, and political engagement. During periods of conflict and immediate post-war recovery, diaspora contributions played a significant role in supporting communities in Jaffna. Remittances provided economic stability for many households, while humanitarian assistance helped address urgent needs. Advocacy efforts at the international level also brought attention to the challenges faced by civilians in the region. As Jaffna continues to transition within a post-conflict environment, the broader context in which diaspora engagement takes place is gradually changing. Development priorities are evolving, and so too are the expectations placed on both local stakeholders and overseas communities. One aspect of this evolving relationship involves differing perspectives within the diaspora itself. While many individuals and organizations focus on humanitarian and development-oriented initiatives, some continue to engage with political narratives shaped by the conflict period, including those associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These perspectives are often rooted in personal histories and collective memory, reflecting experiences of displacement, loss, and unresolved grievances. At the same time, there is increasing recognition—both within Jaffna and among sections of the diaspora—that present-day challenges require approaches that are distinct from those of the past. Economic development, education, healthcare, and infrastructure have emerged as key areas of focus for communities seeking long-term stability and growth. Jaffna today is characterized by a population that is both resilient and forward-looking. A significant proportion of its residents, particularly younger generations, have grown up after the end of the conflict. Their priorities tend to center on access to education, employment opportunities, technological connectivity, and social mobility. These aspirations are shaped not only by local realities but also by global influences, including digital media and international migration trends. In this context, diaspora engagement has the potential to contribute in ways that align closely with current development needs. Financial remittances remain an important source of income for many families, but there is also growing interest in more structured forms of investment. These include support for small and medium enterprises, participation in local business ventures, and funding for community-based projects. Education represents another key area where diaspora involvement can have a meaningful impact. Jaffna has a longstanding reputation for valuing academic achievement, and many diaspora members have themselves benefited from educational opportunities abroad. Partnerships between overseas professionals and local institutions can help expand access to knowledge, introduce new skills, and strengthen capacity in areas such as science, technology, and entrepreneurship. In addition, healthcare and social services continue to benefit from diaspora support. Contributions to hospitals, mental health initiatives, and social welfare programs have helped address gaps in public services. These efforts are particularly important in a region where the long-term effects of conflict are still being addressed. At the same time, effective engagement requires careful consideration of local contexts. Development initiatives are most sustainable when they are aligned with community priorities and implemented in collaboration with local stakeholders. This includes consultation with civil society organizations, local authorities, and community members to ensure that projects are relevant and inclusive. ![Countries of residence of the Sri Lankan diaspora, 2013 Source: United Nations (2013).](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/evolving-diaspora-engagement-s-j-QrtI-kix7xm7vhv0n15a.png) Countries of residence of the Sri Lankan diaspora, 2013 Source: United Nations (2013). Another important dimension is communication. The way Jaffna is represented in diaspora media, social platforms, and advocacy spaces can influence perceptions both within and outside Sri Lanka. Balanced narratives that reflect current realities, alongside historical context—can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the region. It is also important to note that perspectives within Jaffna itself are diverse. Different communities and individuals may hold varying views on development priorities, political engagement, and the role of external actors. Recognizing this diversity is essential in avoiding one-dimensional approaches and ensuring that multiple voices are heard. The relationship between memory and development is a particularly sensitive area. The legacy of conflict remains a significant part of collective identity for many people, both locally and within the diaspora. Efforts to address issues related to accountability, reconciliation, and historical understanding continue to be part of broader national and international discussions. At the same time, there is an increasing emphasis on forward-looking initiatives that focus on improving living standards and expanding opportunities. These two dimensions—acknowledging the past and building for the future, are not mutually exclusive, but balancing them requires thoughtful engagement. From a policy perspective, there are opportunities to further facilitate constructive diaspora involvement. Measures that promote transparency, ease of investment, and regulatory clarity can encourage more structured and sustained contributions. At the same time, safeguards are necessary to ensure that development efforts are equitable and benefit a wide range of communities. Collaboration between local institutions and diaspora networks can also be strengthened through formal partnerships. Academic exchanges, business forums, and cultural programs can serve as platforms for knowledge sharing and mutual understanding. Such initiatives can help bridge gaps between local needs and global expertise. In recent years, there have been examples of diaspora-led projects that reflect this evolving approach. These include technology training programs, support for women-led enterprises, and initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable agriculture. While varying in scale, these efforts illustrate the potential for diaspora engagement to contribute to long-term development. Looking ahead, the role of the diaspora in Jaffna is likely to remain significant. However, the nature of that role will continue to adapt in response to changing circumstances. As new generations emerge, both within Sri Lanka and abroad—there may be shifts in priorities, perspectives, and methods of engagement. For many observers, the key question is how to ensure that diaspora contributions are aligned with the needs and aspirations of communities in Jaffna today. This involves not only the allocation of resources but also the approach taken in designing and implementing initiatives. A focus on inclusivity, sustainability, and collaboration can help maximize the positive impact of diaspora involvement. This includes supporting projects that create employment, enhance skills, and strengthen local institutions. It also involves fostering dialogue between different stakeholders to build trust and shared understanding. In this context, reducing emphasis on divisive or conflict-centered narratives may create more space for constructive engagement. While historical perspectives remain important, a balanced approach that incorporates present-day realities can support more effective development outcomes. Ultimately, Jaffna’s ongoing transition reflects a broader process of change within Sri Lanka. The region’s future will be shaped by a combination of local efforts, national policies, and international connections, including those maintained by the diaspora. By adapting to evolving circumstances and focusing on practical areas of cooperation, diaspora communities can continue to play a meaningful role in supporting Jaffna’s development. Their contributions, when aligned with local priorities—have the potential to enhance economic opportunities, strengthen social services, and contribute to long-term stability. As this relationship continues to develop, maintaining open channels of communication and mutual understanding will be essential. In doing so, both Jaffna and its diaspora can work toward shared goals that reflect the needs of the present while remaining mindful of the past. **Writer Colonel Nalin Herath was the former DG INSS and Military Spokesman** ### Judges’ Retirement Age: A New Proposal and Its Implications URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/judges-retirement-age-a-new-proposal-and-its-implications-2/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T11:10:08.000Z **By: Professor G. L. Peiris** ## **I. The Constitutional Context** Independence of the judiciary is, without question, an essential element of a functioning democracy. In recognition of this, ample provision is made in the highest law of our country, the Constitution, to engender an environment in which the courts are able to fulfil their public responsibility with total acceptance. As part of this protective apparatus, judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are assured of security of tenure by the provision that "they shall not be removed except by an order of the President made after an address of Parliament supported by a majority of the total number of members of Parliament, (including those not present), has been presented to the President for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity"\[Article 107(2)\]. Since this assurance holds good for the entirety of tenure, it follows that the age of retirement should be defined with certainty. This is done by the Constitution itself by the provision that "the age of retirement of judges of the Supreme Court shall be 65 years and of judges of the Court of Appeal shall be 63 years"\[Article 107(5)\]. ### **II. A Proposal for Reform** This provision has been in force ever since the commencement of the Constitution. Significant public interest, therefore, has been aroused by the lead story in a newspaper, Anidda of 13 March, that the government is proposing to extend the term of office of judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal by a period of two years. This proposal, if indeed it reflects the thinking of the government, is deeply disturbing from the standpoint of policy, and gives rise to grave consequences. The courts operating at the apex of the judicial structure are called upon to do justice between citizens and also between the state and members of the public. It is an indispensable principle governing the administration of justice that not the slightest shadow of doubt should arise in the public mind regarding the absolute objectivity and impartiality with which the courts approach this task. What is proposed, if the newspaper report is authentic, is to confer on judges of two particular courts, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, a substantial benefit or advantage in the form of extension of their years of service. The question is whether the implications of this initiative are healthy for the administration of justice. ### **III. Governing Considerations of Policy** What is at stake is a principle intuitively identified as a pillar of justice. Reflecting firm convictions, the legal antecedents reiterate the established position with remarkable emphasis. The classical exposition of the seminal standard is, of course, the pronouncement by Lord Hewart: "It is not merely of some importance, but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done". (Rex v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy). The underlying principle is that perception is no less important than reality. The mere appearance of partiality has been held to vitiate proceedings: Dissanayake v. Kaleel. In particular, reasonableness of apprehension in the mind of the parties to litigation is critical: Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, a reasonable likelihood of bias being necessarily fatal (Manak Lal v. Prem Chaud Singhvi). The overriding factor is unshaken public confidence in the judiciary: State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak. The decision must be "demonstrably" (Saleem Marsoof J.) fair. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has rightly declared: "The authority of the judiciary ultimately depends on the trust reposed in it by the people, which is sustained only when justice is administered in a visibly fair manner". Credibility is paramount in this regard. "Justice has to be seen to be believed" (J.B. Morton). Legality of the outcome is not decisive; process is of equal consequence. Judicial decisions, then, must withstand public scrutiny, not merely legal technicality: Mark Fernando J. in the Jana Ghosha case. Conceived as continuing vitality of natural justice principles, these are integral to justice itself: Samarawickrema J. in Fernando v. Attorney General. Institutional integrity depends on eliminating even the appearance of partiality (Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant), and "open justice is the cornerstone of our judicial system": (Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd. v. SEBI). ### **IV. Practical Constraints** Apart from these compelling considerations of policy, there are practical aspects which call for serious consideration. The effect of the proposal is that, among all judges operating at different levels in the judicature of Sri Lanka, judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal only, to the exclusion of all other judges, are singled out as the beneficiaries of the proposal. An inevitable result is that High Court and District Judges and Magistrates will find their avenues of promotion seriously impeded by the unexpected lengthening of the periods of service of currently serving judges in the two apex courts. Consequently, they will be required to retire at a point of time appreciably earlier than they had anticipated to relinquish judicial office because the prospect of promotion to higher courts, entailing higher age limits for retirement, is precipitately withdrawn. Some degree of demotivation, arising from denial of legitimate expectation, is therefore to be expected. A possible response to this obvious problem is a decision to make the two-year extension applicable to all judicial officers, rather than confining it to judges of the two highest courts. This would solve the problem of disillusionment at lower levels of the judiciary, but other issues, clearly serious in their impact, will naturally arise. Public service structures, to be equitable and effective, must be founded on principles of non-discrimination in respect of service conditions and related matters. Arbitrary or invidious treatment is destructive of this purpose. In determining the age of retirement of judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, some attention has been properly paid to balance and consistency. The age of retirement of a Supreme Court judge is on par with that applicable to university professors and academic staff in the higher education system. They all retire at 65 years. Members of the public service, generally, retire at 60\. Medical specialists retire at 63, with the possibility of extension in special circumstances to 65\. The age of retirement for High Court Judges is 61, and for Magistrates and District Judges 60\. It may be noted that the policy change in 2022 aimed at specifically addressing the issue of uniformity and compatibility. If, then, an attempt is made to carve out an ad hoc principle strictly limited to judicial officers, not admitting of a self-evident rationale, the question would inevitably arise whether this is fair by other categories of the public service and whether the latter would not entertain a justifiable sense of grievance. This is not merely a moral or ethical issue relating to motivation and fulfillment within the public service, but it could potentially give rise to critical legal issues. It is certainly arguable that the proposed course of action represents an infringement of the postulate of equality of treatment, and non-discrimination, enshrined in Article 12(1) of the Constitution. There would, as well, be the awkward situation that this issue, almost certain to be raised, would then have to be adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court, itself the direct and exclusive beneficiary of the impugned measure. ### **V. Piecemeal Amendment or an Overall Approach?** If innovation on these lines is contemplated, would it not be desirable to take up the issue as part of the new Constitution, which the government has pledged to formulate and enact, rather than as a piecemeal amendment at this moment to the existing Constitution? After all, Chapter XV, dealing with the Judiciary, contains provisions interlinked with other salient features of the Constitution, and an integrated approach would seem preferable. ### **VI. Conclusion** In sum, then, it is submitted that the proposed change is injurious to the institutional integrity of the judiciary and to the prestige and stature of judges, and that it should not be implemented without full consideration of all the issues involved. ### Sri Lankan Deputy High Commissioner’s Presence at Puducherry Political Event Raises Interference Concerns URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankan-deputy-consul-generals-presence-at-puducherry-political-event-raises-interference-concerns/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T05:09:23.000Z **CHENNAI, India — April 6, 2026 —** Sri Lanka’s Deputy High Commissioner for South India, Ganesanathan Ketheeswaran, has come under scrutiny following allegations that he attended a politically linked gathering in Puducherry, drawing criticism from Indian opposition figures and raising questions about diplomatic conduct during an election period. Pawan Khera, a senior leader of the Indian National Congress, alleged in a social media post that Mr. Ketheeswaran participated in an event organized by a regional political party, calling it a “gross violation” of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which prohibits foreign diplomats from interfering in the internal affairs of a host country. Khera said the diplomat had been invited by Jose Charles Martin — leader of the Latchiya Jananayaga Katchi (LJK) and son of businessman Santiago Martin — to meet fishermen in the Vaithikuppam area of Puducherry. He also noted the presence of V. P. Ramalingam, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Puducherry president and a candidate in the Raj Bhavan constituency. In his post, Khera questioned whether India’s Election Commission would act against the organizers and whether External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar would issue a formal diplomatic protest. ![A screenshot of a post by Congress leader Pawan Khera on X accusing Sri Lankan diplomat Ganesanathan Ketheeswaran of violating the Vienna Convention by attending a gathering in Puducherry.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/sri-lankan-deputy-consul-gener-RxgJDY-kixfsfa1llhc2sx.png) A screenshot of a post by Congress leader Pawan Khera on X accusing Sri Lankan diplomat Ganesanathan Ketheeswaran of violating the Vienna Convention by attending a gathering in Puducherry. The allegations come at a sensitive time, with electoral activity underway in parts of India. Mr. Ketheeswaran has denied participating in any political campaign, describing the visit as routine engagement with fishing communities. “I’m not here to do politics,” he said in an interview with *The Hindu*, adding that the meeting was held in an open, public setting and was not organized by any political party. He said he had regularly met fishermen across Tamil Nadu — including in Puducherry, Nagapattinam and Kanniyakumari — as part of his official duties. Jose Charles Martin acknowledged inviting the diplomat, describing the interaction as a discussion on issues faced by fishermen in Puducherry and Karaikal. He said the invitation was extended on the basis of a personal relationship and that the meeting focused on livelihood concerns. Photographs shared on social media appeared to show the diplomat addressing a gathering that included political figures, intensifying the controversy. ![Ganesanathan Ketheeswaran, Sri Lanka’s Deputy Consul General for South India,wearing a coat and tie, speaks with fishermen in Puducherry at a gathering that has sparked political controversy.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/sri-lankan-deputy-consul-gener-RxgJDY-kixbhgqh2c62coi.jpg) Ganesanathan Ketheeswaran, Sri Lanka’s Deputy Consul General for South India,wearing a coat and tie, speaks with fishermen in Puducherry at a gathering that has sparked political controversy. Diplomatic observers say the episode underscores the sensitivities surrounding foreign officials’ public engagements during election periods in India, where even informal appearances can carry political implications. Some diplomatic sources, speaking to *Jaffna Monitor* on condition of anonymity, said the incident reflected a serious lapse in judgment and a failure to appreciate the political context in which the interaction took place. “Diplomats are expected to exercise a high degree of caution during election periods,” one former diplomat said. “Even indirect association with politically affiliated actors at such a time risks being interpreted as interference.” The sources added that such appearances can signal either inexperience or an attempt to cultivate visibility among politically influential figures — both of which, they said, fall short of expected diplomatic standards. The controversy has also drawn attention to the political context surrounding the event’s organizers. Jose Charles Martin is the son of Santiago Martin, a businessman widely known in India’s lottery sector. Originally a returnee from Myanmar who began as a daily-wage labourer, he later built a large lottery business that expanded across India, including into northern states and Nepal. Over the years, he has faced allegations related to his lottery operations, which he has denied. Public disclosures show that his company, Future Gaming and Hotel Services, purchased electoral bonds worth ₹1,368 crore between 2019 and 2024, making it the single-largest contributor under the scheme. In the current election cycle, members of the Martin family are aligned with different political parties. Jose Charles Martin is contesting in Puducherry as a BJP ally, while his mother is contesting from the AIADMK, and his brother-in-law is contesting under actor Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK). Critics say the convergence of political interests and influence in this context raises further questions about the appropriateness of a foreign diplomat’s presence at such an event. The Sri Lankan government has not issued an official statement, and it remains unclear whether the episode will prompt a formal diplomatic response. ### **A Cautionary Tale Written in Real Time** The episode in Puducherry did not emerge from a vacuum. It was the predictable consequence of a decision made in Colombo. Ganesanathan Ketheeswaran, sources familiar with the Foreign Ministry say, is not a career diplomat. He has no prior experience in the Sri Lanka Foreign Service or formal diplomatic training. By multiple accounts, he is a known supporter of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), appointed to one of Sri Lanka’s most sensitive overseas postings. The appointment, officials say, was met with quiet frustration within the foreign service. “There are officers who have spent years training in diplomacy and international relations,” one senior official said. “This is a posting that requires experience and judgment.” The Chennai mission is no ceremonial role. It is Sri Lanka’s frontline engagement with southern India — navigating fraught fishing disputes, Tamil Nadu’s volatile political climate, and the enduring sensitivities of post-war relations. It demands a diplomat who understands where the minefields are. Mr. Ketheeswaran walked straight into one. The irony is difficult to ignore. The National People’s Power came to office promising to dismantle a culture of political patronage — a system in which diplomatic postings were long treated as rewards for loyalty. That promise now sits uneasily alongside this appointment. Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry now faces uncomfortable questions: how many key diplomatic postings are shaped by political considerations, and how many trained officers have been overlooked? And who approved placing a politically affiliated figure in one of the country’s most sensitive foreign missions? The answer, for now, was visible in Puducherry. ### Teachers’ Union Blames Northern Officials for Loss of Hardship Allowances in Jaffna’s Island Schools URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/teachers-union-blames-northern-officials-for-loss-of-hardship-allowances-in-jaffnas-island-schools/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T03:20:39.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — April 6, 2026 —** The Ceylon Teachers’ Union has accused education authorities in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province of negligence in the suspension of hardship allowances for teachers working in remote island communities, saying the decision has left dozens of educators without essential support despite the challenging conditions they face. Joseph Stalin, the union’s general secretary, said a formal complaint had been lodged with the Secretary of the Ministry of Education, citing a failure by provincial officials to accurately represent the geographical realities of island schools in Jaffna district. The affected teachers serve in schools located in Delft (Neduntheevu), Nainativu, Analaitivu and Eluvaitivu — areas accessible primarily by sea and often subject to difficult and unpredictable travel conditions. According to union figures, 174 teachers across 16 schools have lost their hardship allowances, including 92 teachers in Delft, 46 in Nainativu, 23 in Analaitivu and 13 in Eluvaitivu. The allowances were discontinued following a reclassification under Education Ministry Circular No. 01/2024 (1), which removed these schools from the “difficult area” category based on criteria such as access to internet, water supply and public transport. Union officials argue that the classification failed to account for a critical factor: the necessity of sea travel to reach the schools. “When submitting data to the Ministry, Northern Province education authorities did not properly highlight the geographical hardships faced by these island schools,” Mr. Stalin said. “Failing to correct this and withholding allowances from teachers is a serious act of irresponsibility.” In a letter to the Education Ministry, the union called for an immediate review of the classification and the reinstatement of the suspended allowances. It also urged authorities to investigate whether similar discrepancies have affected schools in other districts. The union further noted that although the 2026 national budget announced an increase in hardship allowances for teachers, payments continue to be made at older rates — 2,500 rupees and 1,500 rupees — and called for the revised amounts to be implemented without delay. Teachers in these island communities often work in isolated and resource-constrained environments, with limited access to infrastructure and essential services. Union representatives said the withdrawal of allowances risks undermining both morale and the sustainability of education in some of the country’s most underserved regions. The Ministry of Education has not yet publicly responded to the complaint. ### Tilvin Silva Casts Suspicion on Easter Attack Book, Says Truth ‘Will Emerge Soon’ URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tilvin-silva-casts-suspicion-on-easter-attack-book-says-truth-will-emerge-soon/ Last updated: 2026-04-09T02:29:54.000Z **VAVUNIYA, Sri Lanka — April 6, 2026 —** Tilvin Silva, general secretary of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and widely regarded as a key behind-the-scenes figure in Sri Lanka’s ruling establishment, said on Sunday that the truth behind the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings would “emerge very soon,” while casting suspicion on individuals promoting alternative narratives through recent book publications. Speaking at the 55th April Heroes’ Commemoration in Vavuniya, Mr. Silva suggested that some of those involved in publishing or promoting books questioning the identity of the attacks’ “mastermind” were themselves “key figures” connected to the issue. He did not name any individuals or provide evidence. While he did not name individuals, his remarks appeared to target *Searching for the Mastermind Behind the Easter Sunday Attacks*, a recently released book by Udaya Gammanpila, a lawyer and former minister. The book was launched on March 31 at an event attended by several prominent political figures, including former Presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, as well as Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa. “Proper investigations are underway,” Mr. Silva said. “The truth will come out very soon. There is no need for confusion.” Seven years after the coordinated suicide bombings that killed more than 250 people, questions over accountability and the identity of those ultimately responsible continue to shape Sri Lanka’s political discourse. Competing narratives — advanced by politicians, investigators and independent commentators — have deepened public uncertainty rather than resolved it. Mr. Silva used the platform to mount a broader defense of the government, accusing opposition parties of attempting to destabilize the administration through what he described as false allegations amplified by sections of the media. He argued that the government, elected on a mandate to dismantle entrenched political and institutional structures, required time to deliver meaningful change. “It is not possible to develop a country or transform a society in a single day,” he said, describing the existing system as the product of more than seven decades of political evolution. “Countries like Singapore and China took between 10 to 25 years to achieve such transformations. We cannot complete this work within five years.” He said the government must be protected until its objectives are achieved, expressing confidence that the public would continue to support it. “There is a belief that the people will stand with the government,” he said, adding that, if necessary, they would take to the streets to defend it rather than attempt to overthrow it. Mr. Silva also sought to place responsibility for Sri Lanka’s economic crisis on past political leadership, citing a Supreme Court determination on the country’s financial collapse. He said the current administration remained focused on structural reforms while attempting to stabilize the economy. Referring to global tensions, including developments in the Middle East, he said the government was taking steps to mitigate potential economic fallout, particularly disruptions to fuel supply, and urged the public to avoid hoarding and profiteering. He dismissed suggestions that public unrest would intensify in the coming months, saying the government had withstood sustained criticism in the past and would not be weakened by allegations. Mr. Silva said the administration remained committed to addressing long-standing structural challenges while fostering unity across ethnic and social divides. ### Lavan Akshayan Cremated as Jaffna Mourns a Top-Performing Student URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/lavan-akshayan-cremated-as-jaffna-mourns-a-top-performing-student/ Last updated: 2026-04-09T02:29:57.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — April 5, 2026 —** Lavan Akshayan, 19, one of the top-performing Advanced Level students whose death after a sudden illness stirred grief across northern Sri Lanka, was cremated on Sunday at the Thavadi Hindu Cemetery in Jaffna, as thousands gathered to pay their respects. Mourners — classmates, schoolmates, teachers, neighbours and villagers, along with many who had come to know him only through his story — filled his home and later the cremation ground and surrounding streets. Some wept openly; others stood in silence. It was more than a funeral — it was a deeply emotional farewell to one of Jaffna’s brightest young lives. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/lavan-akshayan-cremated-as-jaf-nLuiEs-kixtegwclxc9ac5.jpg) Akshayan, a student of Jaffna Hindu College, died on Saturday after several days in the intensive care unit of the Jaffna Teaching Hospital. He had been admitted with what was initially a wound infection that progressed to sepsis —sepsis — a life-threatening condition in which the body’s response to infection can lead to organ failure. He never regained consciousness. While he lay in intensive care, the results of the 2025 General Certificate of Education Advanced Level examination were released. Akshayan had secured three A passes in the Mathematics stream, ranking 24th in the Jaffna district and 265th nationally — placing him among the country’s top performers. He died without ever knowing. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/lavan-akshayan-cremated-as-jaf-nLuiEs-kixqdeefm2eac2x.png) At the cemetery, that detail — quiet, but devastating — weighed heavily on those gathered. Teachers described a student of discipline and focus, one who had long aspired to become an engineer. Classmates remembered him as ambitious but unassuming, dedicated yet approachable. Villagers recalled a deeply devoted Hindu who consistently participated in temple festivals each year. The sight of his mother, Yalini, and his sister, Akshara, in visible grief was enough to move many in the crowd to tears. Relatives said Akshayan had been preparing for his *mridangam arangetram* — a traditional debut performance marking a student’s first full public recital — with a rehearsal scheduled for Sunday. He had been practicing daily in the weeks leading up to it. The rehearsal never took place. Instead, on that same day, he was cremated — a cruel irony that was not lost on those gathered. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/lavan-akshayan-cremated-as-jaf-nLuiEs-kixkr4t16yaivyt.jpg) In Inuvil, a deeply religious community, some mourners were left quietly grappling with how to make sense of his death — whether to accept it as fate, or as part of a larger divine will. “Our college student, Lavan Akshayan, passed away today,” Jaffna Hindu College said in a brief social media message, noting his academic achievements. In Jaffna, where Advanced Level results are followed with intense attention and top performers are known well beyond their classrooms, Akshayan’s story resonated widely. He had achieved what many spend years striving for. The recognition came too late. Relatives had kept vigil through his final days in hospital, holding on to hope as his condition worsened. In the days since his death, the family has received condolences from across Sri Lanka and from the diaspora — many from people who had never met him, but felt the weight of his story. Jaffna has known many losses. Some are shaped by history, others by circumstance. Akshayan’s was different — a life interrupted at the moment of confirmation, when years of effort had just been validated. He was 19\. He lived in Inuvil. He wanted to be an engineer. On Sunday, Jaffna said goodbye. ### Sri Lanka’s Indian Ocean Reckoning URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sri-lankas-indian-ocean-reckoning/ Last updated: 2026-04-05T14:45:30.000Z **By Abbi Kanthasamy** Sri Lanka’s real strategic question is not whether it can become “the next Singapore” or a miniature Dubai. It is whether it can finally learn the harder lesson those two city-states teach: that financial centres are not created by tax gimmicks, real-estate spectacle, or patriotic rhetoric. They are built by states that become credible before they become glamorous. In 2026, that distinction is even more important than it was a generation ago. The old haven model—low tax, light scrutiny, easy opacity—is being steadily constrained by the OECD’s global minimum tax rules, which allow other jurisdictions to impose top-up taxes when large multinationals pay below the 15 percent floor. That means the future belongs less to secrecy jurisdictions than to places that can offer legality, speed, sophistication, and trust. Sri Lanka should not aspire to be a tax haven. It should aspire to be something more difficult and more durable: the Indian Ocean’s most credible platform for trade, capital, and cross-border services. That was the deeper logic behind Singapore’s ascent. Lee Kuan Yew is often remembered as the prophet of discipline, but the true architect of Singapore’s economic state was Goh Keng Swee, who understood that a small postcolonial island would survive only by turning competence into comparative advantage. The Economic Development Board, created in 1961, was not merely an investment agency; it was a state instrument for industrial transformation. The Monetary Authority of Singapore, established in 1971, was not simply a central bank; it became the institutional spine of a carefully sequenced international financial strategy. Singapore did not leap straight into offshore finance. It first built a serious port, a serious bureaucracy, a serious workforce, and a serious reputation. When it later developed the Asian Currency Unit market, it did so in a way that connected the island to global capital without allowing offshore volatility to overwhelm domestic stability. Today, the financial sector contributes about 14 percent of Singapore’s GDP; MAS says average daily foreign-exchange turnover reached US$1.485 trillion in April 2025; and the country’s 2024 asset-management survey reported S$6.0 trillion in assets under management. None of that was achieved by waving a zero-tax flag. It was achieved by making the state itself into an investable asset. Dubai’s path was different in texture but similar in logic. It, too, is often romanticized as a place that became rich through low taxes and ambition. In reality, Dubai first became indispensable to trade. Jebel Ali, aviation, warehousing, customs efficiency, and free-zone administration came before the full flowering of finance. The Dubai International Financial Centre, created in 2004, was powerful not because it stood in the desert, but because it offered a ring-fenced legal and regulatory order that international firms could trust. DIFC’s own reporting shows 6,920 active companies in 2024, rising to 7,700 by the first half of 2025\. In February 2026 it said it was home to more than 500 wealth and asset-management firms. The lesson is not that Sri Lanka should mimic Dubai’s skyline. It is that finance follows systems, not slogans. Capital arrives where contracts can survive politics, where regulation is legible, and where the surrounding logistics machine actually works. Sri Lanka, for all its disappointments, possesses more of the raw ingredients for this than many of its own elites seem willing to admit. It has one of the most strategically located harbours in the Indian Ocean. The Port of Colombo handled 8.29 million TEUs in 2025, the highest throughput in its history, reinforcing its position as South Asia’s leading container hub. It has a common-law inheritance, deep English-language capacity, a sophisticated diaspora, and a location astride trade and data routes linking India, the Gulf, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. And it now has Colombo Port City: not yet a success, but undeniably a rare piece of institutional hardware. The Port City’s official pitch is not as a tax haven but as a special economic zone for international business and services. Recent amendments moved the framework toward greater seriousness by strengthening the Central Bank’s role in overseeing offshore banking, tying incentives more explicitly to defined criteria, and requiring monitoring and disclosure of fiscal impacts. Properly governed, Port City could be less a glittering enclave than a carefully engineered jurisdictional laboratory. The problem is that Sri Lanka’s history has repeatedly inverted the correct sequence. It has too often wanted the rewards of credibility without enduring the discipline required to earn it. The 2022 sovereign crisis did not create that habit; it merely exposed it. The country is recovering, and faster than many expected. The IMF said in its latest Article IV materials that tax revenue in 2025 was projected at 14.8 percent of GDP and the primary balance at 3.4 percent of GDP, both stronger than earlier projections. The World Bank, meanwhile, has noted that the rebound is real but incomplete, warning that over a third of the population is expected to be in poverty or at risk of falling into poverty in 2025\. These are not the conditions of a country that can afford a fantasy strategy. Sri Lanka cannot build a financial centre as a decorative appendage to a weak state. It must build one as the disciplined extension of a repaired state. That means abandoning the lazy language of “becoming a hub” and replacing it with a much more exact ambition. Sri Lanka should aim to become a trusted Indian Ocean services platform with five distinct functions. First, it should become the easiest place in South Asia to intermediate trade finance, treasury operations, and shipping-related services tied to the Port of Colombo. Second, it should build a high-trust jurisdiction for regional arbitration, insolvency, and contract enforcement, especially for disputes involving South Asia, East Africa, and the Gulf. Third, it should target fund administration, family-office services, and wealth structuring for regional capital that wants exposure to India and the Indian Ocean but would prefer not to operate directly under Indian administrative burdens. Fourth, it should cultivate fintech, regtech, and cross-border compliance services that exploit its talent pool rather than merely its tax code. And fifth, it should turn the Sri Lankan diaspora from a remittance base into an institutional class of returning investors, lawyers, bankers, and founders. These are not fantasies. They are adjacent possibilities grounded in geography and history. What is missing is policy stamina. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/sri-lanka-s-indian-ocean-recko-IiWZuE-kixre5gnf5l69t7.png) The required statecraft is neither mysterious nor easy. Sri Lanka needs its own version of the Singaporean sequence: macro stability, bureaucratic insulation, logistics excellence, legal modernization, and only then financial deepening. The first step is to keep the IMF program’s discipline intact and make fiscal credibility non-negotiable. The second is to ring-fence Port City from the old pathologies of patronage, discretion, and opaque exemptions. The third is to create a genuinely world-class commercial dispute-resolution regime, because legal speed and predictability are more valuable in 2026 than theatrical tax holidays. The fourth is to invest in human capital and targeted migration policy, creating a fast-track route for the Sri Lankan diaspora and foreign specialists in law, banking, compliance, and technology. And the fifth is to market the country not as “cheap” but as “serious”: a place where business can be done quickly, cleanly, and with fewer political surprises than its regional competitors. This is where Sri Lanka’s political class usually stumbles. It still thinks in slogans when the world now trades in governance spreads. The era when a clever minister could launch a free zone, promise tax exemptions, and wait for offshore money to roll in is over. In a Pillar Two world, tax alone is a blunter instrument. And in a post-default Sri Lanka, credibility is the scarcest commodity of all. That is why the country’s greatest obstacle is not India, not global competition, not even the scars of war. It is discontinuity: the inability of the Sri Lankan state to hold a coherent economic line long enough for investors to believe that this time is different. Yet history also suggests that moments of deep crisis sometimes force overdue clarity. Singapore was born amid separation and insecurity. Dubai matured amid regional instability and geographic constraint. Neither had the luxury of incoherence. Sri Lanka, after default and humiliation, now faces its own such reckoning. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake inherited a republic chastened by collapse. His real test is not whether he can manage recovery, but whether he can convert recovery into institutional permanence. Stabilization gets a country back on its feet. Strategy determines whether it ever learns to walk in a straight line. Sri Lanka’s opportunity, then, is not to imitate Singapore’s image or Dubai’s swagger. It is to recover their discipline. The island’s future will not be secured by pretending to be a tax haven. It will be secured by becoming something rarer: a small state in a dangerous region that can be trusted with other people’s money, contracts, and time. That would be transformational not only for Colombo’s skyline but for the republic itself. For the first time in decades, Sri Lanka has the chance to build a national project equal to its geography. The question is whether it has the patience to deserve it. ### For 359 Days, Easter Claims. In Court, None — The Pillayan Case URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/for-359-days-easter-claims-in-court-none-the-pillayan-case/ Last updated: 2026-04-09T02:30:01.000Z Sri Lanka's government spent a year telling its people one story. When it appeared before a court, it told another. On April 8, 2025, the Criminal Investigation Department arrested Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan — widely known as Pillayan — at the TMVP headquarters in Batticaloa. Within two days, Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala stood in Parliament and declared that significant information had emerged linking Pillayan to the Easter Sunday bombings of April 21, 2019 — the worst terrorist attack in Sri Lanka's history, which killed 269 people. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who had built his entire political campaign around the promise of exposing those responsible, referenced the arrest in the same breath at campaign rallies. The government held Pillayan for 359 days under the Prevention of Terrorism Act without producing him before a court. Then, on April 2, 2026, it brought him before the Mount Lavinia Magistrate. Not one Easter Sunday charge was filed. The case before the court was the 2006 abduction and murder of a university vice chancellor. The magistrate remanded Pillayan pending advice from the Attorney General. ## Where They Said It On April 10, 2025, two days after the arrest, Minister Wijepala told Parliament that substantial evidence had emerged linking Pillayan to the bombings. On April 12, President Dissanayake went further, connecting the arrest to his government's flagship promise to deliver Easter justice. As the May 2025 local council elections approached, the arrest was presented to voters as proof that the NPP government was doing what its predecessors had refused to do. In July 2025, during an adjournment debate on the Easter Sunday attacks investigations initiated by ITAK MP Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, Minister Wijepala returned to Parliament with a more detailed account. He stated that Pillayan — who was in remand custody at Batticaloa Prison at the time of the attacks — had prior knowledge of the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. He added that Pillayan had met NTJ leader Zahran Hashim and had subsequently given a secret statement to a magistrate about the attacks. 'Investigations have revealed that he had knowledge of the attacks,' the Minister said. 'However, I will not disclose further details at this point as inquiries are ongoing.' The Minister also referenced the November 30, 2018 killing of two police officers in the Batticaloa area. He noted that a former LTTE member named Ajantha had been arrested after allegedly confessing, but that CID investigations later revealed Ajantha had been framed — a riding jacket belonging to him had been used to plant false evidence — in order to conceal the real perpetrators and their possible links to the wider Easter conspiracy. These were not vague suggestions. They were detailed, named, and presented to Parliament as the fruit of active investigation. The minister spoke with the authority of the state. Not one of these claims produced a charge. ### **The Shield That Made It Possible** Under Article 67 of the Constitution and the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act No. 21 of 1953, as amended, speech, debate, and proceedings in Parliament are absolutely protected. The Act is explicit: parliamentary speech and proceedings 'shall not be liable to be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of Parliament.' A minister who names a man as a terrorism suspect from the dispatch box faces no defamation claim, no criminal proceeding, and no evidentiary standard of any kind. Parliamentary privilege was designed to protect free legislative debate — not to provide cover for unverifiable accusations against individuals. In this case, the Easter allegations lived entirely within that protected space. President Dissanayake referenced the arrest in connection with Easter at campaign rallies — political statements, not legally testable ones. Neither he nor Minister Wijepala made the Easter connection in any forum subject to defamation law or evidentiary scrutiny. The CID issued no official public statement confirming what Pillayan had or had not disclosed. The government made its case to the country in forums where it could not be challenged — and presented its case to the court on entirely different grounds. ### **The Case the Government Actually Filed** ![Professor Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, a Jaffna-born Vice Chancellor of Eastern University, disappeared in 2006 during a period of heightened tensions following the LTTE split. Prosecutors allege he was abducted and killed by members of the TMVP, led by Pillayan.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/for-359-days-easter-claims-in-n-LSZA-kixpi88um5arvnu.png) Professor Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, a Jaffna-born Vice Chancellor of Eastern University, disappeared in 2006 during a period of heightened tensions following the LTTE split. Prosecutors allege he was abducted and killed by members of the TMVP, led by Pillayan. The case prosecutors brought before the Mount Lavinia Magistrate's Court on April 2 was real, and it was serious — but it had nothing to do with Easter. Professor Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath, Vice Chancellor of the Eastern University of Sri Lanka, disappeared on December 15, 2006\. He had attended the annual conference of the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science at the Science House in Colombo 07\. An armed group allegedly linked to Pillayan's Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal had previously abducted the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and held him until Raveendranath agreed to resign. He submitted his resignation. He was told it could not be accepted — his was a presidential appointment. He continued working from Colombo. On December 15, 2006, he attended what his daughter said was meant to be his final administrative meeting before returning home. She called at 2:45 p.m. His phone was off. He was never seen again. CID investigators told the magistrate that Raveendranath had been taken to an illegal detention and torture facility in Sevanapitiya — a site in the Eastern Province — where he was murdered and his body burned. They named Pillayan as the first and primary suspect. They described Sevanapitiya as a facility where civilians, government officials, and businessmen were held, tortured, and killed, and said the evidence confirmed that Pillayan had led what investigators characterised as a part of Sri Lanka's notorious 'white van' abduction culture. They also disclosed that 362 T-56 assault rifles, 36 9mm pistols, and one micro pistol issued to Pillayan's group under the Mahinda Rajapaksa government had never been returned to the state. Udaya Gammanpila — Pillayan's lawyer and the leader of the Pivithuru Hela Urumaya party — spoke to reporters after the April 2 court appearance. He said he would challenge the remand order before the Court of Appeal, and characterised the government's conduct in terms that, given the complete absence of any Easter-related charge, were difficult to dismiss. 'The claims made by President Dissanayake and Public Security Minister Wijepala that Pillayan was arrested under the PTA for the Easter Sunday investigations have been proven to be a lie,' he said. 'One year has passed. Not a single Easter charge has been filed. What was said in Parliament was said only in Parliament — because it could not be said anywhere else.' ### **The PTA as a Political Instrument** Sri Lanka's Prevention of Terrorism Act has been criticised for decades by the United Nations Human Rights Council, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and multiple UN Special Rapporteurs. Its defining feature — the power to detain a person for extended periods under executive order, without judicial oversight and without charge — has been disproportionately applied against Tamil suspects and former combatants. President Dissanayake himself pledged during his 2024 election campaign to replace the PTA with legislation that would address security threats without curtailing civil liberties. ### **A Case Still Unfolding** The prosecution of Pillayan now proceeds on the basis of the 2006 abduction and murder of Professor Sivasubramaniam Raveendranath. His family has waited nearly two decades for accountability, and the case warrants a full and transparent prosecution. The same standard applies to the Easter Sunday attacks. The victims and their families are owed a process grounded in evidence and tested in a court of law — not one shaped by allegations made in Parliament under privilege, timed to election cycles, and quietly abandoned when a courtroom required more than words. ### **THE RECORD** **April 8, 2025:** Pillayan arrested in Batticaloa under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. **April 10, 2025:** Public Security Minister Wijepala tells Parliament: significant information links Pillayan to the Easter Sunday attacks. **April 12, 2025:** President Dissanayake references the arrest in connection with Easter at campaign events. **July 2025:** Minister Wijepala tells Parliament: Pillayan had prior knowledge of the Easter attacks, met NTJ leader Zahran Hashim, and gave a secret statement to a magistrate about the bombings. **April 2, 2026:** Pillayan produced before the Mount Lavinia Magistrate's Court after 359 days in CID custody. **Easter charges filed:** Zero. **Case before the court:** The 2006 abduction and murder of a university vice chancellor. **Outcome:** Remanded pending the Attorney General's advice. ### The Shepherd's Flock: Protecting the Human Rights of the Public Servant URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-shepherds-flock-protecting-the-human-rights-of-the-public-servant/ Last updated: 2026-04-05T02:13:46.000Z **By: Jeevan Thiagarajah** At the heart of a functioning democracy lies a profound paradox: the public servant is both an instrument of the state and a citizen entitled to the full protection of the Constitution. Their service conditions — carefully stipulated by the Public Service Commission and relevant regulations — are not mere administrative guidelines. They are guarantees of dignity. Courts and tribunals have repeatedly reinforced this principle: a person does not surrender their fundamental rights at the entrance of a government office. Yet the recent interim order of the Human Rights Commission concerning teacher transfers in the Northern Province lays bare the wide gap that so often exists between administrative theory and the harsh reality of executive action. To appreciate the gravity of this situation, one must first understand the realities of the teaching profession. Teachers are frequently underpaid, working under difficult conditions while carrying heavy family responsibilities. Together with health workers, they form the two largest pillars of the public service. A humane, fair, and transparent transfer policy — free from discrimination — is therefore not a luxury. It is an urgent necessity, and one that should be shaped with input from all stakeholders. ### **The Case at the Centre of the Storm** The specifics of this crisis are set out in HRC Case No. JAF 081-2026, an interim recommendation and order issued by the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka under Section 15 of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No. 21 of 1996. On February 25, 2026, the Northern Province Education Department issued a transfer list covering 193 teachers, citing "service exigencies" as justification. Affected teachers submitted appeals through their departmental heads to the Northern Province Public Service Commission. Despite this, education authorities simultaneously insisted that the teachers vacate their existing posts and report to new duty stations — before those appeals were even decided. The complainants argued that these transfers were enforced in an arbitrary and unjust manner, in violation of natural justice and the dignity of the profession. Critically, the affected group included some of the most vulnerable members of the service: pregnant women, teachers suffering from cancer or kidney disease, mothers of children under five or children with special needs, and individuals caring for disabled family members. Forcing these teachers to relocate before their appeals were heard, it was argued, would cause serious and irreparable harm. The Commission reviewed the case on March 30, 2026, examining compliance with Public Service Commission rules, Provincial Public Service regulations, and the National Teacher Transfer Policy. It noted that emergency-based transfers require clear justification and procedural safeguards. Crucially, annual teacher transfers for 2026 had already been conducted for 363 teachers — a fact that significantly undermined the claim that transferring an additional 193 teachers was a matter of urgency. Finding a prima facie violation of fundamental rights, the Commission concluded that the respondents had failed to provide adequate justification for treating these transfers as service-exigency cases. It accordingly directed the Provincial Director of Education, the Secretary of the Northern Province Ministry of Education, and the Secretary of the Northern Province Public Service Commission to immediately suspend the implementation of the 193 transfers until the investigation is completed and a final determination issued. In practical terms, the affected teachers must be allowed to remain in their present posts for the time being. The order explicitly warns that non-compliance may constitute contempt under Section 21 of the HRCSL Act, punishable by the Supreme Court. ### **A Pattern, Not an Isolated Incident** This crisis did not emerge from nowhere. It began with allegations that the 2025/2026 transfers — specifically, the selection of replacement teachers who had not applied for transfers — were conducted under the guise of "service requirements" by a transfer board convened without the participation of the Sri Lanka Teachers' Union. Last year, the Jaffna High Court was compelled to intervene, ordering the Provincial Department of Education to withdraw a transfer list of 290 teachers following writ petitions filed by the Union and affected teachers. The Department subsequently issued letters to 198 teachers directing them to serve as replacements — again labelled "service requirement" transfers, and again conducted without union involvement. While affected teachers found themselves unable to sign in at their permanent schools, the Union lodged complaints with the Human Rights Commission. The HRC has now called a halt. The situation has long since ceased to be a routine administrative matter. Officials and teachers now find themselves on opposing sides of an increasingly bitter dispute. Pressing questions remain unanswered: who will hear the pending appeals, and on what basis will they be decided? More importantly, given that the process has twice been found seriously deficient — first by the courts, and now by the HRC — accountability cannot be avoided indefinitely. Someone must answer for this. The question is: who? ### **Three Faces of a Deeper Malaise** Beyond the transfer crisis, a disturbing pattern of cruelty and degradation persists within the provincial public service — one that demands both judicial and institutional attention. The first case involves a teacher on the eve of retirement. Decades into her service, questions were suddenly and belatedly raised about the validity of her original appointment. Rather than resolving the matter with dignity, the system subjected her to months of professional humiliation: denied her teaching duties, confined to a staff room, and left in a state of institutional limbo despite repeated appeals. The heartbreaking end point of this prolonged ordeal came when she was found at 2:45 in the morning, standing outside the Governor's office with her belongings. No woman who has given her working life to the state should ever be reduced to such desperation. It is worth noting that the HRC regional office was well aware of the conduct of the officer principally responsible for her suffering. The second case involves a doctor whose inquiry process had lapsed beyond the legally permissible time limit and was therefore required, by law, to be terminated. The Secretary of the relevant Ministry was furnished with clear legal reasons for this conclusion but chose to disregard them, apparently fearing the political displeasure of a particular union. It was only after the courts intervened that justice was finally served. In the interim, a constitutional crisis of conscience arose when the Attorney General declined to appear on behalf of the Governor, whose position was directly at odds with the legal instructions previously given. The episode posed a stark question: should the Attorney General do what is legally correct, or bow to convention? The final order of the Court provided its own answer. The third case involves a woman officer in the agriculture department who was subjected to a campaign of fabricated allegations and systematic persecution lasting nearly four years, orchestrated by two senior officers. A thorough inquiry by the regional HRC office documented circumstances so disturbing that the Governor himself found them difficult to read. He directed that severe penalties be imposed and relief provided to the victim. Yet compliance with those orders was so poor that the HRC was recently compelled to issue three firm strictures, effectively repeating directives that had been ignored. ### **The Duty to Protect** This culture of retaliation reaches beyond these individual cases. On more than one occasion, the writer and several legal colleagues found it necessary to intervene to protect public officials — largely police officers — who were targeted for punishment simply because they had performed their duties lawfully during election periods. The act of upholding the Constitution had itself become a liability, requiring legal protection against executive retribution. Taken together, these cases make one thing unmistakably clear: public servants require robust protection from executive action — or deliberate inaction — that enables human rights abuses. The Human Rights Commission is a vital, if last, resort in such situations. But the first line of responsibility lies with the Governor, as the chief executive of the Province. The Governor is the shepherd; the officials who serve under that authority are the flock. The duty of protection is not merely administrative. It is moral and constitutional. As the celebrated Indian jurist Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer once observed, the state must not become an "unsympathetic leviathan" that crushes the very people it employs. Civil servants, he reminded us, are not chattels to be disposed of at will — the rule of law must temper the power of the state over its own servants. The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court echoes this: the state is not an abstraction; it acts through people. When it becomes an oppressor of its own employees, it betrays the social contract. ### **The Moral Compass** Law can provide a framework. It cannot legislate conscience. Ultimately, it is Dharma — the righteous duty of those in authority — and the individual moral courage of the Chief Executive, the Secretary, and the Departmental Head that must serve as the final compass. Technicalities and political convenience must yield to the higher demands of fairness. We live in the age of Generation Z and the Aragalaya — a generation that has awakened to the demand for accountability and will not easily be silenced. This Province has known armed rebellion and the deep wounds of prolonged conflict. Old Park stands as a grim monument to that past, its underground structures a reminder of what becomes possible when power is exercised without the restraint of law or conscience. We must not allow people to lose faith in due process and just administration. To do so is not merely a failure of governance. It is a step toward repeating the darkest missteps of our history. ### Jaffna Student Dies Days After Securing Three A’s in A/L Examination URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-student-dies-days-after-securing-three-as-in-a-l-examination/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T03:38:27.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — April 4, 2026 —** A 19-year-old student from Jaffna Hindu College who had recently emerged as one of the district’s top performers in Sri Lanka’s Advanced Level examination died on Saturday after several days in intensive care, hospital officials said. The student, Lavan Akshayan, a resident of Inuvil, had been admitted to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital about a week earlier with what was initially a wound infection. It later progressed to sepsis — a life-threatening condition in which the body’s response to infection causes widespread inflammation and organ failure. A doctor at the hospital, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment publicly, said the infection appeared to have worsened over several days before hospitalization. “Infections of this nature are often manageable if treated promptly,” the doctor said, noting that early medical intervention — including timely assessment and appropriate antibiotic therapy — can significantly reduce the risk of severe complications. “By the time he was admitted, the infection had already progressed considerably.” Relatives told *Jaffna Monitor* that Akshayan remained in a coma in the final days of his hospitalization and was in the intensive care unit when the results of the 2025 General Certificate of Education Advanced Level examination were released. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/jaffna-student-dies-days-after-x3VX8Q-kixijsf29awjqmt-1.jpg) He had secured three A passes in the Mathematics stream, ranking 24th in the Jaffna district and 265th nationally — placing him among the top performers in one of the country’s most competitive examinations. A close relative said he passed away without ever knowing his results. Doctors said all possible measures had been taken to save him. “Our college student, Lavan Akshayan, passed away today,” Jaffna Hindu College said in a social media post, noting his academic achievements. Teachers and residents described his death as a profound loss, recalling a disciplined and ambitious student who had aspired to become an engineer — a future that now remains painfully unrealized. ### When machines think: Reframing the ethics of Artificial Intelligence in the global south URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/when-machines-think-reframing-the-ethics-of-artificial-intelligence-in-the-global-south/ Last updated: 2026-04-04T00:28:37.000Z **Mahesh Nirmalan MD, FRCA, PhD, FFICM and Roshan Ragel PhD** Professor Mahesh Nirmalan is Associate Vice President for Responsible Research Practice at the University of Manchester, UK and Professor Roshan Ragel is Professor of Computer Engineering at the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka How we choose to conceptualise Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of the cornerstones of the current debate on the ethics of AI. In this context, do we see AI as a tool that has been developed by humans to meet human needs – an instrument like a hammer or a washing machine, or do we see AI as a post-human entity and an independent moral agency is relevant? The former position, where we see AI as merely an advanced tool is commonly referred to as ‘*Instrumentalism*’ and the latter - where we see AI as an independent agent that can make independent moral judgements, and therefore can do wrong (a moral agent) or something that can be wronged (a moral patient) is referred to as ‘*Relationalism*’. The current discourses surrounding the ethics of AI sit in a spectrum between these two primary frameworks – “Instrumentalism Vs Relationalism”. Where AI is positioned along this spectrum is not merely a philosophical question as it directly shapes how responsibility, liability, and governance should be assigned when AI systems are deployed. Fundamentally, AI is about creating machines – mostly computers and computer algorithms- that are capable of intelligent behaviour. This leads to the question as to how we define the term ‘Intelligence’. At its core, intelligence, or intelligent behaviour, is about the ability to perceive information from external sources, process it, and produce appropriate responses (or outputs) that are consistent with the processed information. When defined in this manner, it becomes a generic attribute, not limited by human values. Even lower forms of life – single-cell organisms like an amoeba or multicellular life forms such as worms, that are capable of perceiving information, processing it (in their rudimentary nervous systems) and producing appropriate responses, are in fact displaying intelligent behaviour. Machines or robotic systems created by humans equipped with similar abilities are said to possess artificial intelligence. Importantly however, despite possessing such a ‘functional intelligence’, AI systems clearly lack consciousness, free will, emotions, intent, or moral awareness and this distinction is important when considering the position of AI in a modern society. It is, however, common to see human relationships with AI undergoing a rapid transition, with many users voluntarily granting AI systems a higher status than any other machine we have encountered in human history. In interactions with tools such as ChatGPT, Deepseek, MS Co-Pilot or Google Gemini, it is not uncommon to see the use of polite terminology - such as ‘please’ or ‘thank you’, that have thus far been reserved for communication with other life forms. Whether these changes are an effort to protect users’ own humanity or truly represent a fundamental shift in how we perceive AI is hard to determine at this stage. But there is no doubt that the relationship between humans and AI is evolving. Part of this shift reflects a natural human tendency to anthropomorphise complex systems, attributing agency and personality even though they operate purely through statistical pattern recognition. These observed behaviours no doubt will continue to evolve further as AI systems get even more sophisticated and the ongoing attempts to create Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) - capable of carrying out any cognitive task that humans can, reach further maturity. Given the transitional stage we are currently in, how institutions including schools and universities should view the ethical principles that govern the use of AI in education and research needs further consideration. If we view AI through the eyes of “Instrumentalism”, this question becomes relatively easy to navigate. If AI is yet another instrument in our armamentarium, from an ethical perspective we would be justified in viewing it as one of the many other instruments we deploy in our daily lives. It would be no different to how we would for example, view the use of the hammer, the internet or the mass-spectrometer. The use of these instruments is permitted at the user's discretion, with the user taking full responsibility for ensuring that their use complies with the major pillars of ethics. From this perspective, responsibility for ethical outcomes remains firmly with the human actors — the users who deploy the systems, the institutions that govern their use, and the organisations that design and distribute the technology. In other words, the users will ensure that any output generated by these instruments protects the autonomy, best interests (or beneficence), freedom from harm (non-maleficence), and justice for all subjects who could be affected by the output. Structural or systematic breach of these fundamental conditions arising through the flaws in design will fall within the remits of the manufacturers. One could even take the view that within an ‘Instrumentalist’ framework, no fundamentally new ethical principles are needed in the governance of AI applications in teaching, learning or research. ![The Internet has been used in teaching, learning and research simply as a tool. Accountability for the use of this tool rests strictly with the user. Whether AI should be treated any differently for governance purposes is a question worth considering. Unlike earlier tools, however, modern AI systems can generate new knowledge, content, and decisions at scale, often in ways that are difficult for users to fully interpret or predict. (Image generated by AI)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/when-machines-think-reframing-qKi2LY-kix8ch1l3fkrnfs.png) The Internet has been used in teaching, learning and research simply as a tool. Accountability for the use of this tool rests strictly with the user. Whether AI should be treated any differently for governance purposes is a question worth considering. Unlike earlier tools, however, modern AI systems can generate new knowledge, content, and decisions at scale, often in ways that are difficult for users to fully interpret or predict. (Image generated by AI) The ability to hold organisations accountable for their actions is a crucial part of governance. The ‘Instrumentalist’ approach also ensures that the tech companies developing and validating AI applications are held fully accountable for the validity and safety of their products. In medical applications for example, just as much as the manufacturers of medicines and other medical equipment can be held liable for any systematic harm that can arise from faulty design, the tech companies can be held accountable for any harm patients may suffer as a result of wrong datasets being used in the development and validation of AI algorithms. The manufacturers will therefore need to ensure that the datasets used are created and validated, taking into account demographic diversity, age/gender distributions, and genetic variation in society. It is however true that how advanced AI systems integrate sets of data and the diverse methods they use in the analyses of such datasets are not always obvious, even to the most diligent system designers. AI can, and certainly will, design improved versions of itself, which in turn will design even smarter versions of itself repetitively and iteratively, resulting in an “intelligence explosion” through recursive self-improvement. It is also possible that human brains could be scanned, modelled, reproduced and then connected to robotic bodies by advanced systems. The current state of AI technology is virtually knocking at the doors of such possibilities and how such systems will operate is impossible to predict by any system designer. Many present-day AI systems already demonstrate forms of opacity and unpredictability that raise important questions about transparency and therefore accountability. This has led authors such as Yuval Harari to allude to a world in which humans no longer dominate but rather share the world with AI, trusting the algorithms to make the correct decisions on their behalf. Given this direction of travel, is it then possible or even necessary that we should be willing to assign the role of independence and moral/ethical agency to AI systems? There is no doubt that some of the decision-making assigned to these advanced systems will have moral consequences. For example, self-driving vehicles or self-firing weapons operated by AI will be called upon to make decisions that can have tremendous moral consequences including the potential loss of life. In such situations, the central ethical question is not whether the machine can technically make a decision, but rather who should bear responsibility for the consequences of that decision. In this context, is it acceptable to assign the moral responsibility of such decisions to an autonomous AI rather than the organisations and people responsible for their initial design, construction and deployment? But, how can a system that is not conscious and therefore - by definition, does not understand the implications of what it does and merely executing what it is programmed to do take responsibility for its actions? This is clearly a treacherous ethical minefield, and at present there does not seem to be a clear consensus amongst ethicists or policymakers. Whilst the industry surges forward in developing the technology, the ethical and governance framework lags behind, trapped within tentative philosophical discussions and idealistic grandstanding. Equity and fairness are important facets in the ethical argument for or against any technological advancement. It is therefore necessary to consider how a world run by advanced AI systems could affect existing social inequalities. A ruthless pursuit for stable supply chains at the lowest possible cost by developed economies and the expressed desire for social dominance by some sections of society make these considerations urgent and fundamental. Is it possible that the pursuit of these warped objectives can reach a level of unprecedented efficiency in a world run by AI? The recent statement by a senior official of the State Department in the USA “*US won’t repeat China Trade mistake with India*” (Reported on 6th March 2026) and the strategy of bombing sovereign states into submission, underscore the prevailing mindset among some powerful players shaping international relations. ![The dangers inherent in Algorithmic bias – accidental or otherwise - create a new set of imperatives as to why countries in the Global South cannot be passive and blind consumers of AI. Evidence of such bias has already been documented in areas such as facial recognition, language processing, and medical diagnostics, where systems trained primarily on data from the Global North often perform poorly when applied to populations elsewhere. (Image from: Ingvild Bode and Ishmael Bhila. Centre for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog. 3rd September 2024)](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/when-machines-think-reframing-qKi2LY-kixlz4ut5bm4q4t.jpg) The dangers inherent in Algorithmic bias – accidental or otherwise - create a new set of imperatives as to why countries in the Global South cannot be passive and blind consumers of AI. Evidence of such bias has already been documented in areas such as facial recognition, language processing, and medical diagnostics, where systems trained primarily on data from the Global North often perform poorly when applied to populations elsewhere. (Image from: Ingvild Bode and Ishmael Bhila. Centre for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog. 3rd September 2024) In the development of science and the philosophy of science, the dominant approach in the Global South (with some notable exceptions) has been one of reproduction and passive consumption. In other words, the ideas and products created in advanced western economies have been cloned, modified, reproduced and consumed *ad-lib* by the countries in the Global South. Despite frequent rhetorical references in popular media and podcasts/blogs to a bygone era of wisdom - driven by intellectual originality and a culture of ‘seeking’, consumption rather than creation has defined the role of the global south. The underlying reasons are understandably complex and beyond the scope of this article. However, for countries like Sri Lanka, almost 80 years after the end of the colonial period, there is a need to re-evaluate this dependency. The development of AI technology in our asymmetric world brings a sense of urgency to the required paradigm shift. Addressing this challenge will require deliberate investment in local data ecosystems, interdisciplinary research capacity, and regional collaboration. There is therefore an unprecedented need for countries in the Global South to prioritise a collective regional approach, thereby pooling resources and sharing datasets to make meaningful contributions in shaping the debate. Despite some early initiatives and encouraging preliminary steps, tangible actions on the ground are few and far between with most initiatives being limited to conferences and board rooms thus far. Unless local knowledge, literature and experiences are captured and presented in a suitable format there is a risk that AI outputs will be biased and promote distorted social theories. In response - at a national level, some countries (including Sri Lanka) have begun developing AI strategies and governance frameworks to ensure that technological developments align with local imperatives. The ‘*Noolaham*’ project operating in Jaffna and funded by members of the diaspora community, aimed at digitising local Tamil literature, is an outstanding example of this response. As part of this project to date, over 120,000 printed documents and over 35,000 multi-media works have been digitised and made available on the *‘Noolaham’* online library. Furthermore, Sri Lanka has recently adopted a national AI strategy with the ambition of positioning the country as a regional hub emphasising collaboration among government, academia, and industry. In response institutions such as the University of Peradeniya have adopted a proactive public engagement strategy targeting schools. Overcoming the narrow sectarian mindset that divides these countries - along linguistic, religious and tribal lines, must become a priority if these promising initiatives are to deliver the expected outcomes. Such a collective approach is clearly a major political priority in the entire region if these communities are to avoid a second wave of subjugation in a world run by AI. Establishing publicly funded regional AI governance platforms/hubs in South Asia, Africa, and South America could be the first step towards the global south meaningfully and independently shaping the AI revolution. ***The ideas expressed in this article are the personal opinions of the authors and do not represent the views of the Universities of Manchester or Peradeniya on the subject.*** ### From Kilinochchi to Kattankudy, A/L Toppers Emerge Across the North and East URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/from-kilinochchi-to-kattankudy-a-l-toppers-emerge-across-the-north-and-east/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T03:38:29.000Z ***A Tamil student from the war-affected district of Kilinochchi has topped Sri Lanka’s Physical Science stream. A Muslim student from Kattankudy has ranked first in Commerce. And in Mullaitivu, a young woman from a once-displaced Muslim community has emerged as the district’s top performer and secured a place in medical studies.*** **Jaffna, Sri Lanka — April 1, 2026** In results that have drawn attention beyond the usual examination season headlines, a Tamil student from the war-affected northern district of Kilinochchi and a Muslim student from the eastern town of Kattankudy have secured first place in separate streams of Sri Lanka’s 2025 G.C.E. Advanced Level examination — widely regarded as the country’s most consequential school-level test, determining access to state university education. Theiventhiran Thirukumaran, a student at Kilinochchi Maha Vidyalaya in the north, ranked first in the island in the Physical Science stream. Mohammad Subaideen Mohammad Farthan, of Kattankudy Central Maha Vidyalaya in the east, topped the Commerce stream. ![Theiventhiran Thirukumaran, third from left, stands with his parents and Northern Province Governor N. Vethanayagam, second from left, following the announcement of his island-first ranking in the Physical Science stream.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-kilinochchi-to-kattankudy-nX6l9I-kixkni0s25ck4nx.png) Theiventhiran Thirukumaran, third from left, stands with his parents and Northern Province Governor N. Vethanayagam, second from left, following the announcement of his island-first ranking in the Physical Science stream. ### **A Region Re-emerging** Kilinochchi, once the administrative center of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, was heavily devastated during the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war. The town fell to government forces in early 2009, while the war’s last battles unfolded in neighbouring Mullaitivu. Both districts experienced widespread destruction and loss. Schools in the region endured years of damaged infrastructure, shortages of teachers, and cohorts of students shaped by prolonged displacement. That a student from Kilinochchi Maha Vidyalaya now holds the country’s top rank in the Physical Science stream is, by almost any measure, a notable achievement, an educator told Jaffna Monitor. The Northern Province governor, N. Vethanayahan, visited the school following the announcement, describing the achievement as a “new chapter” in the region’s educational trajectory. S. Sritharan, an ITAK parliamentarian known for his Kilinochchi-centric political outreach, was among the first to visit and congratulate the student. Social media pages affiliated with him framed the achievement as a milestone, describing the student as “the one who restored lost pride.” The development comes just days after controversy involving Ramanathan Archchuna, a legislator from the Jaffna–Kilinochchi electoral district and a frequent source of public controversy, who, according to reports, referred to residents of Kilinochchi in derogatory terms during a social media livestream following protests against him in Kilinochchi, reportedly organized by S. Sritharan’s camp. Thirukumaran’s result was not an isolated one. Across the North, the 2025 A/L season delivered a broader base of strong performances than most years in recent memory. In Jaffna, long regarded as one of Sri Lanka’s academic centers, the tradition held: Jaffna Hindu College reported 67 students with three A passes, with more than four-fifths of its candidates qualifying for university admission. At Hartley College in Point Pedro, students secured top district rankings in both Mathematics and Biological Science, with one candidate placing 12th nationally in the Mathematics stream. In the Eastern Province, Sri Shanmuga Hindu Girls’ College in Trincomalee recorded one of its strongest years, with Tharshana Konesh placing third nationally in the Biological Science stream — a result confirmed in the island-wide rankings released alongside the results. ### **Kattankudy: A Different Kind of First** ![Mohammad Subaideen Mohammad Farthan](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-kilinochchi-to-kattankudy-nX6l9I-kixrqesds6axbqt.png) Mohammad Subaideen Mohammad Farthan In Kattankudy, a densely populated, predominantly Muslim town on Sri Lanka’s eastern coast, the island-first ranking in the Commerce stream by Mohammad Farthan of Kattankudy Central Maha Vidyalaya has been widely seen as a community milestone as much as an individual achievement. ### **Muthur: A Story of Survival and Study** ![Mohammad Akram Mohamed Rushdi](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-kilinochchi-to-kattankudy-nX6l9I-kixgtjcbzmwpw0k.png) Mohammad Akram Mohamed Rushdi In Muthur, in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, another student’s journey has drawn attention for the circumstances that shaped it as much as for the result itself. Mohammad Akram Mohamed Rushdi, who has secured a place to study medicine, lost both his parents in an airstrike in 2006 and was subsequently raised by his grandmother, who, according to reports, sells string hoppers to sustain the family’s daily life and support his education. ### ### **Mullaitivu: Medicine, and What It Means** ![Misraj Nida Fathima](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/04/from-kilinochchi-to-kattankudy-nX6l9I-kixu3f6hegajtpy.jpg) Misraj Nida Fathima Of all the results from the North and East this year, few carry more symbolic weight than that of Misraj Nida Fathima, a student of Mullaitivu Maha Vidyalaya. Fathima ranked first in Mullaitivu district and 207th nationally, earning eligibility for medical studies at a state university. Mullaitivu was among the districts hardest hit in the final phase of the war. Its Muslim population had been forcibly expelled from the Northern Province in 1990 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, with many families losing their homes and belongings. Resettlement began gradually during periods of ceasefire and accelerated after the war ended in 2009, but communities returned to areas where schools had been damaged, teachers had fled, and years of schooling had been disrupted. Against that backdrop, Fathima’s achievement is not merely a statistic. “This is not just an individual accomplishment,” a local school official said. “It reflects a community that is still rebuilding but beginning to re-enter national spaces through education.” Another teacher, Ravi Thangathurai, told Jaffna Monitor that her success represents a positive sign for the resettled Muslim community, particularly for young girls. He described her as a student who could “offer a sense of hope to a generation that grew up in displacement.” ### **The National Picture** At the island level, the 2025 results confirm patterns familiar from recent years, even as the geography of top performance continues to shift. In the Biological Science stream, first place went to Dilan Sanjana Karunaratne of Royal College, Colombo, while Darshana Konesh’s third-place finish for Sri Shanmuga Hindu Girls’ College in Trincomalee marked one of the strongest results for an eastern school in that stream in years. The Engineering Technology stream was led by Wanigasuriya Arachchige Don Heshan Anujaya Wanigasuriya of Bandarainake Vidyalaya, Gampaha. The Bio Systems Technology stream was topped by Wijeratne Mudiyanselage Dona Ishani Manodya of Bandaranayake Central College, Veyangoda. The Arts stream was led by Marasinghe Pathiranage Achintha Mihiranga Rathnayake of Wayamba Royal College, Kurunegala. ### **Beyond the Rankings** The A/L examination remains the principal gateway to state university education in Sri Lanka. With placements sharply limited, the pressure is immense — and the stakes are particularly high for students from districts where private tutoring, laboratory access, and qualified teachers are unevenly distributed. This year, educators note, the North and East delivered not just standout individual results but a broader cohort of high-performing candidates — a sign, they say, that the improvements are systemic rather than exceptional. Devathas Kishani of St. Anthony’s College in Kayts, for instance, ranked first in Jaffna district in the Bio-Technology stream and 27th nationally. She lost her father — a fisherman — in a shooting incident when she was an infant, and was raised by her mother, who worked as a daily wage laborer. Her result, educators in the region say, illustrates both the determination that characterizes many students from under-resourced communities and the distance those communities have had to travel. ### Tamil Leaders Raise Plantation Inequality in Talks With Canada URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tamil-leaders-raise-plantation-inequality-in-talks-with-canada/ Last updated: 2026-04-04T14:35:10.000Z For generations, the Tamil communities of Sri Lanka’s central highlands have done much of the physical labour that keeps one of the country’s most prized export industries alive. They pick the tea. They tend the estates. And yet, by nearly every measure of human welfare — housing, land ownership, mortality — they remain among the most marginalised people in the country. That contradiction was the animating argument when Mano Ganesan, the leader of the Tamil Progressive Alliance and a member of Parliament, sat down with Canada’s High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Isabelle Martin, at Canada House in Colombo. “The Malaiyaha Tamil community is no longer a labour identity,” he told the ambassador. “It is a distinct and dignified ethnic community whose future is tied to land, education, and economic mobility.” The meeting was attended by the party’s general secretary, Paraneetharan, and its vice president for international affairs, Barath Arullsamy. ### **A SECTOR WORTH BILLIONS, COMMUNITIES WORTH LITTLE** Sri Lanka’s tea industry generates roughly $1.2 billion to $1.3 billion in foreign exchange annually, making it one of the country’s principal sources of hard currency, Mano Ganesan told the Canadian High Commissioner. Unlike the apparel sector — valued at more than $5 billion a year but heavily reliant on imported raw materials, with a significant share of earnings flowing back out of the country — the tea industry operates largely as a domestic value chain. “The soil, the labour, the processing — nearly all of it is Sri Lankan,” he said. Yet the communities at the base of that chain have historically seen little of the wealth it generates. The plantation system, established under British colonial rule and largely preserved in its structural essentials after independence, concentrated land and capital at the top while tethering workers to estate-bound lives with limited legal title to the ground beneath their homes. Mr. Ganesan argues that this is no longer primarily a question of wages, though wages remain a persistent grievance. The deeper issue, he contends, is one of civic standing — of whether the Malaiyaha Tamil community is treated as a community of citizens with rights, or as a labour pool with needs. “What we are witnessing is not a failure of resources, but a failure of political will,” Mano Ganesan said, adding that despite repeated policy announcements, no meaningful progress had been made in land allocation or permanent resettlement. ### **DISASTER DATA THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED** To underscore his argument, Mr. Ganesan cited data from the 2025 floods and landslides that affected several parts of Sri Lanka. Plantation communities, though they constitute less than one percent of the total affected population, accounted for approximately 11 percent of disaster-related deaths and 28 percent of missing persons. More than 158,000 people were displaced nationally, with thousands still lacking permanent housing nearly four months after the event. The disproportion, Mr. Ganesan told the ambassador, is not accidental. It reflects decades of underinvestment in infrastructure, housing, and early-warning systems in plantation areas — a pattern that successive governments have acknowledged and that none have meaningfully reversed. Barath Arullsamy, who spoke during the meeting, noted that the Kandy District had seen a particularly heavy concentration of displaced plantation families, and said that the urgency of the situation required more than humanitarian handouts. He referenced a recent visit to affected communities by Canadian MP Juanita Nathan and said he hoped Canada would consider a more direct and sustained role, including through partnerships with the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada. ### **AN IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE, CAREFULLY PHRASED** Among the more pointed aspects of Mr. Ganesan’s presentation was a critique aimed squarely at the governing coalition in Colombo. The current administration came to power on a platform rooted, in part, in Marxist and left-populist political theory, with rhetoric centred on economic justice and the upliftment of working people. Mr. Ganesan suggested that rhetoric had not translated into results. “If this were truly a class-driven framework, the working class would be at the centre of economic upliftment,” he said. “Instead, what we see is stagnation.” ### **A CANADIAN MODEL, A LOCAL PROPOSAL** Alongside his criticism, Mr. Ganesan proposed the creation of a Non-Territorial Community Council — a cross-provincial governance mechanism designed to represent Malaiyaha Tamils across Sri Lanka and provide a structured institutional voice on issues such as land, housing, education, and economic development. The proposal is designed to address a core complexity of the community’s situation: plantation Tamils are dispersed across multiple provinces of Sri Lanka, which means that geographically bounded political structures often fail to capture or represent their collective interests. A non-territorial council, the argument runs, would provide coordination without requiring territorial consolidation. The model, Mr. Ganesan suggested, draws inspiration from Canada’s approach to managing diversity within a federal framework. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached approximately USD 540 million in 2025, with Sri Lanka holding a favourable trade surplus, giving the relationship a commercial as well as a diplomatic dimension. “Diversity is not a weakness, it is a strength,” he told the ambassador. “Canada has demonstrated this to the world.” ### **A PERSONAL HISTORY** Writing on social media after the meeting, Mr. Ganesan gave the encounter a dimension that had not appeared in any official readout. Canada House, he recalled, was not simply a diplomatic address to him. During the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war, he said, it had provided him a measure of refuge at a moment when he faced what he described as threats connected to the “white van” abductions that had terrorised political activists and journalists in Colombo — the extrajudicial disappearances that became one of the most sinister emblems of that era. He added that he had pressed the High Commissioner to ensure that international assistance, humanitarian engagement, and human rights monitoring mechanisms reach these communities more directly — not as a peripheral concern but as a central one. Ms. Martin, he said, had demonstrated a clear understanding of what was raised. ### **Diplomacy and Domestic Realities** The meeting with the Canadian High Commissioner is one in a series of diplomatic engagements the Tamil Progressive Alliance has pursued as it tries to build international support for structural reforms that have found limited traction domestically. Those efforts are now extending inward as well. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is scheduled to meet a TPA delegation on Wednesday, April 2, for discussions on the plantation community’s concerns and the country’s broader political situation — a meeting understood to have been arranged following a telephone conversation between the President and Mr. Ganesan in which both sides agreed to hold formal talks. The TPA delegation is expected to include deputy leaders Palani Digambaram and V. Radhakrishnan, as well as members of the alliance’s political committee. A political observer, speaking to *Jaffna Monitor*, succinctly described the plight of the Malaiyaha Tamil community: the land plantation workers stand on, in most cases, is not theirs; the houses they live in sit on soil they do not own; and the tea they harvest feeds a global export economy whose benefits have largely bypassed them. ### Exclusive: Iran’s Ambassador Sets Out Tehran’s Position on the Strait of Hormuz URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft-2/ Last updated: 2026-03-31T14:28:47.000Z **By: Dr. Alireza Delkhosh, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Sri Lanka** On 28 February 2026, the United States and the Zionist regime, through an unlawful act of aggression contrary to the fundamental principles of international law, acted against the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In response, and within the framework of the inherent right of self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted a set of measures to counter this aggression. As a result of this unlawful aggression, passage through the territorial sea of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf, including in the Strait of Hormuz, has become unsafe, and an emergency and extraordinary situation has arisen in the Strait of Hormuz. This situation has had wide-ranging effects on the national security and vital essential interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as on the safety and security of international navigation and shipping in the Persian Gulf. In light of the emergency and extraordinary conditions created, the possibility of innocent passage as under normal circumstances has, in practice, ceased to exist. This situation is the natural and direct consequence of the unlawful aggression by the United States and the Zionist regime against the territory and sovereignty of Iran, and responsibility for it lies with these hostile parties. The particular and unprecedented situation arising from this war of aggression has compelled the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to safeguard its vital essential interests and simultaneously ensure peace, stability, and maritime security, to apply a set of precautionary and restrictive measures with regard to innocent passage through the Strait of Hormuz. In the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the primary objective of these measures is to prevent support for the ongoing and future aggression against Iran, as well as to ensure free maritime navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. Within this framework, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the concerned and responsible coastal State with regard to maritime safety in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, in accordance with established rules of customary and treaty-based international law, prevents the transit of all vessels belonging to or affiliated with the aggressor parties and participants in or supporters of the aggression. Furthermore, the innocent passage of third States through the Strait of Hormuz shall be lawful only insofar as it is not prejudicial to the national security and essential interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the peace and order of the Persian Gulf region, and is free from any form of support for threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the State of Iran. It is evident that should the Government of Iran determine that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the passage of a vessel through the Strait of Hormuz would constitute a threat to national security, public order, or regional peace, it will prevent such passage. The aggressors, by abusing passage through the Strait of Hormuz and their deployment in the Persian Gulf, have initiated a war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran and have continuously threatened the national security of the country. It is evident that in such a situation, characterized by the violation of a peremptory norm (prohibition of aggression) and the breach of Iran’s sovereignty and national security, the normalization of conditions and the expectation of refraining from exercising effective control over the Strait of Hormuz are impossible and devoid of any legal or practical basis. It should be noted that the right of States to adopt precautionary and restrictive measures within the context of armed conflicts has been recognized in international conventions and instruments. The aggressive actions of the United States and the Zionist regime, which clearly violate the provisions of the law of the sea—particularly with regard to the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of a coastal State (which are, under Article 14(4) of the 1958 Convention and Articles 19(2)(a) and 39(1)(a) of the 1982 Convention, considered activities inconsistent with the principles of innocent passage and transit passage)—have disrupted the fragile balance between the rights and security of coastal States and the freedom of maritime navigation, and directly and seriously violate the sovereignty and national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, under these conditions, the prevailing legal regime (innocent passage) has been suspended, and this passage is subject to the conditions declared by the competent authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, under such circumstances, the exercise of effective and intelligent control by the Islamic Republic of Iran over the transit of all vessels, particularly those belonging to or affiliated with the aggressor parties, based on the inherent right of self-defense and the principles of necessity and proportionality, is entirely lawful and legitimate. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always respected the principle of freedom of navigation as well as the safety and security of maritime transport; however, it is evident that the practical realization of these principles with regard to passage through the Strait of Hormuz is not possible except in light of respect for the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the coastal State. The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes that responsibility for any disruption, insecurity, or increased risks in this vital waterway and its surrounding region lies directly with the United States and the Zionist regime, which, by engaging in unlawful and criminal war against Iran, have exposed regional stability and international maritime safety and security to an unprecedented threat and have clearly violated the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In view of the foregoing, the lawful and legitimate measures of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been adopted within the framework of established principles of international law and are based on the two principles of necessity and proportionality. These measures have been implemented with the aim of repelling aggression and neutralizing the source of threats, and in accordance with legal standards, they will continue until the full realization of these objectives and the elimination of the source of threat and aggression. Within this framework, any passage through the Strait of Hormuz must be carried out in compliance with the measures adopted by Iran and in coordination with the competent authorities of the country. **Editor’s Note:** **This article is authored by Dr. Alireza Delkhosh, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Sri Lanka. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of *Jaffna Monitor*.** ***Jaffna Monitor* is committed to fostering informed public discourse and welcomes counter-arguments, responses, and alternative perspectives, enabling readers to engage with diverse viewpoints and form their own conclusions.** ### The Business of Hope: How IMHO Helped Rebuild Lives in Sri Lanka URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-helped-rebuild-lives-in-sri-lanka/ Last updated: 2026-04-10T03:23:47.000Z *Two decades ago, a small group of Tamil professionals in the United States asked a simple question: instead of meeting and eating, why not do something for our people? What grew from that conversation has transformed hospitals, restored sight, saved hearts, and quietly rewritten the story of a community that war nearly erased.* **By: Aruliniyan Mahalingam** I have no formal connection to the medical profession. Yet, in a way that feels almost inevitable, I have always found myself surrounded by doctors—within my family, among my friends, and across the circles I move in. Over time, as I began engaging with them more closely—first out of curiosity, then as a journalist, and eventually as a friend and well-wisher—I was drawn into the world of healthcare stories in Sri Lanka, particularly in the North and East. Almost every time I covered an issue related to health or well-being in Jaffna or elsewhere in the North and East, one name kept resurfacing: IMHO — the International Medical Health Organization. ![Children use a water facility installed through an IMHO school project in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixgirk8zblh0ox-2.jpg) Children use a water facility installed through an IMHO school project in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region. At first glance, the scale of its work was misleading. The reach, the consistency, the depth—it all suggested something far bigger. I assumed IMHO was a global institution, well-funded by states and international actors, something akin to *Médecins Sans Frontières*, backed by vast networks and deep resources. But the truth was far more compelling. IMHO was not a distant international giant. It was, in fact, the creation of a small group of Sri Lankan Tamil professionals abroad—individuals who had chosen, in their own way, to respond to a broken system. In many ways, IMHO is doing the kind of work one would expect from a state—or from a powerful international agency. Only here, it is being carried out quietly, consistently, and almost entirely through collective will. ### **THE ROAD BACK TO JAFFNA** ![Dr. Rajam Theventhiran (third from left) with staff at an IMHO vocational training center in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region. Women in blue aprons produce sanitary pads as part of the initiative.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixpiqxrqdi2fci-3.jpg) Dr. Rajam Theventhiran (third from left) with staff at an IMHO vocational training center in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region. Women in blue aprons produce sanitary pads as part of the initiative. In 2002, following a ceasefire between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan government, some who had left the country were able to return home for the first time in years. Dr. Rajam Theventhiran—a psychiatrist based in New York City and one of the founding board members of IMHO—was among them. What she found was shocking—even to those who had followed the reports from afar. The Jaffna district, home to roughly 600,000 people and once one of the most educationally advanced regions in South Asia, had been comprehensively broken. Jaffna Teaching Hospital—the only tertiary care centre for the entire Northern Province, serving five districts across hundreds of kilometres—had been displaced twice during three decades of conflict. Its buildings had come under artillery fire; at one point, it had witnessed a brutal massacre during the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) period. A report from the mid-2000s, Dr. Rajam told me, estimated that 38 peripheral hospitals across the district were being managed collectively by just 14 doctors. Medications were scarce. Equipment was lacking. In rural areas, even travel was a gamble—landmines still lay buried beneath the soil. “When we had left the country, it had been in a much better condition. We felt a strong sense of responsibility. Perhaps that responsibility took shape in IMHO,” Dr. Rajam told me. “Rajam Akka has given her life to IMHO,” a doctor friend told me. “She breathes it, thinks about it all the time, goes to bed, and wakes up with new ideas related to its work. ### **A MOTHER IN MULLAITIVU** The room from which Dr. Rajam tells me these stories—through a flickering Zoom window—is worlds away from the landscapes, memories, and the immense work she carries within her. She speaks from the United States, from the quiet order of a diaspora life. But her words travel elsewhere. They return to Mullaitivu—to the flat, salt-tinged coastline of Sri Lanka’s north, a region that witnessed not only the brutal final chapter of the Sri Lankan war but also nature’s fury, when the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami swallowed homes, erased shorelines, and upended entire lives. “There was a mother,” she began, her voice slowing under the weight of what she was about to say. A pause. “There was a mother… She had lost all six of her children to the tsunami.” Dr. Rajam had returned then as part of the relief effort—not only to deliver aid, but also to sit with people and listen. She sat with that mother in the aftermath of unimaginable loss. What the woman said next has never left her. “She told me,” Dr. Rajam recalled, “that although she had lost all six of her children, she had found some peace… because she believed that God takes good people at a young age.” “That was her way—her faith, her philosophical explanation for something so unimaginable,” Dr. Rajam told me. “I think of her often. Even today—when you texted me about this interview—that mother came to my mind. She gave me a lesson I have carried all my life.” A silence settled between us. “Even in the deepest cruelty, there is still hope.” Dr. Rajam told me. It lingered in the air. Perhaps that is where IMHO’s charter lies—in that quiet, stubborn insistence on hope. A refusal to look away from suffering. A willingness to sit with it. And, above all, the resolve not just to witness, but to act. Then, with a calm certainty that carried years behind it, she said, “IMHO is in the business of giving hope. And we have been in this business for quite a long time.” ### **THE FOUNDING** ![Prof. Thavam Thampi Pillai, President of the International College of Surgeons and vice president of IMHO, a key figure in the organization’s work.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kix7sxbcg5gkwfp-3.jpg) Prof. Thavam Thampi Pillai, President of the International College of Surgeons and vice president of IMHO, a key figure in the organization’s work. In September 2003, Rajam Theventhiran sat down with Dr. Thavam Thampi Pillai—a transplant surgeon and current President of the International College of Surgeons—along with Dr. S. Raguraj, an internist, and Dr. Sujanthy Rajaram, a specialist in both internal medicine and critical care. None of them had experience running a charity. What they had instead was a shared unease—a sense that something had to be done. They debated names, turning over possibilities, before settling on the International Medical Health Organization—IMHO. From the outset, they were clear: this would not be an organisation confined by race, ethnicity, or even national boundaries. The work, they believed, had to travel wherever it was needed. And the name aptly reflected that. “I returned to Sri Lanka in 2003, after sixteen years,” Dr. Thavam Thampi Pillai told me. “During that visit, I went to Jaffna Teaching Hospital. On rounds with Dr. Perandarajah, I saw a young boy—perhaps in his early teens—diagnosed with kidney failure.” “At the time, there was no dialysis or transplant available in the public sector in Sri Lanka. It was hard for me to come to terms with the fact that a young boy was going to die of a benign illness, which, in another setting, would be a manageable condition. He had a worse prognosis than many of the cancer patients we treat in the West. That harsh truth shattered me completely.” He pauses. “It became one of the key reasons I went on to help co-found IMHO.” “Jaffna Teaching Hospital was, in many ways, ahead of its time,” Dr. Thavam Thambi Pillai told me. “As far back as 1977, it had been performing advanced thoracic surgeries under Dr. Narkunam. Had that trajectory continued, by 2003 the hospital might have been performing heart transplants.” But the reality was starkly different. Years of conflict had pushed it back by decades. Instead of performing advanced surgeries, doctors were watching children die from treatable conditions. “There was a deep sense of sadness—that we had gone back in time,” Dr. Thavam Thambi Pillai said. “A sense of betrayal, on my part, for having left the land. And perhaps even guilt.” “It was that emotional reckoning that became a turning point in my life,” he continued. “I could see the immense level of need. And I knew I could not address it alone. So, I sat down with my friends and well-wishers—and we began IMHO.” ### **Not a Doctors’ Organisation** At first glance, IMHO sounds like what many assume it to be—an organisation of doctors, by doctors, for doctors. But that assumption does not hold. “We are not just a doctors’ organisation,” Dr. Thavam Thampi Pillai told me. “Many of us come from medical backgrounds. But IMHO was never meant to be limited to that.” There is no formal membership structure. No rigid professional boundaries. No gatekeeping. The organisation is governed by a ten-member board—bringing together not just doctors, but also accountants, engineers, university lecturers, and others from diverse walks of life, Dr.Rajam told me. “None of us from IMHO-USA receive any compensation,” Dr. Rajam said, “We are one hundred percent volunteers—and we will remain so for life.” ### **THE FIRST PROJECT—AND WHAT IT BECAME** ![The Iyankankulam Primary Health Care Center, IMHO’s first project, built to provide free primary care in war-affected Mullaitivu.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kix1bg40zn5kiqz-3.png) The Iyankankulam Primary Health Care Center, IMHO’s first project, built to provide free primary care in war-affected Mullaitivu. Their first project reflected a clear philosophy. “The backbone of any healthcare system—whether in a high-income country or a low-income one—is primary care,” Dr. Thavam Thambi Pillai told me. So, they decided to build a primary healthcare centre—and run it free of charge. During the ceasefire period, when travel to the North became possible, they identified a war-affected area in Mullaitivu—Iyankankulam—as the site. The cost was estimated at around $75,000 to build, with an additional $1,500 a month to maintain it. Free medication, he explained, was essential. “If someone is struggling to put food on the table and you ask them to buy blood pressure medication, they simply won’t take it—unless you provide it.” Then came the harder question: how to raise the money. IMHO organised its first fundraising dinner. A plate cost $1,000\. Thirteen people attended. They raised $13,000. It was a start—but far from enough. So, they organised a second fundraiser. This time, they did something different. “We didn’t fix an amount,” Dr. Thavam Thampi Pillai told me. “People told us—we are asking for too little. Just open it up. Let people give what they want.” Within a few fundraisers, the full $75,000 had been raised! ![The Iyankankulam Primary Health Care Center](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixf0deylhrasbc-3.png) The Iyankankulam Primary Health Care Center Then came an unexpected phone call. A man offered to sponsor an entire primary healthcare centre—$75,000\. It was Mr. J. M. Rajaratnam, father of Raj Rajaratnam, the former Wall Street financier. A month later, at a fundraiser in upstate New York, another $75,000 was raised. “That’s when we realised—maybe we are onto something,” he said. “I was reminded of a line from *The Alchemist* by Paulo Coelho: ‘And, when you want something, all the universe conspires in helping you to achieve it.’ It felt like that—the universe helping us, through a few good Samaritans.” What began with thirteen plates and thirteen thousand dollars has since grown—by Dr. Rajam own accounting—into more than fifteen million US dollars in total interventions, across Sri Lanka and nineteen other countries, funded almost entirely by individual Tamil donors. ### **THE TSUNAMI YEAR** Fourteen months after IMHO was founded, the Indian Ocean tsunami struck on the morning of December 26, 2004\. The Sri Lankan coast was among the worst affected in the world. The north and east bore a particularly heavy toll. Within two weeks, Dr. Rajam and others were on the ground. Some went to Kilinochchi. Others moved across the north and east. They bought vehicles and medicines. They set up camps. They drove through a coastline that looked, in places, like a war zone. “It was a huge crisis,” Dr. Rajam told me. “But within a very short time, we were able to collect enough funds, buy vehicles and medicines, and travel to Sri Lanka. Within two weeks, we were there.” The tsunami expanded IMHO’s sense of its own purpose. It also sharpened its instincts. “This showed us the importance of an organisation like IMHO,” she said. “It showed us that we could make a difference—that we could do something meaningful to help people.” But it also taught them something else. That they could move fast—faster than larger institutions, often slowed by bureaucracy. When the ceasefire eventually collapsed, and the A9 highway connecting Jaffna to the south was closed by the military, IMHO managed to send the first emergency shipment of psychiatric medication into the North. When hundreds of thousands were crowded into the Manik Farm, an internally displaced persons camp in Vavuniya after the war’s bloody end in May 2009, IMHO was working on water, sanitation, and nutrition within days, well before any international NGO could start operations. “Do you know who suffers the most during wartime?” Dr.Rajam asked. “It is those requiring long-term care—patients with mental illness, cancer, and renal disease, as well as the elderly, children, and pregnant.” ![Dr. Sathiyamoorthy, Dr. Varatharaja, and then-Acting Government Agent Parthiepan receive a consignment of milk powder sent by IMHO in the No Fire Zone on April 1, 2009, during the final phase of the brutal Sri Lankan war.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixvvenp1on9qs5-3.png) Dr. Sathiyamoorthy, Dr. Varatharaja, and then-Acting Government Agent Parthiepan receive a consignment of milk powder sent by IMHO in the No Fire Zone on April 1, 2009, during the final phase of the brutal Sri Lankan war. During the final and most devastating phase of the war, reports began to emerge from the War Zone—stories of acute suffering, particularly among women and children. IMHO managed to send a shipload of milk powder into the war zone, which reached civilians on April 1, 2009\. A second consignment was dispatched—but it never reached its destination. By mid-May, the war had come to an end. ![A photograph from the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war, which ended in 2009.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixttnf04kxn1gc-3.png) A photograph from the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war, which ended in 2009. ### **DIGNITY IN THE CAMPS** When the war ended, the crisis did not. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people were moved into camps. The largest of them was Manik Farm. In Jaffna, too, camps filled with people who had lost everything—including, for many women, even the most basic conditions for safe childbirth. One project from those difficult months of 2009 has remained especially close to Dr. Rajam’s heart. When displaced families were brought to Jaffna and placed in camps, there were hundreds of pregnant women among them. The Regional Director of Health Services, Dr. Keetheswaran, wanted to convert a small divisional hospital in Varani into a maternity centre—to spare these women from giving birth in tents, under the harsh summer heat. He reached out to IMHO. There was no bureaucracy to slow things down. Within hours, the board had approved the funding. The money was transferred. The hospital was converted. Nearly a hundred mothers delivered their babies there. They were given home-cooked meals—and, for the first time in months, the dignity of a proper recovery. Dr. Rajam told me this project remains deeply personal to her. “As a woman, I have always felt that in vulnerable moments, it is not only survival that matters—dignity matters too.” For her, the significance of the project goes beyond numbers. “It also taught us something important,” she added. “Even a small amount of money—if used at the right time, for the right need—can have a very large impact.” It is a lesson, she said, that has guided IMHO’s work for more than two decades. ### **THE HEART OF JAFFNA** Among the most remarkable contributions IMHO has made in the North is the establishment of a functional cardiac catheterisation laboratory. In 2008, cardiologist Dr. Lakshman approached the organisation. The A9 highway was still closed. The nearest cardiac catheterisation facility was in Colombo—over four hundred kilometres to the south. For a Tamil patient in Jaffna suffering a heart attack, the choices were stark: make the costly and uncertain journey south, or risk death. Many faced the latter. The catheterisation laboratory required over $600,000\. The board began raising funds, reaching out to donors in Boston, New York, Toronto, and London—Tamil families who understood what it meant to live without access to advanced care. They raised enough to construct the building. The Canadian International Development Agency supported the construction. Later, when the French government decided to donate two cath labs to Sri Lanka, Jaffna received one—largely, insiders believe, because the infrastructure was already in place. The unit opened around 2011\. Today, the cardiology centre at Jaffna Teaching Hospital is among the most functional in the country. It draws patients not only from the Northern and Eastern provinces, but also from the North Western and Southern regions. There are no long waiting lists for catheterisation. Bypass surgeries—once unthinkable in Jaffna—are now performed there. Paediatric cardiologists and cardiac surgeons have since joined the staff—drawn partly by the facility’s reputation, and partly by the knowledge that something real and lasting had finally been built in a place long denied both. “Start small, but with sincerity,” Dr. Thavam Thambi Pillai said. “That has always been one of our guiding principles—and it will grow.” The same principle led to the establishment of the diabetes centre at Jaffna Teaching Hospital. In 2008, Dr. Sivansuthan, a consultant physician, approached IMHO with a troubling observation: more than fifty percent of diabetes patients were seeking treatment only at very late stages—often when amputation had already become necessary. IMHO, arranged for him to visit a diabetic centre in Dayton, Ohio. Upon his return, the organisation funded renovations and staff salaries to help establish a dedicated diabetic centre. In 2015, a fully qualified endocrinologist, Dr. Mahalingam. Aravinthan joined the unit. This year, another specialist has followed. The centre now functions with a level of institutional momentum that was once unimaginable. ### **THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION TOOK NOTICE** IMHO’s work in mental health has been, in many ways, the least visible aspect of what it does. In post-conflict societies, mental illness remains a vast and chronically underfunded public health challenge. In Tamil society, as in many others, stigma only deepens the suffering. “We do many projects related to mental health,” Dr. Rajam Amma told me with a faint smile. “Sometimes our friends joke—half seriously—that IMHO stands for the International Mental Health Organization.” Soon after the tsunami, when IMHO contacted Dr. Ganesan, a psychiatrist in Batticaloa, he requested support to complete an inpatient psychiatric unit that had originally been initiated by the World Health Organization. Since then, IMHO has supported mental health programs in Batticaloa, Vavuniya, Negombo, Angoda and Maskeliya under his guidance. In Vavuniya, IMHO funded the first inpatient psychiatric unit in a stretch of more than a hundred and fifty kilometres that had no such facility—a region where most patients spoke Tamil and the nearest care was delivered in Sinhala. The unit cost fifty thousand dollars and was opened just before the end of the 2009 war. During the months that followed, when hundreds of thousands of displaced people were processed through Manik Farm, that unit served patients who had nowhere else to go. ![Kudil, a rehabilitation facility for people with severe mental illness, built by IMHO in Tellipalai, Jaffna.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kix9npx51wjluom-3.jpg) Kudil, a rehabilitation facility for people with severe mental illness, built by IMHO in Tellipalai, Jaffna. In the years following the war's end, IMHO worked extensively with Dr. Sivayogan, a psychiatrist in Jaffna. One key initiative was *Kudil*—a rehabilitation service for people with severe mental illness, operating on the understanding that clinical treatment without social rehabilitation leaves most patients stranded in a recovery that has nowhere to go. *The* *Kudil* project in Tellipalai cost $450,000\. It was funded entirely by a single family, in memory of their parents. It opened in 2022. "When you visit," Dr. Rajam says quietly, "what stands out is not just the care, but the dignity and hope these individuals regain. The World Health Organization has cited *Kudil* in a blog post as a model for mental health rehabilitation in Southeast Asia. More recently, Dr. Sivayogan highlighted the need for a dedicated facility for patients without family or community support. IMHO supported the construction of a new centre, *“Thoomani Maadam”* at $110,000, funded by a single donor. It opened last year and is already fully occupied. ### **Expanding the Meaning of Care** IMHO did not confine itself to medicine alone. Over time, it came to recognise that health cannot be treated in isolation—that medical outcomes are deeply tied to education, water, sanitation, and the broader conditions in which people live. Without addressing these, meaningful healthcare remains out of reach. “If you ask me to classify our main areas of work,” Dr. Rajam told me, “I would say they fall into three broad categories: health, education, and community development—with water, sanitation, and livelihoods forming a key part of that third category.” “In the beginning, we focused mainly on medical needs. But over time, we evolved naturally. We realised that health, in its true sense, is not possible without clean water, proper sanitation, education, and economic empowerment.” That shift began to take shape around 2010, as communities slowly resettled after the war. One of IMHO’s early interventions was in *Sampur,* in the Trincomalee district. There, the organisation built 139 shelters and about 50 toilets. Since most residents were fishermen, IMHO also provided fishing boats and nets—supporting around 50 families to rebuild their livelihoods. Similar work followed in Batticaloa. In *Parankiyamadu,* in 2020, many resettled families lacked even basic sanitation. IMHO helped build 47 toilets and around 30 shelters, while also supporting livelihoods—again, primarily through fishing boats. In total, more than 200 families have received fishing boats—targeted at resettled and vulnerable communities. Support for persons with disabilities became another critical area. In the immediate post-war years, IMHO worked with Mannar and Vavuniya hospitals, as well as the Jaipur Centre, to address urgent rehabilitation needs. They provided equipment, supported physiotherapists’ salaries, and collaborated with multiple organisations. One such collaboration was with the Mehta Foundation, led by Dr. B. Panagamuwa, a Sinhalese doctor, who continues his work today, running a limb-fitting centre in Kilinochchi. IMHO also partnered with a UK-based organisation, Motivation charitable Trust, to provide wheelchairs. Among those most affected were men and women left paraplegic or quadriplegic by war injuries. Many of them came together to form their own organisation—a quiet act of resilience in itself. Since 2012, IMHO has worked closely with this group, helping restore a sense of independence long out of reach. Thirty three-wheelers (auto rickshaws) were provided to improve mobility for paraplegic patients—enabling them not only to move, but to earn a livelihood. For many, it marked the first real opportunity to stand on their own, both economically and emotionally. “One recipient once told us,” Dr. Rajam recalled, “not only has IMHO given us dignity, but you’ve given us our legs back.” In addition, around 30 specially designed bathrooms were constructed, and access to clean water was secured—small interventions, but transformative in their impact. It is difficult to hear such words and remain unmoved—especially when they come from those who have endured the long shadow of three decades of war, Dr. Rajam told me. At their centre in *Mangulam,* a small medical unit treats bedsores—common among those who are wheelchair-bound or bedridden. Since around 2019, IMHO has supported staff salaries and, during times of economic hardship, even medication. These were not large, visible projects—but they addressed deeply human needs. At the same time, IMHO expanded its work in water and sanitation across the North, East, and upcountry regions. But increasingly, another priority began to take shape: education. “Our education work falls into two broad areas,” Dr. Rajam said. “Early childhood education and school-level support.” So far, IMHO has supported at least 65 preschools—helping with infrastructure, learning materials, and teacher training. It has also expanded into STEM education. In partnership with the UK-based Ratnam Foundation, IMHO has provided smart boards to nearly 300 schools. Capacity-building is another focus. Training programmes range from preschool teachers to English teachers—aimed at improving the quality of education across all levels. But the deeper issue, she said, is access. “We often say education is the most powerful tool to fight poverty. But many children still don’t have access to it,” Dr. Thavam Thambi Pillai told me. It is a line that echoes a familiar truth. Nelson Mandela once said, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” Yet, for many children, that weapon remains out of reach. In some of the most vulnerable areas, dropout rates climb to nearly 40 percent. The reasons are rarely simple. Hunger. Long and costly journeys to school. Crumbling infrastructure. Classrooms without furniture. Schools without proper water or sanitation. “So, we try to address all of it,” Dr. Rajam said. In the upcountry, IMHO supports around 75 high school students with scholarships—helping cover transport and tuition. In Vavuniya, where children often travel long distances in search of better schools, the organisation funds a school bus for nearly 90 students, covering fuel and the driver’s salary. “These may seem like small interventions,” she said. “But they fill critical gaps—and make a real difference.” ### **THE UPCOUNTRY AND THE MATHEMATICS OF DIGNITY** ![Distribution of sanitary pads in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region as part of an IMHO initiative.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixac5qvogzbw49-3.jpg) Distribution of sanitary pads in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region as part of an IMHO initiative. In 2016, IMHO expanded its work into Sri Lanka’s upcountry tea-growing regions—home to Tamil communities brought by British colonial planters from South India in the nineteenth century. What it encountered there did not fit neatly into the organisation’s existing framework, which had been shaped largely by post-conflict needs in the North and East. The problems in the hill country were different in character: deep, generational poverty; a persistent water crisis in schools; and dropout rates approaching forty percent—driven by a web of interconnected causes that could not be addressed in isolation. “We are, in many ways, indebted to Sri Lanka’s free education system—something most of us in IMHO have benefited from,” Dr. Rajam told me. “But we must also acknowledge that this system has been sustained, in part, by the foreign exchange brought in by the tea industry.” “The cruel irony is that the very people who generate that wealth continue to live in conditions of deep poverty.” These upcountry Tamil communities remain among the most marginalised in the country—living in conditions that successive governments have, for decades, failed to meaningfully address. For IMHO, the decision to enter the hill country was shaped not only by need, but by a sense of obligation. “We cannot solve every problem,” an IMHO official told me. “But we felt we had to try—at least in some small way.” The reasons, she explained, are deeply interconnected: lack of food, transport difficulties, poor infrastructure, absence of basic furniture, lack of teaching staff, and inadequate water and sanitation. IMHO responded by addressing these gaps simultaneously. It built water supply systems in thirty-five schools. It constructed nearly 1,500 toilets—around 700 in collaboration with Rotary International. It began supporting 380 children between the ages of three and eighteen—all of them orphans or children of single parents—with a monthly allowance of 3,000 rupees, largely in the form of dry rations, tied to one condition: stay in school. Then something unexpected happened. The women in these communities did not ask for more aid. They asked for a way to save. IMHO helped establish savings groups, forming ninety groups that brought together over 1,000 members. In 2019, they opened a cooperative store, which continues to operate. In 2022, a vocational training centre was established in *Maskeliya.* By last year, the initiative had expanded into small-scale manufacturing—producing garments, bags, shoes, and, more recently, sanitary pads, using machinery imported from India. The sanitary pad initiative emerged from a recurring concern. “Many schoolgirls were missing classes during their menstrual periods,” Dr. Rajam told me, “because they could not afford sanitary products—and because school toilets were either absent or lacked basic privacy.” So far, IMHO has provided sanitary pads to nearly 1,000 girls and women. “We do not see this merely as a distribution project,” she said. “We see it as an initiative for women’s dignity and empowerment.” ![A school water project in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region funded by IMHO.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixby6e0uy4nc9x-3.jpg) A school water project in Sri Lanka’s upcountry region funded by IMHO. Among those who benefited from IMHO’s support is a boy whose father died when he was three. His mother works as a tea plucker. With a younger sibling to care for, the family struggled to meet even basic food needs. IMHO began providing them with dry rations worth 3,000 rupees a month. The boy stayed in school. When he sat for his Ordinary Level examinations, he scored nine distinctions! When Dr. Rajam later visited the family, the boy’s mother made a simple request. “She told me,” Dr. Rajam recalled, “‘Please share our story. I want people to know how much this “small” help has meant to us—how it has changed our lives!’” Today, the boy is preparing for his Advanced Level examinations. He has long wanted to become a doctor. One can truly shoot for the stars when the environment is conducive to learning and growth. His teachers say he is on track. ### **THE GEOGRAPHY OF CARE** ![A preschool in Savarikulam, rebuilt by IMHO after being damaged by a cyclone.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixfe0345ippxbn-3.png) A preschool in Savarikulam, rebuilt by IMHO after being damaged by a cyclone. IMHO’s work in Sri Lanka cuts across the ethnic geography that has long shaped humanitarian attention in the country. The organisation has funded a psychiatric unit at Negombo Hospital, a Sinhala-majority town on the west coast. It has provided a dialysis machine to Ratnapura and supported cataract surgeries in Batticaloa, Kalmunai, Trincomalee, Nawalapitiya, Kegalle, and Dickoya. “We do not look at race, religion, or ethnicity,” Dr. Thavam Thambi Pillai told me. “For us, everyone is human, and everyone has an equal right to live and receive care.” “We stand true to our organisation’s name—the International Medical Health Organization,” he told me. “Suffering does not carry an ethnic identity—and neither should compassion. Health is a global language much like love and music.” In practice, much of IMHO’s work remains concentrated in the Tamil-majority North, East, and upcountry regions, where decades of conflict and structural neglect have created the deepest gaps. But the organisation has never confined itself to those geographies. “It goes where the need is real,” an IMHO official told me, “where there is a trusted partner on the ground—and where we can build something that will last beyond the intervention.” ### **HOW A CHARITY STAYS HONEST** ![Regional Stroke Rehabilitation Centre at Divisional Hospital, Arayampathy](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kixano2qylydplh-3.png) Regional Stroke Rehabilitation Centre at Divisional Hospital, Arayampathy One of the questions IMHO faces repeatedly is how an organisation that handles hundreds of thousands of dollars each year sustains the trust of the Tamil diaspora donors who fund it—despite the absence of institutional celebrity or government backing. The answer, Dr. Rajam told me, is simple: paperwork and transparency. IMHO is a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit in the United States, subject to annual IRS reporting requirements. Its tax filings are public, allowing anyone to see how much the organisation receives—and how it is spent. At its twice-yearly public meetings—held in summer and autumn—the board presents a full accounting of expenditures, completed projects, and ongoing needs. “I believe transparency and accountability are the main reasons people choose to support IMHO,” a long-time donor, who requested anonymity, told me. That trust has proven resilient. During the Covid-19 pandemic—when charitable giving to many organisations declined sharply—IMHO’s donation levels remained largely stable. Dr. Rajam attributes that consistency to years of credibility. “When people see the impact,” she said, “they are moved to support.” ### **Not an End, but an Ongoing Work** ![At Jaffna Teaching Hospital, Prof. Thavam Thampi Pillai (second from left) speaks with members of IMHO’s “befriender” programme—believed to be the first of its kind in Sri Lanka; also seen is Dr. Brammah (first from left), Specialist Nephrologist.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-business-of-hope-how-imho-yI0HxA-kix4x4v0lbeua8h.jpg) At Jaffna Teaching Hospital, Prof. Thavam Thampi Pillai (second from left) speaks with members of IMHO’s “befriender” programme—believed to be the first of its kind in Sri Lanka; also seen is Dr. Brammah (first from left), Specialist Nephrologist. It is March 2026\. Nearly seventeen years have passed since the war that devastated Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority North came to an end. Yet the work of reconstruction—physical, social, and psychological—remains unfinished. Jaffna Teaching Hospital, with its 1,310 beds and more than 2,000 staff, now performs kidney transplants and bypass surgeries—procedures once unimaginable in the region —made possible in part through sustained support from IMHO. Beyond Jaffna, facilities such as the stroke unit in Chankanai , Arayampathy and the thalassemia unit in Batticaloa, Diabetic center in Kalmunai—and several others—continue to function with critical backing from the organisation. At Jaffna Teaching Hospital, IMHO has introduced what is believed to be Sri Lanka’s first “befriender” programme. Trained young women are stationed at key entry points to guide patients—many of whom travel long distances from surrounding districts—through the complexity of a large tertiary-care facility. The idea came from local doctors. IMHO funded it. In February 2026, Phase One of a new day surgery centre at the hospital was formally opened. The facility is expected to ease congestion and reduce the need for prolonged admissions, allowing patients to undergo procedures and return home the same day. As with many of IMHO’s initiatives, the concept originated with the university and hospital’s surgical team; IMHO secured the funding. Elsewhere, at *Maathavam*—a centre for children with neurodevelopmental disorders that IMHO has supported since 2014—the organisation continues to strengthen services through training and long-term support. And in Mullaitivu, the *Iyankankulam* primary healthcare centre—the first project IMHO ever built, in 2006—remains operational. Nearly two decades on, the organisation continues to step in when support is needed. For IMHO, Dr. Rajam told me, this is what sustainability means: not a completed project, but a continuing relationship. ### **The Quiet Power of Small Acts** There is a story Dr. Rajam tells about a girl named Yalini from Sampur — a resettled area on the eastern coast where families had returned after nearly twenty years in displacement camps. They had been given thirty-five thousand rupees and some aluminium sheets by the government. They had no toilet and no access to clean water. Yalini was a teenager with significant intellectual disabilities. Her older brother was physically disabled and visually impaired. Their mother's greatest fear, in the absence of a toilet, was that Yalini would have to go into the forest alone — and what might happen to her there. When IMHO built toilets in the area, one went to Yalini's family. A common well was installed nearby. When Dr. Rajam visited again, Yalini showed her the toilet with such pride that the memory has stayed with her for years. "Even a small intervention can restore dignity and safety — and truly change a life." Nirosha is a Sinhalese woman who runs a small poultry farm with around four hundred chickens in Maskeliya. During the COVID-19 pandemic, she was unable to sell her eggs or afford feed. The farm was days away from collapse. She came to IMHO—which does not normally support individuals—and they gave her a small amount to buy feed for a few weeks. All her chickens survived. Today, Nirosha supplies up to two hundred eggs a day to an IMHO-supported cooperative store in Maskeliya, at below-market rates so the store can remain viable. She also volunteers at the vocational training centre, teaching sewing and bag-making. Dr. Rajam tells this story when asked about goodwill and motivation. It is, in miniature, the logic behind IMHO’s work: that help does not end where it is given. It spreads. It returns. It takes new forms in other hands. “That is the power of humanity!” Dr. Rajam speaks easily about her father. He had grown up in poverty, never completing his education beyond the ordinary level, but he read voraciously and spent much of his life writing letters for those who could not—petitions to authorities, appeals against injustice. She remembers him at his desk, sometimes skipping meals until a letter was finished. Though he grew up in poverty, he carried within him a deep sense of justice and compassion. He cared deeply about the suffering of others. He taught her, she says, that indifference to suffering is not neutrality. It is a choice. “I am a very ordinary person,” she says. It is a line others repeat. Dr. Thavam Thampi Pillai says much the same. There is nothing extraordinary, they insist—only a belief that anyone can help, if given the opportunity. “That,” an IMHO official told me, “is the organisation’s working philosophy.” Somewhere in Maskeliya, a boy with nine distinctions at his Ordinary Level examinations is studying for his Advanced Levels. He wants to be a doctor. Somewhere in Sampur, a girl named Yalini lives in a house with a toilet. Somewhere in Jaffna, a man who had a heart attack last week—and who, in 2005, might have died because the road south was closed—is recovering in a hospital that now has the equipment and the doctors to save him. These are not grand narratives. They are the quiet, specific outcomes of twenty-three years of patient, unglamorous, volunteer-driven work—by people who asked themselves a question once, and never stopped answering it. ### Appointed, Then Abandoned: The Betrayal of Northern Health Volunteers URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-tragedy-of-the-plight-of-health-services-volunteers/ Last updated: 2026-04-05T02:14:27.000Z **By: Jeevan Thiagarajah** ## A Travesty of Justice in the Northern Province In the annals of public service recruitment, few stories are as harrowing or as indicative of systemic failure as the plight of the Health Services Volunteers in the Northern Province. This is a saga marked by a cruel travesty of justice, where the hopes of the most vulnerable were raised and dashed by the very system designed to protect them. The most damning aspect of this tragedy is that letters of appointment to government service were indeed issued. For every recipient, this document represented the culmination of an arduous interview process and years of dedication. Yet these letters were rendered effectively meaningless. In a shocking turn of events, records of these appointments were destroyed in certain files, and some public servants — including those present at a meeting with the Secretary to the President — were reluctant to divulge the truth, leaving the appointees in a legal and administrative limbo. One of them, I believe, died by suicide. For over six months, the women health workers staged a silent protest on the roadside outside the Governor's Secretariat, enduring the elements and the indifference of the state. They were ignored by the powers that were. It fell to the Governor, who assumed office in October 2021, to resurrect this dying matter. He found a situation mired in obfuscation; he reconstituted the missing papers and sought to deliver justice. The Governor met with the protestors and took up their cause. When the NPP government assumed office, a delegation of health volunteers visited the Health Minister’s office, and Governor confirmed the facts presented. He followed up with a petition to the Human Rights Commission to underscore the severity of the denial of their rights. To understand the depth of this injustice, one must look at the timeline of events that led these workers to the streets. ### Background & Context **Post-Conflict Era:** Following the end of the conflict, the Northern Province experienced a severe shortage of Public Health Midwives and Health Service Assistants (Junior). **Volunteer Engagement:** To bridge this gap, Medical Officers of Health (MOHs) and hospitals engaged volunteers. These volunteers delivered both preventive and curative healthcare services, assisting midwives and performing minor staff duties. ### Chronological Sequence of Events **2014:** The Ministry of Public Administration issued Circular No. 25/2014\. The volunteers could not apply for permanency under this circular because it was reserved for substitute, casual, and contract workers, whereas these volunteers fell outside those categories despite fulfilling the 180-day service requirement. **2015:** The first known correspondence regarding the recruitment of Health Service Assistants (Junior) Grade III was recorded. **June 2017:** Consequent to a request made by these volunteers, when the former President Maithiripala Sirisena visited Jaffna, the matter was brought to the highest level of attention. **July 26, 2017:** A meeting chaired by former Secretary to the President, Mr. Austin Fernando, was called for at the Presidential Secretariat. At that meeting, the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) was represented by Mr. A. Pathinathan (Chief Secretary), Mr. L. Llangovan (Secretary to the Governor), Mr. C. A. Mohanras (Secretary to the Public Service Commission), and Mr. S. Thiruvaharan (Secretary, Ministry of Health & Indigenous Medicine, Social Services & Rehabilitation, Probation & Child care Services & Women's Affairs). In that meeting, the NPC team submitted a name list of 820 persons as Volunteer Health Workers who had been working on a volunteer basis for a long period. However, there was no fruitful outcome of this meeting. **2018:** A total of 454 vacancies for Health Service Assistants were identified in the Northern Province. **March 28, 2019:** The Department of Management Services approved the recruitment of 454 Health Service Assistants. **September 12, 2019:** Just two months before the Presidential election, the former Governor of NPC, Dr. Suren Raghavan, gave a list containing 1,923 persons as Volunteer Health Workers and requested the NPC Secretary of the Ministry of Health to interview them. **Late 2019:** Out of the 1,923 listed, only 1,631 turned out for interviews. The 389 Volunteer Health Workers referred to in the letter under reference are those selected out of the list submitted by the former Governor. **November 25, 2019:** The Secretary of the Provincial Ministry of Health issued appointment letters to selected candidates (Section 3 refers to 454 candidates selected for these letters). These appointees were directed to assume duties on this date. **Post-November 2019:** The issued appointments were withheld immediately after the declaration of the Presidential Election. **December 20, 2019:** The Secretary to the Treasury (Ministry of Finance) issued a letter halting the recruitment process. **October 26, 2020:** Management Services Circular No. 02/2020 was issued, mandating that all recruitment for PL category positions be conducted through the Department of Multi-purpose Development Task Force. **March 2021:** Governor Charles sought the intervention of the President to remedy the matter. In her plea, she stated: *"Under the circumstances, since they were already issued with appointment letters but not allowed to assume duties due to the subsequent Government policy may I suggest Your Excellency that the issue may be treated as a special case on humanitarian grounds and allow the provincial authorities to fill the 454 vacancies by deviating from provisions laid down in Management Services Circular No. 02/2020 with selectees referred above please."* **April 29, 2021:** A letter (Ref: PS/GPA/05/DG) was sent by Chandima Wickramasinghe, Additional Secretary for the Secretary to the President, to Major General (Rtd.) Nanda Mallawarachchi, Director General of the Department of Multipurpose Task Force, regarding the recruitment of the 389 selected candidates. ### A Way Forward: Training and Certification With the past marred by political interference and administrative failures, a pragmatic solution has emerged to resolve this humanitarian crisis. The proposal is to ask those who were selected if they are willing to be trained and certified under a specialized Program for Care Workers. This initiative aims to transform the tragedy into an opportunity for professional development. **Key Facets of the Proposed Training Program:** **Objective:** To train in the Northern Province in caregiving at minimum or no cost. **Learning Outcomes:** Trainees will gain knowledge in the concept of health, preventive healthcare, mental health services, and curative healthcare services. **Target:** The program aims to initiate NVQ Level 3 caregiver training courses at six centers in the Northern Province, following the NAITA curriculum. **Capacity:** At least 40 candidates trained at each center. **Locations:** DGH Kilinochchi DGH Mullaitivu DGH Vavuniya DGH Mannar BH Tellipalai BH Pointpedro **Curriculum Overview (120 Hours Total):** The training is comprehensive, covering essential skills such as: **English Language Skills(OPTIONAL) :** Basic speaking and writing (8 hours). **Health Concepts:** Introduction to health and healthcare spectrum (8 hours). **Health System:** Sri Lankan health system and clinical governance (6 hours). **Communication:** Developing effective skills and positive attitudes (12 hours). **Specialized Care:** Caring for terminally ill, immobile, and mental health patients (20 hours). **Elderly & Special Needs:** Care for the elderly and special needs patients (20 hours). **Hospital Care:** Caring for acute and chronic patients (20 hours). **Logistics & Safety:** Safe transportation of patients (10 hours). **Nutrition:** Food and nutrition for mothers and ill patients (10 hours). **Infection Prevention:** Waste management and hygiene concepts (6 hours). ### Implementation and Stakeholder Coordination To ensure this solution is viable and executed with the urgency it demands, a coordinated administrative effort is essential. DCS Training, PD Health, RDHS of respective areas, the Department of Social Services, and the Commissioner Cooperatives directed by the Governor needs to be actively involved in the implementation process. The cost of bursaries should be supported by donor funding to alleviate the financial burden on the trainees. Once certified, the graduates should be organized into Care Worker Cooperatives linked with Local Government Hospitals in the area. They could also run care homes. This model ensures they receive an income and that standards of care are maintained. While this solution provides a path to dignity and employment, it must be noted that what these workers still lack—and justly deserve—is a government pension. This initiative is a critical step toward rectifying a wrong that has lasted far too long. ### Hoole Sued for Rs. 1 Billion Over Alleged Defamation URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/hoole-sued-for-rs-1-billion-over-alleged-defamation/ Last updated: 2026-04-01T17:13:52.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — March 30, 2026 —** Tamil nationalist lawyer Kumaravadivel Guruparan has filed a Rs. 1 billion ($3 million) defamation lawsuit against former Election Commission member Ratnajeevan Hoole, alleging that statements published in an article damaged his professional reputation. The case was filed in the Jaffna District Court last Friday. The lawsuit arises from an article written by Mr. Hoole and published in the *Colombo Telegraph* on March 28, 2024\. In the article, Mr. Hoole alleged that a group of lawyers led by Guruparan had met then-President Ranil Wickremesinghe in Jaffna and requested intervention to protect certain lawyers accused of preparing fraudulent affidavits. Following the publication, similar allegations were circulated across multiple media platforms. In his filing, Guruparan contends that the claims are false and defamatory, and that they were made with the intent to damage his professional integrity. He argues that the publication has caused significant harm to his reputation and legal career. The suit seeks compensation of a whopping Rs. 1,000 million. The case is expected to be taken up for hearing in due course. Mr. Hoole has not publicly responded to the allegations. ### Sumanthiran Invites Former LTTE Combatants, Citing ‘Highest Qualification’ URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sumanthiran-invites-former-ltte-combatants-citing-highest-qualification/ Last updated: 2026-04-01T17:13:52.000Z **KILINOCHCHI, Sri Lanka — March 30, 2026 —** M. A. Sumanthiran, general secretary of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), said on Sunday that former combatants who had sacrificed their lives, education, and families for a political cause were the most qualified to join the party. Speaking at a meeting with former LTTE combatants in Kilinochchi, Mr. Sumanthiran said those who had “considered their lives insignificant” and were prepared to give their “life, body and soul” for a goal possessed the highest qualification for membership. “No one else can have a greater qualification than them,” he said. The event was attended by senior party figures, including ITAK leader C. V. K. Sivagnanam and Sayanthan. Framing his remarks within the party’s historical ideology, Mr. Sumanthiran said ITAK, founded in 1949, was built on the premise that Tamil-speaking people in Sri Lanka constitute a distinct nation entitled to self-determination under international law. He drew parallels with independence movements elsewhere, noting that leaders such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman are remembered as “Fathers of the Nation” for articulating a shared national identity. He then extended that comparison to S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, explaining that he came to be known as “Thanthai” (Father) for advancing the idea that Tamil-speaking people in Sri Lanka are a distinct nation with a right to self-determination. Mr. Sumanthiran also referred to recent discussions in New Delhi, where he and colleagues attended meetings at the invitation of the Bar Association of India. He cited concerns about Sri Lankan Tamil refugees who have lived in India for decades. While reiterating that his party preferred the return of displaced Tamils to Sri Lanka, he said those unwilling to return — due to age, family circumstances, or long-term settlement — should be granted Indian citizenship to avoid statelessness. “International law does not permit people to remain stateless,” he said. He also recalled that the ITAK emerged in opposition to the 1949 citizenship legislation that rendered large numbers of Malayaga Tamils stateless, and said it was the first political movement to assert that Tamils constitute a nation with the right to self-determination. Referring to the Vaddukoddai Resolution, he said the party had formally articulated its demand for self-rule decades ago. “Forms of struggle may change, but the goal remains the same,” he said, adding that former combatants had every right to join the party in pursuit of that goal. Still, sources within ITAK offered a more grounded view. “Yes, the invitation is there,” one told the Jaffna *Monitor*. “But if you’re not a ‘yes man’ to Sumanthiran, how exactly do you get a ticket?” ### Excavation Begins at Kurukkalmadam Mass Grave Linked to 1990 LTTE Killings URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/excavation-begins-at-kurukkalmadam-mass-grave-linked-to-1990-ltte-killings/ Last updated: 2026-04-01T17:13:54.000Z **BATTICALOA, Sri Lanka — March 31, 2026 —** Authorities have begun excavating a suspected mass grave in eastern Sri Lanka where the remains of more than 170 Muslim civilians — including pilgrims returning from Hajj — are believed to be buried, more than three decades after they were abducted and killed during the country’s civil war. The court-ordered excavation is underway at Kurukkalmadam, in the Kaluwanchikudy police division of Batticaloa district, under the supervision of a magistrate and with forensic specialists present. For families of the missing, the excavation marks a long-delayed step toward answers after years of uncertainty. According to testimony presented before multiple government-appointed commissions, the victims were traveling along the Kalmunai–Batticaloa road on July 12, 1990, when they were stopped and abducted by cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Among them were Muslim pilgrims returning from Mecca after completing the Hajj. They were later killed, and their bodies are believed to have been buried at or near the Kurukkalmadam site. The killings took place during one of the most violent phases of Sri Lanka’s civil war, as the LTTE escalated attacks against Muslim communities in the north and east. The period was also marked by retaliatory violence and deepening inter-communal tensions, with Tamil civilians in some areas targeted by Muslim home guards and armed groups aligned with the military. In widely cited incidents, Tamil civilians were killed in the eastern district of Batticaloa amid cycles of reprisal violence in the early 1990s. Relatives of the victims have spent decades seeking the recovery of remains to allow for proper Islamic burial rites, as well as official acknowledgment of what occurred. “What they want is to bury their dead with dignity,” said a legal advocate working with victims’ families. “That is the most basic form of closure.” Officials said any human remains and physical evidence recovered during the excavation would be systematically documented and preserved as part of an ongoing forensic investigation. They declined to estimate how many bodies might be found. Preliminary clearing of the site began a day earlier, with full excavation operations commencing on Sunday. Authorities said the process would proceed methodically under judicial oversight. Sri Lanka has struggled to address the legacy of its 26-year civil war, which ended in 2009 with the military defeat of the LTTE. Efforts to investigate wartime abuses have repeatedly stalled, while institutions established to address enforced disappearances have faced sustained criticism from victims’ groups over limited progress. ### Tharanga’s 89.37m Puts Sri Lanka on the Global Javelin Map URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/tharangas-89-37m-puts-sri-lanka-on-the-global-javelin-map/ Last updated: 2026-03-29T15:33:11.000Z **COLOMBO — March 29, 2026 —** In a performance that could redefine the trajectory of Sri Lankan athletics, Rumesh Tharanga launched the javelin to a staggering 89.37 meters, the longest throw ever recorded by a Sri Lankan athlete in any discipline, pending official ratification. The distance places Tharanga firmly within the elite tier of global javelin throwing — not merely as a national record-holder, but as a potential medal contender on the world stage. A comparison with results from the World Athletics Championships and the Olympic Games underscores the magnitude of the achievement. Since 2000, a throw of 89.37 meters would have secured a podium finish in 12 of 13 World Championships and every Olympic Games edition. Tharanga’s path to this moment has been unconventional. At 16, he was clocking deliveries above 130 kilometers per hour as a fast bowler and finished runner-up in Sri Lanka’s Airtel “Fastest Bowler” competition, before coach Tony Prasanna identified his potential in javelin and redirected his career. In practical terms, that distance sits consistently above recent bronze-medal marks and, in several years, rivals or surpasses silver-medal performances — a benchmark that only a handful of throwers worldwide have reached over the past two decades. The result also places Tharanga in rare company historically. Modern javelin throwing has seen only intermittent breakthroughs beyond the 90-meter barrier, making consistent high-80s throws a defining marker of global excellence. At 89.37 meters, Tharanga has crossed that threshold. For Sri Lanka, a nation with limited representation in global field events, the throw carries broader significance. The country’s athletics history has largely been defined by track performances, with field-event breakthroughs remaining scarce. Tharanga’s mark signals a potential shift — one that could recalibrate expectations and investment in disciplines beyond sprinting. Officials are expected to complete ratification procedures in the coming days. If confirmed, the throw will stand not only as a national record but as one of the most competitive performances in the world this season. Whether this moment proves to be an isolated breakthrough or the beginning of sustained excellence will depend on consistency at major competitions. But for now, Sri Lanka has produced a throw that — by any global standard — belongs on the podium. ### Health Director Testifies Against Jaffna MP Archchuna in Defamation Case Over Drug Allegations URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/health-director-testifies-against-jaffna-mp-archchuna-in-defamation-case-over-drug-allegations/ Last updated: 2026-03-28T16:05:48.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — March 28, 2026** — Ramanathan Archchuna, a Member of Parliament for the Jaffna Electoral District, is facing a defamation case filed by Dr. A. Ketheeswaran, Jaffna’s Regional Director of Health Services, who testified in court on Friday that allegations made against him by the lawmaker were false, damaging, and deeply personal. Appearing before the Point Pedro Magistrate’s Court, Dr. Ketheeswaran delivered nearly two hours of testimony, firmly rejecting claims made by Archchuna in a video published in July 2024 that accused him of facilitating the distribution of prescription painkillers as narcotics to schoolchildren through pharmacies. Archchuna — a medical doctor and former acting medical superintendent of the Chavakachcheri Base Hospital — has previously acknowledged publishing the video and making the allegations. He has told the court he will seek to prove the claims are true. During Friday’s proceedings, the video in question was played in court in the presence of the accused. Dr. Ketheeswaran presented documentary evidence outlining regulatory actions taken between 2022 and 2024 to curb the improper dispensing of prescription medication. These, he said, included enforcement measures against pharmacies and oversight of both public and private healthcare institutions. ![Dr. Ketheeswaran](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/health-director-testifies-agai--ofMFo-kix2bw0vvdkivqf.jpg) Dr. Ketheeswaran In his testimony, Dr. Ketheeswaran said the allegations had caused serious harm to his professional standing, describing them as unprecedented in his 35-year medical career. He also told the court that he and his family had received threats following the release of the video, including from individuals overseas. The case has drawn significant attention across the Northern Province, where Archchuna remains a polarizing figure. Critics accuse him of using public platforms to pursue personal or political grievances, while supporters argue that he has raised concerns others in public life have been reluctant to confront. The case is set to continue at the next hearing, where Archchuna’s legal team is expected to begin cross-examining Dr. Ketheeswaran. ### Sand Mafia Tractor Kills Policeman in Jaffna URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/sand-mafia-tractor-kills-policeman-in-jaffna/ Last updated: 2026-03-28T14:07:19.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — March 28, 2026** — A police sergeant was killed and another officer critically injured on Saturday morning after a tractor allegedly linked to illegal sand mining rammed into them in northern Sri Lanka, police said. The incident occurred near a temple in the *Kerpeli* area of *Kodikamam* on the Jaffna peninsula, after officers responded to a tip-off about unlawful sand excavation. According to police, two officers dispatched to the site attempted to intercept a tractor transporting sand. The driver, instead of stopping, accelerated toward them, striking both officers before fleeing the scene. The impact killed Sergeant Hettiarachchi Alpet, 50, attached to the Kodikamam Police Station, officials said. The second officer sustained severe injuries and remains in intensive care at a local hospital. Authorities later recovered the tractor, which had been abandoned and concealed in shrubland in the nearby Kilali area. The driver has not yet been identified. Police said special teams have been deployed to locate and arrest the suspect, and investigations are ongoing. The killing has renewed attention on the persistence of illegal sand mining in parts of northern Sri Lanka, which local residents say continues with the tacit support of some authorities and political actors. ### India Sends Lifeline Fuel to Sri Lanka as Supplies Collapse URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/india-sends-lifeline-fuel-to-sri-lanka-as-supplies-collapse/ Last updated: 2026-03-31T04:25:29.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka — March 28, 2026 —** India has delivered an emergency shipment of 38,000 metric tons of petroleum to Sri Lanka, including 20,000 metric tons of diesel and 18,000 metric tons of petrol, according to a statement from the High Commission of India in Colombo, as the island nation grapples with fuel supply disruptions linked to escalating tensions in the Middle East. The shipment follows a telephone conversation on March 24 between Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake of Sri Lanka, as well as discussions a day earlier between India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath. Lanka IOC, the local subsidiary of Indian Oil Corporation, had earlier secured fuel supplies for March from suppliers in the Middle East and Singapore. However, those suppliers were unable to fulfill their contracts, invoking force majeure due to supply disruptions and vessel unavailability amid the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Faced with the shortfall, Sri Lanka requested urgent assistance from India. The shipment, which arrived in Colombo on March 28, is part of what officials described as “rescue supplies” arranged through Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. The Government of India, acting through Lanka IOC, said it had extended support to ensure the continuity of fuel supply in Sri Lanka. The development highlights Sri Lanka’s continued vulnerability to global energy shocks, as geopolitical tensions strain supply chains and disrupt access to critical imports. ### NPP’s Delay on Provincial Polls Fuels Fears of a Silent Rollback URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/npps-delay-on-provincial-polls-fuels-fears-of-a-silent-rollback/ Last updated: 2026-03-31T04:25:30.000Z **By M.R. Narayan Swamy** Is the Sri Lankan government preparing the ground to quietly do away with the provincial councils established under the 1987 India–Sri Lanka Accord? Signals from Colombo suggest this may be the case. The vexed bilateral agreement, which sought to end Tamil separatism, envisaged elected councils for all nine provinces in Sri Lanka to devolve powers locally and promote more balanced regional development. Although the chief objective of the provision was to encourage people in the then-united Tamil-majority North-Eastern Province to shun separatism, provincial councils were established across the entire island, giving rise to a new tier of political activity. Sri Lanka’s ruling coalition, led by President Anura Dissanayake, promised in 2024 to hold fresh local government and provincial council elections within a year if it formed a government. But despite being in office for more than a year, the pledge has not been acted upon, raising growing doubts about whether provincial polls will be held at all. “If the government has the political will, they can hold the elections now,” Faiszer Musthapha, a former minister for sports and provincial councils, said in a telephonic interview. He said successive governments over almost one decade had repeatedly postponed provincial elections across the country over one pretext or another, and were happy to control the councils through unelected governors appointed by them. This is happening yet again. Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath has now declared that a parliamentary panel, which was to submit an initial report in three months on the feasibility of holding provincial elections, will table only a preliminary report, indicating that further stages of the review will follow, with obviously no clear timeframe in sight. The select committee will meet again on April 7 to consult the Attorney General and the Election Commission on both provincial elections and the full implementation of the India-backed 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which led to the devolution of power. But few expect any breakthrough. Some opposition leaders, including Tamil politicians who place particular importance on the provincial councils, say this reinforces a long-held view that no government is truly committed to decentralising power, regardless of what it states publicly. The Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), or People’s Liberation Front, which heads the ruling coalition, has never supported provincial councils, having bitterly opposed the 1987 accord, which it viewed as an Indian imposition on Sri Lanka. At the same time, as it sought to ride to power and win crucial Tamil votes, the JVP-led alliance promised to hold provincial elections. It was confident of winning them following the 2025 parliamentary contest. That confidence suffered a rude jolt when the coalition lost some 1.8 million votes in local government elections held months after the general election last year. “This is the main reason why the JVP is now running away from provincial council elections,” said a former government minister who did not want to be quoted by name. “The government has been given to understand that they might lose as many as four to five of the nine provincial councils, including those in the (Tamil-majority) north and the (multi-racial) east,” he added. “The government cannot afford this. Any government which loses so massively even before reaching midway through the term will be considered dead for the remaining period.” Senior Tamil politician M.A. Sumanthiran said a week ago in India that his Ilangai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), the main Tamil party, was confident of taking power in both the north and east in any provincial council election. A Tamil political analyst, however, said the JVP seemed to be fundamentally opposed to provincial councils as its leftist ideology clashed with the concept that decentralization was needed to resolve Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis. Provincial councils can enact legislation on subjects such as health, education, and agriculture. With no elected councils in Sri Lanka since 2017–18, these powers are exercised by Colombo-appointed governors, undermining the very purpose for which these bodies were created through legislation decades earlier. The first provincial elections in Sri Lanka took place in 1988, when the Indian army was deployed in the country’s northeast. The elected council in the north-eastern province was summarily dismissed in 1990\. Subsequently, the north-eastern province was split to form separate administrative regions. While the other seven provincial councils functioned until 2017–18, the Tamil-majority North went without elections for 23 years, while the Eastern Province saw no election for 18 years. “That is why Tamils feel so perturbed,” said Tamil political analyst Shanthan K Thambiah, who is based in London. “If no elections are held, it will be a major blow to Tamil aspirations.” He said Sri Lanka must understand that devolving even limited powers to the provinces would strengthen the country in the long term, as seen in the way different states in India contribute to that country’s progress. Sri Lankan leaders argue that the massive infrastructure destruction and deaths caused by last year’s devastating cyclone, as well as the ongoing Gulf war and the resultant energy crisis, need to be tackled before any election can be organised. While Indian officials insist that New Delhi has not softened its stance on the 13th Amendment and provincial council elections, a retired Sri Lankan diplomat said there is currently no pressure from India to hold the polls. “Both India and the West are soft on the JVP government, fearing that any serious pressure from them would push it towards China,” he said, referring to a country with which the Marxist JVP has traditionally maintained close ties. “There is no international pressure on this government,” the ex-diplomat added. “This suits the JVP. This is why (top JVP leader) Tilvin Silva has even said that provincial councils have not served their purpose.” Silva, considered the real power behind President Dissanayake, made the statement without any elaboration after a brief visit to India this month. According to him, the government did want to hold provincial elections this year, but legal barriers, the need for electoral delimitation, and damages caused by last year’s cyclone have come in the way. Some political actors believe that signals from government leaders make it increasingly clear that provincial elections may not be held even in 2027. Provincial councils have served as a springboard for many political figures who later rose to prominence at the national level. Among the most notable is Chandrika Kumaratunga, who served as Chief Minister of the Western Province — which includes Colombo — before ascending to national politics and eventually the presidency. **Editor’s Note:** T**his article was originally published by *The Federal* and is reproduced here by *Jaffna Monitor* with permission, with due acknowledgment to the original publication.** ### Machete Attack Leaves Young Man Critically Injured in Jaffna as Drug-Linked Violence Surges URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/machete-attack-leaves-young-man-critically-injured-in-jaffna-as-drug-linked-violence-surges/ Last updated: 2026-03-27T02:42:00.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka** — A young man was left fighting for his life after a brutal machete attack in the Pannai area of Jaffna on Thursday evening. According to police, the victim, Soundirarajah Majith, in his early twenties, was riding a motorcycle when he was chased down by a group of assailants on two other bikes. The attackers overtook him, hacked him with machetes and other sharp weapons, and fled. During the assault, Majith lost control of his motorcycle and plunged into the nearby sea. Officers from the Jaffna District Crime Division quickly rescued him from the water and rushed him to Jaffna Teaching Hospital, where he remains in critical condition in the intensive care unit. Police highlighted their swift response, but residents questioned what steps, if any, had been taken to curb the growing drug menace, particularly in cases where evidence has been available. The attack has once again drawn attention to the rise of drug-related violence in the Northern Peninsula. Residents and local security sources say such targeted assaults are increasingly linked to narcotics networks and gang rivalries that have taken root in Jaffna in recent years. Once relatively insulated from the drug-related crime seen elsewhere in the country, the Jaffna peninsula has witnessed a noticeable rise in narcotics circulation and the violence that follows it. Local residents say the easy money from the drug trade has fueled disputes and retaliatory assaults. The deteriorating security climate has, in some quarters, prompted an uncomfortable form of nostalgia. Analysts who study post-conflict governance in the North caution that such sentiments are primarily a reflection of frustration with the state’s failure to contain the drug trade, rather than any genuine endorsement of authoritarian methods. Still, the sentiment surfaces in conversations across the peninsula. “In those days, if you were a user or a dealer, you were simply gone. There was no mercy,” one longtime Pannai resident recalled, referring to the period of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam control over Jaffna. Another resident said that whatever the failures of that era, drug-related crime had not been visible in LTTE-administered territory. “The group was known for its strict intolerance toward narcotics,” the resident said. Authorities have not yet confirmed a motive in Thursday’s attack, but investigators from the District Crime Division are working with forensic teams to identify the suspects. They are reviewing surveillance camera footage from the Pannai area in an effort to identify the assailants. This latest incident adds to a string of violent episodes that have unsettled many in Jaffna, prompting calls for stronger preventive action and more effective enforcement against the drug trade, and raising urgent questions about whether authorities can contain a drug-fueled cycle of violence that many fear is already taking root in the peninsula. ### U.N. Envoy Urges Sri Lanka to Resolve Northern Land Disputes URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/u-n-envoy-urges-sri-lanka-to-resolve-northern-land-disputes/ Last updated: 2026-03-28T05:19:28.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — March 26, 2026** — The United Nations’ top representative in Sri Lanka on Thursday called for urgent action to resolve long-standing land disputes in the country’s north, after meeting farmers who have been barred from accessing their lands for nearly a decade despite holding legal title. Marc-André Franche, the U.N. Resident Coordinator and representative of the Secretary-General in Sri Lanka, visited Kovilvayal, a village in the Kilinochchi district, where he met with affected families and surveyed lands that residents say have remained inaccessible since 2015 due to state designations linked to forestry and wildlife protection. In a statement posted on social media following the visit, Mr. Franche said that around 1,420 acres — including paddy fields, private lands, and cemeteries — had been out of reach for local communities. “Resolving these land issues … is not only an issue of fairness, but of development, growth and poverty reduction,” he said, adding that landowners must be involved in decision-making processes and, at a minimum, compensated. The remarks come as land ownership disputes continue to simmer in Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces, where Tamil communities have long complained of losing access to ancestral lands after parts were brought under state control or reclassified for conservation purposes in the years following the end of the civil war in 2009. ![Farmers in Kovilvayal, Kilinochchi, whose lands have remained inaccessible since 2015 despite holding legal title.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/u-n-envoy-urges-sri-lanka-to-r-w5pKDY-kix2374yaz81l0j.jpg) Farmers in Kovilvayal, Kilinochchi, whose lands have remained inaccessible since 2015 despite holding legal title. Farmers who met Mr. Franche described deepening economic hardship, saying that their inability to cultivate their land had eroded household incomes and increased their dependence on irregular work. Some also raised concerns over restricted access to burial grounds, underscoring the cultural and emotional dimensions of the dispute. Sri Lankan officials have previously defended such land classifications as necessary for environmental conservation, particularly in ecologically sensitive zones. However, rights groups and local activists argue that the process has often lacked transparency and adequate consultation, leaving communities in prolonged uncertainty. Political observers said Mr. Franche’s intervention was likely to intensify scrutiny of the government’s handling of land disputes in the north, an issue that has remained politically sensitive years after the end of the civil war. But some affected residents expressed caution about the impact of such high-profile visits. One farmer who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor* said that raising the issue once would not be enough to bring meaningful change. “Just highlighting this at one point will be seen as symbolic rather than a serious intervention,” he said. “What is needed is sustained engagement — continuous pressure on the government — not a one-time visit or a photo opportunity.” No immediate response was available from Sri Lankan authorities regarding the envoy’s remarks, and it remained unclear whether the government would engage further following the envoy’s visit. ### Elephant Incursion in Jaffna Fuels Claims of Engineered Land Seizure URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/elephant-incursion-in-jaffna-fuels-claims-of-engineered-land-seizure/ Last updated: 2026-03-26T02:25:20.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — March 26 —** A herd of wild elephants that suddenly appeared in farmland in the Vadamarachchi East area of Jaffna this week has ignited fresh accusations that Sri Lanka’s wildlife authorities may be using animals to strengthen claims over disputed territory. Residents and a local Catholic priest said the elephants destroyed at least 36 coconut trees in the Kattaikadu–Keavil area earlier this week, describing the incident as unprecedented in a region with no historical record of elephant habitation. “There are no dense forests here, no reliable food sources, and no natural migration routes that could explain how these animals arrived,” said Rev. Vasanthan, the parish priest of Kattaikadu, who visited the damaged farms. “It is very difficult to believe this happened by natural means. People are asking serious questions.” One affected farmer, whose coconut grove was ravaged, pointed to an army camp located barely 50 meters from the site. “The soldiers told us they knew nothing about the elephants coming,” he said. “How does a herd of more than five elephants simply walk into an area like this without anyone noticing?” The incident has sharpened long-simmering grievances over a large stretch of land from Kattaikadu to Chundikkulam that was designated part of Chundikkulam National Park. Many residents view the protected status as an effective seizure of ancestral properties they were forced to abandon during the country’s long civil war. “These are not virgin forests,” said Kanthasamy, a local resident. “When people flee war and leave their lands for decades, the vegetation grows back. That doesn’t mean the land was always wilderness or that it should now be taken from us forever.” Chundikkulam Lagoon and its surroundings were first declared a bird sanctuary in 1938\. After the civil war ended in 2009, the government significantly expanded conservation areas in the Northern Province. A 2014 environmental assessment supported by the United Nations recommended enlarging the sanctuary and upgrading it to national park status. In June 2015, the area was formally gazetted as Chundikkulam National Park, expanding to nearly 20,000 hectares by incorporating adjacent state lands. Wildlife officials have described such expansions as essential for biodiversity protection and habitat restoration in a country that has lost much of its natural cover. But in Tamil-majority areas of the north and east, communities have repeatedly challenged the moves, arguing that many “protected” zones include privately owned or historically inhabited lands that reverted to bush during years of displacement. Rev. Vasanthan said the sudden appearance of elephants appeared designed to bolster the wildlife designation. “There is a strong belief among the people that these elephants were brought here deliberately to justify the national park and to keep residents away from their own lands,” he said. He called on the government to revoke the relevant gazette notifications and restore the land to its original owners. “The people must be allowed to return to their ancestral properties, to live peacefully and to earn their livelihoods without fear,” the priest added. “They have already suffered enough through decades of war and displacement.” Officials from the Department of Wildlife Conservation and the military had not responded publicly to the allegations as of Thursday. Wildlife experts note that elephants have been known to expand their range in search of food, particularly in disturbed or regenerating ecosystems, though no such movement has previously been documented in this area. ### Velnampy Assumes Office as Jaffna University’s 11th Vice Chancellor. URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/untitled-draft/ Last updated: 2026-03-25T15:01:10.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — March 25 —** Senior Professor of Accounting at the University of Jaffna, Prof. T. Velnampy, assumed office on Wednesday as the institution’s 11th Vice Chancellor, succeeding Prof. C. Srisatkunarajah, whose term concluded a day earlier. Prof. Velnampy, an academic known for his administrative experience, has in recent years been seen engaging in public forums associated with the National People’s Power (NPP), including attending some of its meetings. His appointment by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, for a three-year term effective immediately, comes at a time when the university faces growing expectations for academic expansion and institutional reform, alongside concerns in some quarters over political influence in higher education. Professor Velnampy, an academic in accounting who previously served as Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies, formally began his tenure after signing official documents at the Vice Chancellor’s office, a longtime university staff member told Jaffna Monitor. Earlier in the day, he participated in religious observances at the Sivan Temple within the university premises, before being ceremonially escorted to the administrative complex. The event was attended by senior university officials, including the outgoing Vice Chancellor, the Registrar, faculty deans, council members, and members of the academic staff. ### Book Reviews: “The Overthinker and the Elephant” by Vinayak Nirmalan URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/book-reviews-the-overthinker-and-the-elephant-by-vinayak-nirmalan/ Last updated: 2026-03-25T14:29:22.000Z **Dr: Mrs N Rodrigo, Colombo, Sri Lanka** The Overthinker and the Elephant is a must read for all thinkers - not necessarily “overthinkers”! It is a thought-provoking, honest, humane, soul searching, spiritual journey in the quest for happiness. The narrative is set against the stunning, luminous backdrop of the night sky in the Himalayas, written in a fluid, friendly, down-to-earth style, enlivened with good humor. Authored by a young second-generation doctor of Sri Lankan origin, domiciled in the UK, it seamlessly intertwines cultural concepts, medical insights and spiritual themes of both the east and west. Although presented as a fictional fantasy, it is clearly autobiographical and is inspired by his own awakening and seeking, highlighted through various personal experiences during extensive travels to challenging destinations. The first-person narration of “My Story” ensures intimacy and easy access to the author’s personal thought processes and perceptions. The intriguing cover design is also his own creation. Deliberations on ethnic strife, immigrants, “the in-betweens” who lack “Heimet”, the differentiation into “Them and Us” are all emphasised by the story of the “Big Enders and Little Enders”, and group identity is shown up for the illusion it is. The danger of the “smokescreen of collective identity” blocking out the shared soul of humanity is cleverly captured. The intimate personal stories are many and varied, each carrying a different message, with vividly described characters that come alive. The contrasting anecdotes from the experiences of the young medic in Zambia, Nepal, Costa Rica, Dubai, New Zealand and the UK are written with deep insight, empathy and humor. As a first-year medical student, he explores the transient nature of existence and the privilege of dissecting his cadaver which turns out to be Judy - a dignified dynamic old lady. In later years, the heartrending final days of the vibrant young model student Molly on life support machines, stimulated discussions on the miracle of the human body, frailty, futility and meaningless fretting. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/book-reviews-the-overthinker-a-v9i52I-kixlc49qtj4asmi.jpg) The mystic elephant guides him every step of the way as he learns to focus, flow and feel, trusting his own instinct over rational logic. The elephant guru relates just two stories. The first is about crossing the unsafe “*Bridge of Samsara*”, shedding the shackles of dread and fear, replacing them with acceptance, understanding and endurance, stressing the importance of the process of life - the journey, rather than its final unpredictable destination. The second is on the forge of the alchemist which sets the stage for discussing the 5 elements essential for happiness relating it to our genetic wiring - that of Manu and his tribe - our hunter-gatherer ancestors. The need for 'strife' or 'purpose' in life as an indispensable component is a novel concept in this space. The philosophical arguments for living in the “Amber Zone” in Resonance - a perfect balance between Yin and Yang - are challenging and enticing. Throughout the book, the reader is held in suspense regarding the identity of the elephant and how and why it came into being as sage and mentor. The cleverly contrived end is ingenious, as surprising as it is believable. So here’s an unusual book with no acknowledged beginning or ending but crammed in between with 555 pages of philosophical debates, heartwarming stories, emotional challenges and spiritual insights, that invites the reader to embark on an odyssey of his own to determine his place in the Great Cosmic Symphony. ### Anura Calls Modi as Iran Remarks Complicate Sri Lanka’s Position URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/anura-calls-modi-as-iran-remarks-complicate-sri-lankas-position/ Last updated: 2026-03-24T17:09:15.000Z **COLOMBO, — March 24 —** Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake spoke by telephone with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday, with both leaders emphasizing the need to keep vital global shipping routes open amid rising tensions in West Asia. According to India’s public broadcaster Prasar Bharati, the call was initiated by Mr. Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The two leaders “reiterated the importance of keeping shipping lines open and secure in the interest of the whole world,” it said in a post on X. In separate posts on X following the call, Mr. Modi said the leaders had also discussed “disruptions affecting global energy security” and reviewed progress on initiatives aimed at strengthening India–Sri Lanka energy cooperation. He added that both sides reaffirmed their commitment to working closely as “close and trusted partners.” Mr. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in his own statement, said the discussion focused on the broader impact of the Middle East crisis on global and regional supply chains, as well as bilateral cooperation in energy and security. The conversation came shortly after India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said he had held talks with Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath on the implications of the crisis. In a post on X, Mr. Jaishankar said the exchange reaffirmed India’s commitment to its “Neighbourhood First” policy and its “Vision MAHASAGAR” initiative. The back-to-back contacts reflect mounting concern across South Asia over the potential disruption of key maritime trade routes and energy supplies, particularly for import-dependent economies such as Sri Lanka. Some political observers say the timing is notable. The flurry of high-level engagements follows fresh diplomatic sensitivities in Colombo after Iran’s ambassador said a day earlier that the ill-fated IRIS Dena had been invited to Sri Lankan waters but was made to wait in international waters before it was sunk. While no official connection has been drawn, analysts say the sequence highlights the increasingly delicate geopolitical environment Sri Lanka must navigate. ### Trincomalee Oil Farm and Energy Hub: Sri Lanka’s Missed Opportunity Returns URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/trincomalee-oil-farm-and-energy-hub-sri-lankas-missed-opportunity-returns/ Last updated: 2026-03-24T05:48:57.000Z **By: Dr. Gamini Goonetilleke** The Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm stands today as one of the most strategically significant yet historically underutilized energy assets in South Asia. Located in the deep natural harbour of Trincomalee, the facility embodies a convergence of history, geopolitics, and economic potential. In the current global context—marked by energy insecurity, shifting geopolitical alliances, and regional competition—the Trincomalee oil farm offers Sri Lanka a renewed opportunity to transform itself into a regional energy hub. However, this transformation demands clarity of vision, political consistency, and strategic partnerships. #### **Origins and Construction** The origins of the Trincomalee oil tank farm date back to the era of World War II, when the British Empire recognized the strategic importance of Trincomalee as a naval base in the Indian Ocean. Construction of the oil storage facility, spread across nearly 600 acres, began in 1924 and continued into the late 1930s. The project was designed to support British naval operations in the eastern theatre, particularly as Japanese expansion threatened Allied supply lines. The facility originally comprised 101 large storage tanks, each constructed using robust one-inch-thick steel plates and encased by concrete walls approximately one foot thick to protect against aerial attacks. Ingeniously integrated into the natural contours of the terrain, many of the tanks were partially buried, enhancing both structural stability and camouflage. Each tank had an approximate capacity of around 12,000 metric tons of fuel, giving the entire complex a total storage capacity of nearly 1.2 million metric tons—an immense reserve by regional standards even today. This far exceeds the storage capacity of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation’s existing facilities and even surpasses the newer storage complex at Muthurajawela, built with Chinese assistance, which has a capacity of approximately 220,000 metric tons. #### **The Fate of Two Oil Tanks** Out of the 101 tanks, one was destroyed when a Royal Ceylon Air Force plane crashed in the early 1960’s. But the most famous is the destroyed tank number 91 lying on the far edge of the forest. During World War II, the strategic significance of Trincomalee attracted enemy attention. In April 1942, Japanese forces launched air raids on the harbour in what became part of the broader Indian Ocean campaign. One of the oil tanks—commonly referred to as Tank 91—was hit during these attacks and destroyed. This incident underscored both the facility's vulnerability and its importance. While most of the tanks survived the bombardment, the destruction of Tank 91 remains a historical reminder of the oil farm’s wartime role. #### **Strategic Location and Infrastructure** The selection of China Bay within Trincomalee Harbour was not incidental. China Bay offered deep-water access, allowing large oil tankers to dock safely. The harbour itself is one of the finest natural deep-water harbours in the world, capable of accommodating large naval and commercial vessels with minimal dredging. A sophisticated pipeline system was constructed to facilitate the transfer of oil from ships directly to the storage tanks. This network of pipelines minimized handling time and reduced vulnerability during wartime operations. The integration of maritime access with inland storage infrastructure made Trincomalee a logistical asset of immense value, capable of supporting sustained naval operations across the Indian Ocean. #### **Post-Independence Neglect** Following Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948, the Trincomalee oil tank farm gradually fell into neglect. Successive governments failed to recognize or capitalize on its strategic and economic potential. The facility was largely abandoned, with many tanks left unused and the surrounding area overgrown with dense shrub jungle. Infrastructure deteriorated, pipelines corroded, and the once-critical installation became a symbol of missed opportunity. This neglect was not merely administrative but also strategic. At a time when global energy demand was rising and regional economies were expanding, Sri Lanka failed to leverage a ready-made asset that could have positioned it as a key player in the Indian Ocean energy network. #### **Early Attempts at Revitalization** In the late 1970s and early 1980s, President J. R. Jayewardene recognized the potential of the Trincomalee oil tank farm and proposed its development. However, these efforts were complicated by geopolitical considerations, particularly concerns from India regarding foreign involvement in a strategically sensitive location so close to its southern coastline. As a result, the project faced diplomatic resistance and was ultimately abandoned. This marked another missed opportunity, driven by a combination of external pressure and internal indecision. #### **The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and Aftermath** The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987 brought renewed attention to Trincomalee. The accord included provisions recognizing Trincomalee’s strategic importance and implicitly acknowledged India’s security concerns regarding its use. During the years of civil conflict in Sri Lanka, the oil tank farm remained largely inactive. Security concerns, lack of investment, and broader regional instability prevented meaningful development. Even after the end of the war in 2009, progress remained slow. #### **The Role of Trinco Petroleum Terminal – 2022** A significant development occurred in 2022 with the establishment of Trinco Petroleum Terminal (Pvt) Ltd (TPTL), a joint venture between the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), through its subsidiary Lanka Indian Oil Corporation (LIOC), which had been operating in Sri Lanka since 2003\. Under this arrangement, CPC holds a 51% stake, while LIOC holds 49%, reflecting a collaborative approach to developing the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm. As part of the agreement, a portion of the oil storage tanks was leased to the Indian partner, while the remaining tanks were placed under Sri Lankan control and earmarked for phased renovation and redevelopment by TPTL, LIOC, and potential international partners. LIOC has since been utilizing approximately 14–15 tanks, primarily for fuel storage and distribution within Sri Lanka. Although these steps marked meaningful progress, the majority of the tanks have remained underutilized, and the full strategic and commercial potential of the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm remains unrealized. #### **Political Opposition and Geopolitical Concerns** Efforts to expand Indian involvement in the development of the oil tank farm were met with strong resistance from nationalist political groups, particularly the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The opposition was rooted in concerns over sovereignty, national security, and perceived over-reliance on India. This political wrangling delayed decision-making and discouraged investment. The Trincomalee oil tank farm became entangled in broader debates about foreign policy and economic strategy, rather than being treated as a national asset requiring pragmatic management. #### **From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics** In recent years, there has been a shift in perspective—from viewing Trincomalee primarily through a geopolitical lens to recognizing its geoeconomic potential. The global energy landscape is changing, with increased emphasis on supply chain resilience, regional storage hubs, and diversification of energy sources. Sri Lanka’s strategic location along major shipping routes in the Indian Ocean positions it ideally to serve as a regional energy hub. Trincomalee, with its natural harbour and existing infrastructure, is central to this vision. #### **The Tripartite Agreement- 2025** A major breakthrough came in 2025 with the signing of a tripartite agreement involving Sri Lanka, India, and the United Arab Emirates. This agreement aims to jointly develop the Trincomalee oil tank farm, combining Sri Lanka’s strategic location with India’s regional influence and the UAE’s financial and technical expertise. The activation of this agreement marks a turning point. It reflects a pragmatic approach that balances national interests with the need for foreign investment and collaboration. #### **Importance in the Current Global Context** The importance of the Trincomalee oil tank farm has been heightened by recent global developments, including tensions and conflicts in the Middle East. Disruptions in oil supply chains have underscored the need for strategic reserves and regional storage facilities. For Sri Lanka, expanding the storage capacity at Trincomalee could provide energy security by maintaining reserves sufficient for up to 60 days of consumption, which at present is sufficient only for 30 days. Renovation of the existing tanks, along with modernization of infrastructure, would significantly enhance the country’s resilience to external shocks. Moreover, the facility could serve as a storage and redistribution hub for other countries in the region, generating revenue and strengthening Sri Lanka’s economic position. **Vision for Trincomalee as a Comprehensive Energy Hub** The transformation of Trincomalee into a dynamic and sustainable energy hub represents one of Sri Lanka's most significant strategic opportunities in the coming decades. Anchored by its historic oil tank farm at China Bay and supported by one of the finest natural harbours in the world, Trincomalee possesses the rare combination of geography, infrastructure, and strategic location necessary to evolve into a major energy centre in the Indian Ocean region. However, realizing this potential requires a shift from a narrow focus on storage toward a broader, integrated, and forward-looking energy ecosystem. At the heart of this vision lies the expansion and modernization of petroleum storage and distribution. The refurbishment of the existing oil tanks—many of which date back to the Second World War—along with the construction of new, technologically advanced facilities, will significantly enhance storage capacity, efficiency, and safety. With modern monitoring systems and international-standard operational practices, Trincomalee can function as a reliable regional energy reserve, capable of meeting domestic needs while also serving international markets. Beyond storage, the development of refining and value-addition industries is essential. Establishing a modern refinery would reduce dependence on imported refined petroleum products and create opportunities for producing lubricants, petrochemicals, and other high-value derivatives. These downstream industries would stimulate industrial growth, generate employment, and encourage the emergence of ancillary sectors, thereby contributing to broader economic development. Trincomalee’s geographic advantages also extend to the aviation sector. Its proximity to China Bay Airport provides an opportunity to develop a dedicated aviation fuel supply chain, catering to both civilian and military requirements. This would enable the region to function as a refuelling and logistics hub within the Indian Ocean network, strengthening connectivity and enhancing operational efficiency for regional air traffic. Equally significant is the potential of Trincomalee Harbour to emerge as a major centre for maritime services. Located along key east–west shipping routes, the harbour is ideally positioned to provide bunkering, maintenance, and logistical support to passing vessels. Developing competitive bunkering facilities would increase port revenues and enhance Sri Lanka’s standing in global maritime trade, while integrating energy services with port operations. In keeping with global trends, the integration of renewable energy sources must form a key component of this vision. Trincomalee’s climatic conditions are conducive to both solar and wind energy generation, allowing for the development of hybrid energy systems that complement traditional fossil fuel infrastructure. Incorporating renewable energy will not only reduce carbon emissions but also align with international sustainability goals, ensuring that the hub remains relevant in a rapidly evolving global energy landscape. Another dimension that warrants reflection in the development of Trincomalee as an energy hub is the story of Sampur—an example of both missed opportunity and emerging renewal. Strategically located in close proximity to China Bay, Sampur was once envisaged as a key site for a coal power project, later evolving into proposals for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility. However, a combination of political opposition, environmental concerns, and shifting policy priorities led to the abandonment of these initiatives. This not only delayed potential gains in energy generation and regional development but also underscored the need for policy consistency and long-term planning in the national energy strategy. Yet, Sampur’s relevance has not diminished. Its transformation into a ground-mounted solar power facility, commissioned in 2025, marks a significant shift towards sustainable energy development. While its contribution to the national grid when fully operational may be modest (120 MW in two phases) compared to the scale of earlier proposals, it represents an important step in diversifying Sri Lanka’s energy mix and reducing dependence on fossil fuels. More importantly, Sampur’s evolution highlights the potential for integrating renewable energy into the broader vision for Trincomalee. As the energy hub concept matures, Sampur could serve as a model for balancing economic ambition with environmental responsibility, reinforcing Trincomalee’s role in a resilient and forward-looking energy future. The realization of the energy hub vision depends heavily on robust infrastructure development and enhanced connectivity. Modernizing port facilities, expanding pipeline networks, and improving road and rail links to the rest of the country are essential steps. In addition, ambitious proposals such as undersea pipelines linking Trincomalee with regional partners could further strengthen its role as a critical node in South Asia’s energy network, facilitating cross-border energy trade and cooperation. Strategic partnerships will play a crucial role in this transformation. Given the scale of investment and technical expertise required, collaboration with international stakeholders is both necessary and beneficial. However, such partnerships must be carefully structured to ensure transparency, equitable benefit-sharing, and the protection of national interests. Drawing on global best practices while maintaining sovereignty over strategic assets will be key to long-term success. Equally important is the establishment of a stable and consistent policy environment. Investor confidence depends on clear, predictable policies governing taxation, pricing, and operations. A well-defined national energy policy, supported by a strong regulatory framework, will provide the foundation for sustained investment and long-term planning. Regulations must also ensure strict adherence to environmental standards, safeguarding the ecological integrity of the Trincomalee region while enabling responsible development. Human resource development is another critical pillar. The successful operation of a modern energy hub requires a skilled and knowledgeable workforce. Investment in education, technical training, and capacity-building programs will be essential to equip local professionals with the expertise needed to manage advanced infrastructure and complex operations. Finally, regional integration offers a powerful pathway for growth. By strengthening energy and economic ties with neighbouring countries, Trincomalee can position itself as a reliable and efficient hub within the wider Indian Ocean region. This will not only enhance energy security but also elevate Sri Lanka’s role in regional and global energy networks. In essence, the vision for Trincomalee is one of transformation—from a historically significant but underutilized asset into a vibrant, multifaceted energy hub that drives national development, fosters regional cooperation, and secures a sustainable energy future. #### **Lessons from Past Failures** Sri Lanka’s history with the Trincomalee oil tank farm and the projects in Sampur for power generation is marked by missed opportunities, often due to political indecision, opposition by nationalist political parties, and short-term thinking. Repeated changes in policy, lack of continuity, and politicization of strategic assets have hindered progress. To avoid repeating these mistakes, there must be a clear, long-term national strategy agreed by the parties concerned. Transparent governance, professional management, and accountability are essential. #### **Conclusion** In conclusion, the future of Trincomalee stands at a decisive crossroads, shaped by both its historic legacy and its untapped potential. What was once conceived as a strategic wartime asset now presents an opportunity of national significance, particularly at a time when global energy markets are under strain due to ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The convergence of geography, infrastructure, and rising energy demand places Trincomalee in a uniquely advantageous position within the Indian Ocean region. Realising this vision demands more than ambition—it requires disciplined planning, policy consistency, and a commitment to the national interest over short-term considerations. Investment in modern infrastructure, technological advancement, and human capital must be matched by transparent governance and environmental responsibility. Equally important is the cultivation of strategic partnerships that strengthen capacity while preserving sovereignty. If approached with foresight and unity, Trincomalee can evolve into a resilient, multifaceted energy hub—one that not only secures Sri Lanka’s energy future but also drives trade, industry, and regional collaboration. It is an opportunity to turn past delays and missed chances into present momentum and lasting success. The time to act is now. The foundations are already in place; what is needed is the will to build on them. ### Iran Says Sri Lanka Invited Warship Before U.S. Strike, Confirming Jaffna Monitor Report URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/iran-says-sri-lanka-invited-warship-before-u-s-strike-confirming-jaffna-monitor-report/ Last updated: 2026-03-31T04:25:37.000Z **COLOMBO, Sri Lanka — March 24 —** Iran’s ambassador to Sri Lanka said Monday that Sri Lankan naval authorities had invited Iranian vessels — including the ill-fated IRIS *Dena* — to visit the island, reinforcing an account [first reported](https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/invited-then-turned-away-the-11-hour-wait-that-preceded-iris-denas-sinking/) by *Jaffna Monitor* earlier this month. Speaking at a media briefing in Colombo on March 23, the ambassador, Dr. Alireza Delkhosh, said the invitation was extended during MILAN 2026, a multinational naval exercise held in Visakhapatnam, India. “During the exercise in India, your navy commander invited — I repeat, invited — the Iranian Navy to send these vessels to Sri Lankan waters for friendly visits,” Mr. Delkhosh said, adding that the invitation covered three ships: IRIS *Dena*, IRIS *Boshehr,* and IRIS *Lavan*. He said the IRIS *Dena* had taken part in a “peaceful exercise” and was not on a combat mission when it set course toward Sri Lanka. “While in India, this vessel, along with two others, was invited by the Sri Lankan side to come here and remain,” he said. “They came in response to that invitation.” The remarks support a timeline first reported by *Jaffna Monitor*, which said the IRIS *Dena* had been sailing toward Sri Lanka following an invitation conveyed during the naval gathering. The frigate, commissioned in 2021, was struck by a United States submarine south of Sri Lanka on March 4\. Iranian officials say more than 100 sailors were killed. Sri Lankan authorities rescued several survivors and brought them ashore for treatment. Mr. Delkhosh said the vessel had received no prior warning before the attack and that many of those killed were not combat personnel. “Most of those killed were not armed personnel,” he said. “They were members of a music group, playing instruments such as the saxophone and violin.” Sri Lankan navy sources who spoke with *Jaffna Monitor* described the interaction between the two navies as informal and not formalized through official channels. One source, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the navy commander who attended the event may have extended an invitation, but that it was likely informal and not followed up in writing. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake said last week that Iran had formally requested permission on Feb. 26 for three naval vessels to enter Sri Lankan ports between March 9 and 13, describing the proposed visit as part of efforts to enhance cooperation. He added that the vessels were later located near, but outside, Sri Lanka’s maritime zone. *Jaffna Monitor* has previously reported that the vessel remained in waters south of Sri Lanka for several hours after being denied entry, following what sources described as a shift in Colombo’s position amid rising tensions between the United States and Iran. Asked about reports that the ship had sought urgent entry before the attack, Mr. Delkhosh said he did not have confirmed information but stressed that countries have a humanitarian obligation to assist vessels in distress. “If so, absolutely any country — there is no difference between neutral or not — all countries have responsibilities, even from a humanitarian point of view, to give help,” he said. ### The Levantine Hummus Wars URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-levantine-hummus-wars/ Last updated: 2026-03-23T06:59:02.000Z **By: Abbi Kanthasamy** *A dispatch from a tired restaurant owner watching cousins argue over the same recipe.* If the conflict in Jerusalem had been about food instead of religion, it would have ended centuries ago. Because food fights — real ones — are easy. You gather everyone in a room. You put the dishes on the table. People shout a bit. Someone’s grandmother intervenes. And eventually everyone eats. Peace, or something very close to it. Religion, unfortunately, has proven far less cooperative. Which is strange when you consider that the Levant — that small, sun-baked stretch of land between the Mediterranean and the desert — has always behaved like one enormous shared kitchen. The chickpea certainly never cared who ruled Jerusalem. And that’s saying something, because Jerusalem has changed hands roughly forty times. Canaanites. Assyrians. Babylonians. Persians. Greeks. Romans. Byzantines. Arabs. Crusaders. Ottomans. British. If empires were restaurant chains, Jerusalem would have been the most aggressively franchised outlet in human history. Yet somehow through three thousand years of conquest, the menu barely changed. Flatbread. Olives. Lamb. Garlic. Chickpeas. Lemons. Sesame. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/the-levantine-hummus-wars-rurIL4-kixgtbi5wfwq1lc.jpg) And a near universal agreement across Judaism, Christianity, and Islam that pork probably wasn’t a brilliant idea in desert heat. You can actually trace the ingredients historically. Chickpeas were cultivated in the Levant around 7000 BCE. Olive oil production in the region dates back at least six thousand years. Sesame — the base of tahini — arrived along ancient Mesopotamian trade routes long before anyone had written the first line of theology. In other words, hummus existed long before people began arguing about whose God owned the neighbourhood. The earliest written recipes resembling hummus appear in 13th-century Arab cookbooks from Cairo and Damascus. Which means historically speaking, hummus is already an immigrant. And yet today people argue about it as if it were the culinary equivalent of the Ark of the Covenant. “Lebanese hummus.” “Israeli hummus.” “Palestinian hummus.” As if the chickpeas themselves were carrying passports. The truth is that for most of history nobody in the region thought of themselves in modern national terms. They were villagers. Farmers. Ottoman subjects. People are far more concerned with olive harvests and rainfall than with culinary intellectual property. Walk into a kitchen in Aleppo in 1700, a kitchen in Jerusalem in 1700, or a kitchen in Beirut in 1700, and you would have seen almost the same scene. Stone grinders. Clay ovens. Lamb slowly roasting. Someone pounding garlic with lemon. And almost certainly an argument about whether the parsley was chopped too coarse. Chefs find the whole situation faintly ridiculous. Because cuisine does not respect borders. You cannot draw a political line across a spice rack and declare: “This side is Lebanese cumin. That side is Israeli cumin.” Cumin does not recognize sovereignty. And neither, historically, did most kitchens. Even the religions now flying above the argument share the same roots. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all emerged within a few hundred kilometres of one another. They worship the same single God of Abraham. Jesus himself was a Jewish man from Judea, almost certainly brown-skinned and olive-toned like every farmer from Galilee two thousand years ago — not the Scandinavian fellow you occasionally see in Renaissance paintings. And in the Qur’an, Jesus (Isa) is mentioned about 25 times, more often than the Prophet Muhammad is referred to by name. Which suggests that if the founders of these religions had met at the same dinner table, the discussion might have been less about divine exclusivity and more about whether the lamb needed another hour over charcoal. Yet here we are. Thousands of miles away, people in India, Southeast Asia, Africa and everywhere else watch the region explode every few years and quietly absorb the economic shock. Oil prices spike. Shipping lanes tighten. Food costs rise. And somewhere in Kuala Lumpur or Nairobi or Jakarta, a restaurant owner sighs while watching the price of olive oil climb again. All because cousins cannot agree on who inherited the house. Which is unfortunate. Because if this had truly been a food war, it would be magnificent. Imagine the negotiations. The Falafel Accords. The Tahini Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Nations Security Council of Grandmothers. France, naturally, would be appointed a neutral judge. Michelin inspectors would arrive like peacekeepers. They would taste everything with grave seriousness. “This hummus shows promise… but lacks philosophical depth.” One star for Beirut. One star for Tel Aviv. One star for Ramallah. Two stars for someone’s grandmother in Damascus whose lamb stew causes diplomats to reconsider their life choices. Peace through chickpeas. Because here is the quiet truth every chef knows. Civilizations argue about identity. But they unite over good food. Empires rise and fall. Borders move. Flags change. But the same bread keeps coming out of the oven. The same chickpeas keep getting crushed with garlic, lemon and tahini. And somewhere tonight in the Levant, in a kitchen older than most modern nations, someone is serving hummus that belongs to absolutely everyone. Which is why the rest of us — sitting far away and watching this endless argument — can only say one thing. We honestly don’t know what the hell you’re fighting about anymore. Settle down. Take a breath. Think about the generations that will come after you instead of the grudges of the last thousand years. Put bread on the table. Pour good olive oil. Pass the hummus around. Because from where the rest of the world is sitting, it doesn’t look like a holy war. It looks like cousins arguing over who invented lunch. And the food — frankly — is far too good to be wasted on that. ### Global Surgeon Honoured in Jaffna, Calls for Pride in Local Medical System URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/global-surgeon-honoured-in-jaffna-calls-for-pride-in-local-medical-system/ Last updated: 2026-03-31T04:25:37.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka —** Prof. Thavam Thambipillai, president of the International College of Surgeons and a leading transplant surgeon, was honoured in Jaffna on Sunday at a ceremony organised by a group of organisations from his native village of Kaithady. The event drew a large public gathering, with residents from Kaithady and other parts of Jaffna attending in significant numbers, reflecting the pride many expressed in his international achievements. Speakers at the event reflected not only on Prof. Thavam Thambipillai’s career but also on the historical identity of his village. Mr. Laleesan, a classmate of Prof. Thavam Thambipillai at St. John’s College and now Principal of Kopay Teachers’ College and President of the Jaffna Tamil Sangam, said Kaithady was once known for its abundance of *thazhai* (screw pine), also called *kaithai*, from which the village is believed to derive its name. Over time, he said, the village became associated with rice cultivation and later with its musicians, before coming to be closely identified with Prof. Thavam Thambipillai himself. Prof. Balasingam Balagobi, Head and Professor of Urology and Consultant Urological Surgeon at the University Surgical Unit of the Teaching Hospital Jaffna, described the felicitation as both significant and difficult to organise, noting that Prof. Thavam Thambipillai was not someone who sought recognition. ![Prof. Balasingam Balagobi speaks during a felicitation ceremony honouring Prof. Thavam Thambipillai in Jaffna on Sunday.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/global-surgeon-honoured-in-jaf-MHdEOc-kixy5wxksbailt.jpg) Prof. Balasingam Balagobi speaks during a felicitation ceremony honouring Prof. Thavam Thambipillai in Jaffna on Sunday. “Convincing him to attend an event like this is itself challenge,” he said. He then turned to the deeper qualities that he described as defining Prof. Thavm Thambipillai’s career. While acknowledging that many in Jaffna possess strong intellectual ability and excel in their respective fields, Prof. Balagobi said Prof. Thavam Thambipillai stood out for attributes that go beyond academic achievement. “Intelligence alone is not enough,” he said, pointing to what he described as a rare combination of emotional, adversity, and social intelligence. He described emotional intelligence (EQ) as the ability to remain grounded, to understand people, and to carry oneself with humility — qualities he said were evident in Prof. Thavam Thambipillai’s interactions with colleagues and patients alike. He also highlighted adversity intelligence (AQ) — the ability to function under intense pressure. Recalling his own experience, Prof. Balagobi said he had witnessed this firsthand during the early days of kidney transplant surgery at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital, where Prof. Thambipillai played a leading role. During a transplant procedure, he explained, once the kidney is removed and the blood vessels are cut, the organ must be cooled within minutes — a critical phase requiring speed, precision, and composure. “It is a moment of immense pressure,” he said. “Having seen him work in such situations, I can say his ability to handle adversity is exceptional.” Prof. Balagobi also mentioned social intelligence (SQ), recalling Prof. Thavam Thambipillai’s inauguration as President of the International College of Surgeons, during which leading figures from across multiple continents gathered. “The respect he commands internationally, and the relationships he maintains, are remarkable,” he said. “People are genuinely fond of him and willing to support him.” Summing up, Prof. Balagobi described Prof. Thavam Thambipillai as a rare individual who combines intellectual ability with emotional depth, resilience, and social awareness. “In that sense,” he said, “he is not only a distinguished surgeon, but also a model for young people, particularly in a post-war society like ours.” ### **A Journey Rooted in Jaffna** ![Prof. Thavam Thambipillai sits on stage during a felicitation ceremony held in his honour in Jaffna on Sunday.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/global-surgeon-honoured-in-jaf-MHdEOc-kixve66al17572q.jpg) Prof. Thavam Thambipillai sits on stage during a felicitation ceremony held in his honour in Jaffna on Sunday. In his address, Prof. Thavam Thambipillai reflected on his own journey, noting that although he was born in Colombo and studied there until the age of 13, he returned to Jaffna after the 1983 violence. “In many ways, the foundation of my education was laid at St. John’s College, Jaffna,” he said. “Having lived on this soil as one among you, I have gone on to work across much of the world, performing surgeries on five continents.” Drawing from his experience, he emphasised that success is not limited to a select few. “It is not just me — anyone can succeed in life if they put their heart and soul into it,” he said. ### **Praising Jaffna’s Medical Community** A central theme of his remarks was the role of the medical sector in the Northern Province. “You who live on this soil are fortunate — blessed — and a major reason for that is our medical community,” he said. He paid tribute to doctors and healthcare workers who served during the war years under severe constraints. “Amid shelling, violence, and immense hardship, with very limited personnel and facilities, they continued to serve the people. We cannot forget that,” he said. He said the situation had since changed significantly, with a growing number of specialists now working in the region. “Today, we have a wide range of medical professionals working tirelessly for the people,” he said, adding that the standard of care now available in Jaffna compares favourably with many parts of the world. He cited facilities such as the Transplant Centre and the Day Surgery Centre at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital as examples of that progress. “These centres are functioning successfully because of the hard work of our medical professionals,” he said. “These are facilities I have not seen in many of the countries where I have worked.” “It is our own doctors who made this possible,” he added. ### **A Message on Responsibility** Prof. Thavam Thambipillai also urged the next generation to focus not only on achievement but on values. “True happiness lies not in what we receive, but in what we give — in sharing our knowledge and resources with others,” he said. He cautioned against criticism that could undermine public trust in essential institutions. “Spreading false allegations about a medical community that serves with such dedication will only demoralise them,” he said. “We are human — we may make mistakes. But if you place a small black dot on a large white sheet, people tend to focus only on the dot, not the vast expanse of white.” The event was attended by Prof. Thambipillai’s parents and elder brother, along with Dr. T. Sathiyamoorthy, Director of the Teaching Hospital Jaffna, and Dr. K. Ketheeswaran, Regional Director of Health Services (RDHS), among others. ### Jaffna Lecturer Killed in Alleged Family Plot Laid to Rest URL: https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/jaffna-lecturer-killed-in-alleged-family-plot-laid-to-rest/ Last updated: 2026-03-28T07:50:08.000Z **JAFFNA, Sri Lanka — March 22, 2026 —** A senior University of Jaffna lecturer killed in an alleged family plot was buried Sunday, as new details from police investigations painted a disturbing picture of the crime. Dr. (Mrs.) Thayalini Thileepan, 54, a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Siddha Medicine, was laid to rest following funeral rites held at her residence in Jaffna. Her 19-year-old daughter, one of the main suspects in the case, was permitted by court order to attend the funeral under police escort. At the cemetery, several Tamil media online outlets reported that M.A. Sumanthiran, acting general secretary of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), urged that no photographs or video recordings be made. *Jaffna Monitor* could not independently verify these claims, as its reporters were not present at the funeral. Some media reports also described Sumanthiran as a family friend of the deceased lecturer. Others reported that he had appeared in court on behalf of the lecturer and requested permission for her daughter to attend the funeral. Sumanthiran, however, strongly denied those claims in a post on his official Facebook page. In the statement, published by an administrator, it said in Tamil: “Mr. Sumanthiran neither sought permission, nor did the court issue such an order. Misreporting court proceedings amounts to contempt of court.” Sumanthiran had earlier also rejected a social media post by a journalist claiming that he had appeared on behalf of the murdered lecturer’s daughter. In a statement posted on his official Facebook page, he strongly denied the claim, saying he had appeared in court on behalf of the victim, not the accused. “Please refrain from spreading false information,” the post said. “Mr. Sumanthiran appeared in court on behalf of the affected University of Jaffna lecturer. Legal action will be taken immediately against those who disseminate false reports.” ### **Killing and Disposal** ![Suvidhiya, daughter of Dr. Thayalini Thileepan, with her legally married husband, Thivakar.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f0/aa/f0aaf7b7-6b61-437a-846a-1a80de683912/content/images/2026/03/jaffna-lecturer-killed-in-alle-Yju1kI-kixny8k95lmypay.jpg) Suvidhiya, daughter of Dr. Thayalini Thileepan, with her legally married husband, Thivakar. Police said the lecturer was killed in the early hours of March 18 at her home in Pandiyantazhvu. According to police sources who spoke to *Jaffna Monitor*, the daughter’s partner allegedly entered the house at night by removing roof tiles and lowering himself inside with a rope. He had reportedly consumed drugs prior to entering the house. Investigators allege that he later woke the daughter and proposed that they resume their relationship. Police sources said the daughter agreed but indicated that her mother would not allow them to reunite. A police source told *Jaffna Monitor* that the suspect, identified as Thivagar, had stated during questioning that the daughter restrained her mother by holding her legs while he strangled her. *Jaffna Monitor* could not independently verify that account. Police sources also said the daughter has denied direct involvement, stating she acted out of fear. Police sources said the body was wrapped in a bedsheet, placed in the victim’s vehicle, and transported to an isolated area in Thanankilappu, where it was dumped. Another police source told *Jaffna Monitor* that the suspects had initially planned to bury the body, but abandoned the attempt after the shovel they were carrying broke. The body was recovered on March 21 following information provided during interrogations. ### **Flight and Arrest** Police said the suspects removed a digital video recorder (DVR) from the house’s CCTV system and discarded it in a water body while fleeing. They also took jewelry from the house and later pawned some items to obtain money, which they used to rent a house in Trincomalee, where they began living together as a couple, police sources said. The suspects travelled across districts in the victim’s vehicle, using her bank card to withdraw cash in Paranthan and to purchase fuel via a QR-based payment system in Trincomalee. The lecturer’s son, himself a lecturer at Rajarata University, reported her missing and provided key digital clues to police, including transaction alerts and QR-based fuel payment records, which helped trace the suspects. Police arrested the daughter and her 21-year-old partner in Trincomalee on Friday and brought them back to Jaffna for further questioning. ### **Background and Motive** Police sources said preliminary investigations suggest the killing may have stemmed from tensions over the daughter’s relationship. According to police, the daughter had entered into a registered marriage with the suspect after turning 18, without her mother’s consent. The relationship reportedly broke down within months, with the daughter returning home and filing for divorce, citing abuse. Despite this, the couple remained in contact through social media, including Instagram, and had discussed reconciliation, police said. Police sources added that the suspect had previously been arrested multiple times in connection with drug-related activities, and toxicology tests indicated drug use, according to investigators. ### _Includes the latest 500 public posts. Use `/sitemap.xml` for the complete archive of public content._